Oriental than Ashkenasi Israelis in both the 1974 and 1979 polls conducted by the IIASR (Bach *et al.*, 1974: 10; Levinsohn, 1979: 10). By the end of 1982 the enormous costs of the government's settlements policy had sparked controversies within the parties – including Herut – as to whether or not an active settlements policy and social welfare programmes were mutually exclusive (see, for example, *Haaretz*, 24 November 1982 and 23 December 1982). For the first time, the grass-roots Peace Now movement was able to organize demonstrations with more than just a symbolic handful of Oriental Jews participating (*NZZ*, 18 January 1983; L. Galili, *Haaretz*, 26 September 1982). Apart from these individual points of agreement, however, public opinion surveys showed that Israelis of Oriental heritage rejected 'the tactics' of Peace Now in far greater numbers than the 53·8% of the (not further defined) general public which did so in July 1983 (M. Segal, *Jerusalem Post*, 16 August 1983). What is more, dovish parties made poor showings in Oriental neighbourhoods in the 1984 Knesset elections.

It is both an oversimplification and inaccurate to state that Israelis of Oriental heritage prefer the Likud only because of its hawkish positions. Just a brief look at the correlation between the data on public satisfaction with the economic policy of the government and its overall popularity is sufficient to reach the conclusion that this is a highly important, if not the decisive, factor. Using various polls, Diskin (1982a: 58) clearly demonstrated that the disenchanted Likud voters of 1977 began to return to the fold after newly appointed Finance Minister Aridor began to introduce his policy of election-time concessions (see also Figure 56). The reversal of the trend in public opinion in February 1981 was a result of economic policy, not of the rocket crisis in Lebanon, which did not flare up until April, nor of the destruction of the atomic reactor outside Baghdad, which took place on 7 June. (See Wolffsohn, 1983a: 700 f. for literature and data to 1978; Stone, 1982: 228 ff. for data to the fall of 1979; Peretz and Smooha, 1981 for the period from July 1977 to June 1981. The data are for the general population.)

The pattern was slightly different, however, in 1984. Once again the Likud tried the tactic of election gifts, but the general public remained dissatisfied with the economic policies of the government, despite the improvement in its economic performance between June and July. The voters did, however, respond more positively to the social policies of the Likud government. Between December 1983 and June 1984, 11–12% – and in July, 18% – judged that the government had 'succeeded' or 'largely succeeded' in the economic sphere, whereas 28–29% – and in July, 46% – expressed the same judgement on the government's social policy. The opinion of Oriental Israelis was the decisive factor here (Smith poll, *Jerusalem Post*, 17 July 1984). In 1981 the ultra-hawkish voters of the Tehiya Party were much more 'western', that is, Ashkenasi, than the voters of the Likud (Levy and Gutmann, 1981: 9 ff., esp. table 4; Elections, 1981: esp. tables 4, 5 and 18). This same pattern was recognizable in 1984, when only 3·2% of Oriental voters chose Tehiya-Zomet and 5% of the Ashkenasim did so (Smith poll, *Jerusalem Post*, 3 August 1984).

Tehiya was, of course, able to garner more support among the second generation of Oriental Israelis, the Oriental Sabras, than among the immigrant generation. Nevertheless, the proportion of Oriental Israelis voting

Tehiya remained consistently below that of Ashkenasim in every population group (Levy and Guttman, loc. cit.). Tehiya is mainly a party of Sabras of European and American backgrounds.

To confuse things even further, it must be noted that Rabbi Kahane's super-hawkish and extremely anti-Arab Kach list got only 0·4% of the Ashkenasi but 2·5% of the Oriental vote in 1984 (Smith poll, *Jerusalem Post*, 3 August 1984). Kahane himself is an immigrant from the United States, as are many of the members of his party. Altogether, 69% of Oriental Jews voted for hawkish parties in the 1984 Knesset elections (compiled from the Smith poll, loc. cit., for the Likud, Tehiya-Zomet, Kach, NRP, Morasha, Shass).

Nevertheless, there are many examples for the neutralization of security and territorial issues by economic policy factors. While Oriental Israelis formed a large majority of the 40·9% of Israelis who found the War in Lebanon justified (PORI poll in *Haaretz*, 3 March 1983), the same institute reported that the Labour bloc succeeded in overtaking the Likud in the polls in April. The main causes of the dissatisfaction with the governing coalition were its economic policy and the muddled situation in Lebanon (*Haaretz*, 6 May 1983). In April as well, 50·7% of the Israelis surveyed said that their monthly incomes were not sufficient to meet current expenses. On the basis of the known socio-economic data it can be concluded that Oriental Israelis were certainly overrepresented in the groups most directly affected by the economic difficulties. At the same time, 53% of the Israelis polled judged the economic policy of the government negatively, as opposed to only 39% in December of 1982 (*Jerusalem Post* quoted in *FAZ*, 9 May 1983).

In other words, 'bread and butter' issues appear to be more important to Oriental Israelis than policies towards the Arabs or the occupied territories. If at some point forced to choose between the alternatives 'settlements' and 'social welfare', the possibility of their opting for the latter cannot be dismissed. In fact it would seem likely. If a government is able to couple its settlements policy with a programme of subsidies for housing construction and purchases for lower income groups, it may well then succeed in escaping the either/or alternative and thus master the art of squaring the circle. The Likud, together with the other hawkish parties, especially Tehiya, seems to have achieved just that. Despite their dismal economic performance, they were able to both establish settlements and, as the above-mentioned polls suggest, to burnish their popular image on social policy as well.

