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TOWARDS A STRATEGY OF IMPLEMENTATION.

Martin Sherman, 1989.

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ZIONISM NOW - TOWARDS A STRATEGY OF IMPLEMENTATION.

Formulating National Policy - The Point of Departure

It is difficult to deny that all is not well with Zionism today. Even the most enthusiastic Zionists admit to the existence of a severe sense crisis, a feeling of loss of direction, almost a loss of belief and hope.

However, even if one cannot deny the feeling, it is difficult to comprehend the reasons for it.

For if in the 50's, one might have ventured to project that in thirty years time, Israel would boast advanced hi-tech industries; steel and glass skyscrapers; elegant residential areas across the country; high speed, traffic laden freeways, connecting and crossing major cities; trade agreements with the USA and EEC; vast waves of Jewish immigrants clamouring for entry; it would have seemed a vision of success, beyond Zionism's then wildest dreams.

Why is it then, given that this is no longer a dream but the reality of modern day Israel, that there is a feeling of despondency as to the future of Zionism? How can this gloom be explained in the face of the all the external signs of success?

If there are no apparent "external" causes for a sense of failure, then "internal" ones must be sought, since from its inception, Zionism's success originated the inner conviction and fervent commitment of its adherents.

The difficulties which confronted Zionism in the past were no less severe than those of today. On the contrary, past hardships were far harsher and more demanding than those of the present. But in the past, the relative strength and vigour of the belief in the Zionist enterprise outweighed the hardships and rigours that it faced. Today, this ratio of belief to hardship has been eroded, and with it the confidence in the vision of future.

Why?

Is there some internal factor inherent in present day realities which causes the Jewish people to doubt their ability to realize their future in the own land? Or is it rather to be found in more superficial factors which can be changed and overcome - such as poor management, dogmatic adherence to methods (as opposed to principles) long outmoded, forlorn leadership, devoid of vision and imagination?

This article is intended to be a appraisal of the principles (as opposed to the methods) which laid the foundation of Zionism in the past, as a pertinent basis for practical national policy in the modern world today.

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Zionism, in its history and tradition, is a remarkable and undeniable blend of vision and action. If this tradition is to continue to be a valid basis on which to build a practical political program, then at the core of such a program would inevitably be the human factor.

This conclusion is the necessary derivative of a cold matter-of-fact analysis of Israel's national condition. For as a land devoid of territorial expanse, of great rivers and forests, of oil and or mineral deposits, the only significant resources at her disposal are ...people.

Consequently, the attainment of any national goal, whatever it might be, is dependent on the development and the enhancement of the human potential in the country.

The quality of the society in Israel, the prosperity of her economy, and viability of her security depend on the quality of her people as citizens, as productive individuals, and as warriors.

This appraisal of the "inventory" of national resources necessarily implies that Education be placed at the top of list of national priorities, not as an election slogan but as a necessary conclusion resulting from a cold and factual analysis of the realities. For Education - in the broad sense of the word - is the only means by which to achieve the necessary development and enhancement of human resources.

In this broad sense, Education, as the force which both generates and shapes human society, incorporates a number of components:

- * The development of human ability and talent required to increase the level of national attainment.
- * The development of values required to build the belief in the basic justice and necessity of Zionism, and in the right of the Jewish people to their land.
- * The development of the civic awareness of the individual as to the rights and the duties required to fuse the ability and talent on the one hand, and the beliefs and the values on the other, into a vibrant, progressive self-confident society, capable of successfully contending with exciting but testing challenges of the 21st century.

Any political program fashioned in the spirit this analysis, and its chance of success, are clearly dependent on the quality and the effectiveness achieved in developing and enhancing the nation's potential resources - its people.

National Policy - Some General Characteristics.

In any strategic program for Israel, four policy goals should be included:

1. Removing the threat of her destruction which has hovered over the state since its inception.
2. Reducing economic dependence on foreign aid.
3. Creating a society and an economy that can constitute a focus of attraction for voluntary high-grade immigration (aliyah) and conversely, for significantly reducing the tendency of emigration (yerida).
4. Attaining wide-spread international recognition of the Jewish people's right to their ancient homeland.

These objectives embrace a range of issues which traditionally constitute the essence of overall government policy - both on the socio-economic level and on the politico-security level. Accordingly, the approach toward them must be integrative, combining together diverse fields in order to create a comprehensive program of political action, in which the mutual interactions between these fields are taken into consideration. This integrative perspective is of course necessary, as both the different policy goals, and the means for their attainment, are mutually inter-independent on each other.

