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
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THE FORBIDDEN CITY, FROM COAL HILL.

# America

IN THE

## China Relief Expedition

BY

BRIG.-GEN. A. S. DAGGETT,  
U. S. Army, Retired.

---

*An account of the brilliant part taken by United States  
troops in that memorable campaign in the summer  
of 1900, for the relief of the beleaguered  
Legations in Peking, China.*

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WITH ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS.

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## PREFACE.

Since my arrival in America from China and the Philippines, on February 3, 1901, I have been requested many times to tell the story of the China Relief Expedition to audiences varying in numbers from fifty to four thousand. In most instances, friends and strangers have urged me to put into more elaborate and permanent form the material which almost unequalled opportunities had given me. Acting on these suggestions, the following pages have been penned.

So much has been written on this expedition that it would seem that the subject had been exhausted; but most writers have attempted to cover the whole field of operations, and have left out, necessarily perhaps, much that the Americans did which ought to be preserved. And as the campaign for the relief of the beleaguered Legations in Peking in August, 1900, was in many respects unique, and will so live in history, there seems to be room for a book which shall put in convenient and concise form a more detailed account of America's share in that expedition than has hitherto appeared.

I, therefore, have attempted to collect, as far as possible, the facts of the movements and accomplishments of the United States troops, referring to foreign contingents only as has been necessary to make the narrative intelligible.

It would be manifestly improper, as well as contrary to army regulations, to praise or censure officers; I have confined myself, therefore, to a statement of facts, and all the facts, so far as I have been able to obtain them. Many things must have occurred which came not to my personal notice, nor by way of information, and which, unfortunately, may never be recorded.

In writing these pages, I have drawn from my own personal experience and observation as far as they would serve me, and

from official reports and documents. I am indebted to the War Department for the maps and many of the illustrations used, and to the Navy Department for valuable information pertaining to that branch of the service.

I am also under obligations to the Surgeon-General and Chief Signal Officer of the Army and the Commandant of the Marine Corps for reports giving information concerning the labors done in their respective lines of work.

I have abstained from reading books and general literature on the Relief Expedition to avoid being misled by the crude and inaccurate accounts of which I have heard so much. I have departed from this rule, however, in one instance, and have read and received much information from General J. H. Wilson's "Travels in the Middle Kingdom."

While in Peking, I had many conversations with missionaries, and especially with Doctors Martin and Reid, from whom I obtained information that could not have been drawn from any other source. I am also indebted to officers of the Ninth and Fourteenth Infantry for many details which came under their personal observation.

BOSTON, *April*, 1903.

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
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OUTER GATE OF THE TARTAR CITY, FROM INSIDE.





# China Relief Expedition.

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## INTRODUCTION.

The China Relief Expedition, which rescued the beleaguered legations in Peking during the month of August, 1900, was necessitated by the Boxer uprising. Whenever that memorable campaign is mentioned, the question is asked: "Who and what were the Boxers?" A brief but, it is hoped, intelligible answer will be attempted in the following pages.

The materials which will be used were obtained largely from Doctors Martin and Reid and General Wilson's book, referred to in the Preface.

About two hundred years ago there sprang up in the Great Plains district a society called the "I-Ho-Tuan," or "Sacred Harmony Fist." Its purpose was said to be social, patriotic, and for the improvement of the wretched condition of the people in that flood-devastated country. The Hwang-Ho, or Yellow River, "China's Sorrow," takes its rise in the mountains of Tibet, runs eastward several hundreds of miles, makes a great bend, passing under the Great Wall on its way northward and again on its return southward, then easterly and northeasterly until it empties into the Gulf of Pechili. Its course through some sections of the Great Plains is liable to variation. About fifty years ago it emptied into the Yellow Sea more than three hundred miles by land south of its present mouth.

The Yang-tse-Kiang rises in the mountains of Tibet, less than one hundred miles from the source of its neighbor, the Hwang-Ho, and after running in a southeasterly direction some hundreds of miles, flows in a northeasterly direction and empties into the Tung Hai, or Eastern Sea, near Shanghai. It will be

seen that these rivers sweep through a large portion of the Middle Kingdom, the most populous part of China.

The surface of this country is as smooth as a floor, and when, in times of flood, the rivers break through their natural or artificial banks, the country becomes almost an inland sea. There being no high ground on which to take refuge, nor other means of escape, except in a few boats, the people are drowned by the hundreds of thousands. Nothing is left but a scene of devastation.

In other seasons drought sweeps away multitudes by starvation, and the dishonest tax collector afflicts his people. The Germans had taken possession of Kiao-chao Bay, and their soldiers, cruelly, had killed several natives. The conduct of many foreigners is grasping and overbearing. Poverty and distress prevail over large sections of the country, and ignorance and superstition everywhere. Under these circumstances, is it strange that the people should look for the cause of their troubles? Have all these afflictions come upon them because they have allowed the missionaries, merchants, engineers, soldiers, all foreigners, to occupy their soil? Superstition answers, yes. The society of the I-Ho-Tuan, or Boxers, is at hand. It is an old and extensive organization, and, although not previously entertaining hostile sentiments against foreigners, it discusses the question of their presence, and concludes that they are the cause of the floods, droughts, and all these sore afflictions. The natives were led to believe that the noble work of the missionaries in gathering up orphans and placing them in hospitals and asylums was for the purpose of killing them and using their hearts and eyes "in the concoctions of potions and medicines." The foreigner must be exterminated.

Tung-Fuh-Siang, who had commanded an expedition against rebels in the Province of Kansu, came to the front as a leader of the Boxers. The society grew rapidly, and extended over all the Great Plains. They were armed with "pikes, swords, matchlocks, gingals, bows, arrows, magazine cross-bows, shields, armor, and every sort of gymnastic or military equipment." They

were drilled industriously, and reached a fair state of discipline, according to Chinese standards. They had been led to believe that their bodies were bullet-proof. The tide of hatred against foreigners became so strong that it engulfed the Imperial Army. Tung-Fuh-Siang boasted to the Empress Dowager that he could sweep all foreigners into the sea. He took possession of the native city of Tientsin, June 30, 1900. On the 17th the Taku forts were bombarded by the ships of the Allies, except the American, and evacuated by the Chinese. Admiral Seymour's relief column had failed and was on its return to Tientsin, greatly annoyed by the Boxers, who attacked him from every village and wall.

About this time the Empress Dowager yielded to the Boxer movement. Whether willingly, or because she could not depend on the Imperial Army to defend her and the Legations, may never be known to the world. From this time on the Boxers did not act as a separate organization in Peking. Whatever portion of them participated in the attacks on the Legations was absorbed in the Imperial Army. There is reason to believe, however, that most of them dispersed to the villages, where they were found later in the season by what were called "punitive expeditions," in which some foreign armies seemed to take such delight.

So far as can be ascertained, no Boxers joined the Imperial Army in its efforts to resist the allied forces on the campaign from Tientsin to Peking. No prisoners were taken nor dead bodies of soldiers found that were not clothed in the uniform of that army.

In brief, floods and drought and tax-collectors had brought untold sorrows upon these people. A very few foreigners had afflicted them. Superstition led them to believe that the foreigners were the cause of all their troubles. The Boxers were an old organization, possessing some military knowledge and discipline. Tung-Fuh-Siang led them to believe that they could sweep all foreigners into the sea. He attempted to do it. This was the Boxer movement.



## CHAPTER I.

Early in the year 1900 mutterings of the Boxer uprising reached the foreign ministers residing in Peking. Most of the information came from missionaries of all the nations represented there, and coming, as it did, from so wide a section of the Empire and from so many different sources, it was not deemed prudent to ignore it. The ministers, therefore, called upon their home Governments for troops to protect the Legations. In response to this call, the United States, Austria, England, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia ordered war-vessels to Che-fu and Taku.

On May 29, under orders from Rear-Admiral Louis Kempff,\* United States Navy, Senior Squadron, commander of United States Naval Force, Asiatic Station, Captain B. H. McCalla, U. S. N., landed at Taku with 6? blue jackets and 1 officer, Captain Newt. Hall, and 24 enlisted men of the Marine Corps, Captain John T. Meyers and 28 enlisted men of the Marine Corps joined Captain McCalla's command at Tong-ku. The officials of the railroad were unwilling to transport armed men to Tientsin without first referring the request to higher authority. The command, therefore, was sent up the Pei-Ho River in boats. Captain McCalla, accompanied by Paymaster H. E. Jewett, U. S. N., proceeded by rail and arrived at Tientsin about 6:30 P. M., where he prepared comfortable quarters for his men in the American Mission and Temperance Hall. The command arrived about 10:30 P. M., and were the first to arrive in Tientsin for the protection of foreign settlements, except 25 British marines, which had been stationed here for several months. They were welcomed by the foreign inhabitants and escorted to their quarters by a band.

---

\*After the names of Army and Navy officers have been given once in full, with the designation of their corps, their initials and corps will not be repeated, but will appear with their titles and surnames only.

Ensign D. W. Wartzbaugh, Assistant Surgeon T. M. Lippit, Naval Cadets J. K. Taussig and C. E. Courtney, Gunner C. H. Sheldon, and Acting Warrant Machinist W. F. Mullinix belonged to this command.

Captain McCalla obtained permission of the Chinese Government to send guards by rail to Peking. May 31st he proceeded, with Captains Meyers and Hall and their commands of marines and 5 sailors, to Peking, where he arrived on the same day without molestation. They were accompanied by 75 each of British, French, and Russian marines, and 45 Italian and Japanese seamen. But their march from the station, a mile and a half from the south wall of the Chinese City, to the Legations was through a horde of silent, sullen Chinamen, who lined the street, and who, if they had had the courage and skill, could have annihilated this small band of marines and sailors.

June 1st being a Chinese festal day, Captain McCalla remained in Peking to be ready to meet any emergency that might arise. As the day passed without any untoward event, he returned to Tientsin on the 2d.

A list of those he left in Peking will be found in Appendix I. They constituted the Legation guard during the following siege.

Events followed in rapid succession. General Wilson says: "The excitement was now rising throughout the Province of Chihli, especially in the vicinity of Tientsin and Peking and the intervening country. The chancellor of the Japanese Legation was murdered by Tung-Fuh-Siang's ruffians outside the walls of Peking; incendiary fires were burning nightly in all directions from the Legations; the house of every Chinamen suspected of having business relations with foreigners was fired, and one whole district of thirty or forty acres, densely covered with Chinese houses, just outside of the south wall and to the west of the main street previously mentioned, was totally burned over. The Hanlin Collège, with its almost priceless library, was totally destroyed. Sir Robert Hart's compound, with the valuable records of the Chinese customs, was wrecked. Nothing except

solid, impassable walls stopped the work of destruction: everything foreign and everything smirched with foreign influence was wrecked, destroyed, annihilated. Railroad communications with the outside world and the fleet were suspended on the 12th, and the next day the Boxers entered and took possession of the native city of Tientsin."

June 4th a skirmish occurred between Belgians and Chinese, in which several of the former were killed. Cossacks were sent to their relief, killing many Chinamen. Railroad stations, twenty or more miles from Peking, were burned. The Cossacks engaged Boxers eighteen miles from Tientsin, killing 16 of them, and losing 1 officer and 3 men wounded.

On the 5th reports were received of the burning and looting of railroad stations and the killing of missionaries and native Christians and even imperial troops who did not join the lawless Boxers. Minister Conger telegraphed the Admiral that the situation at Peking was becoming very serious, and that he wanted more ships at Taku. He was advised by Captain McCalla to wire directly to Washington for them, as no response could be obtained from Manila. And so the work of looting, burning villages, murder, and destruction went on day after day throughout the Province of Chihli and adjoining provinces, and to some extent in more remote provinces.

In the meantime, ships of the allied Powers were arriving and sending marines and seamen to Tientsin. An expedition of about 2,500 men, as nearly as can be ascertained, was organized for the relief of the Legations at Peking. Admiral Seymour, of the British Navy, was in command; Captain McCalla was second in command. The expedition started from Tientsin on the 10th of June and moved as rapidly as possible, rebuilding the railroads as they advanced. They reached Lang-fang, within about twenty miles of Peking, with but little resistance. Their rations being nearly exhausted, it was decided to return to Tientsin. The return march met with considerable resistance. The column followed the route of the Pei-Ho River. The Boxers were encouraged by this retrograde



movement, and put forth every exertion to exterminate their foe. They blocked the railroad, cutting off all assistance by that route. They attacked in large numbers from every embankment, wall, and village, inflicting considerable loss on the retreating force.

Had an officer of experience and ability been in command of the Chinese forces, the expedition would have ended before it reached Tientsin. The expeditionary force continued its difficult march, being annoyed at every step by the surrounding Boxers, until the 22d, when they reached the Siku Arsenal, within six miles of Tientsin. They gallantly assaulted and captured this arsenal, where they found arms and ammunition and many stores, which they destroyed. They also found shelter, where they could rest after so many days of hard marching and fighting.

In their anxiety for Admiral Seymour's column, the authorities at Tientsin sent out a detachment of the first regiment of marines to meet this expedition at the arsenal.

On the 26th the relief force returned to Tientsin, and the first relief expedition came to an end.

It is to be regretted that data cannot be obtained on which to base a full account of America's share in this expedition, in which Captain McCalla with his contingent took so prominent and gallant a part. I hope the Captain will not be offended at the relation of a personal incident, which is well authenticated.

One day a Boxer approached the Captain with a white rag in one hand and a spear in the other. On arriving within a few feet of the Captain, he thrust his spear at him, narrowly missing him. Before a second effort could be made, the Captain drew his revolver and shot his assailant.

During the period of these disturbances in China, the following U. S. war-ships arrived in the Bay of Pechili:

The *Monocacy* arrived in May;

The *Oregon* arrived in May;

The *Nashville* arrived in June;

The *Newark* arrived in June;

The *Brooklyn* arrived in July.

The *Monocacy*, Captain Wise commanding, was stationed at the wharf at Tong-ku, where the Captain rendered great assistance in forwarding troops and supplies.

Rear-Admiral Louis Kempff, U. S. N., arrived in May, and was in command till the arrival of Rear-Admiral George C. Remey, U. S. N., on July 10th. These officers rendered great assistance to the army in landing troops and stores until the arrival of officers of the quartermaster's department of the army.

When railroad communication to Peking ceased on June 12th, the Powers were under the gravest apprehensions for the lives of the members of their Legations. They were also anxious concerning the safety of Admiral Seymour's expedition.

Frequent conferences of the naval commanders in the bay were held, and it was thought by all, except Admiral Kempff, that the Taku forts must be captured. The Admiral's view was that the United States were at peace with China, and that he could not participate in warlike measures until his Government had authorized him to do so. It would seem that there were reasonable grounds for his position. But the situation was critical. The Legations were in peril at Peking. It was the imperative duty of the Powers to protect them. If communication was cut off between the fleet and Peking, it was their duty to restore it and to resort to any and all necessary means to accomplish that object. If the Taku forts were in the way, they must be taken out of the way. It mattered not whether communication was cut off by the Chinese Government, or whether it was unable to prevent it; in either case it was the duty of the Powers to restore communication as a means of rescuing their Legations.

Notice, therefore, was given to the commander of the forts that he must surrender them or they would be attacked. He refused, and fought enough to "save his face," which was not much. The forts were taken by the allied fleet on the 17th.

The news of the fall of the forts travelled to Peking in two days, a distance of about one hundred and ten miles. The excitement of the Boxers and the Imperial Army knew no bounds. That day, June 19th, the Tsung-li-Yamen, the Chinese Foreign Office, notified the foreign ministers that they must leave Peking within twenty-four hours, offering the protection of a Chinese escort. The ministers wisely declined to leave Peking. Under existing conditions, had they attempted the journey to Tientsin, they would probably have been massacred within twenty-four hours. The Chinese authorities seemed to labor under the misapprehension that if the Government committed no overt acts, the Boxers could do as they pleased without incurring Governmental responsibility. There might be some truth in this if the Government could show that it exerted its utmost powers to suppress them and prevent their lawless acts. But at this time it is more likely that the Boxers had the sympathy of the Government.