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3 THE 'THIRD ISRAEL': THE ISRAELI ARABS

(a) TERMINOLOGY AND POLITICS

The population group under discussion here is frequently described in terms other than the one chosen in the heading above. Since language often either consciously or unconsciously involves politics, it is necessary to draw attention to the various terms employed, each with its own emphasis and value-judgement.

The subject of this book is Israel, the existence of which is taken for

granted and viewed as legitimate. The term *Israeli Arabs* is therefore employed here.

The term *Palestinians in Israel* shifts the emphasis to the Palestinians without necessarily calling Israel's legitimacy into question. Nevertheless, this term implies that the prime reference group for these people is the Palestinians, not the Israelis, and that these 'Palestinians' are more or less strangers to Israel rather than part of that state. The description *Palestinians living under Israeli occupation* is one which casts serious doubt on Israel's legitimacy, as it presumes that Israel 'occupies' the land belonging to the Palestinians – and not to the Jews. This becomes clearer if it is recalled that the Arabs being referred to here live within the pre-1967 borders of the Jewish state. The characterization *Arabs living under Zionist occupation* is one which totally denies the legitimacy of Israel.

(b) SOCIO-ECONOMIC DATA

Table 26 illustrates the youth of Israel's Arabs. In 1955, 64·2% were not older than 24, and in 1981 and 1982 the figure was 68%. Moslems remain a clear majority among Palestinian/Israeli Arabs. Figure 43 and Table 35 illustrate the data for various years.


Figure 43   The Non-Jewish population of Israel, 1922–82.

Some 2,500 Circassians live in Reihaniya and Kfar Kama, two small villages in Galilee. The Circassians are Sunni Moslems who fled to the Middle East from their original home in the Caucasus region between 1861 and 1864 in the face of the Russian invaders.

The Bedouins live mainly in the southern part of Israel, in the Negev (see data on the regional distribution of Israel's population in Figure 49).

The development of the Arab sector is illustrated dramatically in the field of education (see Mar'i, 1978). In 1948/9 there were only fourteen Arab students enrolled in secondary schools in Israel. In 1969/70 there were 8,050 and in 1982/3 there was a total of 28,326 in all three types of secondary schools (*Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1983: 653).

Table 35   The Non-Jewish Population of Israel, 1922–83 (%)

	Moslems	Christians	Druze and other
1922	88·2	10·7	1·1
1945	87·8	11·1	1·2
1951	68·6	22·5	8·9
1981	78·1	13·9	7·9
1982	76·9	13·6	9·5
1983	77·0	13·5	9·5

Sources: Friedlander and Goldscheider, 1979: 34; *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, various vols.

The number of Arab university students rose from 511 in 1969/70 to 1,281 in 1974/5 and 1,740 in 1978/9 (Council for Higher Education, 1982: 15). It must not be overlooked that the number of Israeli Arabs with a higher education is still extremely small on the whole, but nonetheless too high in relation to the employment opportunities available to Arab graduates. It is noteworthy that, in contrast to the Jewish population groups, the numbers of Arab students did not drop in the late 1970s.

Table 36   Arab Student Enrolments

1) Secondary Students (total number)

1949	14
1970	8,500
1982	26,814
1983	29,426
1985	32,006

2) University Students (total number)

1970	511
1975	1,281
1979	1,740

3) University Graduates (total number)

1949	193
1960	1,237
1970	5,566
1983	9,891

Among Arabs over the age of 14, 49·2% did not continue their education in 1961, but only 18·0% failed to do so in 1981; 28·2% of all women were in this category and only 7·8% of the men (*Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1982: 617). In other words, the status of women in Arab Israeli society remains inferior to that of men.

The employment structure among Israel's Arabs has undergone drastic changes, that is, 'modernization'. Under the Mandate, approximately two-thirds of all Arabs were employed in agriculture. This fell to 49·8% in 1955,

to only 11·8% in 1981 and to 11·1% in 1982 (*Encyclopaedia Hebraica*, 1958: 709; Harari, 1976: 15; *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1982: 333, and 1983: 355).

In 1955, 26·3% were employed in industry (including the electrical sector) and construction. The figures for 1981 and 1982 were 45·2% and 42.5% respectively. Only 15·8% were to be found in the tertiary sector (commerce, transport and services) in 1955. This rose to 42·9% in 1981 and 46·3% in 1982 (*Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1983: 355). The development from a traditionally structured agrarian economy via the growth of first the secondary (industrial) sector and then the tertiary sector to a 'modern' economy is apparent (see Figure 44 and section B/VI/3/e).

Urbanization is a further sign of 'modernization'. In 1948, 76·4% of non-Jewish Israelis lived in rural settlements, and only 23·6% in cities or urban surroundings, that is, communities with a population greater than 10,000 as well as non-Jewish towns with a population of between 5,000 and 10,000 in which less than half of the inhabitants were engaged in agriculture (*Society in Israel*, 1976: 5). The figures for 1974 present a completely different picture: 41·7% resided in rural settlements, 58·3% in urban settings (loc. cit.). In December 1980, 32·1% were living in rural areas and 67·9% in urban areas, and the figures for July 1983 were 29·1% rural to 70·9% urban (Jerusalem not included; *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1982: 41, and 1984: 41). Parallel to this, an urbanization of the villages and towns also took place. In 1951 Taibe had 6,350 residents, but a population of 16,800 by 1981 (Harari, 1976: 7; *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1982: 50; for further examples see Wolffsohn, 1983a: 196 f., as well as Figure 45).

