

Saturday. 29.1.55. 20.00 - continuation.

Mr. Blass: Beit Natufa and another 50 for the development in the Jordan valley proper, to the Lebanese 35, to Syria (the Banias? 20, and additional water to Buteida, I do not know how much, then to the Syrians from the Yarmuk 50 or 80, and a portion of the Yarmuk at a small dam built for the Transjordanian Kingdom; and say the ultimate development will be made later on _ I believe this could be a solution. In the meantime within five years the Main Scheme will have been forgotten and thenatural development will go in the direction that we shall have the whole Jordan minus the allocation to the upper parts and the other party will have the Yarmouk minus the part which will be allocated to us. In this way you can camouflage this unhappy Main Report and forget it for five years. Afterwards it will be forgotten and the matter can be finished.

I want to stress that this is my personal opinion - nothing to do with the Government. I am not a member of the delegation.

Mr. Gardiner: Mr. Blass gave us some guidance on the Watermaster problem.

Mr. Blass: After building permanent structures for a diversion, the Watermaster should have a limited task to see to it that this will not be destroyed. That is not a common scheme. That is a one-time diversion of water, and the Watermaster (you could call it Prime Minister, it does not matter what you call him) after the parties approve a scheme which will be worked out by an international engineering body and both parties will say they agree, his task would be to see to it that these permanent structures should not be destroyed or damaged or something done to them which will change the situation.

Mr. Johnston: I put forward one other idea regarding the Watermaster, and that is that the President of the United States would present a list of some 20 to 50 names of eminent neutral people such as Swiss or Swedes or Italians or Japanese and that you choose from that list and the other side choose one,

./and they

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Saturday 29.1.55, 20,000 _ contd.

Mr. Johnston (contd.) and they choose the third, and that be a body of last appeal, so to speak, and that these three men choose a man who would be a supervisor of the system, to see that it operates out of the United Nations, for a period of 5, 4, 3 years. The details are unimportant. They can be worked out if you agree on the principle.

Any questions you would like to ask regarding these suggestions?

Gardiner: What is the entire Arab allocation?

Mr. Blass: 300,000(,) or any figure which you can sell them. But I believe that is a question which only the delegation can answer.

Mr. Eshkol: To my knowledge all the additional water, in addition to what we and the Arabs use to-day, is some 660 mcs., for distribution. (Mr. Wiener elaborates on figures)

Mr. Eshkol: It would be wisest to allocate to Israel 250 mcs and to the Arabs 410, namely, 62% to the Arabs, 38% to us.

Mr. Blass: The idea is not to remind of the existing use.

Mr. Barnes: The 200 you suggest as the allocation for Israel, is that new water?

Mr. Blass: Yes.

Mr. Barnes: So that what you are suggesting is that the allocation to Israel from the actual water of the river would be in the neighbourhood of 400 mcs. As far as we can determine, the present use on the Jordanian side is very very small, 50 or 60. So you are suggesting that the allocation to them would be 460,000.

Mr. Gardiner: By eliminating the Kinereth as storage you will have destroyed 120 mcs.

Mr. Wiener: I would not say "destroy" but that future developments might make it possible to distribute.

EX/II/1 (Immediately after AY/3).

Saturday night, 29th January 1955.

Mr. Gardiner: It would help us a lot if we had an explanation of the difference between the 448 and the 453 that you now suggested as a final allocation?

Mr. Wiener: The Huleh has been taken out of the account. Assume that the Huleh is not to be included.

Mr. Gardiner: Mr. Eshkol suggests as a final allocation: 200 plus 250 plus 2.

Mr. Wiener: It can easily be explained to the Arabs.

In the Ambassador's figures the salinity control is included? We deducted it from the river.. According to... we would be entitled to deduct losses from.... We just took the losses from the salinity control.

Loss for spill - 70

" for evaporation - 18.

In addition we did not take into our figures any return flow from the rivers except the flow from the upper uses.

On the Yarmuk the return flow for Syrian uses, not from Huleh uses.

Those are the differences. They are not differences in allocation, but differences in putting the case.

Mr. Troxel knows, after our discussion, that it is extremely difficult to compare the two tables.

Mr. Troxel: Mr. Wiener and I would agree to tear up both sets of papers.

