

PART TWO

DISCUSSION

The data on the West Bank, compiled in this study, strongly suggests that the processes set in motion in 1967 have created social, economic and political interactions between Israel and the West Bank which have assumed by 1982 a quasi-permanent character.

The data further suggests that without serious intervention the processes of integration of the West Bank into the Israeli system will gather momentum, reaching soon the point of no return. The effective annexation of the West Bank has very nearly been completed and only through tremendous efforts can the trend be reversed, and "the egg unscrambled."

The working hypothesis offered here is that realities, fifteen years after the Israeli occupation, have already created in Palestine (Israel and the occupied territories) a de facto integrated social system. This system is characterized by a dual, polarized or deeply divided society. Admittedly, a society based on coercion and economic interdependence and not a coherent society (Burton, 1979; 44-45) but with strong functional transactions across sectarian divides.

The definition of group relations as a polarized society leads to a further hypothesis, concerning the nature of group conflict in Palestine. It is suggested that the conflict in Palestine is internally generated. The scientific literature clearly distinguished between "internal" and "external" conflicts. The externally generated conflicts stem from the activity of external powers, mainly bordering countries which incite ethnic groups in their neighboring country, in order to achieve political objectives--mostly

to take over territories. These conflicts are political in nature and do not contain fundamental psychological and social elements. They are terminated when the external powers decide to inflame them no longer. The core of internal conflicts, on the other hand, are the points of friction which are inherent to inter-group relations. The fundamental causes of internally-generated conflicts are: a close proximity on one territory, a different cultural and social background, a high level of political cohesiveness, and conflicting political aspirations. Ethnic groups struggle for control over a territory, or for liberation from the other group's rule. These conflicts can exceed territorial boundaries, yet their focus is set in the internal ethnic polarization. They are multi-faceted and contain social, economic, cultural and psychological elements, as well as political. There may be theoretical objections to the use of the term society for Israelis and Palestinians under occupation, but the main objection is political. The term seems to grant legitimacy and permanence to a temporary set-up. It is assumed that occupation is by definition temporary, and that the present ties between Israel and the occupied territories will alter radically with the removal of military government and the signing of a peace treaty.

Politicians and social scientists refrain from analyzing the conflict as internally generated, and Palestine (Israel and the occupied territories) as an integrated social system.

Recent studies of Jewish-Arab group relations concentrate only on pre-1967 Israel and mention the West Bank and Gaza only in passing. The reason is apparently that an assumption of the permanent nature of group relations in Palestine would be interpreted as a political statement indicating agreement to permanent Israeli domination. But there is another reason:

To admit that the conflict is internally generated amounts to admitting that there is no simple solution to it, and perhaps that an "ultimate solution" simply does not exist. All these objections are valid, and as long as there is a chance that present processes would be reversed, the suggested hypotheses seem to be over-pessimistic, fatalistic, and extreme.

However, our hypotheses serve merely as tools to describe social and political realities. They seem to supply a more accurate approximation of reality than those assuming totally separated societies, with superficial and temporary interactions and an externally generated conflict. Such assumptions would ignore or fail to explain the social, economic and political conditions in Palestine in the mid-Eighties. They would also underestimate the difficulties involved in a possible reversal of the ongoing integrative processes. Furthermore, separate social entities and externally generated conflict hypotheses are based on a hidden assumption--namely, that the conflict began in 1967, and involves mainly political and military issues.

Our working hypotheses are supported not only by the data on the realities in the West Bank but also by the study of the perceptions of the partisans to the Israel-Palestinian conflict.

EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL CONFLICT PERCEPTIONS

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the controversial literature on the Palestine conflict is the almost universal perception of the problem as externally generated and the symmetrical exclusionary attitude, employed by both sides.

Palestinian writings view the Zionist enterprise as a white-settler colony, therefore an externally manipulated, non-viable artificial society which is bound to disappear. "The Palestinian people," says Said (1980; 95), "always opposed a general policy on general principles: Zionism, they

said, was foreign colonialism--and it was doomed to die of its various theoretical weaknesses. They have not understood the Zionist challenge as a policy of detail, of institutions, of organization." In other words, the Palestinians did not perceive the Zionists as a formidable, viable and independent force. They underestimated the Zionists until it was too late. The Zionists for their part ignored the Palestinians and later perceived them as a dependent, non-cohesive "Arab population" whose affinity is to the "Arab world." The Palestinians were perceived as an external constraint, an objective obstacle on the road to Jewish statehood.

The establishment of the British Mandate in Palestine "confirmed" Palestinian perceptions of Zionism. The new regime was committed by its mandate to "putting into effect the Balfour Declaration and to establishing a Jewish agency" which would include "all the Jews" the world over. The Arabs directed their struggle therefore more against the British government than against the Jewish "Yishuv." The Zionists, on their part, were "confirmed" in their own perceptions of the Palestinians by Palestinian divisiveness, rivalries and organizational confusion, culminating in the intervention of the Arab states who took over the Palestinian cause in the mid-Thirties.

The nature of Jewish-Palestinian relations under the British Mandate reinforced the mutual exclusionary attitude. The colonial administration facilitated almost total political separation. Both sides tried to persuade or to force the government to assist them against the other, and used the British officials as mediators. There was almost no need to directly relate to one another, even on the operative level, let alone to alter the fundamental perceptions.

