About the Author

Michael Wolffsohn, born in 1947, studied history, political science and economics at the Free University of Berlin and in Tel-Aviv. He received his PhD from the Free University of Berlin in 1975 and holds two higher degrees (*Habilitation*) in political science and in contemporary history (both from the University of the Saarland in 1980). He has taught modern history and international relations at the Hochschule der Bundeswehr (University of the West German Armed Forces) in Munich since 1981. His publications include: *Public Works in Germany 1930–1934* (1977), *Die Debatte über den Kalten Krieg* (The Cold War Debate) in 1982, *Politik in Israel* (Politics in Israel) in 1983, *Politik als Investitionsmotor? Deutsche Multis in Lateinamerika* (Politics as an Investment Incentive? German Multinationals in Latin America) in 1984, *West Germany's Foreign Policy in the era of Brandt and Schmidt* (1986), *German–Israeli Relations 1952–1983: What the Polls Say* (1986), and *German–Saudi Arabian Arms Deals, Past and Present: 1936–1939 and 1981–1984. With an Essay on West Germany's Jews* (1986) as well as over forty scholarly articles on topics including Israel, the Middle East, West German and EEC foreign policy, and other issues in international relations.

He has also contributed articles on Middle East and German foreign affairs for the major West German daily and weekly newspapers and has appeared as a foreign affairs commentator for German TV and radio networks. In 1987 he produced a three part TV series on the Arab–Israeli conflict since 1917. He is currently working on a study of German–Israeli relations since 1948/49 and the American–European–Middle Eastern Triangle 1948–1957.

ISRAEL

Polity, Society, Economy
1882–1986
An Introductory Handbook

Michael Wolffsohn

An enlarged and updated
translation of the German edition:
*Israel. Grundwissen Länderkunde.
Politik. Gesellschaft. Wirtschaft*

Translated by
Douglas Bokovoy

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VI
The Population

1 DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENTS AND STRUCTURES

(a) JEWISH–ARAB POLARIZATION

The modern demographic history of Palestine dates from the arrival of the first Zionist-motivated Jewish immigrants at the end of the nineteenth century. In 1845 there were 11,800 Jews living in Palestine. In 1882, on the eve of the first *aliya*, there were 24,000 (*Encyclopaedia Hebraica*, 1958: 674; Friedlander and Goldscheider, 1979: 14. These numbers are based on estimates by experts rather than on actual census counts.) On the eve of the First World War there were 85,000 Jews in Palestine; and there were 84,000 according to the census of 1922. By 15 May 1948 the Jewish population had reached 650,000, and it stood at 1,014,000 in December 1949 following the War of Independence.

The Arab population of Palestine grew from approximately 500,000 in the middle of the nineteenth century to some 600,000 by the beginning of the First World War (Friedlander and Goldscheider, 1979: 16; *Encyclopaedia Hebraica*, 1958: 707; Gerber, 1979).

At the time of the census of 23 October 1922, 668,000 Arabs were living in Palestine. By 1947 there were approximately 1,200,000 and on 15 May 1948, only 156,000 (see Table 23). These last two statistics are, however, not infrequently subject to misinterpretation as the figures for 1947 count the population of the entire region encompassed by the Mandate for Palestine, including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, whereas the figures for 1948 count only the population within the borders of the newly founded State of Israel and exclude the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Nevertheless, the basic fact remains that even in the remainder of Palestine (excluding Transjordan) the proportional relationship between the Jewish and Arab populations had been so radically reversed between 1922 and 1948 that the once overwhelming Arab majority had, by 1948, been reduced to a minority.

The number of Jews living in Palestine in 1948 was roughly equivalent to the number of Arab residents in 1922, whereas the number of Arabs living within the territory of Israel in 1948 was approximately twice the size of the Jewish population of Palestine in 1922. That this massive shift entailed enormous political and psychological consequences for both sides is self-evident.

(The reader seeking geographical orientation is referred to the maps in

Figure 31　Arabs and Jews in Palestine and Israel, 1882–1982.

Figures 2–11. Figure 31 demonstrates the shifts in the Jewish and Arab populations.)

By the end of 1981 the number of Arabs living in Israel was approximately equal to the Arab population of 1948.

If Israel were to annex the occupied territories, the state would then include slightly less than 2 million Arabs, as opposed to 3·4 million Jews. Even if these Arabs were denied the right of participation in Knesset elections, the basic fact of a mixed Jewish and Arab population could not be ignored.

Even the 720,000 Arabs living within the pre-1967 borders represent a minority of sufficient size as to make it all but impossible to describe Israel accurately as 'purely' Jewish. Over the long term it will not be possible to escape confronting this most fundamental problem: the Jewishness of the Jewish state.

Of the average annual Jewish population growth of 9% in the years between 1922 and 1948, 75% was due to immigration, the remaining 25% to 'natural growth. The annual increase of 2·75% in the Arab population over the same period was almost entirely due to natural population growth and was not related to migratory movements (Friedlander and Goldscheider, 1979: 17 ff.). This finding is of historical-political significance, as it has often been claimed that the economic development of Palestine during this period had acted as a magnet attracting numerous Arabs from other states and territories (see Gottheil, 1975).

Table 23　Arabs and Jews in Palestine and Israel, 1882–1985 (figures for the population in thousands)

Year	Jews	Arabs[1]	Total
1882[2]	24	426	450
1914[2]	85	600	685
1918[2]	56	600	656
1922	84	668	752
1931	175	859	1,033
1935	355	953	1,308
1940	464	1,081	1,545
1945	554	1,256	1,810
1948*	650	156	806
1951	1,404	173	1,577
1954	1,526	192	1,718
1957	1,763	213	1,976
1961	1,932	247	2,179
1967	2,384	393	2,777
1973	2,845	493	3,338
1977	3,077	576	3,653
1981	3,320	658	3,978
1983	3,410	710	4,120
1985	3,510	740	4,250

Notes:
[1] Designated as 'non-Jews' in official statistics.
[2] All figures for these years are estimates
* 15 May 1948

Sources:　*Encyclopaedia Hebraica* 1958: 503, 518, 674, 707; *Friedlander and Goldscheider*, 1979: 30; *Gertz*, 1947: 46 f.; *Horowitz and Lissak*, 1978: appendix 1; *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, various vols.; *Haaretz*, 18 October 1983 with data from the Central Bureau of Statistics.

(b) INNER-JEWISH POLARIZATION

Figure 33 documents a process of increasing 'Orientalization', that is, the impressive increase in the proportion of Jews of Afro-Asian descent in Israel's population since 1948. This fundamental quantitative development has necessarily led to long-term qualitative changes, as discussed in section B/VI/2.

Whereas the Jewish society of Israel was almost exclusively Euro-American in character in 1948, it has since then become structurally polarized.

Statistics on immigrants' countries of origin for the various *aliyot* can be found in Friedlander and Goldscheider (1979: 38) and in the publications of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (Immigration, 1975: tables 1 and 2).

Despite the process of Orientalization described above, it must be noted that even in 1981 the majority of voters were still of Euro-American descent.

Figure 32   Immigration since 1948, in thousands.

Figure 33   The Jewish population of Israel, 1948 and 1981.

In 1981, 50% of the voting-age population consisted of Ashkenasim, 45% were voters of Afro-Asian heritage and 5% were at least second-generation Sabras (data on paternal ancestry from Elections, 1981: XXIII).

(c) THE BASIC DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE

Figure 33 also demonstrates when and how Israel's Euro-American society was transformed into one with a tripartite structure, the 'first' element consisting of the traditional, mainly Eastern-European groups that moulded the nation during the Yishuv, that is, the period before independence, as well as in the following phase of massive development, the 'second' element being the 'Oriental' Jews, that is, Jews who immigrated to Israel from the nations of northern Africa or western Asia and thus also designated as 'Afro-Asian', and the 'third' element representing Israel's Arab population with its religious diversity of Sunni Moslems, Druze and Christians.

(d) POLITICAL GENERATIONS AND *ALIYOT*

In accordance with Karl Mannheim, the term 'political generation' is understood here as an age-group whose political orientation is shaped mainly between the ages of 17 and 25 under the influence of the then current political events. Since the attitudes of a political generation tend to be formed by the same events, the individuals of that generation exhibit largely similar points of reference without being by any means identical (for further details see Wolffsohn, 1983a: pt. II). The political generations of the Yishuv and of

Europe, America, Oceania : Sum 40

USSR	9
Poland	10
Romania	9
Bulgaria / Greece/ Germany / Austria	2
	3
CSSR	1
Hungary	1
Others	2
North Am / Oceania	1

Asia : Sum 22

Turkey	3
Jraq	8
N + S Yemen	5
Jran	3
Jndia / Pak	1
Others	2

Africa : Sum 22

|	
Morocco	14
Algeria / Tunisia	4
Libya	2
Egypt / Sudan	2

Zabarim 15

Figure 34   Jewish population by origin of father, 1981 in (%).

Israel can be easily identified along the lines of the various waves of immigration, to which the term *aliya* (plural: *aliyot*, literally: 'ascendance') is applied.

The *first aliya*, lasting from 1882 to 1903 and including 25,000 to 30,000 immigrants, proved to be of little consequence for the future political system. It was strongly influenced, but deeply disappointed by late nineteenth

Table 24   Political Generations

Political Generation		1st aliya 1882–1903	2nd aliya 1904–14	3rd aliya 1919–23	4th aliya 1924–31	5th aliya 1932–9
Chief effect(s) in Palestine/Israel		Agricultural settlements	Laid foundations of political and economic structures	Strengthening of leftist parties	Stronger organizations, 'bourgeois' tendency, religious moderation	Strengthened bourgeois tendencies religious moderation (PAI), political militancy
Create in Palestine/Israel			Socialist reform party: HPZ Socialist revolutionary: PZ *Kibbutzim*	Histadrut, communist groups Leftist-religious parties: HP, PAI		'New Immigration' Ezel
Political influences from	Palestine/ Israel					
	Orient					
	Germany					Ideology: private property and enterprise Events: Great Depression National Socialism
	Poland			As in Russia	Ideology: private property and enterprise Events: persecution	Ideology: private property and enterprise Events: as in Germany
	Russia	Ideology: liberalism	Ideology: socialist reformist, socialist revolutionary	Ideology: socialist-communist	Ideology: communist and market oriented	
		Events: pogroms 1881 ff.	Events: pogroms 1903 ff. Russo-Japanese War, 1904–5 Russian Revolution of 1905	Events: Russian Revolution, 1917 ff.	Events: Lenin's New Economic Policy	
mass immigration of Oriental Jews 1948 ff.		5708	1956	1967 Zabarim	1973	1977	1982
Weakening of traditional ideologies, hardening of foreign policy positions		Pragmatic outlook, hawkish foreign policy views	As in generation of 5708	Predominance of territorial issues	Polarization	As in generation of 1973	See 1973, soldiers refuse military service
				First groups of extra-parliamentary opposition	Protest groups: GE, DMC	'Peace Now'	

Ideology: *haluziut*	Ideology: building the state	Ideology: state	Rising self-doubt	Issue of character of the state	
Events: struggle for independence	Events: Suez campaign	Events: Six Day War, PLO	Events: Yom Kippur War, political protests	Events: Sadat initiative, Camp David	Events: War in Lebanon

Ideology: private property, religion events: persecutions and expulsions

century *Russian liberalism*, especially by the behaviour of Russian liberals during the pogroms of 1880–2.

Most of the immigrants of the first *aliya* were less interested in the establishment of political organizations than in securing their individual economic existence through agricultural enterprises. The traditions of the Russian agrarian revolutionaries were manifest among the more collectively oriented immigrants, for example, among the Bilu group. Such groups remained, however, a minority in the first *aliya*. The great majority regarded themselves simply as colonists and settlers and were, some twenty years later, often described as a 'planter aristocracy' more willing to hire acquiescent and cheap Arab labour than more revolutionary and expensive Jewish workers (see Table 24).

The initiative for the establishment of political institutions arose principally among the immigrants of the *second aliya*, especially among the socialists of this *aliya*, which produced, among other top politicians, two later prime ministers of Israel, Ben-Gurion and Eshkol, as well as Israel's second and third presidents, Ben-Zwi and Shazar.

This wave of immigration brought between 35,000 and 40,000 immigrants into Palestine between 1904 and 1914, especially in the wake of the Kishinev pogrom in Russia (April 1903) and the further persecutions of Jews there following the Russo-Japanese War (1904/5) and the failure of the Russian Revolution of 1905.

The agriculturally oriented social reformers of the second *aliya* founded Hapoel Hazair, while the social revolutionaries (among them, at this time, Ben-Gurion) created Poale Zion. As true Marxists, the members of Poale Zion believed in the revolutionary role of the proletariat, that is, of the industrial workers, of whom virtually none were to be found in the Palestine of the early twentieth century. It was thus the goal of PZ to stimulate the process of industrialization, in order to pave the way for the creation of a (Jewish) proletariat, which could then – oddly enough within the entirely Jewish setting – overthrow the (Jewish) bourgeoisie.

This wave of immigrants remained politically dominant for a long period, although they gradually lost much of their revolutionary zeal. In the course of the years, more and more of them became social democrats and reformers. (For further information and sources see Wolffsohn, 1983a: pt. II.)

The members of the second *aliya* were mainly from middle-class backgrounds but derived their ideology from the social reformers and revolutionaries of Russia and thus imported these variations of leftist ideology into Palestine.