Mr. Wiener: It depends on the way it is presented - net and gross.. There is a difference of 60 mcs.. which would be to the benefit of Israel.

Mr. Troxel: Recited figures....discussed of these figures.....

Mr. Wiener: Jordan would get 492 (592)?

Syria on upper

Yarmuk 70

For Israel 40 present used from the Yarmuk(part of final allocation)

Balance plus Lake ?

Saturday night, 29 January 1955.

Mr. Johnston: How much would Jordan get?

Mr. Wiener:

Measured flow of Yarmuk	-	475
Historic uses of Arab states on Yarmuk		13

Historic use of Israel & Jewish settlements in Palestine from lower Yarmuk 15 (a bit involved & discussed it with Mr. Criddle)

Whatever we take from the lower Jordan....
Return flow from upper Yarmuk 20
Virgin flow & return flow totals 523

Canal and flood waters..... 220
If you take.... we cannot arrive at a figure of less than..... for local resources.

We have not taken a drop of groundwater.

Mr. Eshkol: We read in the papers that the Arabs are using underground water and planting bananas.

Mr. Gardiner: Let us distribute the 793 on the Yarmuk and local resources

Mr. Wiener: Jordan - for irrigation of 400,000 dunams, (1,480 acres) ... 592 Mos.
Syria " upper & lower Yarmuk 70
Present use of Israel from Yarmuk 40
Spill 73
Evaporation losses in reservoir 18
793

Mr. Johnston: Re the underground water, what our report, from the Baker - Harza Company, with whom we have been in contact, indicates to day is that the figure of 3% is accurate. Also, with regard to the number of wells already drilled by us, in only one instance did we find fresh water. The others were salt or dry. We can show it to you on the maps. At this time the ground water seems to be a complete myth. We had a terrible time convincing the Jordanians about this ground water.

Mr. Criddle: We have dug 6 wells up to now, throughout the west gore and 1 in the east gore, in addition to core drillings which gave some indication... 19 wells were drilled by UNRWA, in their effort to find water for culinary purposes as well as for allocation... Of these 19 they saw fit to equip only 2 - one for irrigation (getting 600 gallons per minute from it). In the area of Wadi Faria, where we would expect to find underground water, of 6 new wells drilled in the west gore, the people were very disappointed. They got water alright, but most of it ^{so} saline they had to abandon the wells. On the East side they struck artesian water.

IA/II/3

Saturday night, 29 January 1955.

Unfortunately, this report is coming out to the Arabs on Monday. A copy is not available now, I can only give these details at present.

Mr. Wiener: A real reaction can be given only after we check with our own geologists. But there is one case in our experience which I should like to tell you about. Not far from Tel - Aviv we had 5 wells drilled, from East to west...the salinity going up gradually - - within 10 kms., there was a difference, first getting salt water and then sweet. Fig. 15 years ago we drilled the first wells and we struck we abandoned the idea of getting any sweet water. 10 years later, in the same area, perhaps..... we struck 150 of water and we had sweet water.

Without having anything positive, from the little experience you have had, I would not say that that is enough information to prove that there is no sweet water there.

Mr. Griddle: The point in regard to the 3% which was used is something of which quite a point was made in the past several days. Whether you agree or not, it is there, and I would like to explain our thinking. In the first place they said they recognized that in the Bureau of Reclamation report there are projects which have been quoted here a time or two that we had put in roads, buildings and lands, farmyards, ditches etc. But they also said UNRWA has been working on this problem for a long time and they came to use UNRWA's studies. They did not accept anything which they did not agree to, but they did give these things some thought. The first thing they pointed out was that all villages are being planned off irrigated land. It may be quite a walk to get to a man's farm, but they do say that it would be 6-7 kilometres distance under some extreme instances. But they do have some breaks (?) between the Zor and the Ghor in addition to the areas above the proposed irrigated lands. Another question that I asked was in regard to the feedyards haystacks and animals, and they said that due to pattern which the Arabs used they felt that the animals had to be kept above, and they were designing their plans accordingly. So I had no point there as far as they were concerned. In regard to the roads they say that the main road will go along the main canal, but that there will, of course, have to be access roads down to the farm lands. They did point out that if you have a farm or a plot of 20 dunams in area, you could have a road 10 feet wide, assuming that at least a dozen plots and it would be five feet on either side of the property line. You could have such a road and still remain within the 3%. In regard to the drainage and irrigation ditches, there was the question whether there would be a road completely around three sides or some other system to allow for ditches.