Traditionally, Christian Arabs have been regarded as the most 'modern' in the sense of the criteria applied above. However, the Moslem Arabs, including the Druze, but the Bedouins only to a lesser extent, have also become much more 'modern' (see section B/VI/1/h).

(c) THE JEWISH–ARAB GAP

Despite their indisputable accomplishments, the progress Israel's Arabs have been able to achieve is only of modest proportion in comparison with the advances made by the Jewish population of the country. Jewish Israelis are better educated, hold many more jobs in the service sector and fewer which could be described as 'proletarian', earn more money and live in less crowded housing (data in Wolffsohn, 1983a: 205 ff.; Lustick, 1980: ch. 5).

The average gross monthly income of Israeli Arabs fell from 61·1% of that of Ashkenasi Israelis in 1970 to 59·1% in 1981 and then rose modestly to 63·9% in 1982), while the income of Oriental Israelis rose continuously. In 1975, however, the Arabs' 86·9% topped the Oriental Jews' 82·2% of the average Ashkenasi income (*Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1982: 291, and 1983: 311). The proportion of Arabs in the lowest income groups has decreased significantly and the gap has, therefore, considerably narrowed.

The Arab income structure does not present a unified picture, as there are differences between Israeli Arabs and Arabs living in the occupied territories, many of whom work in Israel proper (see section B/VI/3/e). In the period from 1969 to 1981 the annual rise in income was higher when the workers from the occupied territories were excluded than when their incomes were included in the average, although the differences were not overly large


Figure 44   Employment structure of the Arab population.

Figure 45   Urbanization of the Arab population.

(*Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1982: 369). This nevertheless indicates that Israeli Arabs tend to be better paid than Arabs from the occupied territories.

By way of contrast, the unemployment rate for the Arab population has remained constantly below that of the Jewish population over the last decade (ibid.: 355; for information on the material standard of living see section C/XIII/6).

(d) SOCIAL ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOUR

A certain 'natural' separation, that is, geographic distance, exists between

the Jewish and the Arab populations of Israel as a result of their geographic distribution (see section B/VI/1/i). From the beginnings of Zionist immigration as well as after independence, Jews tended to found their own settlements separate from the existing Arab communities. The deliberate separation carried out during the foundation of Tel-Aviv beginning in 1909 is a particularly striking example. The goal was clearly to create a Jewish city apart from the Arab city of Jaffa, rather than as a part of the same community.

This had nothing to do with 'racism' or 'hatred'. The Zionist pioneers were determined to totally and completely reform their people, and they were so possessed by this ideal that it led them to ignore and neglect their non-Jewish environment. If one is to make value-judgements, this highly intensive preoccupation with their own group was clearly the 'fault' of the Zionists, but is this not understandable from the point of view of Jewish history? On the other hand, why should the Arabs have to assume the burden for the consequences of the actions of non-Jewish Europeans? There is more grey between Arabs and Jews than most black-and-white analysts can imagine.

Most Israeli Arabs live in central and western Galilee, in the 'Big Triangle', mainly in and around Nazareth. In 1948, 62·9% of the residents of the Northern District were non-Jewish, as compared to 48·6% in 1981 (*Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1982: 37). In the Yesreel Valley subdistrict the non-Jewish population formed a slight majority in 1981 and in the Acre subdistrict a clear majority. A further concentration of Arab population is to be found north-east of Tel-Aviv in the so-called 'Little Triangle'. In the cities of mixed population – Acre, Tel-Aviv, Jaffa, Haifa, Lod and Ramla (Jerusalem, occupied in 1967, presents a special case) – the Arabs are clearly in the minority. There are also smaller concentrations of Arabs to the east of Beersheba and near Haifa.

The geographic distance only serves to illustrate the social distance. As in the section dealing with the attitudes of Oriental Jews towards the Arabs (B/VI/2/e), the longitudinal survey elaborated by Peled (1983) is deserving of special attention here.

The first item of Table 37 shows that Jewish Israelis have given an increasingly lower evaluation of the loyalty of the Arabs to the (Zionist) state in the period between 1967 and 1980. Arab Israelis have been viewed with increasing favour relative to Arabs from the territories (item 2). Clearly, fewer and fewer Jews claim that Arabs are inferior (item 3). If the willingness to get acquainted with the Arab language can be taken as an indicator, the trend has been to a greater open-mindedness towards learning about the culture and mentality of the Arabs (item 4). Apart from this inter-group data, the inter-personal responses of the Jewish public have also demonstrated more moderation and even better matter-of-fact relations (visits in Arab homes or having had Arabs as guests, items 8 and 9).

On the inter-state level as well, more moderation has been reflected by the interviews. A growing number of Jewish Israelis have come to the conclusion 'that Arab states are ready for peace' (item 10).

What follows below are some momentary 'snapshots'.

In June 1967, 31% of Jewish Israelis declared they were 'unconditionally

Figure 46   *The Arabs of northern Israel.*

Source: Gilbert, 1974: 57.