For subsequent groups of arriving immigrants, the authority of these founding fathers of Poale Zion and Hapoel Hazair was, as even the highly self-confident Golda Meir confirmed, beyond dispute. (Meir herself was a leading representative of the third *aliya*.) Both politically and in purely personal terms, the leadership of the second *aliya* occupied – and effectively blocked – the key positions in the political, economic and cultural spheres for a long period lasting, in fact, well into the era following independence. (On the political elite of the Yishuv see Wolffsohn, 1983a: 223; Lissak, 1981: chs. 4 and 5, on the economy, and 6 on culture.)

Believing in the supreme importance of the organization as a prerequisite for successful development, the leaders of the second *aliya* launched economic enterprises with close ties to their parties and thus laid the decisive groundwork for the Histadrut as well as the later state sector of the economy. The network of links between party politics and the economy forged by the generation of the second *aliya* transcended its origins in the Labour bloc and became of central importance for the entire political and economic system in Israel since their achievements served as models for the efforts of the non-socialist groups as well (see Eisenstadt, 1973: 39).

The first *kibbutzim* were also organized by members of the second *aliya*. Contrary to some characterizations, the men and women who founded the *kibbutzim* were not Marxian socialists. Had they been true Marxists, they would have turned their activities to the organization of the industrial proletariat rather than becoming agricultural pioneers.

The immigrants of the *third aliya* (1919–23) belonged to the political generation shaped by the events of the Russian October Revolution. This was the true 'Bolshevist' political generation. More precisely, they were the Bolshevists of the early phase of the revolution who, although not seeking 'democracy for all', at least hoped to establish democracy for one 'class', namely, for the proletariat, rather than a party dictatorship. The 'working class' was to be the ruling class, but it was to be democratic, at least in its internal structures.

This ideological and organizational concept proved significant for the founding of the Histadrut. The third *aliya* was not agrarian. It was instead urban in its outlook and thus more strictly Marxian in that it believed in the revolutionary potential of the industrial proletariat. The only problem was that this proletariat did not yet exist.

The third *aliya* contributed both the ideology and the membership basis for the more leftist parties such as the Poale Zion Left, the Socialist Workers' Party and later the Communists.

The third *aliya* was also of importance for the religious bloc. The development of the leftist-religious parties (Hapoel Hamisrahi and Poale Agudat Israel) was closely related to the influence of basically socialistic (one could also say, egalitarian, justice-seeking) but non-materialistic ideals among Orthodox Russian and Polish Jews.

Many of the immigrants of the *fourth aliya* had experienced the period of Lenin's New Economic Policy in the Soviet Union. This form of modified 'free market' economics within a socialist framework served as a model which the socialists among the immigrants of the fourth *aliya* hoped to introduce

into Palestine. Their efforts considerably strengthened the then rather weak economic enterprises sponsored by Ahdut Haavoda and the Histadrut. Furthermore, their having experienced the creation of a powerful party apparatus in the Soviet Union also served in the long run to strengthen the parties they joined in Palestine, even though the socialists of the fourth *aliya* were for a long time forced to accept relatively minor positions in the party hierarchy and had to content themselves mainly with offices on the local level.

Quantitatively, however, middle-class ideology and backgrounds dominated in the fourth *aliya*, which for the first time provided a recruiting ground for non-socialist groups and thus represented a threat to the domination of the Labour bloc. The extent to which the fourth *aliya* turned the political current against the parties of the left is demonstrated by a comparison of the results of the elections to the Delegates' Assemblies of 1920 and 1925 (see Figure 13).

The fact that the Orthodox immigrants of the fourth *aliya* arriving from Poland in the early 1920s had experienced the wave of anti-Semitism then raging in their native land led to a more moderate stance among Agudat Israel supporters with regard to Zionism, although only gradually and over the long term (Wolffsohn, 1983a: 158 ff.; Friedmann, 1977: chs. 10–12).

The 'modernization' of the Orthodox part of the Yishuv was significantly affected by the immigration of religious German Jews arriving with the *fifth aliya* (Marmorstein, 1969; Schiff, 1977: ch. 3; Friedmann, 1977: ch. 14). These German Jews, both strongly Orthodox and at the same time 'modern', tried to combine Torah (i.e. religious) and Derech Eretz (i.e. secular) concerns in a functional and technical approach. More important, having experienced the rise of National Socialism at first hand, the German immigrants had come to realize the important contribution Zionist organizations were making to the very survival of the Jewish people. Their resistance to Zionism was thus already overcome. This was also true of numerous Polish immigrant supporters of Agudat Israel as well, who owed their survival to the Zionists who helped to secure the all-important immigration visa to Palestine. This process of 'modernization' and the subsequent more moderate attitude towards and even cooperation with Zionism provoked in turn a split within the Orthodox membership of Agudat Israel. The most strictly Orthodox believers rejected any form of compromise with Zionism, broke away from the AI and founded Neture Kartha (Guardians of the City). They continue to live in the Mea Shearim quarter of Jerusalem and their rejection in principle of the State of Israel even extends to cooperation with the PLO.

During the fifth *aliya*, the generation of the Great Depression and of National Socialism made its impact felt among the Labour parties. The socialist part of this political generation believed that the collapse of capitalism was imminent and was filled with a revolutionary impatience which manifested itself most particularly in the increasingly leftward movement of Hashomer Hazair.

Among the parties of the middle class, the fifth *aliya* led to the foundation of the liberal-bourgeois New Immigration Party (later known as the Progressive Party/Independent Liberals), the political fate of which remained closely tied to the maturity and ageing of its generation of predominantly

bourgeois German immigrants (see Wolffsohn, 1983a: ch. 27 for data).

The most important development which the fifth *aliya* brought for the middle-class parties was the arrival of militant young Poles, members of the Revisionist youth organization Beitar. Their militancy can be explained as a reaction against the rising tide of anti-Semitism which they had experienced in Poland. Once in Palestine, they demanded an 'active' policy against the Arabs and the Mandate authorities. Without these young militants Ezel would probably not have been founded, nor would it have made itself independent of the Revisionists.

Due to their predominantly bourgeois composition, the fourth and fifth *aliyot* also led to an increase in the prestige of such 'middle-class' professions as medicine and law.

Figure 35   The aliya *from Europe.*

Source: Carta, 1977: 28.

At first, Sabras of all political blocs and persuasions were only able to continue along existing lines, and not to go off in new directions. Again and again the polls have established that the Sabras are more pragmatic than the 'founding fathers' and identify less with Mapai/ILP or the left in general. For a long time it was possible to apply the simple formula: the younger, the more to the right. (See Tables 18 and 19, and for further data Etzioni-Halevy and Shapira, 1977: 58 f.; Arian, 1979: 81, and 1978: 81; Wolffsohn, 1983a: 166 ff.)

The gradual shift to the right is therefore closely connected to the structural 'Sabraization' of Israeli society (see also C/XII/4). It must also be

noted that 'Oriental' Israelis have a higher birth rate, so that the growth in the numbers of Sabras means at the same time an increase in the proportion of 'Orientals'. 'Sabraization' and 'Orientalization' are intertwined processes.

During the Yishuv and in the first years of the new state of Israel, the only channels to political power open to Sabras led through the ranks of the various party militias and later Zahal (see Wolffsohn, 1983a: 169 ff. for examples and further literature).

The generation of Sabras born in the 1920s did not attain real political power until the installation of the Rabin government in 1974. This group is known as the Generation 5708, the political generation whose soldiers fought for and achieved the independence of Israel in the year 5708 of the Jewish calendar (1948/9). Sabras are now in the process of taking over in most of the parties.

In the National Religious Party the pragmatic generation of the 1930s (Education Minister Hammer and his followers among the NRP 'young guard') has gradually assumed power since 1968, this precipitating an ideological as well as generational and ethnic crisis within the NRP. These ageing youngsters are also of Ashkenasi origin.

To continue the practice of naming political generations according to significant formative events, this is the political generation of the Sinai Campaign.

The political generation of the Six Day War was the first ever to experience the new political-geographical dimensions of Eretz Israel (i.e. Greater Israel) with the occupied territories. Nevertheless, its organizational (but not its ideological) impact appears to be less than that of the political generation of the Yom Kippur War with its protest movements and demands for greater political participation, activism and more 'democracy'. This is also the same political generation which sought either to promote (Peace Now) or to prevent (Gush Emunim) the peace-making process with Egypt by means of extra-parliamentary activities, and it is at the same time the political generation in which significant numbers of individuals have for the first time refused to follow military orders, as for example in the occupied territories and in Lebanon.

The political trend towards the right, involving a shift away from the ideals of the *halutzim*, the agricultural pioneers, in particular, as well as a decreasing emphasis on ideology in general, was not only strengthened by the arrival of the Afro-Asian immigrants of the late 1940s. It was also encouraged by the traditional parties themselves in their attempts to 'buy' political allegiances. Considerable efforts were undertaken to provide services in all areas of life for the newly arrived immigrants in the hope of influencing their later behaviour at the polls. The fact that Oriental, especially Moroccan, immigrants remained at a disadvantage led to their gradual move away from the party of the 'founding fathers', Mapai/ILP, to the Herut/Gahal/Likud bloc.

Since this shift clearly involves a protest reaction, the Likud could easily lose the support of Oriental Israelis if it fails materially to improve their situation. Up to and including the Knesset elections of 1984, however, this had not happened – at least not yet. If on some future election day, Oriental voters decide once again to register a protest at the polls, it will go against the


Figure 36   The aliya *from Arab countries.*

Source: Carta, 1977: 27.

leadership of the Likud and other rightist parties like Tehiya, which is, after all, an almost exclusively Ashkenasi organization. A purely ethnic but corrupt list like Tami may not be their preference. An ethnic Orthodox party like Shass, which obtained four Knesset seats in 1984, may be more attractive. A more far-reaching Orientalization of the Herut rank-and-file as well as its leadership may prove the most promising possibility. The already at least partially completed 'takeover' of Herut may be one reason why Oriental Israelis did not abandon their allegiance to the Likud in 1984 despite economic setbacks and what appears to have been their original intention to 'punish' the ruling party, at least if we are to believe the pre-election polls.

In principle, a government steering a hard course on foreign policy issues in general and in relations with the Arabs and the occupied territories in particular seems to meet with the general understanding and support of younger Sabras and Oriental Jews. (See also section B/VI/2/e.)

(e) POPULATION POLICY

From the beginning of the Mandate in 1922, and especially after 1939, the British allowed only limited numbers of Jews to immigrate to Palestine. The Zionist parties had argued in vain for an 'open door' policy and were forced to accept immigration quotas, which they then divided up in a manner which was anything but non-political.

The Zionist parties, which were dominant at first only in the Yishuv but later also in the entire WZO, distributed the precious immigration permits mainly to their own supporters (for data see Horowitz and Lissak, 1977: 257; Friedlander and Goldscheider, 1979: 71 ff.). It must nevertheless be noted that the socialist Zionists of that time evidenced the strongest dedication to the work of building a Jewish society in Palestine. However politicized and immoral this immigration policy many have been, it did prove advantageous

to the establishment of the later state. Individual and collective interests clearly collided in this case.

After achieving independence, Israel immediately opened its doors to all immigrants and in 1950 passed the Law of Return, Article 1 of which states that 'every Jew has the right to immigrate to Israel' and thus to attain Israeli citizenship.

The mass immigration of the years 1948 to 1951 confronted the new state with enormous economic and social problems, as Oriental immigrants often arrived with little or no vocational training to qualify them for jobs in a modern industrial economy.

In November 1951 'selection criteria' for immigrants were established by the Jewish Agency (Friedlander and Goldscheider, 1979: 98 ff.). In practice, these guidelines gave preference to immigrants from Europe or America. By that time, however, the number of immigrants from these continents was steadily declining. In the early 1950s upper-class Jewish emigrants from North Africa preferred to immigrate to France (ibid.: 102). The new regulations thus had little effect on the composition of the immigrant groups.

'The Orientals were not Israel's first choice, but there was no other alternative than to accept them' (Smooha, 1978: 86.) It is said that Nahum Goldmann even suggested sending some 100,000 Jews from Morocco and Iraq back to their native lands in 1952 but that Ben-Gurion resisted the proposal. (Minutes of a meeting between the Israeli government and the WZO cited in a book by S. Ben-Simchon, *Haaretz*, 2 August 1983. I have thus far not been able to substantiate the truth of this claim.)

Reparations payments by the Federal Republic of Germany contributed to the improvement of Israel's economic situation beginning in 1954, when a phase of significant economic growth set in (see section C/XIII). The policy of immigration quotas for North African Jews was, however, continued, thus opening an apparent gap between ideological pronouncements and political reality. This led to domestic political controversies in Israel, Herut condemning the restrictions on immigration most sharply and drawing parallels to the policies of the British Mandate (Friedlander and Goldscheider, 1979: 104 ff.). This may, indeed, have been the beginning of the Orientalization of Herut supporters, a process which was to prove a decisive factor in the 1977, 1981 and 1984 elections.

The predominance of immigrants from Europe and America since 1967, as well as the stream of Soviet immigrants, mainly between 1971 and 1973, were phenomena closer to the economic, cultural and social ideal. The reluctance of the Jewish upper classes from Iran to immigrate to Israel after the Iranian Revolution was registered with disappointment. That this was so nevertheless fits the general pattern established since the beginnings of Zionist immigration to Palestine.

(f) EMIGRATION

Even among the highly motivated members of the second *aliya*, which began in 1904, only some 6,000 of the original 37,000 immigrants still remained in Palestine by 1918 (Gorni, 1970: 205 f.). In 1927 and 1928 more Jews emigrated from than immigrated to Palestine.

