POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF IRAQ

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SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS

1. THE PEOPLE. The concentration of Iraq's population in the cities—two-thirds of its 13 million people are now urban—has greatly facilitated the Baath regime's policy of controlling the country and building a modern, secular, centralized state. The country's most significant minority, the Kurds, who comprise 20 percent of the populace, for the most part lives in the hilly to mountainous northeast in a separate Autonomous Region: however, despite its title, it is effectively ruled from Baghdad, as is the rest of the country.

2. THE ECONOMY. Oil wealth has fueled Iraq's economic development program, paid for dramatically increased armaments, and funded extensive social programs. Production levels of 3.5 million barrels a day before the war with Iran brought in over $30 billion annually. However, war damage has reduced oil revenue to around $10 billion a year, well short of Iraq's import bill for military equipment, capital goods, and food. Collectivization policies in agriculture have worked poorly and, for several years past, over 10 percent of civilian imports have been devoted to food.

3. DOMESTIC POLITICS. The centralized political system concentrates power in the hands of President Saddam Husayn. His style is aggressive and driving. Using the Baath Party apparatus, affiliated peoples' organizations, and the bureaucracy, he oversees and takes responsibility for the governance of Iraq and for programs that range from eradicating illiteracy through constructing a country-wide road network to building industry. The sense of forward movement, of working to build a new society, appears to be deeply rooted in many Iraqis, especially in the newly educated, upwardly mobile professional and technical classes who like the sight of a man of their generation running the country.

4. EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. Iraq's burgeoning wealth, the Baathist regime's growing military power, and Saddam Husayn's ambition led Iraq to strive for a leading role in the region beginning in the latter half of the 1970s. Saddam Husayn orchestrated Arab opposition to the Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty. In accordance with customary Iraqi policy, he also sought a strong position in the Persian Gulf. In the same period,

Iraq moved to offset heavy dependence on the USSR by purchasing arms from France and by engaging Western firms extensively in Iraq's development program.

5. **WAR WITH IRAN.** Age-old animosity between Iran and Iraq, between Persian and Arab, led to setbacks. Baghdad had learned to co-exist, warily, with the late Shah. However, the Khomeini regime's efforts to project its version of Islam abroad struck at the secular basis of the Baath regime. The latter, in turn, saw an opportunity to weaken Iran. Mutually hostile moves escalated and culminated in Baghdad's decision to invade Iran in order to solidify its claim to total control of the Shatt al-Arab and deal a blow to Khomeini's regime that would bring it down. Iraq has failed to do either; instead it has lost two-thirds of its oil export capacity and its troops are locked in a stalemate that they cannot seem to break. Iraq lacks the military might to subdue Iran, and withdrawal without achieving at least some of the goals it set for itself could jeopardize Saddam Husayn's domestic position.

6. **PROSPECTS.** For the next year, the Iraqi regime can ride out the stalemate, keep the populace fed, and continue its policy of business as usual—pushing ahead with the development program and carrying on with normal civilian life. In time, however, if there is no resolution to the war with Iran, some combination of insufficient oil revenue, transport bottlenecks, manpower shortages, and casualties will make the regime's policy of assuming normalcy impossible to sustain. Saddam Husayn will have to find logical scapegoats or pay the price himself. Any leadership change would come from within the regime, perhaps associating military officers and a few leading party figures. To use an assessment made of the medieval Mameluke sultans, Saddam Husayn will have to "keep a watchful eye on his amirs, since murder, shifted loyalties, and broken alliances were (are) not uncommon Mameluke (Iraqi) political behavior."

I

BACKGROUND—DATA DESCRIPTIVE

1.1 GEOGRAPHY. Iraq is a creation of the two great rivers which run through it from northwest to southeast. The Tigris and the Euphrates, rising in the mountains of Turkey, made possible the rise of settled agricultural communities at the dawn of history. Most of the country's inhabitants today live within 20 or 30 kilometers of one or the other river. Like many Middle Eastern states, Iraq's boundaries owe more to the activities of external rather than local forces. Moving counter-clockwise from the northeast, where Syria, Turkey and Iraq meet, the border runs southwest for 600 kilometers, dividing a largely desert area with Syria. It then runs due south for 100 kilometers abutting on Jordan and southeast to the head of the Persian (Arab) Gulf, where the state of Kuwait occupies 7,800 square miles which, on the map, appear to have been bitten out of Iraq. These lines were established by the European mandatory powers following World War I. Iraq has only some 75 kilometers of coastline on the Gulf and most of that is on a narrow inlet, shared with Kuwait, which leads to the newer of Iraq's two ports.

The disputed border between Iraq and Iran begins in the muddy estuary formed by the confluence of the Tigris and the Euphrates —the Shatt al-Arab—and the Karun rivers. This border was fixed by treaty in 1847, on lines not much different from the line dividing the Ottoman and Persian Empires two centuries earlier. The border runs northwest, dividing the Arab population of the region, along the edge of the mountains for several hundred miles and then along high watersheds that are very hard to cross until it reaches the southeast corner of Turkey where it turns west.

Much of Iraq is flat, almost featureless, terrain. South of Baghdad, the land is laced with both used and abandoned irrigation canals, although a large part of the area is uncultivated marshland. Baghdad itself is situated on the Tigris where that river comes nearest to the Euphrates. Although this city is only 12 centuries old, there has been a major metropolis in that region since antiquity. All of the area west of the Euphrates and most of that between it and the Tigris north of Baghdad is desert. East of the Tigris, where the land rises into the foothills of the Zagros mountains, dry farming is practiced: in the mountains themselves, the people (Kurds rather than Arabs) farm the valleys or are nomads. It is only in this area that any

great amount of rainfall occurs. The rest of the country is hot (summer temperatures of 115° are normal in Baghdad) and dry.

1.2 POPULATION. Iraq's population of over 13 million is growing at a rate of over 3 percent a year. A generation ago Iraq was a predominantly rural country. Migration to cities since the late 1940s has wrought major demographic change. Two-thirds of Iraqis live in urban areas: the sprawling capital, Baghdad, alone holds a quarter of the population. This concentration of people in cities and towns facilitated the government's compulsory literacy campaign for persons between the ages of 15 and 45, begun when the 1977 census showed that there were 2.2 million illiterate people in that age bracket.

