Environmental Degradation, Population Displacement and Global Security: An Overview of the Issues

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Executive Summary

The academic literature on population movement distinguishes between a neo-classical perspective, which promotes population displacement as a natural response to interregional differences in social and economic opportunities, and a structuralist perspective, which argues that macro-structural forces lie at the base of the regional disparities to which people respond. Regardless of one's perspective, involuntary migration caused by war, famine, political repression and environmental degradation is of major concern to the international community. In recent years, there has been pressure on the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to expand its limited definition of refugees, and the term "environmental refugees" has become quite common. The linkage between environmental degradation and population movement, however, is a complex one. This paper is intended as an initial investigation into the interrelationship between environmental degradation and population displacements, in the broader context of how this linkage affects human security. The report focuses on both the causes and effects of population movements, with specific examples drawn from Southeast Asia. It covers types of migrants, the importance of environmental degradation vis-à-vis other contributing factors, and the effects on origin and destination regions. It also looks at the impacts of migration on women and the policy implications of the increasing numbers of migrants and refugees.

The document should also be viewed as a first step towards stimulating future policy research in the area of impoverishment, population and environmental degradation. There seems to be an increasing trend towards people being forced to leave their homes, and our knowledge of the proximate and root causes of such movement is inadequate. Known as refugees, displaced persons, expellees, asylum seekers, economic migrants, environmental refugees or the internally displaced, these people pose a serious dilemma for international organizations and national governments that are involved in developing policies and programmes to cope with the expanding numbers. A key issue set forth in this paper is the multi-causality of such movements, and the importance of improving our understanding of these issues for further policy development. The UNHCR is already considering the question of environmental refugees, and an expanded definition of "official refugees" may be soon in coming. Some governments, however, feel that refugees pose a threat to social and political stability which, in turn, affects the types of assistance those countries are willing to provide. These issues are also important for Canada, since there will be increasing pressures on this country to accept a greater proportion of the global population of displaced persons. What is clear from this study is that the discussion of environment as a cause or contributing factor to population displacement has, to date, been speculative, and the information provided largely anecdotal. There must be greater international attention paid to the causes of refugee movements and to the central role of development assistance in resolving refugee problems.

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I. INTRODUCTION

There has been much discussion in recent years of the linkages between impoverishment, population and environmental degradation. The publication of *Our Common Future* by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) in 1987, explicitly acknowledged these linkages and stimulated a growing body of literature examining these concepts within the framework of "sustainable development". It is imperative that the concept of sustainable development and the relationship between impoverishment and environmental degradation be addressed at the international level, as global environmental degradation is experienced quite differently by countries of the North and the South, and nations with varying levels of development often have conflicting views regarding responsibility for the causes of and the solutions for these problems.

This statement, however, belies the complex nature of the linkages amongst impoverishment, population growth and displacement, and environmental degradation. The relationships are complex, multidimensional, conditional and, at least to date, indeterminate. They are *complex*, in that linkages are not always apparent, fundamental causes are often spatially and temporally unique, and the connections exist well beyond the first order; *multidimensional*, since there are space, time, political, religious, cultural and other dimensions that must be considered and the relationships between these understood; and *conditional* in that the state of a social system and the relationships that describe that system at any time are unique in time and space. Impoverishment, population displacement and environmental degradation are historically, socially and politically constructed; only after assessing the significance of these forces can one understand the society and the relationships within. And last, these connections are, at present, *indeterminate*, since there has been a paucity of empirical work on the subject, the complexity and controversy surrounding the linkages can be oppressive, and the relationships themselves are somewhat ambiguous.

This paper is intended as an initial investigation into the interrelationship between poverty and the environment as it is manifested in a third important component—global population movements. Based on an investigation of the issue of refugee movements, this paper will attempt to demonstrate at least some of the ways in which these phenomena are related with other important global issues. As with the circular relationship between impoverishment and ecological degradation, the involuntary displacement of millions of people worldwide is to a large extent caused by, and at the same time further exacerbates, poverty and environmental decline. Figure 1 identifies the key linkages between population displacement and these associated factors. What is particularly evident in this study is that these factors *are* closely related, and none can be dealt with in isolation.

This paper will also attempt to demonstrate the linkages between these issues and global security. While population displacements are often a result of acute conflict within and between nations, they often cause or contribute to conflict and therefore represent a threat to global security. As Westing (1989) notes, comprehensive security has two intertwined components: *political security* (with its military, economic, and social/humanitarian components), and *environmental security* (including protecting and utilizing the environment). Both must be satisfied to ensure the sustainability of either. Figure 1 provides a conceptual diagram of the linkages between environmental degradation, population displacement, and security.

UNDERLYING FACTOR

Inequitable Distribution of Resources

ASSOCIATED FACTORS

population growth | land/income inequities | access to information | development policies | empowerment

Impoverishment

Security
- violence associated with civil wars, revolutions, foreign interventions, etc.
- police actions; repression, deportations, racial/ethnic/religious/ideological persecutions
- environmental degradation caused by war (unintentional and deliberate)
- competion for scarce resources

Environmental
- vulnerability to physical dangers (floods, volcanoes, earthquakes)
- land erosion/degradation (soil erosion, deforestation, irrigation problems)
- drought, famine
- climate change
- unequal resource distribution

Socio-Cultural Sustainability
- perceptions of opportunites (employment, services, education, etc.)
- group/ethnic traditions, values, etc.
- family relationships
- psychological stress

PROXIMATE CAUSES (?)

Displaced People
- International Refugees
- Internal Refugees
- Environmental Refugees
- Migrants (including rural/urban)
- Forced Displacees

SECONDARY EFFECTS

Security
- increased intragroup tensions, resentment, violence, etc.
- conflict caused by competition for scarce resources, services, etc.
- conflict between states regarding refugee status/placement

Environmental
- pressure on vulnerable areas (deforestation, soil erosion, famine, etc.)
- overcrowding in refugee camps/ urban areas (disease, lack of health and sanitation services, lack of shelter, increased pollution, etc.)

Socio-Cultural Sustainability
- psychological stress
- family disruption
- human rights violations
- pressure on women

**LONG-TERM EFFECT**

Impoverishment

Figure 1: Population displacement, environmental degradation and security: the linkages

The paper begins with a general introduction to the population displacement issue, with specific concern for the Southeast Asian experience. While there are many other examples of the environmental degradation/population displacement linkage globally[1], the focus is on Southeast Asia for two reasons; 1) the paper is an attempt to identify how environmental degradation contributes to population displacement rather than a broad overview of the numerous examples of environment/population interactions, hence the focus on a single region; and 2) our experience is concentrated in Southeast Asia.

Following a discussion of the official definition of refugees, the issue of "environmental" and "internal" refugees will be addressed. The general causes and effects of refugee movements will then be considered, and the role of environmental degradation and the implications for security will be placed in this context. Finally, this paper will include a brief examination of a number of past and current policy initiatives and some indications for future developments.

The definition of refugees used in this examination is very broad, and to some extent this definitional context presents a problem. Vague definitions can lead to inflated statistics, and can make planning and policy development much more difficult. In the context of this issue, the classification of too many people as "refugees" may also lead to what has often been referred to as "compassion fatigue", when excessive exposure to a problem results in an overburdening of aid efforts and an immunity of the international community to additional reports of tragedy and suffering. It may be impossible to extend the refugee status to all categories of people facing hardships, and it *is* necessary to differentiate between refugees and other groups of migrants. The discussion of definition, therefore, is indeed both complex and important. However, a critical examination of the definition of refugees can also demonstrate weaknesses in the common use of the term and can indicate those groups which have traditionally been excluded from recognition. In terms of this paper, the association of population displacements with other variables can best be illustrated using a broad, or liberal, interpretation of "refugees".

It should also be noted that this paper will focus largely on the developing world context, with a particular emphasis on Southeast Asia. It is among the more impoverished nations that the linkages between the various factors examined is the most obvious, and it is often in the developing world that the effects are the most devastating. This is not to imply that a similar cycle of cause and effect does not also exist in developed countries. Poverty is a reality for millions of people in the North, it is associated with environmental degradation as well as issues of security and military spending, and it often results in the forced migration of those lacking the economic and political power to resist forces beyond their control. However, this issue is beyond the scope of this preliminary study.

II. REFUGEES

A. Introduction

Population movements caused by war, economic disenfranchisement, and environmental degradation are one of the most enduring problems in world affairs, and never before have there been so many refugees from so many different countries. In the past two decades, the world's refugee population has increased by over 500% (Crisp and James, 1990), and over the past 30 years, an average of more than 700 people a day have been forced to leave their own country (The Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues [ICIHI], 1986). The current number of refugees worldwide is estimated at between 10 and 15 million (McInnes, 1990; Gurtov, 1991), and this figure includes only those officially defined as such. The immediate causes of refugee movements seem unlikely to change, as the need to escape persecution, famine, war, land degradation, and other deprivations will probably continue for some time (Gurtov, 1991). In addition, millions more would flee their surroundings if their governments or existing situation were to allow it.

It is overwhelmingly the poor and powerless of the developing world who are forced to become refugees, and the causes of massive population movements can be many. Various forms of conflict, including civil war, revolutions and foreign interventions, can result in refugee movements. Also, police actions, which involve repression, persecution and deportation, force many people to leave their homelands. And difficulties arising from the development process which result in problems such as labour migration, land inequities and environmental degradation can also be a cause of refugee movements (Gurtov, 1991). In many cases the causes are not mutually exclusive, and a combination of variables often explains why people are forced to leave their homeland and seek asylum elsewhere.

A number of factors thus influence an individual's decision to move from one region to another. These reasons can include both "push" and "pull" factors; existing conditions at the place of origin may motivate an individual to leave, or qualities of the area of destination may attract a potential migrant (Gomes, 1983). The issue of population movements is very complex, and the relationship between migration and development has been explained in many ways. These can generally be categorized into two broad perspectives, both defined largely by the reasons they provide to explain population movements. As outlined by Hugo et. al., (1987), the first perspective is the so-called "neo-classical economics' equilibrium approach". This perspective suggests that population movement is a 'natural' response to interregional differences in social and economic opportunities, and people generally move from where labour is plentiful and capital is scarce to labour-deficit and capital-rich areas. Thus, the level of development in various regions of the globe is seen as determining the magnitude and direction of migratory streams.

The second approach criticizes the neo-classical economic perspective for placing too much emphasis on the free choice of individuals, and for neglecting the macro-structural forces which lie at the base of the regional disparities to which people respond. Many theories of refugee movements are based on a structural perspective, arguing that refugee movements are not unique or isolated events, but are related to the international power structure and organization. According to this structuralist argument, the explanation of population movements lies in the deeper, underlying forces which structure the unequal distribution of

opportunities between regions. Population movements, then, are a response to broader structural forces in society, in particular those associated with the uneven penetration of capitalism which has created substantial inequalities. For example, Rondinelli (1991) claims that the difficulties of controlling growth in the cities of Southeast Asia arose "from the comparative advantages those regions gained from preferential investment during colonial and postcolonial periods, and from macroeconomic policies that reinforced their dominance of the settlement system".[2] The ICIHI argues that the notion that refugees are regional concerns must be challenged, and that any efforts to improve the situation of displaced people "must be founded on a campaign to adjust the notion of national sovereignty to contemporary humanitarian needs". Similarly, global humanism, as outlined by Gurtov (1991), examines the refugee problem (and other international issues such as underdevelopment, human rights, terrorism, environmental degradation and nuclear weapons proliferation) from the perspective of the human interest, and the approach emphasizes structural features of global problems. Global humanism analyses political and economic power structures within and among states, specifically attempting to understand the effect of these systems on powerless, disadvantaged groups.[3]

The difference between the neo-classical economic understanding of population movements and the structuralist approach influences all aspects of any discussion regarding the issue. Not only do the theories offer opposing views of the causes of refugee movements, but they also imply very different outcomes. The neo-classical approach, arguing that population displacements are natural occurrences, suggests that they are positive events and that policy development should reflect and reinforce the beneficial aspects of these movements. The structuralist approach, however, emphasizes that population movements are a response to unnatural imbalances in power and opportunities. Consequently, the negative aspects of population displacements are a function of inequities in development, and policy should be developed to address these imbalances and attempt to stem what must be viewed as a consequence of the inequitable distribution of resources in society.

1. The Southeast Asian Experience

In Southeast Asia, as in most of the developing world, there is a serious refugee problem. Throughout the region, population movements impelled by religious, ethnic and political conflicts, persecutions, tyranny and war have occurred on a significant scale (Hugo et. al., 1987). It has been estimated that in 1981, there were 2.16 million refugees located in Asia, of which approximately 657 000 were located in the arc of countries from Burma to Hong Kong commonly referred to as Southeast Asia (Hugo, 1987a).

To many, the refugee problem in Southeast Asia is synonymous with the displacement of millions of Indochinese. Perhaps the most crucial issue in the region is the displacement of thousands of Vietnamese who have fled from their homeland in search of a secure livelihood since the reunification of Vietnam in 1975. In the decade following, approximately 775 000 Vietnamese refugees landed in neighbouring countries, but this number only represents those who arrived at their destination and no estimates have been made of how many perished at sea (Hugo, 1987a). Throughout the 1980s, the influx of Vietnamese into Southeast Asia continued. By the end of 1989, the number of Vietnamese in refugee camps in the region reached its highest level since 1979, and fears of an endless flow of "boat people" into countries such as Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia brought the practice of asylum in Southeast Asian nations close to collapse (Taking Steps, 1990). The rate of resettlement in third countries has

decreased significantly since the Indochinese refugee crisis began. From 1984 to 1985, there was a 15 percent reduction in the number of refugees resettled in nations outside of the region, and this trend is continuing (Rogge, 1987). This drop is a dramatic change from the initial acceptance of refugees by most western nations. Yet today there are still over 110 000 boat people in camps throughout the region. With the numbers so large, however, countries of first asylum, such as Thailand and Malaysia, are no longer as receptive as they once were (Gurtov, 1991). In addition to the massive movement of Indochinese after the Vietnam war, Southeast Asia has also experienced several other refugee movements (Rogge, 1987). For example, Nakavachara and Rogge (1987) claim that Thailand's refugee experience is centuries old, with waves of migrants following colonial occupation and each world war. Indochina also generated sizable refugee movements before the Vietnam conflict. And between 1975 and 1983, almost 520 000 people fled Cambodia and Laos. Over 300 000 Cambodian refugees remain congregated along the Thai-Cambodian border, and their return depends on a comprehensive peace settlement in their war ravaged country (Taking Steps, 1990). There was also an exodus of approximately 100 000 Muslim Filipinos to Malaysia since the 1970s, hundreds of Muslims from Thailand and Burma crossed the border before returning to their homelands, and thousands of Cambodians have been admitted to Malaysia after not gaining entry into Thailand (Rachagan, 1987). In addition, there have been large numbers of refugees from Iryan Jaya to Papua New Guinea (Rogge, 1987).

2. International Assistance

The problems for refugees and the causes of massive population displacements are complex, and international assistance is necessary to adequately address this issue. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established to study the dilemma and provide aid for the refugees.[4] In addition, many humanitarian agencies worldwide strive to improve the conditions of people forced from their homelands. In spite of these initiatives, however, for decades refugees have been largely ignored, viewed as tragic but unavoidable results of national developments.

