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ARMY SERVICE FORCES MANUAL

M 354-18B

CIVIL AFFAIRS HANDBOOK

# JAPAN

SECTION 18 B: JAPANESE

ADMINISTRATION OF

OCCUPIED AREAS-MALAYA

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HEADQUARTERS, ARMY SERVICE FORCES, 25 AUGUST 1944

CIVIL AFFAIRS HANDBOOK

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HEADQUARTERS, ARMY SERVICE FORCES, 25 AUGUST 1944

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- ii -

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M500 - M599 Fiscal  
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M800 - M899 Miscellaneous  
M900 - up Equipment, Materiel, Housing and Construction

\* \* \* \*

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[SPX 461 (21 Sep 45)]

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- iii -

This study on Japanese Administration of Occupied Areas - Malaya  
was prepared for the  
MILITARY GOVERNMENT DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL  
by the  
RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS BRANCH, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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- iv -

## INTRODUCTION

### Purposes of the Civil Affairs Handbooks

The basic objectives of civil affairs officers are (1) to assist the Commanding General by quickly establishing those orderly conditions which will contribute most effectively to the conduct of military operations (2) to reduce to a minimum the human suffering and the material damage resulting from disorder, and (3) to create the conditions which will make it possible for civilian agencies to function effectively.

The preparation of Civil Affairs Handbooks is a part of the effort to carry out these responsibilities as efficiently and humanely as possible. The Handbooks do not deal with plans or policies (which will depend upon changing and unpredictable developments). It should be clearly understood that they do not imply any given official program of action. They are rather ready reference source books containing the basic factual information needed for planning and policy making.

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- v -

CIVIL AFFAIRS HANDBOOKS  
TOPICAL OUTLINE

1. Geographical and Social Background
2. Government and Administration
3. Legal Affairs
4. Government Finance
5. Money and Banking
6. Natural Resources
7. Agriculture
8. Industry and Commerce
9. Labor
10. Public Works and Utilities
11. Transportation Systems
12. Communications
13. Public Health and Sanitation
14. Public Safety
15. Education
16. Public Welfare
17. Cultural Institutions
18. Japanese Administration of Occupied Areas

18B Malaya

One Civil Affairs Handbook on each of the above subjects is being issued. This study on Japanese Administration of Occupied Areas - Malaya was prepared for the MILITARY GOVERNMENT DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL by the RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS BRANCH, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
SUMMARY	vii
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. TERRITORIAL CHANGES	2
A. Addition of Sumatra	2
B. Loss of Northern States Thailand	3
III. POLITICAL STATUS - A COLONY	5
IV. MILITARY ADMINISTRATION	7
A. Native Participation in Government	8
B. Scope of the Military Administration's Activities	8
C. Organization of the Military Administration	9
1. Central Government	10
2. Provincial Government	13
D. Japanese Policies and Controls	16
1. Economic Policies and Controls	16
2. Social Policies and Controls	22
V. CHART	
Military Administration, opposite	9
VI. MAPS	
1. Malay States	viii
2. Southeast Asia	ix



RESTRICTED

- vii -

SUMMARY

The Japanese administration of Malaya parallels, to a large extent, the British administrative system it superseded. Where changes have occurred, the most significant have been in the higher levels, while the provincial and local governments remain much as they were before the war. Considerable Japanese military and civilian personnel staff the top administrative offices, and "trustworthy" natives have been selected to serve in the lower ranks.


The political unit known as Malaya has been altered by the Japanese by the addition of Sumatra, and by the exclusion of four northern Malay states (Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, and Trengganu which were ceded to Thailand) and some lesser members of the Straits Settlements distant from the Malay Peninsula.

At present the Japanese are governing Malaya as a colony and apparently intend to keep it as such. They ignored existing British Malayan treaties and replaced the Malay sultans by Japanese governors; each former sultan then becoming merely the chief of his Bureau of Religious Affairs — one of the fifteen bureaus in each of the states.

Confronted by a serious economic situation as a result of the war, the Japanese authorities have established controls regulating nearly every phase of Malayan native life. The chief aims of the Military Administration apparently are to achieve law and order, local self-sufficiency, and native cooperation in the defense of Malaya against an expected United Nations attack.


This report will discuss the Japanese administration of what was formerly British Malaya, excluding Sumatra, but will include the Thai administration of the four northern states ceded to that country.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Both the military and civil administration of Malaya were in a chaotic state when the British surrendered at Singapore, 15 February 1942. Lack of preparations prevented an orderly withdrawal and adequate provision for the local residents — European, Chinese, or Malayan. The result was an almost complete breakdown of administrative functions in those areas abandoned to the advancing Japanese troops.

The Japanese Army took over the administration of both civil and military government and staffed many of these offices with its own personnel. As a result, the early occupation of Malaya was marked by confusion and various excesses before a degree of law and order was re-established. Many of the local Malaya and Chinese had fled southward before the invading Japanese army. Their presence seriously over-taxed the facilities of the larger centers to the south; and since the Japanese lacked the necessary means to care for this influx of population, many of the refugees were dispersed to adjacent rural areas to work on agricultural projects. The former native Malayan government employees in lower ranks who had stayed behind were continued in their jobs while the Japanese adjusted themselves to the situation. Later many of these were replaced by either Japanese or Japanese-trained native officials.

The Japanese administration of Malaya follows the former British pattern rather closely, especially in minor details. The more significant changes are as follows: (1) The area administered as "Malaya" by the Japanese has been (a) increased by the addition of Sumatra,<sup>1</sup> and (b) modified by the omission of some units formerly included in the British Straits Settlements, and by the transfer of the four northern states (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, and Trengganu) to Thailand; (2) The new Malaya is treated in its entirety as a Japanese colony; (3) It is governed by a military rather than by a civil administration; and (4) Japanese political and economic interests have been favored at the expense of all others.

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1 This study will be concerned with the administration of former British Malaya only. Sumatra is omitted.

## II. TERRITORIAL CHANGES

The peninsular territory of British Malaya<sup>2</sup> which the Japanese took over early in 1942, consisted of three separate political units — the Straits Settlements Crown Colony (Singapore, Malacca, and Penang), the Federated Malay States (Perak, Pahang, Selanger, and Negri Sembilan), and the Unfederated Malay States (Johore, Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, and Trengganu). This Malayan administration area has been altered by the Japanese to include within its province Sumatra, and its adjacent islands; and, since 18 October 1943, the unit has excluded from its control the four northern Malay states of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, and Trengganu, which were ceded to Thailand. The Straits Settlements in Malaya no longer exists as a unit. Singapore has become the capital of the entire Malayan area with Penang and Malacca being regarded as subordinate provinces. The entire Riau-Linga archipelago, formerly a part of the Sumatra group, is also controlled by the mayor of Singapore.

### A. Addition of Sumatra.

In terms of size, population, and economic value to the Japanese, the addition of Sumatra with its adjacent archipelago outweighs the loss of the four northern Malay states. Sumatra's area is 182,859 square miles contrasted to only 14,710 square miles of these four states. According to the 1930 census, Sumatra had a population of approximately 8,500,000, while the northern Malay states had only 1,021,293 (1931 census). Sumatra is an exceedingly valuable productive area containing many important oil wells and refineries which are now probably supplying between 40 and 50 percent of Japan's desperately needed fuel oil. It is also, next to Malaya, the world's largest source of rubber. The northern Malay states, on the other hand, provided iron ore for Japan and rice for the rest of Malaya.

