

THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AND THE SUDAN

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THE primary objective of Egypt's policy in the Sudan is to safeguard strategic interests. Its most vital concern by far is the Nile River. The importance of the river as a consideration in Egypt's foreign policy was graphically expressed by an Egyptian army colonel in 1948:

No politician can ignore Egypt's interest in the Sudan. Its permanent and vital interest concerns Egypt's life. Egypt gets its water from the Nile which flows in the heart of the Sudan. The Nile to Egypt is a matter of life or death. If the waters of this river were discontinued or were controlled by a hostile state or a state that could become hostile, Egypt's life is over. Of course, whoever controls the Sudan naturally controls the northern Nile Valley. Egypt in this era of conflicting political doctrines cannot trust the neighbors of the Sudan. Today's friends may become tomorrow's enemies. For this reason, all of Egypt's efforts are to insure for herself a secure life in the coming future.¹

The Sudan is a predominant factor in the formulation of Egypt's African policy. This can be perceived in light of the fact that the decision-making process is, as of this writing, concentrated in the hands of Nāṣir and his fellow officers, most of whom grew up in the era during which the Sudan was a dominant factor in Egypt's national aspirations. Many of them served in the Sudan and some were born there. Also, they are to a large degree strategy oriented, owing to their military backgrounds. Most of them are Staff College graduates and tend to be sensitive more to the strategic rather than to the political considerations in foreign policy. Therefore, it is natural for them to emphasize the Sudan.

Egyptian strategists have dealt in great detail with the importance of the Sudan. The primary consideration is that the Sudan controls the sources of the Nile River. There the branches of the Nile meet to form the so-called Great Nile. The salient point is that "any aggressive power that controls the Nile sources will govern the waters coming north."² Another important strategic consideration is the location of the Sudan. It has "an excellent position" in the heart of the Continent and is "considered a base controlling

1. 'Abd al-Rahmān Zaki, *Al-Sbarq Al-Awṣāt* (The Middle East), (Cairo: The Egyptian Renaissance Bookshop, 1948), pp. 63-64.

2. 'Abd al-Salām Badawī, *al-Taṭawwurāt al-Siwāsiyyah wa al-Iqtisādiyyah Fī al-'Ālam al-'Arabī* (The Political and Economic Development in the Arab World), (Cairo: United Publishers and Distributors, 1959), pp. 262-263.

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the regions surrounding it," and conceivably, it could control the vital lines of communication that run to and from Africa.³ Explaining Egypt's interest in Africa Nāṣir emphasized the location of the Sudan in *The Philosophy of the Revolution*, noting that the Sudan's "boundaries extend to the heart of the Continent where it is bounded by neighbourly relations, being the sensitive center."⁴ There is also the potential of the undeveloped human resources. Utilization of these resources as recruits for his army was one of the factors that motivated Muḥammad 'Alī's conquest of the Sudan in 1820. Therefore, in view of the struggle of the big powers for spheres of influence in Africa and control over the Sudan, Egypt considers it especially vital to keep the Sudan neutral.

Besides the geopolitical factors, there are also economic and commercial considerations influencing Egypt's policy in the Sudan. The underpopulation of the Sudan, its mineral and agricultural richness, and the potential market for Egyptian products have been cited as strategically important for Egypt. These factors are becoming increasingly dominant as Egypt seeks solutions to the problem of overpopulation. When the Census of 1927 made the extent of its population problem apparent, Egypt, for the first time, brought up the question of immigration to the Sudan in negotiations with the British. In 1936, Nāḥas Pasha, Prime Minister then, succeeded in obtaining an agreement with the British for unrestricted immigration. However, no large-scale immigration plan was ever instituted under this agreement.⁵ As Egypt's population has continued to expand rapidly, immigration to the underpopulated Sudan remains a tantalizing possibility.

As Egypt turns increasingly towards industrialization to relieve the pressures of overpopulation, the need to create new outlets for its manufactured products becomes vital. The Sudan, consisting largely of a rural population with little industrialization, presents an excellent consumer market. However, the sale of Egyptian products has been seriously affected by foreign competition. A good illustration of this is the cotton textile industry, on which Egypt heavily depends. A majority of the Sudanese wear cotton goods year round and consequently there is a big demand in the Sudan for cheap cotton goods; but, prior to World War II, the greatest portion of these articles were imported from Japan.⁶ Another example is the sugar industry. Before World War II, sugar was imported from Egypt. After a dispute over prices in 1941, Sudan went elsewhere for its supply. Egypt subsequently regained the Sudanese sugar market. By 1960, cane sugar was Egypt's chief export to the Sudan. In that

3. *Ibid.*

4. Jamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir, *The Philosophy of the Revolution*, (Cairo: National Printing House, [n.d.]), p. 69.

5. Mekki Abbas, *The Sudan Question: The Dispute Over the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium 1884-1951* (London: Faber and Faber Limited, [n.d.]), pp. 91-92.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 93.

year, Egypt exported 44,303 tons of cane sugar to the Sudan at a value of £E. 1,517,031.⁷

There are also political objectives affecting Egypt's policy in the Sudan. Many Egyptian writers emphasize that the Sudan can be the nucleus of the Great State of the Nile Valley. Egypt, united with the Sudan, "will create a great power for the Nile Valley in all respects which will enable her [to gain] sovereignty and real leadership not for the continent alone, but for the whole Middle East group and will give her a very special position in the Afro-Asian bloc."⁸

The above points indicate that Egypt's interests are closely involved in the Sudan. Egypt's policy has always been to influence if not to control that country. This is evident in a study of the policy in practice, which can be divided into three phases: Rationalization of the Policy: 1952-1955; Relations in Crisis: 1956-1958; and Military Rule: 1958-1964.