But this situation is now beginning to change, and there is increasing recognition that refugee movements are not simply unique or isolated events, and that there must be serious consideration of the problem of displaced people within the broader context of the international development process. Gurtov (1991), stresses the "interdependent and structural character of the refugee problem, and therefore the necessity of seeking its resolution, or preferably its amelioration, in a multifrontal engagement of the problem" (p. 485). Gurtov goes on to state that while much of the international attention in the past focused on refugee relief, there must now be a concerted effort to address the root causes of population movements, for without measures to deal with various sources of violence and underdevelopment worldwide there is little hope of either restoring a decent way of life to victims or of preventing future generations of refugees. As well, an understanding of the transnational and structural reasons for refugee movements may lead to a new consensus and international cooperation to mitigate the problem.

B. Defining Refugees

One of the most difficult but critical issues to be addressed when considering the problem of population movements is the definition of a refugee. Estimates of refugee totals only reflect those migrants who are officially recognized as such, but there is an important distinction between those people who are commonly called refugees and those people who are actually accorded such status. There is always a difficult decision to be made by governments and aid agencies regarding whether populations in flight are refugees or migrants—a distinction which is increasingly controversial. Refugees are generally thought of as people in flight, searching for a better way of life; but refugees are officially defined by the UN as those who are forced to look for asylum outside of their home nation out of fear of political, racial, or religious persecution (Jacobson, 1988). Thus, there are several categories of displaced people whose plight is as real as officially defined refugees, but who are overlooked by international groups and ignored during public debate (ICIHI, 1986).

This problem of definition often forces the UNHCR—the only official international aid agency for refugees—to make a difficult choice between a strict application of its mandate and its humanitarian vocation (Roulet, 1990). In addition, the inadequacies of the traditional definition are largely overlooked by the governments of developing nations, which have to cope with the burden of refugees while experiencing conditions of general economic hardship (UNDIESA, 1989).[5] It is increasingly argued that the official definition is too narrow, that it is inadequate in the political and social context of the 1980s, and that the process of refugee claims is unfair. Accordingly, a significant number of displaced people belong to the grey area of "extra-Convention" refugees and are excluded from programs for assistance. As Gurtov (1991) claims, there is a division between *ethics*, which implies that refugees are victims regardless of the cause of their flight, and *politics*, which measures refugees' claims to support and comfort in terms of official definitions and national priorities.

1. Evolution of the Concept of a Refugee

Smyser (1987) outlines the evolution of the definition of a refugee since the end of the Second World War. The 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees—called to address the needs of Europeans who had left their homelands both during and after the war to avoid persecution—established refugee status for those who had left their country of origin because of a "well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion ..." This description has remained the widely recognized official definition ever since. The Convention also outlined rights of fair treatment for refugees, giving them not the right to asylum in their new homeland, but rather the right to "seek and enjoy asylum". This convention and the resulting United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights, established the principle that most states now endorse: that people who have a well founded fear of persecution have the right to leave their country, have international status, and cannot be forcibly returned to their nation of origin.

As Smyser (1987) notes, the use of the official definition of a refugee has evolved since 1951, and the activities of the UNHCR have influenced the working definition of a refugee. For example, specific refugee "crises" have extended the mandate of this commission to periodically assist refugee groups—as opposed to specific individuals—in need. The reasons for providing assistance have also gone beyond the definition of persecution to include people fleeing from economic and social upheavals, and those with a lack of protection from their

home government. Thus, the official definition of a refugee has not always been applied strictly in the past.

In 1969, an Organization of African Unity Convention on Refugee Problems in Africa again considered the definition of officially recognized refugees, which resulted in recognition of every person who, "owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order" in their nation of origin, seeks refuge outside that country. The members of this convention further committed themselves to generous provision for repatriating or resettling refugees. Beginning in the 1960s, the United Nations General Assembly began to indirectly effect the definition of and rights accorded to refugees with the adoption of a number of covenants dealing with economic and social rights, political rights, and racial discrimination.[6] These rights extended the grounds upon which a person could claim refugee status, and if people are denied the basic human rights such as food, shelter, freedom of movement, employment of basic civil liberties, they have a claim to recognition as a refugee. Thus, the official definition of a refugee has been broadened so that many types of population displacements are now cited as deserving of support and international assistance. Refugees are increasingly defined as groups of people who flee for many reasons, the sources of which may be within or outside of their nation of origin, which may take the form of threats or actual depravations, and which may involve physical, political, mental, or material abuse. Olson (1979, cited in Hugo et. al., 1987), identifies 5 types of external forces creating refugee movements: i) physical danger (e.g. floods, volcanic eruptions); ii) economic insufficiency (e.g. drought, famine); iii) religious persecution; iv) ethnic persecution; and v) ideological persecution. Gurtov (1991) includes in his study of the global refugee problem three groups of forced migrants not presently classed as refugees: i) internal refugees, driven from their homes but not from their countries; ii) environmental refugees, and those victimized by natural disasters; and iii) migrant workers who move across international borders in search of employment. Gurtov (1991) estimates that if these three groups of people were included in official refugee statistics, the number of displaced people worldwide would be close to 30 million. Gordeneker (1987) claims that refugees are human rights victims, or people who have been denied some form of basic security and/or fear for their safety, forcing them to take the extraordinary step of leaving their homeland.

C. "Environmental Refugees"

People displaced by disruptions in the natural environment, as noted above, are not officially classified as refugees. It has been estimated, however, that up to 10 million people in the world today are displaced not by political problems, but through the degradation of their environment (McInnes, 1990). Again, there is some question as to whether people forced to move by environmental changes should be considered environmental refugees or environmental migrants. Suhrke and Visentin (1991) have drawn a distinction between populations displaced as a result of sudden and catastrophic environmental change (which the authors refer to as environmental refugees) and populations displaced by a gradual deterioration of the natural environment (where the decision to move is perceived as voluntary and, hence, the term environmental migrant is used). Cumulative environmental change, however, can be equally as devastating to the environment and the population living in that environment. It is not the rate of change which is important, but the underlying cause that is relevant. As the UN Environment Program (UNEP) Director Dr. Mostafa Tolba (cited in Lazarus, 1990, p. 15) has stated, "throughout the world there is copious evidence that the carrying capacity of many

life-supporting systems is being overloaded to a breaking point, and where such systems have collapsed, the options for the poor are stark: either to flee, or to stay put and starve".

Environmental disasters such as floods, droughts and earthquakes are displacing more and more people every year, and such disasters are often not natural (ICIHI, 1986). The people and governments of many developing nations are altering their physical environment in a way which makes it more vulnerable to disaster, and rapidly increasing populations are overutilizing and degrading the land. As deforestation, desertification, global warming and other environmental threats mount, a new category of displaced people is being recognized—environmental refugees. This group may well represent the fastest growing proportion of refugees. In a UN study of the issue, El-Hinnawi (1985, p. 4) defines environmental refugees as "those people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life". Currently, the number of environmental refugees rivals the number of officially recognized refugees, and if present trends continue it is likely that by the next century those displaced by ecological forces will exceed the number of refugees from all other causes by a factor of six (Jacobson, 1988; McInnes, 1990).

But while these disruptions cause millions to flee their homes, many of the people vulnerable to such environmental catastrophes often find that they have nowhere to go. Pressure on cities in the developing world is already great, and urban sprawl is eliminating much of the available arable land (Lazarus, 1990). At the same time, many displaced by environmental degradation are indigenous to the regions in which they had lived, accustomed to living independently and practising their own economic activities, culture and beliefs (Burger, 1990). Often, these people must leave their land and traditional occupation, and are forced to resettle among people whose language they do not speak and whose culture they do not share. Many other indigenous people resettle on marginal lands with poor soil, steep slopes or inadequate rainfall. The settlement of this land then causes further environmental degradation.

However, because environmental refugees are not recognized by the United Nations and the issue is poorly understood by the international community, those fleeing environmental decline are not given sufficient protection or support (Jacobson, 1988). People escaping from natural or human-made disasters do not fall within the official definition of refugees, and as Lazarus (1990, p.15) points out, "one might legitimately ask whether the international community's growing efforts to prevent environmental crisis should not be accompanied by a formal extension of the refugee concept". It would not be the first time the utility of the definition established in 1951 was questioned, and there is a growing argument that refugee movements must be viewed within a broader context of development and environmental issues if the problem is to be adequately addressed.

D. "Internal Refugees"

The official definition of refugees also neglects one of the most important classes of displaced people—those who are forced to leave their homes but do not cross national borders in their search for a better life. It has been noted throughout most of the developing world, social and spatial inequalities in which decisions are made greatly restrict the opportunities available to the poor (Hugo et. al., 1987). In this context, migration often reflects little more than a reaction to stress exerted by the physical, economic, social and cultural environment, and the rural poor

who do migrate are commonly forced to leave their area of residence or face desperation and starvation. Forced internal migrants then often remain trapped by the very situation responsible for uprooting them (Crisp, 1990a). For this reason, it can be argued, internal migrants should be classified as refugees, and they should be allowed the same assistance by international bodies that those who cross borders to flee religious and political persecution receive. Millions of people have been and continue to be displaced within their own countries—people uprooted from their homes but simply unwilling or unable to cross political borders.[7]

These "internal refugees" face several problems, but the primary one is that their governments generally do not have the necessary resources to provide adequate relief, yet they fall outside of the mandate of international organizations which aid people displaced from their homes. There is a recognized need for the United Nations to protect internally displaced people (ICIHI, 1986). Yet these people are not officially recognized as refugees and as such they are not eligible for international support or assistance, instead being subjected to inconsistent and slow responses (Clark, 1989). In addition, many governments are reluctant to consider the notion of international protection and assistance for internal refugees, believing that this would represent an infringement on a country's sovereignty (Crisp, 1990a).[8] According to one director at the UNHCR, Nicholas Morris (cited in Roulet, 1990), "there is no logical reason to limit our action to international borders. What is unacceptable is to leave one's home. It is a matter of chance that some cross a frontier while others remain displaced within their own country". The question, then, is not whether people have crossed a national border, but rather it is how to provide humanitarian assistance to those in need.

Hugo (1987) has produced a comprehensive discussion of the separation which has been established between international and internal migration, and argues that many theoretical and applied issues relating to international refugee migrations are equally relevant and applicable to migrants that remain within the country of origin. The failure to consider these movements holistically results in compartmentalizing studies of the phenomenon and hinders cross-fertilization between scholars working in the two fields. As Hugo notes, the term refugee is popularly used to refer to all persons fleeing from war or civil strife, and "this is one case where the popular conception of a social phenomenon seems eminently more reasonable than the professional one". Because researchers and international agencies usually define a refugee as outside of his or her country, "little or no attempt has been made to examine localized refugee movements within developing countries and regions" (p. 282).

In Southeast Asia there has been significant intranational displacement of populations, but these movements have been largely ignored relative to the attention given to those people who have crossed borders in their search for a secure livelihood. Indonesia, for example, has experienced major internal involuntary migrations of people. Also, during the period from 1954 to 1955 when Vietnam was being divided along the 17th parallel, some 900 000 "ideological refugees" left the North for the South and 90 000 went the other way, and in the subsequent two decades significant numbers of people continued to flow between North and South Vietnam (Hugo, 1987a). As yet, however, there is little documentation of these movements in refugee literature.

1. Internal Migration

In general, whether people displaced within their nations are referred to as refugees or not, the fact remains that internal migration is currently one of the most pressing development issues.

In a broad sense, internal migration can be defined as a relatively permanent movement of an individual or a group of people over a significant distance (Gomes, 1983). The terms "relatively permanent" and "significant distance" are defined in many ways depending upon chosen criteria. Although distance usually refers to physical distance, it can also be determined according to social criteria; for example, migration can be differentiated in terms of the extent to which people move beyond that which is familiar to them. Migrants within provinces of a nation will have a very different experience from those who move to another province, which may involve contact with people of different ways of thinking and doing things (Hugo et. al., 1987). Migration is distinguished from population mobility in that the latter usually refers to temporary population movements, including nomadism and seasonal changes of residence (Gomes, 1983). The question of distinguishing between permanency and non-permanency in population movements is difficult, however. Zelinsky (1971, cited in Hugo et. al., 1987) defines migration as "any permanent change of residence" while circulation or mobility is "a great variety of movements, usually short term or cyclical in nature, but all having in common the lack of any declared intention of a permanent or long-lasting change in residence".

Migration can also be distinguished by whether it involves moving between rural and urban areas. Rural to rural migration does occur throughout the developing world, and urban-rural migration movements of people are gaining increased attention. However, an influx of migrants to cities has been a continuing phenomenon throughout the developing world, and is currently the most common type of internal migration. Urbanization has been called the most crucial and obvious population distribution problem in the world today (Tetrault, 1989).[a] The World Bank (cited in Hugo et. al., 1987) has estimated that there was an increase of 9.63 million people in urban centres between 1971 and 1980, to which migration contributed approximately one half. And this trend is continuing; the world population is expected to grow by 1.2 billion people by the year 2000, and over two thirds of that increase will take place among urban populations. By the year 2000, it has been estimated that one half of the world's population will live in cities, with most of the increase occurring in the developing world. The urban population of the developing world will be twice that of the developed, and by 2025 this figure will have increased to almost four times greater (Tetrault, 1989). The trend toward increasing urbanization is also evident in Southeast Asia. Throughout the region, average population growth rates from 1980 to 1990 were over three percent, and these figures are expected to decrease little in the following decade. The urban population in Southeast Asia continues to grow rapidly, and cities are expanding to unprecedented sizes (Rondinelli, 1991). (Table 1).

The relationship between regional development and internal migration is complex and multi-dimensional. There are two-way interrelationships between population movements and the processes of economic development and social change; migration is both a response to, and has a formative influence upon, interregional and intergroup differences and inequalities within nations (Hugo et. al., 1987). The poor now form the largest single economic grouping of urban residents in the developing world, and while in the 1970s nearly three times more rural than urban households lived in poverty, urbanization is reversing this trend and the urban poor now outnumber the rural poor (Campbell, 1989). Spatial variations between levels of

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a Because rural to urban migration (what is commonly referred to as urbanization) is presently the most common and most important type of internal migration, this paper deals mainly with this phenomenon. Thus, when the term migration (or internal migration) is used, it is referring to rural to urban migration.

regional development, and differences in the distribution of social and economic opportunities which this implies, is the major element causing population movement between regions. However, there are other reasons for the trend toward rapid urbanization. Population migration into and out of regions can also have significant effects on regional development, and the consequences of rural to urban migration for the areas of origin, the migrants themselves, and the cities are all of great significance (Hugo et. al., 1987). Traditionally, cities have acted as important centres of social and economic development. However, it now appears that they are acting as barriers to sustained development. Present knowledge of the causes of population movement is in some ways much better than our knowledge of the consequences (Zablan, 1983), making development of policies to deal with urbanization difficult.

E. "Forced Displacees"

Another form of population displacement which is important to consider is the forced resettlement of groups of people. An intentional relocation of people is most often the residual or prearranged consequence of national development projects. These relocations are occassionaly designed to benefit refugees, but more commonly carried out for other objectives. Examples of such development relocation situations include: i) the construction of dams and other major engineering projects which force removals; ii) the exploitation of sparsely populated forests whose occupants can not protect their land rights; and iii) urban redevelopment projects, which are usually carried out at the expense of shantytown dwellers (Scudder and Colson, 1982). In essence, most people who are forced to move by government-sponsored resettlement programs are those who are "in the way" of a development scheme, and these types of situations are becoming more common (Scudder and Colson, 1982).