Table 37 Selected Findings Presenting the Dynamics of Jewish Public Opinion in Israel on the Topic of Jewish–Arab Relations in Israel (%)*

	Between the wars of 1967 and 1973	Between the 1973 war and Sadat's visit	Between Sadat's visit and up to Oct. 1980 (incl.)
Inter-group level			
1) Percentage assessing that the loyalty of the Israeli Arabs is diminishing	17–33	13–54	36–70
2) Percentage preferring Israeli Arabs to those of the territories	21–42	**	57–68
3) Percentage claiming Arabs are not inferior to Jews	40–42	**	51–56
4) Percentage supporting introducing Arabic in obligatory school curriculum	46–56	**	65–67
Inter-personal level			
5) Percentage ready to become friendly with an Arab (with no reservations)	26–32	37–38	59–64
6) Percentage ready to live in same building with Arab family (with no reservations)	24–28	**	38–44
7) Percentage ready to live in same neighbourhood with Arab families (with no reservations)	19–21	**	35–41
8) Percentage who visited an Arab home	42–45	**	54–56
9) Percentage who had Arabs visiting in their home	26–27	**	37–44
Inter-state level			
10) Percentage who think that now Arab States are ready for peace	8–34	19–50	33–83

* The figures in the table represent the range of the percentages as obtained in *different* surveys within the said periods.

** The question was not asked.

prepared to be friends with the Arabs' and 66% gave the same reply in December of 1979 (Peled, 1980: 20; further data and literature in Wolffsohn, 1983a: 420 ff.).

The image of Jews among the Arabs also improved in this time period (Peled, 1979; Benyamini, 1981).

Surveys conducted by Mar'i (1978) and Smooha (1980) registered a mutual willingness to establish contacts with the other population group, but according to Smooha (1980: 62 f.) this readiness was considerably greater among Arabs than among Jews.

Apart from impersonal business contacts, however, actual contacts remained few in number (loc. cit.), although increasing slightly from 1967 to 1978 (Peled, 1979: 9). In June 1967, 73% of Jewish Israelis had never had an Arab guest in their homes, which was true of 56% in November 1978. The proportion of those who had never visited an Arab at home sank from 58% to 46% (loc. cit.).

The willingness to overcome barriers decreases among Jewish Israelis to the extent that they identify the Arabs as Palestinians. The same is true of the Arabs to the extent that they are not prepared to accept the basic situation of their group within the Jewish state (Peled, 1979: 10, and 1980: 21; but for the most extensive data see Smooha, 1980: 148. Data on the attitudes of Oriental Jews towards the native Arab population can be found in section B/VI/2/c.).

Recent data, however, indicate that young Jewish Israelis are highly prejudiced against Arabs and are also unwilling to grant them equal rights (Hoffman and Nager, 1985; Zemach and Zin, 1984).

(e) AREAS OF TENSION

Apart from the influences of the inter-state Arab–Israeli conflicts, four domestic problem areas have repeatedly led to tensions between Jewish and Arab Israelis: (1) the issue of citizenship (see section A/I/2), (2) the military administration, (3) the acquisition of Arab land by Jews and (4) the relative cheapness of Arab as compared to Jewish labour.

The military administration, which had greatly restricted the Arabs in their freedom of movement, was ended in December 1966.

Conflicts over the purchase of land began at the outset of Zionist immigration to Palestine. After the founding of Israel the issue was the 'Judafication' of areas populated by Arabs (especially in Galilee). The government claimed Arab land for Jewish development projects, first to improve the infrastructure of the country, and second to 'implant' more Jews in areas heavily populated by Arabs.

In 1976 this policy led to the 'Land Day' confrontation. On 30 March 1976, a bloody clash took place, in the course of which seven Arabs were shot by Israeli police. A short time later the Israeli government, led by Prime Minister Rabin, told Arab representatives in unequivocal terms that Israel was, and would remain, Jewish (*FAZ*, 21 June 1976).

When discussing the question of cheaper Arab labour, it must not be forgotten that this problem had, during the Yishuv, already led not only to Jewish–Arab tensions, but to inner-Jewish conflicts as well, some of which were violent in nature (Giladi, 1973: 164 ff.). Not all Jewish employers in either the agrarian or the industrial sectors complied with the Zionist, Labour Party and union 'Jewish labour' (*Avoda Ivrith*) demands. Such

employers set their commercial interests above Zionist ideology and profited from the fact that Arab workers were not only 'cheaper' but also less politicized and aggressive. The perspective of an eventual bi-national, functional coexistence thus opened by this development came to an end between 1936 and 1939 when the Arab Revolt led to a practical economic separation (see Horowitz and Lissak, 1978: ch. 2).

Following independence Jewish Israelis, especially Ashkenasim, exhibited an increasing unwillingness to perform tasks involving hard labour, preferring instead to set their ideological qualms aside and to hire Arab labourers. Since 1967 the supply of willing and inexpensive Arab labour from the occupied territories has grown ever larger. In 1970, 20,600 labourers, or 11·9% of the total workforce in the occupied territories, were involved. In 1981 the figures were 75,800 workers, or 35·1% of the total Arab labour force in the occupied territories, and 79,100, or 34·7% of that workforce, in 1982 (*Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1982: 754, and 1983: 780). Most of these workers were employed in construction: 54·3% of all residents of the occupied territories working in Israel in 1970 and 51% in 1980. In 1970, 24·4% were employed in agriculture, as were 12·7% in 1981 and 12·8% in 1982 (loc. cit.).

(f) ARABS AND PARTY POLITICS

The fact that it never came to the foundation of a purely 'Arab' political party following the creation of the state of Israel can be explained (among other factors) by the shock of the sudden transformation of the Arab community from the large majority in Palestine into a minority in the new Jewish state, a shock which crippled all political activity. In addition, the remaining Arabs were left with little motivation to undertake political initiatives in the wake of the experience of the total failure of their traditional political leadership, which had largely deserted them during the War of Independence (see Landau, 1971: 90 ff.).