Regarding drainage they say that most drainage will have to be tiled underground ditches, because that is about the only thing that will work.

Saturday 29.1.55 (contd.)

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because of the instability of the soils, that will not stand a bank depression. They recognize that if they put up open drains, they would not be satisfactory.

The next point I brought up was regarding fencing. They say that they had not planned fencing, but I do not know about that. These are the points that we discussed with them, and this is their thinking, and I merely wanted to get across this idea. And it was their defense. I was attacking them because I wanted to make sure that they felt that that was right, and I believe they were sincere in their feelings.

Amb. Johnston: We have information that this interim report is under severe attack by the Arabs as being one in which too little water is allowed for water duty, in which there has been too little land to be irrigated, and so forth, and I am simply telling you the temper of the Arabs. Maybe 3% is too low, maybe it should be 5%, but whatever it should be if you don't put in any houses or any feed flats or haystacks on the land but put them off their irrigated land higher up the Valley you arrive at a lower figure than in the U.S. where these things are on the land.

I believe I am just talking off my head now without mature consideration on some of the points. I think we should go back to the original conception that we discussed last June, because we are getting far away from that. I believe we agreed that Jordan was to get all of the water for the land which was feasible to be irrigated and that the balance of the water was to go to Israel. I think that is what we had agreed upon last June. If that is so we have got to get back to that problem. We are perfectly willing to discuss with you the elimination of Lake Tiberias as storage, which is costly. I did not share all of Mr. Blass's dire predictions as to what is going to happen if we build a canal of 15 kilometres through the territory. But you are wasting a great deal of the water - by any calculation at least 120 MCM of water - but not using

Saturday 29.1.55 (contd.)

Lake Tiberias. That is a great deal of water. You are wasting 30 MCM in the salt springs, another 90 in the spill of the Yarmuk, so that any way you are figuring you waste 120 MCM which we figured in our program. If you accommodate yourself to the use of Lake Tiberias as a reservoir 120 MCM more of water could be distributed equitably. We may be able to try to sell the Arabs the idea of irrigating less dunams, but when you waste 120 right away because of your desire to not have Lake Tiberias used for your own particular purpose and then expect to get practically as much water as you originally anticipated. It paints a very dark picture as far as the Arab States are concerned. Mr. Wiener led me to believe that the wastage of water accruing from not using the Kinnereth as storage was 68 MCM. That is different from 120 MCM which go to waste.

Mr. Blass's suggestion to-day opens an entirely new approach. I want to look at the figures to see whether I could buy them or not as I shall have to try to sell them to the Arabs. I think Mr. Blass suggested - an off-the-head suggestion - 200 MCM of new water to Israel and 400 MCM to the Arab States, the balance to be allocated at some future time. I assume Mr. Blass had in mind that perhaps at some future time this water put to waste in the Yarmuk could be used. If you want to approach that point of view I would be delighted to see what we could do about that. If you want to return to the original suggestion of using Lake Tiberias with a watermaster to supervise, we shall see what to do on that.

Mr. Blass objected to these 15 kilometres of a Canal through Israel territory where the measurement of the water would be at the Arab end. My contention is that a people who recognize that they are getting something from the Yarmuk in return for this ought to understand this. They do in other areas of the world, and I am sure that the Israelis would too. I know we could find a little extra water for Israel in the sense of cutting down the Arabs here and there, but I cannot go as far as Mr. Wiener suggested the other day as to the Israeli requests for what they thought was their irreducible minimum.

Saturday 29.1.55 (contd.)