Rationalization of the Policy: 1952-1955

By the time of the July 1952 Revolution, the doctrine of the unity of the Nile Valley had reached dramatic proportions, climaxing in Egypt's abrogation of the Condominium Agreement in 1951. The immediate goal of the new Egyptian régime was to adjust Egypt's policy toward the Sudan in light of the political realities existing in both countries. However, Egypt's own internal situation made the carrying out of the abrogation through forceful means entirely unfeasible. Also, it was doubtful whether the Sudan, in fact, favored unity. The situation there was already complicated by the multiplicity of parties, some in favor and others opposed to unification, and Egypt's unilateral action served only to create more factions and further undermined her position. The Umma Party, led by Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Mahdī, called for complete independence from both Egypt and the United Kingdom. The Socialist Republican Party, which was composed largely of tribal chiefs, called for independence but with strong ties to Britain, and the unionist parties were the Ashiqqa, the National Front and the Unity of the Nile Valley.

After the Egyptian Revolution, the idea of self-determination for the Sudan was accepted for the first time by the new Egyptian military élite. President Najīb himself was an intimate friend of al-Mahdī, the head of the anti-Egyptian Anṣār, and in October 1952, al-Mahdī arrived in Cairo to discuss the draft constitution for the Sudan proposed by Britain. The reason behind Egypt's change in policy was that the new régime's first goal was to rid both countries of British occupation. Therefore, it was decided that Egypt's interests could best be served with a compromise on the issue. Furthermore, the

7. *Arab Observer* (Cairo), No. 100, May 21, 1962, p. 26.

8. Muḥammad K. 'Abd al-Hamid, *Al-Sharq al-Awsat Fi al-Mayzān al-Istrāṭijī* (The Middle East in the Strategic Balance), (Cairo: The Modern Publishing House [n.d.]), p. 385.

amalgamation of the Sudanese unionist parties that had recently taken place greatly increased the prospect that union could be achieved through popular choice. And even if complete independence were chosen, once Britain evacuated the Sudan, it would be free of foreign influence that could threaten the Nile. Also, once the evacuation was achieved, Egypt could always exercise influence through other means and even force its influence if the necessity should arise.

On November 2, 1952, about four months after the Revolution, the Egyptian government delivered a note to the British government concerning methods and means of Sudan self-determination. Then in order to gain trust and support, Ṣalāḥ Ṣalīm and Dhū al-Fiqār Ṣabrī went to Khartum to discuss plans and on January 10, 1953, the Sudanese parties signed an agreement accepting the following recommendations regarding Egyptian-British negotiations: (1) The Egyptian proposal regarding the maintenance of unity between North and South Sudan; (2) the Egyptian proposal regarding the establishment of a committee to aid the Governor General; (3) the concept of Sudanization, which stipulated that Egyptian and British officials holding posts in the Sudan should be replaced by Sudanese wherever possible; (4) the Egyptian recommendations regarding the elections; and (5) the complete evacuation of foreign armies prior to the elections for the constituent assembly. The agreement was signed by representatives of the Umma Party, the Socialist Republican Party, the National Unionist Party, and the National Party, with Ṣalāḥ Ṣalīm as a witness. And following this development, on February 12th of the same year, Britain and Egypt agreed to accept most of the suggestions incorporated in the Egyptian note of November 2, 1952.

After the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement, Egypt immediately began preparing for the new phase in relations that the Sudan's self-determination would bring about. In April 1953, a decree was issued reorganizing and strengthening the department of the Undersecretary of Sudanese Affairs and two important bureaus were established: the Bureau of Economic Affairs and Public Relations and the Bureau of Cultural and Social Affairs.⁹ The main objective of the Bureau of Economic Affairs and Public Relations was to concentrate on the study of the factors influencing the economic relations between Egypt and the Sudan. For this purpose, the Department of Statistics was established. Other programs were also initiated to achieve the Bureau's purpose. One of its primary duties was to investigate methods to expand the Sudanese market for Egyptian products and to protect these products from foreign competition.

Upon its establishment, the Bureau of Cultural and Social Affairs took over supervision of Sudanese living in Egypt. It helped Sudanese who wanted to travel to Egypt to find jobs and extended aid to the underprivileged in the

9. Republic of Egypt, Armed Forces, *Jumhūriyyat Miṣr Fi 'Āmān al-'Awwal* (The Egyptian Republic in Its First Year), (Cairo: Armed Forces Public Relations Department, 1954), p. 595.

Sudan. Exchanges of visits between cultural and scientific missions of students and teachers were organized and supervised. In addition, the agency supervised Sudanese students in Egypt and organized trips to demonstrate "the scientific, social and economic life of Egypt."