Until 1977 increasing numbers of Israeli Arabs voted for the Communist Party because it pursued Arab interests in the political arena, including the Knesset, and because the Communists were non-Zionist, although not anti-Zionist. The decision to vote for the Communists was not and is not a decision for 'communism' but rather a protest, and as such fits within the framework of Israel as a state. Israel's existence is not rejected either by the old Communist Party or by the NCL, which accepts Israel's existence but aims to create another, bi-national rather than Zionist, i.e. exclusively Jewish, Israel.

In the long run, all of those Arabs who are not prepared to accept the existence of Israel, either as a Zionist or as a bi-national state, will have to form an organization of their own. Such a move, however, would probably not be acceptable to Israel's 'armed democracy' (in the original Zionist sense of the term), as was the case in the period 1958/65 in connection with the Arab-nationalist al-Ard Movement.

In November 1964 the Supreme Court of Israel ruled that is was possible to permit political parties which did not accept the status quo, but not parties like al-Ard which did not recognize or which sought to undermine the state (Landau, 1971: 160 f.; similarly the ruling of October 1965, discussed in Rubenstein, 1974: 246 and in Wolffsohn, 1983a: 425 ff.).

In 1984 the Central Elections Committee disqualified an Arab-Jewish party, the Progressive List for Peace (PLP). Resembling the NCL (but without its communist ideology), the PLP accepted the existence of Israel but aimed to transform it into a bi-national, non-Zionist, i.e. not exclusively Jewish state, which the PLP conceived of as coexisting alongside a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Israel's Supreme Court struck down the disqualification by the Central Elections Committee, which had also banned Rabbi Kahane's extremely anti-Arab Kach, and allowed both parties to run for the Knesset. Both succeeded in overcoming the 1% hurdle, Kach receiving one and the PLP two Knesset seats.

The Yom Kippur War served to heighten the political consciousness of Israel's Arabs, particularly among the youth, some of whom had already organized themselves as the Sons of the Village on the local political level in 1972/3 and did very well in the local elections of 1973 and 1978, but achieved a more modest success in 1983.

Like the Sons of the Village, the National Progressive Movement (NPM), founded by Arab intellectuals at the end of the 1970s, is closer to the more radical rejectionists of the PLO than to the more moderate al-Fatah. Running under different names, the NPM met with significant success in the local elections in November 1978, especially in the 'Little Triangle' north-east of Tel-Aviv, after attracting a great deal of attention as a result of its success in the Council of Arab Students at Hebrew University since 1977/8 (for details see Wolffsohn, 1983a: 216 ff.).

A third purely Arab organization is also worthy of note. The Moslem Youth also favours a radical pan-Arab approach to Palestine, but is not a secular party in the normal sense of the term. With its rather fundamentalist religiosity, the Moslem Youth can, with all due caution in making such a comparison, be seen as something like a Sunni–Arab–Israeli equivalent to Shi'ite 'Khomeinism'. Characteristically, it sprang up in the late 1970s and became more visible after the Iranian revolution.

As soon as one or more of the above-mentioned organizations attempt to become active on the national level they will be confronted by the same normative, institutional and judicial barriers encountered by the al-Ard Group.

In 1958/9 al-Ard presented a serious challenge to the Communist Party, as it was first and foremost an Arab-nationalist group and only second a party of the 'left', an attribute it chose not to define precisely. The al-Ard also supported Egypt's President Nasser, who was then the pan-Arabian idol, whereas the CP, riding Moscow's coat-tails, had cast its lot with Nasser's rival, Iraqi President Kassem.

The only traditional party which made the effort to be both Jewish and Arab was the Communist Party. It hoped to neutralize the 'national' aspect by stressing the socio-economic 'class' factor – and failed. The national existence of two peoples in one party remained a 'myth' (Greilsammer, 1978: 346 ff.).

In 1984 the Progressive List for Peace (PLP) presented a truly Arab–Jewish list for the first time in the nation's history. The PLP was founded in 1983 by Arab intellectuals from the Nazareth branch of the New Communist List, who broke away from that party to form an at first purely Arab,

non-communist organization in order to pursue the goal of a bi-national Israel. They gave themselves the name Progressive Movement for Peace (not to be confused with the radical National Progressive Movement) and were soon joined by a number of former al-Ard members. The newly established party won one-quarter of the seats on Nazareth City Council in the 1983 local elections.

In early 1984 the party turned Arab–Jewish when former Shelli founders Uri Avnery and Matityahu Peled, together with other former Shelli members and other non-Zionist (but not anti-Israel) Jews joined. All of them favoured direct negotiations with the PLO. The new bi-national character of the party was not accepted by all of its Arab founders, some of whom refused to join in the new configuration.

Campaigning as the Progressive List for Peace, the new party competed with the NCL for the endorsement of the PLO in order to attract as many Arab voters as possible in the 1984 elections. Among Arab voters the NCL came in first in 1984, and the PLP in third place (see Figure 47), but Jewish support was negligible.

Mapam opened its ranks to Arab citizens in 1954, but these remained a distinct minority. Despite its intensive efforts to attract Arabs, the Shelli Party, founded in 1977, met with no success and failed to receive a single Knesset seat in 1981. The Matzpen group, which attacks the Zionist, i.e. the exclusively Jewish character of the State of Israel, on principle (Bober, 1972: 4), managed to achieve an Arab membership of about 10% (Yuval-Davies, 1977: 48).