A. After 1948

The 1948 war and its aftermath reinforced the perception of the Palestine case as an externally generated conflict. The

exodus of hundreds of thousands of Arabs from the area under Israeli control made Israel almost an ethnically homogeneous society. The Israelis, faced with the enormous problem of absorbing mass Jewish immigration, ignored the remaining Arab population and considered their state a "homogeneous Jewish nation-state." The emerging reality of a sizeable (13 percent of the total population) Arab minority did not alter the basic perception of the Arabs as an external element, outside Israeli society. Many sociologists dealing with Israeli social stratification considered the Arab-Jewish division first and foremost a political problem and only secondarily a social or educational one. The official attitude toward the Arab minority in the context of the overall Israeli-Arab conflict viewed them as a non-assimilating alien group at best, a potential "security risk" or "fifth column" at worst (Lustick, 1978). The incorporation of the non-occupied parts of Palestine by the neighboring countries "confirmed" the Israeli view that the Palestinians were not an independent subject, but rather an object under full control of the Arab states. The Palestine question, the Israelis felt, had been eliminated by the disappearance of the Palestinians who became "refugees" or "infiltrators." The conflict became an "Israeli-Arab conflict" between sovereign states, i.e., externally generated.

The Palestinian and Arab view of the "Zionist entity" as a neo-colonial stronghold relying for its sheer survival on imperialist power, was as strong as ever. The Arabs, says Harkabi (1974; 11), "kept stressing that the Palestinian problem was a pan-Arab problem. To view it in the narrow framework of Palestinians versus Israel was stigmatized as anti-nationalist." Accordingly, Palestinian activities put all their energies into supporting pan-Arab anti-imperialist movements, of the Nasserite or Ba'athist types, because these matched their own perceptions of the Israeli question as an externally generated problem.

B. Post 1967

The 1967 war and its aftermath opened a new phase in Israeli-Palestinian perceptions of their mutual problem. Both sides began to realize that as much as their perceptions of the conflict as externally generated were justified in the past, they were not valid any more. They realized that solving the problem by physically or conceptually eliminating the other side was no longer tenable. "Two things are certain," says Said (1980; 235), "the Jews of Israel will remain; the Palestinians will also remain." The Palestinians had released themselves from the tutelage of the Arab states, becoming an independent political and military power, and they were recognized internationally as a distinct national group. The Israelis maintained their fundamental perceptions, insisted on calling them the "Arab population of Eretz Israel," refused to treat them as an independent power, termed them "terrorists" and tried to look for political "solutions" in the old context of an Arab--or more specifically--A Jordanian option. However, the difficulties of governing close to two million Palestinians brought home the notion that the problem would not go away. The Israelis could no longer ignore the reality of a strong, cohesive and proud Palestinian community.

The Palestinians' image of Israel as a neo-colonial entity, their objective to eliminate the "Zionist-racist" regime, had not altered. But they could no longer underestimate the power that occupied all of Palestine and had defeated all its neighboring countries. Survival under occupation and direct ties with Israeli political, economic and social realities convinced the Palestinians that the "Jews" were here to stay. For the first time the two communities had to relate directly to each other without intermediaries. Both began to realize that their problem was a mutual one. It was difficult for them to conceptualize it, but on the operative level they sensed the only relevant fact that had to be faced:

a hundred years after the beginning of Zionist colonization and the emergence of a Palestinian national awareness, two communities were firmly entrenched on the soil of Palestine. These communities are by now indigenous, permanently settled, and intermingled.

All logical conclusions from the newly-perceived reality were lost on the Israelis and the Palestinians. The process of internalizing the Palestine question did not help solve it. It only defined more clearly its contours and changed its center of gravity. In fact, the recognition of the other side as a formidable adversary produced a deadly "zero sum game" which further exacerbated the intense conflict. By now both sides knew that the conflict could not be resolved by force or coercion. But being prisoners of their fundamental perceptions of mutual exclusion, they are unable to formulate realistic policies. Consequently, they are caught in a vicious circle of violence and counter-violence.

The latest round in this deadly cycle of violence has been the 1982 Lebanese war, termed "the second Israeli-Palestinian war" (1948 being the first). Many versions were offered to explain its objectives. However, perhaps the most authentic one is the Israeli Chief of Staff's statement that "It is a war for Eretz Israel." Menahem Begin's clear intention has been to eliminate the Palestinian external power base and quasi-sovereign status. In order to achieve his objectives he was ready to wage a ruthless war. The disciple of Jabotinsky was never torn by an ambivalent attitude towards the Palestinians. The stream of Zionism represented by Begin has always perceived the conflict as "internally generated," between two movements whose aspirations could never be bridged. Due to their strong belief in the moral superiority of their national aspirations, Jabotinsky and Begin did not hesitate to define the conflict as a "Zero Sum Game," to be decided by the "just" victory of one side. They perceive the take-over

of all of Western Palestine as the fulfillment of the Zionist dream and the perpetuation of the internal conflict between Jews and Arabs as an acceptable consequence. They view the permanent subjugation of two million Arabs as an inevitable by-product of their victory, and the endemic nature of the inter-communal conflict as a reasonable price to be paid for the "liberation of the land." Their solution to the internal conflict is defined by Begin's Autonomy Plan ("for the inhabitants, not for the territory"). They do not hesitate to use coercive measures, which they considered to be justified. External solutions, such as a "Jordanian option," let alone a Palestinian state is anathema to them. On the other hand, their perception of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as internal made Menahem Begin pay a heavy price for the elimination of the external conflict with Egypt.