The Sudanese elections took place in November 1953, and resulted in an absolute majority for the pro-Egyptian National Unionist Party. It is apparent that Egypt considered this success to be a guarantee of unity and, in early 1954, she moved rapidly to consolidate relations between the two states. The Egyptian government established religious grammar and high schools in the Sudan, whose graduates would be sent directly to Al-Azhar. Ṣalāḥ Ṣālīm suggested that arrangements be made to facilitate 4,000 Sudanese students in Egyptian summer camps by 1955. In February, he and 'Abd al-Hakīm 'Āmir arrived in the Sudan for a four-day trip. The trip was extended to 25 days and they traveled 10,000 miles through the Sudan promoting Egyptian-Sudanese relations. Also in February, the Minister of Works and a number of Egyptian technical experts arrived in the Sudan to discuss future projects. Emphasizing the importance of the Sudanese question to the Egyptian government, Ṣalāḥ Ṣālīm stated: "The duty of Egypt toward the Sudan . . . was given the first place of priority by the revolution's leadership and the policy of its government and Egypt is ready to do everything in order to reach the goal. . . ."¹⁰

On the occasion of the opening of the Sudanese Parliament, the Egyptian government sent gifts to the Sudan, including a number of arms. Egypt stated that these were sent to celebrate "this happy occasion as a practical token of her love and to strengthen the Sudan . . . by giving its (Egypt's) citizens in the south (Sudan) arms that are sufficient to equip 1,000 Sudanese soldiers and five new training airplanes to train the sons of the south (Sudan) . . . because power is the sign of success in this materialistic age."¹¹

Relations in Crisis: 1956-1958

In May 1955, al-Azharī told Egyptian leaders in Cairo, including Nāṣir, "Unity was no longer contemplated by any of the major Sudanese political parties."¹² Of even greater consequence to Egypt was al-Azharī's threat against its most vital interest. He declared: "The Nile flows through the Sudan first and we can no longer be content to receive our share last."¹³ And several observations can be made as to the causes of this change in attitude. The fear that union with Egypt would precipitate a civil war was most likely a major factor. The Umma Party had effectively demonstrated its ability to mobilize support for its political cause and the clashes this created delayed the opening

10. *al-Abrām* (Cairo), February 13, 1954, p. 11.

11. *al-Abrām* (Cairo), February 17, 1954, p. 1.

12. *New York Times*, June 2, 1955, p. 8.

13. *Ibid.*

of Parliament. Then there were also developments that resulted in a loss by the Egyptian régime of its popularity with the Sudanese public. Muḥammad Najīb's disputes with Nāṣir and his subsequent removal from power had an adverse reaction among the Sudanese because of his personal popularity and Nāṣir also lost the support in the Sudan of the Muslim Brotherhood, the communists and the leftists when he suppressed these groups in Egypt.

In August 1955, Egypt began a radio and press campaign against al-Azharī in an apparent effort to discredit his government among the Sudanese people. On August 11, Radio Cairo announced that al-Azharī refused Ṣalāḥ Ṣālīm's offer to supply the Sudan with Egyptian arms and military advisers and refused an offer to train soldiers and officers. The campaign was heavily directed toward Southern Sudan where it attempted to win support for union with Egypt. The broadcasts accused al-Azharī of discriminating against the South by not accepting Egyptian aid for that less developed region. The Egyptian government claimed that its offer to establish cultural and health projects in the South that would cost Egypt £E. 3,500,000 annually had been refused.¹⁴

By the end of August 1955, it was apparent that there was division within the Egyptian government over the Sudan. Ṣalāḥ Ṣālīm resigned his posts of Minister of National Guidance and Minister of Sudanese Affairs and Nāṣir himself took over the direction of Egypt's Sudanese policy, indicating a definite change in Egypt's program. On the day of Ṣālīm's resignation, the campaign against al-Azharī was dropped, and Egypt's policy toward the Sudan became conciliatory. When the Sudanese Parliament declared independence in December 1955, Egypt was the first country to extend formal recognition and immediately appointed Lt. General Muḥammad Sayf al-Yazāl Khalīfah as Ambassador to the Sudan where he became dean of the diplomatic corps.

The Sudan's emergence into the community of independent nations opened a new phase in Egyptian-Sudanese relations. Of immediate concern to Egypt was to reach agreement over the Nile waters division to facilitate the commencement of the Aswan High Dam project. There were also the traditional strategic and economic interests in the Sudan that Egypt wanted to protect. Since the Sudan's independence, Egypt has aimed at maintaining amicable relations with all Sudanese governments. At times, the policies of the two governments have taken diametrically opposed courses, but even then, Egypt has attempted to assume at the very least a semblance of friendship, utilizing indirect means of influence to bring pressure to bear.