The next day Baron von Ketteler, the German minister, was brutally murdered near the Foreign Office. His secretary was badly wounded, but escaped death. The door for the escape of the Legations was closed; nothing remained but to protect themselves and the missionaries and native Christians till relief should come from some outside source. The siege now began in earnest.

The combined strength of the Legation guards was 21 officers and 429 enlisted men, with a moderate supply of ammunition. They had no artillery. The missionaries entered the ranks, and made efficient soldiers. The services of the Rev. Mr. Gamewell, who was a skillful engineer, and who had charge of that work during the siege, are well known. Without his skillful management, or that of someone equally competent, the Legations must have perished long before the 14th of August. There were also nearly 3,000 native Christians, who rendered invaluable services as laborers. In all, there were about 850 Caucasians within the beleaguered district.

The story of the siege has been so often told, and by those who experienced its hardships and dangers, that there is no need of repeating it here. It was a remarkable episode in history.

## CHAPTER II.

On June 12th, Major Littleton W. T. Waller, with a battalion of 7 officers and 132 enlisted men of the First Regiment, U. S. Marine Corps, left Cavite, Philippine Islands, for service in China. This battalion arrived off Taku June 18th. It was joined by a detachment of 30 men from the U. S. S. *Nashville*. The officers of this battalion, besides Major Waller, were First Lieutenants S. D. Butler, Henry Leonard, Geo. C. Reid, R. F. Wynne, W. G. Powell, A. E. Harding, and Second Lieutenant Wade L. Jolly.

Word having been received by Rear-Admiral Kempff that the American consul and citizens of Tientsin were in imminent danger of being massacred by the Boxers, he took measures to relieve them. Finding Major Waller's command available, he ordered it to join the Russian force that was preparing to move for the protection of citizens of its own nation. This command landed on the 19th, and moved to Tong-ku, about three miles up the Pei-Ho River, the next day. The railroad from Tong-ku to Tientsin and Peking had been torn up in many places. Captain Wise and Major Waller succeeded in making up a train to move the latter's troops, with one 3-inch gun and one Colt's automatic gun, 6-millimeter. They repaired the railroad as they moved forward, and reached a point eighteen miles from Tong-ku and twelve miles from Tientsin, where they found a force of 400 Russians. A conference of commanders was soon held, and it was decided to remain where they were till reinforced by British and additional Russian troops, which were expected the next day. With this understanding, the troops went into bivouac. At 2 A. M. June 21st, the Russian colonel notified Major Waller that he had decided to move on with his men, and requested the Major to join him. The latter objected, on the ground that it was unwise to do so with so

small a force, and especially as reinforcements were expected that day. But he was overruled, and reluctantly consented to accompany the Russians. The 3-inch gun, proving defective, was disabled and thrown into the river. This force of 8 officers and 123 men, Americans, and 400 Russians, moved out early in the morning, Lieutenant Powell with the Colt gun in advance, the Russians following, the Americans in the rear. They advanced without opposition until they reached a point near the Imperial Arsenal, where they received a light flank fire, which was speedily silenced by American sharpshooters. Continuing the advance, they soon met a heavy front fire from a wall about three hundred yards distant, and a flank fire from a point about nine hundred yards away. The strength of the enemy was estimated to be from 1,500 to 2,000 Boxers and imperial troops. The Colt gun, with some assistance, kept the frontal fire down, while the Americans, with some Russians, changed front to right and rear, to meet the annoying flank fire. Soon after this the Russians withdrew from the front and formed about half a mile to the right of the Americans, thus exposing the left of the latter to a severe fire. The Colt gun, having jammed several times, and only Lieutenant Powell and one man left to man it, was disabled and abandoned.

The Russians sent word that they would retreat to a point about four miles below their place of bivouac the night before. They immediately proceeded to carry this decision into effect. This left the small force of Americans in a perilous situation. The enemy advanced on this small force, but were stubbornly resisted by their rear guard, where the skill of our riflemen proved effective. A four-hours running fight was kept up, until our troops reached their camp. So well was this retreat conducted that all the wounded were brought back by hand, the dead being left behind.

This force had marched thirty miles and fought five hours since it left camp in the early morning. The losses were 4 killed and 9 wounded. As far as I have been able to ascertain, the Americans covered the retreat of the Russians, receiv-

ing no assistance from them whatever. This little band of 123 men, now reduced by casualties to a little more than 100, successfully resisted the pursuing enemy, who, had they been braver and more energetic, should have overwhelmed these stubborn fighters. It was here, as at Santiago and other places, that the skill of the riflemen saved from disaster or gave us victory.

The wisdom of the Government in maintaining a system of target practice for many years, defective as it was, was more than justified in the first encounters at El Caney and San Juan. Under judicious rules, there should be no limit to the expenditure of ammunition on the target range. A nation whose army is largely composed of marksmen and sharpshooters will be a victorious nation.

During the afternoon and night reinforcements of 600 Russians, 600 English and small detachments of German, Italian, and Japanese soldiers arrived. The strength of the allied forces was now about 2,000 men. For defensive purposes this force was sufficient, but could it advance against the unknown strength of the enemy? An immediate advance was decided upon. Major Waller chose to cooperate with the British forces under the charge of Commander Craddock, of the Royal Navy. On the following day, the 23d, this army moved up the river to a point about twelve miles from Tientsin. It was decided to move the next morning at 4 o'clock, in two columns. The Americans led the British column and occupied the right of the firing-line. The enemy was found about 7 A. M., but the advance continued steadily and with slight resistance till 12:30 P. M., when Tientsin was entered, and the Europeans relieved.

The casualties of the Americans that day were 1 killed and 3 wounded. The Russians followed the British and Americans into Tientsin.

Admiral Seymour's and Captain McCalla's contingents having returned to the Siku Arsenal, it was thought they were besieged at that place. The allied commanders determined to

relieve them. At 12:30 A. M. on the 25th a relief force was sent out, which met with little or no resistance. All returned by 12 o'clock the next day.

On the 27th the Russians attacked the arsenal which they and the Americans failed to carry on the 22d, and which came so near being a scene of disaster. They asked Major Waller for reinforcements, and he sent Second Lieutenant Jolly with 40 men. Lieutenant Harding, adjutant, volunteered to go with this detachment. Lieutenant Jolly reported to Commander Craddock, Royal Navy. The enemy, with a force of about 7,000 men, were strongly fortified. The Allies moved on their works with about 1,800 men. The Americans and British charged together over a parapet, the former being first over the works. Our loss was 1 man wounded.

During the last five days, this little band of about 130 officers and men had marched nearly one hundred miles; they had been under fire about ten hours of this time; they had lived on scant rations, as must necessarily be the case on campaigns and in proximity to the enemy; 4 men had been killed in battle, and 9 wounded. During this short campaign, these marines, officers and men, had behaved like soldiers, and had reflected credit on American arms. Especially creditable was the retreat on the 22d of June, where Major Waller's men resisted alone and unaided the horde of pursuing Chinamen, bringing off all his wounded without ambulances or stretchers. Less stubborn and less skillfully handled soldiers would have been overwhelmed and massacred.



### CHAPTER III.

During the following eleven days our marines were allowed, for the most part, to rest and recuperate as far as possible while performing guard duty, and exposed to more or less artillery fire from the Chinese City, and occasional "sniping" from different directions. The physical condition of the men and their morale were good; there were none on the sick-list except the wounded.

On July 9th an attack was made by the allied forces on the Chinese right flank, in which the Americans and Japanese sailors joined and entered the arsenal together. The Americans suffered no losses, though subjected to considerable artillery fire. On this, as on other occasions, the gallantry of our troops was observed and praised by three different nations.

The following letters are from English officers:

"TIENTSIN, July 10, 1900.

"*Dear Major Waller:*

"The officers who were with the detachment of my regiment that were dragging the guns yesterday asked me to write and thank you for the support you gave them yesterday by keeping down the enemy's fire while they were crossing an exposed place. Their opinion is that had it not been for the action by you and your men, they would have had a good many casualties.

"Please accept my sincere thanks, and believe me,

"Yours sincerely, H. BOWERS."

"TIENTSIN, July 9, 1900.

"SIR,—I beg leave to thank you for having been good enough to send out a force to coöperate in the action to-day. The steadiness of your men and the manner in which they entered the arsenal were much admired. The actual command of the expedition was, as you know, under the Japanese general, with our general, Brigadier-General A. R. Dorward, D. S. O., assisting; but, as being myself present, I desire to thank you for your valuable assistance, and to assure you that we are

always happy to have your officers and men associate with us.

"I have the honor to be, sir,

"Your obedient servant,

"E. H. SEYMOUR, *Vice-Admiral.*

*"Major Waller, United States Marines."*

On the arrival of Colonel Robt. L. Meade, United States Marine Corps, July 12th, he assumed command of the United States forces at Tientsin. Major Waller had exercised this function since his arrival, June 19th. He had participated willingly and energetically with the Allies in all movements against the enemy, and he and his officers and men had reflected credit upon American valor.

Being asked if he would serve under a foreign "commanding general," or under a "prince of the blood," he replied that "for the purposes of the expedition, he would gladly do so," which, it would seem, was a proper answer.

Vice-Admiral Seymour's expedition for the relief of the Legations in Peking having failed, it was plain to see that the Powers must concentrate a large force at Tientsin for that purpose. Japan was near by, and was ready to throw a column of her splendid army into China, and could have entered Peking in thirty days. Why she was not permitted to do this is a secret which may never pass the portals of foreign courts.

## CHAPTER IV.

On June 16th the War Department ordered the commanding general, Division of the Philippines, to send a regiment of infantry, with supplies and transportation, to Peking, to report to the American minister, for the protection of the lives and property of the American citizens in China. Pursuant to this order, the Ninth Infantry, under the command of Colonel Emerson H. Liscum,\* embarked in Manila Bay, June 27th.

Officers of the Ninth Infantry in China :

Lieutenant-Colonel Charles A. Coolidge,\*  
Major Jesse M. Lee,\*  
Major Morris C. Foote,\*  
Major James Regan,\*  
Captain Charles R. Noyes,\*  
Captain Robert H. Anderson,  
Captain André W. Brewster,\*  
Captain Frank De W. Ramsey, quartermaster;  
Captain John M. Sigworth,\*  
Captain Edwin V. Bookmiller,\*  
First Lieutenant Francis H. Shoeffel, sick;  
First Lieutenant Joseph Frazier,\*  
First Lieutenant Louis B. Lawton,\*  
First Lieutenant Thomas W. Connell,\*  
First Lieutenant Harry F. Rethers,\*  
First Lieutenant Fred L. Munson, regtl. commissary;  
First Lieutenant Harold Hammond,\*  
First Lieutenant Ira C. Welborn,\*  
First Lieutenant John B. Schoeffel,\*  
First Lieutenant William K. Naylor,\*  
First Lieutenant Easton R. Gibson,\*  
First Lieutenant Edward A. Bumpus,\*  
Second Lieutenant Fred R. Brown,\*  
Second Lieutenant Reuben Smith,\*  
Second Lieutenant Frank R. Lang,  
Second Lieutenant William H. Waldron,\*

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\*The above officers marked with a (\*) were in the battle of Tientsin, July 13, 1900.

Second Lieutenant Allen Smith, Jr., commanding mounted detachment—not in battle Tientsin, sick day of battle;

Second Lieutenant Willis P. Coleman,  
Second Lieutenant Robert S. Clark,\*  
Second Lieutenant Abraham U. Loeb.

Attached to regiment:

First Lieutenant Marion M. Weeks, Eleventh Infantry;  
First Lieutenant Harley B. Ferguson, Engineer Corps.

Officers who joined the regiment in China subsequent to July 15, 1900:

Colonel Charles F. Robe,  
Major Edgar B. Robertson,  
Captain Frederick L. Palmer,  
First Lieutenant Benjamin M. Hartshorn, Jr.,  
First Lieutenant Benjamin P. Nicklin,  
First Lieutenant James P. Drouillard,  
First Lieutenant Clifton C. Kinney,  
First Lieutenant Geo. S. Simonds,  
Second Lieutenant Paul M. Goodrich,  
Second Lieutenant Emory T. Smith,  
Second Lieutenant Thomas M. Bains, Jr.

The Sixth United States Cavalry also embarked at San Francisco, July 1st, under orders to proceed to China.

The Ninth Infantry reached Taku July 6th. The Bay of Pechili being shallow, vessels were obliged to anchor seven or eight miles from the shore. At that time the facilities for landing were inadequate. It was the season of high winds. The disembarkation of troops and supplies was a slow and difficult process.

In the meantime the British, French, and Japanese forces were preparing to attack the southwest wall of Tientsin. The Chinese imperial troops and Boxers occupied the Chinese City, surrounded by an immense brick wall. The part of the city occupied by foreigners was outside this wall. The Chinese, having kept up a persistent shelling of the foreign residences and business portion of the city, it was determined to dislodge

\*The above officers marked with a (\*) were in the battle of Tientsin, July 13, 1900.

them. The Allies, having but a small force for operations, desired that the Ninth Infantry should join them in the attack. Colonel Liscum, therefore, pressed forward with the two battalions he had succeeded in landing—Lee's and Regan's—ascended the Pei-Ho River in junks and by such other means as could be improvised, and arrived at Tientsin on the 11th. The effective strength of these two battalions was 15 officers and about 575 enlisted men.

Colonel Robert L. Meade, First Regiment, United States Marine Corps, arrived at Tientsin on the 12th with 18 officers and about 300 enlisted men, which swelled the number of marines at Tientsin to 26 officers and about 425 men, 415 of whom were able to perform duty.

The British, French, and Japanese commanders had arranged to make the contemplated attack on the 13th. Neither Colonel Meade nor Colonel Liscum had had an opportunity to view the field of contemplated operations nor to mature plans. They were not, as I understand, admitted to the councils of the allied commanders until their plans had been formed for their own as well as for the American contingent. The American officers were then invited to a council for the purpose of explaining to them what they were expected to do.

They were expected to move into the darkness of an unexplored field. Under the circumstances, they might have said that they represented a separate command; that this command was larger than that of two of the Allies, the French and German; that the lives of their men and the honor of their country were in their keeping; that they must have time and opportunity to bring to bear their experience in attacking positions; and that they could not take the risk of hazarding the honor of their flag by making a leap in the dark. Thoughtful military men, I think, would have justified them in asking for a postponement of the movement for one day for the purpose of giving them an opportunity to prepare for an intelligent participation in it. Their command would have been strengthened by the arrival of the third battalion of the Ninth Infantry. It is altogether probable

that further inspection of the ground over which the allied forces were to move, especially with the aid of these experienced American colonels, would have prevented the faulty dispositions which caused unnecessary loss of life in the battle of July 13th. As delay could have given no advantage to the enemy, and much to the Allies, that would seem to have been the wise course. But these officers trusted in the wisdom of their seniors—not superiors—and entered earnestly into all their plans.

On the 12th, A Company, Ninth Infantry, Lieutenant Weeks commanding and Lieutenant Brown attached, was sent to the north pontoon bridge, about one mile from the railroad station, which is on the northeast side of the river.

Company E, except 12 men who were attached to Company D, was detailed to protect the barracks during the absence of the remainder of the regiment the next day.

The command which was engaged in the battle of Tientsin, July 13th, was made up as follows:

*Ninth Infantry.*—Colonel Liscum, Major Lee, commanding First Battalion, composed of Companies B, C, D, and 12 men detached from Company E; Major Regan, commanding Second Battalion, composed of Companies F, G, H. Total strength, 15 officers and 430 men.

*Marines.*—Colonel Meade, Captain Lang, commanding Second Battalion, composed of Companies A, D, C, F; Captain Fuller, commanding Company F, an artillery company of three 3-inch rapid-fire guns and three Colt's automatic guns.

