

3 DEPARTMENT (Continued)

France. Kissinger-de la Granville conversation. NATO: France requires that US bases should be changed into French bases and formal command should be French; France wants the right to release its forces in case of war and a decisive voice in the conduct of military operations on its territory. Europe: de Gaulle no longer feels he can govern the Germans and now seeks to keep Germany under control by balancing it off against the Soviet Union. Vietnam: France is "far from neutral"; many senior officials would welcome humiliation for the US. Nuclear weapons: France has not yet solved the technical problem of developing a hydrogen bomb; warheads will be tested around July 1st in the Pacific which are a marginally improved design from those exploded in the Sahara. Report, Henry A. Kissinger, State Dept. Consultant. Jan. 23, 1966. 9 p. CONFIDENTIAL. PERSONAL. Declassified Aug. 18, 1977. Johnson Library, White House Central File, Confidential File, CO 81.

Geneva [Conference], U.S. Goals at (with Probable Attitudes of UK and France) progress toward unification of Germany, control of armaments, independence of Soviet satellites. Paper No. 1. July 6, 1955. 2 p. Att: (1) Soviet Goals at Geneva Western recognition of Soviet moral and social equality, relaxation of cold war, imbalances toward disarmament and freer trade, advancement of status of ChiComs, weakening of allied unity. Paper No. 2. 3 p.; (2) Estimate of Prospect of US Achieving Its Goals. Paper No. 3. 3 p.; (3) Estimate of Prospect of Soviet Union Achieving Its Goals. Paper No. 4. 3 p. SECRET. Declassified Mar. 18, 1977. Eisenhower Library, Papers as President of the US, 1953-61 (Ann Whitman File), International Meetings, Box 1, Folder: Geneva Conference, July 18-23, 1955 (1).

Israel, Harriman Mission to [US is considering supplying Jordan with arms to prevent Jordan from falling under Soviet-Nasser influences; US continues to be keenly concerned about Israel's security; US is discussing direct sales of military equipment to Israel; Israel demands to know US position regarding the Jordan water problem]. Memorandum of Conversation [Levi Eshkol, Prime Minister, Israel; Golda Meir, Foreign Min., Israel; W. Averell Harriman, Amb. at Large, US; Robert Komer, Dep. Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Nat. Security Affairs; other US and Israeli officials]. Feb. 25, 1965. 8 p. SECRET. EX DIS. SANITIZED copy. Released Dec. 30, 1977. Johnson Library, NSF, Countries, Israel, Vol. 4.

Israel, Harriman Mission to [discussion of Jordan waters question: Israel opposes the involvement of the UN; US opposes the use of force; Israel requests that the US tell Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria not to divert the waters]. Memorandum of Conversation [Levi Eshkol, Prime Minister, Israel; Golda Meir, Foreign Min., Israel; W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador at Large, US; Robert Komer, Dep. Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Nat. Security Affairs; other US and Israeli officials]. Feb. 25, 1965. 5 p. SECRET. EX DIS. Declassified Dec. 30, 1977. Johnson Library, NSF, Countries, Israel, Vol. 4.

STATE DEPARTMENT (Continued)

A. Israel, Harriman Mission to [discussion of US arms sales to Israel and Jordan, Arab diversion of Jordan River headwaters, and Israeli defense capability]. Memorandum of Conversation [Levi Eshkol, Prime Minister, Israel; Golda Meir, Foreign Minister, Israel; W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador at Large, US; Robert Komer, Dep. Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Nat. Security Affairs; other US and Israeli officials]. Feb. 26, 1965. 7 p. Encl: (1) Israeli Bout de Papier [assessment of Middle East balance of arms. US policy on Israel's independence and on Arab diversion of water]. Paper. 2 p.; (2) United States Draft Memorandum of Understanding [US wishes to provide arms to Jordan to prevent its acceptance of Soviet arms; US also wishes to avoid supplying offensive weapons to Israel or Arab States]. Memorandum. 3 p. SECRET. EX DIS. SANITIZED copy. Released Dec. 30, 1977. Johnson Library, NSF, Countries, Israel, Vol. 4.

B. Israel, Harriman Mission to [Israeli Defense Min states: "rather than complicated words about a change in US policy, let's have the hardware, bombers and tanks"; US should oppose Arab diversion of waters; Israel opposes UN involvement in Jordan waters issue, "but if the US brings in the UN, how can we oppose?"]. Memorandum of Conversation [Levi Eshkol, Prime Minister, Israel; Golda Meir, Foreign Minister, Israel; W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador at Large, US; Robert Komer, Dep. Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Nat. Security Affairs; other US and Israeli officials]. Feb. 27, 1965. 2 p. SECRET. EX DIS. SANITIZED copy. Released Dec. 30, 1977. Johnson Library, NSF, Countries, Israel, Vol. 4.