Because of the intensity the prevailing realities in Israel, the linkage and mutual influence between the security situation and socio-economic conditions, is more pronounced and immediate than in most other western nations. It is therefore doubtful whether in Israel, it would be possible to apply the same draconian methods employed by the Thatcher government to rescue Britain's failing economy. The economic burden, the massive unemployment and social despair that accompanied those policies would have serious security implications in Israel which are not of concern in the case of Britain. For there, low morale and wide spread emigration, especially of those with high earning potential, are not phenomena which impair the immediate ability of the U.K. to survive physically as a political entity, as they would be in Israel.

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It is for these reasons that the attainment of these four policy goals require an integrative planning approach. The success such a program will depend on its content, on the effectiveness of its execution and perhaps above all, on the degree of its compatibility with the prevailing realities in the theatre of its intended implementation.

National Policy and its Compatibility with its Theatre of Implementation.

If the degree of compatibility of a political program to the prevailing circumstances is a key factor in determining its chances of success, it therefore essential to identify and characterize the features which determine these circumstances, their nature and their significance.

What are these features?

The political "facts of life" in the environment in which Israel finds herself are that the entire area is composed of regimes which are, in one form or other, military dictatorships.

In regimes of this type, the continued rule of the incumbent head of state is not dependent upon his concern for the quality of life of the citizens, but on the power of the armed forces. Thus bolstering his rule implies bolstering the armed forces and the consequent allocation of considerable resources appropriate to this end. Since these resources must come at the expense of the civilian sector, their allocation to the military requires some immediate and tangible reason to justify it. Clearly, the only justifiable reason for massive allocations to the military is the threat of some immediate and tangible external adversary. In this sense the hated "Zionist enemy" fulfills exactly this function. In fact if such a conveniently presentable "threat" did not exist, the Arab leaders would probably have to invent it.

In the face of this intrinsic drive for greater military might, and the implacable enmity which inevitably accompanies it, the only way in which Israel can avert war, is by appearing to be in the eyes of her foes, an adversary of unequivocal and insurmountable deterrence ability, and by generating the perception that conflict with her would inevitably involve unacceptable cost.

In a political climate in which the nature of the participating regimes create unconditional hostility, compromise and concessions cannot reduce tensions or end conflicts. They can at best delay them or moderate them temporarily, until they erupt again with the same intensity as before, usually on conditions less favorable to the compromising or conceding party. For the spirit of generous reciprocity and considerate reconciliation, necessary for compromise arrangements to work, is not compatible with that which motivates the workings of military dictatorships. Indeed, it is if anything, the very antithesis of the internal logic which sustains them.

This inherent contradiction, between a mood of concession and compromise on the one hand, and dictatorial regimes on the other, is intensified even further in the case of Islamic regimes in conflict with non-Islamic rivals. Here political incongruence is reinforced by religious animosity.

For those who feel that the treaty between Egypt and Israel indicates otherwise, it may be a very salutary lesson to examine the continued (and

continuous) manifestations of Egyptian hostility towards Israel after the signature of peace agreement, including vitriolic, Nazi-like anti-Jewish attacks in the state controlled press. It may be equally salutary to compare the striking similarities between the agreement to evacuate and demilitarize the Sinai (under US auspices) and the agreement to evacuate and demilitarize the Rhineland (under US auspices). It may be as well to recall that the latter treaty, which supposedly was to end a war in which 9,000,000 human beings lost their lives, became a vital link in the chain of events which brought about a later war in which 50,000,000 lives were lost.....vindicating with tragic accuracy the prophecy of the French general who warned that the treaty was "not a peace agreement but a merely cease-fire for twenty years". It would be as well to recall that all this came about after an extreme dictatorial regime (the Nazis), swept to power by economic crisis, then repudiated the obligations of the previous regime; and to recall that in Egypt, caught too in the throes of a severe economic crisis, the extreme Islamic fundamentalists are growing ever stronger. It is hardly conceivable that were these extremists to come to power, they would see themselves bound by any obligations undertaken by their hated predecessors, particularly as it is likely that these obligations would constitute, in no small measure, the very motivation for the latter's overthrow.

Deterrence as an Integrative Concept

Thus, the generation of unmistakable deterrent capability in the eyes of the Arabs, is an essential requirement for stability (i.e. non-war). This is a conclusion inevitably derived from the political realities of the region, and without such deterrent capability and the stability which it insures, it would not be possible to conduct any far-sighted national policy or to achieve any long range national goal. For without stability, no orderly development of the future can be successfully undertaken.

However, it is important to realize the creation of an impression of appropriate deterrent capability in the eyes of the Arabs is an integrative multi-dimensional process. Arab perception of Israel's deterrence is not dependant on the strength of the IDF alone. In the building of the national power of a state, economic vitality and social cohesiveness are ingredients no less essential than the operational capability of the army. They are therefore equally important in generating its overall deterrent image.