The Israel opposition represented by the Labor Party has always been torn by unresolved contradictions between their nationalist and socialist-humanist-universalist ideals. Their perception of the conflict as external prevailed in Zionism, during the pre-state period and until 1977 (see above). The inherent contradiction still prevents them from perceiving the multi-faceted nature of the conflict in the Eighties. Were they to accept the conflict as internally generated, they would be further torn between their national objective of "reclaiming the land" and the inevitable consequence, which they abhor, of subjugating the people living on it. In their distress they look for external Jordanian options, or believe that the Palestinians are willing to accept a territorial compromise which will turn Palestine into two separate units (see below). Their unresolved internal contradiction is also expressed in the confused and contradictory positions taken during the 1982 Lebanese war. The Labor Party is opposed to the total-annexation policies of the Likud government, but at the same time they support annexation of almost 40% of the

West Bank area and settlements in "security zones." They convince themselves that the "remaining" West Bank territory is enough to allow for an external, Jordanian solution. The Likud government exploits the ambivalence of the opposition to continue with the unrestricted integration processes.

The Israeli-Palestinian military confrontation in Lebanon has diverted the attention from the real battleground between the parties, namely the West Bank. President Reagan's initiative helped re-focus the attention to the main issue and the crucial battle. This battle is not a military confrontation but a typical majority-minority struggle, involving efforts by the stronger majority to take over land and dominate the minority, and attempts by the minority to resist domination and to "hold out." Majority violence takes the form of coercive measures, while minority violence takes the form of acts of terrorism and violent demonstrations. Both sides take the dialogue of violence seriously, but the superior power of the Israelis has clearly affected profound changes in the occupied territories and, as a consequence, not only internalized the conflict, but perhaps perpetuated it. ✓

Based on the polarized society and the internally generated conflict hypotheses, we wish now to use several models of internally-generated conflicts and describe through them some aspects of the realities in the West Bank and the motivations behind the actions of Israelis and Palestinians. These models are derived from analytical frameworks developed to interpret the Northern Irish Conflict (Lijphant, 1975; Whythe, 1978).

1. Binational Conflict, or the "Two Nation" Model

The earlier discussion of the Palestinian conflict points to the dominance of the national cleavage. However, some clarifications of national perceptions, national objectives and group perceptions of their adversary and of the nature of national conflict seem in order.

Both Israelis and Palestinians are distinct national groups by way of feeling that "their unique qualities require that a separate nation exists" in Palestine. But they also perceive themselves as an integral part of larger national entities that reside outside of Palestine.

The Israelis view themselves as an integral part of the world Jewish community, and the State of Israel as a homeland for every Jew. The Law of Return (Moore, 1977; 991) specifies that "every Jew has the right to immigrate to this country (para. 1); "an immigration visa shall be given to every Jew who has expressed his desire to settle in Israel" (para. 2(b)). There exist a number of overlapping identities, such as "Jewish" as a religious identity; "Jewish" as a national identity; "Zionist" as a pioneer immigrant; "Zionist" as a passive supporter of Israel; "Israeli" as a citizen of Israel; and "Israeli" as synonymous with the term "Jewish". Among Diaspora Jews there exists a conflict between their loyalty to Israel and their country of citizenship. There is a degree of confusion as to the uniformity of Jewish national identification, although since the creation of the State of Israel, Zionist and non-Zionist Jewish ideological debates on national and religious identity had ceased. The perception of Israel as a land that belongs to "all the Jews," not only to its citizens, and the ideology of the "ingathering of exiles" intensify the national conflict because it "confirms" Palestinian perceptions of Zionism as an "expansionist" movement.

Palestinian national identification fluctuates between Pan-Arabism and regionalism. In the early stages of their national movement, Palestinians saw themselves as "South Syrians" and believed in the unity of "Greater Syria." Pan-Arabist identity remained strong up to 1967 and afterwards, but diminished with the disillusionment with the Arab states after the Six-Day War. The establishment of a separate political entity in Palestine (the British Mandate) changed

the Palestinian orientation and strengthened identification with a specific Palestinian-Arab patriotism (Wataniya). The sense of national unity had always been weakened by strong local-regional patriotism. Rivalry between Jerusalemites, Hebronites, Gazans, and Galileans had impaired the attempts at creating uniformity of group identification. The 1948 war had created two new "identities," the Israeli-Arab and the Hashemite. The 1967 war and the occupation had reinforced the feeling of Palestinian national identification as the strongest source of identity. The ultimate objective of the Palestinian national movement remained unaltered ever since they abandoned their "South Syrian" orientation in 1920. It is the creation of a Palestinian-Arab sovereign state in the territory of the British Mandate, which is considered "one integral territorial unit" and "an integral part of the great Arab homeland" (Porath, 1974; Palestine National Covenant, passim). The ultimate objective remained unchanged after 1948. Some Palestinians supported the union with Jordan, but even the act of union was phrased so that it would not contradict the fundamental position: "This unity shall in no way be connected with the final settlement of Palestine's just cause, within the framework of national hopes, Arab cooperation and international justice" (Whiteman, 1963; 116-18). During the 1970s, a new concept,--"the democratic, non-sectarian Palestine"--was coined (Moore, 1977; 798) but its purpose was mainly as a propaganda device.

A more serious development in PLO political thinking had occurred in 1974, when it began to grapple with the idea of a "mini-state" in the West Bank and Gaza. After a heated debate between the central Fatah faction and the rejectionist faction, an agreed plan of action emerged. The PLO agreed that the first priority in the Palestinian struggle was the attainment of a Palestinian state in the occupied territory as an interim phase on the road to the establishment of a

Palestinian state in the whole of Palestine. In Tripoli (December 1977) they unanimously declared:

"We shall persevere in realizing the rights of the Palestinian people to the return, and self-determination in the context of an independent national Palestinian state in any part of Palestinian soil, as an interim objective, with no compromise, recognition, or negotiation" (Journal of Palestine Studies 7 (3), Spring, 1978, p. 188, quoted by Matti Steinberg in "The Palestine Problem," Van Leer Jerusalem Symposium, 1982; 158).