C. North Africa, Polarization in: Implications for the US [relations between Morocco and Algeria, which had been cooperative during the fight for independence, have deteriorated dramatically since Ben Bella's rise to power; relations could lead to a polarization with the US backing Morocco, the USSR supporting Algeria, and France attempting to remain neutral; Morocco hopes to gain economically from this polarization and to solve domestic problems by concentrating on a conflict with Algeria, even at the expense of alienating the OAU; Algeria, feeling threatened by two US-supported neighbors, would turn to the USSR and would support opposition and liberation groups in Morocco and southern Africa]. Research Memorandum, RAF-1, Thomas L. Hughes, Dir., Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to the Secy of State. Jan. 6, 1965. 8 p. SECRET. NO FOREIGN DISSEM. CONTROLLED DISSEM. Declassified Dec. 12, 1977. Johnson Library, NSF, Countries, Algeria, Vol. 1.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Review

EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION

Subject : Harriman Mission to Israel
Date : February 25, 1965 - Afternoon Session
Place : Prime Minister's Office, Jerusalem
Participants: ISRAEL - Prime Minister Levi Eshkol
Foreign Minister Golda Meir
Director U.S. Department Moshe Bitan

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UNITED STATES - S/AH - W. Averell Harriman
Robert W. Komer, White House
Walworth Barbour, U.S. Ambassador
Stephen E. Palmer, Jr., First Secretary

Reference : Tel Aviv's 1050 to Department

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Mrs. Meir continued to voice concern about the Jordan waters question. Whatever progress Israel made in exploiting its share of Jordan waters was because the UN had not been involved. Who could be responsible for guaranteeing that a Soviet veto might not stop all utilization of Jordan waters? A State Department officer recently even suggested Israel might take the case to the International Court of Justice. Israel had its fill of the ICJ in the case concerning the El Al plane that was shot down by the Bulgarians.

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Governor Harriman reiterated that the U.S. was opposed to the use of force. It supported the Unified Plan, but was "definitely opposed to preventive action and will continue to oppose it." Mrs. Meir said the Arabs got all the water they asked for during the Johnston negotiations; now they wanted to take more merely to spite Israel. Governor Harriman said we were not convinced that the Arabs would implement their diversion plans. An issue such as this could be taken to the UN. We were willing to talk about procedures. Now we were asking for an understanding that preventive action would not be used. Mrs. Meir remarked that perhaps Israel was mistaken to believe, as it long had, that the U.S. would oppose spite diversions. She requested the U.S. to tell the Lebanese, Jordanians, and Syrians not to divert. This would be more effective than an appeal to the UN. The Soviets had already taken the Arab side on the water issue. Mr. Komer said that even in the face of a Soviet veto, Israel would come out ahead. It would start to build up a good international case against excessive Arab diversion. Ambassador Barbour said the Israelis could not help but be better off after Security Council consideration.

The Foreign Minister said, "So what is next?" Governor Harriman observed that no water was flowing through the Arab diversion projects. Nobody knew when, if ever, these projects would be completed. Whenever and wherever the GOI wanted, we would be willing to discuss details of appropriate action in the UN context. The U.S.G. was quite determined to support Israel on its share of the water; it was also quite determined against the use of force. Mr. Komer said the U.S.G. wanted a firm understanding that Israel would take the peaceful road to solve the problem of Arab spite diversion, in conjunction with "all the other things we are talking about." The Prime Minister said he could not commit his Government to taking the matter to the UN. The Soviets would veto any good resolution. If the Arabs continued, Israel "would be compelled to do it. What would your attitude be then?"

Governor Harriman said it was impossible now to foretell the outcome of UN deliberations, but Israel would be in a better situation after UN consideration. However, he stated bluntly, the U.S. "would oppose you if you take preemptive action." Israel's interests were being threatened but Israel was not being hurt. The U.S. was ready to discuss plans on what might be done at the UN. We thought Israel had a case in equity. Mrs. Meir suggested UN consideration might result in Israel's being asked to relinquish a "minor percentage" of its allocation. It could not agree to any such thing. Would the U.S. support Israel up to the full limit of its allocation? Mr. Komer said, the Foreign Minister was asking for the end of the play before there was any decision to have a play. She retorted that whereas in the past the U.S. said it would oppose spite diversion, now it was advising Israel to be patient.

Mr. Komer

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Mr. Komer thought the Foreign Minister might mean that the U.S.G. was winking on a commitment. Nothing of the kind was true. The whole idea of preemption in this case was poor. An early attack would merely serve as a warning. It would have no material effect, and could very well serve to unite the Arabs further. Therefore, it was advisable to buy time, to find out what the Arabs would do. A great deal of time remained, as the completion of the Arab projects would take two to three years at least. Meanwhile, Israel should exhaust all peaceful recourses in order to build up the strongest case for its right to take water up to the Unified Plan allocation. The GOI now wanted to know what we would do if all peaceful recourses failed. This could not be foreseen, but we were quite confident peaceful recourse will not fail. Prime Minister Eshkol said obviously Israel would be entitled to fight for its water if peaceful recourse failed. Mr. Komer said Israel would be entitled to ask us what we thought at the time. Governor Harriman repeated the point that Israel's moral position would be improved by taking the problem to the UN.