The similarity between the economy and population<sup>3</sup> of Malaya and Sumatra makes their joint administration a convenient arrangement. Furthermore, the union of these adjacent areas under one military authority greatly facilitates the defense of both.

The fact that Sumatra is a separate island, however, nullifies to a considerable extent the gain to peninsular Malaya of its added territory and population. There is probably no greater contact between their respective

- 
- 2 Labuan, in North Borneo, and the Cocos and Christmas Islands, south of Java, which were formerly parts of the British Straits Settlements are not now being administered by the Japanese with peninsular Malaya.
  - 3 It is widely held that the Malay race as such probably originated in Palembang and Menangkabau on Sumatra whence it spread over the Archipelago and to the Peninsula. Moreover, during their development by the British, Dutch and others, Malaya and Sumatra have been closely associated with one another and have been separated only since the eighteenth century.

populations now than there was when the two were separate British and Dutch territories; and there are few commodities that Sumatra and Malay can exchange to their mutual benefit. The acquisition of Sumatran oil does not compensate Malaya for the loss of the much needed rice produced in the ceded northern Malay states.

B. Loss of Northern States to Thailand

One of the most significant changes made in Malaya by the Japanese occupation is, as already indicated, the transfer of four northern states to Thailand. Although these states have been placed under Thai administration there nevertheless remains a decided degree of Japanese supervision, particularly of industries and transport facilities. It is therefore essential to include them in a discussion of the Japanese administration of Malaya.

A joint communique from Japan and Thailand 5 July 1943, stated that the four northern Malay states of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, and Trengganu (formerly British Protectorates) would be ceded to Thailand. A preparatory committee met several times in the latter half of July to discuss the general principles of the settlement, and a treaty was signed by Japan and Thailand on 20 August. The four states were formally transferred to Thailand on 18 October 1943 and the next day Thai forces marched across the border. Japanese liaison offices are now established in Alor Star, Kota Bharu, and Kuala Trengganu to handle matters relating to the property of Japanese nationals and the development of resources in these states. Three sonin-rank Japanese officials have been appointed to these posts. Treaties favorable to Japan have been concluded concerning railway, mail, cable, and telephone services. The Thai are to operate the east coast railroad in Kelantan but the Japanese will continue to operate the strategic west coast line in Perlis and Kedah.

On 14 September (before actual occupation) the Thai announced the administrative system for these four states. It was to consist of a Chief Administrator for all four states ( a Major-General), and for each of the states an individual administrator (three now are Army officers) who would be advised by the local army commander. An "Administrative Adviser" (an Army Captain) would also assist both the Chief Administrator in "general affairs" and the Chief of the Armed Police "in matters concerning the general policy."

In December 1943, however, the Thai authorities announced plans to turn over the administration of the newly acquired states to their respective sultans in direct variance from the Japanese practice in the rest of the peninsula. The Thai declared that "following the abolition of the Military Administration, a State Government will be established with the sultan at its head while the present [Thai] military administrators will remain as advisers." In addition, the Thai declared their intention to establish similar municipal governments in each of the large cities subsequent to

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- 4 -

the organization of the state governments. The suggested administration resembles that formerly employed by the British under whom the sultan, as sovereign of the state, was assisted in his duties by a British Adviser. Most of the actual governing was done by the Adviser, but the sultan was not without some authority and prestige, especially in the northern states which had a greater proportion of natives in responsible positions than had any of the other states except, perhaps, Johore. All this was changed, however, when the Japanese took over and has been restored only in those states under Thai control.

On the whole, the above transfer was carried out smoothly, but there are two basic situations which may cause trouble in the future: (1) Thai-Japanese disagreement over a financial settlement, and (2) some special social legislation affecting the Malays which was passed by the Thai just prior to the acquisition of these states.

First, the financial problem: Although the Thai tried several times to get permission from the Japanese to put in circulation at least a million baht a month in their newly acquired territory, the Japanese refused on the ground that it would upset the economy of the region. The Thai countered with the claim that the local economy was already upset by the enormous spending of the Japanese army and insisted that Thailand be allowed to issue its own currency for propaganda purposes if for no others. This request has probably met little success.

As a second basis of discord, on 18 August 1943, just two days before the treaty was signed between Thailand and Japan, the Thai Assembly approved two bills which have particular bearing on Malays. One stipulates that persons "between the ages of 20 and 45 unable to read and write the Thai language by the end of this year, will be subject to a surtax of not more than 5 baht." The other rescinds "the official recognition of polygamy of Thai and Mohammedans and bans the registration of polygamous marriages." Although Islam does not encourage polygamy, it specifically permits it on certain conditions. Hence this new regulation officially declares numbers of Malay children to be illegitimate and deprives them of their rightful inheritance under Muslim law. This fact is of especial significance because the four ceded northern states contain more Mohammedan Malays in proportion to the rest of the population than any of the other Malay states.<sup>4</sup> This entire area had been recognized as Thai territory before 1910, and was shown on official maps as an integral part of Thailand (then Siam). But in parts of the area Thai control remained very loose, since Thai claim to these states

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<sup>4</sup> The proportion of Malays to the total population of these states in 1940 was as follows: Kedah, 65 percent; Perlis, 79 percent; Kelantan, 87 percent; and Trengganu, 91 percent.

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rested on no firmer basis than the traditional payment of tribute to the Thai Crown. Even this claim was abandoned under a treaty with Britain in 1909 and was not revived in Thailand until an extreme nationalist minority started agitation after the 1933 Revolution. Until the construction of the Peninsula Railway in 1922, the Thai had seldom interfered with the Malays in Thailand. But after the Revolution of 1933, the Thai Government's policy toward them became actively "nationalistic" by attempting to suppress the Malay language, customs, and religion, and to reduce all the various elements in Thailand to a common Thai level. Malays were required to alter their traditional dress. The use of Malay names was forbidden. All official business had to be transacted in the Thai language. Transactions and accounts had to be recorded in Thai; and advertisements were heavily taxed if not in Thai. Only Buddhists in Thailand could hold official posts, whereas under the British Administration the local governments of Malaya were staffed largely by native Malays. All in all, then, the cession of the four northern Malay states to Buddhist Thailand is a violation of Muslim community feeling which will affect the Malays throughout the entire peninsula. Whether or not the Malay lesser officials in the four ceded states are retained or supplanted by Thai will be of considerable significance.

### III. POLITICAL STATUS - A COLONY

The Japanese at present are administering Malaya as a colony, and apparently intend to keep it in a colonial status. Late in 1942 Shigemasa Sunada, the Military Administration Advisor for Malaya-Sumatra, announced the intention of Japan to hold this area as a permanent colony and to promote a mass immigration of Japanese there. This attitude towards Malaya is in sharp contrast with Japan's expressed purpose with regard to the neighboring areas of Burma, Thailand, Indochina and the Philippines where "independent" governments have been recognized. The fact that the Japanese have in so arbitrary a fashion altered the territory included in the Malayan administration is evidence of their disregard for the wishes of both native rayat and rulers.

Further evidence that Malaya is regarded as a permanent Japanese colony is the fact that it has not been included within the scope of the Greater East Asia Ministry.<sup>5</sup> No representative from Malaya attended the meeting of this Ministry held in Tokyo in November 1943.