Two major divisions characterize the Iraqi population. The first is religious. The vast majority of the population is Muslim (Christians account for only 3-4 percent) divided, however, into two categories. Sunnis, followers of the main Muslim tradition, account for 40 percent of the population and are about evenly divided between Kurds and Arabs. Sunni Arabs have been politically and economically dominant in independent Iraq. The remaining 55 percent of the population are Shi'a Muslims, followers of the Twelfth Imam, as are the Shi'as of Iran. These people traditionally lived in the area from Baghdad south to the Gulf where they worked the land under very onerous conditions, but in the past two decades enormous numbers of them have moved to the cities.

The second division is an ethnic one. About 20 percent of Iraq's inhabitants are Kurds, people who speak an Indo-European language and who, living in the mountainous area where Turkey, Iran and Iraq meet, have preserved cultural separateness for many centuries. The Kurds have long resisted the imposition of authority by outside rulers, and their opposition has periodically errupted in periods of armed rebellion against the central government in Baghdad.

1.3 RESOURCES. Iraq sits on part of the largest oil-bearing structure in the world. Its reserves are usually given as 35 billion barrels, but this vastly understates reality: estimates of actual reserves run as high as 100 billion barrels. Production of oil began in 1927 from fields near Kirkuk and later discoveries led to the development of fields in the south. Production was about 3.5 million barrels a day prior to the outbreak of war with Iran. Phosphates and sulphur exist in quantities large enough to permit commercial exploitation.

Iraq's second most important resource is land. The area has been farmed for centuries. As much as 12 million hectares of land are considered cultivable, but far less than that is actually farmed in any given year. All of the land south of Baghdad requires irrigation. Iraqi dates are well-known, and, prior to the era of oil, were the country's principal export.

1.4 **THE ECONOMY.** Iraq's growth and development are direct outcomes of the country's great oil wealth. An early oil exporter, it has benefitted from cumulative increases in the value of that commodity. Production grew slowly through the 1960s as a result of disputes between the Western concessionaires and the state. The Baathist regime nationalized most of the oil industry in 1972 and the remainder in succeeding years. Revenues rose from about $600 million in 1972 to $1.8 billion in 1973, tripled again in the following year because of the price increases engineered by OPEC at the time of the Arab-Israeli October War, and again increased substantially during the decade following to over $10 billion. Iraq took advantage of the drop in Iranian oil production, resulting from the disruptions surrounding the fall of the Shah, by increasing its exports and, along with the rest of OPEC, raising its prices further. Until its oil facilities were damaged in the fighting with Iran, Iraq anticipated revenues for 1980 of over $30 billion.

These funds have served to pay for a wide variety of activities directed by the regime through a centralized system. The Baathists have a firm idea of how the country should develop, and their philosophy involves ensuring that the population is told what to do and made to do it. Economic activities of all sorts, from housing to retail trade, are grouped in state establishments. The private sector is quite small.

Enormous sums have been spent on hydraulic works designed to harness the two rivers and provide water for irrigation. Devastating floods have been a recurrent feature of Iraqi life, and the control works are well on the way to preventing major damage in the future. Agricultural output has not registered a similar success. The regime's emphasis on state farms and other collective approaches has not worked well in rural areas. For the past three years, the country has spent over $1 billion annually for food imports.

1.5 **SOCIAL.** A generation has wrought many changes in the way Iraqi society functions. Perhaps most dramatic is the great urbanization. The decade following the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958 saw the disappearance of the tribal heads who owned vast

tracts of land and who, for the most part, exploited their farmers. The small pre-revolution political class also vanished. The Baath Party is run by men in their forties, mostly Iraqi-educated and, by an accident of recruitment, predominantly from small towns in the Sunni area of the country. However, advancement in the party is not restricted to such people: loyalty to the party and to its leaders is the paramount requirement.

In Iraq, it is still mainly a man's political and social world. Women have been elected to the National Assembly and do account for 30 percent of government bureaucrats at the director-general level. However, none are in the top echelons of the party. Women began to serve as officers in non-combatant roles in the army in 1979 and, more recently, have been accepted for pilot training. They are particularly well-represented in the educational and medical fields, on which the regime has put great emphasis.

Nearly 3 million children were in primary and secondary school in 1978, with some 85,000 students in universities. There were over 35,000 students in vocational schools that year and the number is growing. The regime recognizes that lack of technically trained people is a handicap and it does not like to rely on foreigners. The compulsory literacy training instituted in 1978 is another effort to train citizens to be capable of doing needed jobs, as well as being a means of inculcating loyalty to the regime. All educational materials are produced or vetted by the state, and the contents are frequently used to glorify the regime.

Although it is a Muslim country, Iraq has a strong secular streak. Part of this stems from the Baath Party which has tried to de-emphasize religion. Demonstrated zeal for the social and cultural values of, say, Shi'a Islam, would be an impediment to advancement. As a matter of practical politics, however, regime leaders take care to be seen at religious ceremonies. But at least as important as the Baath's attitude toward religion is the fact that Iraq, in recent decades at any rate, has not been a country in which religious practice has been widespread. It has been low in the Shi'a areas, save in the shrine cities which have religious training schools. There are no indications of the emergence of that sort of fundamentalist movement which has appeared in Egypt and Syria.

1.6 **TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION.** A large amount of development money has been spent on building an extensive transportation system. The country has 2,000 kilometers of railway, reaching from its two ports to Baghdad and, in the north, tying into the Turkish and Syrian systems. An extensive metalled road network links major cities and most towns and it is being added to year by year.

The two ports have an annual capacity of 14 million tons, and the country aims to double that; however, for now, warfare has closed Basrah on the Shatt al-Arab and virtually shut down Umm Qasr. Most Iraqi imports come overland from ports in Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Iraqi Airways serves some 50 countries with equipment of Western manufacture, chiefly Boeing.

II

THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE

2.1 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS. Iraq's half century as an independent state divides almost equally into periods of monarchy and republic. For 10 years after the monarchy was ousted in July 1958, there was a struggle among the elements which had wanted to get rid of that form of government but who had developed little idea of what should replace it. The Baath Party seized power in a coup on July 17, 1968. Allied at first with non-Baath factions, it moved as quickly as possible to eliminate them from the government. It also developed mechanisms to place and keep the military establishment under party control. This is a matter of central importance, because the Iraqi army has been intimately involved in the political life of the country since independence, the agent of a dozen coups d'etat.