Protection of its interests in the Sudan was one of the causes of the expansion of Egypt's African policy. In January 1956 Nāṣir formed the "Supreme Committee to Supervise African Affairs" to formulate an African policy for Egypt,

14. *al-Abrām* (Cairo), August 13, 1955, p. 6. The offer included the establishment of an institution to train Southern Sudanese in agrarian sciences and the establishment of a hospital. Both institutions would be secular. Egypt claimed that under terms of the agreement it had proposed to pay teachers' salaries and the Sudanese government would have the right to appoint all personnel.

and that the Sudan was an important consideration in the new plan can be gleaned from the fact that the Egyptian Ambassador to the Sudan, the Egyptian Director of Sudanese Irrigation Works, and the Economic Chancellor of the Egyptian Embassy in Khartoum were all members of the committee. Since Africanism became a potent force in Sudanese politics, Egypt also greatly expanded its support to the African national liberation movements and thus by the time of the Sudan's admission to the Arab League in January 1956, Egypt's policy was already being formulated within an Afro-Arab framework. An Egyptian political science textbook states:

... the relationship between the Sudan and Egypt was moved from the African circle to the Arab circle. As a result of this new direction, Egyptian policy toward Africa expanded beyond the belt of the Nile Valley . . . to a wider belt extending to the heart of the African Continent.¹⁵

For its part, the new Sudanese government could not afford to ignore public demands for independence nor open hostility toward Egypt. Therefore, upon receiving independence, all of the Sudanese political leaders affirmed their desire to maintain close ties with Egypt. Al-Azharī declared in the Sudanese Parliament: "The Sudan will always remain the closest, most sincere and fraternal country in its relations with Egypt."¹⁶

Egypt's shift in policy led to the development of cordial relations between the two countries. In April, Egypt made a gift of \$1,500,000 worth of arms to the al-Azharī government and when 'Abdallāh Khalīl, head of the fiercely anti-Egyptian Umma Party, became Premier in July 1956, the mutual accord continued. In its first month in office, Egypt offered Khalīl's government military aid and offered to send two professors from the War Staff College to train Sudanese officers. In addition, the Sudan sent 11 officers and 25 soldiers to be trained in Egyptian military institutions. After his visit with Nāṣir in late July 1956, Khalīl stated that the Sudan had no desire to unite with Egypt. However, he added: "I returned to the Sudan with a new idea. Now I can feel free to put my hand in Egypt's."¹⁷

The Suez crisis intensified the emotional bonds between the Sudanese and Egyptians and in late 1956, Egypt attempted to form a defense alliance with the Sudan and Ethiopia, perhaps hoping to utilize the emotional sentiment aroused by the Suez crisis. It was reported that the Sudanese government had taken the matter under serious consideration and was negotiating with Ethiopia. The Egyptian Ambassador was reportedly given all the details of the meetings and Nāṣir discussed the subject with Khalīl during the latter's visit to Cairo in December 1956.¹⁸ During his visit, Khalīl stated: "Our ties with Egypt

will always remain strong. It is the closest state in the world to us. The policy of our government is close, strong cooperation with Egypt in all vital matters between the two brotherly countries. . . ."¹⁹

Egypt apparently hoped by means of a pact to forestall the threat of American penetration into the Sudan through economic and technical aid. As early as mid-1956, Egyptian newspapers accused America of attempting to replace British hegemony in the Sudan through aid. There was also the threat that Uganda and Ethiopia would attempt to participate in the Nile waters negotiations and in April 1956, the Sudanese government announced that Britain had requested that Uganda be included in the discussions. By establishing a military alliance with Ethiopia, Egypt perhaps hoped to guarantee its cooperation and in late 1957, Ethiopia did attempt to participate in the negotiations.

However, the alliance never materialized, and in February 1957, the Sudan officially requested economic and military assistance from the United States. The *New York Times* noted that "the trend of the Khalīl government is definitely pro-Western and in the Arab League alignment, the government now leans toward Iraq rather than Egypt. The Premier will visit Baghdad . . . as a guest of the Iraqi Premier Nuri El-Said. . . ." There was even talk of the Sudan joining Iraq in an alliance.²⁰

By early 1957, as a result of the Baghdad Pact, the Suez war and other factors, Egypt regarded America as its arch rival in Africa and the Middle East. Thus, the threat of American influence in the Sudan had the same implications as the Baghdad Pact.

Vice President Nixon's visit to the Sudan and Ethiopia in March 1957, "aroused deep anxiety and suspicion in Egypt, where it was seen as a new campaign to isolate Egypt."²¹ The cool reception he received in the Sudan indicated the reservoir of influence that Egypt could still command there.

Egypt also accused America of attempting to threaten Egypt's most vital interest, the Nile, by penetrating and influencing the Nile Valley from its origins. It considered this was the purpose of America's invitations to the Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda and Tanganyika to discuss the possibility of projects on the Nile.²² The great expansion of Egypt's aid to the African liberation movements in 1957 was an apparent attempt to strengthen its bases of influence and nurture anti-Western sentiment in order to hinder the extension of America's influence.

Ismā'īl al-Azharī, perhaps hoping to utilize an upsurge of pro-Egyptian sentiment to return to power, attempted to regain Egypt's confidence. He also

15. Butrus Ghālī and Muhammad K. 'Isā, *Mabādi' al-'Ulūm al-Siyāsiyyah* (Introduction to Political Science), 1st ed., (Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, 1962-63), pp. 566-67.

16. *The Scribe* (Cairo), No. 6 (January, 1956), p. 10.

17. *New York Times*, July 26, 1956, p. 3.

18. *Rose El-Youssief* (Cairo), No. 1497, February 18, 1967, p. 4.

19. *Rose El-Youssief* (Cairo), No. 1449, March 19, 1956, p. 18.

20. *New York Times*, February 19, 1967, p. 1.

21. *New York Times*, April 2, 1957, Section M, p. 4.