There remain substantial differences as to what political price should be paid (in terms of interim arrangements, negotiations through third parties, etc.) for achieving the mini-state, but there is unanimity on the final objective. It is defined (1977) by three elements: the right of return (to all Palestine), self-determination and the establishment of an independent national state on their national soil. The change is therefore tactical. "In the past the PLO considered that a settlement, even minimal, cannot be reconciled with the ultimate objective. Now they suppose that such a settlement can serve as a detour leading to the ultimate objective" (Steinberg; 170). The emphasis is on a settlement that will not force them to deal directly with Israel, nor recognize it. The "mini-state" is perceived as a base that will be used against Israel and Jordan.

Until the mid-1940s, the Zionist Movement refrained from officially defining its ultimate national objectives, except by the general formula of the transformation of Palestine (Eretz Israel) into an independent entity with an overwhelming Jewish majority. It concentrated on formulating intermediate political objectives. These objectives (in chronological order) were: National home, unrestricted

immigration and the creation of a Jewish majority; "organic Zionism," i.e., settlement, an independent Jewish economic sector, power-sharing with the Arabs (irrespective of size of population); bi-national state; federation of Jewish-Arab cantons; partition; a "commonwealth;" Jewish state. The ultimate objective of all national movements, i.e., the creation of a sovereign Jewish state, was implied in Zionist self-identification as a national liberation movement. But the arguments over the merits of emphasizing that ultimate objective continued throughout the history of the Zionist Movement.

The territorial objectives of the Zionist Movement were also ambiguous. The agreement to the partition of Palestine was accepted as a phase in the realization of Zionist aspirations, but also (by some) as a fundamental compromise with the Palestinian national movement.

The creation of the State of Israel and the mass immigration that followed were perceived as the full realization of Zionist political objectives and Israel was ready to accept the armistice lines as permanent boundaries. But the 1967 war, and the rapid change in the perception of war aims, showed that Zionism's acceptance of the partition had indeed been only a phase in the realization of its objectives. The war aims were changed from those of "a defensive war" to a "war of liberation." The definition of the occupied areas was also changed from the "occupied West Bank" to "administrated Judea and Samaria" and then simply to "Judea and Samaria." The principle adopted during the War of Independence was that the "area of jurisdiction and authority" of the Israeli government will extend to all areas held by the Israeli army (Ordinance, 26.9.1948). This principle was not implemented after 1967 in form, but definitely was in spirit. "Zionist action" and Zionist ideology of colonization continued in the occupied area as if it had been a direct continuation of

the pre-state period. In fact, most leading Israeli statesmen who dealt with post-1967 national policies took part in pre- and post-1948 major political decisions. Most of them perceived their actions after 1967 as a direct continuation of their actions in 1948, despite a gap of 19 years. Brecher (1947; 35-47) shows that as crucial a decision as the annexation of East Jerusalem was a tactical decision, the "consummation" of the "initial high-policy decision to assert Israel's overall claim to the city" taken in 1949.

Although there is an overwhelming consensus on these national objectives, groups of Israeli Zionists consider the 1948 partition and the establishment of the state as the realization of Zionist objectives and view the continuation of settlements as "creeping annexation" and "colonial expansion." These groups are a minority in Israel. Larger groups oppose unrestricted settlement and policies of formal annexation, but their opposition is based on expediency (refusal to absorb large Arab populations) and not on principle. They share the view of "settlement in empty areas" as a legitimate Zionist action. Thus, we may conclude that the Palestine case can be described as a bi-national conflict, namely, a clash between groups whose objectives are to attain exclusive national sovereignty over a contested territory which both claim as their homeland.

This bi-national conflict is unique because both sides refuse to view their adversary as a legitimate national group and to define the conflict as bi-national. The Israelis see the Palestinians as a cultural, religious, or ethnic group, provoked by corrupt and fanatic leaders to kill and rob Jews. "We will never consider a movement which murders and robs, and which is full of religious and national fanaticism, as a national liberation movement" (Berl Katznelson). In Ben-Gurion's words: "I would not say 'two nations;' I have said that the Jewish nation is not (1936) in the country and

I do not recognize the Arabs (of Palestine) as a nation."

Katz (1973; 114) asserts:

"There was never a Palestinian Arab nation-- to the Arab people as a whole, no such entity existed--those few who lived within its bounds may have had an affinity for their village--for their clan-- they were not conscious of any relationship to a land."

Palestinian perceptions of Zionism are symmetrical:

"The claim of historical or spiritual links of the Jew to Palestine is not in accordance with historical facts--Judaism, being a religion, is not an independent nationality with an identity of its own; Jews are also not one people but citizens of the country in which they reside." (Palestine National Covenant, para. 20).

There are no Israelis, claims "Fatah" (Moore, 1977; 798):

"The majority of Jews in Palestine are Arab-Jews, euphemistically called 'oriental' Jews by the Zionists. Therefore Palestine combines Jewish, Christian, and Moslem Arabs, as well as Non-Arab Jews (Western Jews).

"Religious and ethnic lines clearly cross in Palestine so as to make the term bi-national and Arab-Jewish dichotomy meaningless or at best dubious."