Ambassador Barbour said Mrs. Meir was jumping to unjustified conclusions regarding the US position on the Unified Plan. In the recent discussions to which the Foreign Minister had referred we had not intended to give the impression that we were aiming towards any reduction, however slight, in Israel's allocation. The U.S. supported Israel's adherence to the Unified Plan. Mrs. Meir said that until U.S. officials started to advise Israel to take the matter to the UN, she thought the U.S. supported Israel on the Plan. Mr. Komer observed that the U.S. started to think about UN involvement when Israeli officials started to threaten preemptive action. The Prime Minister said the key to the situation would be the commitment of King Hussein, and of Lebanon, not to deprive Israel of its share of water. "Tell Hussein it is nonsense. He has \$40 or \$50 million from you a year. He has his water, and now he is going to get U.S. weapons."

Governor Harriman recalled that Mrs. Meir had been "sneering" at the Security Council. The U.S. did not sneer at the Security Council. That body had been very helpful over the years. The force of world opinion reflected through the UN was an important element in international affairs. The Security Council was not something to be brushed lightly aside. World opinion would support Israel more on the water issue if it took it to the UN. Prime Minister Eshkol said, "Tell it to the King." Mr. Komer said we had thought of this, and there had been some discussion at lower levels. But we could push Hussein past the point where he would be forced to do something foolish. The King was in a box on the Jordan waters, the same box that contained the arms problem. Mr. Komer said, in confidence, that the Lebanese were telling us to inform Israel not

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to push them too hard. Lebanon stalled a year and would stall further. But it was a weak country, and the Lebanese could be pushed so far that they would have no other course but to rely on Nasser. So we needed to play for time. We did not think that Israel would lose water.

Governor Harriman said it seemed to him Israel was worried that the U.S. would, after encouraging Israel to take its case to the UN, try to pressure Israel to take less water than it was allotted. Such fear was completely unjustified. The Arabs had embarked upon an untenable course. If it was all brought out before the world, Israel would get more support. An international airing would be a good thing. Israel would be in a far better position than if it used force. President Johnson had a keen understanding of water problems.

The Foreign Minister said it took a lot of courage for some countries to support Israel in the UN. The Arabs had 13 votes. The Security Council might decide to send the problem to the ICJ, or to set up a committee which would investigate the situation for a long time, etc. At the time the world situation might be such that the U.S. would feel that it had to go along with such a decision.

Governor Harriman said that nonetheless Israel would be in a better position. Right now we needed to focus on the Jordan arms matter. The King had bravely resisted UAC demands for standardization, i.e., Soviet equipment, and he had decided he could live with a smaller package than UAC wanted him to have. Thus, currently the King's position was not too strong and probably it would not be profitable now to ask him also to oppose the Arab water projects.

Mr. Komer made a personal suggestion as to how we could get out of the impasse. As a part of our general understanding Israel would undertake not to use preemptive action and to use all peaceful means. If we had such an understanding then we could discuss the best peaceful means to utilize.

Prime Minister Eshkol said one thing was fundamental: "You must bear the responsibility for our getting our share of the water." Governor Harriman said we would support Israel, but could not promise such a guarantee as the Prime Minister requested. The Prime Minister asked who on the U.S. side would deal with further consultations on Jordan waters. Where would these discussions take place, in Washington or Jerusalem? Governor Harriman said they could occur whenever the GOI wanted, but we still wanted an undertaking against the use of force.

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The Prime Minister said he would like to have something in writing on the arms to Israel matter. People would ask about this. The Cabinet would have to be told. The press would have to be told something. "As of now, this is a very bad outcome." Mr. Komer stressed that it was crucial that these discussions remained confidential. Governor Harriman also stressed the need for secrecy, noting that what we were discussing was in effect a Presidential communication. Mrs. Meir asked what the GOI could say now, i.e., assuming we reached agreement. Governor Harriman said the GOI could state that the U.S. supported Israel's right to its Unified Plan allocation, and opposed the use of force. But we would have to wait for a better time to talk openly about any direct arms sales to Israel.

Mrs. Meir wondered what the GOI would say to its people if the Jordanians began to receive tanks and the GOI were bound by secret agreement not to say anything about compensatory action for Israel. Governor Harriman said we would consider this to be a mutual problem. It was agreed to meet in Tel Aviv the afternoon of February 26.

SEPalmer, Jr.; rvc:3/18/65

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