Mr. Johnston (contd.): I think we have got one of two alternatives: We have either got to use the Lake ~~Eilat~~ Kinnereth with a Watermaster and save 120 MCM or you have to come to something completely different, such as the suggestion of Mr. Blass to allocate on a temporary basis. We have this timetable difficulty - I am trying to put all my cards above board. We are meeting in Cairo - with technical experts and some of their Ministers. I cannot meet them on Wednesday morning unless I have a plan. We have got to have a plan. We have got to have a plan before we go down - we have two days' time to do it. And I cannot be equivocal about it. Therefore we come back to what kind of plan we have. The main objection to that plan is the use of Lake Tiberias as storage. We are willing to listen to your objection and modify our program and eliminate Lake Tiberias, but you have got to take the losses involved in doing so, because we are doing it at your request. It is an uneconomical program, completely unfeasible, purely for the political motives of Israel, and you have got to take all the blame and responsibility for this. If, on the other hand, you will use Lake Tiberias, which is the economical and efficient way, thus saving 120 MCM we could try to get for you more water out of the little water: we might be able to provide that by cutting down the 3% in some way.

We are willing to send drilling groups to find ground water. We are willing to make the programs as flexible as possible. Now you have to tell us whether you do or whether you don't want to use Lake Tiberias as storage?

Mr. Eshkol: It is not unknown to you that the Arabs do not like the idea.

Mr. Johnston: I know they don't like it, but I think I can sell it to them.

Mr. Eshkol: The Arabs say there is more than 400 MCM to irrigate. If I were the planner I would build the settlements on the land. We say we are prepared to take into account the land to be irrigated ~~as~~ there, we plan it according to our standards, according to which we are planning our settlements here, and we know it takes 15%. The accruing difference is between 400 and 511. Let us say you split the land and there

Saturday 29.1.55 (contd.)

Mr. Eshkol (contd.) So you will have in the Main report 340 instead of 270, and there is still untouched underground water. We know that Mr. Moussa Alami is planning 2-3 plantations using underground water.

Mr. Gardiner: On the Wadi flow, the determination made by Baker-Harsa...
... is 224

This is a very complete engineering job and we are told that this is all we can get from the Wadi flow. I feel we must accept that figure. We must remember that the Arabs look on the Yarmuk, as well as on the Jordan, as an Arab river, as well as an Israeli river. They are being offered so very little from the 793 that they don't feel they can get less. Great concession to Israel if Israel goes ahead with the conversion of the stream. Nothing here that would be a consideration to the Arab mind

Mr. Eshkol: Do you realize that if you ask a man in the street, in Israel, he will tell you that he is certain that the Jordan is an Israeli river.

If you take the overall picture of the river and split it 50-50 ...
and if you take the additional water you will see that

62% goes for the Arab states and
38% for Israel

It makes sense.

Amb. Johnston: I would suggest that we adjourn and that we try to meet tomorrow when we will present to you one or two proposals based on what you indicated ~~yesterday~~ today. Tomorrow is our last time to do ~~max~~ it. Monday is our last day here. We cannot go to Cairo without a program.

We will try to come up with something tomorrow.

I don't want you, Mr. Minister, to overlook what I said here yesterday re the Arab refugees, who will be off your back. Reparations to them will be reduced by the land we will start giving them. It is a political consideration which must be uppermost in your mind. Don't forget this is a problem which we can take off your back.

(end of Saturday night meeting).

Saturday, 29.1.55, 20.00)

Mr. Johnston: A new idea was presented to us this afternoon which I would like to have explored. Mr. Blas, if you feel at liberty to, I would like to have explored your new avenue to the whole situation.

Mr. Blas: I did it absolutely personally. It is my proposal. The finish of this agreement as I understand cannot be less than that the Arab side will get nothing south of Tiberias. I tried to do my best to explain to you that even for the biggest compensation which we could get that will actually not work, because the Government cannot be sure that the water which will remain from a canal running along our country will be according to an agreement because it is not in the power of a Government to fight against their own people, more so when the population is so thirsty for water. Then I said that it would be best for our side to postpone a solution because with every year passing we will use more water, and this will be a fact, and ^{with} if every year passing more underground water will be developed in the Jordan Valley proper, and the pressure from the U.S. will be smaller, but the shadow of the Main plan is still so fresh ~~there~~. We cannot accept these figures of the Main plan. We will never accept them. They will not work. The Main Plan disregards our interests in a very very serious way, so we cannot take it into account. But the Arab side got something from the Main Plan, and anything less will be difficult for them to take. So I say leave the final development for a ~~few~~ few years later, but in the meantime forget about the existing uses because we are using about 200,000 cms. a year and the Arabs only a few tens of millions. If you forget this you will be talking about a preliminary allocation for the first five years, thereby you can allocate more to the Arabs and less to us, because we are actually using more. Allocate to us say 200,000 cms. and to the Arabs even a bigger part - of this bigger part 150,000 going to