The following additional officers were engaged in the battle of the 13th: Majors L. W. T. Waller, George Richards; Captains W. B. Lemly and A. R. Davis; First Lieutenants S. D. Butler, H. Leonard, G. C. Reid, W. G. Powell, J. H. A. Day, R. F. Wynne, R. H. Dunlap, David D. Porter, I. F. McGill, C. G. Andersen, A. G. Matthews, W. H. Clifford, A. E. Harding; Second Lieutenants F. M. Wise, Jr., Wirt McCreary, L. McC. Little, W. L. Jolly; Surgeon O. D. Norton, regimental surgeon; Assistant Surgeon Thomson.

## CHAPTER V.

The attacking force was composed of: Americans, 900, English, 2,200; French, 600; German, 250; Japanese, 1,600; Russian, 2,300; total, 5,650.

The Americans had three 3-inch naval field guns and three Colt automatic guns. The English, Japanese, and Russians also had some artillery.

At 3 A. M. the Americans, English, and Japanese moved out to attack the south or Taku gate of the walled city, and the French and Russians to attack the north side of the city. The former moved to the grounds lying outside the mud wall and in the vicinity of the West Arsenal, which was situated just inside this wall. The Taku gate of the walled city was the objective; it was about one mile from the West Arsenal.

These three allied forces, therefore, were concentrated in rear of the mud wall and arsenal and about one mile and a half from their objective. The general appearance of the ground between the arsenal and the gate was that of a smooth and level plain, broken in some places by mud houses, especially on the right, where there was quite a collection of them. But in fact, the surface was broken up into large and small ponds and mud-puddles from six inches to eight feet in depth. The space, also, was interspersed with ditches and low embankments and on the left with grave-mounds. It was these latter which gave shelter to our troops and saved them from more serious loss. Neither the impassable ponds nor friendly dikes were known to the allied commanders. Had a formidable enemy defended the Chinese position, the attacking column would have been annihilated. But I presume that the quality of the Chinese soldiers had been taken into account by the commanders when they made their plans of attack.

Colonel Liscum had conferred with General Dorward, with whose brigade he was to coöperate, and, for the sake of unity of action, was placed under the general's command. It was about 5:30 A. M. The Ninth Infantry was in extended order, with intervals of one pace in rear of the British Naval Brigade, and about one-half mile from the mud wall, the left nearly opposite the gate which opened through that wall. In this position the regiment was exposed to an indirect but rather severe fire. General Dorward sent a staff officer to Colonel Liscum with a message to the effect that, if his regiment was suffering loss, he could move up to the mud wall, where he would find shelter. The regiment advanced to the protection of the wall, where it remained about half an hour.

There is some doubt what part the Americans were to take in the attack, but it is most probable that they were to support the Japanese. The Japanese passed through the wall at the causeway, formed by companies, under cover of some mud huts at the left of the arsenal, and advanced towards the Taku gate of the walled city. The Ninth Infantry followed the Japanese, and formed by companies under the same cover. It then advanced and formed in line under the shelter of a raised roadway to the rear and right of the Japanese. It was 8 o'clock. Immediately there was opened upon them a severe fire from a mud village about one thousand yards to their right. Colonel Liscum ordered a change of front to the right, and advanced rapidly to within about one hundred and fifty yards of these huts. Here the advance was stopped by an impassable body of water. They were subjected to a heavy rifle and shrapnel fire. The men were ordered to shelter themselves in ditches and behind embankments. It was about 9 A. M. Many were obliged to lie with their heads just above, and others stand in water up to their shoulders.

During these movements Major Regan and Captains Bookmiller and Noyes were severely wounded, the latter being twice wounded. When the change of front was made, and during the advance, Colonel Liscum was conspicuous for gallantry and in-



trepidity, inspiring his men by heroic example. About 9 o'clock he fell, mortally wounded. Thus ended a long and useful life. It seemed hard that one who had been severely wounded twice before, yet had lived through the Civil War, Indian campaigns, the Santiago campaign, and had met the enemy in the Philippines, should have come to this far-off country near the close of his military career, to be shot down by a barbarous foe. But he gave his life to save others. If his life must be given, he could not have asked that it be sacrificed in a more righteous cause.

His record is a rich legacy to his family and friends and a treasure to his country he served so well.

The command of the regiment devolved on Major Lee, a veteran of the Civil War, an officer of wide experience, and fitted for the responsible position to which he had been so suddenly called. A trying situation it was in which Major Lee found his regiment. It could neither move to the front nor to the rear. He sent his adjutant, First Lieutenant Lawton, to General Dorward to explain the situation. Lieutenant Lawton was obliged to pass, going and returning, over ground swept by the enemy's fire, and was twice wounded. About the same time Captain Noyes, who had been twice wounded and had crawled behind some houses a short distance to the rear, sent Private Carrier, Company B, with a similar message. In response to these messages, one company of the English Naval Brigade was sent to reinforce this line. Soon after Captain Noyes sent Private Carrier with another message, suggesting that reinforcements should cross the mud wall five hundred yards to the right in order to turn the enemy's left. This suggestion was not heeded. A company of United States marines soon arrived at the position where Captain Noyes was. The suggestion of Captain Noyes was in the right direction, but five hundred yards was not far enough to the right to have turned the enemy's flank. The situation was simple, and the general officers from their position in the rear should have seen it. The moment the flank attack was made on the Ninth Infantry, a force of two or

three companies should have been dispatched to cross the mud wall ten hundred yards to the right and have fallen directly on the enemy's flank. In one hour or less this would have relieved not only the Ninth Infantry, but the whole line. It seems strange that this small flanking force of Chinese should have been allowed to impede the progress of the allied forces during the remainder of the day to such an extent as it did. So the only alternative was for the Ninth Infantry to remain in its position until it could move back under cover of darkness. Soon after 8 o'clock that night, while still under fire, it began to move back by squads, taking with them all the wounded. During the withdrawal 1 man was killed.

While this battle was going on, there appeared to be danger of an attack on the railroad station on the north side of the Pei-Ho River, about one and three-fourths of a mile in a direct line in a northeasterly direction from the West Arsenal and about three miles by road. A British officer requested Lieutenant Weeks, who was in command at the upper pontoon bridge, to send 50 men to the railroad station to reinforce the United States marines and French stationed there. They were sent under Lieutenant Brown, and occupied the round-house. This house was shelled during the morning, when a shrapnel burst inside, killing 2 and wounding 5 men of the Ninth Infantry, and killing 1 and wounding 4 marines. It also killed and wounded several foreign soldiers.

## CHAPTER VI.

Lieutenant-Colonel Coolidge, with the third battalion of his regiment, Major Foote commanding, was left on board the transport to take charge of the Government property and follow with it as soon as possible to Tientsin. He proceeded up the Pei-Ho River on lighters on the 12th, and arrived at the encampment of his regiment at the German Concession at Tientsin about 10 A. M. the 13th. Here he learned that his regiment was engaged in battle. While making preparations to join the two other battalions at the front, he was requested by Lieutenant-Colonel Bower, of the British Army, to send reinforcements to the railroad station. He detached Major Foote, with Companies K and M, for that purpose.

Having received from the medical officer of his regiment a request for medical supplies and water for the wounded, he procured carts to be drawn by hand and loaded them with such necessaries as he could obtain, and ammunition also, and accompanied them with Companies I and L, to the south gate, where he arrived about 4 P. M. Here he was informed by General Dorward that it would be worse than useless to move his two companies to the firing-line, and that he intended to withdraw the Ninth Infantry as soon as it should be dark enough to cover the movement. He therefore directed Colonel Coolidge to care for the wounded until the return of the regiment. This, of course, was the only proper and wise thing to do, but it took more courage to remain there than it would to have moved to the firing-line. The impulse of too many young and inexperienced officers is to get under fire, no matter how, nor what for, but get under fire and gain glory. They forget, perhaps never realize, that the command given them is the instrument, of which they are an important part, with which to gain victories for the *Government*, not for personal glory, and that it

is as much their duty to protect and preserve that instrument from needless impairment as it is to expose it to great danger, even sacrifice, when demanded by the emergencies of battle. And here is shown the difference between the experienced and the inexperienced officer. The former, exercising self-restraint, looks to the interest of his Government; the latter, impulsive, excited, looks for personal glory; the former, his reputation for personal courage being secure, bends all his energies to the best methods of gaining victory; the latter, having no reputation for personal courage, exerts all his energies to gain one. Perhaps our recent wars, especially in the Philippines, have illustrated more fully the motives of these two classes of officers than most wars. It has been said that more cheap, and cheaper, reputations have been made in the last four years than ever before. Of this I cannot judge. It has caused me to suspect, however, that in all wars with inferior and barbarous races there may be a large element of truth in it.

This digression was not intended; the thought arose as an impulse, but I have concluded to let it stand, to show what thoughts may pass through one's mind as he contemplates past events.

The Ninth Infantry, having been withdrawn from its perilous position about 8 P. M., returned to its camp to change clothing—the men having been in water nearly all day—and prepare for a renewal of the attack on the walled city on the morrow.

Company A was relieved from duty at the pontoon bridge and railway station, and joined its regiment at the south gate about dusk. Major Lee, commanding the Ninth Infantry, made the following recommendations for the conduct of the officers and men of his regiment in that battle:

“The following-named officers are recommended:

*“For Medals of Honor.*

“Captain Charles R. Noyes, adjutant, for conspicuous gallantry for continuing on duty until twice wounded. \* \* \*

"Captain André W. Brewster, in rescuing, at great risk of his life, a wounded soldier, who would have drowned.

"First Lieutenant Joseph Frazier, for conspicuous gallantry in rescuing at great peril the colonel of his regiment, who had fallen mortally wounded, and conducting him to the trench.

"First Lieutenant Louis B. Lawton, adjutant first battalion, for conspicuous gallantry in carrying a message for relief over a field swept by a deadly fire, returning and reporting after having been twice wounded in doing so.

*"For Brevets.*

"Major James Regan, as lieutenant-colonel, for coolness, courage, and heroic exposure under fire.

"Captain Charles R. Noyes, adjutant, as major, for constant coolness and gallantry under a deadly fire until disabled by a second wound.

"Captain André W. Brewster, as major, for conspicuous gallantry, coolness, and heroism in the extreme advance and inspiring the men of his company and battalion by fearless example.

"Captain Edwin V. Bookmiller, as major, for conspicuous coolness under a deadly fire, leading his company until he fell twice wounded.

"First Lieutenant Joseph Frazier, as captain, for conspicuous gallantry and fearless example, inspiring the men of his company and battalion.

"First Lieutenant Louis B. Lawton, adjutant, First Battalion, as captain, for conspicuous gallantry, coolness, and efficiency in the discharge of every duty throughout the day.

"First Lieutenant Harry F. Rethers, as captain, for conspicuous gallantry, coolness, and heroism, being with the extreme advance, and inspiring his men by example throughout the day.

"First Lieutenant William K. Naylor, as captain, for conspicuous gallantry, coolness, and heroism, being with the extreme advance, and inspiring his men by example throughout the day.

“First Lieutenant Edward A. Bumpus, as captain, for conspicuous gallantry, coolness, and heroism, being with the extreme advance, and inspiring his men by example throughout the day.

“Second Lieutenant William H. Waldron, as first lieutenant, for conspicuous gallantry, coolness, and heroism, being with the extreme advance, and inspiring his men by example throughout the day.

“Second Lieutenant Robert S. Clark, as first lieutenant, for conspicuous gallantry, coolness, and courage throughout the battle.

“Second Lieutenant Abraham U. Loeb, as first lieutenant, for conspicuous gallantry, coolness, and courage throughout the battle.

“It is deemed proper to say that the conduct of all the foregoing officers came more or less under my personal observation throughout the battle of Tientsin on July 13, 1900, which subjected the regiment to an almost constant fire for fourteen hours' duration. A number of these officers have been recommended for brevets for gallantry in action in Cuba and the Philippines, and, if such recommendations are ever acted upon, these recommendations are for one grade higher than may be bestowed.

“Major W. B. Banister, of the Medical Department, United States Volunteers, captain and assistant surgeon, United States Army, performed most valuable service under fire in removing and caring for our wounded, as far as it was possible to do so. Though not under my personal observation, wounded officers and men can so testify. I recommend him for the brevet of major, United States Army.

“The following enlisted men have been recommended for medals of honor and certificates of merit, as per special reports submitted:

“*For Medals of Honor.*—Sergeant Alfred A. Bernheim, Company D; Sergeant John Pleasants, Company B; Private John H. Porter, late Company D; Private John Gallagher, Company C;

Private Robert H. Von Schlick, Company C; Private Taylor B. Hickman, Company C; Private Wilson C. Price, Company F.

*“For Certificates of Merit.—Sergeant Albert Davis, Company B; Private Max Cline, Company D; Private Edward Heenan, Company D; Private Harry Van Leer, Company B; Private Martin Doyle, Company B; Private Ezekiel Hale, Company C; Private James Pickett, Company C.”*

The losses of the Ninth Infantry during the day were 1 officer and 16 men killed, and 4 officers and 67 men wounded. The names of the officers have been given in the foregoing pages.

It would be a pleasure to speak of the heroism displayed by the officers and enlisted men during this dreadful day, but, as said in the Preface, regulations and propriety forbid. But it is not needed. The facts, as related, speak for themselves. The flag was honored, as it always has been where American soldiers have borne it.

## CHAPTER VII.

It was understood at the council the night before the battle that on the arrival of the troops near and in rear of the arsenal definite instructions would be given to subordinate commanders. This was carried out only for the United States Marines. They arrived here at 5 A. M. About 6:30, Colonel Meade received orders from General Dorward to support the Welsh Fusileers. He moved forward with the marines, except Company F, the artillery, in extended order, crossing the mud wall and many ponds of water and mud, some of them of considerable size and depth. They were exposed to some rifle and artillery fire during this movement, but grave-mounds, dikes, and ditches were numerous on this ground. Availing themselves of the cover thus afforded, the lines were advanced by alternate rushes until they reached the position sought, and with comparatively small loss. They were on the extreme left of the allied forces. Their left flank was exposed, and assaulted by the enemy. Captain Long, commanding Second Battalion, moved his battalion slightly to the rear, and left to meet this assault; the enemy were driven off, but, to guard against further danger from this source, he sent Lieutenants Wynne and Jolly with 50 men still farther to the left. This command remained in this position, exposed to an annoying fire, till about 7 P. M., when it was moved to the rear. The withdrawal was difficult, and was accomplished by a few men at a time rushing from cover to cover. All the wounded were removed.

Captain Fuller's artillery company first went into position behind the mud wall, the 3-inch naval field guns on the right and the three Colt guns on the left of the arsenal. About seventy-five shells were fired from the naval guns into the walled city at a range of about twenty-two hundred yards. The enemy's artillery soon found the range of this battery, and



poured a dangerous fire into it. Being also exposed to rifle fire, this battery was withdrawn, and the 3-inch guns placed inside and to the left of the arsenal gate. From this position these guns played upon the walled city and a fort to the west until they had exhausted their thirty rounds of ammunition, when they were withdrawn and placed behind the wall. The Colt guns were brought into action also, but, so far as could be ascertained, without effect. One Colt gun was sent to the left of the line of marines, but soon became disabled. The crews of the Colt guns, under Lieutenants Parker and Little, were sent to reinforce the left of the line at the front. About 9:30 A. M., the remainder of this company, Captain Fuller and Lieutenant Clifford and about 60 men, was sent to reinforce the Ninth Infantry on the right of the allied forces, by order of the British general. The execution of this order was somewhat difficult, as the movement from the arsenal to the position of the Ninth Infantry was over a field swept by the enemy's fire. Advancing by alternate rushes, they arrived at a line about two hundred yards in rear of the Ninth Infantry, when word came from an English officer that it was useless to proceed further, but to find shelter where they were. A house and ditches gave them protection during the remainder of the day. They were in position to protect the right of the Ninth Infantry, and rendered great assistance to that regiment in caring for their wounded. On the withdrawal of the Ninth Infantry soon after 8 P. M., these marines and some sailors from the British ship *Orlando* rendered valuable assistance in carrying the wounded of that regiment to hospitals. An English hospital steward was very kind and attentive to the wounded during several hours of the day.