After independence as well, the numbers of Jews turning their backs on Israel were significant. The not always uncontroversial figures of the Central Bureau of Statistics list some 390,900 Israeli citizens as 'not yet returned' (*Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1983: 125, also with annual statistics). In the summer of 1984 a controversy arose over the exact number of *yordim* (the somewhat pejorative Hebrew word for emigrants). A study prepared for the Ministry of Immigrants Absorption claimed that 252,000 Israelis had left the country between 1948 and late 1983. The Central Bureau of Statistics, on the other hand, gave a figure of some 350,000 (G. Alon, *Haaretz*, 30 August 1984). Most of these emigrants live in the United States. The numbers were particularly high for 1980 (31,000), 1981 (32,400) and 1982 (90,800), although it must be noted that the time elapsed between the date of departure and the present is also the shortest. The most recent figures can, therefore, be expected to decrease after some time (see *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1982: 121, and 1983: 125).

Up until 1973 the annual figure for Israeli citizens 'not yet returned' was well under the 10,000 mark, the highest contingent (7,100) having been recorded in 1967. Table 25 shows the data for the period since 1973.

Table 25   Israeli Citizens 'Not Yet Returned', 1973–1983

1973	11,500
1974	12,900
1975	10,400
1976	13,500
1977	12,600
1978	8,100
1979	11,200
1980	24,400
1981	18,400
1982	33,300
1983	89,200

Source: *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, various vols.

It is also of significance that approximately 70% of the Jewish immigrants who were allowed to leave the Soviet Union in the 1970s decided to remain in various Western countries rather than proceed to Israel (data in Wolffsohn, 1983a: 399).

Yerida, that is, emigration, enjoys about the same prestige in Israeli Jewish society as a four-letter word. The *Talmud* (*Bava Batra* 91a) admonishes that Jews may leave Eretz Israel, the Land of Israel, only in case of emergencies and also states that 'everyone' (i.e. every Jew) 'who lives outside Israel acts like an idolater' (*Ketuvot* 110b).

What do the polls reveal? in April 1974, shortly after the Yom Kippur War, a survey conducted by the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research found that 9% of those questioned did 'not desire' or 'not desire very much' to remain in Israel, whereas 40% intended to continue on living there 'by all means'. Some 21% wanted to do so 'very much', 13% 'wanted' to, another 7% chose the response 'more or less' and 10% 'not very much' (Levy and

Gutmann, 1974: 36). Although only 9% expressed clearly 'negative attitudes' concerning their desire to stay in Israel and a total of 74% wanted to remain 'by all means', 'very much' or just 'wanted' to, the latter figure is certainly not impressively high for a country which wishes to act as a magnet for immigrants.

Moreover, the number of younger Israelis between the ages of 20 and 29 willing to leave is higher than among their elders. On the one hand, this must be seen within the context of a generally higher mobility among young people. On the other hand, it could also be argued that this indicates a weaker spiritual bond with Israel. The latter argument is strengthened by a PORI poll conducted in June 1980. Among its findings was that 36·1% of all Israelis between the ages of 18 and 29 approved of *yerida* (emigration), as opposed to 23·4% among the overall population (*Haaretz*, 8 July 1980). Here, too, origin was an important intervening factor. The desire to remain in Israel was stronger among Ashkenasim than among Oriental citizens (Levy and Gutmann, 1974: 43). *Yerida* was also approved of by more Oriental than Ashkenasi Israelis (PORI poll, loc. cit.).

Four years later, in March 1984, PORI conducted another survey on the subject and found that only 15% approved of emigration and 75% 'didn't approve'. In other words, the approval rate decreased from about 23% in 1980 to only 15% in 1984 (*World Opinion Update*, vol. VII, no. 5, May 1984: 71 f.).

At the same time, 28% of the interviewees stated that they personally knew people who were 'planning emigration' and 20% knew of actual emigrants or persons firmly intending to leave Israel. The interviewees nonetheless overwhelmingly rejected the idea of *yerida* for their own persons. Asked whether they considered themselves a 'potential emigrant', 90% replied they did not, and only 5% answered affirmatively (loc. cit.).

There is an undeniable gap between the position or attitude assumed by the interviewees and the actual behaviour of their environment.

(g) AGE STRUCTURE

Table 26 shows that Israel's population is extraordinarily young. However, the average age of the Jewish population steadily increased until 1981, whereas that of the non-Jewish, that is, Arab population declined during the period 1955 to 1970 and then remained constant until 1981. In 1982 the average age of both the Jewish and non-Jewish groups once again declined.

The extent to which the increasing youthfulness of the population is simultaneously a growing Orientalization is demonstrated by the 1982 statistics for children up to the age of 9, of which there were 134,800 among Sabras of Euro-American backgrounds, 148,900 among Sabras where the father is of North African heritage and 108,600 among Sabras where the father is of Asian extraction. This makes for a total of 257,500 among Jews of Afro-Asian origin. The 304,500 Sabras whose fathers were already born in Israel partially restored the balance, although with a shift in favour of the Oriental groups (*Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1983: 61). But here, too, we find a cross-current. The number of babies (children under the age of 1) was highest among Sabras with a father born in Israel, and there are more children between the ages of 1 and 4 whose fathers were born in Israel than


Figure 37a   The Jewish population: age, sex and origin, 1978 (%).

*Source*:   Karmon, 1983: 66.

Figure 37b   The non-Jewish population: age, sex and religion, 1978 (%).

Source: Karmon, 1983: 66.

Table 26 The Population of Israel, 1948–82: Age Structure

Age cohort as percentage of total:	0–4	5–14	15–19	20–24	25–34	35–44	45–64	65+	average age
Jews:									
8 Nov. 1948	12·2	16·5	8·4		43·9		15·0	4·0	28·9
1955	13·6	20·3	7·4	7·6	14·8	13·2	18·4	4·7	27·9
1970	10·7	19·4	10·4	10·0	12·0	10·7	19·6	7·2	30·1
1981	10·7	19·9	8·0	8·2	16·7	9·9	16·9	9·7	30·7
1982	10·5	20·2	8·0	7·9	16·6	10·4	16·9	9·5	30·2
Non-Jewish:									
1955	18·7	27·0	10·5	8·0	12·0	7·5	10·9	5·4	23·0
1970	19·5	30·2	10·1	7·4	12·3	8·0	8·6	3·9	21·1
1981	17·2	29·6	11·8	9·4	12·2	8·2	8·6	3·0	21·1
1982	16·7	29·8	11·7	9·0	12·5	8·2	8·7	2·8	20·7

Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1983: 56 f.

in Africa, Europe, America or Asia. The latter group is by far the smallest (loc. cit.). Among Sabra fathers, however, we may assume a significant number with Oriental origins. Nevertheless, the 'performance' of the ethnic groups seems to indicate an 'Ashkenization' of Orientals in terms of child-bearing.

The lowest average age among the Arab population groups is to be found among the Moslems (19·5 years), followed by the Druze (20·7) and the Christians (26·8) (Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1983: 57). This is closely related to the more 'modern' life-styles among the Christian Arabs (see section B/VI/3).

(h) OTHER DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

The divorce rate (per 1,000 of the average population) was 1·7 from 1950 to 1954, 0·9 from 1965 to 1969 and 1·3 in 1982 among the Jewish population. The divorce rate among Moslems was 0·7 from 1955 to 1959, 0·4 from 1965 to 1969, 0·7 in 1981 and 0·5 in 1982. The estimates for the Christian Arabs remain at about 0·1 between 1955 and 1981. Among the Druze the numbers were 1·0 from 1955 to 1959, 0·5 from 1965 to 1969, 0·6 for 1981 and 0·8 for 1982 (Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982: 75 ff.).

The infant mortality rate for the Jewish population sank from 38·8 for the period 1950/4 to 11·6 in 1982, among Moslems from 60·6 for 1955/9 to 22·1 in 1982 (a dramatic decline but still nearly double the rate for the Jewish population), among the Christian Arabs from 46·1 to 12·2 (significantly less than the rate for the Moslems and only slightly higher than that for the Jews!) and among the Druze from 54·3 to 18·9 (Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1983: 76 ff.).

The gross reproduction rate between 1955 and 1959 was 1·73 for the Jewish population, 3·98 for the Moslems, 2·24 for the Christian Arabs and 3·47 for the Druze. The figures for 1982 were 1·35 among Jews, 2·68 among Moslems, 1·13 among Christian Arabs (the lowest rate of all!) and 2·91 among Druze (ibid.: 98).

The general fertility rate for Jewish women was 121·8 in 1951, 90·7 in 1981 and 92·4 in 1982. For Sabras the rate was 107·9 in 1951, 101·8 in 1981 and 102·7 in 1982. For Afro-Asian woman it was 199·7 in 1951, 81·0 in 1981 and 80·9 in 1982 ('modernization'!). The rate for Euro-American women was 90·8 in 1951, 73·0 in 1981 and 77·5 in 1982. The fertility rates for Moslem mothers were 241·0 in 1955 (earliest available statistics) and 173·2 in 1982 (a much more modest 'modernization'). The decrease in the fertility rate for Christian Arab women was dramatic: from 147·3 in 1955 to 76·0 in 1982. The rates for Druze women were 202·7 in 1955 and 169·1 in 1982 (ibid.: 99 f.). The overall trend is towards fewer children, most especially among Euro-American Jews and Christian Arabs, and to a lesser but still observable extent among Moslems and Druze.

In all of these areas the patterns for Christian Arabs and Euro-American Jews on the one hand and Moslems and Druze on the other are remarkably similar.

The average life expectancy for 1971 was 72·8 years for Arab women and 68·7 for Arab men, 73·8 for Jewish women and 70·6 for Jewish men. The data for 1980 were 73·3 years for Arab women and 70·8 for Arab men, 76·2 for Jewish women and 72·8 for Jewish men (ibid., 1982: 110 and 1983: 114).

(i) REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION

The shifts in the percentage of the overall Israeli population residing in the various districts of the country are shown in Table 27. These figures show a clear shift to the southern region as well as a certain, although incomplete, reduction in the concentrations around Tel-Aviv and the Central District. It is noteworthy that the shift has been to the south, and not to Jerusalem, despite the prime ideological and political status of the nation's capital. The population increase of the Jerusalem District has, in fact, remained very limited. The strong development of the south is related to the settlement of Oriental immigrants there as well as to the 'challenge' of the Negev. In 1982

Table 27 Israel's Population Distribution by Region, 1948 and 1982 (%)

1948	1982	District
35·7	24·8	Tel-Aviv
14·3	20·4	Central District (including Petach Tikva, Ramlah, Rehovot and the Plain of Sharon)
16·8	15·4	Northern District (incl. 0·5% in the Golan Heights in 1982)
20·5	14·2	Haifa
2·5	12·2	Southern District
10·2	11·5	Jerusalem
—	0·5	'Judaea and Samaria'

Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1983: 33.

1% of the total population lived in the occupied territories (including the Golan Heights).

One means employed to relieve the congestion of the central areas was the founding of 'development towns' in which numerous new citizens of Oriental heritage have been settled since 1948. Among the better-known of these new centres are (from south to north) Mitzpe Rimon, Jeruham, Dimona, Beersheba, Arad, Ofakim, Netivot, Ashkelon, Ashdod, Javneh, Kiryat Gad, Bei-Shemesh, Afula, Upper Nazareth, Tiberias (formerly an Arab city) and Kiryat Shmonah (see Figure 38).

For the sake of electoral geographers it should be noted that many of these new towns delivered large majorities for the Likud in the elections of 1977, 1981 and 1984 (on regional inequalities see Gradus, 1983).

As was already the case at the time of the War of Independence, the Jewish population in 1982 was largely urban (90·2%). The Arab population, too, was becoming increasingly urbanized. Whereas 30–35% lived in the cities during the Mandate period, 55·4% did so in 1972 and 69·8% in 1982. At the same time, the proportion of the rural Arab population dropped from 44·6% to 30·2% (data compiled from various sources for the Mandate period and from the *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1983: 43).

2   THE 'SECOND ISRAEL': ORIENTAL JEWS

Oriental Israelis, that is, those Israelis whose roots lie in North African and West Asian countries, particularly those of Moroccan and perhaps least of all those of Iraqi heritage, tend to be more 'proletarian', more religious (Goldscheider and Friedlander, 1982: 10 ff.; Bar-Lev and Kedem, 1984; Shokeid, 1984) and more nationalistic than Israelis of European or American backgrounds. Furthermore, a significant socio-economic gap exists between these two groups.

(a) SOCIO-ECONOMIC DATA: THE INNER-JEWISH GAP

While the following statistics demonstrate an undeniable improvement in the quality of life for Oriental Israelis, the data also show that their development has nevertheless lagged behind that of Euro-American Jews in Israel.

1   Education

The proportion of Oriental Israelis in junior high schools (grades 6 to 8) and in high schools has risen dramatically (see Table 29). Table 40 indicates a continuous growth in the numbers of Oriental Israelis born outside Israel enrolled in higher education, but the proportions remain below those for students from European and American backgrounds.

Much more revealing are the data for the second generation, the Sabras of the various ethnic groups. Here the statistics show that proportional enrolments of Oriental Jews increased in the period up to 1974/5 but have been dropping since 1977/8. Both the time frame (the election of 1977 and the subsequent change in governments) and the political-psychological perspective are significant; the overall situation improves, hopes rise, the trend falters, disenchantment grows. In this case the trend was even backwards. It


Figure 38   Israel's development towns, by size of population, 1979.