Mr. Blas: Beit Natufa and another 50 for the development in the Jordan Valley proper, to the Lebanese 35, to Syria (the Banias? 20, and additional water to Buteiha, I do not know how much, then to the Syrians from the Yarmuk 60 or 80, and a portion of the Yarmuk at a small dam built for the Transjordanian Kingdom; and say the ultimate development will be made later on - I believe this could be a solution. In the meantime within five years the Main Scheme will have been forgotten and the natural development will go in the ~~ix~~ direction that we shall have the whole Jordan minus the allocation to the upper parts and the other party will have the Yarmuk minus the part which will be allocated to us. In this way you can camouflage this unhappy Main Report and forget it for five years. Afterwards it will be forgotten and the matter can be finished.

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Saturday 29.1.55, 20.00 - contd.

Mr. Johnston (contd.): and they choose the third, and that be a body of last appeal, so to speak, and that these three men choose a man who would be a supervisor of the system, to see that it operates, out of the United Nations, for a period of 5, 4, 3 years. The details are unimportant. They can be worked out if you agree on the principle. Any questions you would like to ask regarding these suggestions?

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(Mr. Wiener elaborates ^{on} figures)

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Mr. Barnes: So that what you are suggesting is that the allocation to Israel from the actual water of the river would be in the neighbourhood of 400 mcs. As far as we can determine, the present use on the Jordanian side is very very small, 50 or 60. So you are suggesting that the allocation to them would be 460,000.

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Mr. Wiener: I would not say "destroy" but that future developments might make it possible to distribute.

Sunday, 30.1.55

Johnston

Emb. Johnston: I learned in Sunday School that the way of the transgressor was ~~hard~~ difficult, but I do not think the Biblical ~~times~~ knew much about the ways of a mediator. I find myself in a very difficult position. As one very much interested in the progress of Israel, I find it is essential for me to be very firm and to make some decisions which I wish we did not have to make. Last evening we sat up till very late going over figures and facts that have been presented, trying to reconcile them and trying to come up with something which was acceptable. It is our conclusion that it is impossible to do anything with the total development of the river valley without using Lake Tiberias. The wastage of water under any other system would be so great that it could not be justified for me to recommend a large sum of money to be spent by the Congress of the United States in this year with the wastage of such a large quantity of water; even though we used the best storage available on the Yarmuk which we know about we could not justify it. The cost of the very high dam which has been suggested I think by Mr. Wiener would be so great and the cost so great per cubic meter of the water stored that I am sure the Reclamation Bureau people in the U.S. would simply laugh at us for any such type of procedure. We are willing, however, to make the maximum storage on the Yarmuk which is possible in view of the cost involved. As Mr. Wiener well knows - and we can show from charts - as we increase the size of the dam the cost increases out of all proportion to the amount of water stored.

So we come to the inescapable conclusion that under any scheme in which the U.S. can put up the money for this, or that we have got to use Lake Tiberias as storage. We have also come to the inescapable conclusion that without the use of some of the water of the Lower Jordan it would be impossible to irrigate a sufficient amount of land ~~which~~ in Jordan to make it worth while.

Therefore, to summarize it, - and I want to go into more details after I get through with this paper - I would like to pass out a summary of my decision at this moment on January 30, 1955. ^{to you}

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Sunday, 30.1.55 (contd.)

Mr. Johnston (contd.): I shall read it out. We can go over it, and in doing so let me tell you that I shall use every possible effort at my command to get more water for Israel. There are some intangibles here that we do not know about, but we shall make every effort to see that more water is secured for Israel. I will go over this in detail as we go through the paper. It is reasonable to assume that we can do so, but I certainly cannot definitely promise until we get some of the facts.