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5 The Greater East Asia (GEA) Ministry was created in November 1942 to head all organizations controlling Japanese occupied areas. Its headquarters are in Tokyo; its chief is Kazuo Aoki. The Ministry has been divided into five Bureaus, one of which is the "South Seas Bureau", The GEA Ministry maintains civilian representatives and civilian staffs in all areas not under a military administration. Often personnel of existing Japanese consulates act also as representatives of the GEA Ministry but there appear

(concluded on p 6)



Although the Japanese Military Administration is the highest local authority for farming political and economic policies, plans for the political control of Malaya, the exploitation and distribution of Malaya's raw materials, and the use of shipping are formulated as part of the larger Japanese plans for the southern regions in general. The Military Administration presumably integrates its policies with those of the Empire. Whether these over-all plans are formed by the GEA Ministry, the Foreign Office, or Army Headquarters in Japan, or by a combination of agencies is not clear. Neither is the channel of authority between the military Administration in Malaya and the deciding body in Japan known. It was stated by Tokyo, late in 1942, that although the Army was supreme in the administration of Malaya, it required the assistance of civilian agencies in Japan in choosing suitable technical personnel to emigrate to Malaya to work under the Military Administration. This statement suggests coordination of both personnel and policy in Japan.

The administration of all peninsular Malaya as one colony is a change from the three-fold pattern of pre-war British Malaya. Only the Straits Settlements (i.e. Singapore, Penang, Province Wellesley, Malacca, etc.) had colonial status in the British Empire. Great Britain's relations with the nine federated and unfederated Malay states were set forth in treaties concluded with their respective sultans. The states in theory retained their sovereignty and independence except in foreign relations and defense. In practice, however, British Advisors in the Unfederated States and British Residents in the Federated States took responsibility for all important details of government except matters dealing with Malay customs and religion.

There were, therefore, under the British, two governments; the hierarchy of Malays, and the actual controlling group of British officials. The Japanese, however, have abolished this dual form and established one supreme government headed by the Military Administration at Singapore. In so doing they have ignored the treaties with the sultans and reduced their prestige. Malay sultans in "Japanese" Malaya are now in actual practice only minor officials.

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5 (Cont'd from p 5) to be no representatives of the GEA Ministry in Malaya.

The functions of the GEA Ministry are: (1) to unify economic policies relating to capital, labor, transportation, trade, and the development of natural resources: (2) to protect and supervise Japanese interests and nationals.

The relation of the GEA Ministry to Army Headquarters in Japan or to the Military Administration in Malaya in the formulation of economic and political policy is not clear. Whichever organization formulates policies, they are applied even in areas under a military administration, as part of an Empire-wide plan.

RESTRICTED

- 7 -

From the beginning of the Military Administration Japanese were placed in positions of power in Malay's political and economic life. Japanese administrative personnel are now found in Malaya at the following levels: (1) Japanese Army officers in a few top positions and (2) Japanese civilians (including former residents of Malaya, <sup>6</sup> and imported technical experts or representatives of large Japanese companies) as heads of departments, mayors of large cities, and holders of all important staff positions. For this second group a rich source was the Malayan Association (made up of former residents of Malaya) which was formed in Japan soon after the conquest of the peninsula. About five hundred of its members were persuaded to return to Malaya, many of them to accept positions under the Military Administration. Through the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Bank of Taiwan, they received loans up to \$5,000 each.

According to a radio broadcast in September 1942, Suzuki, director of the Military Administration, stated that the policy of his administration would be to extend every possible aid to Japanese residents working in Malaya, Japanese authorities were determined, he said, that Japanese nationals should become the leaders in every phase of Malaya's economic life. They should engage in occupations worthy of them as leaders of the native inhabitants.

IV. MILITARY ADMINISTRATION

The Japanese are governing Malaya by a strict military administration with its headquarters in Singapore. This system is in contrast to the civil administration under the British, however, the continued use of native officials in inferior positions but in wide contact with the population conceals, to some extent, the real control of the military. State entities have been maintained throughout Malaya, but the State Federation of Perak, Pahang, Selangor, and Negri Sembilan is no longer recognized. All states appear to be coequal, governed similarly, and regarded as provinces. Penang and Malacca — once parts of the British colony of the Straits Settlements — have been given separate provincial status. Thus, "Japanese Malaya" by 12 March 1942 was divided into the seven provinces: Penang, Malacca, Johore, Perak, Pahang, Selangor, and Negri Sembilan, with the capital in Singapore Special Municipality.

In April 1942, the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Japanese.

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6 Before the war there were only 5,000 Japanese in all of Malaya, 4,000 of whom were on Singapore Island. Their principal economic interests were the mining and exporting of iron ore and bauxite, banking, fishing, and shop-keeping on a small scale. They held no political positions, not even of an advisory nature.

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- 8 -

War Office made clear the Army's point of view concerning its authority in occupied areas. He stated that no organization would be allowed to operate in the occupied regions except under the supervision of Army and Navy commanders. Hence, all economic and political activities, including those of the Japanese, were to be subordinate to the Military Administration. But in actual practice, the absolute military control of Malaya has already been modified by two factors: (1) the need to integrate Malaya into the general political and economic pattern of the Japanese empire; and (2) the lack of trained military personnel for government and the consequent need of assistance from civilian agencies in Japan for the selection of the technical personnel to emigrate to Malaya. A corollary of this second factor has been the use of native Malaysians in numerous minor posts, the employment of Japanese civilians in intermediate positions, and with professional military personnel for only top positions of the Military Administration.

A. Native participation in Government

The Malay sultans have been subordinated to the Japanese governors, and hence have lost their former prestige of being, at least nominally, heads of their own states. Under the Japanese the sultans retain authority only over matters concerning Malay customs and religion, serving the administration as chiefs of the Bureaus of Religious Affairs. Native participation in local government otherwise appears to remain much the same under the Japanese as it was under the British rule. However, the Military Administration is by degrees indoctrinating local officials in Japanese methods of administration. Following the establishment of a training school for native officials in May 1942, the Chief of the General Affairs Bureau stated in June 1943 that native Malaya would be allowed to participate in the government to the extent that they cooperated with the Military Administration. As far as is known, the Japanese impose no racial or class restrictions on participation.

B. Scope of the Military Administration's Activities

The principal purposes of the Japanese Military Administration, as expressed by a prominent army man early in 1942, are fourfold:


- (1) to secure resources, especially those necessary for the prosecution of the war;
- (2) to prevent the flow of resources into hostile zones;
- (3) to make the Japanese troops self-supporting through use of materials obtained locally;
- (4) to induce existing enterprises to cooperate with the Japanese.

A slightly different, though fundamentally similar, statement of policy was made in July 1943 at a Conference of the Japanese Governors of the Malay States by an official from the Military Administration at Singapore. He announced the following three aims of the Military Administration:


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MILITARY ADMINISTRATION

1. CENTRAL GOVERNMENT



2. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT



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Kedah (see page 15) appears to be the norm.

In order to present the Japanese Military Administration as clearly as available information allows, a brief discussion of the authority and function of the several governmental offices follows.