Figure 39   The distribution of population (population density by
   natural regions).

Figure 40   Israel's population and communities.

Table 28   Israel's Arab Population. Distribution by Region, 1948 and
            1981 (%)

1948	1981	District
58·1	47·2	Northern District
17·6	15·7	Haifa
10·3	9·6	Central District
9·9	7·9	Southern District (mainly Bedouins)
2·3	1·6	Tel-Aviv
	18·2	Jerusalem (incl. East Jerusalem)

Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1983: 34.

must be noted, however, that the drop in the proportion of students among
Sabras of Euro-American backgrounds was even greater, as the demand for
university graduates had declined on the Israeli job market. (For further
information on the ethnic problem and education, see E. Peled, 1984;
Steinitz, 1984; Yossi Shavit, 1984; Shokeid, 1983; Yuchtman-Yaar and
Semyonov, 1979.)

Table 29   Jewish Secondary Students Ages 14–17, 1966/7 to 1981/2 by
            Parental Origin (number of students per 1,000 of appropriate
            population group and ratio of Euro-American to Afro-Asian
            groups)

Year	Euro-Americans	Afro-Asians	Ratio
1966/67	686	379	1·81
1969/70	775	442	1·75
1976/77	797	637	1·25
1979/80	809	710	1·14
1980/81	817	734	1·11
1981/82	828	758	1·09

Sources: Bernstein and Antonovsky, 1981: 11; Statistical Abstract of Israel,
            1982: 275, 291 and 1983: 298 f., 311.

2   Occupational Structures

The economic and intellectual elites of the Oriental Jews, most especially of
the Moroccan (and least of all the Iraqi) emigrants did not come to Israel.
For the most part the elite opted to immigrate to France instead.

The majority, that is, somewhat more than half of those who became
Israeli citizens, belonged to the traditional middle classes in their native
lands, that is to say, they were largely artisans and merchants (Friedlander
and Goldscheider, 1979: 42 f.).

In Israel the new immigrants found employment mainly in 'proletarian'
occupations, a situation which became even more pronounced among the

Table 30   Jewish Students Ages 20–29, 1964 to 1980/81 by Origin of
            Father (% of all Jews of the appropriate age cohort, approx.
            75% of all students in 1978/9)

Origin	1964/65	1969/70	1972/73	1974/75	Average 1977/78 and 1978/79	1980/81
Israel Total:	8·1	9·9	9·8	9·5	7·5	7·2
Father from:						
Israel	5·2	7·5	8·6	10·0	11·3	
Africa/Asia	1·6	2·5	2·8	3·0	2·6	
Europe/America	10·7	12·6	13·8	14·0	12·7	
Africa/Asia	0·8	1·6	2·0	2·1	2·1	2·8
Europe/America	5·3	9·8	9·3	8·4	9·8	9·1

Sources: Council for Higher Education, 1982: 14; Statistical Abstract of Israel,
            1982: 629, and 1983: 657.

Sabras of the second (Sabra) generation than was the case for the immigrant
generation (Bernstein and Antonovsky, 1981: 15).

In 1978, 50·5% of the immigrant generation and 57·4% of second-
generation Sabras were blue-collar workers. Among Euro-American immi-
grants to Israel this trend was reversed: 34·4% were blue-collar workers in
the first generation and only 28·2% in the second. In 1982, 36·6% of Oriental
immigrants and 34·5% of the second generation were to be found in blue-
collar occupations. Among Euro-American immigrants 25·2% of the first
generation were blue-collar workers and only 13% of the following genera-
tion born in Israel. Despite the remaining gap, an improvement for the
second generation of Oriental Jews is recognizable. (See 'Jewish employed
persons by occupation, contingent of birth, period of immigration and sex',
in *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1983: 370 f.)

In 1982, 25·3% of Oriental Sabras and 15·9% of the immigrant generation
were employed as white-collar workers ('clerical and related'). The propor-
tions for the Euro-American groups were 18·7% and 25·4%, first and second
generations respectively. This can be viewed as a recognizable improvement,
provided clerical work is to be considered as such. The proportion of
professional and technical workers rose from 9·0% (immigrant generation) to
12·0% (second, Sabra generation) among Oriental Israelis, but rose among
Ashkenasim from 15·5% to 24·7% (loc. cit.).

In the scientific and academic professions the gap was enormous: 15·2% of
Ashkenasi Sabras were occupied in these professions in contrast to only 2·6%
of Oriental Sabras. In the immigrant generations 13·8% of the Ashkenasim
as opposed to 3·0% of the Orientals fell into this category. For Oriental
Israelis this meant that there had been no improvement at all from one
generation to the next (loc. cit.).

In 1954, 43·2% of Oriental Israelis were employed in construction or in industry. This fell to only 31·9% among Oriental immigrants by 1981 and to 31·4% among Oriental Sabras, a pronounced downward trend overall, but one showing little difference between the generations. The proportions declined among Ashkenasim from 35·2% to 22·8% in the immigrant generation and to 13·2% among Sabras during the same period. The gap thus remained (Smooha, 1978: 291 f.; *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1982: 348 f.).

3 Income and Housing

Table 31 includes data on income since 1930 and shows a clear decline in the transition period from the Mandate to the first years after independence and an improvement during the 1970s as well as the continuing gap between Ashkenasim and Oriental Jews. Despite this gap, however, the overall economic improvement is impressive – a development which can easily lead to exaggerated expectations all too difficult to fulfil (see Semyonov and Krauss, 1983).

The gap operating in favour of second-generation Oriental Jews in the area of housing in 1980 should also be noted.

4 Composition of the Oriental Population

Neither the differences in the composition of Israel's Oriental population before and after independence nor the fact that this group represented a very distinct minority up to 1948 should be overlooked. Only 4·7% of the third *aliya* came from Western Asia or North Africa. In the fourth *aliya* the proportion was 11·8% and in the fifth 9·0%. From 1939 to 1945, 18·3% and from 1946 to 1948, 4·0% of the immigrants were Orientals, whereby the numbers of West Asians greatly exceeded those from North Africa (Friedlander and Goldscheider, 1979: 38).

5 Income Distribution

The data in Table 31 also indicate a significant leap forward economically for Oriental Israelis in the period from 1970 to 1975. A slight backward trend set in in 1977 (change of governments) and continued through 1980. In 1981 there was a slight improvement, which certainly was not without effect on the election results (see section C/XIII/2). The setback in 1982 was minor.

A study of the regional distribution of income reveals that the new 'development towns' in which mainly Oriental immigrants have been settled since 1948 rank well below the national average in income (Ginor, 1979: 109). This fact is significant for understanding the geography of Israel's election results.

6 Poverty

Poverty will be defined here as having an income ranking among the lowest 10% on the scale. While Ginor (1979: 175) registered an increase in poverty among Oriental Jews from 59·9% to 67·3% in the period from 1968/9 to 1975/6, her data also registered a concurrent drop in poverty among Ashkenasim from 33·2% to 22·2%.

Table 32 includes data for the period from 1975/6 to 1979/80. These

Table 31 The Jewish Population, 1930–1984
By Origin, Income and Living Conditions

	Income/Oriental Family (% of Euro-Am.)	Persons/Room	
		Euro-Am.	Afr.-As.
1930	70	2.5	3.5
1946	78	2.7	4.5
1956/57	73	2.1	3.2
1965	72		
1968/69	72	1.6	2.0
1970	74		
1975	82		
1977	81	1.0	1.6
1980	80		
1981	81	2.5* (3.4)	4.0* (3.4)
1982	80		
1983	82	3.1*	4.5*
1984	78	3.1*	4.5*

*Persons per household
() Second generation

Sources:
Ginor, 1979:106; *Statistical Abstract*, various vols.

figures illustrate a dramatic improvement in the economic situation of Oriental Jews (as well as Israeli Arabs). This is especially true in the case of the more recent immigrants, where a gap has opened in favour of the Oriental Jews.

The index of relative equality is defined as the average monthly income of Oriental Israelis in IL (Israeli pounds) or – since 1980 – in shekels, divided by the average monthly income of the Ashkenasi population then multiplied by 100. This index has risen from 73 in 1956/7 to 82 in 1975, 87 in 1977 and 92·3 in 1979/80 (Smooha, 1978: 282; *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1978: 297, and 1983: 295).

(b) THE SOCIAL GAP: ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOUR

Apart from short-term emotional waves of mutual solidarity (for example, during the wars of 1967 and 1973 and the Lebanon incursion of March 1978), attitudes towards ethnic relations among Jewish Israelis have remained fairly stable (see Figure 41 and Table 33). Following every outbreak of hostilities, up to and including the Lebanon incursion of 1978, polls revealed that ethnic feelings were consistently perceived as more harmonious than immediately before the fighting began. The outbreak of the War in Lebanon in 1982 represents an exception to this pattern. Failing to generate even a passing wave of emotional unity, the War in Lebanon only contributed to the deterioration of the social consensus in Israel.

In July 1981 a PORI survey found that 69·2% of Oriental Jews expressed

Table 32   Poverty in the Jewish Population, 1975/76 to 1979/80 (income in lowest 10%)

	1975/76	1979/80
Jews in total	82·5	96·3
Afro-Asians in total	55·5	31·0
Veterans	34·8	21·5
New immigrants	20·7	9·5
European-Americans in total	18·3	57·9
Veterans	11·1	31·8
New immigrants	7·2	26·1
Israel	8·7	7·4
Non-Jews	17·5	3·7

Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1977: 266 f., and 1983: 302 f.

the belief that they were not being discriminated against, an opinion which was shared by 50% of the Ashkenasim and 65% of the Likud voters but only 52·9% of the Maarah voters. Among the population as a whole, the percentage of those perceiving discrimination fell from 64% in 1971 to 58·7% in July of 1981 (*Haaretz*, 5 August 1981).

The surveys conducted by Ben-Rafael (1982: 147) in 1978 and 1979 revealed that Israelis of Moroccan and Yemenite backgrounds viewed the ethnic polarization as significantly sharper than that between 'rich' and 'poor', 'left' and 'right' or 'religious' and 'secular'.

A striking phenomenon continuing from the 1950s to the present is that North African Jews are much more likely to seek the company of Ashkenasim than is the case the other way around (details in Wolffsohn, 1983a: 410 ff.; Ben-Rafael, 1982: 137, 167). The latter apparently view such contacts as a step down, the former as a step up the social ladder. It would seem equally manifest that Oriental Jews have come to assume the dominant European-American value-structure and prefer 'integration' to the kind of 'pluralism' Smooha (1978: 14) defines as 'cultural diversity and social division'.

The acceptance of intermarriage (among Sabras) is greater among Oriental Jews than Ashkenasim, although here, too, the polls indicate an increasing willingness to enter into mixed marriages (Peres, 1976: 91; Levy and Gutmann, 1976a: 297).

Surveys of attitudes may be very revealing, but actual behaviour is a more valid indicator. Let us therefore examine the data on intermarriage. An intermarriage or 'endogamy' index is calculated by Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics. The lower the index is, the more frequent are the cases of intermarriage. This index was 0·81 in 1955, 0·73 in 1965, 0·64 in 1975, 0·62 in 1979 and 0·60 in 1980. This indicates that the greatest progress in mutual acceptance was made between the 1950s and the 1960s and continued into the 1970s but that conditions have remained relatively unchanged since then. (On the offspring of ethnic intermarriages, see Yogev and Jamsky, 1984.)

In a study of acquaintance networks, Weimann (1984) found that these are also impinged upon by ethnic distinctions.


Figure 41   Attitudes towards ethnic relations in Israel, 1967–82 'very good' or 'good'.

Table 33   Attitudes towards Ethnic Relations in Israel, 1967–82 (%)

Period	% of respondents replying 'very good' or 'quite good'
June 1967	84
Up to April 1969	Between 84 and 74
March–April 1971	65 (beginning of 'Black Panther' activities)
June–July 1971	47
May–June 1972	40
July–September 1973	43
October 1973	80 (Yom Kippur War)
April 1974	47
May 1974	57 Maalot
Summer 1975 to Autumn 1977	Between 55 and 61*
Summer 1978	68 (March: fighting in Lebanon against PLO)
March 1979	59
July–August 1982	58 (polarization after 1981 elections, War in Lebanon

*Only a slight drop up to the May elections.

Sources: Etzioni-Halevy and Shapira, 1977: 201 ff.; Stone, 1982: 286; Ben-Sira, 1983: 85.

It must also be noted that Oriental Jews seem to prefer an increasing political compartmentalization, as evidenced by a growing trend in favour of the small parties in their voting behaviour from 1977 to 1984. In addition, they have established more strongly ethnic parties in the religious camp. Thus Tami was founded in 1981 and achieved notable success, only to lose in 1984, whereas Shass, formed in 1983, did well in 1984. On the other hand, there was also a trend towards rather than away from Herut.

(c) UNDERREPRESENTATION

Smooha (1978: 39 ff.) has drawn up an impressive collection of data on the underrepresentation of Israeli immigrants from Islamic countries, and the present author has supplemented the collection (Wolffsohn, 1983a: 413 ff., 432, 503).

Although Oriental Jews remain undeniably underrepresented in Israeli society, a certain improvement cannot be overlooked. Nevertheless, the rule of thumb still holds: the lower the political rank, the better the representation of Oriental Israelis.

This can be observed particularly well on the level of local politics. In 1957, for example, only 20·9% of the general secretaries in the local Histadrut workers' councils were of Oriental heritage. The percentage had risen to 56·9% by 1973 (Smooha, 1978: 318).