(Mr. Johnston reads his statement)

Now, gentlemen, there is a feeling by Mr. Wiener, and perhaps by Mr. Blass, that at least 100 mcm of usable water can be found in the valley on the Jordan side. We will make and be prepared to make an extensive survey of that, using the locations which you think we should use, and if you have some ideas as to where you think we should drill, we will be very glad to consider this in any drilling program that we are starting. If we can discover up to 100 mcm or any other amount which can be used to irrigate these present lands, we will be delighted to deduct that amount from the amount which Jordan would be getting from the river. This is a gamble it seems to me that you ought to take. You are sure that there are these waters available. We will explore for them. You cannot use all the water for several years, but by that time a thorough exploration of the valley will have been made, and if we could come up with any such quantity or any quantity of water involved that can be used for this irrigation then this amount will be given to Israel from the river, so that you get, in addition to the 492 mcm in this program perhaps 50, 100 or 150 mcm.

In addition to that we will use our best efforts in the Arab States to reduce the amount of water which they would get. There is some question about this 3%. We will certainly use our best efforts - I will use them and I pledge you that - to find in any way if that 3% can be increased to a larger sum, based

upon use in Egypt or any other method by which it can be done. So you are assured of a minimum of 492 mcm of water from the river systems, including the drains of the Huleh, plus whatever additional water we find. We know your necessity for water, and how vital it is for you. At the same time there are other problems involved which you must recognize I have the responsibility for attempting to settle. I do want to emphasize that we shall do everything we can to be of assistance. Now if there is any question of these figures, it would be advisable for Mr. Wiener and Mr. Criddle to go over them and to see how we have arrived at them. It gives to Israel a large share of the waters of the Jordan and the Yarmuk, 40% of the waters of these two rivers. It enables us to resolve effectively with the aid of the United Nations the B'not Yaakov problem, which is a problem that faces us. It enables you to take 150 mcm of water to the coastal plain immediately. It enables us to resolve all of these problems and get on with the work, and it enables us, if we can sell this in the Arab States, to begin to resolve the problems that exist in this area, and they are, to bring a better stability in the area which I am sure you realize is for the benefit of all concerned. It is certainly for the benefit of the United States. Our interest is not just to build some shining dams on the Jordan and the Yarmuk. It is our interest to attempt to bring stability for the Arabs and Israel. We are willing to tax American tax payers for that purpose.

This program which we have presented we feel is the best we can offer. We would like to have an indication as to a general acceptance in principle before we leave. I think there is very little use of discussing with the Arabs storage in Lake Tiberias if you won't stand for it. On the other hand I do not know how you can get water from Jordan without Lake Tiberias. You certainly cannot get it out of the Yarmuk. Furthermore, it does not solve the problems simply to split the Yarmuk into one way and the Jordan in another. It does not resolve the riparian rights of the stream to these nations that have riparian rights in the stream

AY/III/3- Sunday 30.1.55

Mr. Johnston (contd.): just like you do. And they must be resolved, and they cannot be resolved on a mathematical formula always. There are many factors involved. This would settle the question of the riparian rights of the stream which we think is essential. So we would like some answer in principle before we leave.

Mr. Eshkol: Your figures for the other side are increasing all the time. We were told that Syria would get from the Yarmuk 50-60 mcm, now it is 90. What will be left is for Israel.

Mr. Johnston: We have not increased the figures since last June. The figures have been exactly the same for the two countries Syria and Lebanon. We have increased the amount of land area in Jordan because of this Baker-Harza engineering report, and this is a final report. I cannot very well say that there is less land than that.

Mr. Eshkol: What if there were a million dunams in the Jordan Valley instead of 4 or 500 dunams, would you say that all of the billion cubic metres of water would go to them?

Being continued

Sun. Aft., Jan. 30, 1955

MR. ESHKOL: We showed that you could do intensive irrigation on 400,000 dunams without a drop of water additional from local resources, from local wells. We said if you have more land, there is a possibility of adding more water from wells. It makes no sense to come back to all the arguments of the past two days. It strikes me that this approach of first 100% to our neighbors and then what is left, for Israel, is hard.

MR. JOHNSTON: In the first place, in Lebanon there is little water involved and most of it returns to the river anyway. In Syria, there is not much involved and again it returns to the river system. Both countries have refugees.

MR. ESHKOL: And we have Jewish refugees.

MR. JOHNSTON: Well, if we break on the quantity of water, I am sorry. We cannot give everybody all the water they want. You do have more water. There are four states involved. You will be getting over 40% of the total, the other three states 60%.

MR. ESHKOL: But Syria and Lebanon have water in such abundance—I would like to have half of it. Yesterday we took an average figure of 270, without drilling.