1. Central Government.

a. Director-General. The highest executive in the organization is the Director-General of the Military Administration, at present Major-General Goro Isoya, whose headquarters are in Singapore. He is responsible, presumably, only to the War Office in Tokyo and is assisted in the performance of his duties by officials called Advisers to the Military Administration, as well as by other staff officers not included in the army per se.

b. Central Council. A Central Council was formed in Singapore 7 August 1943 following a visit by Tojo to that city. This Council, composed of senior government officials and representatives of the various communities, is supposed to advise the administration. The members of the Council hold office for one year but may be reelected. The Overseas Chinese Association was asked to nominate three members. Just how these members are "elected" and who is allowed to take part in the "elections" is not known. On the whole, this Central Council seems to parallel the former British Executive Council for the Straits Settlements Colony which met at Singapore.

c. Administrative Bureaus. According to reports, the Military Administration of Malaya is now composed of at least fifteen different bureaus, as follows: General Affairs, Religious Affairs, Finance, Industry, Transport, Justice, Communications, Auditing, Police, Information, Broadcasting, Welfare, Food, Wartime Affairs, and Lumber. Each bureau is in turn composed of a varying number of subordinate sections. The executive head of each bureau is styled the chief, and is, with only one exception, a Japanese official. The exception noted is the Bureau of Religious Affairs whose chief is the sultan of the state, or a corresponding Malayan dignitary. There are branch offices of these bureaus in each state under the direction of the Japanese Governor of the state.

d. Courts. In May 1942 the Japanese reconstituted the courts of Malaya. Up to that time the administration of law and order presumably was effected in the main by military courts. An ordinance of the Military Administration dated 26 May 1942 declared the intention of the authorities to replace these by civil and criminal courts shortly thereafter. Accordingly, the Shonan Criminal court, which included the police courts and mortuary, was set up 27 May and a judge and two magistrates were appointed from among the natives of Singapore. Two days later the Shonan Peoples Court was set up and a Chinese judge was appointed. At the same time the Shonan Higher (Supreme) court was established and a Japanese judge and Public Prosecutor were appointed.

RESTRICTED

- 11 -

This court began regular sessions on 2 June. The Japanese authorities explained that cases could be transferred to this court from the military tribunal and that the records of the military courts could be employed there. The criminal section of the Supreme Court, however, was not constituted until August.

The Chief Justice of Selangor in a press statement December 1943 said that the various departments of the Ministry of Justice have maintained the closest relations, thereby ensuring the smooth working of the administration. With a view to standardizing the administration of law, he stated the judicial administration throughout Malaya has been reorganized. Each state now has a Higher Supreme Court, a Supreme Court, and Magistrates Courts all under one controlling body for the whole of Malaya, whereas formerly each state administered its law according to its own requirements. Moreover, the practice of holding courts in villages has been restored, and there is a Public Prosecutor for every state with his office in Singapore. An institute to train judicial officials has also been established in Singapore. It will train judges and prosecutors from among suitable Malayan candidates. There are said to be no complaints from the public against native judges or magistrates.

e. Police. The present civil police force is divided into two sections: Regular Police and the Jikeidan (Peace Preservation Corps). There is also a special Secret Police with members recruited from the Regular Police Force.

In the early months of the occupation the nucleus and framework of the pre-war Malayan regular police force were retained. A great number of the police officers were Sikha and other Punjabis imported from India, while the higher police officials were usually British though sometimes Malays. Of necessity, the Japanese utilized those members of the former British Police force who remained after the fall of Singapore. Later, a Special Secret Police Corps was formed, made up of young and healthy recruits from the former police force who would swear loyalty to the Japanese Emperor. They are the most dreaded of all and are notorious for their cruelty. This well-paid and well-treated Secret Police Corps, since it operates directly under the Japanese Army, has been given strict military training and informed that it must be prepared to go out and fight if the need should arise. A Malay Police Officers' Training School has been established in Singapore to train officer personnel and by February 1944 six classes, averaging over 300 recruits were graduated.

f. Peace Preservation Corps. As an adjunct to the state and military police forces of Malaya the Japanese have established Peace Preservation Corps with their companion Neighborhood Associations throughout the country. With the fall of Singapore and the consequent economic dislocation, kidnapping and thievery became widespread throughout the less settled parts of the country. As the problem of maintaining peace and order became acute everywhere existing measures were found to be inadequate. As a result, the Japanese instituted

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

- 12 -

the Peace Preservation Corps system, already well known in the occupied countries to the north. This system, as it has been applied in Malaya, appears to be patterned upon the Japanese "Tonari-gumi" system where a certain number of households are organized and made collectively responsible for any untoward happenings. The chief function of the Corps is to register all the families in its neighborhood and report on all strangers and suspicious events. It may, upon occasion, be dispatched to other areas in the vicinity to quell disorder. It is clear that the Peace Preservation Corps could become a rigid controller of details in the daily life of the Malaysians. The collaborating Neighborhood Association (Rimpohan) is that part of the organization which functions locally, providing personnel for patrols, extending aid to the poor, and generally implementing Japanese programs.

The Corps organization founded in Singapore September 1943 demonstrates the normal setup. It consists of 80,000 members divided into 55 sections, with a leader in each section. Each section is subdivided into 10 sub-sections comprising 10 neighborhood units, each of which consists of 30 households. As of 18 March 1944 corps organizations have been reported from Perak, Penang, Malacca, and Selangor and it is presumed that they exist throughout Malaya generally.<sup>8</sup>

g. Malay Defense Army and Corps. Malaya now has a native Defense Army. In response to the "request" of the inhabitants, so the Japanese say, they have granted the opportunity to "enlist" in this new Japanese-sponsored organization and assist in the defense of the country. The announcement of such an army is in accordance with Japanese policy elsewhere in Greater East Asia. Its formation comes as a logical development of the defense program which the Japanese have recently adopted. In a radio broadcast 8 December 1943 the Japanese declared their intention to found a native army for Malaya "in order to permit them (the natives) to cooperate in the defense of Malaya". In a second broadcast, 14 January 1944, the difference between the Defense Army and the Defense Corps was explained. The Corps is to consist of small units formed at various places to maintain peace and order and to perform local defense measures. The Army, on the other hand, is a regular force; all males between the ages of 16 and 30 are eligible to enlist; ranks will be similar to those in the Imperial Japanese Army; and well-educated candidates may become officers. Recruits will receive regular salaries, uniforms, barracks meals, and other daily necessities. The primary function of this army is said to be to prepare an adequate force for the defense of their native land in the event of an attack. A secondary function may be to inspire nationalism and corporate responsibility among the natives of Malaya.

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<sup>8</sup> In Kuala Lumpur there are 20,300 members divided into 33 sections (7 December 1943) Penang had 1,000 members; 26 July 1943

RESTRICTED

The Japanese claim that expected quotas of enlistments have been exceeded but non-Japanese reports indicate that the numbers are anything but impressive. One report states that the unit in Singapore is armed with captured British machine guns.

h. Heiho Auxiliary. In addition to the Defense Army and Corps, a local militia, the Heiho Auxiliary, has also been organized. It appears to be an auxiliary to the Japanese Army while the Malaya Volunteer Army is an integral unit. Recruits for the Auxiliary are mostly Malays drawn from all over the peninsula, though Chinese, Indians, and Eurasians are also accepted. They were assembled at a camp in the vicinity of Singapore and put through a vigorous program patterned after Japanese army training, with commands being given in the Japanese language. Here they are provided with free uniforms, board, and lodging plus \$25 per month. A few of the more promising recruits have been selected for officer training. The Japanese state that these men are being trained to "play an active role in the defense of their country." Japanese reports further claim that the Malay recruits "are happily and enthusiastically carrying out their duties side by side with their Nippon comrades" and that "a feeling of brotherhood seemed to prevail among all ranks."