Zionism is not a national liberation movement, claim the Palestinians, but a white-settler, racist philosophy. That perception of mutual denial and refusal to view the symmetrical position makes the Palestine case an extremely intense bi-national conflict.

2. Plural Society

The interpretation of the conflict in sociological terms emphasizes the inter-ethnic tension in relation to the political factors. "Pluralism" defines inter-group relations in multi-ethnic societies. These relations are characterized by cultural segregation, structural segmentation, spatial separation, unequal distribution of resources, asymmetric economic dependence, absolute political control of one ethnic group, and a tendency to instability and violence.

Israel (and the occupied territories) in the 1980s possesses one major pluralistic cleavage on core-cultural or nationalistic lines. It is a division separating Israeli Jews from Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Arabs. Israeli social structure can be defined as a de facto dual society. Both Jewish and Palestinian societies are "normal" in the sense that they are divided into sub-cultural divisions and possess separate social stratification. There is little interaction between them except that Israeli Arabs, to a larger degree, and Jerusalem Arabs, to a lesser degree, interact more with the Jewish society than the majority of Palestinians.

The present polarized society emerged historically from the dual social structure of Mandatory Palestine (Horowitz & Lissak, 1979).

The Zionist Movement, whose motivation was ideological and whose objective was to create a new society in Palestine, had built a separate Jewish society, with little or no interaction with the existing and developing Palestinian society. The separation was ecological (creation of homogeneous Jewish settlements and cities), cultural (revival of the Hebrew language, Hebrew schools, Hebrew University), economic (separate economic sector), psychological (ignoring the Palestinians; see below), political (separate political system, trade unions), and military (underground army). The amazing success was due to a large extent to Palestinian policies and

actions aiming at disrupting Arab interaction with the Jews. The breaking point was reached as a result of the Arab Revolt (1936-39). At that time, a dual society existed. Its components were separately stratified, with completely separated systems, functioning side by side. They were equally ranked under the British colonial bureaucracy.

The 1948 war destroyed Palestinian society, and left in Israel the most backward elements of that society, without its elites, and lacking any social or economic cohesion. The policies adopted by the Israeli government towards the Arab minority were geared to maintain ecological, cultural and social separation, to fight cohesive processes by forced segmentation (Druze, Christian villages, townfolk), economic dependence and cooptation of "positive elements." Israeli Arab society never gained independence, and remained a subordinate group, outside the pale of Israeli society (Lustick, 1980; passim).

In the area occupied by Jordan, the Hashemites employed the same policies of segmentation, economic interdependence and cooptation as the Israelis, aiming at the destruction of independent Palestinian society and its incorporation into Jordan. But their efforts were not successful and the Israelis found after the 1967 occupation a cohesive Arab society, with weakened but still powerful elites and with considerable economic viability. Recognizing the difference between Israeli Arabs and West Bankers, the Israelis did not employ (until very recently) policies of segmentation and cooptation. They accepted as given the existence of a Palestinian society in the territories and began a dialogue with its elite.

Mr. Begin's "Autonomy Plan" testifies to Israel's acceptance of a Palestinian independent social system as a permanent feature. Thus, the old mandatory dual society structure had been recreated, but with a fundamental difference:

Instead of equally ranked social systems, a superordinate-subordinate status hierarchy had been created. This polarized society was kept together by coercion and economic interdependence. The political, economic and social inequalities are explained away by the status of military occupation. But that status does not fall upon Israeli settlers or on Israeli interests in the occupied territories. This separate--but unequal principle is employed in all sectors: ecological (creation of Jewish neighborhoods, settlement regions, towns, separate infrastructure in the West Bank); cultural; economic (West Bank as a source of unskilled manpower and market for finished products); political; and military. Moreover, the dual society is hailed as liberal and progressive because it "recognizes ethnic diversity, and allows separate development." The Jewish public in general supports policies of separation, because they view it (see above) as a direct continuation of pre-1948 Zionist policies of building a separate Jewish society. The contribution of the existing polarization and superordinate-subordinate status hierarchy to the intensity of the Palestine conflict is obvious.

3. Israel as a Colony /

X The description of Israel as a colony is comprised of three elements; Zionism as a colonial movement, Israel as a neo-colonial regime, and Israeli rule of the occupied territories as a colonial rule. The colonial perspective of Zionism is that of a white-settler movement that colonized Palestine by displacing the indigenous Arab population. Based on 19th century Imperialist perceptions, Zionism was premised on "the functional absence of 'native people' in Palestine, institutions were built deliberately shutting out the natives" (Said, 1981; 82). The Zionists deliberately drove out the Arabs, usurped their territory and established a neo-colonial state.

The neo-colonial character of Israel is depicted as a client-state of Western imperialism. its society is perceived as being comprised of a small dominant Western-Jewish minority who exploit Third World peoples, oriental Jews and Arabs alike. After 1967 this neo-colonial regime began exercising classical colonialist policies in the occupied territories. The fate of Israel, so goes the argument, will be like the fate of other neo-colonial regimes, it will be destroyed as a regime by revolutionary forces.

As stated above, that description is used exclusively by pro-Palestinian observers and is an ideological rather than an analytical description. It is basically a "call for action;" it is also an "externally generated" explanation of the conflict. However, the colonial perspective illuminates some important aspects of the Palestine conflict.