22. Political Books Committee, *Ḥaqā'iq wa Waṭṭā'iq* (The Sudan . . . Facts and Documents), pp. 18-19.

boycotted Nixon during his visit to the Sudan, declining a government invitation to greet Nixon at the airport and attend a Palace reception. He declared his support for the creation of a mutual defense pact with Egypt, stating, "We must stand with Egypt in defense." He also declared that the Sudan's foreign policy should be closely linked with Egypt's.

Even during this tense period in Egyptian-Sudanese relations, both countries attempted to maintain a semblance of cordiality. Egypt's campaign was directed against Western influence, not against the government directly. For its part, the Sudanese government was not stable enough to withstand an intense effort by pro-Egyptian and anti-Western factions if they mobilized their efforts. 'Abdallāh Khalīl expressed this when he declared: "I want to develop this country and raise the standard of living of the people. I cannot face intrigue. I cannot fight on two fronts. I have to be on peaceful terms with Egypt."²³

Thus, Egyptian-Sudanese relations were cool but not openly hostile until they reached the crisis point over two issues in 1958: the Sudanese-Egyptian border issue in February 1958, and the Nile waters problem in July-August of the same year. The border dispute arose when the Sudanese government announced the delineation of constituencies for the Sudanese parliamentary elections which were to take place on February 27, 1958, and included areas that Egypt claimed to be Egyptian territory. Egypt complained that a Sudanese delegation was in Cairo working with the Egyptian government on the dispute, when suddenly and without consulting the Egyptian government, the Sudanese government made the conflict public a half hour prior to the last meeting of the two parties and issued a statement on the results of the meeting. Egypt considered that this was an attempt by the Sudanese to create an artificial disturbance in the relations between the two countries. It contended that if the Sudanese government had been serious about the negotiations, it would have waited until after the final meeting, not a half hour prior to the meeting, before issuing a statement.²⁴

On February 20, 1958, the Sudan brought the issue before the UN Security Council and claimed that Egypt was massing troops on the disputed border to intervene and aggress against the Sudan. The pro-Egyptian factions in the Sudan urged the Egyptian government to solve the problem without disturbing the relationship between the two countries. Nāṣir personally promised al-Azharī and al-Marghanī to do this.

On February 21, 1958, the Security Council met to consider the issue. Both the Egyptian and Sudanese representatives expressed their desire that the issue could be negotiated after the Sudanese elections and emphasized each country's desire to maintain friendship with the other. Consequently, the Security Council

23. *New York Times*, February 19, 1957, p. 13.

24. *al-Abrām* (Cairo), February 20, 1958, p. 1.

took no action and ended the meeting. The heated intensity of the border dispute subsequently subsided.

The second problem arose in July 1958, when the Sudanese government opened the Gezira Canal at an earlier date than that provided by the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement. In reply to an Egyptian memorandum regarding the violation, the Sudan declared that it did not recognize the 1929 agreement. Relations between the two states deteriorated as negotiations on the issue failed. In September 1958, it was reported that the Sudanese government banned Sudanese merchants from importing UAR goods and allowed European goods to be imported instead.²⁵ Egyptian newspapers considered that the aims of the Sudanese government were "to isolate the Sudan from its natural atmosphere, the Arab world, and to direct it toward . . . the West and imperialism."²⁶

With the problem of the Nile waters, for the first time since the Sudan's independence, Egypt attempted to intervene directly into the Sudan's internal politics through the National Liberation Party. This party, which was founded in 1958 after the first Sudanese post-independence parliamentary election, called for close cooperation with the National Unionist Party, the Democratic Peoples' Party, the Southern Liberal Party and the Anti-Imperialist Front. The National Liberation Party also claimed to have the support of the religious faction, al-Khalīfah al-Ma'āyishī, whose aim is "the liberation of the Islamic world and its unity."²⁷

In September 1958, the National Liberation Party leaders met in Cairo. One of them declared: "We believe that the only security against the maneuvers of the imperialists are close ties with the UAR and coordination of our relations to the fullest extent."²⁸ The Party called for the problems between Egypt and the Sudan to be resolved in a peaceful and friendly manner, especially the Nile waters dispute, and it condemned the Sudanese government for its attempt to disturb relations between the two countries. The Party also asked for the transformation of the Sudan into a Socialist Democratic Society.

On November 17, 1958, it was reported that Sudanese mediators in Cairo had reached a basis for negotiations over the Nile waters program. Khalīl's postponement of Parliament from November 17 to December 8 was reported to be an attempt to resolve the dispute prior to the legislature's reassembly.²⁹ Khalīl proposed to travel to Cairo to reach a settlement on all issues. The degree to which Egyptian pressure was responsible for bringing about this development can only be conjectured. However, it would seem that Khalīl

25. *Rose El-Youssief* (Cairo), No. 1577, September 1, 1958, p. 5.

26. Ihsān 'Abd al-Quddūs, "Ma'rakat al-Shi'ārāt Fi al-Sudān" (The Battle of Slogans in the Sudan), *Rose El-Youssief* (Cairo), No. 1577, September 1, 1958, p. 6.

27. *Rose El-Youssief* (Cairo), No. 1578, September 8, 1958, p. 10.