Examples of the forced resettlement of vulnerable population groups are numerous in Southeast Asia. Sahabat Alam Malaysia (Friends of the Earth) (1992) outlines the effects of the development process on rural and native communities in Malaysia. According to this group, the Malaysian government's policy of encouraging industrialization and achieving the status of a "developed country" by the year 2020 has resulted in extreme pressure on the land base and an increase in the expansion of development into areas previously reserved for agriculture or left intact. Decades of development policies that have favoured mining for tin, oil and coal, the stripping of the forests for lumber, megaproject development and large-scale plantations, has led to many resettlement schemes to remove people in the path of this "progress". In 1969, the Bukit Jelutong Plantations was eliminated to allow for the establishment of a new settlement—Shah Alam—and the workers were forced to move to squatter settlements nearby. Recently, the Malaysian government has announced plans to convert estate lands in the Klang Valley for industrial projects, which is predicted to result in the displacement of 35 000 workers. Agricultural workers have had their land appropriated for the building of roads, the expansion of urban areas, and the construction of tourism facilities such as golf courses, hotels and condominiums. In Thailand, the Royal Forestry Department and the Royal Thai Army are planning to evict over ten million people from the country's National Forest Reserve to enable the government to lease the land for fast-growing tree plantations to provide raw materials for the pulp and paper industry (Hubbel and Rajesh, 1992). These situations clearly demonstrate the belief by some planners that the interests of people are secondary to the demands of economic development strategies.

F. A Summary of Definitional Issues

It should be noted once again that the categories described above arbitrarily distinguish different populations of displaced peoples. Many authors remain committed to a broad concept of the term refugee. Islam (1992), for example, claims that those uprooted from their homes by an amalgam of economic, social, institutional and political factors, as well as by consecutive onslaughts of natural disasters and environmental decline, are often conceptually termed variously as "economic migrants", "distress migrants" or "compelled migrants", but the compulsive push of circumstances becomes so much a matter of life and death for the people fleeing that normally they have no choice but to migrate. Therefore, the author argues, the term refugee is more appropriate than the term migrant, and labelling them anything other than refugee cannot bring out the real plight of these groups of displaced people; even the term "economic refugee" seems to evoke connotations that tend to minimalize the utter desperation and helplessness of such people. Lassailly-Jacob and Zmolek (1992) also claim that "economic refugees, environmental refugees, migrants, internally displaced persons, whatever we call them, all are one in that they are all destitute and oppressed people". While it is true that a definition of a concept can become so broad that it becomes impractical, dividing refugees into classes amd then arbitrarily dismissing some groups in need as not "legitimate" refugees risks developing hierarchies that may be used for political manipulation and bring about nightmarish difficulties for people trying to find refuge (Lassailly-Jacob and Zmolek, 1992). Also, while the search for an adequate definition is important, an understanding of the complexity of causes and effects of population displacements is much more crucial to the attempt to find real, viable solutions.

III. CAUSES OF POPULATION DISPLACEMENTS

A. *International Refugee Movements*

There have been a number of causes identified for refugee movements. The reason traditionally accepted—violations of human rights—persists throughout many regions of the world. Reports indicate that tortures, forced disappearances and summary executions are still occurring, particularly in the less developed nations (World Organization Against Torture, 1990). People forced to leave their homelands due to human rights violations, as noted previously, fall within the official UN definition of refugees, and have been the subject of many studies. The refugee literature clearly demonstrates that examples of terrible brutality and tragic indignities continue to plague people in many nations, and repression of rights and injustices throughout the world force hundreds of thousands of people to seek more tolerable conditions away from their homes.

While human rights violations are the root cause of refugee movements in many cases, other explanations of refugee movements have also been cited but are generally less recognized. In the context of underlying political and power structures determining patterns of refugee movements, there are a number of factors which influence the problem. One of the most important examples is the relationship between poverty and population movements. This connection is very strong, and many refugees are fleeing from the consequences of underdevelopment. Despite technological and scientific advances, the elimination of poverty and the satisfaction of basic needs has remained an elusive goal, and for millions of people throughout the world hunger, disease, and death are still facets of everyday life (Crisp, 1990b). There is a growing acknowledgement that it is much too simplistic to place the responsibility for refugee movements on the developing nations from which most originate, and the important role of underdevelopment in the production of refugees is increasingly being underlined (Roulet, 1990).

Closely associated with the issues of poverty and development is a connection between population growth and refugee movements. This relationship is not a simple or obvious one, and it would be wrong to suggest that refugee movements are an inevitable result of population increases. As Crisp and James (1990) note, some of the most densely populated regions of the world generate relatively few refugees, while some thinly populated regions exhibit higher levels of refugee movements. However, a growing imbalance between human numbers and human needs is a contributory cause of most refugee movements, as the pattern of uncontrolled population growth and uneven distribution of people is associated with problems of widespread poverty, high mortality rates, rapid urbanization, inadequate food supplies, and environmental degradation—all of which help to stimulate population displacement.

B. Rural to Urban Migration

1. Regional Disparities in Income

In spite of their differences, both the neo-classical economic perspective and the structural argument explain migration in terms of availability of opportunities. This coincides with the findings of a number of authors who have attempted to outline causes of migration. According to the Harris Todaro migration model, the role of an expectation of obtaining higher wage employment in the city should be emphasized in any explanation of rural to urban migration (Hugo et. al., 1987). Cities, with their industries and wage-labour markets, tend to lure rural people, as they represent a place of opportunities (Zablan, 1983). Brauer (1987), also claims that:

> in the past urban areas profited disproportionately from the social and economic policies of the newly independent states. Schools, universities, hospitals, industries, not to forget the state bureaucracies, were all concentrated in the capital or, at best, in a few urban conglomerates. The "urban bias" resulted in a massive drift of rural people to the cities.

Environmental services are also more readily available in the cities; the World Health Organization in 1973 calculated that for a range of nations worldwide, 74 percent of urban populations had access to safe drinking water compared with only 39 percent of rural populations, and 52 percent of urban dwellers had access to sanitation facilities compared with only 14 percent in rural areas (The Greedy City, 1988).

Indeed, throughout the Southeast Asia region, a substantial proportion of the national productive capacity is concentrated in one or two big cities—especially the capital cities. In the Philippines, Burma, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Thailand, most of the national productive activities and social infrastructures are located in the capitals. Manila, for example, with less than 15% of the Philippines' total population, contributed more than one third to the country's gross national product, distributed 70% of all imports, and contained approximately two thirds of all manufacturing establishments. Similarly, Bangkok accounted for 86% of Thailand's GNP in banking, insurance and real estate, and 74% of manufacturing, although it had only 10% of the nations' total population. And in Burma, Ragoon—with only 6% of the population—exhibits more than 50% of the country's manufacturing industries (Rondinelli, 1991). The largest cities in Southeast Asia now play a dominant role in national economic development in terms of a number of variables: they are generally the communication and transportation hubs, with international ports, harbours, and air facilities; they are important national and international financial and banking centres; and they are central points of trade. The cities provide managerial, clerical, and professional jobs, and the "informal sector" absorbs millions of unskilled workers.[9] This heavy concentration of manufacturing and economic opportunities in the cities largely explains the attraction they hold for people in impoverished rural areas.

Kangsanant (1983) conducted a study of internal migration in the southern region of Thailand to determine the role of rural to urban migration in the industrial potential of the Haad-Yai province, and found that "the most important and outstanding reason for migration appears to be the search for employment". Again, in a study conducted by Zablan (1983) in which the author questioned internal migrants in the Philippines, reasons given by the people who moved included, as the two most frequent responses, job related reasons, attesting to the general belief

of the rural population that the city offers job opportunities which can improve one's position in life, and education related reasons—either in terms of education for the respondents themselves or in terms of families moving for their children's education—related to the absence of well-equipped learning institutions in rural areas.[10] In addition, according to Hugo et. al., (1987), surveys in Indonesia indicate that economic motives are of prime significance in the decision to migrate, and the main force behind the currently rapid migration to Indonesian cities is the unequal regional distribution of educational and employment opportunities.[11]

Population growth is a factor which is closely associated with economic motives for migration and it, too, has had an important role in rural to urban migration. The rural population in the developing world is increasing, and growth rates are far higher than can be accommodated by the agricultural sector (UNESCO, 1987). For example, in rural Java an increase in the rural population is exerting pressure on the absorptive capacity of the rural sector. At the same time, the introduction of new high yields of rice and various forms of mechanization are acting to reduce local employment opportunities. The resulting increased economic pressure in rural Java, where most people are landless or with land holdings too small to be sufficient for subsistence needs, is forcing many people to move to the cities (Hugo et. al., 1987).[12] According to Zablan (1983), population pressure at areas of origin is one of the reasons for population movement least perceived by migrants themselves, but this lack of perception is largely explained by the fact that it is an abstract concept. Population pressure is a major impetus for migration, but it is more commonly confused with economic motives.

Also associated with the economic explanation for migration is the accessibility of information throughout the region. In Zablan's study (1983), reception of information on better livelihood opportunities in the area of destination, either in terms of employment or education, tends to have a positive influence on the decision to migrate, and more so in the case of individuals than in the case of families. Hugo et. al. (1987) suggest that improved transportation routes and increased mass media penetration have had a large role in increasing migration, as they have been instrumental in the spread of information regarding opportunities available. Also, one should not underestimate the so-called "bright lights" attraction of urban areas, and the role that perceptions of urban centres play in stimulating migration. This aspect is also associated with the availability of information.

2. Socio-Cultural Factors Influencing Rural to Urban Migration

In addition to economic motives, there are a number of other factors which can influence the choice to migrate, and socio-cultural explanations are too frequently overlooked as an important element. According to Zablan (1983), in past studies it has been shown that economic, socio-cultural and psychological reasons motivate migrants, and these often converge in a way that can not be distinguished by the migrant her/himself, and the separation of them would in any case be artificial. Indeed, there are many interregional and intergroup variations in levels of migration, even where economic and political considerations appear relatively homogenous (Hugo et. al., 1987). Reasons for migrating do not operate independently, and there are attitudes and behaviour patterns in society that may either facilitate or impede an individual's decision to migrate.

A decision to move is based in large part on tradition, and one important factor is the structure of the community of origin, including its sets of standards, values, beliefs, and customary

practices (Hugo et. al., 1987). Some authors have suggested that for several ethnic groups, internal migration is so significant that it has become institutionalized in the process of life (Naim, 1974; Maude, 1979; both cited in Hugo et. al., 1987). Many studies within Indonesia have shown that when members of an ethnic group have been migrating for many years, this is itself a factor which predisposes other members of the same group to leave.[13] Ethnic communities established in the region of destination provide sources of information which other members of the ethnic groups can relate to and trust, and the existence of a large population of people of the same background can also provide moral assistance to the potential migrant. Tradition can also be a factor in decisions not to migrate, as it can encourage stability and lack of mobility. According to Mantra (1981, cited in Hugo et. al., 1987), the Javanese people have a very strong attachment to their home villages, making permanent displacement a very unlikely choice for them, even in times of severe economic hardship; these people have largely adopted commuting and other forms of non-permanent resettlement, but they rarely migrate.

A number of authors have also indicated the role of family relationships in the choice of whether or not to migrate (Lapuz, 1967; Maceda, 1967; Simkins and Wernstedt, 1971, all cited in Zablan, 1983). The authors suggest that family ties and closeness of an individual with her or his family can function as a deterrent to migration, or family encouragement can make it more likely that an individual will migrate. In either case, relationships of individuals with their families influence decisions regarding a move. Also, in Zablan's study (1983), the expectation of aid from the potential migrants' relatives in the place of destination reinforces the motivation to migrate, especially for individual migrants. Relatives in areas of destinations in general do help newcomers in a number of ways. Relatives often provide accommodations and shelter and assist when the migrants have health, financial or family problems.

In addition, included among the social and cultural factors accounting for the migration of people is marriage and the desire to join spouses who have previously migrated (Kangsanant, 1983; Zablan, 1983, Hugo et. al., 1987). Gambits (1983), for example, notes that among the Temuan people of Malaysia, mate exchanges between villages have caused a considerable amount of migration. And demographic factors in general can cause migration; migration is usually sex selective, and if the out-migration of one sex leaves an imbalance in the population at the area of origin, the other sex may have to leave to find a partner (Gomes, 1983).

Some studies have also taken a more behaviouralist approach to the explanation of migration. As Hugo et. al. (1987) outline, intervening variables can influence an individual's decision to leave, and these include the demographic, educational, socio-economic position, personal background and psychosocial characteristics of the individual or family choosing whether or not to migrate. But as the same authors note, it is important not to transfer Western beliefs and modes of thought onto individuals in the developing world. In the Western tradition, individuals will usually move if the total perceived benefits (social, economic and emotional) accrued by the individual are seen to outweigh the costs. In the developing world, however, this model is often inappropriate. Instead, in many cultures the well-being of the family is more important than the individual, and the benefits and costs are evaluated for the migrants' entire family.

C. The Environment and Population Movements

Existing literature regarding refugee movements seldom refers to environmental causes specifically. With the exception of the recent and relatively scarce literature defining "environmental refugees" referred to above, most discussions of population displacements treat environmental causes in terms of "physical" or natural disaster scenarios. A number of explanations, however, have been posited for the growing number of environmental refugees. For example, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates that up to 300 million people could be affected by rising sea levels which may result from global warming, and changes in rainfall patterns, disruptions of crop production, soil erosion, and desertification may also cause environmental devastation. In addition, the more immediate danger of more frequent and more destructive storms and floods which are expected to result from climate change will force many more people to move. According to the Worldwatch Institute (cited in Lazarus, 1990), yearly topsoil erosion is approximately 25 billion tons, and destruction of tropical rainforests for short term profit from timber sales, cattle ranching and plantations forces many forest dwellers from their homes and also leads to increased droughts and floods. Land degradation due to irrigation is another example of environmental decline that contributes to population displacement, as desalinization and waterlogging pose threats to sustained production and improper drainage can cause disease.

In the case of refugee movements, environmental issues can influence internal population movements, either as a push or pull factor. Abundant resources at an area of destination may encourage migration. More importantly, however, throughout the world there is an increasing migration of subsistence farmers to cities because of environmental degradation in rural areas (Timberlake and Tinker, 1985). Ecological causes of migration are particularly important when there is a disparity between production in a region and the subsistence requirements of its inhabitants. Indeed, it has been argued (Myths, 1987) that the popular notion that the lure of the city "pulls" people away from rural areas is wrong, and that "the major determinant in Third World urbanization is the 'push' exerted by the inability of available resources in rural areas to sustain the population that drives the masses from impoverished villages to urban centres." While it is more likely a combination of these "push" and "pull" factors rather than one explanation at the exclusion of the other, it is also apparent that a weakening of the resource base in rural areas contributes to urbanization. This situation may be caused by the depletion or deterioration of the region's resource base, by increasing population pressures on available resources, or by some combination of these two factors (Gomes, 1983).

As discussed in a working paper on environmental change, population displacement and conflict by Suhrke and Visentin (1991), studies demonstrate that at the outset of environmental change, the affected populations resort to various survival strategies, including shifting crop use, changing areas of production, seasonal migration and other coping mechanisms. As conditions continually worsen, however, entire communities may move as a last resort. At this point, the authors claim, migrants become refugees. And again, those living in impoverished conditions are the most vulnerable to change and are most often forced to move.

D. The Environment and Forced Displacees

Environmental degradation is also closely associated with the problem of forced displacements. Laissailly-Jacob and Zmolek (1992) note that "industrialization, development schemes

and subsequent land speculations have resulted in a plethora of environmental catastrophes for rural and indigenous peoples, often resulting not only in displacement, but repeated displacement". Since the 1960s when the first superdams were built in developing countries, one million people have been displaced against their will, and a further million are threatened with the same fate if the dams presently scheduled for the 1990s proceed (Burger, 1990). Similarly, development patterns in many Southeast Asian nations have caused environmental damage which has forced millions of people to move. On Langkawi Island in Malaysia, the development of tourism facilities has destroyed catchment areas and small streams, drastically reducing the water resources of the island causing crop failures and flooding during the rainy season. Farmers have suffered the effects of massive soil erosion and slope failure, forcing many to abandon their farms. Many others have been intimidated into giving up their land and their heritage (Sahabat Alam Malaysia, 1992).