There are also hopeful signs to be noted in the upper echelons of the political system. Oriental Jews have become judges in the Israeli Supreme Court; Israel's chief of staff in 1984, Moshe Levy, was an immigrant from Iraq; and the man who became secretary general of the Histadrut in 1984, Israel Kessar, is from Sanaa in Yemen.

Apparently, Jews from the Arab states of Asia are at an advantage in comparison with Jews from North Africa. It must not, however, be overlooked that David Levy, an immigrant from Morocco (and therefore not a Sabra) was defeated by a relatively narrow margin in the September 1983 ballot of the Herut Central Committee to choose the party's candidate for the post of prime minister. The winner was Yitzhak Shamir, who is of Polish extraction.

The increase in the number of Oriental MKs representing religious parties in the Eleventh Knesset (1984) was striking. Seven out of the thirteen members from religious parties were Oriental Jews. These included all four of the Shass deputies, two of the four NRP parliamentarians and Tami's only delegate, Abuhatzira.

Finally, the very low number of Jews of African or Asian descent to attain high rank in the military (major general or troop commander) ought to be mentioned. Between 1948 and the end of December 1978, 105 of the officers who had attained such a rank were of European or American ancestry and 82 were Sabras – most of these, in turn, were Ashkenasim and only 7 were of Oriental heritage (compiled from data provided by the IDF spokesman). Chief of Staff Levy therefore represents an exception illustrating that the factor of ancestry can serve as an impediment to the larger group but presents no bar to advancement for the particularly industrious and able individual. In the case of equal accomplishments, the disadvantages become fewer. These are socio-economic rather than individual in nature.

(d) POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOUR

The political consciousness of Israelis of Oriental heritage is much more pronounced in the second generation than in the first (Shoked and Deshen, 1977: ch. 12, and 1982: 155 ff.; Levy and Gutmann, 1976a: ch. 7; Lehman-Wilzig, 1981: 188).

At the same time, the polls have shown that Sabras of Oriental backgrounds stand more to the 'right' politically than their parents. (See Etzioni-Halevy and Shapira, 1977: 57 for polls on the 'left' and 'right' as well as religious issues.)

Over the long term this meant that it was the growing numbers of Sabras of African and Asian heritage which caused the political pendulum to swing, first in favour of Gahal/Likud and the NRP (up to 1977) and then also to Tehiya and Tami in 1981 as well as Shass and Rabbi Kahane in 1984. This has been especially evident in the 'development towns' since 1965 (see Tables 18 and 19 as well as Wolffsohn, 1983a: 188 f. and 326–30).

According to polls conducted by Hanoch and Rafi Smith (*Jerusalem Post*, 3 August 1984), 51·1% of Israel's Oriental Jews voted Likud in 1977, 51·6% in 1981 and 52·3% in 1984. Tehiya got 1·3% of the Oriental vote in 1981 and 3·2% in 1984. Rabbi Kahane received 2·5% of the votes cast by Oriental Jews in 1984. Their overall vote for the religious parties dropped from 17·9% in 1977 to 15·7% in 1981 and 15·3% in 1984 (17·8%, however, including Kahane's Kach). To sum up: since 1977 roughly 70% of the Oriental Jewish vote has gone to the Likud and to religious parties; conversely, 'only' about

60% of Euro-American Jews have voted for Labour and its allies since 1977.

Despite the measurable, 'objective' improvement in the socio-economic situation of Oriental Jews, the heightened political consciousness of the younger generation has brought the recognition that possibly even more can be accomplished by means of protest votes. One anti-establishment step could be taken by merely voting Herut/Gahal/Likud, which maintained its non-establishment image through the elections of 1981 and even in 1984, at least as far as its 'Oriental' touch was concerned. In the early 1970s some of the highly impatient founded the party of the 'Black Panthers', which has since undergone numerous splits and remained ineffective. Tami (established in 1981) and Shass (in 1983/4) proved relatively successful anti-establishment ethnic lists.

Figure 42 illustrates the increasing preference of Oriental Jews, especially Sabras, for Gahal/Likud (see Arian, 1983: 96; Peres and Shemer, 1984).


Figure 42   Party preferences of Oriental Jews, 1969–85.

In 1977 and 1981 Oriental Israelis decided the outcome of the elections and were also a key factor in the 1984 stalemate. In 1981 and in 1984 the Likud was the bloc chosen most often by Oriental Jews, and the Maarah was the choice of Ashkenasim.

Diskin (1982a), however, has demonstrated that Oriental Israelis are more prepared to stick with the Likud through good times rather than in bad, their electoral loyalty depending on concrete economic promises and measures. It was as a result of the well-timed measures of Finance Minister Aridor in 1981

that the turnabout in public opinion in favour of the Likud came about.

But why, then, did they still cast their votes for the Likud in 1984, when the economic outlook for the average Oriental Israeli was less bright than it seemed in 1981? Was it because the short-lived election-time economic bubble which rose in early 1984 brought them back over again? This seems unlikely, as there was only a minor improvement in the rating given the economic policy of the Likud-led government by the general public between December 1983 and July 1984. The approval rate increased from 11% to 18% (Smith polls, *Jerusalem Post*, 17 July 1984), but the overall gap between Labour and Likud grew ever narrower (Smith polls, *Jerusalem Post*, 19 June 1984).

One explanation is that the party identification of Oriental Likud voters has in the meantime intensified. About 30% of the general Israeli public claims to make its choice at the polls for reasons of identification with or support for a specific party or its leadership team rather than because of the party's positions on economic or social policy (Smith polls, *Jerusalem Post*, 29 June 1984). Despite the vacillation which can be observed in the polls taken between the elections of 1977 and 1981 as well as in the period between the 1981 and 1984 Knesset elections, Oriental Jews apparently returned to Likud at the polling station, making their decision even as late as on election day itself, as Diskin claimed in 1984 (*Haaretz*, 5 August 1984). Apart from some cyclical volatility, there now seems to be a stronger identification with the Likud among Oriental voters than has previously been assumed.

Upon further consideration, however, a qualification must be made with regard to this theory. It would appear that this party identification has proved highly susceptible to election-time 'gifts'. We have already observed this phenomenon between January and June 1981 as well as between June and July 1984. In both cases, timely measures taken by the Likud-led coalition led within four weeks to a dramatic improvement in the government's image in the eyes of the public. Approval of the government's economic performance (as 'successful' or 'fairly successful') rose from 12% in June to 18% in July 1984, approval of its social policies from 29% to a sensational, ethnically accentuated 46%, approval of its defence policy from 40% to 46%, and of its handling of foreign affairs from 38% to 45%. Finally, public approval of the government's overall performance rose from 25% to 34% (H. and R. Smith, *Jerusalem Post*, 17 July 1984). This data would seem to cast serious doubt on the theory of increased party identification and to suggest that a better explanation might be found in the mechanics of electoral manipulation, both in 1981 and 1984.

Without the predominantly Moroccan Tami Party, the Likud victory among Oriental Jews would have been even more clear-cut in 1981, and if it had not been for Shass, the Likud might have won a slightly greater share of the vote in 1984. Tami and, to an even greater extent, Shass represent the most successful purely Oriental political groupings to date, although it must be added that this success appears much more modest when viewed from a larger perspective, especially with regard to Likud's ethnic results. This is due in part to the fact that Oriental Israelis have, in principle, always sought to improve their situation within the framework of the traditional established parties. (For further details and literature, see Wolffsohn, 1983a: 418 ff.)

Table 34   Selected Findings Presenting the Dynamics of Public Opinion within Different Subgroups (%)

	Between the wars of 1967 and 1973	Between Sadat's visit and October 1980
Subdivision by Country of Origin		
Percentage assessing that Israeli Arabs' loyalty is diminishing		
1) Israel born of European origin	15–23	34–61
2) Israel born of Asia-Africa origin	8–31	23–45
3) European born	23–36	45–69
4) Asia-Africa born	23–27	36–64
Percentage ready to become friendly with Israeli Arabs		
1) Israel born of European origin	25–41	66–75
2) Israel born of Asia-Africa origin	20–23	52–60
3) European born	27–37	60–69
4) Asia-Africa born	19–21	55–61
Percentage of those claiming that Arabs are not inferior to Jews		
1) Israel born of European origin	40–44	70–71
2) Israel born of Asia-Africa origin	23–31	58–60
3) European born	33–49	68–75
4) Asia-Africa born	24–25	41–49

Source: Peled, 1983: table 3.

Despite all of the above, we must look for still further reasons to account for the preference of Oriental Israelis for the Likud. In doing so, let us turn to the issues of relations with the Arabs and of settlements in the occupied territories.

(e) ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE ARABS AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
The polls have shown time and again that Israelis of European and American origin at all educational levels are more willing to form friendships with Arabs than Jews of Oriental ancestry belonging to the same sociological groups (Peled, 1972: 62; Peres, 1976: 91 ff.; Levy and Gutmann, 1976a: 277; Zemah, 1980; Peled, 1973).

Whereas all the other data referred to in this section (as well as in all other studies on the subject) present a momentary picture, Table 34 shows the results of the longitudinal research Peled (1983) has carried out together with her colleagues in the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research (IIASR, Jerusalem) since 1967.

Oriental Jews are more optimistic as to the loyalty of Israeli Arabs than

their Ashkenasi counterparts, who may see things more realistically. In general, the first as well as the second generations of Oriental Israelis have remained less willing to establish friendly personal relationships with Israeli Arabs than Ashkenasim. The latter also less often considered Arabs to be inferior than did Orientals. Nevertheless, a comparison between the data for the period between 1967 and 1973 with the figures for the years 1977 to 1980 will show an overall moderation among all groups.

While 50% of the immigrants from Europe and America were interested in social contacts with Arabs, only 41% of the immigrants from Africa and Asia expressed similar interest. In the second generation the relationship was 51% to 39%, an even wider gap (Zemah, 1980: 45 f.). Since, in contrast to their parents, the younger generation has grown up in Israel and thus has had no direct negative experience in Arab countries, this result must be viewed as a product of their political education in Israel. It is possible that they have merely assumed the attitudes of their parents, but it is also imaginable that they have, as members of an underprivileged group themselves, sought another group to which they might feel superior. If such an attitude already existed in principle, it was certainly reinforced by the political confrontation with the Arab states and the PLO.

This data is doubly important, first because further reverberations in the Israeli–Arab/Palestinian conflict cannot be excluded as it becomes ever more difficult for the political parties in Israel to 'sell' a dove-like policy, and second because of the effects on the Arabs living in Israel proper.

In all polls conducted by IIASR since 1967, far more Oriental Israelis than Ashkenasim have said they felt 'hate' for the Arabs (Levy and Gutmann, 1976a: 277; Z. Peled, 1979: 8, and 1980).

In September 1979, 70% of all Jewish Israelis responded that they believed their Arab fellow-citizens did 'not hate' them (Peled, 1980: 15 f.). Peled does not give any figures with regard to ethnic differences, but this clear majority opinion would not have been possible without Oriental Israelis. It must be noted on the other hand that, according to a poll conducted by Zemah (1980: 37) in January 1980, 51·6% of Jewish Israelis believed that the native Arabs did, in fact, 'hate' them. These numbers must therefore be interpreted with great caution. It is a noteworthy fact that Israelis of the older generation in Tel-Aviv and in the other 'older' cities expressed this pessimistic opinion much more frequently (totals ranging from 57% to 63%) than inhabitants of the newer development towns (21%) with their large Oriental majorities. On the other hand, 52% of the latter believed that Israel's Arabs had not yet accepted the existence of the Jewish state and 60% agreed with the statement that their Arab fellow citizens were 'happy' to see Israel suffer setbacks (Zemal, 1980: 89 f.).

According to a PORI poll, industrial workers (mainly Oriental Jews) are 'more' likely (exact figures not given) to favour deporting 'Arabs who promote disturbances in the West Bank and Gaza Strip' (general population: 45·9% in favour, 39·7% against, *Haaretz*, 3 July 1981). Of the Israelis polled, 55·5% denied any responsibility on the part of their country for the September 1982 massacre of Palestinians in Beirut, and here the proportion of Oriental Israelis was 'substantially higher' (PORI poll in *Haaretz*, 3 November 1982).

Support for settlements in the occupied territories was stronger among

Oriental than Ashkenasi Israelis in both the 1974 and 1979 polls conducted by the IIASR (Bach *et al.*, 1974: 10; Levinsohn, 1979: 10). By the end of 1982 the enormous costs of the government's settlements policy had sparked controversies within the parties – including Herut – as to whether or not an active settlements policy and social welfare programmes were mutually exclusive (see, for example, *Haaretz*, 24 November 1982 and 23 December 1982). For the first time, the grass-roots Peace Now movement was able to organize demonstrations with more than just a symbolic handful of Oriental Jews participating (*NZZ*, 18 January 1983; L. Galili, *Haaretz*, 26 September 1982). Apart from these individual points of agreement, however, public opinion surveys showed that Israelis of Oriental heritage rejected 'the tactics' of Peace Now in far greater numbers than the 53·8% of the (not further defined) general public which did so in July 1983 (M. Segal, *Jerusalem Post*, 16 August 1983). What is more, dovish parties made poor showings in Oriental neighbourhoods in the 1984 Knesset elections.