28. *Ibid.*

29. *al-Abrām* (Cairo), November 16, p. 1 and November 17, 1958, p. 1. See also *The Times* (London), November 18, 1958, p. 11.

was anxious to reach a settlement prior to the convening of Parliament in order to save his government, which was faced with a united pro-Egyptian front, led by the National Liberation Party. The military coup of November 18, 1958, nevertheless, superseded Khalil's trip.

The Military Rule: 1958-1964

The coup was considered a victory for Egypt. The first statement by the new Prime Minister clearly indicated its desire for friendship with the UAR. "It is my pleasure," said 'Abbūd, "to affirm here that the free independent Sudan will build its relations with all states . . . and the brother Arab states especially, on the basis of respect, sincerity and mutual benefit. With our brother, the UAR, we will work very hard to improve relations, to solve all the unsettled questions between us and to end the created cool relations that have been between the two brother countries."³⁰ And all the leaders of the new régime immediately affirmed the government's goodwill and friendship toward Egypt. The Foreign Minister declared:

We will work on our side to strengthen relations that bind us to the Arab fate, especially the UAR. Our determination, the honesty of our feeling and our belief in solving all the problems between our two countries lets us look at the future of the relationship between our countries with assured optimism.³¹

General 'Abd al-Wahhāb, the Deputy Prime Minister, stated: "Our brothers in Cairo will find out when they negotiate with us that we are a government that is working to solve its problems with its neighbors and brothers. I am optimistic about solving all the problems . . . with the UAR."³² And General 'Abbūd, the leader of the coup, emphasized the desire for friendship with the UAR when he said:

Our policy is to have better relations and cooperation with all states . . . we have a special policy with the Arab states, especially the UAR. The Egyptian region and the Sudan are brothers from old times and the bonds of love between us are strong and continuous.³³

The most striking aspect of the official declarations is the desire to solve all unsettled questions. Of course, the outstanding issue at the time was the Nile waters problem and it may be recalled that Egypt feared the intervention of other states, particularly Ethiopia (a close friend of the United States) and Uganda (a British colony), into the negotiations; but this fear was quietly allayed when Muḥammad Tal'at Farīd, the new Sudanese Minister of Information, said: "The problem of the Nile waters will be solved between the two governments of Cairo and Khartoum only . . . ;"³⁴ and the new government

30. *Khuṭab al-Thawrah* (The Speeches of the Revolution), comp. Republic of the Sudan, the Sudanese Central Information Bureau (Khartoum: Central Bureau of Information [n.d.]), p. 2.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

32. *al-Abrām* (Cairo), November 23, 1958, p. 1.

33. *al-Abrām* (Cairo), November 27, 1958, p. 1.

34. *al-Abrām* (Cairo), November 29, 1958, p. 1.

declared that it welcomed the High Dam; and Nāṣir concurred and expressed his personal pleasure with the new government's desire to solve the unsettled issues and its intention to allow the resumption of Egyptian exports to the Sudan.³⁵

The UAR was the first state to recognize the new Sudanese government. General Farīd declared that the reasons behind the coup were American influence and interference in the internal affairs of the Sudan and the problems between Egypt and the Sudan, especially the Nile waters issue and the stoppage of commercial exchange between the two countries.³⁶ The new régime declared its adherence to the policy of non-alignment and neutrality. Commenting on the government's first full year in office, *al-Abrām* stated: "The aims of the Sudanese revolution are very similar to the aims that were achieved by the 23rd of July revolution for the nation of the UAR . . ."³⁷

In November 1959, Egypt and the Sudan signed the Nile waters agreement. Eight months later, *al-Abrām* reported that both the UAR and the Sudan instructed their delegations to the negotiations to accept all conditions specified by the other country.³⁸ The agreement provides that when the High Dam is completed the Sudan will be entitled to one-third of the total annual flow instead of the one-twelfth share provided under the 1929 agreement. This would provide the Sudan with 18,500,000 cubic meters of water instead of 4,000,000 and Egypt with 55,500,000 compared to the 48,000,000 it had been receiving. It was also agreed that Egypt would pay £E. 15,000,000 to meet the costs of providing homes and lands for the 70,000 Sudanese living in Wadi Halfa who would be displaced and that the two states would share the costs of other Nile projects which would be designed to increase the total annual flow of the Nile.³⁹ The agreement was generally hailed as "a welcome sign that the leaders of both countries are determined to end polemical bickering which has hitherto made nonsense of their fervent protestations of good will . . . negotiations over the Nile."⁴⁰ And UAR Vice President Zakariyā Muḥyā al-Dīn, the head of the Egyptian delegation to the Nile waters negotiations, stated: "We hope that this will pave the road to more agreement to coordinate the two countries in the economic, cultural and military fields."⁴¹ He also discussed the possibility of unifying the cotton policy between the two countries.⁴²

35. *Khuṭab al-Ra'is Jamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir*. (Speeches of President Jamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir), Cairo, National Printing House, [n.d.] v. 2, p. 228.

36. *Rose El-Youssief* (Cairo), No. 1590, December 1, 1958, p. 8.

37. *al-Abrām* (Cairo), November 18, 1959, p. 6, Editorial.

38. *al-Abrām* (Cairo), July 22, 1960, p. 2.

39. *The Scribe* (Cairo), November 30, 1959, pp. 11-12.

40. *The Times* (London), November 9, 1959, p. 11.

41. *al-Abrām* (Cairo), November 21, 1959, p. 4.