Only when Arab rulers believe that they are confronted with a state resolute, united and self-confident, equipped with the necessary endurance and effectiveness to make any clash with it futile; only when these rulers believe that hostilities would involve unacceptable cost to themselves (i.e. the ruling class - as the fate of the public at large is usually of little consequence in dictatorships), only then will violence and aggression against Israel be avoided.

All the required social, economic and security elements for the building deterrent capability (both on the material and on the spiritual level) are dependent on the quality of the Education in the country - Education as defined previously as a generator of ability, values and awareness. Deterrence as an Integrative Concept

Neither the attainment of economic independence nor the reduction of reliance on foreign economic aid are separate national goals, which can be isolated from other goals, or from the process of building up Israel's unequivocal deterrent capability.

Economic strength and vitality is a crucial factor in determining the freedom of choice a country has in the determining its policy in matters of defence and foreign affairs. Over-dependence on foreign aid is liable expose Israel to potential pressures, creating the perception with her enemies that she is limited in her options of dealing with them, and in her ability to safeguard her vital interests. This perception, in itself, is likely to encourage more hostile and audacious attitudes (and perhaps, deeds), aimed at eroding her security, under the assumption that her ability to counter-act them is restricted.

Economic Independence: An Attainable Goal

Is the attainment of economic independence feasible for Israel? The answer to this depends on the sense in which the term "economic independence" is used.

If the meaning is that the Israeli economy be converted into an total autarky, physically supplying all its own needs, the answer is certainly no. Her paucity of natural resources, mineral deposits, forests and so on, oblige the Israel to acquire the necessary raw materials from sources beyond her borders. In this sense the country will be inevitably dependent on outside elements.

However, if the meaning is that Israel should attain levels of national production that would allow her to sustain a standard of living comparable to that of other western countries, without reliance on foreign aid, the answer is an unequivocal yes.

Where is the hidden potential required to generate the transition to an economy independent of outside aid?

The answer to this question takes us back to our point of departure regarding the essence of Zionism as a national experience...the human factor and its potential as a creative force.

Inspection of data published by the Institute for the Productivity of Labour and Production, reveals that had the labour productivity level in Israel been equal to that in the industrial world, then during the period 1976 to 1986, Israel's GNP would have been \$35 billion larger than it in fact was. In other words an additional \$3.5 billion would have been generated each year! This is equal to (if not more than) than the annual

foreign aid the country received.

Thus by improving productivity levels, Israel can bring the country to levels of production that would free it from the need for foreign aid.

However productivity is a result of the activation of human resources. So, by correct and intelligent activation of these resources, the Israeli economy can indeed reach level of production which would in effect represent economic independence.

Productivity is a function the quality of people, their talent and their diligence. Therefore, there is no doubt that Israel can attain the productivity levels prevalent in the West. For not only is the standard of her people and their talents, equal to that of other industrial countries, but the country has shown that she can actually exceed Western productivity levels, as she did in her early years.

Productivity is currently low in Israel not because of the low level of the population, but because of a bureaucratic, stifling and outmoded managerial apparatus which prevents the talent and the creativity inherent in the people from fully expressing themselves.

Poor productivity indicate the acceptance of poor standards of performance prevalent in the economic system today. But standards (in other words, accepted norms of performance as to what is possible and what is proper to achieve) is determined by the quality of human management.

Therefore an improvement in the current productivity levels (the prerequisite for economic independence) necessitates an improvement in the level of activating human resources in the country. The first step towards this goal is the setting of new standards of performance of dedication and of diligence. Changing standards is an educational process - an amalgam of that creation of talents, values and the awareness that one can and ought attain higher level of achievement.

The concept that it is possible to generate a greater product using given resources by improving their mode of activation must become the cornerstone of Israeli economic thinking.

In accordance with the spirit of this direction of thought, it would be inappropriate to analyze the economic state of the country and to formulate solutions, as is usually done, in terms of a "zero-sum" allocation of resources. A solution to Israel's economy demands a "synergetic" approach focussing on the activation rather than the allocation of existing resources.

Under conditions of sub-optimal utilization of resources (and the figures on productivity show that this is indeed the case for the dominant resource in Israel), the "zero-sum" approach which characterizes current economic thinking and according to which one additional goal can only be

achieved by forgoing the resources necessary for the achievement of some other alternative goal, is not a relevant principle upon which to base economic policy. For obviously, if there is sub-optimal use of resources, it is possible to increase the number of goals attainable without conceding the attainment of alternative ones, by improving the method of activation of the sub-optimally used resources.

In this way, Israel can increase the level of her national production, and with it the number and scope of the objectives she can attain by improving the mode of human resource activation in the country.