## 2. Provincial Government.

Beneath this central organization of Director-General, Central Council, and various Administration Bureaus at the "capital" come the corresponding governmental bodies for each province with its governor as chief executive. Each province or state has a Japanese governor, who is responsible to the chief of the Military Administration in Singapore. The provinces seem also to have departmental divisions which correspond in general to the divisions of Military Administration headquarters. Whether the heads of provincial departments are subordinate only to the governor of their state or also to their parallel divisions at Singapore or to both, is not known.

a. Governors. Of the seven governors, all Japanese, the majority are high ranking Army officers. As chief executive of their respective states, they have replaced the sultans and rajas of the former Federated and Unfederated Malay States under the British. They appear to combine most of the duties of both the former British officials and native rulers. They preside over the meetings of the State Administrative Bureaus and also serve as chairmen of the State Regional Councils.

b. Regional Councils.<sup>9</sup> The institution of "Regional Councils" has been

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<sup>9</sup> Sometimes referred to as "Consultative Boards", "Advisory Councils", or "State Councils."



RESTRICTED

- 14 -

a recent development. In October 1943 it was announced that "advisory councils" composed entirely of natives were to be established in each state and city. Natives selected by the governor (for the state councils) or by the mayor (for the city councils) will be nominated as members, subject only to the approval of the Military Administration. The number of members will be determined by the governor or mayor, acting as chairman. In a state council the sultan will act as vice-chairman. With the exception of the governor or mayor, no Japanese will be allowed to be a member. Native participants of any race, class, or background may be selected. The requirements for candidacy are "unswerving faith in the ideals for which Nippon is fighting the present war. They (the candidates) will be men of high caliber who thoroughly realize the gravity of the present situation and cooperate wholeheartedly in prosecuting the war and establishing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere". The function of these Regional Councils is to acquaint the government with the desires of the people. Undoubtedly other functions are to organize those natives sympathetic to Japan, and to keep a check on public opinion and on possible subversive groups.

c. Administrative Bureaus (Provincial). These bodies are homologous to the Administrative Bureaus at Singapore of which they may only be branches, There is a similar group in each state presided over by the governor.

d. Mayors. The mayors are appointed by either the governor of the state or the Director-General to control the affairs of the several municipal areas. They are chairmen of the municipal Advisory Councils. Even though Singapore is the capital of the Japanese Military Administration its municipal affairs are supervised by a Japanese mayor who is responsible to the Director-General.

No specific information is available regarding the minor officials in charge of routine municipal or rural affairs. It has been reported that most of the minor officials, both European and Oriental together with their clerical staffs, have returned to their posts. However, it is very likely that qualified Japanese-trained natives have largely, if not entirely, replaced all former European officials. In May 1942, the Military Administration opened a training institute to prepare native officials to work under a Japanese administrative system. Since August 1942, more than 1200 educated Malaysians have been placed in official posts. Some 700 mechanical and civil engineers were doing reconstruction work for the Singapore Special Municipality.

e. Regional Council (local). The local Regional Councils are identical with those described above (see paragraph b). In this case the mayor nominates the members, convenes the Council, and presides at the meetings.

f. District Officers. The district officers are appointed either by the governor of the state or by the Director-General to handle the affairs of

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

- 15 -

the rural areas. This office appears to be a carry-over from the earlier British system of administration. There is little information on the existence of Sanitary Boards and other minor officials subordinate to the district officers but the vital service these organizations once performed makes it highly probable that similar bodies still function.

g. Administration of Kedah as Example. The only information available concerning the organization of a provincial (state) government is for the state of Kedah before its cession to Thailand. There follows a chart comparing the government of Kedah under British and Japanese administrations. Only those British offices for which there are apparent Japanese counterparts have been listed in order to contrast, as nearly as possible, analogous organizations. Even then, however, the data reveal a greater number of Japanese administrators than the British had in similar positions.

BRITISH

JAPANESE

Executive

Raja Muda (Malay Regent for Sultan)  
British Adviser

Governor (Japanese)

State Council

Executive Council  
President: The Regent (Malay)  
British Resident  
4 prominent Malays

Central Council  
Chairman: Governor (Japanese)  
2 Japanese officers  
3 Members of Malay Royal House  
2 other Malays

Religious Affairs

Chief: Regent (Malay)  
Secretary (Malay)

General Affairs

Supt. Education (British)

Chief (Japanese)  
Education Sec. (Japanese)  
Overseas Chinese Sec. (Japanese)  
3 others

Finance

State Treasurer (Malay)  
Financial Commissioner (British)

Accounting Section (Japanese)  
Planning Budget Sec. (Japanese)  
2 others

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

- 16 -

BRITISH

JAPANESE

Industry

Director of Lands (Malay)  
Chairman Sanitary Board (Malay)  
Supt. Monopolies and Customs (Malay)  
Supt. Mines (British)

Land Affairs Section (Japanese)  
Sanitary Affairs Sec. (Japanese)  
Industry, Commerce and Fishery  
Section (Japanese)  
Agricultural Affairs Section (Japanese)

Police

Commissioner of Police (British)

Police Affairs Section (Japanese)  
Special Secret Affairs Section  
(Japanese)  
Peace Maintenance Section (Japanese)

Communications

Marine Department (all Malay)

Land and Water Section (Japanese)  
Petrol Rationing Section (Japanese)  
2 others

D. Japanese Policies and Controls

Japanese policies and controls in Malaya have been particularly evident in the two spheres of life which are of greatest concern to the native population, economic and social. The two basic economic tasks confronting the Japanese in Malaya were and are: (1) to develop and export to Japan essential raw materials, and (2) to produce for and distribute within Malaya consumer goods and foodstuffs. The Sociologic program for Malaya under the Japanese administration is also two-fold: (1) to stimulate and exploit native collaboration in Japanese programs, and (2) to expedite the spread of Japanese propaganda and culture throughout the country.

1. Economic Policies and Controls

Both of the economic tasks set forth above have been seriously handicapped by war conditions. Pre-war Malaya had a surplus of raw materials but had to import almost all of her food and consumer goods. The present war cut off the principal markets for Malaya's raw materials, created a shipping shortage which drastically reduced essential imports, and caused prices to rise. At the same time, the operations of the large scale rubber and tin industries were curtailed, thus depriving many laborers of their jobs. The price of both rubber and tin fell below the bare margin of profit and thus impoverished many laborers in these industries. The Japanese have adopted various measures in

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

- 17 -

their effort to achieve self-sufficiency. The several Japanese policies and controls will be discussed below as they affect (a) Finance, (b) Business and Industry, (c) Trade and Transport, (d) Labor, and (e) Agriculture.

a. Finance.

i. Banking and Currency. There have been three distinct phases of Japanese control of banking in Malaya. Throughout these three periods, Japan has taken more in exports from Malaya and in goods supplied to Japanese forces in the area, than Malaya has received in imports from Japan or other Japanese-occupied areas. Part of Malaya's exports to Japan have consisted of iron ore from mines owned since pre-war times by Japanese, and could therefore be classed as investment returns as also could the profit on any new factories installed by the Japanese. Most of Malaya's exports and supplies to Japanese troops, however, have been paid for by new currency issued under military authority.

During the occupation of Malaya from March 1942 to July 1942, control was characterized by the liquidation of enemy banks, the freezing of all deposits, and the establishment of branches of leading Japanese banks in order to extend Japanese financial power. Currency was issued directly by the military authorities.

From July 1942 to March 1943, financial control was characterized by establishment and expansion of branches of the Southern Regions Development Bank and of the new People's Bank, which makes smaller loans.

From April 1943 to the present, financial control has been characterized by the issue of notes by the Southern Regions Development Bank to replace military scrip and by an effort to absorb surplus capital in order to reduce speculation and price inflation.