The key administrative institutions are the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and the Regional Command of the Baath Party. In the early years of the current regime, the RCC was composed of military officers and senior Baathis. Since 1977, the membership of both organizations has been identical, save for one former general who is on the RCC but not the Command. This dual body, under the leadership of the country's president and his closest adherents, sets policies, instructs the bureaucracy in their implementation, sets standards for performance, and rewards or punishes officials. The presidential office functions as secretariat, overseer of programs, and troubleshooter for the top man. A cabinet officer is merely the highest level bureaucrat. However, some of the ministers are members of the president's inner circle. A national assembly of 250 members was elected in 1980; all candidates were approved by the regime before being permitted to run. The assembly discusses and suggests minor changes to draft laws; it does not initiate legislation. There is a separate assembly for the Autonomous Region (Kurdistan), which has little power; the region, in practice, is governed by Baghdad's appointees.

2.2 POLITICAL PARTIES. Although there is more than one party in Iraq, the single one that counts is the Arab Socialist Baath (Resurrection) Party. It shares a common origin with the Baath Party ruling in Syria; a split between the two occurred in 1966. Nominally, the senior party body is the National Command, on which in addition to Iraqis are Arabs from other states, in

keeping with the party's original pan-Arabism to which Iraq still adheres. In Baath parlance, the Arab world is the nation and each state in that nation is a region. In practice, however, the Regional Command is the stronger body. Each of its members has a special responsibility for a specific function or organization in the system. Thus, Adnan Khayrallah Talfah is Minister of Defense, Taha Yasin Ramadan heads the People's Army, and Tayih Abd al-Karim is Oil Minister. Below the Regional Command, there are branch organizations in each of the 18 provinces and subordinate units within districts.

In addition to formal party members, the regime seeks to involve large numbers of the citizenry in "people's" organizations, which exist for students, peasants, women, labor and various professional groups. These organizations helped provide the framework for the literacy campaign mentioned above. Millions are enrolled in them.

In 1973 the regime formed a National Progressive Front with the Iraqi Communist Party; a tame Kurdish group and some independents later joined it. However, the ICP left the Front and, in 1980, formed an anti-government front with two Kurdish parties. Its leaders and many of its members are in exile. At about the same time, another Kurdish group associated itself with other Iraqi dissidents in an opposition front. The two opposition groups sometimes cooperate, sometimes fight each other. There are also three Shi'a organizations which oppose the Baath regime in the name of religion. None of these groups has any legal standing, nor does any appear to have an extensive following.

2.3 **POLITICAL LEADERSHIP.** The centralized, hierarchical system employed by the Baath in Iraq makes the role of the leader particularly important. Since the Baath seized power in 1968, there have been two leaders. Initially, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, a respected military officer and early adherent of the Baath Party, was president, party head, and the party's means of ensuring control over the military. His son-in-law and near relative, Saddam Husayn, was Bakr's deputy in his political and party posts and gradually took more and more power into his own hands. In mid-1979, with no advance notice, Bakr went into retirement on the grounds of ill-health, and Saddam Husayn moved into the top spot. He is a product of the revolution and the violence that have marked developments in Iraq for decades. Joining the Baath Party in his late teens, he first came to notice in 1959 as a member the party team which tried to assassinate Iraq's ruler. He continued to work clandestinely organizing the party during the 1960s.

2.4 MILITARY STRUCTURE. The Iraqi army, essentially an internal security force until the 1950s, has grown enormously under Baathist rule, more than doubling in size from 1973 to 1979. Even before the war, it numbered over 200,000 men, was organized into 12 divisions, and contained smaller specialized units. There is a naval arm which primarily utilizes small, fast missile boats. The airforce entered the war with Iran with about 330 combat aircraft. Most Iraqi equipment is from the USSR, although France broke into the market in the late 1970s with a sale of Mirage aircraft and Iraq also buys from other Western sources.

The People's Army, a part-time militia, grew to 380,000 during 1981. Its members undergo training in various categories of weapons and are meant to be ready to support the regime as necessary. Many units have served short tours on the frontier and some have replaced military units previously performing security duties in Kurdistan. Until the war with Iran, membership in the People's Army was restricted to Baathists: others are now accepted and, for example, 10 percent are pro-government Kurds. The militia and the army account for a large percentage of able-bodied, literate males over 20. Consequently, the People's Army now accepts some women and students.

2.5 FACTORS FOR STABILITY AND INSTABILITY. Iraq has a long history of instability and a centuries-old reputation as a country that is hard to govern. Nonetheless, there are several factors favoring the stability of the Baath regime as it strives to remake the country and the society. First is the disciplined, centralized party organization which responds to the direction of its leaders. Second is the regime's monopoly of physical force and its multiple, extensive internal security services. Third is a reward and punishment system for party members and ordinary citizens alike. Doing a competent job brings advancement and prestige: inefficiency is often rooted out and any form of opposition to the regime is severely, even brutally, repressed. Fourth is the enthusiastic support of many professional and administrative personnel for the modern centralized state that the Baath is trying to build.

Several of the factors favoring stability have a dark side as well. The centralized system which commands positive support is rigid; it does not allow for divergent views. Ideas mostly come from the men at the very top and few Iraqis are going to risk their livelihoods or their necks by suggesting that a given policy is in error. The country is also a potential victim of the "single bullet" phenomenon: Saddam Husayn is so much the boss of Iraq that his assassination would open the way to a considerable

internal power struggle. Furthermore, the Kurdish issue remains an open sore. Many Kurds have accepted the reality that the Iraqi state is too powerful to challenge, but others have not. There is some anti-regime activity, and Baghdad must devote extensive security resources to ensuring order in the northeast.

And, finally, there is a factor that could go either way, namely the war with Iran which has been stalemated for a year. It is Saddam Husayn's war. If he can find a face-saving way out of the conflict, his position would be relatively secure. If it drags on inclusively or if Iraq suffers costly defeats, his responsibility is clear and his position would be jeopardized.

III

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

3.1 INTERNAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS. Ten years after the unpopular Iraqi monarchy was overthrown, the Baath Party seized control. Since that date, in July 1968, its leaders have been single-mindedly building the political and social system in which they believe and which they consider to be necessary if Iraq is to become a modern progressive state. The first few years were devoted to eliminating any possible opposition. The Baath had had to cooperate with non-party military men to gain power because it was, by its own later admission, relatively weak in 1968. It succeeded admirably; efforts directed against it in 1970 and 1973 were defeated. By the end of 1973 the regime could be said to be firmly in control and, in particular, to have a firm hold on the military establishment.