In accordance with this conceptual guide-line, a comprehensive economic strategy should be formulated, incorporating fiscal and monetary policies, the "black" economy and "black" capital with their potential and actual influence on the official economy, wage and prices policy, the state budget and the public sector, exchange rates, and a strategy for industrial development. Such an overall policy would be composed of a system of incentives and constraints which facilitate, encourage, and indeed compel, more vigorous, productive and effective activation of the human resources in the country.

This, as the foregoing analysis indicates, is the only way possible to generate in Israel, a society with sufficient operational freedom of choice necessary to deter her foes, and to create a quality of life sufficiently attractive both to prevent her sons from leaving her and to draw immigration (aliyah) to her shores.

Change of the Electoral System - The Key to Creating Decisive and Effective Government.

Of course, as is usually the case with the application of any far-reaching program of reform, there will portions of proposed economic policy that clash with the narrow sectorial interests of some pressure groups in the country. The elimination of bureaucratic distortions, and the political strangle-hold that party-partisan organizations have on major economic processes, are vital pre-requisites for economic recovery. These measures necessitate the establishment of an effective and decisive executive authority. However, the present electoral system deprives the government of any possibility of functioning effectively. Political constraints resulting from the dependence on small parties with narrow sectorial interests and great extortionary power, create a situation in which issues of national importance are often put aside in favour of petty party issues, for fear of endangering the survival of some fragile coalition.

It is therefore imperative that to bring about legislation aimed at changing the system of administration (rather than the system of parliamentary elections), and at extricating the state from the structural governmental paralysis in which it finds itself today, whilst preserving and indeed, bolstering, the democratic foundations of the

country.

In broad terms this legislation should include the following principles:

- * The elections for legislative authority (parliament or Knesset) would remain unchanged - proportional elections on an overall national basis.
- * In parallel, direct personal elections on a national basis would be held for the post of the head of the executive authority (i.e. for the post of prime minister).
- * The chosen candidate will be empowered to appoint (and dismiss) all the ministers to his government (who would not necessarily be drawn from the ranks of the members of parliament).
- * It will not be permissible for one to hold both the post of government minister and member of parliament simultaneously - i.e. to hold posts in both the legislative and executive authorities at the same time. Members of parliament appointed to ministerial posts would be obliged to resign as legislators.
- * The prime minister will hold his post for a seven year period.

Application of the proposed changes will bring about fundamental reforms in the structure and process of government in Israel:

1. The new system of administration will eliminate the extortionary power of small parties at the time of formation of the government, since this will be composed entirely of ministers appointed by the prime minister who achieved his position by popular vote and by not intra- and inter-party horse trading. Moreover, as the government will not be dependent on fragile coalitions for its existence, it will be free of the narrow sectarian pressures to which it is subject today. It will be able to act with greater decisiveness in controversial issues of national importance. However, the proposed changes will maintain and preserve the present possibility of allowing expression of the full range of political opinion in Israeli society in the country's legislature (Knesset).
2. It will be possible to appoint ministers of appropriate talent for their posts (and not on the basis of political quid pro quo) who will be able to fulfill their functions according to professional, rather than party-political considerations.
3. Together with freeing the government from the narrow sectarian interests of the small parties and facilitating its composition by those professionally competent to hold office, the proposed longer period of incumbency will allow it to operate according to longer range considerations than is the case to day. A period of seven years will allow the government to plan, initiate and execute, during its term of office, large scale ventures and to reap the electoral

benefits thereof, without the fear of elections catching it in the midst of ongoing operations, which may include some unpopular but necessary interim measures.

4. By disqualifying the holding of simultaneous position in both the legislature and the executive, the proposed measures would accentuate the principle of separation of powers, one of the corner-stones of democratic rule, which would therefore be accordingly strengthened.

There are those, especially among the proponents of continued Israeli control in Judea, Samaria and Gaza who may be apprehensive of changing the existing system to one which bestows upon any one individual such sweeping powers and authority, lest he be tempted (or pressured) to agree to the relinquishing of some or all of these territories.

This apprehension, and the strange lack of confidence implicit in it, seem singularly misguided, for a number of reasons.

Firstly, there is a clear-cut majority among Jewish voters against significant territorial concession in Judea and Samaria. (As for insignificant concessions, there is no prospective Arab partner who would be even remotely prepared to consider them.) Therefore is patently unreasonable to suppose that a candidate representing the minority view in favour of significant concessions, should be elected.

Secondly, there is nothing more dangerous to Israel's continued control of Judea, Samaria and Gaza than a weak, divided government, paralyzed by internal dissension, whose impotency compels it to forgo initiative and invites outside pressures upon it.

Therefore enhancing the executive's capacity to function effectively is a fundamental pre-requisite for the creation of concerted national vigour necessary to maintain Israeli rule in Judea and Samaria.