The description of Zionism as a colonial movement is diametrically opposed to the description of Zionism as a national liberation movement. The Zionist Movement originated in the Jewish faith which is an ethnic religion, with strong nationalistic elements. The Zionists came to Palestine not in search of space but in order to return to their ancient homeland. It was an ideologically motivated movement whose objective it was to build a new society, based on self-work. They came without help from a mother country, created separate institutions without forming a superordinate class dominating and exploiting the native population. They recognized the right of Palestinian self-determination and accepted repeated proposals for the partition of Palestine. All these remarks point to the bias of colonial perspective. Having said this, one should consider also the strong colonial perceptions of Zionism concerning the Palestinian population. The Zionist Movement was touched from its inception with strong "Europo-centrist" perceptions. They viewed the land as "empty" because it was populated by Asians

they felt superior to the native population, did not grant them the capacity to national aspiration, expected them to accept Zionism because of the economic progress it brought. The "white man's burden" or the "mission of civilization" were also not missing. In short, the Zionists ignored the Palestinians because they were not considered equals. The liberation of the land (Geulat Ha'aretz) was perceived not as a conflict between equal peoples, but between one people and a "local population" that happened to be squatting on that land. These ethnocentrist attitudes persisted and remain at the root of the Israeli actions in the occupied territories. Jewish settlements, "land liberation" defended by the might of a regular army and a semi-colonial economic structure, do conform to colonial models.

4. The "Double Minority" Syndrome

That syndrome, detected in Northern Ireland, fits the Palestine case perfectly. The Arabs are a minority in Palestine, but an overwhelming majority in the Middle East. The Jews are a majority in Palestine, but a tiny minority in the area. The result is that both feel threatened and act as if they are a besieged minority. The feelings of insecurity and stress are especially strong in the Jewish community because the minority syndrome is not particular to their present situation in the Middle East. It was their status for thousands of years, and became second nature. The memories of persecution, pogroms, and especially the Holocaust are connected with their previous status of a scattered and defenseless minority. The fact that they are surrounded by a hostile "sea of Arabs" causes them to be preoccupied with their security. With the vow "Never Again," they display inflexible positions. The Palestinians who in one generation lost their majority in Palestine through their own 'Naqbah' (disaster) of 1948 are equally insecure and stressful. They

are left with a burning sense of grievance, and adopt inflexible positions.

X Historical precedents in Palestine play a major role in mobilizing the conflicting communities and in intensifying the strife. The Jews, with a written history of 3,700 years, commemorate innumerable events from the past and with the prescience of the Prophets anticipate the worst. The Palestinians commemorate with equal zeal past events from their bloody feud with the Zionists. The double minority syndrome is an important contributor to the intense conflict in Palestine.

5. Biracial Society

Pro-Palestinian writers describe the Israeli regime as "exclusive-racist" or "racist-chauvinistic" (Fatah in Moore, 1977; 797). The PLO succeeded in obtaining a UN resolution comparing Zionism with South African apartheid (1975). To support their allegations, they cite policies of segregation, legally sanctioned ascriptive membership by birth of Jews and Arabs, legal discrimination based on ethnicity (social security, land and housing allocation), endogamy, rigid status-hierarchy and stereotypes. Smootha (1978; 74) suggests that the "Jewish-Arab division is at present so rigid as to require a stronger term than the common notion of ethnicity." He suggests the term ethnic quasi-caste, and shows that the three minimal criteria of a quasi-caste (ascriptive membership, endogamy and status hierarchy) do apply to Israeli Arabs and Jews. But he adds that quasi-castes are not "racial castes." Therefore, "the simple equation of the status of Arabs in Israel to the status of Blacks in the United States and non-Whites in South Africa is simply fallacious" (pp. 74-75).

It seems that endogamy, ascriptive membership, enforced identity of religion and nationality are the result of the traditional millet system of the Orient, and not

devised to give legal sanction to ethnic discrimination. They are strictly enforced because of orthodox Jewish religious practices, and cause perhaps more hardship to Jews than to Arabs. Segregation policies are better explained by the dual society structure than by racial tendencies. Stereotypes are the result of Jewish ethno-centrist attitudes. Highly unflattering stereotypes, invidious beliefs typical of intense conflicts exist on both sides and are not limited to Israeli attitudes toward the Palestinians. Anti-Semitic stereotypes exist in Palestinian literature and in common daily parlance.

The legacy of centuries of Jewish subordinate status in Muslim society on the one hand, and the Zionist Europo-centrist attitude on the other, contribute to the vitriolic propaganda and emotionally charged antagonism.

The image of the conflict as racial is therefore more of an analogy than a reality aimed to highlight the fundamental cleavage between Israelis and Palestinians.

6. The Intra-Ethnic Dimension

We shall now turn to examine Jewish and Palestinian internal cleavages and their impact on the bi-national conflict. The Jewish-Israeli society is distinguished by two main divisions: oriental Jews vs. occidental Jews, and religious vs. non-religious Jews. The Palestinian Arab society is marked by five divisions: Israeli Arabs vs. Palestinian Arabs; Muslims vs. Christians; refugees in Palestine vs. permanently settled; villagers vs. townfolk; and expatriates vs. occupied-territory Palestinians.

There are various degrees of "overlapping memberships," therefore various degrees of antagonism and moderation in these group relations. To a great extent, the bi-national conflict definitely submerged internal conflicts. The Israeli-Arab conflict mitigated internal Jewish group tension to such an extent that it should be considered a prime factor

in the relatively successful process of Israeli nation-building.

Jewish attitudes toward the bi-national conflict are varied. The ultra-religious and the orientals express more hostility than the occidental group. The ultra-orthodox Jews are worried that Jewish youth will intermingle with Arab youth and become "culturally assimilated." It is largely a residue of their centuries-old diaspora fear of assimilation into the Gentile society.