The casualties of the marines in this battle were: Captain Davis killed, and First Lieutenants Leonard and Butler wounded; 2 enlisted men were killed and 11 wounded.

List of officers who were engaged in the battle of Tientsin, July 13, 1900: Colonel Meade, Majors Waller and George Richards; Captains W. B. Lemly, A. R. Davis, C. G. Long, B. H. Ful-

ler, P. M. Bannon; First Lieutenants S. D. Butler, H. Leonard, G. C. Reid, W. G. Powell, J. H. A. Day, R. F. Wynne, R. H. Dunlap, David D. Porter, J. F. McGill, C. G. Andersen, A. J. Matthews, W. H. Clifford, A. F. Harding; Second Lieutenants F. M. Wise, Jr., Wirt McCreary, L. McC. Little, W. L. Jolly; Surgeon O. D. Norton, regimental surgeon; Assistant Surgeon Thompson.

Colonel Meade made special mention of officers of his regiment, as follows:

"I desire to call attention to the work of Captain M. J. Shaw, acting commissary and quartermaster, after Captain Lemly was wounded. His untiring activity in keeping the command supplied with ammunition, food and water, and all other necessaries, merits commendation from me.

"Major George Richards, assistant paymaster, and Captain W. B. Lemly, assistant quartermaster, on the regimental staff, volunteered to act as my aids, and they accompanied me during the day of the battle. Captain Lemly was wounded in the leg very early in the action and before he had reached the arsenal.

"The conduct of my officers and men I cannot praise too highly. I had them, for the most part, under my personal eye. I desire especially to call your attention to the conduct of First Lieutenant Charles G. Andersen, whose fearless conduct excited the admiration of all. First Lieutenant S. D. Butler, who, at the risk of his life, went out of the trench to bring in a wounded man, and was shot while doing so; First Lieutenant Henry Leonard, my adjutant, who brought in First Lieutenant Butler in safety, and was dangerously wounded. All conducted themselves well, and I cannot commend them too highly.

"Sergeant Clarence E. Sutton, U. S. M. C., headquarters clerk, behaved himself with especial gallantry on the firing-line and in volunteering with First Lieutenant Henry Leonard to bring in First Lieutenant S. D. Hiller, commanding A Company, who had been badly wounded and was in great danger. This work he successfully accomplished, and I respectfully recommend him for promotion.

“Sergeant-Major John F. Lawler, sergeant-major of the regiment, also behaved in such a courageous manner as to entitle him to special notice, and I respectfully ask that he may be suitably rewarded.”

Captain Long, commanding Second Battalion, reports as follows:

“The officers and men during the engagement, which lasted thirteen or fourteen hours, displayed coolness and in every way the qualities of good soldiers and marines. The artillery under Captain Fuller and his officers was handled well, and the fire was effective. \* \* \* Lieutenant Dunlap, in command of Company D, kept his company under excellent control, and by well-directed volleys and individual fire well protected the extreme left flank of the allied forces. \* \* \* Private Desmonds, Company A, who was acting as a sharpshooter, well on our left flank, was wounded in the arm and leg, but moved to the rear without assistance. His action indicated bravery, fearlessness, and good judgment.”

Captain Bannon reports as follows:

“The behavior of Lieutenant McGill and the men of the detachment proved them to be most courageous, reliable, and efficient. They are deserving of the highest praise.”

Captain Fuller reports as follows:

“Lieutenant Henry Leonard, who had joined the company when it went out to reinforce the Ninth Infantry, was wounded in the arm when leaving the cover of the before-mentioned house—a most gallant attempt to get to the front. He was taken to the rear under a heavy rifle fire by Sergeant Adams and Corporal Adriance, of Company F, whose courage I wish to most emphatically commend. Sergeant Foley showed great coolness and bravery in taking position on the extreme left flank and in carrying messages under heavy fire.”

When men have been engaged in battle, especially under so trying conditions as was the Ninth Infantry, their whole nature is wrought up to the highest pitch. Their instinctive admiration for bravery knows no bounds. Sharing mutual dangers

and hardships, they look upon their comrades as heroes, all of them. And so they are. Acting under these generous impulses, it is no wonder that commanding officers of all grades should recommend large numbers of their subordinates for brevets and medals of honor. No regiment in the service, regular or volunteer, was in so trying a situation during the recent wars as was the Ninth Infantry on that dreadful day; and if any troops are entitled to distinctive recognition, those two battalions of that regiment are. When one looks over the long list of recommendations sent to the Senate last winter, the question arises, What are brevets given for? An officer is expected to do his duty well, faithfully, "bravely," "heroically." If he does not, he is liable to censure, even dismissal. He is entitled to no brevet for this conduct. He must do something beyond the usual requirements of duty to entitle him to this distinction. Otherwise, brevets are of no value. When one examines the long lists of recommendations for brevets and medals of honor, he feels that the value of these honors has been so cheapened as to have no significance. Especially does this apply to Philippine service. The vocabulary of adjectives and skill in framing descriptive phrases was exhausted in attempts to make ordinarily good conduct appear extraordinarily heroic.

## CHAPTER VIII.

As the advance on Peking could not begin, at the earliest, before the first of August, it was necessary to adopt some form of government for the city of Tientsin. By agreement of the Powers, a commission of three was appointed as a governing council. The city was divided into four sections, and assigned to the commanding officers of the American, British, French, and Japanese forces for the execution of such rules as might be formulated.

As the Chinese troops left on the morning of July 14th, fires were kindled in several places, probably by them, and a large portion of the walled city was burned. Early that morning Major Foote, with one company of the Ninth Infantry, and Major Waller, with some marines, were ordered to take possession of the American section, and to use their utmost endeavors to prevent looting and to restore order. As the fire spread, wild disorder prevailed, and advantage was taken of this situation by Chinese and non-combatants and the troops of the Allies to loot the city. The Chinese were the most persistent in this line of work, but the Sikhs were adepts also, followed in a more clumsy way by the French, Russians, and Japanese. While American soldiers were not free from this evil, I am led to believe, from the best information I can obtain, that it was not indulged in by them to any great extent. Strict orders were given against it, and reduced the practice to a minimum. The Japanese immediately followed the example of the Americans, and almost completely stopped it among their soldiers.

The fires subsided, and a degree of good order was restored. The city was filthy beyond description, and added to this were hundreds of corpses of Chinamen. Coolies were pressed into the service and paid at the rate of twenty cents a day to bury the dead and clean the streets. In two weeks the city probably

was cleaner than it had been for generations. In carrying out these measures for restoring order and improving the sanitary conditions, the Americans received great assistance from Mr. Wah, a native resident of the city.

Although the mint had been burned, there was found a large amount of silver bullion that had not been melted, in the form of shoes of "sycie." Some of it, however, was found in a fused mass. The total amount recovered was valued at \$375,300. This treasure was removed to the Hong-Kong and Shanghai Bank and sold to Mr. C. H. C. Moller, agent for J. P. Morgan, and the amount deposited in the United States Treasury. This has since been returned to the Chinese Government.

The expeditionary force of sailors and marines under Vice-Admiral Seymour having failed to reach Peking and having returned to Tientsin, it was decided by the Powers that a much larger and more completely organized force should be set in motion as speedily as possible for the relief of the Legations. In anticipation of this, the Secretary of the Navy instructed Admiral Kenpff to ascertain from the commanders of the forces of the different nations represented at Taku what force they deemed necessary for a new expedition. He reported, July 8th, that, in their opinion, a force of 20,000 men would be required to protect the line from Taku to Tientsin, that an additional column of 60,000 men would be required to march on Peking, and that America's proportion would be 10,000 men.

Previous to this report, the Secretary of War had ordered the Fourteenth Infantry and Captain Reilly's Battery F, Fifth Artillery, 6 guns, from Manila to Taku.

It is well within the bounds of truth to say that, officered as it was, no better battery could have been selected. Sometimes there grows up between organizations of different arms of the service a very strong attachment. In campaign and battle, the relations between the infantry and artillery are intimate. A battery commander is proverbial for his solicitude for the safety of his guns. Whenever he goes into action, his anxious

thought, if not inquiry, is, "Who is going to support me?" And this anxiety is justifiable; for if he is not well supported and his horses are shot down, his guns are lost. On the other hand, no one but the old, experienced infantryman knows what a great moral as well as actual support the booming of guns at his side is, when he feels that they are well served and in reliable hands.

The Fourteenth Infantry and this battery had served together in the Philippines and had learned to put perfect confidence in each other. Reilly's guns were always at the front, either with himself or his lieutenants. Not a gun could have been lost as long as there was a squad of the Fourteenth left, nor could the Fourteenth have been overwhelmed as long as a gun of this battery and a round of ammunition remained. The general reader will probably think that this is carrying sentiment a little too far, but there are a few participants left who will not think so.

## CHAPTER IX.

An eventful night was that of July 8th for the Fourteenth Infantry. A little before midnight General Williston, that noble man and hero of many battles, and who deserves far more reward than he has received, came to my room after I had gone to bed and informed me that our regiment had been ordered to China and must embark in about a week. After giving some information as to preparations for the movement, he offered some conservative congratulations and withdrew.

He was a Civil War veteran, and I have noticed that they do not manifest such a degree of enthusiasm at the prospect of campaign and battle as the younger officers do. I notified the officers near me, who in turn notified all the others, and in a short time the whole garrison was in a blaze of enthusiasm. The news spread to other organizations, especially to the Twentieth United States Infantry, from which officers applied for transfer or to be temporarily attached to the Fourteenth; any way, no matter how, to get to China. I wanted our full quota of officers for so important an expedition, and approved their applications for transfer. But their colonel and the division commander wisely withheld their approval, and no transfers were effected. These incidents are given to show the spirit that actuated the enterprising American officer, and while it may not always be accompanied by a wise discretion, it is in every way commendable. The same spirit seemed to pervade the enlisted men, and it was this, in large measure, that made them what they afterwards proved themselves to be—the best soldiers of the allied forces in China.

A weeding process had been instituted in the previous January, which had effected the discharge of nearly all the bad men in the regiment. Drills, target practice, and disciplinary measures had been so faithfully and intelligently carried out during



the last six months by the officers of the regiment that they had brought it to a high state of discipline and efficiency. It had been highly commended in official reports.

Fortunate it was for those officers and the men they commanded that they had worked so faithfully, for they soon had occasion to reap the fruits of their labors.

All duties of this kind were now suspended, and the regiment was busy in its preparations to invade the Flowery Kingdom.

A complete transfer of quartermaster's property was ordered and all regimental property packed. Without anything substantial to base it upon, the opinion prevailed that the regiment would never return to Manila. On the 8th the division commander asked if the regiment could be ready to sail on the 13th, and, on receiving an affirmative reply, that date was fixed for its departure. As quite an amount of supplies was to be taken along with us, the transports *Indiana*, *Flintshire*, and *Weyfield* were designated for the transportation of the command.

The troops were in readiness to embark on the 13th, but the transports were not ready for them. The Pasig River and the channel leading out of it into Manila Bay for a distance of three or four miles is not deep enough to allow the passage of large steamers; they anchor that distance from the shore. The steamers, therefore, are loaded and unloaded by the use of lighters. Often in summer typhoons make this process difficult and sometimes impossible.

On the 14th the headquarters and six companies of the Fourteenth Infantry boarded the *Indiana*, and the two other companies and Reilly's Battery the *Flintshire*. When the hour for departure had nearly arrived, it came to our knowledge that important articles of commissary stores had not been placed on board. This caused a delay of twenty-four hours. I believe there was no good reason why this fleet could not have sailed on the 13th, the day appointed for its departure.

About 3.30 p. m. of the 15th the *Indiana* weighed anchor, and we were finally on our way to a strange land. The *Flint-*

*shire* had preceded us by about two hours. The *Wyefield*, not being ready, was to follow in a few days; she was loaded with supplies and battery horses, besides other horses and mules.

The following is a list of the officers who sailed with this expedition:

A. S. Daggett, colonel, commanding regiment;  
 Leslie R. Groves, chaplain;  
 H. G. Learnard, captain, adjutant;  
 William B. Reynolds, captain, quartermaster;  
 F. M. Savage, first lieutenant, commissary;  
 F. F. Eastman, captain, commanding 2d Battalion;  
 R. M. Brambila, first lieutenant, adjutant 2d Battalion;  
 William Quinton, major, commanding 3d Battalion;  
 L. M. Nuttman, first lieutenant, adjutant 3d Battalion;  
 J. F. Gohn, first lieutenant, commanding Company E;  
 James Hanson, second lieutenant, on duty, Company E;  
 J. C. F. Tilson, captain, commanding Company F;  
 D. K. Major, Jr., second lieutenant, on duty, Company F;  
 Alfred Hasbrouk, captain, commanding Company G;  
 J. L. Gilbreth, first lieutenant, on duty, Company G;  
 P. H. Mullay, first lieutenant, commanding Company H;  
 C. E. Kilbourne, second lieutenant, on duty, Company H;  
 J. R. M. Taylor, captain, commanding Company I;  
 H. S. Wagner, first lieutenant, on duty, Company I;  
 W. A. Burnside, first lieutenant, commanding Company K;  
 W. S. Sinclair, second lieutenant, on duty, Company K;  
 A. N. McClure, second lieutenant, commanding Company L;  
 I. McL. Hamilton, second lieutenant, on duty, Company L;  
 C. H. Martin, captain, commanding Company M;  
 C. N. Murphy, first lieutenant, on duty, Company M.

Attached:

C. P. Faulkner, first lieutenant, Eighth Infantry, on duty with Company F.

Surgeons:

Wm. S. Lewis, captain, regimental surgeon;  
 E. R. Schreiner, first lieutenant, assistant regimental surgeon;  
 R. N. Winn, contract surgeon.

Officers of the regiment who joined in China subsequent to the campaign:

- Joseph Frazier, captain, October 27, 1900, commanding Company H;
- F. S. L. Price, first lieutenant, September 22, Company H;
- R. M. McMillan, second lieutenant, September 22, Company M;
- Harry Mitchell, second lieutenant, September 22, Company K;
- E. E. Allen, second lieutenant, September 22, 1900, Company F;
- P. K. Brice, second lieutenant, September 22, 1900, on duty, Company L;
- George Green, second lieutenant, August 20, 1900, on duty Company M;
- James Regan, Jr., second lieutenant, September 6, 1900, on duty, Company H.

Contract surgeons who joined in China:

- H. S. Vankirk, August 5, 1900.

Battery F, Fifth Artillery:

- H. J. Reilly, captain, commanding battery;
- Louis R. Burgess, first lieutenant, on duty, battery;
- Charles P. Summerall, first lieutenant, on duty, battery;
- Manus McCloskey, second lieutenant, on duty, battery;
- Harry Greenleaf, first lieutenant and assistant surgeon.

With the two battalions of the regiment, 1,135 enlisted men embarked. The first battalion sailed for America in April.

The weather was pleasant, and the journey was a joyous one from Manila to the Gulf of Pechili. The master of the transport was a courteous gentleman, and the excellent quartermaster, Captain Henry Kinnison, an old Twenty-fifth Infantry comrade in the Santiago campaign, did all in their power to provide for the comforts of all. The most interesting and attractive feature of the journey to me was the harmony that prevailed among all on board. There was not, so far as I know, any unpleasantness existing between any two officers on the *Indiana*. There seemed to be a disposition to gather in a circle

and banter each other, and sing songs, and, more than all, to discuss the prospects of the campaign they were about to enter upon. Small knots would sometimes gather on different parts of the deck, but, somehow, they lacked coherency, and they would soon join the large circle.