Mapai/ILP had traditionally relied on its allied Arab minority lists (led by the heads of the Arab clans) to maintain political contacts with the Arab population. In 1969 membership in the ILP was opened to Druze and in 1973 to other Arabs. There had already been Druze members in Herut since the 1960s, as this party, despite its Zionist-nationalist character, maintained from the beginning the position that all Israeli citizens should enjoy equal rights. In Herut the effective barrier was a different one: ideology and policy (further details and literature in Wolffsohn, 1983a: 427 ff.).

(g) ARABS IN THE MILITARY

As early as 1948 there were already some Circassians fighting on the side of the Israelis. After independence some young Druze began to serve as volunteers in the army. On 3 May 1956 the first Druze unit consisting of draftees was created, the initiative for this step have been taken by the Druze leadership in Israel. The gradual 'Arabization' of the Druze in Israel, as well as tensions between Israeli authorities and Druze on the Golan Heights and the prolonged War in Lebanon, which found Israel fighting alongside the Lebanese Christians (who were, to put it mildly, the traditional rivals of the Druze), served to erode the loyalty of some younger Druze soldiers to Israel. Some of them (albeit not many) even deserted Zahal to join their religious and ethnic brothers in Lebanon.

Bedouins are not subject to the draft, but are allowed to serve as volunteers, a smattering of whom are to be found in Zahal. In late 1984 the ranks of Zahal were also opened for some two hundred volunteers from 'Arab villages' (i.e. non-Bedouins; A. Mantzur, *Haaretz*, 18 December 1984).

(h) UNDERREPRESENTATION

Smooha (1978: 351 f.) has put together an extensive documentation of the political underrepresentation of Israel's Arabs in relation to their proportion of the total population. It need only be updated in the area of local politics.

Table 38 shows the number of Arab deputies in the various Knessets. The numbers in parentheses refer to the total of members elected to the Knesset via the Arab minority lists.

Table 38 Arab Members of the Knesset, 1949–84 (number of MKs from minority lists in parentheses)

1949	1951	1955	1959	1961	1965	1969	1973	1977	1981	1984
3(2)	8(5)	7(5)	7(5)	6(4)	7(4)	7(4)	6(3)	7(1)	5	7

(i) POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOUR

As a result of the heightened political consciousness among Israeli Arabs, encouraged and conditioned by their improved educational status, protest attitudes and actions in the form of votes cast for the only non-Zionist party in the country, the Communists (and NCL from 1965 on), increased significantly, as shown in Figure 47 and Table 39. The success of the Progressive List for Peace in 1984 fits into this pattern, which also documents the desire of many Israeli Arabs for bi-national institutions neither Zionist nor Communist in character, but instead 'pluralistic' in the sense of rejecting exclusivity and demanding mutual tolerance.

The Communists' losses in 1959 were related to the already described rivalry with the al-Ard Group. The losses in 1981 were less indicative of a renewal of willingness to cooperate with the Zionist parties than of resignation.

Overall participation in 1981 was considerably lower than for the local elections of November 1978, in which the Sons of the Village and the National Progressive Movement were allowed to run. While voter participation reached 80% in 1973, it fell to 76% in 1977 and to only 70% in 1981 (Elections, 1981: XXIV, 2). The participation in Moslem communities was lower than in Druze areas (loc. cit.), which is a further indication of protest behaviour, as the Druze have traditionally been better disposed towards the state. Except for the 1949, 1977, 1981 and 1984 Knesset elections, Arab voter turnouts have been higher than for Jewish voters. Despite the increase in the participation of Arab voters from 70% in 1981 to 76% in 1984, the pre-1973 levels were not reached. This continuing gap may indicate a certain resignation on the part of those for whom it does not make sense to vote for bi-national, let alone Zionist, parties. The non-voters may, therefore, consist of basically uninterested and fatalistic eligible Arabs as well as rejectionists. Figures on the latter remain open to speculation – or polls, which, to this author's knowledge, are unfortunately lacking.

Nevertheless, the NCL remained the party with the single largest bloc of voters among Israel's Arabs in 1981. The Labour bloc received the most

Figure 47 Arab voting patterns in Israel, 1949–84

Legend:
☐ Zionist Parties (incl. minority lists)
▨ Non-Zionist Parties (incl. Communists)

Table 39   Arab voting patterns in Israel, 1949–84

Elections	Arab Voters	Participation (in %)	Zionist Parties	Minority Lists	Communists	PLP
1949	24,000*	79	26·1	51·7	22·2	—
1951	69,000*	86	28·9	54·8	16·3	—
1955	70,827	90	26·6	57·8	15·6	—
1959	75,155	89	30·2	58·5	11·3	—
1961	80,454	86	32·0	45·6	22·5	—
1965	92,505	87	33·1	40·8	23·1	—
1969	105,948	85	29·7	41·0	29·5	—
1973	119,627	80	27·1	36·0	36·9	—
1977	132,684	76	27·9	21·5	50·7	—
1981	168,000	70	48·7	13·4	37·9	—
1984	199,968	76	50·0	—	32·0	18·0

* Estimates (rounded) by Harari, 1978: 12 and, similarly, Landau, 1971: 167, 172).

Sources: Landau, 1971: 165 ff.; Harari, 1978: 12, 14; Elections, 1981: XXVI; Cohen, 1984: 24.

votes among Bedouins, with 50% in 1981 (Elections, 1981: XXXI). In Druze communities the minority lists were the largest vote-getters, followed by the Labour bloc and the NCL (ibid.: XXVII).