E. Security and Refugee Movements

The global population displacement problem is closely linked to issues of international security. Conflict and warfare are leading causes of refugee movements and, as a Director at the UNHCR, Nicholas Morris (cited in Roulet, 1990) notes, "it will be impossible to envisage a solution for the refugee problem until the conflicts which are tearing regions apart have been settled". Conflicts between states cause great ecological devastation and represent a threat to people living in vulnerable areas, forcing millions of people to flee their homes for the relative safety of other nations and other societies. For the same reason, millions more have been displaced from their roots in internal exile. Rambo (1968, cited in Hugo, 1987a) conducted a detailed study of population displacement in Southern Vietnam, and from that work produced a model of refugee movements during three stages of revolutionary warfare. The steps are:

    i)   subversive activity is a potential threat but there is no major outbreak of violence, and as a result small, homogenous groups move, consisting largely of large landholders, officials, or important supporters of the legal government;

    ii)   the insurgent movement gains sufficient local or external support to initiate organized guerilla warfare, resulting in the displacement of more people;

    iii)   the insurgency becomes a war between organized forces, and the high stress levels result in peak rates of refugee generation with virtually no social selectivity.

Thus, conflict within states can also result in major population movements.

The relationship between conflict and refugee movements is very evident in Southeast Asia. The Vietnam War had perhaps the most obvious repercussions in terms of population movements. Since the beginning of that conflict there have been large displacements within Vietnam and Cambodia as a consequence of social, economic and political transformations (Rogge, 1987). Some three million people were forced to leave their homes because of bombings and other war related reasons. There was a prolonged evacuation of northern cities during the air war, but in the South the majority of the migration was to cities near areas of heavy fighting which became major refugee centres (Hugo, 1987a). People of the region fled

before advancing troops, with fear of the opposing forces and of being caught up in the fighting.[14]

Like Vietnam, many other Southeast Asian nations have experienced large refugee movements as a result of conflicts in the region. Malaysia has been effected by a number of conflict induced refugee movements, and in Burma there have been as many as 187 000 internal refugees and thousands of refugees crossing the nation's borders as a result of continual conflicts between the government and rebel forces (Hugo, 1987a). More recently, over 100 000 Burmese Muslims have fled to Bangladesh to avoid ethnic persecution. Violent clashes between rival forces and a series of conflicts in the Philippines has created waves of refugees (Rachagan, 1987). And Laos has also been subjected to almost continual conflict for several decades; Olson (1979, cited in Hugo, 1987a) suggests that by 1959 there were 40 000 refugees within Laos, forced to move because of fighting in the nation. During the 1960s, the ferocity of the war caused entire villages to flee from war zones, and by 1970 the number of internal refugees was estimated to be 260 000. This number continued to increase until the ceasefire in 1974, when many refugees began to return to their homes or relocate permanently.

Hugo (1987) has also outlined a number of internal refugee movements which have resulted from conflict in Indonesia and the Philippines. According to the author, the upheavals associated with World War II and the subsequent struggle for independence produced substantial population dislocation within Indonesia. In addition, Indonesia's annexation of East Timor in 1975 caused great violence and dislocation of thousands of people. Up to fifty percent of the population of East Timor was displaced during the second half of the 1970s, with some 20 000 fleeing overseas and tens of thousands more fleeing to West Timor. By 1978, an estimated 125 000 East Timorese had passed through or were still living in squalid refugee camps and up to 100 000 more could be hiding in the mountains, and malnutrition and hunger were rife, and death commonplace (Hugo, 1987).

In addition, it has been suggested that no country in the contemporary era has experienced greater forced migration of its people than Cambodia (Hugo, 1987a). During the 1970s, the nation suffered upheaval, hardship, and horror; civil war, a subsequent revolution, and the Vietnamese invasion have caused mortality from massacres, war, executions, and famine, resulting in large population movements. Again, cities grew rapidly from the internal refugee flows, and the capital—Phnom Penh—experienced an influx of more than 2 million refugees. Thousands of refugees have also fled Cambodia, with an estimated out-migration of 450 000 people between 1975 and 1978. Since 1979, the acute famine conditions that were the legacy of years of Khmer Rouge control and brutal repression have ensured that population displacements have continued. It has been suggested that as many as 900 000 Cambodians have moved, seeking assistance and safety (Hugo, 1987a).[15] Hundreds of thousands of these refugees are now settled along the Thai border. Some were allowed to enter Thailand, but over 20 000 remain on the border, vulnerable to armed conflict between opposing forces (ICIHI, 1986).

According to Gurtov (1991), refugees live in a world in which violence, both tangible and psychological, is frequently used by those in power to deal with social inequalities, to punish disaffections, and to achieve order and profit; it is within this framework that millions more are fleeing their homes. Worldwide, governments are spending billions of dollars to achieve military security, but comprehensive security also involves economic, social and cultural stability. For example, the debt crisis of the developing world is draining capital from already impoverished nations, further lessening their ability to meet the basic needs of their people. At the same time, there is a growing food shortage throughout much of the developing world,

with stocks inadequate to feed increasing populations. Problems such as these force more and more people to leave their homes in search of a secure livelihood. And as Hugo (1987) suggests, the origins of insecurity are both socioeconomic and political. In the Philippines the island of Mindano has experienced considerable insecurity since 1972, resulting in between 30 000 and 50 000 civilian deaths and up to one million refugees. However, the major shortcoming in Mindano is its backward economy and the existence of two extremely unequal income groups. The weak economy led to communal misunderstandings and a breakdown in law and order (Hugo, 1987). Thus, issues of impoverishment are also associated with the security question.

F. The Environment, Security and Refugees

The security related factors influencing population displacements are further intensified when there are is environmental degradation associated with the dispute. One such example is competition for the resources—usually food or land. Populations almost never exist as isolated entities relating only to their environment; instead, there is almost always constant interaction with other groups of people, and the potential for conflict is significant. In his study of two aboriginal populations in West Malaysia, the Negritos and the Temuans, Gomes (1983) found that competition for land, which results in conflicts and territorial disputes, was an ecological cause of out-migration from the villages. The continuing migration of Malays from Sumatra and Java back to their traditional homelands has led to frequent territorial disputes with the Temuans, and the resulting pressure has forced many Temuans to migrate to other areas in Malaysia. In some cases, entire villages have moved away from recently settled Malays.

Also, environmental disaster inflicted by war has a large role in the displacement of large numbers of people. Since the time of the Second World War, the increasing strength of weapons has resulted in environmental destruction on a new scale with the infliction of lasting damage. The use of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima and Nagasaki is perhaps the most infamous example of this destructive capability, creating as it did the largest firestorm ever produced by warfare, incinerating both cities, and resulting in radioactive fallout which effected millions of people.

The Vietnam war is also one of the best examples of deliberate environmental destruction as a military tactic. The United States army undertook massive campaigns of deforestation to expose the opposing forces, and the use of tens of millions of tons of herbicides and extensive bombing left hundreds of thousands of acres of forest destroyed. Figures quoted vary regarding the level of destruction; Glassman (1992) claims that between 1962 and 1970 the U.S. dropped one hundred million pounds of herbicides on over four million acres of South Vietnam, defoliating 25 to 50 percent of the country and destroying as much as 41 percent of the mangrove forests. Other tactics included bulldozing land and direct attacks on animals. The legacy of these practices continues to exist in Vietnam, flooding of rice lands due to deforestation continues, and many of the herbicides remain in the ecosystem of Vietnam still, causing further damage. This massive bombing and the chemical and mechanical destruction of the land left many people with no alternative but to seek a livelihood elsewhere. According to Lazarus (1990), environmental damage from the Vietnam war combined with political and economic motivations to force millions of Vietnamese to flee their homeland, greatly increasing the rate of urbanization. As Glassman (1992) notes, "the success of U.S. warfare in swelling urban centres with refugees also had social costs; a whole generation of Vietnamese youth

grew up without learning farming skills or developing other abilities that were essential to traditional Vietnamese society", while in the urban centres "a culture of prostitution, drug addiction, racketeering and petty commerce blossomed". Glassman (1992) claims that the aim of the environmental destruction was to create refugees from rural areas in order to undermine rural support for the revolution.

Conflicts around the world continue to displace millions of people from their homes through the resulting environmental destruction, and there is the potential for wars involving the use of chemical and biological weapons to take an enormous toll on the earth, displacing more people in the future. Deforestation and crop losses are large problems; Guatemala, for example, is now engaged in a war of ecocide much like that experienced by the Vietnamese, and the Indian people of the highlands are being forced to move as their traditional land is being destroyed. In addition, governments engaged in military conflicts generally support the growth of "cash crops" in an effort to finance their armies, and at the same time many farmers are forced to join the armies. The end result is increased poverty and famine, forcing further environmental exploitation and a vicious cycle forcing millions of people to leave their homeland.

IV. OUTCOMES OF POPULATION MOVEMENTS

A. Problems for Refugees

Refugees are generally trapped in the muddled world of international affairs, often caught between competing state interests. They have little control over their situation; while they have the "right" of exit, states often deny that right and may prosecute those people who attempt to leave. Also, refugees may "seek and enjoy" asylum, but the state decides whether it will be granted (Gurtov, 1991). The question of why people are moving and whether they should be accorded refugee status has always been a matter for courts to decide. The state, then, determines which among the numerous reasons for population movements are valid and worthy of support, and these decisions are seldom made for humanitarian reasons; more often they are a reflection of a nation's domestic and international interests (Rogge, 1987).

As Gurtov (1991) notes, the people often considered refugees are those who have useful skills or whose plight is politically useful to spotlight. The unskilled, or those whose skills are not needed, those fleeing a "friendly government", and those escaping economic or environmental destitution rather than political persecution are not often recognized as refugees. In addition, restrictions against minority groups are often even more severe than for other refugees. As noted previously, many groups of refugees have sought asylum in Malaysia, including Filipino Muslims, Thai and Burmese Muslims, Cambodian Muslims, and Vietnamese fleeing the war and ethnic Chinese from Vietnam. The response of the Malaysian government, however, differed significantly in each of these cases. The Thai and the Burmese were provided temporary asylum, and the Cambodians were accepted for permanent resettlement. The Filipinos were labelled refugees and received identification cards, found occupations and are being assimilated into the Malaysian society. The Vietnamese and ethnic Chinese of Vietnam, however, were classified illegal immigrants and were confined to camps until they could be resettled in a third country. At one point, the Vietnamese were even provided rations and towed out to sea in the boats in which they arrived. As Rachagan (1987) notes, "numbers, the nature of the relationship between Malaysia and the source countries of these arrivals, ethnicity, religious affiliation, labour requirements, and local political attitudes, rather than the plight of the asylum seekers, determined the response of Malaysian officials and society to these people" (p, 266). Similarly, Nakavachara and Rogge (1987) note that refugee migrations into Thailand have periodically surged and decreased in a repetitive pattern, and that the response of the government has ranged from hospitality and acceptance to resistance and outright hostility. The result of trends such as these is great uncertainty for refugees, and discrimination based on a variety of factors beyond the control of those forced to move.

The uprooted share a number of characteristics. The majority are poor, and have lived in circumstances which have allowed them few choices. Refugees become displaced and lose their independence, their status, their livelihood and their identity (ICIHI, 1987). In moving, established ways of life are disrupted, families are broken up, and people must abandon their familiar surroundings to live in alien and frequently hostile environments (ICIHI, 1986). It is true that displacement may offer new and unexpected challenges for some refugees, but most find that their situation is not improved, and they face equal or greater impoverishment and hardship. Asylum countries often fear refugee populations as a loss over control of immigration, and while the incoming population seeks a new home, employment, and the right to bring their family with them, many states prefer to restrict the arrivals to camps and perceive them

as temporarily displaced people. As a result, refugees often live in crowded conditions without provision of basic services. Many will never qualify as refugees and after several years will be sent back to the country they left (Taking Steps, 1990), and, as Rachagan (1987) suggests, "the compulsion to move from [home] to an unknown future, often at short notice, by subterfuge and without protection, is sufficiently traumatic without [having] to face rejection" (p. 268).

While living in refugee camps, people who have already faced the difficult task of leaving their homes face further hardship. Refugee camps most commonly exist in developing nations which are unable to cope with the needs of their own populations. Unlike previous generations of refugees, the majority now will not have the opportunity to resettle in one of the industrialized states or to return home; instead, they will remain in developing nations (ICIHI, 1986). Refugees are among the first to suffer the effects of inflation, breakdowns of service delivery and shortages of jobs (Crisp, 1990a). The camps also represent an artificial life, with refugees of different ethnic, religious, and political backgrounds forced to live together, and with unfamiliar food, climate, and landscape (ICIHI, 1986).

Whether in camps or not, refugees are particularly vulnerable to the volatility of national economies, and have few rights or influence over those in power. In some cases, governments have limited residence and employment rights for refugees to reduce competition with their own citizens. Tired of bearing the economic and political costs of refugee influxes, a number of governments have instigated or threatened mass repatriation. In 1979, for example, the government of Thailand pushed almost 40 000 Cambodian refugees over the border to their own country, where several thousand were killed (ICIHI, 1986). With the resources of asylum nations already stressed, refugees are generally forced to seek assistance from international organizations—groups which are also limited in their financial and human resource capacities to provide aid.[16]

1. Human Rights Violations

In spite of a substantial body of law designed specifically to safeguard refugees, human rights abuses of these groups are commonplace throughout the world. As the ICIHI (1986, p. 43) notes:

> there is news, with unrelenting regularity, of massacres in refugee camps; of failure to rescue those in distress; of starvation and disease and death among the uprooted masses who could not get international aid in time; of the forced repatriation of asylum seekers; and of practises designed to deter refugees from seeking asylum.

There have been numerous incidences of armed attacks on refugees, physical abuse, abduction, forced conscription and other forms of exploitation (ICIHI, 1986). With little control over their own lives, the psychological impacts on refugees are important, and many feel inadequate and guilty. But with assistance programs already strained, these problems are rarely addressed.

2. Problems for Women

While serious problems are faced by all refugees, women often experience unique difficulties. Women and children make up the largest proportion of refugees, and exploitation of these groups is consistent throughout the world (Burgess, 1991). According to Sima Wali (cited in Kratovil, 1991), an Afghan refugee woman and Executive Director of Refugee Women in Development, patriarchy and power politics are principle factors not only in the creation of refugee movements but also in the relegation of refugee women to a forgotten population. In addition to facing the same problems confronted by all refugees, women suffer the added disadvantage of sexual discrimination. For example, some cultures require that men be fed first, and in refugee camps where supplies are usually limited this often means that women and children go unfed. Also, adequate health care for all refugees is a crucial concern, but women's health care needs in particular are overlooked in many cases (O'Neill, 1990). Gynaecological and family planning services are usually inadequate, and serious problems are often undetected (Burgess, 1991). Due to malnutrition, many women stop menstruating and are thus more at risk of acquiring all kinds of diseases, and a lack of hygiene usually exacerbates these problems (Berthiaume, 1991). Most training programs and public services target men, giving little attention to the needs of female refugees (Kratovil, 1991). Women are often not allowed to participate in training and literacy initiatives, and in some cases when they have attempted to join the programs they have been threatened and forced not to participate (O'Neill, 1990).