A small amount of literature on China was obtained before leaving Manila, and this, as well as all other available sources of information, was exhausted in discussion on that journey. Some idea of the empire had been absorbed by means of these discussions, and it is safe to say that every officer was better prepared to meet the emergencies of the coming campaign at the end than he was at the beginning of that voyage.

The men also were equally happy, and looked forward with eager anticipations to the new field of activity they were about to enter in that strange country. Little did they know of the heat and dust they were to encounter, and that more than forty of their number would never return.

The transport put in to Nagasaki, Japan, on the morning of July 21st, where she remained thirty-six hours for the purpose of taking on coal.

Several foreign men-of-war were in the harbor, and they, with all the novelty of the scenes witnessed here, made the sojourn interesting and all too short for the pleasure-seeker, but we were not on a pleasure trip.

Army transports do not receive nor return salutes, but on its departure, as the *Indiana* passed the different foreign men-of-war, the Fourteenth Infantry band played their national airs, which were recognized by calling their sailors to attention. A Russian ship was noticeable in its manner of returning the compliment: the sailors sprang into the rigging and made it black with their dark uniforms until the band ceased to play.

The remainder of the journey to Pechili Bay was without incident of special interest to the general reader; the same routine of drills, athletic exercises, interspersed with discussions and speculations on China, its army, the walls of Peking, how

they could be reduced or scaled, gave plenty of employment, so that time did not drag heavily. But no one dreamed of the manner in which two companies would scale and unfurl the flag of their regiment on those walls about three weeks hence.

On the morning of the 25th, the hills of the Province of Shantung broke on our view. Barren for the most part, and broken into deep gorges, they reminded us of mountain scenery in Arizona and California. As we rounded Shantung promontory and entered the bay, small villages appeared, surrounded by green cultivated fields, extending well up into the foot-hills. We had left the damp air of the Philippines, and, while on the steamer, were enjoying the dry and cooling breezes of a more northern climate. But it was July, and no change of uniform was necessary; the khaki of the tropics was the proper uniform for China; and, as we afterward learned on landing, a thinner suit would have been more comfortable.

Noon of the 26th found us in the midst of a fleet of forty or fifty men-of-war and transports of eight nations. It was a grand sight as the colors of those nations floated in the breeze. Flags are but pieces of cloth, but when adopted by Governments they are the symbols of all those Governments stand for—power or weakness; justice or tyranny; liberty or oppression; benevolence or cruelty.

A stiff breeze was blowing, and the bay was rough, but those monster battleships lay silent and almost motionless. What a reserve power was stored behind those walls of steel! And while they could not be made available on land, China little knew or realized that they represented the mighty enginery of war that those nations could throw against Peking itself.

## CHAPTER X.

I immediately called on Rear-Admiral George C. Remy, U. S. N., whose flagship was the *Brooklyn*, for information concerning the condition of affairs and as to means of landing troops and stores.

The water being shallow, it was necessary to anchor from seven to ten miles from the shore. Everything had to be landed by means of lighters, and when the bay is rough, as is usual at this season of the year, it is a difficult and sometimes dangerous undertaking. The headquarters of the regiment, two companies, and such property as could be loaded on the lighter, started at about 2 A. M., July 27th, for the landing at Tong-ku, where they arrived about 5 A. M. Captain Wise, U. S. N., soon had cars in readiness to transport this part of the regiment and baggage to Tientsin. The Russians being in charge of the railroad, it was here that we first came in contact with foreign troops. The ill-fitting black coat, trousers once white, and heavy boots of the enlisted men first attracted our attention. They were prompt, alert, and rather soldierly in bearing when officers of any army were near.

Here was found the grave of the lamented Liscum—desolate, lonely, fit place for the dead, if death ends all. But this was only a temporary burying-place: his remains were soon removed to America and placed in the cemetery at Elmira, N. Y., surrounded by the beauties of nature, emblematic of the brighter hope in the eternal beyond.

The distance from Tong-ku to Tientsin is about thirty miles. The country is level and nearly treeless, and for the most part only moderately productive. It was sparsely inhabited, and the few mud villages were in ruins and deserted, except by wretched and starving dogs.

The railroad equipment was poor; it took more than two hours to cover the thirty miles.

On arrival at Tientsin, the troops were marched to the headquarters of the Ninth Infantry in the German "Concession," which had been kindly turned over to the Americans for temporary occupation.

This regiment was slowly recovering from the effects of the battle of July 13th, but it was physically in bad condition. It participated in the Santiago campaign, passed the Montauk Point experience, had been in the Philippines about eighteen months, had fought a battle only two weeks before, in which the casualty list reminds one of Civil War losses, and was now sweltering under a sun more scorching than that of Cuba or the Philippines. I say "slowly recovering," but many of them never recovered. The remainder only regained a measure of health and strength.

The marines, numbering a few more than 100, had gallantly participated in the battles and trying experiences previous to the 13th, and were engaged in that battle, but were not as unfortunately located as their comrades of the Ninth, and their losses and experiences were not as severe. Also, having been stationed at Cavite, P. I., where they occupied good quarters, the hardships they endured were not as great and enervating as the Ninth suffered in the Philippines; while, therefore, their physical condition could scarcely be called good, it was fair.

A conference was soon had with Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Gaselee, commanding the British forces, and Baron Mootoomi Yamagutchi, lieutenant-general, commanding the Japanese forces.

General Gaselee and his chief of staff, Major-General Barrow, were in favor of an immediate advance on Peking, and pressed me to join them, even with the two companies which had arrived. While I did not deem it advisable to move while six companies and the battery were still on the transports, I gave

them to understand that I should not see the Allies advance without joining them with whatever fragment of the American contingent might be available. General Yamagutchi, however, was opposed to moving until reasonable preparations could be made; he preferred to wait until August 15th, when heavy reinforcements would have arrived for his own as well as for all the armies represented. He was not, however, strenuously opposed to advancing within a few days.

Lieutenant-General Linivitch, commanding the Russian contingent, being the senior officer of the allied forces at Tientsin, was not consulted at that time. He was less communicative than others, but was not, apparently, in favor of an immediate move. General Yamagutchi, having nearly as many troops as all the others combined, must necessarily exercise a controlling influence. The first of August, therefore, was tentatively fixed upon as the day when the move on Peking should begin. By this date I hoped to have all of the Fourteenth Infantry and the battery ready to join the column.

Captains Joseph C. Byron and Winthrop S. Wood, assistant quartermasters, U. S. Army, were stationed at Tong-ku and Taku. They worked energetically in supplying the means for unloading the transports and forwarding supplies to Tientsin.

During the 27th the bay was so rough that loading lighters had to be suspended; it was not till the 28th that Major Quinton with Captain Reynolds succeeded in landing his battalion and necessary stores; he arrived at Tientsin the evening of the 29th of July.

Reilly's Battery and horses were still on board. The *Wyefield*, with all the transportation, had not arrived. In the meantime, such preparations as it was possible to make with the means at hand were going on.

Soon after our arrival on the 27th of July we were introduced to Rev. Dr. Lowry, a missionary of the Presbyterian Church, who had escaped from Paoting-Fu just before the massacre. He was living in the compound belonging to the



American Board, and, on consultation with a gentleman who was left in charge, we were invited to occupy the place as a camp-ground. One battalion of the Fourteenth Infantry went into camp there, and the other battalion occupied a compound just across the street. During the few days' stay in this camp Dr. Lowry rendered all the assistance in his power. He made several addresses to the command of a secular and religious character, giving us the first reliable information we had received as to the causes of the Boxer uprising and the general conditions in China. His deportment was such during these few days that he endeared himself to many and won the respect of all.

## CHAPTER XI.

About noon of the 30th, Major-General Adna R. Chaffee, United States Volunteers, arrived. He was accompanied by Captain Grote Hutchison, Sixth United States Cavalry, adjutant-general of the expedition, and Second Lieutenant Roy B. Harper, Seventh United States Cavalry, aide. The command of the United States forces was turned over to General Chaffee. He was unwilling to move until Reilly's Battery could be landed. The 1st of August had not been decided upon by all the commanders, and that day was abandoned.

A conference of all the allied commanders was held on the 1st of August at the quarters of General Linivitch. There were present: General Chaffee, Lieutenant-General Yamagutchi, Lieutenant-General Gaselee, Major-General Frey, of the French Army, and an officer of the German Navy. It was decided to move out of the city on the afternoon of the 4th, and attack the enemy early the next morning.

As no officer, whatever his rank, could give orders to officers of any other army, it was decided that a conference of commanders should be held every evening, or when necessary, to determine the movements of the following day or days, and that a majority should rule. Everybody was so anxious to relieve the Legations in Peking that all jealousies were smothered for the time being, and all worked harmoniously with one exception, which will be referred to in its proper place.

The battery arrived at Tientsin on the 3d. The Sixth United States Cavalry and a battalion of United States marines came on the transport *Grant* from San Francisco with General Chaffee; they also arrived at Tientsin on the 3d.

Officers of the Sixth Cavalry in China:

Colonel Theodore J. Wint,  
Major Eli I. Huggins,  
Captain R. B. Paddock.

Captain A. P. Blocksom,  
Captain Wm. Forsyth,  
Captain De Rosey Cabell,  
Captain Grote Hutchison,  
First Lieutenant F. C. Marshall,  
First Lieutenant Charles D. Rhodes,  
First Lieutenant John W. Furlong,  
First Lieutenant Benj. B. Hyer,  
First Lieutenant E. R. Heiberg,  
Second Lieutenant W. B. Scales,  
Second Lieutenant Wm. I. Karnes,  
Second Lieutenant Frederick G. Turner,  
Second Lieutenant Warren Dean,  
Acting Assistant Surgeon Eduardo Carlos Poey,  
Acting Assistant Surgeon John T. Halsals.

As their horses could not be landed immediately, the cavalry did not accompany the expedition, except Troop M, Captain De Rosey C. Cabell commanding, with 2 officers and 76 men, who joined the column on the 9th at Peh-Meaou.

By agreement of the Powers, troops were to be left at Tientsin to maintain civil government, and the quota of American troops was 100 men. One company of marines was selected for that purpose.

The transportation of the Fourteenth Infantry had not arrived. The only transportation available was 19 four-mule wagons, 4 ambulances, and 1 Dougherty wagon brought by the Ninth Infantry. These were used to carry ammunition and rations and such things as must accompany a column moving in an enemy's country.

A fleet of junks also was loaded with reserve ammunition and other supplies, and moved up the river with the troops; but as the Pei-Ho is very crooked, the troops frequently bivouacked many miles from it. The American and English fleets were combined and placed under the charge of a British officer. The junks would carry from six to twelve tons each, and were pulled by coolies, some of whom were accustomed to that occupation. But they were rigged with sails, also, and as the prevailing winds were from the east, they were floated along against

the current about as fast as the army could march. § An interesting sight that fleet was, especially to Americans. About 200 coolies were pressed into the service to carry cooking utensils, cans for boiling water, litters, rations, and many things for which other transportation could not be furnished. Major Waller, having been there longer than most officers, had gathered Chinese carts for the marines. A pack-train of about 50 mules also arrived on the 4th, just in season to be of use that afternoon.

The men carried 100 rounds of ammunition each, one day's rations, mess-kit, a half shelter tent, and some of them a blanket.

Thus hurriedly prepared, the American contingent was ready for the campaign.

The strength of the allied forces was reported as follows:

American . . . . .	2,500
English . . . . .	3,000
French . . . . .	800
Japanese . . . . .	8,000
Russian . . . . .	4,300

Total . . . . . 18,600

These figures are too large. The effective force probably did not exceed 16,000 men.



## CHAPTER XII.

In the meantime reconnoissances had been made for several days by the ever-active Japanese. They had found the enemy occupying a strong line of works at Pei-tsang, about eight miles up the river.

At 3 P. M., August 4th, the Americans, British, and Japanese moved out of Tientsin, and went into bivouac about four miles above and on the right bank of the Pei-Ho River. The French and Russians, being on the left bank, operated on that side of the river.

It is not the purpose of this book to describe movements and battles farther than is necessary to give an intelligent idea of what the American soldiers did. It will, therefore, be sufficient to say that at about 2 o'clock on the morning of the 5th the Japanese led the column on the right bank of the river towards Pei-tsang, where, about 4 o'clock, they encountered troops of the Chinese Imperial Army—not Boxers—strongly entrenched, their right resting on an arsenal. After a sharp fight of about two hours, in which artillery was freely used on both sides, the Japanese made a gallant charge right against the Chinese position at the arsenal and swept everything before them. Their losses were quite severe. They then faced to the right, and swept the whole line. They then followed in hot pursuit, but no resistance of any account was made.

The Americans deployed once in the pursuit, and a half-dozen or more unexploded shells fell about the field.

A few British Sikhs were engaged, and some British artillery, near the river. It was Japanese day, and splendidly had they borne their part.

The French and Russians did not, I believe, encounter the enemy on their side of the river.

The pursuit was continued to a point near Tao-Wa-She, where the troops bivouacked for the night.

The country on the left bank of the river having been flooded, the French and Russians drew over to the right bank in the afternoon, where they went into bivouac.

The Chinese had retreated to Yang-tsun, about twelve miles from Pei-tsang, and where the railroad crosses the river. This was supposed to be their strong position between Tientsin and Peking, to which Pei-tsang was an outpost. It was on the left bank of the river. The country was flat in every direction, so that all our movements were exposed to the full view of the enemy; but little cover could be found for advancing lines, except over a small section covered with grave-mounds. The railroad embankment gave perfect shelter to the enemy for the front it covered. Also a small village screened the enemy and part of his position from our view, in the vicinity of the bridge. A large portion of the country was covered with corn-fields; these afforded concealment for fortifications and stationary troops, but did not offer the same advantage to advancing lines. The field of operations between the railroad and river converged as it approached the bridge. It was agreed that on the morrow the Japanese should continue to advance up the right bank of the river, while the Americans, British, French, and Russians should cross the river and move up the left bank. The Japanese had a pontoon bridge at Pei-tsang, which was to be taken up at 6 o'clock the next morning. Consequently the march began at 4 o'clock, in order to get the troops and trains over by that hour.

The plan for the day was for the British to advance with their left resting on the river, and the Americans to follow their right as a support. The Americans crossed the bridge first, followed by the British, French, and Russians.

The Japanese, in their advance on the other side of the river, found flooded ditches or canals, which compelled them to lay their pontoon bridges. They therefore requested that the

movement of our wing of the army be delayed a short time to secure coöperation on both sides of the river.

The British followed the river road, which ran nearly parallel with the river and about a mile from the railroad at this point, but converging until it crossed it, at the bridge near Yang-tsun. The Russians and French followed the British; the Americans moved diagonally towards the railroad, bearing to the left until their line of march became parallel with, and their right rested on it. Their march was over corn- and sweet-potato-fields, and ground that had not been cultivated for two or three years; it was soft and partly covered with weeds and impeded the progress of the movement, and, worst of all, exhausted the men. The sun was scorching. It seemed to have more power to prostrate men than I had witnessed in our Southern States or Cuba or the Philippines.

The Fourteenth Infantry was in advance, followed by Reilly's Battery, the Ninth Infantry, and marines, in the order named. After advancing a few miles in column of fours, part of the leading battalion—the Third, Major Quinton—was deployed in line of squads. A few miles farther on, about six miles from the bridge we had left in the morning, General Chaffee crossed to the east side of the railroad with the Ninth Infantry, the battery, and marines, leaving the Fourteenth as the only Americans on the west side of the railroad. The British were advancing along the river road rather slowly and in extended order.

By request of General Gaselee, General Chaffee gave the Fourteenth a direction which would lead it to the village and position of the enemy along the railroad near and at the bridge. As the advance continued, a few shells, most of them unexploded, fell on the field over which the regiment was advancing; one came directly from the right and struck about four feet in front of a platoon of K Company. Those four feet, the men claimed, were as good as four miles. Considerable shrapnel fire also came from the opposite bank of the river.