Thirdly, in a democratic regime, the battle to win public support is fought on the media front. The winner will be who presents his views most convincingly to the largest segment of the population. Certainly, in this regard those who oppose territorial concessions should have little cause for concern as to the soundness of their position. For quite apart from the belief that Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip belong to the Jewish people by way of age-old historical and moral rights, there is an wide array of eminently rational and pragmatic arguments why the relinquishing of Israeli control over these territories would endanger the existence of the state in the most tangible way, both in the long and short run. It is quite easy to expose the internal logical and moral inconsistencies of any solution based on significant territorial concessions by Israel to the Arabs ... unless one assumes that the proponents of such concessions place unreserved trust in the Arabs - something which they themselves vigorously deny.

The Future of Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip - The Media Front and the Battle for Public Opinion.

It is precisely on the critical front of the media that supporters of continued Israeli rule in Judea, Samaria and Gaza have failed miserably.

For in spite of the fundamental public misgivings regarding significant territorial concessions, and in spite of the excellent arguments for continued Israeli control, they have not succeeded in generating wide spread and coherent public support for their position. Such support would constitute an effective political vehicle, creating the impression at home and abroad that these views represent a broad national consensus as to the need for continued Israel control of Judea, Samaria and Gaza.

The dismal failure in explaining the need for Israel to keep these territories, in the face of the eloquent and well oiled propaganda machine of those of supportive of concessions has let the latter capture the limelight in the media, creating the false impression that they represent a far greater proportion of the Israeli public than is actually the case. The feeble and ineffectual media performance of those opposed to Israeli concessions, together with high public profile of their political rivals, have created a image of a state torn and divided, unsure of its direction, inviting outside pressure on it to comply with the will of the Arabs. This impression of indecisiveness, and the resultant international pressures, create expectations of success with the Arabs, thereby sustaining their motivation to continue the conflict.

The failure in effectively presenting the case for continued Israeli control over Judea, Samaria and Gaza can be attributed to both the style and content of the presentation. This not to say that what has been presented is not correct, but rather that it is not relevant for the most important objective of any media campaign - to convince those who have yet to be convinced!

The most serious error that has been committed in the battle for public opinion on the issue of the future of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, is that the major thrust of the argument has been cast in terms which tend to be emotional, dealing with the historical rights of the Jewish people to the land, rather than in terms more concrete and tangible, stressing the immediate and vital significance that land has for the continued existence of state.

For although declarations about "ancient birthrights" may be pleasing to those who advocate retaining the territories, they will carry very little weight with those who do not. Indeed, it is almost tautological that anyone who accords decisive importance to the Jewish people's historical rights to Biblical sites in the territories, will reject any policy involving the giving up significant parts of them to the Arabs. Therefore, equally obviously, anyone who advocates making such territorial concessions, is not one who accords the issue of "historical rights" much weight in forming his political opinions. It is also

therefore clear that a message stressing these rights will not be considered relevant as a political argument for such an individual.

Now, it is precisely the weight of those holding such pro-concession opinions, together with the active support they enjoy in the media, that endangers Israel's continued control over Judea, Samaria and Gaza. For as long as Israeli politics is governed by the rules of democracy, the only way to increase the support for a given policy is by convincing those not yet convinced as to merit of that policy. However, there is clearly no chance of winning over any segment of the public if the message transmitted to it is caste in terms which it considers irrelevant!

For these reasons, it is imperative to design and implement a comprehensive information campaign regarding the fate of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, which is qualitatively different from those previously conducted in support of continued Israeli control over these territories.

It should of course be stressed that the intention is not merely a "media gimmick". Indeed, the fact that it is possible to ground such arguments on firm empirical data (usually also conceded even by political rivals to be true) proves that they are substantive points of debate and not some propaganda hoax. Emphasizing the security and strategic aspects (both military and civilian, such as the issue of the water resources), and the immediate and direct implications these issues would have for the fate of Israel should she withdraw, compel political opponents to respond and contend with arguments based on them. For in contrast to claims based on biblical birthright, these arguments cannot be dismissed as irrelevant mysticism, for they undermine the very basis of their political stance.

Understanding the Strategic Significance of Judea Samaria and Gaza: A Critical Element in Israel's Deterrent Capability.

The understanding of the strategic and security significance of complete Israeli control over Judea, Samaria and Gaza is of vital national importance, for two reasons.

- * It reveals all proposals for significant Israeli withdrawal to be either proposals so dangerous as to be totally irresponsible - the exact opposite of how their advocates attempt to portray them - or to be proposals which are based on the assumption that one can place implicit trust in the Arabs - not only any Palestinian partner to some withdrawal agreement, but also any potential successor in the future.