42. *Ibid.*

The agreement did in fact mark the beginning of expanded cooperation. Trade, payments and custom dues agreements were signed in 1959. In May 1961, an Egyptian commercial mission arrived in Khartum to explore the possibility of economic and commercial agreements between the two countries,⁴³ and in August of the same year, another group appeared that represented the most productive companies of the UAR. This later mission concluded a half-million dollar agreement of commercial exchange between UAR and Sudanese businesses and established the Arab-Sudanese Petroleum Company. A third UAR commercial probe following closely upon the heels of the second discussed the creation of a commercial fleet to operate between Egypt and the Sudan on the Lake of the High Dam which would transfer 100,000 passengers, 80,000 tons of goods and 60,000 head of cattle between the two countries annually, and in September 1961, the UAR and Sudanese governments were reported to be investigating the possibilities of creating telephone and telegraph communications between the two countries.

There also appeared to be cooperation in foreign policy matters external to both nations. During an eight-day visit to Egypt in July 1961, 'Abbūd declared his adherence to a policy of non-alignment. In the final joint communiqué issued by 'Abbūd and Nāṣir, both parties pledged their full support to the Congo, called for Afro-Asian support for the Congolese people, denounced Israel and French actions in Algeria, and assured increasing cooperation between the two countries.⁴⁴

Two months later, Nāṣir made an 11-day visit to the Sudan to participate in the celebrations of the second anniversary of the revolution. In welcoming Nāṣir, 'Abbūd declared: "The principles that you established the foundations for and are working for in the Arab sphere or the international sphere . . . These principles we adhere to in the Sudan and work for them. . . ."⁴⁵ And on the basis of 'Abbūd's statements, the Sudan's foreign policy appeared to be compatible with the UAR's and he seemed prepared to take action in cooperation with Nāṣir, especially with regard to the Congo crisis. However, the Sudanese government was apparently merely paying lip service to these ideas, perhaps only to mollify Nāṣir, as its actual policy turned out to be quite moderate compared to that of Egypt. The disparity between 'Abbūd's statements to Nāṣir and the Sudan's actual stand was very evident during the Congo crisis. The Sudan regarded the Congo issue as an internal Congolese problem, took a neutral position in supporting the UN action and refused to allow any country to assist the Congo through Sudanese territory.⁴⁶

43. *al-Ra'y al-'Amm* (Khartum), August 18, 1961, p. 1.

44. *al-Abrām* (Cairo), July 29, 1960, p. 11.

45. *al-Abrām* (Cairo), November 16, 1960, p. 1.

46. *al-Ra'y al-'Amm* (Khartum), February 1, 1961, p. 1.

The Congo issue, the Sudan's identification with the Monrovia group rather than the rival Casablanca group, and the continued acceptance of large-scale American aid and technical assistance (which amounted to \$82,000,000 between 1958 and 1964) resulted in a cooling of UAR-Sudanese relations.

By the end of 1964, anti-government demonstrations against 'Abbūd's régime created an internal crisis in the Sudan. A general strike called on October 24 virtually immobilized the government. Cairo informants reported scores killed and hundreds injured during the riots. In an attempt to quell the civil unrest, 'Abbūd dissolved the ruling Armed Forces Supreme Council and Cabinet. Beirut newspapers reported that 'Abbūd took this action upon an ultimatum issued by a group of "Free Officers." A transitional government was formed preparatory to the drafting of a constitution; but the unrest continued. In mid-November, 'Abbūd was forced out. The UAR immediately recognized the new Sudanese government. Egypt considered it to be an ally and Cairo news media describing the attitude of the new régime declared: "The Sudanese National Government, which assumed power last October, has been eager to dissolve all differences between the Sudan and the Egyptian people, and to consolidate the age-long ties which bind them together."⁴⁷ The Sudanese government affirmed its friendship with the UAR and Dr. Mubārak Shaddād, Chairman of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council, in a statement broadcast from Radio Omdurman, stated: "The friendship of the two peoples and the two countries grows stronger every day, and the will to live happy and dignified lives has made our two countries an invincible wall against colonialism."⁴⁸

On January 6, 1965, the new Sudanese Prime Minister, Sir al-Khatm Khalīfah, visited Nāṣir in Cairo. Then in the late part of January 1965, an economic delegation headed by the Minister of Economics and Foreign Trade and including the Minister of Communications and twelve other members traveled to the Sudan to negotiate and solve all questions between the two countries and "lay the strong foundation . . . for the continuation and growth of economic and commercial exchange between the two countries . . ." and new commercial agreements were discussed.⁴⁹

As has been observed, the securing of economic and technical cooperation has been a dominant factor of Egypt's policy in the Sudan. With each successive Sudanese government, Egypt has immediately sent economic and technical missions to the Sudan. The table below reflects a significant correlation between commercial activities and the political relations between the two countries.

Egypt has been able to establish indirect means of influence through cultural instruments such as sending teachers to the Sudan, establishing educational institutions there and accepting Sudanese students in Egyptian institutions. There

47. *Arab Observer* (Cairo), No. 239, January 18, 1965, p. 10.

48. *Ibid.*

49. *al-Jumhūriyya* (Cairo), January 25, 1965, p. 6.