To curb the inflation which threatened Malaya as a result of too much cash in circulation and too few goods to purchase, the Japanese initiated several schemes. A series of lotteries were held with tickets sold throughout the country at one dollar each. Various inducements such as prizes and attractive interest rates were offered in order to encourage savings accounts. At the same time regulations for vital Commodities Control, Price Control, and Productive Goods Control have been issued as occasion demanded and have probably been adjusted to meet changing conditions. For most goods these regulations have been designed to lower prices in order to offset speculation and prevent inflation.

ii. Taxes. Practically no change has been made by the Japanese in the taxation system used by the British in Malaya except for the abolition of the customs duty which produced little revenue under the drastic reduction

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

- 18 -

in imports. Existing sources of revenue are being tapped to meet budgetary needs. These include receipts from government monopolies, business licenses, land leases from various states, death duties, etc.

b. Business and Industry. The Japanese have regulated business and industry in Malaya by a permit system, such as has been applied to most areas under their occupation. Permits from the Military Administration are necessary for a store, factory, or other business enterprise to reopen after Japanese occupation. Moreover, a permit has first to be secured in order to start operating any new enterprise, buy raw materials, transport goods, and export or import supplies. The officials empowered to issue or withhold permits have always been Japanese. It is probable that great injustices have been done by them in return for personal favors, a part of the profits, or even a share in ownership; and Japanese and Japanese-speaking persons have undoubtedly been favored in the granting of business permits.

As economic conditions became worse because of the cumulative effects of war — lack of shipping, shortages of consumer goods, and loss of normal export markets — inflation set in and strict controls of many phases of business life were instituted in addition to the permit system. Prices were fixed for some 800 types of goods, including such necessities as, clothing, drugs, tires, and tubes. Rationing and other restrictions on sales of most consumer goods (rice, sugar, salt, flour, matches, soap, etc.) were started. In August 1943 a survey was taken of current stocks of all necessary goods. Shops were requested to report within ten days all commodities in their possession.

In September 1943 the Japanese said that a transformation had occurred and that Malaya was actually operating on a planned economy. On 8 September the following broadcast was recorded:

Reaching a turning point, Malaya definitely has entered into a controlled economy, centering around a series of economic control regulations including the Key Industrial Goods Control Act which plays an important role as the balance wheel of other regulations....It is generally considered that shifting from a liberal economy to a planned economy will bolster greatly the economic reconstruction of Malaya

This Key Industrial Goods Act was imposed by the Military Administration to control the supply of raw materials and other potential war goods. The Administrator of the Act was given power to prohibit or control the transfer in any way of industrial materials, to fix prices, to regulate the use of goods, and to requisition or dispose of plants, equipment, land, buildings, or other property connected with War Industries.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

- 19 -

The Military Administration appointed a Committee for the Disposal of Enemy Assets (March 1942), to take the necessary steps in managing and disposing of all property which formerly belonged to British, American, and Dutch interests. Certain Japanese firms were designated to develop the main industries of Malaya. Other Japanese firms bought controlling interests in local companies. Companies under Japanese control were able to secure permits from the Military to buy raw materials and to export and import finished goods when non-Japanese firms were frequently refused permits to carry on business. Thus Japanese firms easily took over financial control, ownership of key mines and industries, and management of wholesale trade.

The South Manchuria Railroads research department sent thirty-seven members to Malaya to undertake a systematic investigation of that country and especially of the following problems: acquisition of national defense resources, industrialization, increase in production of foodstuffs, and the control of capital. The Mitsubishi, Teihoku, Osaka, and Taisho Marine and Fire Insurance Companies were designated by the Military Administration to start operations in November 1942. Mitsubishi was given exclusive control of Singapore's harbor facilities and shipyards. The Nippon Electric Generation and Transmission Company was given a monopoly of power plants and power development. The Yokohama Rubber Manufacturing Company was named to supervise the Singapore Rubber Works and the Singapore Rubber Association, made up of Japanese capitalists, was given direct management of the whole rubber industry.

The expansion of Japanese economic control was easy because most of the property and businesses taken over by Japanese firms had belonged to British, American, and Dutch interests, and were so-called "enemy property", which had to be disposed of. The Chinese, too, had investments in mines, plantations, trading companies, etc., which were not insignificant; Chinese investors have been the principal sufferers among the local inhabitants. Chinese suspected of loyalty to the Chungking Government were ruthlessly deprived of their properties and, in many cases, of their lives. Those with lucrative businesses on whom no suspicion of political disloyalty could be pinned, suffered gradual encroachments from Japanese interests. But the majority of the local inhabitants had been the producers, retail dealers, and suppliers, and they continued in these roles for the Japanese firms.

c. Trade and Transport. Both external and internal trade and transport in Malaya have come to a virtual standstill since the Japanese occupation. Even Japanese firms desirous of overseas trading with Malaya have been unable to secure adequate shipping space and proper permits from the military authorities. During the first year of occupation exports went only to Japan. During the last year, however, the Japanese claim that exports have gone as well to Java, Sumatra, and Burma. Malaya has made trade agreements to send petroleum and rubber to China in exchange for silk, textiles, and medicines; and to Thailand in exchange for rice and medicinal herbs, but there is no evidence that these arrangements have been carried out.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

- 20 -

The Japanese authorities have imposed further restrictions on trade and travel, not only between Malaya and adjacent countries, but also between the several Malay states. After the fall of Singapore, 15 February 1942, all travel was forbidden, and when limited travel was eventually permitted no person was allowed to take more than \$100 with him. The Japanese have consistently discouraged all civilian travel; and where it has been permitted special passes have been necessary, formerly granted by the military authorities but now by the police. Most of the space in the limited train service is reserved for Japanese military and civilian personnel. Moreover, train service has been curtailed and those trains still running make many more stops than formerly.

The Japanese control Malaya's trade by requiring permits for all types of transport and contracts. All harbors, docks, and dock facilities are under the supervision of the Japanese armed forces and no coastwise shipping can be effected without the consent of the military authorities. The same restrictions apply to shipping by rail.

d. Labor. The labor programs of the Japanese are the product of an anomalous situation in Malaya. Following the fall of Singapore, and as a natural result of the war, there was sudden and widespread unemployment in Malaya.

However, in spite of this, the Japanese found it necessary to form a Labor Service Corps throughout all Malaya 20 December 1943. From every 250 inhabitants between the ages of 15 and 45 of the various provinces, twenty are selected to serve in the Labor Corps. A leader is appointed for each unit of the Corps, under the direct control of the Auxiliary Police. All members are paid for their work and receive badges for identification. The Labor Service Corps in Penang numbers 23,000 strong and is made up of 460 groups consisting of fifty members each, under a section chief.

As a further step in their effort to round up sufficient labor the authorities of Shonan Special Municipality decided 1 January 1944 to register all the workers on Shonan island. They expected the workers to number about 150,000 in the various fields of industry, commerce, and agriculture. It was said that the purpose of the registration was to assure an appropriate distribution of workers.