RUSSIAN INFANTRY, NEAR HO-HSI-WOO.



half a mile, he met a mounted orderly, to whom he entrusted the message.

English Signal Corps men were discovered on the railroad embankment near by, and signaled the batteries to cease firing.

While bearing these messages, Lieutenants Brambila and Hanson and Sergeant Bowen passed over a field that was swept by the artillery fire of the Chinese as well as by that of the English and Russian batteries.

The casualties for the day in the Fourteenth Infantry had been 8 enlisted men killed and 57 wounded. As many of the wounds were caused by artillery fire, they were very serious, some of them of a shocking nature; 15 men died within a few days.

The water in the canteens was exhausted by 10 o'clock, and there were no wells nor streams of water in the country over which the advance was made. The men were famishing with thirst. They fell by scores with heat-exhaustion.

To enter and bear the strain of battle under these circumstances was testing human endurance to its utmost limit. Patriotism, sustained by Anglo-Saxon pluck, won, and the flag was honored at Yang-tsun in the presence of foreign nations.

There is no more important acquisition for an army officer than the knowledge of how to march troops. Soldiers may be ever so well disciplined and skillful riflemen; if they can not be at the right place at the right time, or, if there, so exhausted as to be unable to render service, they are useless; they might as well have never been enlisted. The knowledge of what men can endure is acquired by long experience in marching troops and close observation. To understand thoroughly what men can endure, the officer must have had experience in marching with them. Some officers can march a column of troops to the designated point with the loss of only the feeblest; others will exhaust and disintegrate their commands during the first hours of the march, and the few that may reach their destination will be unable to render much, if any, service.

Sometimes a young staff officer will ride up to a commanding officer and urge him to press forward more rapidly. He is honest and sincere, and is trying to carry out the spirit of his general's orders, but he has no realizing sense of what marching soldiers can endure. Staff officers have called upon commanders of troops to do certain things without considering for a moment the condition of the troops and without knowing whether it were possible of accomplishment. Many a commander of troops has suffered from the crude judgment of inexperienced officers as to what men can endure.

The practice marches instituted in our Army ten or twelve years ago are in the right direction. But the primary effort of those marches should be to teach officers how to march troops.

#### CHAPTER XIV.

In the meantime General Chaffee had crossed to the east side of the railroad at 10 o'clock, about four miles below, with the Ninth Infantry, Reilly's Battery, and the marines, with the intention of supporting the Fourteenth Infantry in its direct attack on the Chinese position at the village and station. The battery went into position near the railroad, and the Ninth Infantry deployed on its right, the marines in support. This movement drew artillery fire from the enemy from the direction of our right front. Our battery opened, and soon silenced the enemy's fire. A forward movement was then made.

General Chaffee had received the loan of a troop of British cavalry, Sikhs, and had sent them forward to scout his front and right. The commanding officer of this troop soon returned with the information that eight companies of Chinese infantry and three guns were in and near the village to our front right. Orders were then given for the Ninth Infantry to change direction slightly to the right and attack the village. The regiment advanced through the corn-field towards the village, but met no resistance therefrom; but it did receive considerable infantry and artillery fire from the village of Yang-tsun and vicinity, which was then in their left front. Having reached the village, the men were given an opportunity to obtain water.

While advancing on the first village, General Chaffee received a message from the British commander, that the Fourteenth Infantry was suffering severe losses, and requesting that the battery be sent to their assistance. General Chaffee considered the clearing of his right front of great importance, and hesitated to abandon the movement then in progress. He also believed, and correctly, that the British and Russian artillery was sufficient for the work to be accomplished on that side of the railroad. On receiving a second and urgent message, he

reluctantly changed the direction of his battery and marines towards the water-tower at the bridge. The battery was directed to fire over the railroad into the enemy's position beyond. When the battery had been unlimbered and was in readiness to fire, Captain Reilly saw men of the Fourteenth Infantry on the embankment at the point where the fire was to be directed. General Chaffee ordered Captain Reilly not to fire, and returned to complete the work of clearing the village and corn-fields.

It was now 1 o'clock. The march had been exceedingly fatiguing, and many had fallen out from heat-exhaustion. Orders were to press on to another village a little more than a mile distant, in nearly the same direction in which the advance had been made. Line was again formed, and the advance continued. On passing the corn-field—it was all corn-field—the troops were again exposed to rifle and artillery fire, which the line returned and silenced. Arriving at the village, the men were allowed to rest and fill their canteens with water. It was 2 P. M. The men were nearly incapable of further exertion, and sank down under the shade of the trees. Still, they must make another attempt. It was difficult to form the line for an advance to the clump of houses a mile and a half to their left front. The movement was accomplished, however. The marines were deployed part of the time in support of a battery and the general movement, and suffered the same fatigue and exposure as the others.

During all these halts Reilly was pouring shell and shrapnel into the fleeing Chinese. It seemed impossible for him to rest. His men, being mounted either on horses or caissons, had some advantage over their comrades of the infantry and marines. At 3 o'clock all the troops that had operated on the east side of the railroad returned to the west side, and all the United States troops went into bivouac near the bridge on the bank of the Pei-Ho.

The casualties were: Ninth Infantry, 1 killed, 5 wounded; Marines, 1 wounded; Battery, 1 wounded.

As the Fourteenth Infantry had lost 8 killed and 57 wounded, the total American losses at Yang-tsun were 9 killed and 64 wounded.

The heat-prostrations had been many, and there were two deaths from that cause.

First Lieutenant T. M. Corcoran, Sixth Cavalry, was in charge of two Gatling guns, manned by nine men of the Ninth Infantry. Owing to heavy roads, these guns did not arrive in season to participate in the attack with the Ninth Infantry, but accompanied the marines, with whom they served during the day.

The enemy had been met twice and routed: at Pei-tsang, by the Japanese; and at Yang-tsun, mainly by Americans. This may be said without disparagement to other armies. It so happened that the Japanese struck the Chinese position at Pei-tsang, and gallantly swept its defenders away. It so happened that mainly the Americans struck the enemy's position at Yang-tsun, and carried it with equal gallantry.

Whichever army had met the Chinese at either of these places would probably have been victorious. So completely had the Chinese been routed at these battles that they made no stand until they got behind and upon the walls of Peking and the Imperial City.

There was an incident that occurred on the east side of the railroad which does not appear in official reports, because the officer, Captain Reilly, who witnessed it, was killed before he had made his report. Reilly's Battery was directing its fire on the enemy's position, but the officers could not see the effect, because the tall corn hid the enemy from view. The battery carried observation ladders, about fifteen feet long, that would raise a person above such obstructions, and give him a view of the surrounding country. Lieutenant Summerall ascended the ladder, and while in full view of and being fired upon by the enemy at short range, directed the fire of his guns. As he was the only person that could be seen by the enemy, he was a conspicuous target for them. It was an exceedingly hazard-

ous position. The simple relation of this incident is sufficient. It was a matter of frequent occurrence for Lieutenants Summerall and McClosky to stand on their caissons and direct the fire of their guns.

General Chaffee allowed the Fourteenth Infantry to attack on the west side of the railroad, by request of the British commander.

There was not room on that side of the road near the Chinese position for more than 3,000 troops to operate. The British had that number. The Russians and French also were on that side, but did not engage in the battle, except the Russian battery. After the battle was over, a company of Russian infantry arrived, and fired from the village across the railroad.

At the last conference of commanders at Tientsin it was agreed that the first step in the advance on Peking should end when Yang-tsun should have been taken. That accomplished, plans for further operations would be considered. The armies, therefore, remained at Yang-tsun on the 7th, buried the dead, and sent the wounded to Tientsin.

Although the campaign had lasted only three days, it had been of so trying a nature that the men needed the rest. Most of them had not been hardened to the march by any very recent campaigns, and they were comparatively soft. Many of them also were recruits, and had never before been engaged in battle. It is generally considered that the march is what most tests a soldier's endurance. But the experienced soldier knows that the strain of battle, if long continued, is more exhausting than the mere physical exertion of marching. It is especially wearing to the recruit. Though he may not feel it in the excitement of battle, when it is over, the relaxation is very trying, and in some cases it requires a long time to recover from it.

Chaplain Groves was untiring night and day in administering to the needs of the sick and wounded. He caused the name and necessary data of each soldier who died to be sealed in a bottle and buried with the body, so that it could be identified when it should be removed.

## CHAPTER XV.

On August 7th, at a conference of generals, it was decided to make a forward movement the next day, and concentrate the allied armies near Tsai-tsun. The Japanese, having the largest force, and being the most thoroughly equipped for the purpose—having more cavalry than the others—took the lead during the remainder of the advance on Peking. The other armies followed in the following order: Russian, American, British. The Japanese were to start at 4 A. M., but it took time to straighten out the 8,000 Japanese and 4,000 Russians on the road. Those who are not accustomed to seeing troops and trains on the march are little aware of the length of road it requires to straighten out a column. While the following rule is not accurate, and will vary under different circumstances, it is convenient to remember, and near enough to the truth for all practical purposes: A column of infantry with its trains will occupy about half a mile of road per thousand men. The Army of the Potomac occupied from fifty to sixty miles of road on the march. Large bodies of troops are marched on parallel roads as far as practicable, and if there are not roads enough, the trains take the roads and the troops march across the country, removing obstructions as they go along. Cavalry and artillery increase the length of a column enormously.

The Americans, therefore, were obliged to begin the march about three hours later than the head of the column; this was unfortunate, for it threw them back into the heat of the day, which they were the least fitted to endure, because of their service in the enervating climate of the Philippines. The British also were compelled to march in the heat of the day; their Indian troops, being natives of a hot country, seemed to suffer less than the others. The column crossed to the west side of the Pei-Ho at Yang-tsun, and remained on that side during the

remainder of the campaign. The distance marched that day by the route taken was about twelve miles. The day was oppressively hot. The road lay from one-fourth to three-fourths of a mile from the river and ran through almost continuous corn-fields. The corn was from ten to fifteen feet high. "The dust of ages," as it was called, rose at every footstep. The corn obstructed the breeze, and did not allow it either to blow away the dust or fan the burning faces of the fainting soldiers. Wells, the only sources of water, were far apart on this road, and correspondingly scarce. As the men sank down on the hot ground under the scorching sun, breathing air loaded with dust, with not a breath of air stirring, and famishing with thirst, many of them suffered heat-prostration.

The well water was generally good and cold enough to be refreshing. As 12,000 men had preceded [us,] it may well be imagined that the resources of the wells had been severely tested; some had failed, and in nearly all of them the water had become turbid. Buckets, ropes, and means of drawing too had been destroyed or carried away. It became necessary for every man to carry with him a cord to attach to his tin cup for the purpose of drawing water. These cords were used afterwards for a purpose never dreamed of, as we shall see further on.

The allied forces having been concentrated in the vicinity of Tsai-tsun on the evening of the 8th, it was decided by the commanders to continue the advance from day to day until Peking should be reached.

There was no resistance to speak of, and what there was was brushed away by the alert and energetic Japanese, who were in the lead.

The river is very crooked, and sometimes was four or five miles from the column. It was necessary, however, to bivouac near it every two or three days to obtain supplies from the fleet.

The country was interspersed with villages of mud houses, or partly mud and wood—there is an abundance of the former



and scarcity of the latter. Baked in the sun, the clay becomes very hard and durable. Many of the villages are surrounded by walls of the same material. And even houses within the villages are guarded by walls. The more pretentious villages, like Tung-Chow, are surrounded by brick walls, varying from twelve to twenty-five feet in height and thickness. Generally, towers rise high above the walls over the gates and at the corners and intervals between. Skillfully defended by troops of the civilized nations, the villages could be made impregnable to assault.

Many trees were found in these villages, and, when near wells, gave grateful shelter to our soldiers from the scorching sun. There was a fierceness in that China sun's rays which none had experienced in the tropics or our Southern States during the Civil War.

Its prostrating effect was unaccountable, and caused our men to fall by hundreds. After a long march, and when the men were lying under the refreshing shade of these trees, it was heartrending for many an officer to compel his men to put on their heavy burdens and move out into the heat and dust again. Many of them could not move; they had reached the limit of their endurance. The four ambulances were reserved for the severest cases, but forty could have been filled. The result was, the road was strewn with fainting soldiers. These suffering men found a friend in Chaplain Groves. He was mounted, but oftener a soldier was on his horse than himself. He was constantly in attendance on the severest cases, giving such aid as was possible. He would generally arrive at the bivouac of his regiment hours after it had gone into camp for the night. In some instances he would be out late, and yet be ready for the early start in the morning. Such conduct as this needs no comment.



VIEW AT YANG-TSUN JUST BEFORE THE FIGHT.

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or parts of villages were burned. Sometimes the scarcity of fuel necessitated the burning of furniture, doors, window-frames, and whatever was made of wood, for cooking purposes. When necessary, this is justifiable, but it should be limited to strict necessity.

The Japanese advance guard had an occasional brush with the Chinese rear guard, but the progress of the march was not retarded by them. Dead bodies of Chinamen, non-combatants, were too often found along the road. These remained unburied, and were food for dogs and hogs and crows and buzzards. How frequently one was reminded of the prophecy: "And their dead bodies shall be food for the birds of the heavens, and for the beasts of the field!"

A raised wagon road, from six to twelve feet high and about twelve feet wide, ran from Tientsin to Peking. It was very crooked, as all Chinese roads are. The object is to prevent the passage of evil spirits, for they always fly on straight lines, according to Chinese lore. Part of the way the armies marched on this road, for it raised the soldiers above the corn-fields, where they found refreshing breezes and comparative freedom from dust. But to follow it too closely would increase the distance; so, like the evil spirits, as the Chinamen doubtless thought they were, they descended to the corn-fields to cut off angles. The roads through the corn-fields were natural roads. Whatever line the Chinese carts marked out became the road. There were no bridges; none were needed. Not a stream of water was crossed on the route.

It was necessary to guard the road and river between Tientsin and Peking, it being the line of communication. Company G, Ninth Infantry, was left at Pei-tsang, and Company C, same regiment, at Ho-Hsi-woo. At Matow Captain Hasbrouck was left with 150 men, who were reported as unable to march; 20 enlisted men were left also at Tung-Chow. At all these places foreign troops enough were left to make the garrisons sufficiently strong to resist any reasonable force.

The Allies bivouacked as follows:

August 4th, at Si-Koo;  
August 5th, at Tao-Wa-She;  
August 6th and 7th, at Yang-tsun;  
August 8th, at Tsai-tsun;  
August 9th, at Peh-Meaou;  
August 10th, at Tsun-Ping, Matow;  
August 11th, at Chang-Chai-Wan;  
August 12th, at Tung-Chow;  
August 13th, at Kai-Pei-Tien.

It was expected that the enemy would make a stand at Tung-Chow. The Japanese advance guard moved early on the morning of the 12th, and reached the south gate without resistance. They blew open the gate and found the village deserted. The armies were in bivouac by noon. The Japanese advance guard had pushed on about seven miles farther, and was within five or six miles of Peking.

General Linivitch, the Russian commander, sent a note to the other commanders during the afternoon, recommending that the armies rest at Tung-Chow for a day. This proposition did not meet the approval of the other commanders, and they called on General Linivitch and urged an advance the next day. He said he could not move; his men must rest. It was finally agreed, however, that the 13th should be devoted to reconnoissance.

A canal extends from the Pei-Ho River, near Tung-Chow, to a point just south of the Tung-pein gate of the Tartar City of Peking. A paved road runs parallel with and just north of the canal. The Japanese were to reconnoiter north of the road, the Americans south of the canal, and the British about a mile and a half to the left of the Americans. It was agreed also that on the 14th the armies should advance to the line held by the advance guard of the Japanese, and then a conference of generals should be held to determine methods of attack on Peking on the 15th. The reader should bear this in mind when he reads the following pages.