Its methods were harsh. Arrests, mistreatment of detainees, and political murder were among the tools used. Under the leadership of Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, president until he retired in 1979, and his son-in-law, Saddam Husayn, the Baath militants built and dominated a rigidly centralized system. Control, not haste, characterizes their style. For example, the regime nationalized the major portion of the oil industry in 1972, only when it had a sufficient number of party members with the qualifications to run it. Another instance of this caution is the surprisingly mild deal offered the Kurdish rebels in 1970, which gave the regime a further four years during which to prepare for the serious attempt it made to impose its will on them when they refused the central government's terms for autonomy in 1974.

The leadership is concentrated in a very few hands. During the years that Bakr was president, Saddam Husayn gradually accumulated more and more power. Membership in the top party body, the Regional Command is risky: only three of those who were on it when the party seized power in 1968 are still members—Saddam Husayn, Taha Yasin Ramadan, who commands the People's Army, and Izzat Ibrahim, who is Saddam Husayn's formal deputy on the Command. Of the remaining original members, a few went into retirement, three were ousted in 1977 for not dealing severely enough with persons accused of fomenting trouble among the Shi'a, and five (along with a dozen others of lesser rank) were shot in 1979 for what was termed a plot against Saddam Husayn. These executions were carried out by party members from various provinces while the erstwhile comrades of the convicted on the Command watched.

A secretive centralized system such as that of Iraq affords little opportunity for conventional political analysis. Therefore, the following discussion deals with Saddam Husayn's accession, the development of a "cult of personality" around him, certain institutional developments, and the attitudes and actions of ethnic and religious groups.

While Saddam Husayn was acquiring increasing power during the 1970s, he was always careful to accord primacy to President Bakr formally. Although Bakr had been known for years to be in uncertain health, the RCC's announcement of his retirement and the elevation of Saddam Husayn to the presidency came without warning. The totality of that retirement—Bakr was only seen in public once or twice during the first few months after he stepped down—argues that the younger man pushed him aside. The execution of their RCC colleagues, which also occurred at that time, was an element in the shaking down process, as Saddam Husayn assumed complete control. He has put his own stamp on Iraqi affairs. His style features unannounced visits to schools, factories and offices—visits which he uses to urge greater productivity, efficiency and patriotism. Tours through rural or workers' areas are widely publicized and often include gifts of TVs or other equipment to the group involved.

The cult of personality has grown enormously in the past two years, even allowing for the high level of formal adulation that is normally accorded to heads of state in the Arab world. The growth is seen in many areas, most strikingly in relation to the war with Iran. Although he had no military experience or training Saddam Husayn had himself appointed to the rank of general in 1976, effective retroactively to make him senior to officers then serving. In 1980, he took the rank of staff field marshal and, since September of that year, he has been constantly photographed in military uniform both in Baghdad and while visiting the front. The war with Iran is known as Saddam's qadisiyyah—the name of a battle fought in 637 in which the newly-created Arab Muslim armies defeated the Persians. His association with the war is total.

In an effort to create a broader base of support during its early years, the regime established a Progressive National Front with the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), to which was later added pro-government Kurdish factions. Relations between the Baath in Iraq and the ICP have never been good, although, on occasion, they have cooperated to achieve mutual goals. In 1978, the Baath rulers accused the ICP of carrying out political activity in the armed forces, something which is restricted to the Baath alone, and executed a score of communists. The ICP subsequently left the Front, gave up its seats in the cabinet, and went into

opposition. After trying for a year, in November 1980, along with the Democratic Party of Kurdistan and the Unified Kurdish Socialist Party, it formed a front aimed at overthrowing the Baath regime. Elements of this front have engaged in anti-regime activity in Kurdistan. The original Progressive National Front still exists, but only on paper.

In the summer of 1980, the regime held long-promised elections for a national assembly. The voters were able to choose among candidates for each seat, but all candidates were first approved by the regime and only those who supported it were allowed to run. Nonetheless, the exercise excited a certain amount of interest and provided one more link between the leadership and the populace.

Saddam Husayn presides over a party and a government run by people in their forties who are not the sons of the small ruling elite of monarchical days. The system does not in any way provide a place for the independent thinker: the man at the top knows best, he decides and others obey. However, those who are willing to work within the centralized authoritarian system and who see that system as the way to create a modern Iraq—and they are many—find useful roles. The country is growing and the fields of opportunity are legion.

The Baath regime has continued a historic pattern—domination of Iraq by Sunni Arabs. Saddam Husayn and many of the leading figures in the regime come from small towns north and west of Baghdad. Beginning in Ottoman days, people from Sunni areas had greater access to education than did those from the Shi'a south. However, one can easily make too much of this religious and geographic difference. Shi'as did reach the prime ministership under the monarchy and the present regime is using all the means at its command to create for all Iraqis ties of loyalty to the state and the party which embodies it. Evidence of this effort is everywhere: a well-financed information network, regime-approved school textbooks and curricula, the large people's organizations, and even the literacy campaign. The war with Iran has provided a further mechanism—appeals to patriotism and the heaping of opprobrium on those not seen to be working in the war effort are common, although this approach appeals more to Arabs than to Kurds.

The long-standing issue of what place the Kurdish portion of the population should occupy has been settled, at least for a time, by this regime. The last major flareup of rebellion began in March 1974 and ended a year later when the late Shah of Iran withdrew his support from and refused to allow Israel and the United States to aid the Kurds. The revolt collapsed. Many Kurds fled to Iran and many more were relocated to other parts of Iraq.

Deprived by the exile and then the death of the one leader who had been able to unite them, Mustafa Barzani, the Kurds split into several factions, one under the leadership of Mustafa's son, Masud. The northeast was quiet from 1975 until 1979, when the inability of the Khomeini regime in Iran to control its own Kurdish region opened a way for arms to enter Iraq. There has been a recurrence of anti-regime violence, especially since the war with Iran has required Baghdad to draw down the normal garrisons it keeps in the Kurdish areas. Two groups are chiefly responsible for this violence: Masud Barzani's Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and its communist associates, backed mainly by Iran, and Jalal al-Talabani's Popular Union of Kurdistan (PUK), a Syrian sponsored group.