The 1984 elections demonstrate the first real upheaval among Israeli Arabs. The rejection of the Zionist parties (including their affiliated Arab minority lists) was more decisive than in the previous record year, 1977. Overall, slightly less than 50% of the vote was cast for Zionist parties in 1977. This dropped to a total of 48% in 1984 and, for the first time, there was a truly bi-national alternative. Looking at the results for the individual parties, the setback for the Communists (NCL/Rakah) was relatively modest, namely, a 3% drop (from 1981) to 35%. The Alignment came in second with 23% in 1984, compared with about 29% in 1981, but in the earlier election the Arab minority lists linked to the Maarah had attracted another 13% of the vote. It is thus safe to say that the support for the Alignment among Arab voters was cut almost in half (from a total of 42% in 1981 to 23% in 1984).

The undisputed winner among Israel's Arabs was the Progressive List for Peace, which got 18% of the Arab vote. The results for the other parties in 1984 were 6% for Ezer Weizman's Yahad, 5% for Shinui, 3% for the Likud and 8% for the other coalition parties (data from Y. Litani, *Haaretz*, 27 July 1984; A. Mantzur, *Haaretz*, 30 July 1983; H. and R. Smith, *Jerusalem Post*, 3 August 1984).

It is practically self-evident that the developments described above have led to an 'Arabization' of the Communist voters. In 1955 Arabs cast only 27·8% of the total votes for the CP, whereas they contributed 80–83% in 1981 and 98% in 1984 (Wolffsohn, 1983a: 194; Elections, 1981: XXVII; and author's calculation for 1984).

Figure 48   Likelihood of radical attitudes and behaviour among Israeli Arabs.

Notes:

1) Urban–Rural: the more urban, the more radical.
2) Christian–Sunnite–Druze–(Bedouins): Christians Arabs are more radical than Sunnites. These are more radical than Druze and the latter are more radical than Bedouins.
3) Old–Young: the younger the Arabs, the more radical.
4) Formal education and media exposure: the better educated and the more exposed to (Arab) media, the more radical.
5) Pan-Arab influence: the more influenced by pan-Arab ideas the more radical.

We can also call this process one of 'radicalization' because it shows the gradual but steady erosion of the 'roots' (Latin *radix*, thus English 'radical') of the Jewish State of Israel among its Arab population. This development demonstrates an active, not just passive, alienation and thus an increasing unwillingness to accept the predominantly Jewish character of the state. The 'carrot' of the bread-and-butter issues which had long attracted Arab votes to the Labour parties can no longer compensate for the Jewish, i.e. Zionist, 'stick'. This radicalization could be observed first among Christian Arabs and later among Moslems, Druze and finally Bedouins (for data see Wolffsohn, 1983: 198 f.). Again, this is a 'radical' and not an 'extreme' trend. It does not threaten the existence of the State of Israel, but rather its predominantly Jewish substance. Israel's Arabs apparently desire a different Israel, not necessarily its destruction, or, if they had wanted to destroy it, they have come to a realization that its transformation remains the only realistic alternative.

The following can be said of Israeli Arabs: the younger, the more urban, the better educated, especially if Christian, or (Sunni) Moslem, and less so if Druze or Bedouin, and the more exposed through the media of radio and TV to the influences of the neighbouring Arab states, the more 'radical', that is,

likely to vote for non-Zionist parties such as the Communist NCL and PLP or, as in 1981, deliberately not to vote at all. (see Figure 48 and, for more details, Wolffsohn, 1983a: 203 ff.)

The increasingly important role of the 'Palestinian' element in the political consciousness of Israeli Arabs is documented in the surveys conducted by Peres (1976: 185 f.), Tessler (1977: esp. 317), Meari (1978: 56) and Smooha (1980: 58 f.). The results, with the exception of Smooha, can also be found in Wolffsohn (1983a: 211 ff.).

In opinion polls the Arabs have been offered more than just the Zionist or bi-national alternative which they find at the ballot box. In order to get a more differentiated view, let us therefore examine some of the more revealing polls. The Arabs of Israel are divided over the issue of Israel's right to exist, which was accepted by 40% in 1974/5, and by a further 35% 'with reservations' (Tessler, 1977: 318). In Smooha's 1976 poll (1980: 42), 49·8% responded positively, 28·7% 'with reservations' and 21·5% negatively. Three years earlier, Tessler had already received 25% negative responses. In 1976, 64% of all respondents considered Zionism a 'racist movement' (Smooha, 1980: 42).

Whereas 63·1% of the Druze accepted Israel's legitimacy in 1976, 57·1% of the Bedouins, 44·3% of the Christians and 47·9% of the Moslems did so (Smooha, 1980: 44).

A comparison of Jewish and Arab attitudes concerning individual aspects of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is made possible by the collected results of the surveys conducted in 1980 by Smooha and Peretz (1982). The pollsters found that Israeli Arabs contradict the Zionist consensus on the following points: (1) the national character of the Palestinians, (2) the borders of 1967, (3) recognition of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people, (4) the creation of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, (5) the annexation of East Jerusalem and (6) the right of the Palestinian refugees to return. On the other hand, Israeli Arabs do not accept the ideology of the 'rejectionist front', which seeks to replace Israel with a 'democratic and secular state in the whole of Palestine'. In other words, most of the polls, and especially the last one discussed, confirm our previous statement concerning the process of 'radicalization': Israel's Arabs do not reject Israel's existence but rather its predominantly Jewish substance.

4   SOCIAL-DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECTS OF CRIME STATISTICS

The purpose of the data presented here is not to prove that criminal acts are determined by socio-economic or demographic factors, but these certainly cannot be entirely excluded from the consideration of the motives behind criminal acts.