It is both an oversimplification and inaccurate to state that Israelis of Oriental heritage prefer the Likud only because of its hawkish positions. Just a brief look at the correlation between the data on public satisfaction with the economic policy of the government and its overall popularity is sufficient to reach the conclusion that this is a highly important, if not the decisive, factor. Using various polls, Diskin (1982a: 58) clearly demonstrated that the disenchanted Likud voters of 1977 began to return to the fold after newly appointed Finance Minister Aridor began to introduce his policy of election-time concessions (see also Figure 56). The reversal of the trend in public opinion in February 1981 was a result of economic policy, not of the rocket crisis in Lebanon, which did not flare up until April, nor of the destruction of the atomic reactor outside Baghdad, which took place on 7 June. (See Wolffsohn, 1983a: 700 f. for literature and data to 1978; Stone, 1982: 228 ff. for data to the fall of 1979; Peretz and Smooha, 1981 for the period from July 1977 to June 1981. The data are for the general population.)

The pattern was slightly different, however, in 1984. Once again the Likud tried the tactic of election gifts, but the general public remained dissatisfied with the economic policies of the government, despite the improvement in its economic performance between June and July. The voters did, however, respond more positively to the social policies of the Likud government. Between December 1983 and June 1984, 11–12% – and in July, 18% – judged that the government had 'succeeded' or 'largely succeeded' in the economic sphere, whereas 28–29% – and in July, 46% – expressed the same judgement on the government's social policy. The opinion of Oriental Israelis was the decisive factor here (Smith poll, *Jerusalem Post*, 17 July 1984). In 1981 the ultra-hawkish voters of the Tehiya Party were much more 'western', that is, Ashkenasi, than the voters of the Likud (Levy and Gutmann, 1981: 9 ff., esp. table 4; Elections, 1981: esp. tables 4, 5 and 18). This same pattern was recognizable in 1984, when only 3·2% of Oriental voters chose Tehiya-Zomet and 5% of the Ashkenasim did so (Smith poll, *Jerusalem Post*, 3 August 1984).

Tehiya was, of course, able to garner more support among the second generation of Oriental Israelis, the Oriental Sabras, than among the immigrant generation. Nevertheless, the proportion of Oriental Israelis voting Tehiya remained consistently below that of Ashkenasim in every population group (Levy and Guttman, loc. cit.). Tehiya is mainly a party of Sabras of European and American backgrounds.

To confuse things even further, it must be noted that Rabbi Kahane's super-hawkish and extremely anti-Arab Kach list got only 0·4% of the Ashkenasi but 2·5% of the Oriental vote in 1984 (Smith poll, *Jerusalem Post*, 3 August 1984). Kahane himself is an immigrant from the United States, as are many of the members of his party. Altogether, 69% of Oriental Jews voted for hawkish parties in the 1984 Knesset elections (compiled from the Smith poll, loc. cit., for the Likud, Tehiya-Zomet, Kach, NRP, Morasha, Shass).

Nevertheless, there are many examples for the neutralization of security and territorial issues by economic policy factors. While Oriental Israelis formed a large majority of the 40·9% of Israelis who found the War in Lebanon justified (PORI poll in *Haaretz*, 3 March 1983), the same institute reported that the Labour bloc succeeded in overtaking the Likud in the polls in April. The main causes of the dissatisfaction with the governing coalition were its economic policy and the muddled situation in Lebanon (*Haaretz*, 6 May 1983). In April as well, 50·7% of the Israelis surveyed said that their monthly incomes were not sufficient to meet current expenses. On the basis of the known socio-economic data it can be concluded that Oriental Israelis were certainly overrepresented in the groups most directly affected by the economic difficulties. At the same time, 53% of the Israelis polled judged the economic policy of the government negatively, as opposed to only 39% in December of 1982 (*Jerusalem Post* quoted in *FAZ*, 9 May 1983).

In other words, 'bread and butter' issues appear to be more important to Oriental Israelis than policies towards the Arabs or the occupied territories. If at some point forced to choose between the alternatives 'settlements' and 'social welfare', the possibility of their opting for the latter cannot be dismissed. In fact it would seem likely. If a government is able to couple its settlements policy with a programme of subsidies for housing construction and purchases for lower income groups, it may well then succeed in escaping the either/or alternative and thus master the art of squaring the circle. The Likud, together with the other hawkish parties, especially Tehiya, seems to have achieved just that. Despite their dismal economic performance, they were able to both establish settlements and, as the above-mentioned polls suggest, to burnish their popular image on social policy as well.

3 THE 'THIRD ISRAEL': THE ISRAELI ARABS

(a) TERMINOLOGY AND POLITICS

The population group under discussion here is frequently described in terms other than the one chosen in the heading above. Since language often either consciously or unconsciously involves politics, it is necessary to draw attention to the various terms employed, each with its own emphasis and value-judgement.

The subject of this book is Israel, the existence of which is taken for

granted and viewed as legitimate. The term *Israeli Arabs* is therefore employed here.

The term *Palestinians in Israel* shifts the emphasis to the Palestinians without necessarily calling Israel's legitimacy into question. Nevertheless, this term implies that the prime reference group for these people is the Palestinians, not the Israelis, and that these 'Palestinians' are more or less strangers to Israel rather than part of that state. The description *Palestinians living under Israeli occupation* is one which casts serious doubt on Israel's legitimacy, as it presumes that Israel 'occupies' the land belonging to the Palestinians – and not to the Jews. This becomes clearer if it is recalled that the Arabs being referred to here live within the pre-1967 borders of the Jewish state. The characterization *Arabs living under Zionist occupation* is one which totally denies the legitimacy of Israel.

(b) SOCIO-ECONOMIC DATA

Table 26 illustrates the youth of Israel's Arabs. In 1955, 64·2% were not older than 24, and in 1981 and 1982 the figure was 68%. Moslems remain a clear majority among Palestinian/Israeli Arabs. Figure 43 and Table 35 illustrate the data for various years.


Figure 43   The Non-Jewish population of Israel, 1922–82.

Some 2,500 Circassians live in Reihaniya and Kfar Kama, two small villages in Galilee. The Circassians are Sunni Moslems who fled to the Middle East from their original home in the Caucasus region between 1861 and 1864 in the face of the Russian invaders.

The Bedouins live mainly in the southern part of Israel, in the Negev (see data on the regional distribution of Israel's population in Figure 49).

The development of the Arab sector is illustrated dramatically in the field of education (see Mar'i, 1978). In 1948/9 there were only fourteen Arab students enrolled in secondary schools in Israel. In 1969/70 there were 8,050 and in 1982/3 there was a total of 28,326 in all three types of secondary schools (*Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1983: 653).

Table 35   The Non-Jewish Population of Israel, 1922–83 (%)

	Moslems	Christians	Druze and other
1922	88·2	10·7	1·1
1945	87·8	11·1	1·2
1951	68·6	22·5	8·9
1981	78·1	13·9	7·9
1982	76·9	13·6	9·5
1983	77·0	13·5	9·5

Sources: Friedlander and Goldscheider, 1979: 34; *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, various vols.

The number of Arab university students rose from 511 in 1969/70 to 1,281 in 1974/5 and 1,740 in 1978/9 (Council for Higher Education, 1982: 15). It must not be overlooked that the number of Israeli Arabs with a higher education is still extremely small on the whole, but nonetheless too high in relation to the employment opportunities available to Arab graduates. It is noteworthy that, in contrast to the Jewish population groups, the numbers of Arab students did not drop in the late 1970s.

Table 36   Arab Student Enrolments

1) Secondary Students (total number)

1949	14
1970	8,500
1982	26,814
1983	29,426
1985	32,006

2) University Students (total number)

1970	511
1975	1,281
1979	1,740

3) University Graduates (total number)

1949	193
1960	1,237
1970	5,566
1983	9,891

Among Arabs over the age of 14, 49·2% did not continue their education in 1961, but only 18·0% failed to do so in 1981; 28·2% of all women were in this category and only 7·8% of the men (*Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1982: 617). In other words, the status of women in Arab Israeli society remains inferior to that of men.

The employment structure among Israel's Arabs has undergone drastic changes, that is, 'modernization'. Under the Mandate, approximately two-thirds of all Arabs were employed in agriculture. This fell to 49·8% in 1955,

to only 11·8% in 1981 and to 11·1% in 1982 (*Encyclopaedia Hebraica*, 1958: 709; Harari, 1976: 15; *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1982: 333, and 1983: 355).

In 1955, 26·3% were employed in industry (including the electrical sector) and construction. The figures for 1981 and 1982 were 45·2% and 42·5% respectively. Only 15·8% were to be found in the tertiary sector (commerce, transport and services) in 1955. This rose to 42·9% in 1981 and 46·3% in 1982 (*Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1983: 355). The development from a tra-ditionally structured agrarian economy via the growth of first the secondary (industrial) sector and then the tertiary sector to a 'modern' economy is apparent (see Figure 44 and section B/VI/3/e).

Urbanization is a further sign of 'modernization'. In 1948, 76·4% of non-Jewish Israelis lived in rural settlements, and only 23·6% in cities or urban surroundings, that is, communities with a population greater than 10,000 as well as non-Jewish towns with a population of between 5,000 and 10,000 in which less than half of the inhabitants were engaged in agriculture (*Society in Israel*, 1976: 5). The figures for 1974 present a completely different picture: 41·7% resided in rural settlements, 58·3% in urban settings (loc. cit.). In December 1980, 32·1% were living in rural areas and 67·9% in urban areas, and the figures for July 1983 were 29·1% rural to 70·9% urban (Jerusalem not included; *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1982: 41, and 1984: 41). Parallel to this, an urbanization of the villages and towns also took place. In 1951 Taibe had 6,350 residents, but a population of 16,800 by 1981 (Harari, 1976: 7; *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1982: 50; for further examples see Wolff-sohn, 1983a: 196 f., as well as Figure 45).

Traditionally, Christian Arabs have been regarded as the most 'modern' in the sense of the criteria applied above. However, the Moslem Arabs, including the Druze, but the Bedouins only to a lesser extent, have also become much more 'modern' (see section B/VI/1/h).

(c) THE JEWISH–ARAB GAP

Despite their indisputable accomplishments, the progress Israel's Arabs have been able to achieve is only of modest proportion in comparison with the advances made by the Jewish population of the country. Jewish Israelis are better educated, hold many more jobs in the service sector and fewer which could be described as 'proletarian', earn more money and live in less crowded housing (data in Wolffsohn, 1983a: 205 ff.; Lustick, 1980: ch. 5).

The average gross monthly income of Israeli Arabs fell from 61·1% of that of Ashkenasi Israelis in 1970 to 59·1% in 1981 and then rose modestly to 63·9% in 1982), while the income of Oriental Israelis rose continuously. In 1975, however, the Arabs' 86·9% topped the Oriental Jews' 82·2% of the average Ashkenasi income (*Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1982: 291, and 1983: 311). The proportion of Arabs in the lowest income groups has decreased significantly and the gap has, therefore, considerably narrowed.

The Arab income structure does not present a unified picture, as there are differences between Israeli Arabs and Arabs living in the occupied territories, many of whom work in Israel proper (see section B/VI/3/e). In the period from 1969 to 1981 the annual rise in income was higher when the workers from the occupied territories were excluded than when their incomes were included in the average, although the differences were not overly large

Figure 44   Employment structure of the Arab population.

Figure 45   Urbanization of the Arab population.

(*Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1982: 369). This nevertheless indicates that Israeli Arabs tend to be better paid than Arabs from the occupied territories.

By way of contrast, the unemployment rate for the Arab population has remained constantly below that of the Jewish population over the last decade (ibid.: 355; for information on the material standard of living see section C/XIII/6).

(d) SOCIAL ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOUR

A certain 'natural' separation, that is, geographic distance, exists between

the Jewish and the Arab populations of Israel as a result of their geographic distribution (see section B/VI/1/i). From the beginnings of Zionist immigration as well as after independence, Jews tended to found their own settlements separate from the existing Arab communities. The deliberate separation carried out during the foundation of Tel-Aviv beginning in 1909 is a particularly striking example. The goal was clearly to create a Jewish city apart from the Arab city of Jaffa, rather than as a part of the same community.

This had nothing to do with 'racism' or 'hatred'. The Zionist pioneers were determined to totally and completely reform their people, and they were so possessed by this ideal that it led them to ignore and neglect their non-Jewish environment. If one is to make value-judgements, this highly intensive preoccupation with their own group was clearly the 'fault' of the Zionists, but is this not understandable from the point of view of Jewish history? On the other hand, why should the Arabs have to assume the burden for the consequences of the actions of non-Jewish Europeans? There is more grey between Arabs and Jews than most black-and-white analysts can imagine.

Most Israeli Arabs live in central and western Galilee, in the 'Big Triangle', mainly in and around Nazareth. In 1948, 62.9% of the residents of the Northern District were non-Jewish, as compared to 48.6% in 1981 (*Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1982: 37). In the Yesreel Valley subdistrict the non-Jewish population formed a slight majority in 1981 and in the Acre subdistrict a clear majority. A further concentration of Arab population is to be found north-east of Tel-Aviv in the so-called 'Little Triangle'. In the cities of mixed population – Acre, Tel-Aviv, Jaffa, Haifa, Lod and Ramla (Jerusalem, occupied in 1967, presents a special case) – the Arabs are clearly in the minority. There are also smaller concentrations of Arabs to the east of Beersheba and near Haifa.

The geographic distance only serves to illustrate the social distance. As in the section dealing with the attitudes of Oriental Jews towards the Arabs (B/VI/2/e), the longitudinal survey elaborated by Peled (1983) is deserving of special attention here.