3.2 **THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY.** The caution that marked political affairs in the early years of the Baath regime is also a feature of its economic policy. A sense that its enemies had been defeated combined with the huge increase in oil revenues from 1974 onward, enabled the regime to step up its development program sharply. Since oil exports were crucial, and since it was conscious that its exports were subject to interdiction by its neighbors, Iraq built multiple export systems. To the original pipeline across Syria to the Mediterranean it added two deepwater terminals on the Gulf, a pipeline across Turkey, and an internal line that permitted it to move some southern oil through the northern facilities and vice versa. Export levels jumped from about 2.5 million barrels a day in the period 1976-1978 to around 3.5 million barrels a day in 1979 when the revolution cut Iranian exports. This level was close to production capacity.

The war with Iran has cut Iraqi production sharply, holding it to an estimated one million barrels a day throughout most of 1981. About three-quarters of this is exported through the pipelines that run across Turkey and Syria, since the Gulf terminals are completely unusable. This level brings in some $9 billion in foreign exchange on an annual basis, well below the $12 billion budgeted for civilian imports in 1980. Import levels have remained high during the war, and, in addition, Iraq has had heavy requirements for military goods. As a result of the drop off in oil revenues, Iraq, which had very large foreign exchange reserves when the war began, has had to borrow billions of dollars from oil-rich Gulf states.

IV

EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS

Revolutionary Iraq has swung between isolationism and attempts to play a leading role in the Arab world. Since 1977, the latter has predominated. The regime seized on the opportunity provided by Sadat's peacemaking efforts with Israel to orchestrate opposition to a treaty with Israel. It downplayed earlier policies of working to establish and promote the fortunes of Baath organizations in the Gulf states. It improved bilateral ties with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and, for a time, even with Syria. After the fall of the Shah, when the market for Iraqi oil began to improve, Baghdad gradually shifted away from its policy of pushing for the highest possible price per barrel for oil exports and moved closer to the Saudi position—recently accepted by OPEC—that price increases should be planned and tied to inflation.

4.1 THE GULF STATES. Iraq's external interests lie primarily in the Gulf and in the states that lie between it and the Mediterranean. The present regime is acutely aware that Iraq's access to the world at large is at the mercy of other states. It has tried to extend its influence over the smaller Gulf states. In earlier years this was attempted through subversion and crude pressure (for example, border incidents designed to convince Kuwait to cede territory) but, since 1980, it has appealed instead to Arab chauvinism against the religious claims of Khomeini's Iran. The Gulf states are concerned over the Iranian attempt to export its version of Islam and welcome Iraqi support. At the same time, however, they are concerned about Iraq's ultimate goals in the region and they pointedly excluded Iraq from the Gulf Cooperation Council they formed in May 1981.

4.2 SAUDI ARABIA. The last few years have seen the development of greatly improved relations between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Iraq was quick to appreciate that the Saudi willingness to use its massive oil producing capacity and resultant revenues for political purposes gave Saudi Arabia influence in Arab councils. Iraq began to soft-pedal its anti-monarchical ideology and work in harmony with Riyadh. In return, Saudi Arabia has been forthcoming about the use of its ports and transportation system for the transhipment of goods to Iraq since the latter's Gulf ports were closed by the war.

4.3 **JORDAN.** In the latter half of the 1970s, Baghdad successfully wooed Jordan away from close ties with Syria. From its large financial reserves, Iraq paid for agricultural development in the Jordan valley and for improvements in Jordan's transportation system. Politically, the Iraqis offered King Husayn an alternative to close ties with the Alawi-dominated regime in Damascus which had begun to show signs of weakening. Husayn, who has few friends in the Arab world, took the bait. He wholeheartedly supported Baghdad when it raised the level of hostilities with Iran in September 1980. The road route across Jordan has become a major source of supply for Iraq.

4.4 **SYRIA.** Iraq has long desired to have a government in Syria that would view the world in a manner similar to that of Baghdad. It has not got one. The two Baath regimes are bitter enemies; each claims to be the legitimate successor of the original party, each supports opposition elements in the other's body politic, and each seeks to rally neighboring states against the other. Syria, which for many years provided the only way for Iraqi oil to get to market, can and has interrupted the flow of this oil for political reasons or has charged higher transit fees than Baghdad thought were warranted. It is now supporting Iran in the current hostilities, although it has permitted Iraqi oil to flow through the pipelines. One reason for the latter is that it needs some of the oil itself and another is that it needs the money generated by transit fees.

4.5 **IRAN.** In mid-1979, the Iraqi regime was in a strong position among the Arab states. Now, two years later, it is forced to rely heavily on several of them as a result of the war with Iran. Relations between the two countries were generally poor, with border incidents not uncommon. One reason is ethnic: Persian and Arab cultures have clashed rather than meshed. Another is religious: Iran's vigorous espousal of the Shi'a strain of Islam as the way to practice the faith sits poorly with Sunni Muslims in Iraq, including the not-very-religious Baath leadership. A third reason is geographical: the border divides tribes and other "natural" units. For example, there are a couple of million Arabs living in southwestern Iran and the boundry also runs through the heart of Kurdistan.

Trouble between Iran and Iraq began shortly after the fall of the Shah. Iranian leaders began to call on their co-religionists in Iraq to rise up against the atheistic Baathis. For its part, Baghdad supported dissident groups in Iran. Efforts by Iranian-sponsored Iraqi dissidents to assassinate Iraqi officials in the

spring of 1980 apparently galvanized the Iraqi regime into preparations for war. Iraq charged that Iran had not turned over some territories required by a 1975 agreement and also asserted that Iran had not responded to communications by its diplomats. Border incidents continued. Iraq sent troops into Iran on September 22, asserting that war had actually started on September 4 when Iranian forces shelled Iraqi villages. Saddam Husayn asserts that the war is also needed to redress the injustice of that 1975 agreement, that Iraq must have control of the Shatt al-Arab. After initial success on the ground, the Iraqi advance stopped. Fighting has been at a fairly low level with the Iranians periodically initiating major actions such as that which drove the Iraqis out of a salient east of Abadan in September 1981.