Among adults convicted of criminal offences (men over the age of 16 and women over 18), Arabs were clearly overrepresented. Table 40 shows the percentage of Arab convicts followed in parentheses by the percentage of Arabs in the overall population for the given year.

Until 1970 about one-third of criminal acts were directed against property,

Table 40   The Arab crime rate relative to population, 1955–82,
(1) Arabs as % of Total Convicts, (2) Arabs as % of Total
Population

Year:	1955	1960	1965	1970	1979	1982
1)	36·3	34·4	28·0	25·8	23·6	23·4
2)	12·5	12·5	13·0	17·0	19·0	17·0

Sources: Statistical Abstract of Israel, various vols.; Society, in Israel 1975: 167.

another third against persons and about a quarter involved violations of 'public order' (i.e. transgressions against state institutions or norms). This last proportion increased to 32% in 1979 but fell again to 27·9% in 1981 (Society in Israel, 1975: 167; Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1983: 624). The political implications are self-evident.

In 1979, 80% of Arab criminals were Moslems, 12% Christians and 8% Druze. The proportions remained nearly the same in 1981 (Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982: 597, and 1983: 624).

In 1982 about one half of all juvenile offences were committed by Arabs, as reported by a special investigative committee (Jerusalem Post, overseas edition, 10–17 June 1984). A quarter of these crimes was carried out by youngsters who had come to Israel from the occupied territories. The proportion of juvenile offences committed by Arabs rose from 29% in 1978 to 49% in 1982 (loc. cit.).

In the criminal statistics for Jews, criminals of African descent were the most numerous, followed by Sabras, who pushed Jews from Asian countries into third place in 1970. By 1979 Sabras were actually leading the statistics when the background of the father was not taken into account (Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1982: 597, and 1983: 624; Society in Israel, 1975: 169).

While 80–85% of all crimes committed by Jewish adults in the period from 1960 to 1974 were against property (Society in Israel, 1975: 169), this proportion sank to 29% by 1979, at which level it remained in 1981. As in the case of Arab adults, 32% of crimes committed by Jewish adults in 1979 were against 'public order', whereas this percentage had been only 7% in 1974 (loc. cit.). This is a dramatic change which can hardly be understood in non-political terms or without reference to 'socio-economic' motives.

FURTHER READING

GENERAL WORKS

Ernest Krausz (ed.) Studies of Israeli Society, 2 vols. (New York: Praeger, 1980, 1983).
Dov Friedlander and Calvin Goldscheider, The Population of Israel (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979).
Fanny Ginor, Socio-Economic Disparities in Israel (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, and Tel-Aviv: Tel-Aviv University, 1979).
S. N. Eisenstadt, Israeli Society (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964); 'the' classic.

POLITICAL GENERATIONS

Unfortunately, the in-depth analyses of the political generations of the founding fathers have been written in Hebrew. Therefore the reader will have to consult histories of the Zionist movement and parties. Nevertheless, one may get a general, though journalistic, picture by reading:

Amos Elon, The Israelis–Founders and Sons (New York: Bantam Books, 1971).
On American Jews who immigrated to Israel, see:
Kevin Avruch, American Immigrants in Israel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).
Aaron Antonovsky and Abraham D. Katz, From the Golden to the Promised Land (Jerusalem: Academic Press, and Darby, PA: Norwood, 1979).
On American and Soviet immigrants, see:
Zvi Gitelman, Becoming Israelis. Political Socialization of Soviet and American Immigrants (New York: Praeger, 1982).
On Oriental Jews, see:
Sammy Smooha, The Orientation and Politicization of the Arab Minority in Israel (Haifa: The Jewish-Arab Centre, Institute of Middle East Studies, 1980);
Marc L. Robbins, 'The strategy of innocence: political resocialization of Oriental Jews in Israel', unpublished PhD dissertation, Princeton University.
On German-Jewish immigrants who were less decisive for the political system, see:
Shlomo Erel, 50 Jahre Immigration deutschsprachiger Juden (Gerlingen: Bleicher, 1983);
David M. Elcott, 'The political resuscitation of German Jews in Palestine, 1933–1939', unpublished PhD dissertation, Columbia University, New York;
Gerda Luft, Heimkehr ins Unbekannte (Wuppertal: Peter Hammer, 1977);
Eva Beling, Die gesellschaftliche Eingliederung deutscher Einwanderer in Israel (Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1967).

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Moshe Shokeid and Shlomo Deshen, Distant Relations. Ethnicity and Politics among Arabs and North African Jews in Israel (New York: Praeger, 1982).
Sammy Smooha, Israel. Pluralism and Conflict (Berkeley, Calif. University of California Press, and London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978); a classic, but a polemical one.

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Alouoh Hareven (ed.), Every Sixth Israeli. Relations between the Jewish Majority and the Arab Minority in Israel (Jerusalem: Van Leer Foundation, 1983).
Tsiyona Peled and David Bar-Gal, Intervention Activities in Arab-Jewish Relations: Conceptualization, Classification and Evaluation (Jerusalem: Israel Institute of Applied Social Research, 1983).
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Sammy Smooha, The Orientation and Politicization of the Arab Minority in Israel (Haifa: University of Haifa, The Arab-Jewish Centre, Institute of Middle East Studies, 1980).
Jacob M. Landau, The Arabs in Israel. A Political Study (London: Oxford University Press, 1971).
See also the sections on Elections (A/I/3) and Oriental Jews (B/VI/2).