Since 1967, a new fundamentalist-religious group has gained much support and political power. Their identification of national objectives with religious beliefs created chauvinistic and extremist religious norms. On the national level they perceive the occupation of Greater Israel as the "Beginning of Redemption," as a fulfillment of the Prophets' teachings. Therefore "handing back" parts of Palestine is forbidden by the Torah. The future of the West Bank is not considered a political issue but a divine one, therefore it is the divine laws that should be obeyed, and not the secular authority of the elected government. This messianic-fundamentalist perception of the state, the army, and the territories is behind the motivation of Gush Emunim, the religious ultra group mainly responsible for the settlement of the West Bank.)

The fact that oriental Jews express more hostility towards the Arabs is well known and amply documented. There are perceptual, cultural and socio-economic explanations for that phenomenon: "By expressing hostility to Arabs, an oriental attempts to rid himself of the 'inferior' Arab elements in his own identity" (Peres, quoted by Smooha, 1978; 103). Arabs serve as "scapegoats" for lower class, economically deprived oriental Jews. The oriental Jews want to "settle the score" with the Arabs for the centuries of humiliation in the Arab countries; they want to maintain their superior social status as Jews and therefore are jealous of Arab

mobility. Because of their hostility and their wish for a "strong hand" against the Arabs, they support hyper-nationalistic parties.

By contrast, the most moderate element vis-a-vis the bi-national conflict is the upper middle-class Ashkenazi group, from which almost all "peace movements" emerged. In view of these attitudes, official Palestinian belief that the "Arab Jews" are their natural allies because of their common cultural heritage (Fatah in Moore, 1977; 799) seems naive.

The continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and especially the continuation of the occupation, had a tremendous impact upon Palestinian internal group relations. The traditionally regionally-oriented, quarrelsome and violent, disorganized segments show greater cohesion and unity of purpose than ever before. Attitudes towards the bi-national conflict vary, although the degree of variation is smaller than in the Israeli camp. The Israeli Arabs, who after a separation of nineteen years renewed their connections with their Palestinian kinfolk, underwent a process of political radicalization. But their attitudes, although more hostile, remain relatively moderate compared to the occupied-territory Palestinians. The Christian-Muslim cleavage seemed to the Israelis worth exploiting because they perceived Christian nationalist feelings to be less strong than the Muslims'. At first they proved right. Christian villages and towns remained calm when the Muslim areas rioted. But towards the mid-Seventies the difference disappeared. At the same time one should consider the prominent position that Christian Palestinians held in the PLO. In fact, Christian Palestinians seemed to gravitate to the more radical and revolutionary factions of the Palestinian movement. The Israelis made apparently the same naive assumption that the PLO made about oriental Jews. They believed that favorable sub-cultural factors would overcome core-cultural ones.

The Israelis also tried to encourage the "a-political" non-elite Arab rural population and turn them against the traditional urban political elite. Their success was limited and irrelevant to the bi-national conflict.

The most significant difference in the degree of hostility among Palestinian groups exists between expatriates and occupied-territory Palestinians. The occupied-territory Palestinians showed more moderation and expressed more willingness to enter into a dialogue with Israel. The 1948 refugees, who controlled the military arm of the PLO, were obviously more radical; they had nothing to lose. But the Israelis never encouraged the more moderate occupied-territory Palestinians by offering them a reasonable solution. On the contrary, the expropriation and settlement policies radicalized them. As always in situations of intense conflict, the extremist factions usually held the upper hand, mainly because they were more genuine in expressing the deep-seated animosities, and also by threatening to denounce the moderates as traitors. In a polarized society inflexibility is much more prized than the ability to coalesce. This is true for both conflicting groups.

CONCLUSION

The situation as viewed through the prisms of the various hypotheses and models offered in the preceding discussion can be summarized thus:

A. In the 1980s, the Palestine conflict is basically internally generated, but the two parties involved, the Israelis and the Palestinians, refuse to acknowledge it as such because of their mutual exclusionary attitude. They realize on the operative level that their problem is mutual, and can be settled by themselves only, and on the soil of Palestine. But that realization cannot blur the deeply imbued perception of the other side as illegitimate, therefore an objective constraint not an independent subject. The bi-national conflict is not perceived by the sides as such, but as a war of liberation. The two societies, both "normal," containing their respective internal sub-cultural divisions, found themselves after 1967 co-existing in the same polity, and conducting a "zero sum" type of conflict.

B. Most Israelis perceive the occupation of all Palestine as the ultimate realization of Zionist territorial objectives. They pursue classic Zionist policies of separate Jewish nation-building based on the ideological motivation of making diaspora Jews into a "normal society and a normal people," but also a Europo-centrist attitude toward the "native" Arabs. They recognize the Palestinians as a "de facto" a-national community and are prepared to grant it independent status, provided this is a permanent subordinate status.

C. The Palestinians, with a fundamentally unchanged perception of the Zionists as a white-settler colonial movement and Israel as a neo-colonial state, refuse to see their future in terms of an Israeli-controlled Palestine or

to live in peace with a Jewish state. Not only do they reject "community autonomy" plans, but also the creation of a "Palestinian mini-state" in agreement with Israel. They call for withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories, viewing it as a first phase in the liberation of all Palestine. They pursue classic mobilized minority tactics of terrorism, demonstrations, civil disobedience and non-collaboration.