Female refugees, vulnerable to exploitation, have the additional burden of having to deal with sexual abuse and harassment. Often separated from their husbands, they are forced into the unfamiliar role of family head and become solely responsible for their families. They become totally dependent on others for everything, and in order to obtain basic requirements such as food, clothes and firewood, women must often bribe camp guards with sex, while others resort to prostitution to support their families (Burgess, 1991). To feed their children, refugee women often leave the camps and try to find work locally at the risk of being arrested, beaten, or raped. And women also sometimes have difficulty convincing officials that they are victims of persecution; for example, some of those women raped by soldiers in their homeland are not granted refugee status because this is considered to be a normal part of warfare (Burgess, 1991). The psychological problems women must confront are often devastating, and researchers consistently report overwhelming fear that grips these women throughout their lives as refugees (Berthiaume, 1991).

Worldwide, between 70 and 80% of all refugees are women and children, but women are rarely included to an equal extent in humanitarian assistance programs supported by the international community (O'Neill, 1990; Berthiaume, 1991). In general, refugee women remain powerless and voiceless (Kratovil, 1991). For example, women, the primary care givers and traditionally responsible for feeding their families, are generally excluded from food distribution systems. And within the camps, women are often barred from making decisions regarding their daily lives which could improve their situation (Burgess, 1991). Decisions about when and where to collect water and firewood, the kind of cooking implements to be used, or the location of living quarters are generally made by relief workers in consultation with male refugees only. Although it is argued that cultural constraints are responsible for the absence of women in decision making, women traditionally had some access to the decision making process by making their opinions known to their husbands (Burgess, 1991). But separation from their husbands, as noted earlier, forecloses this small voice in the process.

B. Impacts of Migration

Population movements are an influential factor in promoting social and economic change, not only in terms of the movers themselves, but also in the places of origin and destination. Migration has been said to be one of the great demographic and social adjustive procedures in the history of humankind (Gomes, 1983). Indeed, as migration tends to be age and sex selective, it increases the size of particular age groups more than others, and it affects the balance between female and male populations (Zablan, 1983). In the case of the Indonesian population movement, for example, peak mobility occurs in the younger adult years. This characteristic is common to most instances of migration; the younger, economically active population moves more often, largely because they are looking to enter the work force or begin learning at a higher education institution (Hugo et. al., 1987). Migrants may thus alter fertility and mortality patterns (Gomes, 1983). In general, population movements between regions will produce short and long term changes in demographic, social, and economic composition of the population at both the places of origin and destination (Hugo et. al., 1987). The magnitude of the impacts of these changes are determined by the characteristics of the migrants themselves and the scale on which the movement occurs.

As Hugo et. al. (1987) outline, the neo-classical economic perspective implies that migration is beneficial to regional development because it is an equalizing mechanism. Internal migration corrects for localized poverty and locally low labour productivity, as people with low living standards will simply move. According to this perspective, welfare is enhanced through increased productivity of labour, reduced pressure on wages and employment opportunities, and, occasionally, an influx of remittances from those who have migrated. At the same time, the increased size of the labour force and market at the receiving end allows for economies of scale, thus maximizing the efficient use of resources. Also, cities may provide markets for rural areas (provided the inhabitants enjoy a reasonably high standard of living and can afford to buy the farmers' products), stimulating agriculture and rural industries and raising incomes of rural dwellers (Brauer, 1987; Myths, 1987). According to the neo-classical view, the gains of the migrants are matched by the overall benefits to the entire society from the migration.

Bogue (1959, cited in Zablan, 1983) outlines the positive functions of internal migration. Internal migration: i) siphons off excess population to regions of better opportunity; ii) is a process of personal adjustment for an individual; iii) is an arrangement for making maximum use of persons with specialized qualifications, moving them to areas where their services can be used most effectively; and iv) is an instrument for cultural diffusion and social integration. Bogue further suggests that rural to urban migration serves the economic welfare of the migrating "ruralite", while helping to maintain the growth rates of cities. Indeed, Rondinelli (1991) points out that the growth of cities in Southeast Asia provide economies of scale conducive to industrialization so that cities are able to absorb large numbers of people in manufacturing jobs and allow governments to construct modern infrastructure, health, education, commercial, and other facilities that make them more attractive to rural migrants. According to Hugo et. el. (1987), the overwhelming evidence suggests that for most individual migrants significant benefits result from a move to a city which far outweigh any problems experienced. The authors cite an example of a study of migrants in 14 major Indonesian cities (Aklilu and Harris, 1978) which concludes that "this and other previous studies continue to support that at least the private, if not the social, benefit of migration is positive and that migration is a rational and informed decision triggered by the differentials in expected income and opportunities."

According to the structuralist view of population movement, however, the consequences of uncontrolled internal migration are largely negative. The migration to core regions of a nation drains the periphery of its economic surplus and its most talented residents, thus increasing regional disparities and generally limiting the chances of national development (Hugo et. al., 1987). Indeed, most studies outline a number of problems which result from internal migration and seem to support the structuralist argument. Although the growth of cities and urbanization may have some positive impacts, the uncontrolled and increasingly rapid pace at which rural to urban migration is taking place in Southeast Asia, and in the developing world in general, appears to be resulting in extremely serious problems.

1. Problems For Those Internally Displaced

Most authors support the view that rural people are encouraged to migrate to the city by a host of attractions—employment and income, housing, food supplies, and health and education services. But what migrants find in cities is often quite different from what they expect. According to Harris and Puente (1990), traditionally it was believed that poverty and ill health were concentrated in rural areas, and cities were seen as relatively rich. This contention, however, is increasingly being shown to be false, and if present trends continue the majority of poor households may soon be urban based. Difficulties encountered by rural migrants in the city include: i) a lack of jobs, especially reasonably paying jobs; ii) a lack of shelter, including insufficient space and water, or flooded accommodations in the rainy season; and iii) a lack of a sense of community, including much less social interaction than migrants are used to and generally little or no help in times of need. Thus, there are socio-cultural, economic and physical problems experienced by migrants (Zablan, 1983).

2. Economic and Employment Difficulties

Some of the greatest difficulties experienced by migrants are related to employment. Those who are unable to immediately obtain work are often burdens to friends and families. Migrants who are able to find work often do so in marginal occupations and the jobs they obtain require long hours with low pay. As a result, migrants generally have low purchasing power and must rely on credit for buying necessities. The majority of the migrants who participated in Kangsanant's (1983) study were low income earners.[17] Suharson (1976, cited in Hugo et. al., 1987), in a study of population movement in the Jakarta region of Indonesia, also found that migrants, especially newly arrived, have little education and lack capital and skills; as a result, they have difficulty getting a permanent job and they are forced into marginal occupations with little immediate hope for economic and social betterment. Similarly, Papanek's study of the poor in Jakarta (1975, cited in Hugo et. al., 1987) found that rural migrants, with little education and few relations in powerful positions, have virtually no chance of obtaining permanent work with regular hours of employment and moderate wages. In general, in Indonesia recently arrived migrants exhibit higher levels of unemployment than non-migrants, proportional representation of migrants in manufacturing is less than for non-migrants, and many more migrants participate in service sector employment than non-migrants.[18] In a 1969 study of Manila squatter settlements, Stone and Marcella (cited in Zablan, 1983) suggest that migrants are beset with many problems, the most important of which is unemployment and underemployment; there are not enough jobs in the cities for all of the migrants, who further do not generally possess the skills and training required to fill the few positions which

are available. Most migrants, therefore, either remain unemployed or they are forced to accept jobs in the service sector with minimal pay.

This disproportionate representation in the marginal economic sector is even more pronounced for women (Hugo et. al., 1987). A majority of female migrants become engaged in service occupations, requiring relatively little skill, while male migrants at least have a better chance of gaining employment in occupations requiring specialized skills and knowledge (Zablan, 1983). In Zablan's (1983) study of migration in the Philippines, no female migrants the author questioned were on the upper occupational level, but three percent of the males were there. Zablan believes that "this finding indicates that female migrants who participate in the city's labour force occupy the lowest rung of the occupational ladder, while male migrants tend to be found on the middle and upper levels" (p. 126).

3. Poor Living Conditions and Lack of Shelter

Migrants often find themselves in crowded surroundings, without proper sanitation or clean water supplies, and the areas many migrants are forced to occupy are prone to flooding during the rainy seasons. In general, most migrants are forced to live in unacceptable living conditions (Zablan, 1983). As there is a tendency for migrants to obtain marginal jobs in the service occupations, they are commonly forced to settle in slum areas.

As UN Secretariat Dwyer (cited in Zablan, 1983, p. 113) commented, "a large part of the urbanization of the underdeveloped world represents at present little more than the transfer, through migration, of rural poverty into the cities, where it often becomes concentrated and conspicuous in squatter settlements." According to Tetrault (1989), in some parts of the developing world up to 65% of the urban population lives in squatter settlements without water, sanitation, public health services, or decent housing, and in other extremely poor areas this figure exceeds 80 percent (see Tables 1 and 2 for numbers of people in Southeast Asia without access to services and a rural/urban breakdown). Slums and squatter settlements are expanding at a dramatic rate; worldwide, the population of these settlements is generally growing at twice the rate of the cities themselves (Tetrault, 1989). In Jakarta and Manila, for example, more than one million people were living in slums in 1980. And in these slums and squatter settlements, rates of mortality, morbidity and malnutrition are often worse than in most rural areas.

Recent arrivals to cities also frequently find it difficult to find homes and shelter once they reach the city. Inadequate shelter is a worldwide problem, but in the cities of the developing world conditions are the most appalling (Tetrault, 1989). Housing represents a tremendous problem in areas of destination, and the rapid growth of urban populations has created serious housing deficiencies, especially in the poorest regions. According to Bapat (1989), while the "urban explosion" continues unabated, "an increasingly larger proportion of the urban population is having to live in abysmally deplorable conditions ... in what can only be an apology for shelter." And although the relationship between shelter and health is complex, it is certain that poor housing is always associated with high disease and death rates.[19] Inadequate housing is associated with problems of unsafe water supplies, indoor air pollution, insufficient protection from the elements, and serious impacts on mental health and well-being. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that 5 million deaths could be prevented each year if housing conditions were improved, and that an additional 2-5 million cases of permanent disablement could also be avoided (Shelter and Health, 1988).

It has been estimated that in Indonesian urban areas over the period of 1971-1991, the number of housing units required has ranged between 7.6 and 8.7 million (Hugo et. al., 1987). Many arrivals to Indonesian cities are forced to live in overcrowded and unhealthy facilities, unfinished buildings, under bridges, in the open, and in similarly unacceptable conditions. Zablan (1983) found that most migrants in the Philippines have to be content with poor accommodations and poorly constructed houses at cheap rental rates in low-income neigh-bourhoods.[20] None of the migrants indicated a desire to move to better areas, but Zablan suggests this fact was an indication not of their satisfaction with their surroundings but of their economic inability to improve their situation through another move.

4. Socio-Cultural Problems for Migrants

Psychological difficulties also exist for the migrant to a city. Migrants are often deprived of the security and control which traditional social organizations allowed, they are forced to adjust to a formal, impersonal, specialized, achievement oriented lifestyle, and their hopes which brought them to the city can seldom be realized (Zablan, 1983). Other difficulties experienced by migrants, particularly during their early stay in the city, include an absence of friends and no sense of community. Consequently, there is little or no social interaction and it may be difficult to obtain help in times of need (Zablan, 1983). Integration in neighbourhoods consisting largely of other migrants was generally easier than in communities composed of old residents (Zablan, 1983), but migrants generally find it difficult to feel at home in the city and have difficulty adjusting to the new experience.

C. Problems for Forced Displacees

Like the other categories of displaced people, those forced to leave their homes because of national policies face a number of difficulties. With few exceptions, the vast majority of those who are forced to move by government-sponsored resettlement programs are low-income, low-status people who have very little economic and political power and scant access to national resources. Governments can and often do move these people with impunity (Scudder and Colson, 1982). In addition, the vulnerable groups who are relocated are often repeatedly displaced. For example, squatters who were previously removed from the Kampong Sungai Dumansara region of Malaysia to allow for the building of a road are now going to be relocated once again because of plans to build a golf course and develop a park (Sahabat Alam Malaysia, 1992). Similarly, the Orang Asli of Malaysia have been forced to move three times since the Second World War and face another move now because of plans to build a second international airport in the region in which they live. As the Sahabat Alam Malaysia (1992) note, the Orang Asli object to these continuous disruptions, claiming "we are not nomads".

Perhaps the most vulnerable groups of all are the indigenous peoples of a nation; these people are also displaced most often. As the ICIHI (1986) notes, "traditional land users are often viewed as a hindrance to economic growth, especially when they are tribal peoples with an apparently archaic culture". In many cases, they are simply told to leave their land, or they are evicted from it. What is particularly disturbing about the displacement of indigenous peoples is that their lives are usually inseparable from the land on which they live. Having been supported by the land for generations, the cultures and traditions of indigenous peoples are intimately associated with their environment, and removal from their homeland can mean the

loss of their entire way of life. However, indigenous peoples have little or no economic or political power and no proof of land ownership, making them easy to displace.

In general, the stresses experienced by resettled populations are similar to those which affect refugees in general; psychological stress, family disruption, human rights abuses and desperate conditions in the regions in which they are resettled (Scudder and Colson, 1982). People displaced by development projects are typically promised adequate compensation, yet plans for resettlement are often ruined by corruption and people are left in a much worse condition than before their displacement. In Malaysia, for example, when the Bukit Jelutong Plantations were eliminated to allow for the establishment of a new settlement—Shah Alam—the workers were removed from the area, and were promised low-cost housing and other retrenchment benefits; yet only after twenty years were some families allocated low-cost homes or empty land on which to build, and many received no compensation at all. Similarly, the Batang Ai power project in Sarawak was constructed on the land of the Iban people, 3,000 of whom were resettled away from their traditional homes. Once relocated, instead of the eleven acres of cleared land they had been promised, each family only received one, and they had to pay for their new longhouses which they had been promised would be free (Sahabat Alam Malaysia, 1992).

At best, the majority of those displaced can expect to suffer at least some period of readjustment. When relocatees are moved to a dissimilar habitat where they must coexist with unfamiliar people and confront different environmental factors, they face cultural dislocation and are forced to adapt to new economic practices. Even governments with the best intentions frequently move people to new sites without establishing a suitable economic base. In Malaysia, in order to develop the beaches for tourism, the inhabitants of fishing villages located at the edge of Redang Island are being moved inland, away from the water (Sahabat Alam Malaysia, 1992). As Scudder and Colson (1982) note, almost universally governments fail to pay proper attention to how relocatees are going to make a living after removal, and scarce funds that are available for the relocation are all too often expended on housing and social services at the expense of job training and job opportunities.

The forced displacement of people violates the most basic of human rights—the freedom to locate at will (Scudder and Colson, 1982). Those who resist relocation often put their very lives at risk. According to Hubbel and Rajesh (1992), in Thailand those people who have been evicted from their homelands in the past have had their crops ploughed under, and have been threatened and beaten. Zmolek (1992) also reports that in India, people about to be displaced by the construction of the Narmada Dam have made "drowning pacts", vowing to stay in their homes even while they are being flooded out; the police, however, have been using force and violence to remove people from their villages.

D. Problems for Regions of Origin

The impact of refugee movements on the country or region of origin has often been ignored in studies of refugee movements (Hugo, 1987a; Simmance, 1987). Any large population change has serious consequences for the region from which the people originate. In some cases, it may be that the refugee movement relieves pressure on an overstrained environment. However, when the refugees are educated, the movement of large numbers of people may represent a loss of human resources. As the ICIHI (1986) notes, throughout the developing

world, education and training facilities are often inadequate, and skilled workers are in short supply. The workforce is further depleted by migratory movements to parts of the world where living standards are higher, and refugee exoduses frequently make this situation even worse. An observer once commented that at one time there were more Laotian doctors in refugee camps in Thailand than in the whole of Laos itself (ICIHI, 1986). Rambo (1968, cited in Hugo, 1987a) conducted a study of refugee movements in South Vietnam and concluded that literate persons move earlier than illiterate, persons with skills move earlier, and younger people move earlier than older people. Despite the potential for adverse affects on the country of origin, this aspect of refugee movements has been largely unstudied.