4.6 **ISRAEL.** Iraq remains a bitter enemy of Israel. It refuses to consider recognition and backs some of the more extreme Palesinian organizations. Iraq's military growth in the 1970s was partly directed at future hostilities with Israel. In practice, however, distance and intervening geography limit what Iraq can do against Israel. In effect, it has had to wait for others to initiate hostilities in order to become actively involved. Not so the Israelis. They have twice interfered with Iraq's nuclear program, the first time by sabotaging portions of the reactor under construction in France and the second time, June 1981, by using an air attack to destroy the reactor under construction near Baghdad. The Iraqi reaction to this attack was surprisingly subdued, perhaps because of an inability to deliver a counter blow and a realistic assessment that a verbal explosion would be of little value. Iraq's relatively good relations with Saudi Arabia are at odds with the latter's recent efforts to establish ground rules for dealing with Israel. Saddam Husayn did not attend the Arab Summit at Fez in November and his opposition to the Saudi plan helped the speed with which the meeting recessed.

4.7 **THE WEST.** Iraq broke off relations with the United States in 1967 because of the latter's support for Israel. When Iraq moved out of its self-imposed isolation in the mid-1970s, it permitted a modest improvement in ties with the U.S. By the latter part of the decade, American firms were being encouraged to do business in Iraq, although conducting business there is difficult for outsiders. However, Baghdad continues to adhere to its position that there has to be a fundamental shift in the U.S. attitude toward Israel before real improvement in state-to-state relations is possible.

When the Iran-Iraq war broke out, some observers saw an opportunity for the U.S. to "choose" Iraq as a partner in the area. The latter was not eager to be chosen, and there was no strong push in Washington for such a policy. Consequently, a policy of neutrality prevailed, albeit one that is somewhat more favorable to Iraq than to the Khomeini regime.

Among Western European nations, France has the strongest ties with Iraq, dating from the days in the 1960s when it was less demanding in oil negotiations than either American or British companies. France has sold arms to Iraq for several years and was the principal contractor on Iraq's nuclear reactor project. However, under the Mitterand government, progress on an agreement to rebuild the destroyed plant is being made very slowly. Italy is both a good customer of Iraq and a supplier of needed material and expertise. Britain's former dominance in Iraq is at once a handicap and an advantage. It is still blamed for many of the things today's Iraqis don't like about the overthrown monarchy, but, at the same time, it has advantages stemming from a knowledge of the country and its people.

All in all, the Western European position with respect to Iraq is primarily commercial; there is little political affinity or harmony of outlook.

4.8 **THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES.** The USSR has long been in a strong position in Iraq, easily the strongest of any external power. It has been Iraq's major—and for many years sole—supplier of arms; it has provided weapons in large quantities and in types of growing sophistication. Additionally, the USSR and other socialist countries are the source of much technical assistance for Iraq's development program. Baghdad and Moscow signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1972, one similar to those signed by India and Egypt.

However, the limits to the strength of the Soviet position in many ways puts the USSR on a plane not much different from that of other outsiders. One characteristic of the Baath regime is its determination to be self-sufficient and independent; Saddam Husayn's speeches frequently contain assertions of Iraq's insistence on making its own choices. And the more dependent it is in fact on the USSR, the more it is apt to look for ways to show the Russians that they are not essential to Iraq's well-being. The Baathists have turned on the ICP several times; the most recent incident involved the execution of a score of Iraqi communists in 1978, which incident led to the ICP's forming an opposition front with Soviet approval. Baghdad has also publicly condemned the

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and it is worthy of note that, although it has used Iraqi airspace for military overflights, the USSR has no military privileges in Iraq, such as the use of facilities for repair or service.

Commercially, the USSR and its East European associates are active in Iraq, which has concluded nearly 50 economic and technical agreements with socialist countries. According to Iraqi publications, 30 percent of the country's current exports go to socialist countries. It is probable that this does not include oil, because it would mean that about a quarter of Iraq's diminished oil exports were being sent to those states; however, Iraqi data is so limited that one must speculate. Iraq is also affiliated with the socialist Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the first non-socialist state to achieve that status.

4.9 **THE THIRD WORLD.** As it moved out of isolated status in the latter half of the 1970s, Iraq also moved beyond its principal area of interest to seek support among non-Arab states. In those years, it concluded a number of economic agreements with states in the Third World. Many of these involved loans or grants to help those countries pay for the very expensive oil they were importing. Iraq has also participated vigorously in Third World activities, particularly in the Non-Aligned Movement. At the latter's triennial conference in Havana in 1979, Iraq was selected to be the site for its next conference, which is scheduled for September 1982.

V

THE PRESENT SITUATION

5.1 WAR WITH IRAN. The sixteen-month-old war with Iran has become a national preoccupation. Despite the regime's effort to maintain normalcy at home, the conflict dominates the lives of half a million full and part-time soldiers and their families, occupies much of the time and energies of the country's leaders, and is an economic drain. Most, if not all, regular armed forces units have seen action and contingents of the People's Army do stints of service on a regular basis. The government officially admitted to 7,000 deaths as of December 1981.

In some ways, however, the war does not touch the bulk of the population: food is plentiful and consumer goods are adequate—12 percent of the 1981 import budget was earmarked for food and 8 percent for consumer goods—and there is now little of the air activity near Iraq's cities that marked the first few weeks of fighting.

No outsider can know the thinking that lay behind the Iraqi decision to invade Iran. This is the only major international war the Iraqi army has fought (the large-scale fighting in Kurdistan in 1974-1975 had the definable object of restoring Baghdad's control over its own territory). Analysis of the level of force needed to achieve the goals of toppling Khomeini and restoring Iraqi control over the Shatt al-Arab may have been left to the general staff, which lacked experience in warfare on this scale, or it may have been done, in effect, by Saddam Husayn and his brother-in-law, who had only achieved the rank of lieutenant colonel when appointed Defense Minister in 1977. In any event, the Iraqi conception of how the war would go was wide of the mark. Iraqi leaders expected that a quick heavy blow would so damage Iran as to put its regime in peril. This has not happened; despite the turmoil in the country, both regular Iranian forces and revolutionary guard units have performed fairly well. Iraqi troops are holding approximately the same ground they held a year ago, and Saddam Husayn does not appear to have any strategy beyond that of keeping pressure on the Iranians. The Iraqis, while claiming to be able to take Abadan or Ahwaz have not wanted to incur the losses that such attempts would incur—much less undertake more ambitious moves such as an attempt to seize the Kharg Island oil loading installation.