## CHAPTER XVII.

On the morning of the 13th, General Chaffee, with the Fourteenth Infantry, Reilly's Battery, and Troop M, Sixth Cavalry, reconnoitered the road on which the Americans were to move to a point within five miles of Peking. This was in accordance with the agreement. Captain Cabell, with six men of L Troop, while moving forward, came to a village where there were some Chinese soldiers. He charged through the village, driving the enemy away. Meeting with no further resistance, General Chaffee ordered the remainder of the American forces to concentrate at this advanced position. This was accomplished about midnight. The Japanese reconnoitered their own and the Russian fronts.

General Chaffee states that, "For reasons unknown to me, the Russians left their camp at Tung-Chow about the time that my troops were marching to close on my advance guard; they followed the road that had been assigned to them, and about 9 o'clock heavy firing was heard in the vicinity of Peking." This firing continued during the night, and speculation was rife among the Allies as to what it meant. The artillery firing was rather heavy at times, and occasionally small-arms firing broke out in considerable volume. Until midnight it seemed to be coming nearer to the camp of the Allies. Having drawn the allied forces far from their base, had the Chinese concentrated their hordes to carry out the promise of Tung-Fuh-Siang to the Empress Dowager to drive the foreign devils into the sea? Had they at the same time an army moving on Tientsin to cut off supplies and intercept retreat, should any survive to reach that point? These were questions asked, but more in a humorous than serious vein.

It was, however, supposed to be the last effort of the Chinese to overcome and destroy the Legation guards and massacre all

whom they were protecting. And as the night wore on and the firing grew fainter, gloomy forebodings arose in our minds. Was it possible that when relief was so near, it was yet just to late? For many an anxious member of that relief expedition there was no sleep that night. Everyone felt that he was engaged in a righteous cause, and was stimulated to energetic exertion thereby.

General Chaffee continued: "It was the next day ascertained that they [the Russians] had moved forward during the previous evening and had attacked the 'Tung-pein gate,' an east gate of the city near where the Chinese wall joins the Tartar wall."

The road south of the canal on which the Americans were to advance led through this gate into the Chinese City. The Russians, therefore, had deflected to their left and struck the wall in the American front. Had they kept the paved road, as agreed, they would have struck the Chi-ho gate, one and a fourth miles north, which leads into the Tartar City.

About daybreak on the morning of the 14th a Japanese staff officer inquired of General Chaffee if he knew where the Russians were. The General replied that they must be at Tung-Chow, or on his right across the canal. The Japanese officer said they were not across the canal. As it had been agreed that this day should be devoted to reconnoissance and preparations for the attack on Peking on the 15th, General Chaffee made his plans accordingly.

Captain Eastman, with Companies E, F, K, Fourteenth Infantry, was ordered to be in readiness to move at 5 o'clock on the morning of the 14th, but did not move until about 7 o'clock. About 5 A. M., Captain Cabell, with his troop, moved out in the direction of Peking, leaving surplus equipage in camp. Soon after a body of about 200 French troops followed on the same road. The commander informed General Chaffee that he was marching to join the Russians in advance. The General informed him that there were no troops in front, except

a troop of cavalry he had just sent out, and that the Russians were on our right. Up to this hour, about 6 o'clock, it was not known by General Chaffee that the Russians had moved forward during the night.

About 7 o'clock, Mr. Lowry, an interpreter, who had accompanied Captain Cabell, rushed back, saying that the cavalry had been attacked and surrounded by Chinese cavalry. General Chaffee hurriedly came to the Fourteenth Infantry camp, and said: "I want some *soldiers*; my cavalry is surrounded." He took Captain Eastman's battalion, that was in readiness, and hastened to the rescue. On arrival at the scene of action, a mile and a half distant, he found the cavalry in no danger, but firing from the roofs of houses into a village in their front. While pressing forward, however, in great haste, General Chaffee overtook the 200 French troops, and it was with much difficulty that he persuaded the French commander to let the Americans pass.

Captain Cabell's orders were to reconnoiter to the walls of Peking, unless sooner checked. When within about two miles of Peking, his advance guard was fired upon from a village. The troop dismounted to fight on foot. Lieutenant Guiney, with six men, was sent forward to develop the enemy. He was fired upon by ten or twelve mounted men and some dismounted. The Lieutenant then withdrew, when an attack was made on our right rear. The troop was then mounted and trotted about five hundred yards to the rear, where a position was taken up in a walled enclosure, and word sent back to General Chaffee. The man who bore the message, being unaccustomed to such duty, represented the situation as critical.

General Chaffee continued the reconnoissance, without much resistance, to a point near the northeast corner of the Chinese City. This is about four hundred yards east of the southeast corner of the Tartar City. General Chaffee deemed it advisable to hold this advanced position, and ordered the rest of his troops to concentrate on this line. He had learned that the

Russians moved forward during the night; the Japanese guns could be heard still farther to the right. The British did not leave Tung-Chow till the morning of the 14th, and did not arrive at Peking till noon. The American left, therefore, was uncovered except by a troop of British cavalry.

The remainder of the Fourteenth Infantry and the battery moved out about 7 o'clock, and advanced through a slightly rolling country towards Peking. The Ninth Infantry and the marines followed about an hour later.

Having advanced about three miles, the battery went into position on a high knoll on the left of the road. The right platoon, Lieutenant Burgess, fired about twenty shots at the nearest tower of the Tartar City at an estimated distance of thirty-two hundred yards. The tower was set on fire. A man of the battery, having been sent out a short distance to the left, was fired upon and wounded. General Chaffee then ordered Lieutenant Summerall, with two guns, to move about a mile to the front, and open fire on what was supposed to be the enemy advancing towards our left. The General was very anxious, and properly so, about his left, until the British arrived, about noon. The remainder of the battery soon followed, and directed its fire in the same direction.

The left platoon was again advanced to a point near the northeast corner of the wall of the Chinese City, where it fired on the east wall of that city.



## CHAPTER XVIII.

Before the two guns moved forward, General Chaffee took Company E, Fourteenth Infantry, Lieutenant Gohn, and moved forward along the bank of the canal. At the same time he ordered Colonel Daggett, with Company H, Lieutenant Mullay, to advance on the road parallel with the canal, and which led to the Tung gate of the Chinese City. Lieutenant Gohn met no resistance until he arrived near the bridge which crosses the moat running parallel with the east wall of the Chinese City. A severe fire from this wall and also from the east wall of the Tartar City was directed on this bridge by the Chinese. E Company crossed the bridge, and proceeded along the base of the wall about two hundred yards to a projecting bastion. The appearance of these men drew the enemy to that vicinity and increased their fire. It became necessary to rush H Company across the bridge one by one. Both companies were sheltered under the north wall of the Chinese City. This gave an opportunity to look about and consider the situation. Some Russian soldiers were across the canal behind houses, and could move neither forward, to the rear, nor to the right or left. It was ascertained that the Russian artillery had opened the Tung gate during the night, and a few soldiers were securely cooped up within the archway. All these Russian soldiers had been in this situation since 3 o'clock in the morning. The remaining distance of two hundred yards to the gate was so exposed to fire from the east wall of the Tartar City that a rush to that gate was not deemed advisable. The wall must be cleared of the enemy somehow, and to do it our soldiers must find a way to get on top of that wall. It was perpendicular and thirty feet high. There were no scaling-ladders, no ropes, no tools with which to construct means of ascent. There was absolutely nothing with those companies but their rifles. While casting about for

some means for climbing those walls, Captain Learnard discovered that bricks had fallen out in many places, leaving cavities and corresponding projections all the way to the top of the wall. He suggested interrogatively that it might be possible to climb to the top by using the cavities and projections as a ladder. It seemed a difficult and dangerous undertaking. The wall was surmounted by a crenelated parapet. Hundreds of Chinese soldiers might be hiding behind it. A volunteer was called for to make the attempt. Immediately there stepped forward a young soldier who had been noted for his unspotted character and clean life. It was Trumpeter Calvin P. Titus, Company E, Fourteenth Infantry. He said: "I will try." Divesting himself of everything that would impede his progress, he began the ascent.

With what interest did the officers and men watch every step as he placed his feet carefully in the cavities and clung with his fingers to the projecting bricks! The first fifteen feet were passed over without serious difficulty, but there was a space of fifteen feet above him. Slowly he reaches the twenty-foot point. Still more carefully does he try his hold on those bricks to see if they are firm. His feet are now twenty-five feet from the ground. His head is near the bottom of an embrasure. All below is breathless silence. The strain is intense. Will that embrasure blaze with fire as he attempts to enter it? or will the butts of rifles crush his skull? Cautiously he looks through, and sees and hears nothing. He enters, and, as good fortune would have it, no Chinese soldiers are there. Titus stands in the embrasure, and informs those below that he thinks others can climb the wall in the same way, but adds some qualifications to his expressions.

Captain Learnard is the next to attempt the ascent, and is followed by Lieutenant Gohn and men of his company. Lieutenant Hanson soon follows.

Orders were given for the company to scale the wall. Leaving every ounce of weight behind, such men as were able to accomplish so difficult an undertaking began the ascent.

Captain Learnard was directed by his regimental commander to conduct the operations on the wall. The enemy soon discovered our soldiers on the wall, and opened rifle fire upon them from two directions, and artillery fire from a third. The men found cover behind the parapet of the bastion. But only five men were up there, and they with only two rifles. Here the cords with which the men drew water from the wells, and previously referred to, were put to an extraordinary use. They were let down from the top of the wall, tied to rifles and ammunition-belts, and drawn up; gun-slings were fastened together and used for the same purpose. In this way all rifles and ammunition were raised to the top of the wall.

As the men were armed, they opened fire on the enemy, and soon silenced their artillery and reduced the severity of their rifle fire. At a distance, our men might be taken for Chinese soldiers and fired upon by some of the allied forces. It therefore was necessary to indicate what soldiers they were. The flag was with the Third Battalion, some distance away. Private Detrick, the regimental commander's mounted orderly, was sent for it. He had been a cavalryman, and was a fine rider. Mounting his horse, he started on a full gallop, crossed the bridge before mentioned, where he was exposed to a terrific fire, and returned over the same route with the flag in an incredibly short time. It was 11:03 o'clock A. M. At this time fifteen or twenty soldiers were on the wall—enough to protect the flag. It was drawn up by a cord. It was a cloudless day, and a gentle breeze was blowing. As that flag was unfurled and stood out against that August sky, there went up to heaven a shout of triumph that Spartans might have envied. Even the stolid Russians, who had been watching the operations from their position near by, caught the spirit of enthusiasm and echoed back the triumphant shout.

In his official \*report, General Chaffee said: "At 11 A. M. two companies of the Fourteenth Infantry \* \* \* \* had

\*See Appendices I. and V.

scaled the wall of the Chinese City at the northeast corner, and the flag of that regiment was the first foreign colors unfurled upon the walls surrounding Peking."

In the meantime Company H, Lieutenant Mullay and Lieutenant Gilbreth, were scaling the wall about two hundred yards to the east. There were not as many cavities in the wall at that point. Bamboo poles and wire were found, and a ladder improvised, by which they ascended. The orders were for all who could accomplish the difficult task to scale the wall. Only twenty-five of Company E attempted it. Some accidents occurred. One man fell, receiving permanent injuries.

Some time after the flag had been planted on the wall, Captain Crozier, now Chief of Ordnance, and Lieutenant Furguson, Engineer Corps, scaled the wall. The flag drew considerable fire from the Chinese artillery, which was stationed behind breastworks on the wall near the east gate of the Chinese City, through which the British troops passed later on without opposition. Lieutenant Furguson asked Captain Learnard if he could be of assistance. The Captain replied that it was of importance that the battery shell the Chinese artillery, just referred to. Lieutenant Furguson immediately descended and bore the message to Captain Reilly, who quickly comprehended the situation, and began a vigorous shelling of the Chinese position. This, with the constantly increasing volume of infantry fire from Captain Learnard's position, soon silenced the enemy's artillery.

When a portion of the two companies and their rifles were upon the wall, Captain Learnard swept it clear of the enemy, descended on a ramp inside, and came out through the gate in which the Russians were confined. This movement cleared the way to this gate, and released the few Russians who were cooped up within and others who were equally helpless behind buildings outside.

It was a little after noon. A street ran directly south from the gate, crossing Tan-Sang bridge, which spans the moat that

runs east and west and parallel with the south wall of the Tartar City. The street is very narrow, and is lined on both sides with houses. The bridge is about one hundred yards from the gate. The tower on the southeast corner of the wall of the Tartar City was about two hundred yards from the bridge; the latter, therefore, was in full view of the Chinese soldiers in the tower. It was exposed also to an oblique fire from the south wall of the Tartar City. The wall of the Tartar City is about forty-five feet high and the same in thickness.

The street before described was in great confusion. A Russian gun and its horses and a few infantrymen soon arrived, and, taking position behind the houses, were concealed from the view of the Chinese in the tower. They placed the gun behind a house, and, pointing it in the direction of the tower, fired through the house. How effective this fire was I am unable to say. In the meantime Captain Eastman arrived with Company G of his battalion. Necessity only would have justified an attempt to cross the Tan-Sang bridge. It was found that just below and partly under the shelter of the bridge there was but little water in the moat, and men could be rushed across without much loss. \*This was accomplished by Companies E and G, Fourteenth Infantry, the men running a few yards apart. Strange to say, not a man was hit during this operation, though exposed to fire from the tower and wall. These companies were assembled behind some houses to await further orders.

The Legations were about a mile and a half to the west and within the Tartar City.

Chinese troops occupied this wall, except about one hundred yards of it nearest to the Legations. After investigation, it was decided to move west on a street running parallel with and about two hundred yards from this wall. In moving forward, the fire was severe at the crossings of the streets running north and south. These companies, therefore, climbed on the roofs of buildings along the street and fired over the ridge-poles,

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\*See Appendix.

through the embrasures of the walls, driving away some of the Chinese and reducing their fire. These companies proceeded slowly westward until their ammunition was expended, when they had to suspend further operations. It was about 3 o'clock. Word was sent back to hurry up the other companies of the battalion and ammunition. Soon after, Captain Eastman arrived with H Company, and the work was resumed. About 4 o'clock Lieutenant Murphy discovered a small flag waving above the wall and suspended firing, and someone called to him from an embrasure. This he reported to his regimental commander, when firing ceased all along the line. The point on the wall of the Tartar City which had been held by the Legation guards during the whole siege had been reached. It was a man of the First Regiment, United States Marines, who waved the flag and called out to our troops. He informed us that we could enter by passing through the water gate under the wall. About this time General Chaffee arrived.

## CHAPTER XIX.

Before proceeding further, let us return to the operations of our other troops while the Fourteenth Infantry was engaged in the work just described. About 9 A. M. we left Reilly's Battery on a knoll firing at the tower at an estimated distance of thirty-two hundred yards; except Lieutenant Summerall's platoon, which had advanced about a mile and was firing at what was supposed to be the enemy advancing on our left. Before the British arrived about noon, as before stated, our left was exposed, except what cover was afforded by a troop of British cavalry. The enemy was located in the south and east, and it was from those directions that his movements must be guarded against. General Chaffee, therefore, was on the alert to prevent any surprise from this source. He had with him the battery, the Ninth Infantry, Major Quinton's battalion of the Fourteenth Infantry, and the marines.

About 11:20 A. M., General Chaffee's attention was called to the Fourteenth Infantry flag on the wall near the Tung gate. The British advance, being near, relieved the American left. General Chaffee then ordered all of his troops that had not entered the city to move to the Tung gate. Here everything was in confusion. A Russian battery and company of infantry were in the narrow street. The American troops that had just arrived were trying to press their way through. Reilly, somehow, forced two of his guns—the left platoon—through, and, by tearing down a building, got them into action. While tearing down the building one of the guns fired into the tower from the narrow street. In this he was assisted by Captain Eastman with a company of the Fourteenth Infantry. / Lieutenant Burgess says: "Lieutenant Kilbourne, Fourteenth Infantry, rendered valuable assistance by covering the movement of the

platoon in this position with a squad of infantry under his command."