D. Attempts of moderates on both sides and good offices of third parties have not been successful. As time passes the de facto dual society becomes more pervasive. It is a superordinate-subordinate status hierarchy system, where the Jewish majority holds a monopoly over all political, economic and social powers, and the Palestinian minority is utterly dominated. Such systems can be governed only by the coercive power of a majority dictatorship. But the political realities in Palestine call for a more coercive regime. The fact that 1.4 million Palestinians are disenfranchised (not including 600,000 Israeli Arabs), and that the Israelis will not grant them full voting rights lest it "blur the Jewish character of the state," points to the Herrenvolk Democracy model (van den Berghe, 1969; 73). It should be pointed out at this juncture that on both occasions that the Israelis formally annexed occupied territories, i.e., East Jerusalem (1967) and the Golan Heights (1981), they did not grant automatic citizenship to Arab residents, who remained Jordanian and Syrian nationals. The status of "military occupation" proved to be in this respect a useful and respectable device to grant legitimacy to disfranchisement.

E. The increased coercion it is forced to apply in order to "control" the increasingly mobilized Palestinians is well documented. However, the belief that such polarized situations and intense conflict would lead to open communal violence of the Northern Ireland type is questionable. When the conflict is seen as involving social identity, cultural

values, and inalienable rights, as it is indeed perceived in Palestine, the "bearable" costs of maintaining "control" seem almost infinite to the regime. As long as it can count on the allegiance of its own side, maintaining also military superiority and economic viability, it will pursue its basic policies and will be able to "subdue unrest." However, the most important objective of the regime, i.e., forcing the other side to submit and accept its assigned subordinate role, will be denied them. The Palestinians, also perceiving their struggle as involving inalienable rights, will refuse to give in and will choose tactics of civil disobedience, but mainly of exploiting their strongest assets--their presence, natural increase, and economic and educational development. Thus, the conflict will remain endemic and organic, with little chance of "resolution."

F. The theoretical alternatives to the present political structure are simple to define; partition or consociational arrangements (power-sharing, federalism, etc.). However, the implementation of these political alternatives is very problematic. The conflicting parties view political arrangements only through the prism of exclusive nationalist values, and not through the conflict-regulating merits. Both are confident of their capability to persevere, and win.

G. The partition of Palestine, established de facto in 1948, had created at a tremendous human and material cost, two almost homogeneous areas, and could have become a long-term solution to the binational conflict. Since then the two groups have become increasingly interspersed territorially, and the process of remingling has just started. Partition would require not only a fundamental change in political perceptions, but as in 1948, tremendous human and material costs. Considering the alternatives, however, it seems the only long-term solution.

H. Consociational arrangements require a minimum of willingness of elites to cooperate (Nordlinger, 1972;

Lijphart, 1977) and cannot be instituted against the wishes of the majority segment, let alone against the wishes of both segments. Therefore "living together peacefully" does not seem a realistic possibility but rather a recipe for eternal strife and instability.

I. The persistence of the intense Palestine conflict is perceived to be detrimental to regional and world stability. Third parties, assuming correctly that a resolution will not emerge from the sides directly involved, advocate an imposed solution. These third parties estimate that the present political situation exacerbates the conflict and that consociational arrangements are unrealistic. Inevitably they advocate enforced partition. Partition may be the only long-term solution, but an imposed partition will not terminate the conflict, but rather, may exacerbate it. The Israelis who will be forced to withdraw will consider the pressures as directed against their very existence. Consequently, they will resist external pressure with all their might, including the intensification of anti-Palestinian policies. Third parties will find the cost of applying extreme pressure on Israel too high. On the other hand, the Palestinians will feel that pressure on Israel to withdraw absolves them of the need to come to peaceful terms with their adversary. Some of them will view Western pressure on Israel as a sign of "de-colonization" and therefore an incentive to intensify violent actions.

J. The Palestine question is a multilevel conflict, involving political, economic, societal and psychological dichotomies that cut through all levels of interaction. Such conflicts are resistant to comprehensive, surgical solutions, because they are basically endemic and organic.

Political or diplomatic efforts to solve the problem are ineffective because they address themselves only to the

upper stratum of the conflict. Unless an effort is made to deal with more fundamental elements, all options devised by diplomats remain unacceptable, unattractive or impractical. In the forthcoming stage of this study, ways will be explored to cope with the multidimensional aspects of the Palestine conflict.

K. The data compiled suggests that the integrative processes are approaching rapidly the point of no return. How irreversible is the pattern set in motion? Nothing is irreversible, only the cost changes. The accelerated pace of annexation makes disengagement progressively more difficult. If the trend is now reversed, disengagement may only come about through trauma or catastrophe. There can be no radical surgery. The necessary process is one of disentanglement that will be as complex as are the present policies of entanglement.

A strategy for disentanglement should be the focus of the second stage of this study.

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WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS: 1967-1982

MILITARY GOVERNMENT BOUNDARY
REGIONAL COUNCIL BOUNDARY
AREAS UNDER JURISDICTION OF
ISRAELI REGIONAL COUNCILS
EXISTING JEWISH SETTLEMENT
PROPOSED JEWISH SETTLEMENT
JEWISH URBAN CENTRES
ARAB TOWNS
EXISTING ROAD
NEW ROAD COMPLETED OR
UNDER CONSTRUCTION
ELECTRICITY GRID (SCHEMATIC)



SCALE 1:250,000



Compiled by Aaron Tur-ner
in cooperation with the Israeli Ministry of Defense

JULY 1982

DATE OF REVISION

DISSEMINATION: UNCLASSIFIED
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THE WEST BANK
DATA PROJECT