- * In earlier paragraphs it was pointed out that the element of overall deterrence capability is a vital factor for the success of any Israeli national policy. Political scientists generally agree that an essential component in generating an deterrent image is social cohesiveness. Conversely, disagreement and disunity create the

impression of internal disintegration and weakness which erode this deterrent image. Of course the implication is not that some sort of monolithic consensus of mindless dogma is a pre-requisite to generate national power. Quite the opposite is true! In order to refute and contend with the half-truths and ignorance on which the great majority of the proposals for Israeli withdrawal are based, thorough explication and understanding of the critical strategic significance of Judea, Samaria and Gaza and the perils involved in relinquishing control over them, are called for. This is essential to prepare the ground to create intelligent and wide spread support for continued Israeli control of the territories. For such support would be to seen a clear, firm signal to the Arab world and the international community that territorial concessions are neither reasonable nor feasible.

The Pre-requisite of Retaining Judea Samaria and Gaza: Dispersion of the Fog of Ignorance and Half-Truths Regarding their Strategic Significance.

There is immense public ignorance surrounding the vital practical importance of Judea Samaria and Gaza (over and above their symbolic and historical significance). On this ignorance, much cynical and irresponsible charlatantry has flourished (such as "General's Plan" advanced by the Labour Party) as well as dangerous and myopic naivete (such a support for a Palestinian state).

Clearly an article of a general nature such as this is not an appropriate framework for a full and detailed explication of all the security and strategic aspects of these territories and the serious influence they have on all walks of life in Israel. Consequently, no attempt will be made to do so.

Instead, the aim of this section will be to sketch in general outline the basic elements upon which an effective information campaign should be based and the rationale which should guide it conduct.

The major thrust of such a media strategy should be to emphasise that even under the most favorable conditions, Israeli concessions as to its control of the territories would still involve grave perils for the state and its existence. In other words, even if one could find some Palestinian with the willingness the sincerity and the authority to sign a genuine peace treaty with Israel, and even if such a Palestinian agreed that the state he was to head, be a de-militarized state (a virtual contradiction in terms), even then, the topographical, hydro-geological, and socio-political conditions are such that in order to prevent any serious threat to the her existence, Israel would have to control so many major factors, as well as fulfil such active administrative roles, that any governmental status for any other non-Israeli body would be precluded.

1. Firstly Israel would have to play an active and decisive role in all matters concerning the armed forces and the maintenance of both internal

and external security of the demilitarized state. For the dangers involved in the establishment of a demilitarized state do not arise from its strength but from its very weakness, not from its ability to constitute a threat to Israel, but from its inability to prevent threats originating elsewhere in the Arab world. Since without aircraft and heavy weapons, the incumbent regime in the demilitarized state would find it most difficult to contend with para-military forces, financed and equipped by governments such as Libya and Syria, aspiring to depose it - precisely because it had signed an agreement with Israel. Similarly, such a demilitarized state could not prevent the entry of regular Arab forces into its territory, even if it wanted to do so. It is virtually universally accepted - even by the proponents of withdrawal - that the deployment of such forces on the very approaches of the Greater Tel Aviv area and the capital, Jerusalem, would constitute a critical threat to the country's existence. Thus Israel would be obliged to not only to concern herself with the maintenance of her own security, but also that of her newly created Arab neighbor.

2. Israel would have to control all matters regarding the frontier crossings including passport control and customs inspection so as to prevent the smuggling in of arms and weapon systems to hostile elements located inside terrain from which the Israel's entire infrastructure can be controlled - military and civil airfields, sea ports, transport and communications systems, the sweet water system, major power stations, centers of government and administration and most of the country's civilian population. From the evacuated areas of Judea Samaria and Gaza, all of these would be in range weapon systems that are cheap, mobile, and easily concealed; and whose operation by non-governmental renegade forces could paralyze the vital activities in heart of Israel's metropolis, making life there impossible.

3. Israel would have to control, or at least oversee, all aspects of the banking system and financial institutions so as to prevent the funding of extremist elements who would strive to instigate hostile actions against her, and indeed, against the Palestinian regime who dared conclude a peace treaty with her.

4. Israel would have to have the right to veto any acts regarding the signing of international treaties involving the Palestinian state, especially in respect to issues involving co-operation with third parties and in particular security and mutual defence accords.

5. Israel would have to control all aspects of immigration into the Palestinian state and the associated legislation, so as to prevent the voluntary or forced return of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees, living in surrounding Arab states, to their newly created national home. Israel could not allow a huge wave of human misery to flow into the new Palestinian state in Judea Samaria and Gaza, and to settle in great poverty-stricken zones, on the very doorstep of Greater Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, where deprivation and bitterness would fester and ferment, creating impossible social and economic pressures on the regime which was party to the peace treaty with Israel. This would be an almost

certain recipe for agitation and incitement against such a regime, and unabating attempts to remove it and replace it with some other regime which would have no commitments to the treaty obligations of its predecessor, and indeed would probably even be violently opposed to them.