Several reasons why these steps became necessary can be suggested. In the first place, it is quite likely that the natives of Malaya have not been anxious to work for the Japanese. This might be especially true of the professional and white collar workers who have apparently been unmoved by Japanese appeals. Furthermore, even if the average Chinese coolie in Malaya were willing to work for the Japanese in order

RESTRICTED

to get food, his efforts might not be very effectual. It is highly probable that the Japanese had many defense projects of an urgent nature to complete. Hence the obvious method of acquiring sufficient labor immediately was a labor draft. As a matter of fact the Japanese went even further and imported labor from Java in spite of the acute food shortage afflicting Malaya. On the whole, therefore, the majority of native labor available in Malaya appears so uncooperative or inefficient that the Japanese have resorted to extreme measures in order to provide an essential labor force to take care of their military necessities.

e. Agriculture. The chief emphasis in the Japanese agricultural program for Malaya has undoubtedly been to increase the production of food crops in order to establish self-sufficiency in foodstuffs. Japan, on taking over Malaya, was pressed for shipping facilities to maintain her widely dispersed outposts, yet Malaya, if it were to be fed adequately, must import nearly 70 percent of its rice and probably a higher percentage of its total food requirements. The only solution, and the one adopted by the Japanese, was to make the country as nearly self-supporting as possible. On taking stock, the Japanese found that their supplies were very low. They therefore placed immediate and severe restrictions on the use of the remaining rice and instituted a three year program to achieve self-sufficiency. This program comprised the following main points: (1) further development of existing rice lands, aided by the introduction of Japanese agricultural experts and techniques, (2) introduction of new paddy strains, and (3) opening up new lands and releasing restricted land to non-Malays.

Existing paddy land has been further developed, according to the Japanese, by the adoption of improved methods of planting and manuring so that a substantial increase in yield is obtained. Agricultural experts are said to have arrived to supervise local rice cultivation and teach Japanese methods in agriculture schools now established throughout the country. As a result of these practices, the Japanese claim to have raised the paddy yield of the Krian area of Perak by 50 percent. This figure is questioned by the British authorities who know the area. They believe that such an increase is unlikely despite the ingenuity of the Japanese and the industry of the cultivators, because the Krian area was already one of the most highly developed in Malaya before the war.

A significant Japanese innovation has been the introduction of a new strain of paddy from Taiwan. This Taiwan paddy matures in about half the time required by the average Malay paddy and thus it is possible to get two crops a year instead of one, as formerly. Taiwan paddy, however, has never been grown so far south before and the British agricultural experts feel that some difficulties will accompany an attempt to introduce it in the climate of Malaya.



The obvious step, however, was to open up new lands not previously used as paddy fields. The Japanese claim to have constructed upland paddy terraces; to have converted former rubber estates and farm lands into paddy fields by cutting down the trees and building irrigation systems; and even to have cleared wood lands for rice growing. Much labor was required to prepare and cultivate this new land and since Malays were apparently either uninterested or insufficient in numbers, the Japanese made arrangements to settle other people on the new plots. Much of the land thus developed had been restricted under British administration by Federal Enactments for Malays since immigrant non-Malays were acquiring more and more of the Malays' land. The Japanese have ignored this legislation and established in many of the states farming colonies for groups of Chinese, Indians, Arabs, Eurasians, and even Burmese. The majority of those participating in this new venture are Chinese who receive land allotments from the Japanese-sponsored Overseas Chinese Associations. Most of the colonies have been established in Johore, Negri Sembilan, Perak, Selangor, and the former Straits Settlements of Malacca and Province Wellesley. The Japanese promised to provide schools, churches, houses, and roads; to loan equipment and seed against payment after the harvest; and to supply buffaloes at nominal prices for cultivating.

The Japanese have used both tribes and coercion to encourage the industry of their farmer proteges. They offered a prize to the person raising the most rice per acre and making the most fertilizer through the fermentation of grasses. Two controls of a more serious nature are calculated to guarantee all-out effort by the farmers. One is the drafting of a Labor Service Corps (see page 20) to secure sufficient manpower. The other is the appointment of Japanese "soldier-farmers" to direct the efforts of the natives.

## 2. Social Policies and Controls.

Japanese control measures of a social kind have been designed chiefly to encourage cooperation from the native population and at the same time inculcate ideas concerning the superior culture of Japan. Japanese language, music, religion, and history have been stressed and Japan's heroic mission to "liberate" Asia from Anglo-American influence has been extolled. These programs have been carried out by (1) organizing native racial groups, (2) reorienting Malaya's educational system, (3) indoctrinating the natives with Shintoism, (4) employing all possible media for the dissemination of propaganda.

a. Japanese Organized Groups. The various associations and organizations discussed below indicate attempts on the part of the Japanese administration to keep native groups in line. There is ample evidence to prove that almost all of these groups are hostile in varying degrees,

to Japanese domination. The longer Japanese autocratic control continues the greater this hostility will become. Therefore, the Japanese have segregated the different groups and apparently hope by keeping close check on their activities and by extending severe regimentation to avoid any trouble which might arise if the native peoples were allowed to organize themselves.

The Indian Independence League (founded in 1942) with its Army has been fostered by the Japanese as a means of organizing the Indians of Greater East Asia. In Malaya the League was the agency for recruiting the Indian Independence Army and the channel through which Japanese economic and social programs were directed to the resident Indians. For example, it took charge of settling Indian farmers in the newly developed agricultural colonies, raising funds for the war effort, and establishing Indian schools. The headquarters of the Indian Independence League which were formerly in Singapore were moved to Burma in January 1944 as a step in the avowed campaign to "liberate" India.

The Overseas Chinese Associations were organized before the war to keep emigrant Chinese in touch with things at home. The Japanese assumed control, however, and are using them to coordinate the activities of Chinese collaborationists and to integrate Chinese into the Japanese war program. Their organizations also serve as clearing agencies for the establishment of Chinese agricultural colonies and for the collection of funds for the war. In several instances the Associations have been directed by the Japanese authorities to nominate members for the so-called "advisory" councils or to provide personnel for the Neighborhood Association patrols.

A Malay Welfare Association was formed last December with the avowed aim of looking out for the interests of all Malaya in Singapore. It was stated that all Malays residing in Shonan would automatically become members. About a month later it was announced that a "Badan Penerangan" or Enlightenment Section was formed to serve "as a medium through which advice and guidance on the most effective methods of cooperation with the authorities will be given." Prior to the Japanese invasion there existed a party made up entirely of Malays called the "Kasatuan Malayu Muda" (Malayan Young Men's League). Its sympathies were thoroughly pro-Japanese and during the invasion many of its members served the Japanese forces as spies and guides. The leader of this party is believed to be Haji Yacob, an ex-teacher of the Sultan Idris College, Tanjong Malim.

A similar Arab Welfare Association was formed January 1944 as a "non-political" organization. Again it was stated that "all the members of the community will automatically become members of the Association which will .... cooperate with the Japanese in the prosecution of the war."

RESTRICTED

- 24 -

The Malaya Southern Development National Service Association was established by the Japanese in December 1942. This association includes all Japanese residents of Malaya and Sumatra with the exception of soldiers and military employees. The aim of the association is said to lie "in the promotion of further friendship among the Japanese residents." A Young People's Department was inaugurated at the end of June 1943 to train leaders from among the younger Japanese. Both divisions serve as means for directing the efforts of the Japanese living in Malaya towards the prosecution of the war.

There are other special racial groups such as the Eurasians, Filipinos, Burmese, and even Annamese who, although they do not occur in great number and therefore are not dignified by their own associations, are nevertheless kept in close check by the Japanese through their respective community leaders. In all cases they too are segregated and treated as separate units by the Japanese military authorities.

b. Educational Policy. Immediately following the Japanese invasion, all Malayan schools were closed and most of the buildings were used as barracks for Japanese soldiers. Gradually the vernacular schools, but not the English ones, were opened, beginning with the primary schools. The teachers received special instruction in the Japanese languages, and it was reported that in the summer of 1943 many teachers were still being instructed during their vacations. Those who became proficient in the allotted time were retained and those who failed were probably replaced by specially trained substitutes. It is estimated that about half of the school period, especially for the first year or two, is confined to the study of Japanese. In addition, special Japanese language schools were founded for adults, and attendance became essential for many persons because of regulations restricting the use of non-Japanese languages for postal, telephone, telegraph, and other purposes. It was decided in July 1942, for example, that all letters should be written and addressed in Japanese, and that telephone, telegraph, and cable messages must be in Japanese. It was expected that by 1943 only Japanese newspapers would be published. These latter plans have not been successful, however, but the general educational program seems to making headway.