The first item of Table 37 shows that Jewish Israelis have given an increasingly lower evaluation of the loyalty of the Arabs to the (Zionist) state in the period between 1967 and 1980. Arab Israelis have been viewed with increasing favour relative to Arabs from the territories (item 2). Clearly, fewer and fewer Jews claim that Arabs are inferior (item 3). If the willingness to get acquainted with the Arab language can be taken as an indicator, the trend has been to a greater open-mindedness towards learning about the culture and mentality of the Arabs (item 4). Apart from this inter-group data, the inter-personal responses of the Jewish public have also demonstrated more moderation and even better matter-of-fact relations (visits in Arab homes or having had Arabs as guests, items 8 and 9).

On the inter-state level as well, more moderation has been reflected by the interviews. A growing number of Jewish Israelis have come to the conclusion 'that Arab states are ready for peace' (item 10).

What follows below are some momentary 'snapshots'.

In June 1967, 31% of Jewish Israelis declared they were 'unconditionally

Figure 46   *The Arabs of northern Israel.*

Source: Gilbert, 1974: 57.

Table 37   Selected Findings Presenting the Dynamics of Jewish Public Opinion in Israel on the Topic of Jewish–Arab Relations in Israel (%)*

	Between the wars of 1967 and 1973	Between the 1973 war and Sadat's visit	Between Sadat's visit and up to Oct. 1980 (incl.)
Inter-group level			
1) Percentage assessing that the loyalty of the Israeli Arabs is diminishing	17–33	13–54	36–70
2) Percentage preferring Israeli Arabs to those of the territories	21–42	**	57–68
3) Percentage claiming Arabs are not inferior to Jews	40–42	**	51–56
4) Percentage supporting introducing Arabic in obligatory school curriculum	46–56	**	65–67
Inter-personal level			
5) Percentage ready to become friendly with an Arab (with no reservations)	26–32	37–38	59–64
6) Percentage ready to live in same building with Arab family (with no reservations)	24–28	**	38–44
7) Percentage ready to live in same neighbourhood with Arab families (with no reservations)	19–21	**	35–41
8) Percentage who visited an Arab home	42–45	**	54–56
9) Percentage who had Arabs visiting in their home	26–27	**	37–44
Inter-state level			
10) Percentage who think that now Arab States are ready for peace	8–34	19–50	33–83

* The figures in the table represent the range of the percentages as obtained in *different surveys* within the said periods.

** The question was not asked.

prepared to be friends with the Arabs' and 66% gave the same reply in December of 1979 (Peled, 1980: 20; further data and literature in Wolffsohn, 1983a: 420 ff.).

The image of Jews among the Arabs also improved in this time period (Peled, 1979; Benyamini, 1981).

Surveys conducted by Mar'i (1978) and Smooha (1980) registered a mutual willingness to establish contacts with the other population group, but according to Smooha (1980: 62 f.) this readiness was considerably greater among Arabs than among Jews.

Apart from impersonal business contacts, however, actual contacts remained few in number (loc. cit.), although increasing slightly from 1967 to 1978 (Peled, 1979: 9). In June 1967, 73% of Jewish Israelis had never had an Arab guest in their homes, which was true of 56% in November 1978. The proportion of those who had never visited an Arab at home sank from 58% to 46% (loc. cit.).

The willingness to overcome barriers decreases among Jewish Israelis to the extent that they identify the Arabs as Palestinians. The same is true of the Arabs to the extent that they are not prepared to accept the basic situation of their group within the Jewish state (Peled, 1979: 10, and 1980: 21; but for the most extensive data see Smooha, 1980: 148. Data on the attitudes of Oriental Jews towards the native Arab population can be found in section B/VI/2/e.).

Recent data, however, indicate that young Jewish Israelis are highly prejudiced against Arabs and are also unwilling to grant them equal rights (Hoffman and Nager, 1985; Zemach and Zin, 1984).

(e) AREAS OF TENSION

Apart from the influences of the inter-state Arab–Israeli conflicts, four domestic problem areas have repeatedly led to tensions between Jewish and Arab Israelis: (1) the issue of citizenship (see section A/I/2), (2) the military administration, (3) the acquisition of Arab land by Jews and (4) the relative cheapness of Arab as compared to Jewish labour.

The military administration, which had greatly restricted the Arabs in their freedom of movement, was ended in December 1966.

Conflicts over the purchase of land began at the outset of Zionist immigration to Palestine. After the founding of Israel the issue was the 'Judafication' of areas populated by Arabs (especially in Galilee). The government claimed Arab land for Jewish development projects, first to improve the infrastructure of the country, and second to 'implant' more Jews in areas heavily populated by Arabs.

In 1976 this policy led to the 'Land Day' confrontation. On 30 March 1976, a bloody clash took place, in the course of which seven Arabs were shot by Israeli police. A short time later the Israeli government, led by Prime Minister Rabin, told Arab representatives in unequivocal terms that Israel was, and would remain, Jewish (*FAZ*, 21 June 1976).

When discussing the question of cheaper Arab labour, it must not be forgotten that this problem had, during the Yishuv, already led not only to Jewish–Arab tensions, but to inner-Jewish conflicts as well, some of which were violent in nature (Giladi, 1973: 164 ff.). Not all Jewish employers in either the agrarian or the industrial sectors complied with the Zionist, Labour Party and union 'Jewish labour' (*Avoda Ivrith*) demands. Such

employers set their commercial interests above Zionist ideology and profited from the fact that Arab workers were not only 'cheaper' but also less politicized and aggressive. The perspective of an eventual bi-national, functional coexistence thus opened by this development came to an end between 1936 and 1939 when the Arab Revolt led to a practical economic separation (see Horowitz and Lissak, 1978: ch. 2).

Following independence Jewish Israelis, especially Ashkenasim, exhibited an increasing unwillingness to perform tasks involving hard labour, preferring instead to set their ideological qualms aside and to hire Arab labourers. Since 1967 the supply of willing and inexpensive Arab labour from the occupied territories has grown ever larger. In 1970, 20,600 labourers, or 11·9% of the total workforce in the occupied territories, were involved. In 1981 the figures were 75,800 workers, or 35·1% of the total Arab labour force in the occupied territories, and 79,100, or 34·7% of that workforce, in 1982 (*Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1982: 754, and 1983: 780). Most of these workers were employed in construction: 54·3% of all residents of the occupied territories working in Israel in 1970 and 51% in 1980. In 1970, 24·4% were employed in agriculture, as were 12·7% in 1981 and 12·8% in 1982 (loc. cit.).

(f) ARABS AND PARTY POLITICS

The fact that it never came to the foundation of a purely 'Arab' political party following the creation of the state of Israel can be explained (among other factors) by the shock of the sudden transformation of the Arab community from the large majority in Palestine into a minority in the new Jewish state, a shock which crippled all political activity. In addition, the remaining Arabs were left with little motivation to undertake political initiatives in the wake of the experience of the total failure of their traditional political leadership, which had largely deserted them during the War of Independence (see Landau, 1971: 90 ff.).

Until 1977 increasing numbers of Israeli Arabs voted for the Communist Party because it pursued Arab interests in the political arena, including the Knesset, and because the Communists were non-Zionist, although not anti-Zionist. The decision to vote for the Communists was not and is not a decision for 'communism' but rather a protest, and as such fits within the framework of Israel as a state. Israel's existence is not rejected either by the old Communist Party or by the NCL, which accepts Israel's existence but aims to create another, bi-national rather than Zionist, i.e. exclusively Jewish, Israel.

In the long run, all of those Arabs who are not prepared to accept the existence of Israel, either as a Zionist or as a bi-national state, will have to form an organization of their own. Such a move, however, would probably not be acceptable to Israel's 'armed democracy' (in the original Zionist sense of the term), as was the case in the period 1958/65 in connection with the Arab-nationalist al-Ard Movement.

In November 1964 the Supreme Court of Israel ruled that is was possible to permit political parties which did not accept the status quo, but not parties like al-Árd which did not recognize or which sought to undermine the state (Landau, 1971: 1160 f.; similarly the ruling of October 1965, discussed in Rubenstein, 1974: 246 and in Wolffsohn, 1983a: 425 ff.).

In 1984 the Central Elections Committee disqualified an Arab-Jewish party, the Progressive List for Peace (PLP). Resembling the NCL (but without its communist ideology), the PLP accepted the existence of Israel but aimed to transform it into a bi-national, non-Zionist, i.e. not exclusively Jewish state, which the PLP conceived of as coexisting alongside a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Israel's Supreme Court struck down the disqualification by the Central Elections Committee, which had also banned Rabbi Kahane's extremely anti-Arab Kach, and allowed both parties to run for the Knesset. Both succeeded in overcoming the 1% hurdle, Kach receiving one and the PLP two Knesset seats.

The Yom Kippur War served to heighten the political consciousness of Israel's Arabs, particularly among the youth, some of whom had already organized themselves as the Sons of the Village on the local political level in 1972/3 and did very well in the local elections of 1973 and 1978, but achieved a more modest success in 1983.

Like the Sons of the Village, the National Progressive Movement (NPM), founded by Arab intellectuals at the end of the 1970s, is closer to the more radical rejectionists of the PLO than to the more moderate al-Fatah. Running under different names, the NPM met with significant success in the local elections in November 1978, especially in the 'Little Triangle' north-east of Tel-Aviv, after attracting a great deal of attention as a result of its success in the Council of Arab Students at Hebrew University since 1977/8 (for details see Wolffsohn, 1983a: 216 ff.).

A third purely Arab organization is also worthy of note. The Moslem Youth also favours a radical pan-Arab approach to Palestine, but is not a secular party in the normal sense of the term. With its rather fundamentalist religiosity, the Moslem Youth can, with all due caution in making such a comparison, be seen as something like a Sunni–Arab–Israeli equivalent to Shi'ite 'Khomeinism'. Characteristically, it sprang up in the late 1970s and became more visible after the Iranian revolution.

As soon as one or more of the above-mentioned organizations attempt to become active on the national level they will be confronted by the same normative, institutional and judicial barriers encountered by the al-Ard Group.

In 1958/9 al-Ard presented a serious challenge to the Communist Party, as it was first and foremost an Arab-nationalist group and only second a party of the 'left', an attribute it chose not to define precisely. The al-Ard also supported Egypt's President Nasser, who was then the pan-Arabian idol, whereas the CP, riding Moscow's coat-tails, had cast its lot with Nasser's rival, Iraqi President Kassem.

The only traditional party which made the effort to be both Jewish and Arab was the Communist Party. It hoped to neutralize the 'national' aspect by stressing the socio-economic 'class' factor – and failed. The national existence of two peoples in one party remained a 'myth' (Greilsammer, 1978: 346 ff.).

In 1984 the Progressive List for Peace (PLP) presented a truly Arab–Jewish list for the first time in the nation's history. The PLP was founded in 1983 by Arab intellectuals from the Nazareth branch of the New Communist List, who broke away from that party to form an at first purely Arab,

non-communist organization in order to pursue the goal of a bi-national Israel. They gave themselves the name Progressive Movement for Peace (not to be confused with the radical National Progressive Movement) and were soon joined by a number of former al-Ard members. The newly established party won one-quarter of the seats on Nazareth City Council in the 1983 local elections.

In early 1984 the party turned Arab–Jewish when former Shelli founders Uri Avnery and Matityahu Peled, together with other former Shelli members and other non-Zionist (but not anti-Israel) Jews joined. All of them favoured direct negotiations with the PLO. The new bi-national character of the party was not accepted by all of its Arab founders, some of whom refused to join in the new configuration.

Campaigning as the Progressive List for Peace, the new party competed with the NCL for the endorsement of the PLO in order to attract as many Arab voters as possible in the 1984 elections. Among Arab voters the NCL came in first in 1984, and the PLP in third place (see Figure 47), but Jewish support was negligible.

Mapam opened its ranks to Arab citizens in 1954, but these remained a distinct minority. Despite its intensive efforts to attract Arabs, the Shelli Party, founded in 1977, met with no success and failed to receive a single Knesset seat in 1981. The Matzpen group, which attacks the Zionist, i.e. the exclusively Jewish character of the State of Israel, on principle (Bober, 1972: 4), managed to achieve an Arab membership of about 10% (Yuval-Davies, 1977: 48).

Mapai/ILP had traditionally relied on its allied Arab minority lists (led by the heads of the Arab clans) to maintain political contacts with the Arab population. In 1969 membership in the ILP was opened to Druze and in 1973 to other Arabs. There had already been Druze members in Herut since the 1960s, as this party, despite its Zionist-nationalist character, maintained from the beginning the position that all Israeli citizens should enjoy equal rights. In Herut the effective barrier was a different one: ideology and policy (further details and literature in Wolffsohn, 1983a: 427 ff.).

(g) ARABS IN THE MILITARY

As early as 1948 there were already some Circassians fighting on the side of the Israelis. After independence some young Druze began to serve as volunteers in the army. On 3 May 1956 the first Druze unit consisting of draftees was created, the initiative for this step have been taken by the Druze leadership in Israel. The gradual 'Arabization' of the Druze in Israel, as well as tensions between Israeli authorities and Druze on the Golan Heights and the prolonged War in Lebanon, which found Israel fighting alongside the Lebanese Christians (who were, to put it mildly, the traditional rivals of the Druze), served to erode the loyalty of some younger Druze soldiers to Israel. Some of them (albeit not many) even deserted Zahal to join their religious and ethnic brothers in Lebanon.

Bedouins are not subject to the draft, but are allowed to serve as volunteers, a smattering of whom are to be found in Zahal. In late 1984 the ranks of Zahal were also opened for some two hundred volunteers from 'Arab villages' (i.e. non-Bedouins; A. Mantzur, *Haaretz*, 18 December 1984).