The movement from rural to urban areas can also result in problems in the area of origin. Increasing population pressures in urban areas force an expansion of cities, encroaching on the adjacent farmland and displacing people. Urbanization can effect development in rural areas by decreasing available labour—especially young and healthy workers who are most able and most likely to move. This makes subsistence farming more difficult, and makes the nation less able to feed its own people (Tetrault, 1989). In addition to the many uneducated farmers leaving the rural areas, the few people who *are* educated also tend to migrate. Surveys of university graduates in Indonesia show that many tend not to seek employment in their native provinces, but instead they generally move to a metropolitan area—usually Jakarta (Suharson, 1976, cited in Hugo et.al., 1987). Thus, the place of origin is drained of the people who hold the most potential for its development. In addition, migration to cities not only draws away the more dynamic members of rural communities, but it may also divert national investment resources towards urban areas (Myths, 1987). Brauer (1987) notes that for years there has been an "urban bias" in development assistance, favouring help for the millions of impoverished people in cities where it is sometimes easier to provide services to many at one time. The rural areas, meanwhile, have been neglected in development efforts, and "the word 'rural' often became a synonym for 'poor'" (Brauer, 1987).

E. Problems for Regions of Destination

1. Refugees and Nations of Asylum

The impacts of refugee movements on areas of asylum, however, are better understood and much more obvious. States can become victims of refugee movements as fragile ecologies are often disrupted, unemployment is usually exacerbated, and ethnic tensions intensified by an influx of large numbers of people. In addition to being a consequence of poverty and underdevelopment, refugees are also part of the cause of scarcity and instability in many developing nations (Crisp, 1990b). Of the world's estimated 15 million refugees, approximately 12.5 million are located in the developing world (Crisp, 1990b), and globally the 20 states with the highest ratio of refugees to local populations have an average annual per capita income of under seven hundred dollars (ICIHI, 1986). Refugees have the potential to make substantial contributions to host nations, refugee centres can become areas of rapid economic growth, and wealthy members of the local population can benefit from the arrival of cheap labour and new skills (ICIHI, 1986). Past experience has shown, however, that when large numbers of people move to impoverished nations those who gain are in the minority, and the effects have generally been negative.

Many refugees arrive in a severely debilitated state and settle in areas where resources are in short supply. Often, industrialized nations resettle the skilled, educated and physically fit, leaving in the countries of first asylum the diseased, the aged, the illiterate, the unskilled and the politically suspect (Nakavachara and Rogge, 1987; Stubbs, 1980). In response to an influx of these refugees, national and regional authorities must divert resources from the demands of their own development programs to the task of providing food and shelter to the incoming population (Crisp, 1990b). Thus, refugees often place a tremendous strain on already limited resources, and they compete with their hosts for basic requirements. Over time, the presence of refugees places great pressure on the asylum nation's facilities for education, transport, health, and social services. A refugee influx can force prices up and wages down, can have a negative impact on the balance of payments, and put a strain on local political and administrative structures (Simmance, 1987; Crisp, 1990b). In many instances, the presence of large numbers of refugees has had a detrimental effect on the economies of the regions involved; black markets often thrive, and inflation becomes a problem as the scarce food and medical supplies are sought after by an ever increasing number of refugees (Stubbs, 1980). Developing nations generally find the burden of supporting refugees difficult to bear, and many have been forced to increase their debts and implement tough austerity programs to cope with the problems resulting from the population influxes (Crisp, 1990). And in many instances, the asylum nations simply do not have the space for refugees, with levels of population density already high. These problems cause hardship among the local population, and create deep resentment against the refugees.

The governments of Southeast Asia simply do not have the resources necessary to settle large numbers of refugees, and with unemployment and underemployment major problems throughout the region, most nations cannot absorb the resulting influx of labour (Stubbs, 1980). According to Hugo (1987), in the two decades following 1975 almost 1.3 million refugees left Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and almost all initially found refuge in an Asian country of first asylum. Although many were eventually resettled outside of the region, hundreds of thousands remain. In Southeast Asia, Thailand is the first asylum nation bearing the brunt of the Indochinese exodus, with approximately 82 percent of those refugees contained in Thai camps (Rogge, 1987). In addition to some 130 000 refugees, however, Thailand also accommodates almost a quarter million Kampucheans who have been "temporarily" displaced and are now living in camps along the border following the 1984-85 Vietnamese offensive against Khmer resistance forces (Rogge, 1987). This is a common occurrence; often temporary camps become permanent. Malaysia has absorbed by far the greatest proportion of the region's refugees (Rogge, 1987). The problems refugee influxes cause lead many first asylum nations to believe that the economic capacity for absorbing refugees, and not geographic proximity, should be the criterion for deciding where the refugees will end up (Stubbs, 1980).

2. Rural/Urban Migration and Cities

The high rate of net migration to urban centres is also an issue of great concern as population densities increase, promoting competition for limited resources and creating severe problems such as unemployment, housing shortages, and increases in slum areas (Kangsanant, 1983). Studies on migration consistently mention economic, social and environmental problems evident in the place of destination (Barclay, 1958; Prothero, 1967; Perevedenster, 1969, cited in Zablan, 1983). Boldt (1959, cited in Zablan, 1983) also indicates negative aspects of uncontrolled internal migration; the influx of people into cities usually causes demographic, social and personal problems. The difficulty for the city lies in its limited absorbing capacity.

The cities' economies are usually not sufficiently strong to absorb the influx of labour (Zablan, 1983), and more often than not the housing, water, electricity, and communication facilities are also not sufficient to serve a rapidly growing population. Generally, cities tend to attract migrants in numbers far above their capacity to employ, house, feed, service, and educate (Zablan, 1983).

Several writers have indicated the enormous pressure the migration of large populations places upon services in the cities of destination. Increased competition for entrance into secondary and post secondary schools is one example. In Jakarta, a regulation had to be enacted in 1970 stating that all children wishing to enter school had to provide a certificate stating that no schools existed closer to their place of origin, and in some areas of the city all children wishing to enter elementary school for the first time must write an entrance exam and only the most qualified students are accepted (Hugo et. al, 1987). The pressure on education facilities is also duplicated in many other service sectors. In general, the demands of vast numbers of urban dwellers strains urban management capabilities. As a result, the desperate people who have moved to the cities are prone to crime and civil disorder, and security in urban centres is seriously weakened by the increasing urbanization (El-Hinnawi, 1985).

Rural to urban migration may provide some benefits to individuals and, theoretically at least, may benefit the greater society as well. However, evidence suggests that negative aspects of uncontrolled rates of urbanization outweigh the advantages. As Rondinelli (1991) notes, even if there are economic benefits for a nation from urbanization, the disparities it creates demand a more balanced development pattern so that larger numbers of people can participate in, and benefit from, economic growth. Along with problems for both migrants and the cities, there is also a growing inequity between people living in urban and rural areas, and between those living in large cities and smaller towns.

F. Environmental Effects

The ecological impacts of large refugee movements have only recently received serious attention, but it is increasingly acknowledged by many researchers that large influxes of people can have significant environmental implications. Any modification of ecosystems can produce a variety of disturbances, the degree of which depend on both the intensity of the interference and the fragility of the existing ecology itself (Simmance, 1987). Refugee movements tend to produce uncontrolled modifications which can lead to serious disruptions of the ecological system's balance, and the ecological impact of mass movements can be very severe. Many nations' refugee influxes in the past decade have destabilized the local ecology, and have caused a rapid depletion of scarce vegetation (Crisp, 1990). The use of wood by refugees for fuel and home construction requires millions of trees, often in sensitive areas susceptible to ecological damage. The cattle refugees often use for sustenance also have great impacts on the ecosystem of the areas they enter, trampling small trees and bushes and over-grazing the land. Many refugee camps are now surrounded by vast stretches of barren land no longer capable of supporting life (Crisp, 1990). The environmental stresses caused by population displacements are overwhelming the capacity of some developing nations to deal with them.

Rural to urban migration also results in ecological problems in urban areas. Environmentalists familiar with urban conditions in the developing nations of the world often see the large city as symptomatic of environmental decay (Campbell, 1989). Large urban centres are over-

crowded, congested with traffic, poisoned by air pollution and a lack of sanitation facilities, and burdened by an ever growing number of shanty towns. As Campbell (1989) notes, large cities are perhaps the most striking example of areas which have grown rapidly out of proportion with their ecological settings, and "resource consumption and degradation has taken a serious toll on the health and safety of all residents, as well as future development prospects for urbanized Third World countries" (p. 166).

As noted above in the discussion of the impacts of urbanization on those who move, many of the environmental problems caused by the uncontrolled growth of cities are borne by the poor. Household sanitation problems and waterborne diseases traceable to poor environmental health conditions account for hundreds of thousands of deaths each year among the poor (Campbell, 1989). Further, many low-income urban dwellers still depend on traditional biomass fuels for cooking. The use of biomass for indoor cooking results in products of combustion which, combined with poor ventilation, cause contamination and disease (especially among women and children). Alternative sources of fuel, however, remain too expensive. As Campbell (1989) notes:

> it is in some sense ironic that the immediate, household-level environmental problems of indoor air quality and sanitation are often ignored or given slight treatment by activist environmental groups, international agencies, governments, and even national groups concerned with the environment. ... The adverse effects of household airborne and water-carried wastes on child mortality and child life expectancy are of no less global proportions than, say, the destruction of tropical forests, and in immediate human terms they may be the most urgent of all worldwide environmental problems. p. 173.

In addition, there are a number of other environmental effects of the growth of urban areas. Cities consume not only land in their expansion process, but a distinct aspect of large city size is the location of settlements on steep, swampy, or otherwise unsuitable land on the periphery of the cities (Campbell, 1989). High prices and an associated general unavailability of land forces many poor to settle on marginal land on the urban fringe, vulnerable to flooding, aridity, and erosion. Further, the conflict between safety and the need for housing is reflected in the location of many shanty areas in close proximity to dangerous industries. Catastrophic accidents, like the Bhopal chemical accident in India, are obvious examples of the problems related to this inappropriate land use, but disease caused by contamination and pollution are also evident.

A great deal of resources are also required to maintain an urban population. A study in Kenya, for example, demonstrates that the major contribution to deforestation was not the villagers' use of wood for fuel, but was instead the conversion of wood to charcoal for sale to people living in the cities (Gordenecker, 1988). Similarly, in Pakistan the use of the country's fuelwood by urban households has increased and may account for as much as half of the fuelwood consumed in the past ten years (Campbell, 1989). Thus, urban use helps drive deforestation, and a critical element in the survival of the urban poor has repercussions for the entire nation. Supplies of water are also a major problem for most cities of the developing world, as it is not always readily available, and importing it any distance is usually expensive (Campbell, 1989). Both food and water systems are also heavily energy dependent in most cities, and sound development strategies for supplying basic needs have not been available (Campbell, 1989).

Cities also produce excessive waste. It has been estimated that, on average, a city of one million people produces 500 000 tons of waste water, 2000 metric tons of solid wastes, and 950 metric tons of air pollutants per day, and many of these pollutants are generally exported to the surrounding areas (Gordenecker, 1988). While it could be argued that people create waste whether living in urban or rural areas and thus the problem is really one of overpopulation, this problem is exacerbated by an imbalance in the distribution of people, with too many concentrated in areas unable to sustain them (Gordenecker, 1988). Solid waste disposal has also been given low priority in terms of public services in most developing cities, and contamination from these wastes often infects groundwater, carrying a multitude of chemical and toxic substances (Campbell, 1989). Large numbers of families also rely on urban waste for their subsistence, but while working in the dumps to collect waste the poor are exposed to a wide variety of bacteria and disease, and hazardous and toxic wastes. Thus, protecting the environment and the poor from contamination by solid wastes involves a trade off with the thousands of people who depend on access to the dumps.

This type of dilemma is characteristic of most of the environmental problems in the urban areas of the developing world. The close relationship of the poor with the environment demonstrates the extent to which addressing the environmental problems in cities are as much social as environmental tasks (Campbell, 1989). However, environmental problems will become more intense as cities continue to grow and as the number of households grows, and more attention to the environmental dimensions of urban development is needed.

G. Population Movements and Security

There is also great potential for displaced people to cause conflict. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Stoltenberg, 1990) points out that while there is general consensus on the need for a global environmental strategy and a new recognition that security has social and economic, as well as military, dimensions, it is still of primary importance that the refugee issue begin to appear on the international agenda. As Stubbs (1980) notes, of crucial concern to each government involved is the threat that the refugees pose to the social and political stability of a region. For example, as Prasong Soonsiri, the Secretary General of the Thai National Security Council (cited in Nakavachara and Rogge, 1987), has stated, "Thailand will give assistance to refugees in accordance with humanitarian principles so long as it does not adversely affect Thai sovereignty, national security, and national interests". The Thai government has adopted what appears to be an intransigent position toward refugee dilemmas, balancing its principles with what it perceives as a possible security threat. The existence of refugees exerts tremendous pressures on destination regions, their presence can exacerbate inter-state and domestic conflicts, and sometimes can influence foreign policy.

Homer-Dixon (1991) outlines sociological theories of conflict which can be used to explain the links between population movements and security issues, with environmental factors acting to either initiate or exacerbate the population movement. According to this author, three types of theories of conflict are particularly relevant to such a consideration:

i) **frustration-aggression theories**—psychological theories used to explain civil strife such as strikes, riots, revolutions ... which suggest that people respond aggressively when they believe that their fulfillment of a strong desire is being impeded. This idea can be associated with either absolute

deprivation (failure to receive a minimum amount of food or shelter) or relative deprivation (when a gap is perceived between the level of satisfaction achieved and the level desired);

ii) **group-identity theories**—social-psychological theories that explain conflicts involving nationalism, ethnicity, religion, and other strong motivating group identities; and

iii) **structural theories**—theories which explain conflict in terms of rational choices in response to external constraints, which can be social (including power relations) or material (such as shortages of important natural resources).

As Homer-Dixon (1991) explains, these theories point to the principle types of conflicts which may arise from environmental degradation and population displacements. One of the most common types of conflicts, "simple scarcity" conflicts, is predicted by the structural theories. As Crisp and James (1990) note, social and economic conditions which include inadequate food supplies, high unemployment, and environmental degradation, provide an ideal breeding ground for violence and unrest. Recent violence in Hong Kong refugee camps between rival Vietnamese factions attests to this fact.