6. It will be imperative for Israel to retain complete control of the water and sewerage disposal system in Judea and Samaria in order to prevent depletion, salination and pollution, not only of the water sources that extend physically into that area, but also those which are fed by waters that originate in them. For up to 60% of water in the national system can be influenced, either directly or indirectly, by activities (i.e. pumping and polluting) in Judea and Samaria. Again, this general article is not an appropriate forum for a detailed explication of the issue, and it will suffice to illustrate the severity of the situation in which Israel could find herself should she withdraw from the western slopes of the hills of Judea and Samaria, by citing from the abstract of "Water Policy in Israel: Perspectives of National Planning", a work written by Matti Hagai, Tel Aviv University in Sept. 1989:

Whoever controls the water sources of Judea and Samaria, can dry out, should he so wish, the wells of the coastal plain and of the Harod and Bet She'an Valleys by the principle of connecting vessels

It is important to stress that in this case, severe damage to one of the most vital of Israel's strategic resources, water, can be inflicted even without there being any purposeful malice on the part of the Arabs. The very same damage, with the very same results, could be caused by lack of awareness, neglect or genuine need, as the only water resources there would be in any area evacuated by Israel, would be those common to herself and the Palestinian entity, and subject to the same mutual influence by way of the principle of connecting vessels mentioned earlier.

7. Israel would have to see to the maintenance of the road system connecting the coastal plain and the Jordan Valley, and have the authority to control the traffic movement on it. This is necessary so as to be able to ensure that in times of emergency it will be possible to move forces and heavy vehicles to the front. These roads which cut through the hills of Judea and Samaria, are vital for facilitating access to troops which would be deployed in the Jordan Valley according to the "Allon Plan", and to the early warning stations which be installed on the highlands of Judea and Samaria according to the "Generals' Plan", both of which were proposed by the Labour Party. (It is as well to note that these "early warning stations" would be virtually valueless, since without forces physically deployed in the vicinity - i.e. in Judea and Samaria - Israel would not have time to react to the warnings they gave, and to enlist and mobilize the troops necessary to halt the enemy advance, before they reached the major cities in the coastal plain.)

On the one hand, relinquishing the control over these critical factors into foreign hands, would leave the decision of if, how and when to exploit them to Israel's detriment, to discretion the Arab rulers in the evacuated areas ... or to some future successors who might overthrow them - precisely because they did not so exploit them against the "Zionist foe".

On the other hand, retaining the control over the same factors, and the severe restrictions on Arab authority - on both domestic and foreign issues - that this would imply, are not consistent even with even the most limited version of Arab autonomy in Judea, Samaria and Gaza.

This then, is the representation of the situation which illustrates starkly that if any proposal for an Israeli withdrawal and her relinquishing of control in these territories, does not rely on an assumption of implicit and unreserved trust in the Arabs (something which the proponents of such policies usually deny), then such proposal must surely be either a totally irresponsible gamble or foolish ignorance ... provided of course that the agreed point of departure is that a sovereign Jewish state should exist in Middle East.

Portraying the argument for continued Israeli retention of Judea, Samaria and Gaza in these terms signifies a total reversal in the traditional perceptions of the political postures the "Left" and "Right". For in contrast to the rational analysis formulated in terms sober and aware risk management, and tangible and concrete issues such as "topographical barriers", "aquifers", "water resources", and "mobilization and deployment time", the Left relies on such ephemeral and abstract phrases as "the spirit of the time", "peace momentum", and "vision of a brotherhood of nations". It would appear the rational and the mystical have swapped political allegiances....

Settlements: An Essential Zionist Value and Creation of Political Facts.

There is of course no need to elaborate on the role of settlements in the Land of Israel as a foremost Zionist value. However in areas such as Judea, Samaria and Gaza, in which the sovereignty is in dispute, settlement activities have special significance and urgency, as form of political action. In such areas of disputed sovereignty, the objective of highest priority must be to create realities which make the handing over of them to others, impossible.

At this juncture is appropriate to re-examine settlement policy, and to formulate a line of action with clearly focussed aims, consistent with the previously defined strategic goals. Accordingly, it is the urgent need for creating irreversible facts on the ground that must guide operations and priorities. The greater the number of Jewish inhabitants in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, the more difficult will it be for those, who would have Israel leave these areas, to realize their objective.

The crucial issue is therefore whether or not it is possible to increase, significantly and rapidly, the total number of Jewish inhabitants living

in these areas, at a bearable economic cost, while confining criticism to a minimum.