MR. JOHNSTON: As I understand your figures put forward, you wanted 562—we gave you 492 (short 70). I think you have an excellent chance of picking up more than that (the 70) from Jordan on our efforts there. If you are certain that there is water there—but I cannot go to Jordan and sell them something if we are not sure of it.

MR. ESHKOL: Why should ~~MY~~ one side gamble. We are two sides. America helped to build up this nation, but you cannot build with gold or dollars. Why suggest to only one party that they get the 100%.

MR. BARNES: We have put a geographical limitation, so to speak, on the amount of water which comes out of ~~MY~~ Jordan. Theoretically, it would be possible for Jordan at some expense and high cost to pump water out/ of the basin. We have not put a geographical limitation on Israel because we believe water can be used better by you outside of the basin. We are obliged to put some mathematical limitation on Israel. There are different kinds of limitations,

MR. ESHKOL: You have 400,000 dunams under the best economic conditions. You are going into new ventures, settling refugees. With 400,000 dunams you are able to settle 5,000 (?) less, but put them in a place where there is more water. You have large territories and much water.

MR. BARNES: We have about 600,000 refugees to worry about.

MR. ESHKOL: If it is so and our arguments can prove that such a settlement plan with 3% difference between gross and net--you say alright then we want 100% and more than 100% to other countries and feel we will be satisfied with this. Baker-Harza cannot prove that 3% is enough.

MR. JOHNSTON: We don't say we want to give them more than 100%. We cannot go against the 3%--against an engineering report which took 18 months to prepare. I agree that that 3% sounds low, and I will do my best to get that up.

MR. ESHKOL: It is the same with us--we have our reports ~~xxx~~ to consider.

MR. KOLLEK: I have suggestion as to procedure. I think our side has to consider 3-4 points: whether there is a chance to accept or get any kind of a guarantee about underground water or whether our national interest indicates that we cannot run the risk, and ^{we} must give a clear reply. We must discuss this among ourselves.

MR. ESHKOL: I can speak from the heart. I am afraid that your suggestion is a very hard one for us.

MR. JOHNSTON: It is hard for us too. Frank discussions are preferable. I hoped we could find a solution without using Lake Tiberias. We cannot spend all that money on a huge dam.

MR. ESHKOL: It is a hard decision for Israel.

MR. JOHNSTON: Even if we spend \$70-80,000,000 for a dam, we would be wasting 100 ~~MM~~ mcm (98 according to Wiener's figures).....there are a couple of other points not covered.

MR. BARNES: I recall other discussions--whether we can introduce the Yarmuk waters into the Jordan. We do not subscribe to that theory because our technicians believe that ...?..... pumping it out below the level....

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

MR. ESHKOL: I am not hiding under this economic reason. We explained to you our reasons. In this state of affairs with our neighbors, it is too

AY/II/5

Saturday 29.1.55 (contd.)

Mr. Esakol (contd.):

Irrigate. If I were the planner I would build the settlements on the land. When we say we are prepared to take into account the land to be irrigated there, we plan it according to our standards, according to which we are planning our settlements here, and we know it takes 15%. The accruing difference is between 400 and 514 ~~mm~~. Let us say you split the area and there will be 450,000 dunams. This will require an additional 75 million ccm. So you will have in the Main Report 340 instead of 270, and there is still untouched underground water. We know that Mr. Moussa Alami is planning 2-3 plantations using underground water.

Mr. Criddle: The point in regard to the 3% which was used is something of which quite a point was made in the past several days. Whether you agree or not, it is there, and I would like to explain our thinking. In the first place they said they recognized that in the Bureau of Reclamation report there are projects which have been quoted here a time or two that we had put in projects roads, buildings and lands, farmyards, ditches etc. But they also said UNRWA has been working on this problem for a long time and they came to use UNRWA's studies. They did not accept anything which they did not agree to, but they did give these things some thought. The first thing they pointed out was that all villages are being planned off irrigated land. It may be quite a walk to get to a man's farm, but they do say ^{at} it would be 6-7 kilometres distance under some extreme instances. But they do have some breaks (?) between the Zor and the Ghor in addition to the areas above the proposed irrigated lands. Another question that I asked was ~~that~~ in regard to the feedyards haystacks and animals, and they said that due to pattern which the Arabs used they felt that the animals had to kept above, and they were designing their plans accordingly. So I had no point there as far as they were concerned. In regard to the roads they say that the main road will go along the main canal, but that there will, of course, have to be access roads down to the farm lands. They did point out that if you have a farm or a plot of 20 dunams in area, you could have a road 10 feet wide, assuming that at least a dozen plots and it would be five feet on either side of the property line. You could have such a road and still remain within the 3%. In regard to the drainage and irrigation ditches, there was the question whether there would be a road completely around three sides or some other system to allow for ditches.