When too many people compete for too few resources, ethnic and religious tensions become accentuated, giving rise to communal conflict, a type of conflict explained by group-identity theories. In host countries and internal regions of destination, the infrastructure and services are often below standard and can barely meet the needs of existing residents. An influx of refugees into such areas exerts more pressure on services and can create conflict with regular users (El-Hinnawi, 1985). Frustration-aggression conflicts are also evident in these types of situations. According to Hugo (1987), the treatment in refugee centres in Indonesia and the Philippines is so good that it has caused resentment among the local population; the refugees, guaranteed food, water, medical supplies, education, and other welfare facilities, have a higher standard of living than many of the local people, and they are further destined to be resettled in rich countries. Rachagan (1987) also suggests that this is true in Malaysia when refugees put pressure on health facilities and social services, causing resentment among the poor, local villagers. Alternatively, many other refugees find themselves in slums and squatter settlements where they are deprived access to basic facilities, are forced to use open water for washing and cleaning, and must live in poorly-constructed shelters where crowding and accumulating wastes result in disease. In these conditions, there are conflicts among the residents of the settlements, a great number of riots, high levels of crime and drug addiction, and mistrust between the refugees and the original population (El-Hinnawi, 1985). Similarly, rural to urban migrants can also cause disruptions to security. Poverty and hunger drive many people in the city to petty crime, prostitution and drug dealing, dangerous and disruptive practices which often trigger violence. Murder, armed robbery, rape and other violent crimes are commonplace in sprawling slum settlements, and tensions are high (Urban dilemma, 1987). As in the case of refugees, large numbers of frustrated people from varying cultural backgrounds confined by poverty into small, densely populated communities represent an extremely volatile group.

Thus, there are several ways in which massive population movements can threaten security. In addition to those mentioned, political factors can also be associated with insecurity. Under international law, the granting of asylum to a refugee is a humanitarian, non-political act, but countries of origin rarely perceive it as such (ICIHI, 1986). Thus, the movement of people

across borders can increase tensions between states. Further, when marginalized people protest, it can trigger official reprisals and human rights violations, and with the resulting instability unelected regimes have greater opportunity to seize power (Lazarus, 1990). In these respects, refugees can cause domestic strife and considerable friction in the areas to which they flee, resulting in more persecution, violence, and another flow of refugees seeking security.

V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

A. *International Refugee Movements*

International refugee policy must reflect the complexity of the issue in terms of both the reasons for the population movement and the effects on both the refugees and the regions of origin and destination. The immediate demand for international assistance most often concerns the aid and relief of refugees. Emergency relief is often required, including the provision of food, fuel, water, shelter, and transportation. The immediate provision of adequate health measures and decent sanitation is another means to reduce the risk of infectious disease epidemics (Simmance, 1987). In the longer term, education and skill training are needed. The Philippines and Indonesia, for example, presently have Refugee Processing Centres which provide training programs for refugees before resettlement (Hugo, 1987a). International organizations must also use their influence to ensure that displaced populations are treated in a humanitarian way (Crisp, 1990a). In Southeast Asia, only the Philippines has signed the 1951 Convention on Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, and thus it is the only state in the region bound to the Convention's recommendations (Hugo, 1987a). As Rachagan (1987) notes, the position of refugees in countries not signatories to any international instrument pertaining to refugees is much the same; they find themselves classified as illegal immigrants and are not provided refugee assistance or protection.

Also required is greater international attention to the causes of refugee movements. As the ICIHI (1986, p. 48) notes, "the principle of international solidarity should be expressed ... through economic and foreign policies which are designed to prevent and resolve the situations which provoke large refugee movements". Development assistance has a central role to play in the resolution of refugee problems; people have less reason to leave their homelands, and they are more likely to return, if there is an opportunity to meet their basic needs (Crisp, 1990b). The reintegration of refugees must begin with projects to create a favourable economic and social environment in the regions to which they wish to return, for few will go home to intolerable conditions, or many will be displaced a second time if they do return (ICIHI, 1986). Also, refugee relief programs will have little effect, no matter how well financed or organized they might be, if the host nation remains impoverished. It is unrealistic to expect that areas with large populations of refugees will become centres of sustained growth while other parts of the host country remain trapped in a spiral of underdevelopment (Crisp, 1990a). Initiatives taken to improve the living standards of either potential or actual refugees must be placed within a broader context of national and regional development relief programs. Organization- ally, there is some difficulty with this argument, however, because refugee relief agencies (like the UNHCR) are not development agencies. Thus, the gap between refugee assistance agencies and those designed to promote economic planning and development must be bridged (Crisp, 1990a). Similarly, a recognition of the role of both environmental decline and insecurity in the problem of population displacements demands that these factors also be addressed. Refugee movements will continue and, indeed, will likely worsen as global environmental issues remain unresolved, and in a world plagued by war and conflict people will inevitably continue to flee from unstable, dangerous conditions and search for security elsewhere.

While these issues are associated with long term solutions, measures must also be taken to deal with the existing problem of refugee movements. In Southeast Asia, most of the emphasis has been on policies to stem the flow of refugees into nations through restrictive policies in

first asylum countries, but few of these have been successful. In the early 1980s, for example, Thailand initiated a "humane deterrence" policy to stem the flow of refugees from Cambodia. Under this policy, newly arriving refugees were confined to austere prison-like camps and were ineligible for resettlement until the backlog of earlier arrivals was cleared (Nakavachara and Rogge, 1987). While this reduced the numbers initially, refugees continued to enter Thailand, resulting in the creation of refugee camps along the Thai border containing approximately 250 000 people (Hugo, 1987a). Throughout the region, procedures were introduced in all first asylum countries to distinguish between refugees and migrants, but this has done little to stem the flow of refugees.

Repatriation of refugees is the most desirable in the abstract, but also the most difficult to achieve (Gurtov, 1991). Thailand, for example, has seen repatriation as the only viable option other than resettlement, and has been forceful in its application of this concept. After the massive influx of Cambodians in 1979, some 42 900 refugees were forcibly relocated across the border, an exercise aimed primarily at deterring other Khmer refugees from seeking refuge in Thailand (Nakavachara and Rogge, 1987). While international outcry halted further efforts such as this, the Thai government remains committed to voluntary repatriation. Success, however, been limited. The UNHCR also began a voluntary repatriation program in the region focusing on Vietnamese refugees. This program included the provision of transportation back to the country of origin, reintegration assistance, and monitoring of the refugee's welfare. It was hoped that refugees who returned would tell others about the experience and the difficulties of becoming settled elsewhere—including the fact that only those who could prove persecution were accepted as refugees—and so the number of refugees would be reduced. The UNHCR also began a media campaign in Viet Nam to raise awareness about the realities of the refugee process (Taking Steps, 1990). However, the overall instability of many regions—including most of Southeast Asia—has prevented repatriation from becoming a lasting solution, and waves of new refugees outweigh returnees (UNDIESA, 1989).

While repatriation remains a difficult goal to achieve, programs to resettle refugees continue to be important. The most urgent need of people who are displaced is a safe refuge, but currently the granting of asylum is regarded as a state decision and thus remains a matter for government discretion. In practice, in many instances refugees are not granted asylum (ICIHI, 1986). Malaysia, which together with Thailand bore the brunt of the refugee exodus from Indochina, experienced tremendous pressure on its resources and growing local resentment of refugee groups. When the number of Vietnamese refugees moving into Malaysia peaked at 450 000 in 1978, the Malaysian government became the first in the region to declare the boat people as "illegal immigrants" and to deny them refuge. Since that time, the Malaysian government has continually emphasized a policy of third country resettlement (Hugo, 1987a).

At present, no Southeast Asian nation is willing to accept significant numbers of refugees except on a temporary asylum basis, and the region stands out for its almost total dependence on third-country resettlement as its only acceptable durable solution (Rogge, 1987). After the large exodus of people following the Vietnam War, the nations of the region clearly stated that they would only provide temporary asylum for the Indochinese, and some countries—particularly Thailand and Malaysia—refused to allow boat-people to land until western governments committed themselves to the principle of resettlement (Rogge, 1987). Indonesia and the Philippines have played important roles in resettling Vietnamese refugees to third countries by processing refugees from a number of countries for resettlement. But according to Gurtov (1991), while resettlement programs which have been attempted in many nations have had some success, almost all of these initiatives have reached a peak level. Resettlement

opportunities have declined dramatically since 1980 and 1981, due largely to "compassion fatigue" combined with growing competition from an increasing number of refugee areas. Recipient countries are now creating discrete regional quotas for their annual refugee intake, and some Southeast Asian states are pressuring Western governments to increase resettlement quotas to clear the backlog of refugees (Nakavachara and Rogge, 1987).

In general, there is a pressing need for more study of the impacts of refugee movements and the various policies designed to respond to them. The data available is currently insufficient, and more innovative, flexible and appropriate strategies must be developed (Hugo, 1987a).

As discussed previously, because women experience unique problems as a result of refugee movements, they must have an increased role in the development of programs and initiatives aimed at alleviating refugee problems. Systems which allow for women's participation are crucial, as female refugees have the greatest insight into the problems effecting them and possible solutions (O'Neill, 1990). According to the UNHCR's senior coordinator for refugee women, Ann Brazeau (cited in Burgess, 1991, p. 41), "[women] maintain a sense of dignity given the circumstances they're living under. They're partners, not passive recipients. They often have solutions to problems, if only we'd listen to them". Women have tremendous skills to offer, including potential as leaders, entrepreneurs, homemakers, and child care providers, but these skills have largely been ignored (Kratovil, 1991). In recognition of the unique problems of female refugees, the UNHCR's Executive Committee called for a new set of guidelines in 1990 for their protection. The guidelines have been designed to eliminate many of the root causes of abuse as well as to help those women who have already suffered (Burgess, 1991). The emotional and economic needs of refugee women must be improved if their situations are to improve (Kratovil, 1991), and attempts to alleviate their suffering should include leadership training, better protective measures for women in refugee camps, and better education. Other ways to address the needs of women include improved camp planning. Camps are generally overcrowded and facilities are often far from living quarters, and in the generally poorly lit and seldom patrolled camps there is little security for women (Burgess, 1991). Improving basic physical features of the camps could address some of the problems refugee women face. Generally, relief workers must be trained to be sensitive to women's needs, there should be more female health workers, and the needs of women should be given greater priority in the planning and running of refugee camps.

B. Internal Refugee Movements

The continued rapid urbanization in Southeast Asian countries during the 1990s will create increasingly complex challenges for governments of the region and policies are currently being pursued to address the phenomenon. Because an understanding of the reasons for and consequences of internal migration depends to a large extent on which perspective of migration—the neo-classical economic or the structuralist—is supported, the policy implications of migration will clearly depend on the same factor. According to the first perspective, in the long run migration is beneficial for both the individual and society, and, as Myths (1987) suggests, "findings in general suggest that migration cannot, or even should not, be completely controlled, since it is a part of the whole process of economic growth and social advance". Thus, any interventions should be developed in such a way that they serve to enhance or encourage existing patterns of mobility. These initiatives could include such things as investment into transportation infrastructure, providing more information in rural regions

regarding jobs and housing in destination regions, and generally removing any significant barriers to migration (Hugo et. al, 1987).

According to the structuralist argument, however, the overwhelmingly negative aspects of migration implies the need for strategies to limit urbanization. As Crisp and James (1990) note, coming to grips with the population challenge and the growth of urban areas is fundamental to solving many other development problems, and the extent to which these issues are addressed now will have a major impact on the lives of future generations. As rural to urban migration continues at a rapid pace in Southeast Asia, governments face the daunting prospect of providing sufficient numbers of jobs for a growing labour force, in extending urban services, and in dealing with the physical problems brought about as a result of the expansion of cities (Rondinelli, 1991). In the past, urbanization was associated with national development policies, and rural to urban migration was only a concern when critical urban problems caused serious political difficulties. However, national leaders throughout the region have now expressed dissatisfaction with the spatial distribution of their population and patterns of human settlement in the region, and governments in Southeast Asia have been seeking to slow the pace of urbanization and limit the expansion of cities for nearly half a century.

Past proposals outlining ways to limit urbanization have usually been based on the concept of increasing opportunities in underdeveloped regions and including migration policies as part of an integrated regional development program aimed at enhancing social and economic opportunities in those regions (Hugo et. al., 1987). Underlying the evolution of urbanization policies, then, has been the enduring goal of creating a balanced distribution of settlements, population, and economic activities (Rondinelli, 1991).[21] Many authors have supported this direction. Kilaton-Abenjo (1975, cited in Zablan, 1983), recommends a balanced national development scheme through regional planning, which would give attention to both the development of high growth areas (such as cities) and the surrounding region (especially towns which are presently undeveloped). This policy would relieve some of the pressure from regions of uncontrolled growth, and would redistribute the population. Proposals include the redistribution of economic and employment opportunities to less developed regions and centres, as well as the establishment of educational facilities in rural areas. Similarly, Zablan (1983) claims that while urban migration is difficult to curtail, it would still be useful to reduce the influx of migrants into cities by discouraging unskilled workers from moving. This could be achieved by assisting people to make resources available in rural areas more productive, perhaps involving the implementation of policies to maximize agricultural production and other rural industries, teaching better farming techniques, making capital available to farmers, and helping the rural population market their products. Policies to discourage migration may also involve the dissemination of information about the reality of the situation in cities and difficulties often encountered by migrants at their destinations (Zablan, 1983).

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, governments throughout Southeast Asia fashioned new regulations and incentives to restrict population movements to large cities. Governments tried to use integrated rural development programs, preferential investment for economically lagging regions, and land resettlement and colonization schemes to retain people in rural areas. In several cases, governments provided subsidies and tax incentives for industries to move out of cities, and the state constructed industrial estates in rural regions (Rondinelli, 1991). Indonesian governments, for example, have long sought to influence migration patterns through a range of policies and programmes which have been designed to more evenly match spatial distributions of populations and resources. The most notable is Indonesia's Transmigration Programme, implemented in an attempt to redistribute people from densely populated

Java, Bali and Lombok to other major islands of the archipelago (Hugo et. al., 1987). The Program began in the late 1960's, and has been somewhat successful in resettling significant numbers of Javans in agricultural colonies on other islands, especially Sumatra. Malaysia also experimented with programs to reverse the flow of migration and resettle the urban poor in frontier areas through rural colonization projects (Rondinelli, 1991). And in both the Philippines and Indonesia, efforts were made to restrict the entry of migrants into national capitals and to limit access to urban services (Rondinelli, 1991).

Throughout Southeast Asia, policies aimed at creating a balanced pattern of urban development over the past three decades have largely failed, and programs to slow rural to urban migration and to control the expansion of cities have not achieved their goals (Rondinelli, 1991). In many cases, programs were not effectively implemented, nor were they sustained long enough to have the desired impacts. In addition, the assumption generally supported throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s that investment in one or two large cities would spread through the rest of the economy has been seriously questioned, and the evidence suggests that this belief was misguided. While it had limited success, the Indonesian Transmigration Program had little impact on reducing population increase or rates of urbanization, the land settlement project did not significantly raise the incomes of settlers, and little non-farming employment was provided for settlers or their offspring because of insufficient investment in facilities and roads. As a result, many who were resettled in rural areas have had to leave again to find employment. Similarly, attempts to use subsidies and incentives to entice industry out of Jakarta have had virtually no effect on location decisions (Rondinelli, 1991). These problems have been experienced throughout Southeast Asia, and some now feel that it is futile to try to reverse the trend of rural to urban migration.

In the early 1980s there was a reassessment of traditional strategies, and an attempt to focus on creating more equal development by stimulating growth of smaller towns (Rondinelli, 1991). Investing in secondary cities would direct migration from primary cities. In Thailand, a national policy was implemented to counterbalance the flow of migrants into Bangkok and decentralize the urban population. An important component of this policy was the expansion of industry and employment elsewhere, based on the concept of developing a limited number of industrial centres (Kangsanant, 1983). The government of Thailand attempted to stimulate the growth of regional towns with locational advantages for small and medium scale industry, so that they could become centres for the development of industry and commercial activities (Rondinelli, 1991). Malaysia also called for infrastructure investments to promote the growth of secondary towns, and all Southeast Asian governments sought to improve the capacity of villages and towns to provide basic services, and to develop secondary towns as sites for rural industrial and commercial activities. These programs were intended to discourage people in small towns in rural areas from migrating to the largest, overburdened cities (Rondinelli, 1991).