(h) UNDERREPRESENTATION

Smooha (1978: 351 f.) has put together an extensive documentation of the political underrepresentation of Israel's Arabs in relation to their proportion of the total population. It need only be updated in the area of local politics.

Table 38 shows the number of Arab deputies in the various Knessets. The numbers in parentheses refer to the total of members elected to the Knesset via the Arab minority lists.

Table 38   Arab Members of the Knesset, 1949–84 (number of MKs from minority lists in parentheses)

1949	1951	1955	1959	1961	1965	1969	1973	1977	1981	1984
3(2)	8(5)	7(5)	7(5)	6(4)	7(4)	7(4)	6(3)	7(1)	5	7

(i) POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOUR

As a result of the heightened political consciousness among Israeli Arabs, encouraged and conditioned by their improved educational status, protest attitudes and actions in the form of votes cast for the only non-Zionist party in the country, the Communists (and NCL from 1965 on), increased significantly, as shown in Figure 47 and Table 39. The success of the Progressive List for Peace in 1984 fits into this pattern, which also documents the desire of many Israeli Arabs for bi-national institutions neither Zionist nor Communist in character, but instead 'pluralistic' in the sense of rejecting exclusivity and demanding mutual tolerance.

The Communists' losses in 1959 were related to the already described rivalry with the al-Ard Group. The losses in 1981 were less indicative of a renewal of willingness to cooperate with the Zionist parties than of resignation.

Overall participation in 1981 was considerably lower than for the local elections of November 1978, in which the Sons of the Village and the National Progressive Movement were allowed to run. While voter participation reached 80% in 1973, it fell to 76% in 1977 and to only 70% in 1981 (Elections, 1981: XXIV, 2). The participation in Moslem communities was lower than in Druze areas (loc. cit.), which is a further indication of protest behaviour, as the Druze have traditionally been better disposed towards the state. Except for the 1949, 1977, 1981 and 1984 Knesset elections, Arab voter turnouts have been higher than for Jewish voters. Despite the increase in the participation of Arab voters from 70% in 1981 to 76% in 1984, the pre-1973 levels were not reached. This continuing gap may indicate a certain resignation on the part of those for whom it does not make sense to vote for bi-national, let alone Zionist, parties. The non-voters may, therefore, consist of basically uninterested and fatalistic eligible Arabs as well as rejectionists. Figures on the latter remain open to speculation – or polls, which, to this author's knowledge, are unfortunately lacking.

Nevertheless, the NCL remained the party with the single largest bloc of voters among Israel's Arabs in 1981. The Labour bloc received the most

Figure 47 *Arab voting patterns in Israel, 1949–84.*

(Bar chart showing, for each election year, the percentage of Zionist Parties (incl. minority lists) and Non-Zionist Parties (incl. Communists).)

Year	Zionist Parties (incl. minority lists)	Non-Zionist Parties (incl. Communists)
84	48%	52%
81	62%	38%
77	49%	51%
73	63%	37%
69	71%	29%
65	74%	26%
61	78%	22%
59	89%	11%
55	85%	15%
51	84%	16%
1949	78%	22%

Axis: 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10

Legend:
☐ Zionist Parties (incl. minority lists)
▨ Non-Zionist Parties (incl. Communists)

Table 39 Arab voting patterns in Israel, 1949–84

Elections	Arab Voters	Participation (in %)	Zionist Parties	Minority Lists	Communists	PLP
1949	24,000*	79	26·1	51·7	22·2	—
1951	69,000*	86	28·9	54·8	16·3	—
1955	70,827	90	26·6	57·8	15·6	—
1959	75,155	89	30·2	58·5	11·3	—
1961	80,454	86	32·0	45·6	22·5	—
1965	92,505	87	33·1	40·8	23·1	—
1969	105,948	85	29·7	41·0	29·5	—
1973	119,627	80	27·1	36·0	36·9	—
1977	132,684	76	27·9	21·5	50·7	—
1981	168,000	70	48·7	13·4	37·9	—
1984	199,968	76	50·0	—	32·0	18·0

* Estimates (rounded) by Harari, 1978: 12 and, similarly, Landau, 1971: 167, 172).

Sources: Landau, 1971: 165 ff.; Harari, 1978: 12, 14; Elections, 1981: XXVI; Cohen, 1984: 24.

votes among Bedouins, with 50% in 1981 (Elections, 1981: XXXI). In Druze communities the minority lists were the largest vote-getters, followed by the Labour bloc and the NCL (ibid.: XXVII).

The 1984 elections demonstrate the first real upheaval among Israeli Arabs. The rejection of the Zionist parties (including their affiliated Arab minority lists) was more decisive than in the previous record year, 1977. Overall, slightly less than 50% of the vote was cast for Zionist parties in 1977. This dropped to a total of 48% in 1984 and, for the first time, there was a truly bi-national alternative. Looking at the results for the individual parties, the setback for the Communists (NCL/Rakah) was relatively modest, namely, a 3% drop (from 1981) to 35%. The Alignment came in second with 23% in 1984, compared with about 29% in 1981, but in the earlier election the Arab minority lists linked to the Maarah had attracted another 13% of the vote. It is thus safe to say that the support for the Alignment among Arab voters was cut almost in half (from a total of 42% in 1981 to 23% in 1984).

The undisputed winner among Israel's Arabs was the Progressive List for Peace, which got 18% of the Arab vote. The results for the other parties in 1984 were 6% for Ezer Weizman's Yahad, 5% for Shinui, 3% for the Likud and 8% for the other coalition parties (data from Y. Litani, *Haaretz*, 27 July 1984; A. Mantzur, *Haaretz*, 30 July 1983; H. and R. Smith, *Jerusalem Post*, 3 August 1984).

It is practically self-evident that the developments described above have led to an 'Arabization' of the Communist voters. In 1955 Arabs cast only 27·8% of the total votes for the CP, whereas they contributed 80–83% in 1981 and 98% in 1984 (Wolffsohn, 1983a: 194; Elections, 1981: XXVII; and author's calculation for 1984).

Figure 48   Likelihood of radical attitudes and behaviour among
Israeli Arabs.

Notes:

1) Urban–Rural: the more urban, the more radical.

2) Christian–Sunnite–Druze–(Bedouins): Christians Arabs are more
radical than Sunnites. These are more radical than Druze and the
latter are more radical than Bedouins.

3) Old–Young: the younger the Arabs, the more radical.

4) Formal education and media exposure: the better educated and the
more exposed to (Arab) media, the more radical.

5) Pan-Arab influence: the more influenced by pan-Arab ideas the
more radical.

We can also call this process one of 'radicalization' because it shows the
gradual but steady erosion of the 'roots' (Latin radix, thus English 'radical')
of the Jewish State of Israel among its Arab population. This development
demonstrates an active, not just passive, alienation and thus an increasing
unwillingness to accept the predominantly Jewish character of the state. The
'carrot' of the bread-and-butter issues which had long attracted Arab votes
to the Labour parties can no longer compensate for the Jewish, i.e. Zionist,
'stick'. This radicalization could be observed first among Christian Arabs
and later among Moslems, Druze and finally Bedouins (for data see Wolff-
sohn, 1983: 198 f.). Again, this is a 'radical' and not an 'extreme' trend. It
does not threaten the existence of the State of Israel, but rather its predomi-
nantly Jewish substance. Israel's Arabs apparently desire a different Israel,
not necessarily its destruction, or, if they had wanted to destroy it, they have
come to a realization that its transformation remains the only realistic
alternative.

The following can be said of Israeli Arabs: the younger, the more urban,
the better educated, especially if Christian, or (Sunni) Moslem, and less so if
Druze or Bedouin, and the more exposed through the media of radio and TV
to the influences of the neighbouring Arab states, the more 'radical', that is,

likely to vote for non-Zionist parties such as the Communist NCL and PLP
or, as in 1981, deliberately not to vote at all. (see Figure 48 and, for more
details, Wolffsohn, 1983a: 203 ff.)

The increasingly important role of the 'Palestinian' element in the political
consciousness of Israeli Arabs is documented in the surveys conducted by
Peres (1976: 185 f.), Tessler (1977: esp. 317), Meari (1978: 56) and Smooha
(1980: 58 f.). The results, with the exception of Smooha, can also be found in
Wolffsohn (1983a: 211 ff.).

In opinion polls the Arabs have been offered more than just the Zionist or
bi-national alternative which they find at the ballot box. In order to get a
more differentiated view, let us therefore examine some of the more revealing
polls. The Arabs of Israel are divided over the issue of Israel's right to exist,
which was accepted by 40% in 1974/5, and by a further 35% 'with reser-
vations' (Tessler, 1977: 318). In Smooha's 1976 poll (1980: 42), 49·8%
responded positively, 28·7% 'with reservations' and 21·5% negatively. Three
years earlier, Tessler had already received 25% negative responses. In 1976,
64% of all respondents considered Zionism a 'racist movement' (Smooha,
1980: 42).

Whereas 63·1% of the Druze accepted Israel's legitimacy in 1976, 57·1%
of the Bedouins, 44·3% of the Christians and 47·9% of the Moslems did so
(Smooha, 1980: 44).

A comparison of Jewish and Arab attitudes concerning individual aspects
of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is made possible by the collected results of
the surveys conducted in 1980 by Smooha and Peretz (1982). The pollsters
found that Israeli Arabs contradict the Zionist consensus on the following
points: (1) the national character of the Palestinians, (2) the borders of 1967,
(3) recognition of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people,
(4) the creation of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and in the Gaza
Strip, (5) the annexation of East Jerusalem and (6) the right of the Palesti-
nian refugees to return. On the other hand, Israeli Arabs do not accept the
ideology of the 'rejectionist front', which seeks to replace Israel with a
'democratic and secular state in the whole of Palestine'. In other words, most
of the polls, and especially the last one discussed, confirm our previous
statement concerning the process of 'radicalization': Israel's Arabs do not
reject Israel's existence but rather its predominantly Jewish substance.

4   SOCIAL-DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECTS OF CRIME STATISTICS

The purpose of the data presented here is not to prove that criminal acts are
determined by socio-economic or demographic factors, but these certainly
cannot be entirely excluded from the consideration of the motives behind
criminal acts.

Among adults convicted of criminal offences (men over the age of 16 and
women over 18), Arabs were clearly overrepresented. Table 40 shows the
percentage of Arab convicts followed in parentheses by the percentage of
Arabs in the overall population for the given year.

Until 1970 about one-third of criminal acts were directed against property,

Table 40   The Arab crime rate relative to population, 1955–82,
           (1) Arabs as % of Total Convicts, (2) Arabs as % of Total
           Population

Year:	1955	1960	1965	1970	1979	1982
1)	36·3	34·4	28·0	25·8	23·6	23·4
2)	12·5	12·5	13·0	17·0	19·0	17·0

Sources: *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, various vols.; *Society, in Israel* 1975: 167.

another third against persons and about a quarter involved violations of 'public order' (i.e. transgressions against state institutions or norms). This last proportion increased to 32% in 1979 but fell again to 27·9% in 1981 (*Society in Israel*, 1975: 167; *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1983: 624). The political implications are self-evident.

In 1979, 80% of Arab criminals were Moslems, 12% Christians and 8% Druze. The proportions remained nearly the same in 1981 (*Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1982: 597, and 1983: 624).

In 1982 about one half of all juvenile offences were committed by Arabs, as reported by a special investigative committee (*Jerusalem Post*, overseas edition, 10–17 June 1984). A quarter of these crimes was carried out by youngsters who had come to Israel from the occupied territories. The proportion of juvenile offences committed by Arabs rose from 29% in 1978 to 49% in 1982 (loc. cit.).

In the criminal statistics for Jews, criminals of African descent were the most numerous, followed by Sabras, who pushed Jews from Asian countries into third place in 1970. By 1979 Sabras were actually leading the statistics when the background of the father was not taken into account (*Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1982: 597, and 1983: 624; *Society in Israel*, 1975: 169).

While 80–85% of all crimes committed by Jewish adults in the period from 1960 to 1974 were against property (*Society in Israel*, 1975: 169), this proportion sank to 29% by 1979, at which level it remained in 1981. As in the case of Arab adults, 32% of crimes committed by Jewish adults in 1979 were against 'public order', whereas this percentage had been only 7% in 1974 (loc. cit.). This is a dramatic change which can hardly be understood in non-political terms or without reference to 'socio-economic' motives.

FURTHER READING

GENERAL WORKS

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Fanny Ginor, *Socio-Economic Disparities in Israel* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, and Tel-Aviv: Tel-Aviv University, 1979).
S. N. Eisenstadt. *Israeli Society* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964); 'the' classic.

POLITICAL GENERATIONS

Unfortunately, the in-depth analyses of the political generations of the founding fathers have been written in Hebrew. Therefore the reader will have to consult histories of the Zionist movement and parties. Nevertheless, one may get a general, though journalistic, picture by reading:

Amos Elon, *The Israelis–Founders and Sons* (New York: Bantam Books, 1971).
On American Jews who immigrated to Israel, see:
Kevin Avruch, *American Immigrants in Israel* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).
Aaron Antonovsky and Abraham D. Katz, *From the Golden to the Promised Land* (Jerusalem: Academic Press, and Darby, PA: Norwood, 1979).
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On Oriental Jews, see:
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On German-Jewish immigrants who were less decisive for the political system, see:
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Jacob M. Landau, *The Arabs in Israel. A Political Study* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971).
See also the sections on Elections (A/I/3) and Oriental Jews (B/VI/2).