Iraq has displayed some curious military deficiencies. Despite the importance of oil exports, its forces did not provide

adequate protection for Iraqi Gulf oil shipping facilities, which were put out of commission. Control of the Shatt al-Arab is an Iraqi goal, but there was no attempt made to clear Abadan Island and open the waterway to Iraqi shipping. Defense against Iranian air attacks in the early months of the war was spotty at best, and the Iranians damaged northern oil installations and electric generating plants. In the field, Iraqi forces have had the upper hand and Iraqi engineers did build the infrastructure the troops required. However, the Iraqis did allow themselves to be caught napping by a local Iranian offensive in late September 1981 and were pushed back from Abadan to the west bank of the Karun river with a substantial loss of equipment. The subsequent claim of the propaganda department that Iraqi forces withdrew when the Iranians attacked because they had completed their mission is lame and unconvincing. Iraq yielded more ground to another Iranian offensive in December 1981.

The Iraqi regime has boxed itself in by invading Iran. It has repeatedly offered to cease hostilities if Iran will negotiate a new border agreement. Iran, however, insists that all Iraqi troops must withdraw from its soil before it will agree to a ceasefire. Iraq claims that it raised the level of hostilities in September 1980 because Iran would not hand over territory due Iraq under a 1975 agreement. At the same time, however, Baghdad asserts that this agreement must be changed in its favor because the former Shah imposed overly severe terms at a time when Iraq was in such need of an end to the Kurdish war that it had no choice but to accept them. There is no sign of a break in the stalemate. Despite Iran's local successes, neither country has the capacity to inflict a major defeat on the other.

5.2 THE GULF STATES. For the Arab states of the Gulf, the war has some advantages. An Iran convulsed by internal troubles and at war with Iraq has limited capacity to meddle in Gulf affairs. An Iraq enmeshed in war needs their assistance and, so, will avoid antagonizing them. They find it politic to lend Iraq money to help it compensate for lost oil revenues, but, as long as it is bogged down in the war with Iran, Iraq's hopes to be a leader among the eastern Arab states will have to be put aside.

5.3 ISRAEL. For the time being Iraq is not a factor in the Arab-Israeli military equation. Should hostilities break out in the coming year or so, Iraq would be unable to participate in any more than a token fashion. Between the war front in Iran and security requirements in Kurdistan, its forces are fully occupied. The animosity it bears Israel has been increased by Israel's

destruction of its nuclear reactor. Baghdad's continued opposition to any settlement with Israel led it to be among those states which forced a recess at the November Summit after only a few hours of discussion.

5.4 **THE THIRD WORLD.** Baghdad's goal of achieving prominence among the leaders of the Third World may also become a casualty of its war with Iran. Iraq is scheduled to host the Non-Aligned Conference in September 1982. However, preparations long under way are running into difficulties due to the claim of the war on resources. Besides being directed at boosting domestic morale, the regime's insistence on maintaining a state of normalcy at home is also aimed at convincing the non-aligned states that the conference can and should go on. So far, little has been heard from the prospective participants, who may still hope that hostilities will cease in the next six months, but the Cuban effort to arrange a ceasefire met with no more success than did that of the Islamic Conference. If it turns out that Baghdad does not host the conference, the cancellation will be a severe blow to Iraq's prestige and to its ambitions to be recognized as a state of international importance.

5.5 **THE WEST.** The war brought about a number of developments with respect to non-regional powers. Foreign firms continue to be active in the economic development of Iraq. The regime made it clear immediately after the war began that it wanted contractors to continue work. Baghdad announced that if firms refused to continue work neither they nor their countries of origin would be considered for contracts once the fighting was over. Virtually all contractors continued their projects, and over $3 billion of new contracts have been let since the war began. The most expensive, a $1.5 billion dam and associated works on the Tigris at Mosul, was given considerable publicity as a symbol of business as usual.

Relations with the superpowers also improved, but on a very different schedule. Even before the war began, Iraq was viewing the U.S. with more favor than it had for years because of Washington's difficulties with the Khomeini regime. In the months following the outbreak of hostilities, relations improved further; for example, Iraqi leaders characterized the status of the U.S. Interests Section as that of an embassy in everything but name and agreed, after consultation with the U.S., to accept surprisingly mild language in the UN resolution which condemned Israel's raid on its reactor.

5.6 **THE SOVIET UNION.** With the USSR, affairs started badly, went downhill, and then, in recent months, turned up. Soviet arms carriers on the way to Iraqi ports stopped when the fighting with Iran broke out and eventually turned back. Moscow was unhappy that two anti-imperialist states were fighting one another. The Soviets could have made an argument for supporting either side; they remained neutral. Iraq was not able to get arms directly from Russia as Syria had in 1973, although some were allowed to reach Baghdad by roundabout means. Furthermore, Moscow allowed the exiled ICP leader to use the forum of the Congress of the CPSU in March 1981 to blast Saddam Husayn's regime. However, by summer, Iraq's Soviet ties were improving; as a symbol of the improved situation, the Soviets chaired the October session of the Iraq Council for Mutual Economic Aid Committee.

5.7 **INTERNAL AFFAIRS.** Since the war with Iran started, the regime of Saddam Hussayn has striven to keep life in Iraq as normal as possible. As noted above, it has determined to push ahead on its development program—keeping construction going on the various segments of the motorway that is to run from Basrah to Baghdad and thence to the western border, building bridges, and extending irrigation works. Schools are running normally. The vast state bureaucracy continues its tasks. A variety of international meetings have been held in Baghdad, and the flow of foreign visitors is about as usual. The regime has taken great care to see that shortages of food and consumer goods do not occur. Early in 1981 it established a special State Organization for Imports to ensure that the markets remain well-stocked—a clear indication of its concern in this area.

Nonetheless, the strain on resources is considerable and is beginning to mount. With all goods having to come overland, delays and bottlenecks occur, affecting the completion of construction projects and the output of factories. The most serious strain is in the area of manpower. For some years past, the military services have competed with the civilian sector for manpower. Even before the war, Iraq had invited Arabs from other countries in to work. A large number have come from Egypt. Such outside assistance is even more needed now with so many Iraqis in uniform. The figures of between 750,000 and one million non-Iraqi Arabs working in Iraq given by Iraqi officials are suspiciously round. Whatever the true number, Iraq does not have enough skilled manpower. The calling up of reserves and the volunteering for the People's Army has reduced some factory staffs by 40 percent, and the regime sent students into factories during

their vacations this year. In mid-1981, the regime showed signs of recognizing that changes in agricultural policy were called for; it is unlikely to find the trained manpower needed to improve production or, perhaps, even to prevent further declines.