Value of UAR Trade with the Sudan (in £E.)⁵⁰

Year	UAR Exports	UAR Imports	Balance of Trade
1938	1,108,805	818,050	+ 290,755
1951	4,264,746	3,019,323	+1,245,423
1952	5,055,356	3,451,967	+1,603,389
1953	5,207,942	2,176,736	+3,031,206
1954	5,584,299	3,105,721	+2,478,578
1955	7,616,108	4,334,714	+3,281,384
1956	9,364,928	4,679,028	+4,685,900
1957	7,510,698	4,907,578	+2,603,120
1958	5,652,885	2,733,041	+2,919,844
1959	5,602,445	1,896,249	+3,806,196
1960	4,807,902	2,495,604	+2,312,298
1963	3,136,261	2,948,580	+ 187,681
1964	4,634,262	1,295,591	+3,338,671

was a steady increase in the number of Egyptian teachers in the Sudan from 307 in 1953-54⁵¹ to 645 in 1959-60.⁵² Egypt has also established a system of grammar and high schools in the Sudan. In 1963 there were 20 Egyptian schools, plus a popular university and a branch of Cairo University in Khartoum.⁵³ Exact figures on the number of Sudanese students in Egypt are difficult to find. In 1955, there were 3,721 Sudanese students in Egypt studying at all levels of education.⁵⁴ In 1960, there were 1,205 Sudanese students supported by Egyptian government scholarships in Egyptian universities, higher institutions and Al-Azhar.⁵⁵ And as there has been a steady acceleration in the total number of foreign students appearing in Egypt, it may be assumed that the number from the Sudan has also steadily increased.

It is apparent in this brief overview of Egyptian-Sudanese relations that where early protestations of friendship from both sides have marked the ascension to power of each Sudanese government, tense relations have existed by the time of its demise. Since Egyptian-Sudanese relations are dependent upon the internal political developments within each country, any long-time prognostication must remain a matter of sheer speculation so long as their political systems are so unstable. However, the Sudan's importance to Egypt's security and livelihood will likely remain the main consideration in Egyptian policy formulation.

50. Figures for 1938 to 1960 derived from the *Arab Observer* (Cairo), No. 100, May 21, 1962, p. 26; 1963 and 1964 figures derived from *al-Abrām* (The Brotherly Sudan: A Special Issue of *al-Abrām*), February 15, 1964, p. 26.

51. Abdah, *Misr wa Ifriqiya Fi al-'Asr al-Hadith* (Egypt and Africa in Modern Times), p. 96.

52. United Arab Republic, *Al-Kitāb Al-Sanawī*, 1960 (The Yearbook), p. 647.

53. United Arab Republic, *al-Ta'lim al-'Alī Fi al-'Amm al-Hādī 'Ashar Li Thawra* (Higher Education in the Eleventh Year of the Revolution), p. 19.

54. Abi Elfarah, I. E. Baddour, *Egyptian-Sudanese Relations: A Chronological and Analytical Study*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960, p. 187.

55. Republic of the Sudan, Ministry of Education, *al-Ta'lim al-'Alī Fi al-'Abd al-Watani* (Education in the National Period), (Khartoum, Ministry of Education: 1960), Appendix.

THE CHANGING CLASS STRUCTURE
IN LEBANON

Fuad I. Khuri

IT IS still inappropriate to use the concept of class to study social structure in Lebanon, the more so if this study involves power structure. Not that the Lebanese, as groups, lack class consciousness, but they have been unable to translate their consciousness into collective, organized power. Family and sect interests, not class interests, dictate the course of political rivalry.¹

Class differences do exist: either in the sense that a community as a whole is ranked higher or lower than another, as when the Christians are reputed to be richer than Muslims, or villagers poorer than city dwellers, or that each community is internally stratified into graded classes, called *ṭabaqāt*. The classes of one community overlap with those of other communities—that is, membership in a class extends across the boundaries of ethnic-religious groups.² To understand class in Lebanon, therefore, it is necessary to realize two points: first, that class is a group of people with distinct ways of life; second, that this grouping is not based strictly on ethnic-religious or rural-urban differences. Where ethnic-religious or rural-urban differences produce a class, they do so only in conjunction with differences in income, occupation, education and social power. Today, the class structure in Lebanon does not conform to the simple division of minority versus majority or village versus city. Just as the ruling élites, the upper class, for example, are the product of city tradition and of village tradition, the village peasants, or *fallāḥīn*, migrate to cities and become fused with the urban lower classes.

In this paper, I intend to discuss (1) some of the general factors that have changed the class structure in Lebanon, (2) the meaning of class and the number of classes evolved, (3) the distinguishing features of each class and mobility between classes and (4) the reasons for the lack of antagonism

1. The lack of class conflict in Lebanon and in the Middle East in general has led some Middle Eastern sociologists either to use the term "class" apologetically as Van Nieuwenhuijze does (1965: 2), in studying the Middle East, or to exaggerate the peasant character of the area, for peasantry lacks class struggle. For further information on peasantry and class struggle, see Mehmet Beqiraj (1966: 42-43) and Karl Marx (1957: 109).

2. See E. T. Prothro for his description of a small sample of lower and middle class families (1961: 39-40). See also C. W. Churchill (1954) and D. Yaukey (1961: 33-43), both of whom incorporated in the same class people of different ethnic-religious background.

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