Regarding drainage they say that most drainage will have to be tiled underground ditches, because that is about the only thing that will work.

NY/11/2

Saturday 29.1.55 (contd.)

Mr. Johnston (contd.): go as far as Mr. Wiener suggested the other day as to the Israeli requests for what they thought was their irreducible minimum. I think we have got one of two alternatives: We have either got to use the Lake Kinnereth with a Watermaster and save 120 mcm ~~xxxxxxx~~ or you have to come to something completely different, such as the suggestion of Mr. Blass to allocate on a temporary basis. We have this timetable difficulty - I am trying to put all my cards above board. We are here Sunday and Monday, leaving Tuesday. We are meeting in Cairo - with technical experts and some of their Ministers. I cannot meet them on Wednesday morning unless I have a plan. We have got to have a plan before we go down - we have two days' time to do this. And I cannot be equivocal about it. Therefore we come back to what kind of a plan we have. The main objection to that plan is the use of Lake Tiberias as storage. We are willing to listen to your objections and modify our program and modify our program and eliminate Lake Tiberias, but you have got to take the losses involved in doing so, because we are doing it at your request. It is an uneconomical program, completely unfeasible, purely for the political motives of Israel, and you have got to take all the blame and responsibility for this. If, on the other hand, you will use Lake Tiberias, which is the economical and efficient way, thus saving 120 mcm we could try to get for you ^{more water} out of the little water. We might be able to provide that by cutting down the 3% in some way.

We are willing to send drilling groups to find ground water. We are willing to make the program as flexible as possible. Now you have to tell us whether you do or whether you don't want to use Lake Tiberias as storage?

Mr. Eshkol: It is not unknown to you that the Arabs do not like the idea.

Mr. Johnston: I know they don't like it, but I think I can sell it to them.

LA/II/3

Saturday night, 29 January 1955

6.

west .. the salinity going up gradually -- within 10 kms. there was a difference, first getting salt water and then sweet.

E.g. 15 years ago we drilled the first wells and we struck....

we abandoned the idea of getting any sweet water. 10 years later, in the same area, perhaps..... we struck 150 of water and we had sweet water.

Without having anything positive, from the little experience you have had, I would not say that that is enough information to prove that there is no sweet water there.

(AY/II/1 - Saturday night - continues here)

Mr. Gardiner: On the Wadi flow, the determination made by Baker-Harza ..
... is 224

This is a very complete engineering job and we are told that this is all we can get from the Wadi flow. I feel we must accept that figure.

We must remember that the Arabs look on the Yarmuk, as well as the Jordan, as an Arab river, as well as an Israeli river. They are being offered a very little from the 793 that they don't feel they can get less.

Great concession to Israel if Israel goes ahead with the conversion of the stream. Nothing here that would be a consideration ⁱⁿ the Arab mind....

MR. ESEKOL: Do you realise that if you ask a man in the street, in Israel, he will tell you that he is certain that the Jordan is an Israel river.

If you take the overall picture of the river and split it 50-50... and if you take the additional water. ... you will see that

62% goes for the Arab states and
38% for Israel

It makes sense.

AMB. JOHNSTON: I would suggest that we adjourn and that we try to meet tomorrow when we will present to you one or two proposals based on what you indicated today. Tomorrow is our last time to do it. Monday is our last day here. We cannot go to Cairo without a program.

We will try to come up with something tomorrow.

I don't want you, Mr. Minister, to overlook what I said here yesterday re the Arab refugees, who will be off your back. Reparations to them will be reduced by the land we will start giving them. It is a political consideration which must be uppermost in your mind. Don't forget this is a problem which we can take off your back.

(end of Saturday night meeting).