This leads to a clear and definite conclusion: Priority should be given to bolstering and enlarging existing settlements over establishing new ones. Greater volume should be preferred to wider distribution not as a Zionist value, but as a dictate of political pragmatism.

It is clearly easier to uproot and remove several small and flimsy settlements than a single large town. It is clearly easier, physically and financially, to attract new inhabitants (especially in view of today's dramatic increase in immigration) to a large established settlement with an existing infrastructure of education and health services, than to engineer new approach roads to development sites for new settlements. The construction of a new neighborhood in an existing town annoys the opponents of settlements far less, and is of far less interest to the media than a company of soldiers assigned to guard a handful of "pre-fabs" on an isolated and windswept hill.

But when there will be tens of thousands of Jewish settlers in the major centers such as Ariel, Elkana, Ma'ale Ephraim and Alfe Menashe, it will be impossible to remove them.

Along with this emphasis on bolstering the existing settlements, there must be an intensive effort invested in the construction a safe high-speed road system connecting the settlements in Judea, Samaria and Gaza to the major metropolitan centers in Israel.

When Ariel, Elkana, and Alfe Menashe become part of the Greater Tel Aviv area - both in terms of travel time and in terms of perception - handing them over to Arab rule will be inconceivable... even to those who object to their development today.

Moreover, large well-established urban centers will foster the setting up smaller peripheral settlements in the surrounding vicinities. Thus the policy of bolstering existing settlements will attain - albeit at a later stage - some measure of population distribution as well.

There is another dimension to the settlements in Judea, Samaria and Gaza which is given a special relevance in these days of the "Intifada". This is the transmission of a firm and unequivocal message of Jewish resolve never to relinquish these territories.

There is a general consensus amongst scholars of political science that revolt for improved political status (as opposed to revolt for physical survival, as in the Warsaw Ghetto) is not motivated by despair, but by hope, not a feeling that one has nothing to lose, but rather by the conviction that one has something to gain. Expectations of success are the fuel of political revolt. Therefore, the elimination of these expectations is the only way to terminate the revolt. The presence of hundreds of thousands of Jewish settlers in Judea, Samaria and Gaza will constitute the most tangible indication to the instigators of Arab

violence that their efforts are in vain, and that the people of Israel will never abandon any part their homeland.

State and Religion

The Jewish religion and tradition are one of the most precious part of the nation's heritage. Without them, it is doubtful if the Jews would have survived as a people for last 2000 years.

It is precisely for this reason the why present the practice of exploiting the secular political system to legislate religious laws should be abolished. For it is decidedly misguided for those who claim to honour and respect the Jewish religion, to degrade it by turning it into "political merchandize" with which to buy and sell support for this or that issue in the ugly inter-party "horse-trading".

Moreover, it is difficult to imagine anything more absurd or self-contradictory than those who purport to hold religion dear, stubbornly insisting on preserving a situation in which Arab members of Knesset and Arab-dominated, hostile, anti-Zionist parties, participate in determining issues related to Jewish religion and the definition of Jewish identity, especially as in many cases, their votes on the matter may be crucial.

It is for these reasons, together with the belief that in these testing times for the Jewish people, delicate and wise navigation is required in the stormy waters of religious dispute, navigation which should be characterised by common sense rather than rigid dogma, and by the understanding that internal bickering weakens Israel, alienates sources of support, and benefits her antagonists. All of this leads to the conclusion that of religion should be removed from the sphere of secular politics. In order to deliberate and resolve religious issues in dispute, an authoritative religious body should be established in which all variants of modern Judaism are fairly represented, and to which such disputes would be referred.

Hope and Belief: The Sine Non Qua of Zionism

The opening paragraphs of this article dealt with the concepts of belief and hope. It is perhaps therefore appropriate to close with some reference to them.

These concepts, as abstract and intangible as they may be, constitute forces of tremendous and indisputable power in the human experience, forces which have generated very concrete and tangible changes throughout history, bringing about revolutionary scientific inventions, and the discovery of new continents. The founding of Zionism on the same concepts is not unrealistic mysticism, but rather a pragmatic recognition of their proven power in the past and the present.

We would do well to recall, how, in one the poems of the well-known Israeli poet, Nathan Alterman, Satan chose to overcome his besieged foe, bold and talented as he was. Satan did not attempt to weaken his

physical strength, nor strike fear into his heart. Instead he chose to strike as his belief, by dulling his mind and causing him to forget that right was on his side!!!

Perhaps the essence of Zionism, both as a description of its past, and a prescription for its future, can be succinctly expressed in the French saying :

La victoire elle comme Dieu. Si on y croit, elle exist
Victory is like God. If one believes in it, it exists.

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