It is premature to evaluate the effect of the new policies, but in some cases it appears that they are still being undermined by a lack of political commitment, and by attempts to develop too many towns at once, spreading financial and managerial resources too thin. In the 1990s, Southeast Asian governments will also have to supplement their strategies to limit the growth of large cities with plans to improve the efficiency of city economies, promote overall economic growth, expand employment opportunities, and decentralize power to local governments and the private sector (Rondinelli, 1991). While policies are developed to deal with the issue of migration, there must also be programs initiated to help those who have already migrated. Zablan (1983) suggests that programs designed to alleviate the migrants' physical

and economic problems should be formulated with both actual and potential migrants in mind. Since most Southeast Asian governments now believe that urbanization is inevitable, they must extend urban services and support productive activities that expand employment opportunities (Rondinelli, 1991). Also, the environmental implications of rural to urban migration must be addressed, and the living conditions in cities must be made tolerable not only for the present migrants forced into shanty towns and slums but also for future inhabitants and generations to come.

Thailand provides an excellent example. Bangkok will continue to expand even if present policies to slow its growth are successful, and the government therefore plans to make Bangkok more orderly and efficient by integrating physical planning and infrastructure investment, by removing obstacles to economic growth, and by making substantial investments into urban transportation systems, flood protection, water supply facilities, and housing. For migrants, a need to provide low cost housing complete with basic services is imperative. The United Nations has a "sites and services" policy which aims to relocate urban squatters in areas which are close to their place of work and which are equipped with sewage, paved roads, and other infrastructure components (cited in Zablan, 1983). Initiatives to relocate the urban poor, however, will only be feasible if real economic opportunities for unskilled workers are also provided. Unless the areas to which squatters are relocated offer job opportunities and the chance to participate in economically productive activities, relocation plans will fail. Thus, economic development of a region must precede any relocation activities.

The participants of a 1976 international meeting "The Survival of Humankind: The Philippine Experiment" (cited in Zablan, 1983) suggested that squatter settlements provide for migrants the only shelter they can afford and, because they are often located close to the best opportunities for employment, they also allow migrants their first contact with the labour market. Squatter areas, then, are used as transitory residences which the migrants will leave when their economic situations improve. Thus, relocation of migrants from these settlements deprives them of these possibilities. What is required are facilities which are better equipped for migrants and will improve their living conditions without a loss of the functional aspects of squatter settlements (Zablan, 1983). And improving the economic status of migrants is the most difficult and probably the most time consuming task to be dealt with (Zablan, 1983). Migrants are caught in a cycle; they are poor because they have low paying jobs, which they must take because they are generally untrained and unskilled. Thus, the establishment of training centres and overall development of the area to offer more jobs is required to help the migrants' economic situation—both of which are long term, and slowly implemented, solutions.

Redistribution projects must also be carefully considered for their potential to cause further harm rather than improve existing situations. For example, the Indonesian transmigration program's overall success has been quite limited. There is a decreasing availability of suitable land on the other islands, there has been considerable conflict with the established populations of the areas of settlement, and the program has been criticized for alienating tribal groups in the outer islands from their traditional lands, sedentarizing groups that have traditionally been shifting agriculturalists, and for destroying tropical rainforests (Hugo et. al., 1987). This example again demonstrates the importance of considering a number of variables—including implications for the environment and for security—when addressing the population movement problem. It is very difficult to formulate policies which will prevent migration but which will not impinge on the rights of individuals to move around freely and which will not produce negative effects as well as benefits. However, the problems resulting from presently uncon-

trolled population movements and the unbalanced concentration of people in urban centres demands that the issue be addressed.

The implementation of policies to deal with the increasing rural-urban migration problem is a complex and daunting challenge. National development plans of nearly all Southeast Asian nations must continue to seek, directly or indirectly, to assure that population and economic opportunities do not remain concentrated in one or two large cities, but that they also do not become too dispersed in towns and villages that can not support the social services, physical facilities, and production activities essential for economic growth (Rondinelli, 1991). As the Indonesian state policy notes, "urban development must be planned by giving attention to the harmonious relation of the city and its environment and between the city and its rural hinterlands as well as the harmony of city development itself" (Padmopranato, 1987 cited in Rondonelli, 1991). This assessment clearly demonstrates the difficulty of the task. And experience in Southeast Asia suggests that only when a wide variety of reinforcing economic, social, and physical policies are pursued simultaneously and along with appropriate regional policies over a long period of time do they have any impact on slowing growth of cities (Rondinelli, 1991). This fact suggests that not only will the process of reversing the present trend of uncontrolled rural to urban migration be difficult, but it will be time consuming as well.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

There is presently a global trend toward increasing numbers of people being forced to move from their homes. Known variously as "refugees", "displaced persons", "expellees", "asylum seekers", "economic migrants", "environmental refugees", and "the internally displaced", there are millions of people throughout the world obliged to leave their homeland (ICIHI, 1986). In order to comprehensively address the question of population displacement, it is useful to consider the problem in the context of other variables—particularly the problems of environmental degradation and international security. As demonstrated in this paper, the key concept relating to refugee movements—whether internal or international—is multicausality, and there are a variety of push and pull factors contributing to instances of population displacement in unique ways. In most cases, it is difficult to distinguish amongst impoverishment, environmental degradation and security as causal agents of population displacement, since many other factors are often involved, and it is impossible to isolate the relationships. Despite the cumulative causality, it does appear that these factors are related, and must be considered integral to any study of population displacement.

The purpose of this paper was to set the stage for a further discussion of the causes and effects of population displacement, particularly as it relates to environmental degradation and global security. The focus was on definition, examining the causes of population movements and assessing the general implications of such movement, rather than on providing detailed case studies. What is needed at this point is to examine these issues in more detail, both to better identify the linkages amongst environmental degradation, population displacement and global security as well as to facilitate the design of intervention strategies where needed.

Discussing the significance of population movements in terms of environmental degradation and global security, to date, has been speculative and the information provided has been largely anecdotal. At this point, two elements warrant further study. First, better definition of the linkages amongst these elements is needed. What role does environmental degradation and change play in population movements relative to other causes, such as economic incentives? What types of conflicts may result from population displacement, and is there a direct linkage between the type of population movement and the type of conflict?

There appears to be two approaches to designing a research proposal to clarify these issues. First, one could focus on the types of population movements (migration, refugee movements and forced resettlement programs) and identify the causes and outcomes of each. Second, one could concentrate on a set of outcomes (for example, implications for women and children; the demand for environmental services and health) across all types of population movements. These issues are vitally important to governments who are facing rapid urbanization, a flood of immigration requests, and resettlement of refugees. What is needed is a study that will empirically examine the causes and effects of population displacement, set in an appropriate theoretical framework. It is hoped that this background piece represents a first step towards that effort.

Tables

Table 1. Southeast Asian Rates of Urbanization

	URBANIZATION					
	Urban Population (% of total)			Urban Population Annual Growth Rate (%)		Population in Largest City (%)
	1960	1990	2000	1960-1990	1990-2000	1980
Brunei	...	...	...	...	...	...
Cambodia	10	12	15	1.8	4.3	...
Indonesia	15	31	40	4.7	4.4	23
Laos	8	19	259	5.1	5.9	48
Malaysia	25	43	51	4.5	3.9	27
Myanmar	19	25	28	3.0	3.5	23
Philippines	30	43	49	3.9	3.6	30
Singapore	100	100	100	1.7	1.0	100
Thailand	13	23	29	4.6	4.0	69
Viet Nam	15	22	27	3.6	4.3	21

Source: UNDP, 1991

Table 2. Southeast Asian Populations With Access to Services

	PROFILE OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (millions of people)			
	People Below Poverty Line	Without Access to Health Services	Without Access to Safe Water	Without Access to Sanitation
Brunei	...	...	...	...
Cambodia	...	3.8	...	...
Indonesia	69.5	36.9	99.3	113.1
Laos	...	1.4	...	3.7
Malaysia	3.8	...	8.8	13.4
Myanmar	12.5	27.9	29.0	29.6
Philippines	36.2	...	...	9.9
Singapore	...	0.0	...	...
Thailand	16.5	16.7	18.8	12.4
Viet Nam	...	13.0	36.2	...

Source: UNDP, 1991.

Table 3. Rural and Urban Populations With Access to Services

RURAL-URBAN GAPS IN ACCESS TO RESOURCES						
	Rural Population (% of total)	Rural Population With Access to Services (1985-1988) (%)			Urban Population With Access to Services (1985-1988) (%)		
		Health	Water	Sanitation	Health	Water	Sanitation
Brunei	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Cambodia	88	50	...	...	80	10	...
Indonesia	69	...	40	38	...	60	40
Laos	81	...	...	6	...	14	28
Malaysia	57	...	14	15	...	100	39
Myanmar	75	11	28	27	100	38	35
Philippines	57	...	...	85	...	49	85
Singapore	0	...	...	...	100	100	97
Thailand	77	...	66	76	...	67	84
Viet Nam	78	75	45	...	100	48	48

Source: UNDP, 1991.

Endnotes

1. Refugee movements on the African continent, for example, are numerous, such as the redistribution programs in Ethiopia as well as in Tanzania and Mozambique. For further details, see *Refuge*, 12;1. 33 - 36.

2. A more specific example of this structuralist perspective is presented by Hugo (1975, as cited in Hugo et. al., 1987), who maintains that contemporary population movements in Indonesia can only be fully understood with reference to the formative influence of colonialism on the political, economic and social systems of the nation. The fundamentally exploitative colonial system, designed to control the local population and facilitate the efficient extraction of raw materials from the country, shaped the pattern of migration in distinct ways which have yet to be altered. Investment is still concentrated in areas of resource extraction, and capital is diverted from areas of subsistence agriculture—where the bulk of the population lives. Also, the colonial system created centralized politics, with core regions. In Indonesia, the areas which have attracted the most investment and are most integrated into the world economy—including areas of resource development and urban centres—are now the dominant migration destinations, while regions dominated by food crop production are the leading areas of out-migration.

3. Global humanism generally promotes a stronger role for community groups, individuals, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations in order to decentralize political and economic power. Global humanism is a "system-changing" approach (Gurtov, 1991); politics in practice is emphasized in global humanism, and policies that undermine human security—such as militarism, racism, patriarchy, class inequities, and unaccountable bureaucracies—are the most common issues central to this type of critical research.

4. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established in 1951 and became the one international figure empowered to act on behalf of people in desperate situations when their status was challenged by states. As the humanitarian arm of the international community, the UNHCR mandate is to protect and grant aid and relief for refugees who have been forced to flee across borders to escape threats at home. The UNHCR, however, is not responsible for addressing the underlying causes of refugee movements (Simmance, 1987). The High Commissioner is elected by the General Assembly, and receives guidance from an executive committee on which 41 member states are represented. Currently, the organization has 80 offices worldwide, a staff of more than 1,800, and an annual budget of more than $300 million (ICIHI, 1986).

5. In Thailand, for example, in response to an overwhelming refugee burden the government has strictly applied the UN definition, attempting to reduce the entry of those people responding not to political push factors but to economic pull factors by screening refugees to "differentiate bona fide refugees from economic opportunists" (Nakavachara and Rogge, 1987).

6. Smyser (1987) summarizes the human rights outlined in the UN Covenants as: i) economic social and cultural, including the right to self-determination, political status, nondiscrimination, work, physical and mental health and safety, unionization, food,

education, cultural life, and an adequate standard of living; ii) civil and political rights, including freedom from torture and from cruel and unusual punishment, security of person, status in law, quick and fair justice, freedom of thought and belief, cultural independence, freedom of movement within and out of a state, and lawful decision; and iii) racial discrimination, and the elimination of segregation and apartheid practices and laws at all levels of society, and the prohibition of laws, practices and groups that promote racial hatred and prohibit the practice of the above rights.

7. Many black South Africans have been forced to resettle within that country, and it has been estimated that in 1981 about 3.6 million African refugees were internally displaced—approximately 28% of the estimated world refugee population (Gurtov, 1991). Similarly, it has been noted that the number of internally displaced people in Central America is much greater than that of refugees, and their needs are as important. There are some 150 000 internally displaced people in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua (Crisp, 1990a).

8. In fact, the UNHCR normally acts only if invited to do so by the host government concerned, and it does not provide material assistance directly to refugees but provides funds to government organizations and voluntary agencies working within the host nation (ICIHI, 1986).

9. Brauer (1987) maintains that cities offer job opportunities for millions of people through this "informal sector" of the self-employed petty traders, small restaurant owners, street-side craftsmen, or street vendors—offering an "almost limitless potential for survival". In Indonesia, for example, 4 million (of an estimated 9.5 million employed in urban areas) people are working the informal sector.

10. It is important to note, however, that females more often mentioned job-related reasons for the migration, and fewer women moved for education-related reasons. According to Zablan (1983, p. 125), "this would indicate that males have higher educational aspirations than females. This may be partly due to the tendency of rural parents to give priority to their male children as far as education is concerned".

11. There are two groups responding to the opportunities perceived to be present in the city: i) the children of the rural wealthy, who seek higher education and high paying, high status jobs in urban centres; and ii) those who are forced to move by a lack of any employment opportunities in the areas of origin (Hugo et. al., 1987). Thus, the Harris Todaro model applies to the first group mentioned above, but for the latter it is not higher wages, but simply the chance for any employment that is encouraging their migration; the choice is not between a current or a better job, but it is between a job or no job at all.

12. Those who are moving from rural Java to the cities are not the very poorest, however; these people do not have any surplus with which to experiment, and they are simply trying to produce enough to stay alive. Instead, the people who are migrating are those with a small surplus giving them some margin of choice—although these people are still poor by any absolute or relative standard.

13. For examples of these ethnic groups, see the studies of peoples' in Indonesia: the Achenes people (Seigel, 1969); several Batak groups (Bruner, 1972); the Banjarese people (Rambe, 1977); and the Bugis people (Lineten, 1975).

14. After the Vietnam War, a resettlement program was initiated to redistribute the population, aimed particularly at relieving some of the pressure from Saigon (now Ho Chi Min City). This policy has continued with varying levels of success. See Hugo (1987) for a detailed account of this program.

15. When the Khmer Rouge seized control in 1975, they immediately evacuated virtually the entire population of the swollen cities in a massive and brutal campaign, causing further "refugee movements" (Hugo, 1987).

16. For example, the UNHCR has been confronted by a growing number of refugees—over a one hundred percent increase in one decade alone—but its funding has not increased at nearly that rate. The High Commissioner stated in 1990 that "the enforced reduction of UNHCR resources is gradually leading to a diminution, and in some cases the elimination, of medium and longer term measures" (cited in Crisp, 1990a).

17. However, a large number of the people in Kangsanant's study (1983) were earning more than they had previous to their move. Similarly, Zablan (1983) found that migrants still consider their economic status in the city an improvement over the conditions in the area of origin.

18. Service sector employment includes jobs such as domestic service, small-scale selling, and becak (pedicab) driving.

19. In fact, the burden of poor housing and the related health problems is borne mainly by women and children—the most intensive users of housing (Shelter and Health, 1988).

20. But while most migrants in Zablan's study (1983) were aware of their poor living conditions, they largely preferred them over their areas of origin.

21. As Rondinelli (1991) further notes, this concept of "balanced" development is a relative one, and it remains quite ambiguous. Friedman (1981, cited in Rondinelli, 1991) expands upon this notion, claiming that the concept of balance used in most Southeast Asian countries implies a lessening or prevention of locational disparities in income and wealth, but what is meant is not "a rigid mathematical balance", but rather a sense of interrelation between rural and urban areas in which their obvious differences in levels of living and opportunity will become progressively less pronounced.

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