Because Iraqi society is controlled, assessing whether and how much dissatisfaction exists with regard to the war or the regime itself is very chancy. The regime is relying on the very real sense of commitment to the new Iraq that many citizens, especially the educated, have; substantial numbers in their thirties and forties like being led by a hard-driving man of their own generation. The regime also relies on sentiments (again, mostly on the part of the educated) of patriotism, anti-Iranian feeling, and a genuine dislike of religious government. Open manifestations of unhappiness with the current situation have been few; those that have occurred have been in the south or in the Kurdish area, where two anti-regime groups wage guerrilla warfare. Additionally, three Shi'a organizations have attacked police stations and Baath Party offices. However, at this stage, none of these groups—nor all of them together—represents much more than an annoyance.

Inability to end the military stalemate is beginning to be a drag on the regime. Iraq could mount an offensive and capture more territory, but it cannot destroy Iran's ability or will to continue fighting. Furthermore, the terrain (ranges of high mountains athwart the route from the border to Teheran and marshy land liable to inundation between it and the main Iranian oil fields) sets real limits on what the Iraqis can do. Saddam Husayn, a mover and a shaker by instinct and design, finds himself faced with a situation of his own making that does not respond to his attempts to change it. His policy now is to sit tight and wait for an anticipated collapse of the Khomeini regime.

Where will the situation lead and over what period? If a major change does not occur in Iran permitting Iraq to get out of the war without serious loss of face, pressure on Saddam Husayn will increase in time. Some combination of insufficient oil revenue, transport bottlenecks, manpower shortages, and casualties will make the regime's policy of maintaining normalcy impossible to sustain. This is unlikely to occur in 1982, but the chances of its happening will increase as years pass—and this war could drag on for years.

A change in leadership would come from within the regime, perhaps associating military officers and civilians. Taha Yasin Ramadan, head of the People's Army, is a possible challenger to Saddam Husayn. Ramadan is the only member of the Regional Command who can be said to have the means of physical force at his

command, but, even so, little is known of the loyalties of the members of the Popular Army. Matters would have to get quite serious before any but the most foolhardy would try to overthrow Saddam Husayn. His control of the security and intelligence services and his demonstrated willingness to treat opponents harshly will deter many from turning against him. However, unless some currently unanticipated development enables him to claim victory over Iran, he will someday pay the price for having led Iraq into an unwinnable war.

VI

FUTURE PROSPECTS

The leaders of Iraq have many reasons to believe that they will succeed in their goal of creating a modern, secular state and society. Iraq's enormous oil resources, its compulsory literacy program, its educational system aimed at producing technically qualified manpower, and its vigorous single-minded leadership are factors favoring their attempts. The regime's insistence on continuing its development program even while at war with Iran will ensure continued progress for a time. Reduced Saudi oil exports, a return for OPEC's agreement to standardize prices, may open a larger share of the international market to Iraq and thus increase its income.

However, there are limits and problems on the horizon. If Iraq cannot export enough oil, the regime will be forced to choose among three very expensive import areas, all of which it regards as critical—war materiel, food and other consumer goods, and capital equipment. If this moment of truth arrives, it will not occur in the immediate future. However, Iraq's leaders are clearly aware of the fact that none of these areas can be cut back without inviting serious trouble; the demands of the war are peremptory, the regime's popularity is not such as to inspire sacrifice on the home front, and even just a reduction in the "business as usual" development policy would be read by many as evidence that the all-powerful regime was inept.

In sum, by plunging into war with Iran, the hard-driving leadership of Saddam Husayn and his associates in the long term may have landed the country in deep trouble. The problem is not that they went to war without provocation—the Khomeini regime was a very uncomfortable neighbor—but that they failed to foresee its possible consequences. And it is this failure that could prove the undoing of Saddam Husayn. However, if this comes about it will not be in the near future. Iraq has too large a cushion of financial resources and too tightly controlled a system for cracks to show in the next year. A major setback on the battlefield for Iraq could change this assessment, but such a development is unlikely.

Table 1

GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ

PRESIDENT, CHAIRMAN OF REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL:
Saddam Hussain
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL:
Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri
VICE PRESIDENT: Taha Mohieddin Maarouf

FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER: Taha Yasin Ramadhan
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTERS: Naim Haddad, Tariq Aziz
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, MINISTER OF TRANSPORT & COMMUNICATION:
Saadoon Ghaydan
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, MINISTER OF DEFENSE: Adnan Kahralah
MINISTER OF OIL: Tayeh Abdul-Karim
MINISTER OF HEALTH: Ryad Ibrahim Hussain
MINISTER OF INDUSTRY & MINERALS: Tahir Tawfiq
MINISTER OF LOCAL AUTHORITY: Abdul Fatah Mohammed Amin
MINISTER OF TRADE: Hasan Ali Nassar
MINISTER OF INTERIOR: Saadoon Shakir
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: Saadoon Hammadi
MINISTER OF JUSTICE: Munthir Ibrahim
MINISTER OF WAQF: Nouri Faisal Shahir
MINISTER OF LABOR & SOCIAL AFFAIRS: Bakr Mahmoud Rasoul
MINISTER OF YOUTH: Karim Mahmoud Hussain
MINISTER OF IRRIGATION: Abdul Wahab Mahmoud Abdallah
MINISTER OF CULTURE & INFORMATION: Lateef Nisaif Jasim
MINISTER OF FINANCE: Thamir Razzouqi
MINISTER OF HOUSING & CONSTRUCTION: Mohammed Fadhil al-Haboubi
MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE & AGRARIAN REFORM:
Amer Mahdi Salih al-Kashali
MINISTER OF PLANNING: Taha Ibrahim al-Abdallah
MINISTER OF HIGHER EDUCATION & SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH:
Abdel-Razzaq Kasim al-Hashimi
MINISTER OF EDUCATION: Abdel-Kadir Izzadin
MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS: Hammed Alwan
MINISTERS OF STATE WITHOUT PORTFOLIO: Hashim Hasan,
Abdallah Mustafa, Abdallah Ismail Ahmed, Aziz Rashid

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