Courses in Japanese are apparently obligatory in technical, medical, marine and normal schools, except for students who can pass a language examination. Particularly promising students from Malaya are sent to Japan for further training and in most cases return home to work in the educational program.

To stimulate further language study, "Japanese Language Weeks" have been proclaimed in various cities. These occasions are characterized

RESTRICTED

by contests in essay writing, public speaking, and debating, for which prizes are awarded. Another method of Japanese indoctrination is to flood the libraries with books on Japan and its language and culture.

On 6 January 1944 the Japanese took another step in their program of direct propaganda for the youth of Asia. They announced that following the New Year's vacation, free education would be provided for the school children of Singapore. No fees would be charged for either instruction or textbooks. Such free education, they pointed out, was consistently denied by the British, though much sought after by the natives of Malaya. It was claimed that 20,000 pupils would benefit by this step. This number is not impressive, however, when compared to the British pre-war figures. In 1937 there were 93,145 pupils enrolled in the Straits Settlements schools with more than half of these in Singapore. There were probably many more just prior to the invasion in 1941, and considerably more than the Japanese claim at present.

Japanese "free education" is not new to Malaya. The Perak Government decided on 1 June 1943 that fees for Chinese, Malay, Tamil, and Japanese language schools should be abolished. In July of the same year free education was introduced to Selangor for the 17,500 pupils there. Moreover there were already fourteen Japanese language schools in Johore in June 1943 where 2,500 pupils received free instruction.

The chief motive of the Japanese educational program appears to be to eradicate all traces of Anglo-Saxon language and culture. At the start the Japanese tried to spread their own language to the exclusion of all others but when this was recognized as impracticable the native languages were included within the scope of their program. The Japanese have found, however, that they could not overcome the English language as a common medium of communication in Malaya.

c. Religious Policy. There has been a decided change since the early days of the occupation in the Japanese attitude towards the religious beliefs of the inhabitants of Malaya. At first the Japanese soldiers committed many acts of sacrilege and persecution against the local religions, especially Islam. It is said that many Malays were forced to eat pork and that pigs were butchered in some of the mosques. The violent outbursts which must inevitably have followed such actions probably caused the occupying forces to reserve their policy completely.

RESTRICTED

- 26 -

However, they appear to have made extravagant promises which they could not-fulfill; it is possible that their promises were made for their propaganda effect alone. An outstanding example of this was the Japanese false promise of shipping space in the Spring of 1943 for loyal Muslims for their annual Haj.

The Japanese insist that they have followed a policy of complete religious tolerance. For the purpose of substantiating this claim sundry Muslim and Christian leaders have been quoted by the Japanese radio as being completely satisfied with the beneficent treatment they are receiving at the hands of their Japanese friends. Furthermore much attention is paid by the Japanese radio to the various Muslim and Christian religious festivals, and the Japanese authorities frequently claim not only to grant holidays to the worshipers but, in some cases at least, to participate in the celebrations themselves. This apparent "tolerance" has been unmasked, however, and now appears for what it really is -- a type of infiltration. One Hisao Tanabe in a talk entitled "The Music of the GEA Sphere" explained to his compatriots that Japan's present plan was to take over the people of the GEA Sphere by "patent guile" and propaganda rather than by direct force; but to take over nevertheless. With regard to religion he said, "Toady wherever the august virtue of our Imperial Majesty the Emperor shines there are kunitsu-kami (national gods). I humbly interpret that these kunitsu-kami are all to return to the bosom of our amatsu-kami (heaven gods) who, in Japanese belief, are Japanese and have their abode with the sun-goddess Amaterasu-omikami in Japan. With this attitude we can happily, from the bottom of our hearts, participate in the festivals for the gods in the regions to which we go. You who are on the spot, I desire, will participate in these ceremonies with a solemn attitude." The motive behind this program is quite plain. Japanese citizens are urged to realize that, no matter what the local worshippers may think, all the various gods in foreign religious systems are actually subordinate to the Japanese Shinto deities and will in time be incorporated within the Japanese national religious system. Japanese who take part in foreign worship, therefore, in spite of appearing to acknowledge the tenets of that faith are actually performing Shinto ritual. This apparently innocent hypocrisy probably conceals a plan to reduce all religions in the GEA Sphere to a common national Shinto level. Evidence of this tendency is quite clear in the Japanese attempt to Nipponize Christianity and send "Christian" ministers of this stamp to the Philippines.

The gradual infiltration of Shintoism into Malaya is witnessed by the fact that more and more Shinto shrines are being built throughout the country. Some, as for example the shrine at Bukit Timah, are ostensibly in memory of the Japanese war dead. There is such a close tie, however,

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

- 27 -

between honoring heroic dead and worshipping ancestors — a phase of Shintoism — that even this ceremony can be construed as part of the religious infiltration scheme.

d. Propaganda. In order to implement their propaganda line in Malaya the Japanese have remodeled the educational system and have also employed the press and radio. Ownership of radio sets is permitted but listening to foreign stations is forbidden. In an attempt to increase the circulation of their own propaganda, however, the Japanese offered to "repair" all radio sets turned in to the Shonan Broadcasting Company and give them back to the owners provided that the owners promised to place them where they could render the maximum service. Where necessary, the Japanese offered to install loud speakers so that more people could here the broadcasts. It is likely that sets thus turned in were adjusted so that they could pick up on the local Japanese stations.

The Japanese press has spread itself all over Malaya in an attempt to spread the GEA "Co-prosperity" message. Malaya's leading newspaper, the Shonan Shimbun, was launched 3 March 1942 in an English as well as a Japanese edition. With the publication of the Perak Shimbun 1 January and the Malai Shimbun 1 March 1944 the Shonan Press Association has completed its chain of fifteen journals throughout Malaya. The policy of the Japanese administration, however, is to publish the Army newspapers in the morning and the English papers in the evening using the same news. The motive obviously is to encourage the study of Japanese among those who want to get the news sooner. Not many Japanese home newspapers reach Malaya but there are many books, magazines, and pamphlets each extolling some outstanding characteristic of Japanese culture and the Japanese people. These are either sold very cheaply or distributed gratis. Moving pictures are also widely used to spread Japanese propaganda.

Japan's chief propaganda line during the past year to the natives of Malaya has been that she cannot lose the war... "all the most essential war materials have fallen into the hands of Japan. We have everything necessary for the successful prosecution of the war.... We have... 90 percent of the world's output of tin, plenty of rubber and oil. America lacks mica, nickel, rubber, tungsten, tin... the Allies... have not got enough quinine.... America is beginning to feel the pinch as her manpower is not sufficient.... Japan has all the necessary war materials to continue the war indefinitely." To this is added "...the countries under Japan are united against the Allies: they are at one with Japan in the struggle against the Anglo-American combination.... They are all ready to meet the enemy for the sake of freedom." However, from all reports, the exact opposite is true and these persistent efforts on the part of the Japanese witness an attempt to counteract native optimism that the Japanese will soon be driven out of Malaya.

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