The artillery and infantry fire soon drove the Chinese out of the tower, and rendered the crossing of the Tan-Sang bridge comparatively safe. The left platoon remained in this position, firing on the south wall of the Tartar City until 5:30 in the afternoon. The four other guns crossed the Tan-Sang bridge and ford, and proceeded in a westerly direction. At the crossing of the street near the Hai-ta gate a gun was put in position to silence the fire at that point from the wall, which it did. The first platoon then proceeded to and entered the Chein gate, and fired one shot at the gate of the Imperial City, when orders were received to suspend further operations.

The center platoon, Lieutenant McClosky, proceeded also along a street parallel to the wall of the Tartar City, and when within about four hundred yards of the Hai-ta gate, fired about twenty shots into it. Moving to the western opening of the gate, it fired two shells into the opening, "raising the portcullis eighteen inches from the ground." The battery was then assembled for the purpose of entering the grounds of the Legations.

During the forenoon of the 14th, and while the battery was in different positions east of the Chinese City, the third battalion of the Fourteenth Infantry was its support. About noon the Ninth Infantry moved to the Tung-pien gate, where it was delayed by the crowded condition in the narrow entrance and street beyond. It finally moved forward, following the route passed over by the Fourteenth Infantry and battery. It placed a few men on the buildings to keep down "snipers" that remained on the wall.

The marines acted as guard to the wagon-train much of the time. Company A, Lieutenant Butler, was sent to the wall of the Chinese City, and placed a few men thereon to prevent "sniping."



Let us now return to the point reached by the Fourteenth Infantry, where they came in contact with the Legation guard on the wall of the Tartar City. It was about 4 o'clock. The way was now clear to enter the Tartar City. There not being room for a large force to enter, a detail was made for that purpose. General Chaffee said in his official report that, "The Fourteenth Infantry was selected on this occasion in recognition of gallantry at Yang-tsun, and during this day." This regiment entered through the water gate under the wall. The battery also was selected to accompany the infantry, and passed through the Chein gate, which was opened for them by the American and Russian marines of the Legation guards.

As is well known, the beleaguered people had been confined within the limits of the British Legation grounds. Followed by the troops selected, General Chaffee proceeded to the house where Major Conger, the American minister, and his family and many other Americans were. The men stacked arms in the shade of the beautiful trees and where there was an abundance of cool water. The officers were invited into the house. As we entered a momentary silence seemed to prevail. There they stood, face to face, the rescued and the rescuers. At last the venerable Rev. Dr. Martin, with trembling voice, said: "We are glad to see you." Conversation then gradually became general, but in low, subdued tones of voice. Somehow, all seemed to be under the influence of a spell, which no one was willing to break. A lady, with a little girl in her arms and another by her side, related the following experience: She said they had lived for almost two months in constant fear of a fate worse than death. If the Chinese had broken through their lines, they, the beleaguered people, would have been tortured in all ways Chinese ingenuity could devise, while women would have suffered even a worse fate. Her husband and herself had considered thoroughly what they would do if the Chinese should overpower them. They decided that if the husband should be with his family at the time, he would shoot his wife.

and children and then himself. If he should be absent on the wall—for he was taking his turn with his rifle with the guards—the mother was to shoot her children and then herself. This was talked over so familiarly in the family during those dreadful days that the horror of this contemplated act seemed to lose its keenest edge. Others among them, missionaries, took another view of the situation. They said God had sent them there, and they would submit to whatever torture and death might befall them. When torture and final death are certain, who can blame the father or mother for putting their loved ones beyond the reach of suffering?

The Legation guards on the wall of the Tartar City had watched with intense interest the advance of the two Fourteenth Infantry companies as they drew nearer and nearer, and the booming of Reilly's guns that were enfilading the same wall so effectively. The Legations were in constant communication with the guards on the wall, and were informed of the progress of the Americans. Although an immense wall was still between them and the Allies, they felt that, somehow, barriers would be broken down, and relief soon reach them. They therefore had time to array themselves in the best raiment they had, and make a presentable appearance. What a contrast between their appearance and that of the officers and men who had just released them! They had not changed clothing for ten days. They had marched in the most intense heat, their clothing soaked with sweat and muddy with adhering dust. They had passed through the supreme hours for which armies are organized and kept in existence—the hours of battle. They had reached, in some cases, the limit of endurance. Some had fallen by the wayside, never to rise; others had fallen by the bullet. And having just come from such scenes as the scaling of the walls and the battle on the roofs, their faces grimy, haggard, shriveled, the contrast could not have been greater than between the parties now mingling with such affecting emotions.

Within the Legations the ladies and children wore pale and wan faces, and some of the former that sweetest of all faces,

the chastened countenance, the product of intense suffering sustained by Christian faith.

There have been so many descriptions of the fortifications and manner of defense of the Legations, that no attempt will be made here to show how these people heroically fought the Chinese for nearly two months. Suffice it to say, that the appearances gave sufficient evidence of the severity of the siege. I do not think the picture has been or could well be overdrawn.

The Rev. Dr. Nevins, rector of the American Church at Rome, is reported in the *New York Sun* of November 17, 1901, to have said:

“Really, I was astonished to find what a comparatively trivial thing that siege was. \* \* \* \* No one would dream, I told him [the British minister], that the place had been bombarded. To my utter astonishment, I found that none of the buildings I had been examining had been hit at all. They had not been fired on. \* \* \* \*

“Take into consideration the fact that no \*non-combatant was killed or wounded, and that no one died of disease during the siege, and I think we have a new and less romantic view of the whole proceeding.”

If Dr. Nevin used this language, he was strangely ignorant of what he was talking about. I, as well as many others, saw hundreds of thousands of bullet-marks, as well as evidence of artillery fire. While we were in the Legation grounds on the 14th, and after the Chinese had been driven from the nearest positions they held during the siege, a scattering fire was continued, and one woman wounded while we were standing there.

\*See Appendix.

The following is a list of casualties at the British Legation:

Non-combatants killed .....	12
Non-combatants wounded .....	<u>23</u>
Total .....	35
Combatants killed .....	53
Combatants wounded .....	<u>145</u>
Total .....	233

At the Catholic church, Pei-tang:

Combatants killed .. . . . .	10
Combatants wounded .. . . . .	<u>12</u>
Total .. . . . .	22

Total killed and wounded at both places . . . . . 255

Total of Legation guards at beginning of siege, 450

It is our duty now to record a great disappointment: the British had preceded the Americans into the Legation grounds.

It will be remembered that in the advance from Tung-Chow to Peking, the position of the British contingent was on the left of the Americans. They also did not arrive at the walls of the Chinese City till about noon. At that hour the Americans had scaled the walls and cleared them of the Chinese, leaving the British to enter the Sha-ku gate without opposition. Their course was then due west on a wide street running through the Chinese City about half a mile to the left of and parallel to the course of the Americans when they were clearing the south wall of the Tartar City. The route of the Americans, therefore, was always between the Chinese and the British column. The latter, therefore, met no opposition in entering either the Chinese or Tartar City. Had not the two companies of the Fourteenth Infantry been obliged to suspend operations in their battle on the roofs for lack of ammunition, they probably would have entered the Tartar City first. As it was, they did the fighting and the British gathered the fruits. This is not in disparagement of the British. They kept their agreement, and it so happened that the Chinese were not in their front as they advanced.

The troops were withdrawn from the Legation grounds about 6 o'clock, and the Americans went into bivouac just outside of

the south wall of the Tartar City. While there they were exposed to fire from the same wall farther west. It rained some that night, and, while it laid the dust, it made the ground muddy, which is worse for a camp than dust.

The casualties for the day had been slight for the work accomplished:

Fourteenth Infantry. . . . .	1 killed.
Fourteenth Infantry . . . . .	8 wounded.
Battery F, Fifth Artillery. . . . .	1 wounded.

The Russians and Japanese did not enter their gates till the next morning.

When the Americans went into bivouac under the walls of Peking the night of August 14, 1900, it was with the consciousness that they had done a good work. A terrible fate had been hanging over the more than 800 foreigners and 3,000 native Christians for nearly two months. Harrowing accounts of massacre and torture had given impulse to the advancing army. The determination to save these beleaguered human beings from such a fate caused what seemed the impossible to be done. It scaled the perpendicular walls thirty feet high without ladders or other means; it fought the battle on the roofs. The Legations had been relieved; the mission of the Allies had been accomplished. A satisfaction, born only of such stress of circumstances, filled the breasts of the allied forces that night.

While the troops were preparing for the coming winter, another organization also was making preparations to carry on its work during that season; it was the Young Men's Christian Association. A day or two after the Fourteenth Infantry had been ordered to China, Dr. John M. Phipps, a secretary of the Association, came to me and asked permission to sail with the fleet to China. Permission was gladly given, and he boarded one of the transports with whatever materials he thought he could handle. During the voyage he was taken sick with fever, and, on arrival at Taku, was removed to Tientsin, where he was placed in hospital in the Methodist Mission.

At Tientsin we found Mr. Robert E. Lewis, a secretary of the Association, who had been stationed at Shanghai for some time, laboring for the interests of the Association in North China. Mr. Lewis arrived at Tientsin on July 13th, the day of the battle. He immediately established Y. M. C. A. headquarters near the barracks of the Ninth United States Infantry. The Welsh Fusileers being not far distant, he organized a Bible class among them and other English troops, and made frequent visits among the American and English soldiers. On the arrival of the Fourteenth United States Infantry, Mr. Lewis expressed a desire to be attached to that regiment for the coming campaign, and was received with a warm welcome. And while no better chaplain ever served with troops than our own chaplain, Groves, we knew there would be great need of men to assist in caring for the sick and wounded; and well did he fulfill his mission. At the battle of Peh-tsang, which was fought principally by the Japanese, he found a representative of the Y. M. C. A. among them, and they went to the firing-line, where they gave aid and comfort to the wounded. At the battle of Yang-tsun he followed the advance of the Fourteenth Infantry, rescuing the wounded from exposed positions and placing them behind grave-mounds. He rode a mile to the rear, and gave the surgeon information on which he moved the ambulances to the front. Understanding somewhat the topography of Tung-Chow, he gave General Linivitch information on which he ordered the movement of the Russian troops. He was at the foot of the wall on August 14th, when the two companies of the Fourteenth Infantry scaled the walls of Peking.

After the beleaguered Legations had been relieved, Secretary Lewis provided the troops with correspondence paper, envelopes, reading matter, etc. Owing to illness, he was unable to extend his labors among the men as far as he desired to.

After Secretary Phipps had recovered from his sickness, he began his labors at Tientsin among the troops there, and while his work was principally with American soldiers, he extended it,

to some extent, to the troops of foreign nations, as did Mr. Lewis at Peking.

Mr. R. R. Gailey, permanent secretary for Tientsin, arrived, and carried on the work with Secretary Phipps. In September Mr. Phipps went to Peking and relieved Mr. Lewis, who then returned to Shanghai, his former station.

It will be seen, therefore, that the Young Men's Christian Association was represented at every stage of the campaign for the relief of the Legations, and rendered practical assistance and relief to the soldiers of the allied forces.

In that far-off, strange country the men could hear the familiar hymns they used to hear in their churches at home. Comfortable rooms were fitted up, and there were the same comforts and conveniences as were found in the Philippines.

This Association has shown wonderful wisdom and perseverance in its work in the Army. Never obtrusive, but ever present, to lend a helping hand wherever needed. No danger, no hardship seemed to deter its secretaries from going where they thought they could be of service to the soldiers. Secretary Jackson went to Bacoor, twelve miles south of Manila, in the fall of 1899, and held services in the old church, while the crack of the rifle was frequently heard, and an attack was liable to occur at any moment.

These things were done, not in a spirit of bravado, but for the sole purpose of being of service to the soldiers in the field and on the firing-line. Many a parent may well thank this Association for the moral and religious restraints that it threw around their sons, and saved them from degradation and death.

## CHAPTER XX.

Although the mission of the allied forces seemed to have been accomplished, the enemy still remained within the Imperial and Forbidden Cities. From the walls of the former they continued a desultory but annoying fire. While it did not do much damage, it must be stopped. Company F, Fourteenth Infantry, Captain Tilson, was placed on the wall of the Tartar City, near the Chein gate, on the evening of the 14th, and did guard duty that night. This held the wall clear for any further operations that might be determined upon.

The court in front or inside the Chein gate was occupied by Reilly's Battery. Just before entering the Legation grounds on the afternoon of the 14th, the battery was temporarily withdrawn to accompany the troops to those grounds. During its absence Russian troops were stationed at the gate. On his return from the Legation, General Chaffee moved with troops to reoccupy this court, when he found the way barred by Russian troops. He objected, and informed General Linivitch that he had first seized the court with his troops, and that he had not abandoned it by the temporary withdrawal of the battery. General Linivitch declined to withdraw his troops. In some way news of this disagreement reached Minister Conger. About 11 o'clock that night, Mr. Squires, secretary of the American Legation, and the secretary of the Russian Legation called on General Chaffee. It was decided that the troops would be ready to move the next morning at 7 o'clock, and if the Russian troops were ready, they could pass the Americans. At the hour named there was no appearance of any movement in the Russian camp.

Having decided to attack the Imperial City, General Chaffee ordered his troops to concentrate at the Chein gate. About 7:30, on the morning of the 15th, four guns were placed on the



wall of the Tartar City, over the Chein gate. These guns were the right platoon, Lieutenant Burgess, and the center platoon, Lieutenant McCloskey. The marines also were placed upon that wall near the guns. Two companies occupied the second story of the tower, from which they fired during the day. Three guns were trained on the Shun-Chih gate, a mile and a quarter to the west, from which the enemy opened fire with infantry and poor artillery. The other gun was trained on the Imperial City. While the three guns were firing westward, the one pointing toward the Imperial City was silent. A severe fire was opened from the second wall in that city, half a mile distant. Lieutenant McCloskey's platoon opened on them, and continued firing during the operations about to be narrated.

The Fourteenth Infantry left camp about 7 A. M., followed by the Ninth Infantry, with the expectation of going into camp in another part of the city. It was rumored that possibly we might find some of the enemy on the ground to be occupied and have to brush them away. No other thought was in our minds. After marching a short distance, General Chaffee came to the commanding officer of the Fourteenth, and said: "I want you to enter the Imperial City." Immediately after, Captain Crozier, of the General's staff, came to the same officer, and said: "The General directs that you enter the Imperial City. I will show you the way." Arriving at the gate, he said: "There is the gate. My duty ceases, yours begins." The regiment knew not what the Imperial City was, what was within, what means were to be employed. It had no means of scaling walls, nor battering-rams to break down gates. It had simply its Krag rifles. Perhaps it was thought the exploit the day before showed that it needed no means of scaling walls, other than toes and fingers. It was a step in the dark. There they were. A wall forty-five feet high, surmounted by a tower itself probably fifty feet high, barred the way. The wall was pierced by three archways, about fifteen feet high by twelve wide. These archways were closed by gates swinging to the center. They did not

close tightly, but left an aperture half an inch wide between them. On examination, it was found that the right and center gates were fastened, but the left one was ajar. It was found, also, that the center gate, the largest, must be opened to give ingress and egress to and from the court within. The gates were fastened by cross-beams eight or ten inches in diameter; these beams were fastened to the gates by a peculiar Chinese lock, an iron bar about three inches in diameter and two feet long. The gates were about eight inches thick, and made of very strong timber. With the means at our disposal, we could make no more impression on them than with a pen-knife. Two officers were sent, one to General Chaffee and one to Captain Reilly, with the request for two guns to blow open the gates. These officers and the battery were at the Chein gate, only about two hundred yards in the rear. The request was responded to, and in a few minutes Lieutenant Summerall, with the left platoon of his battery, was seen galloping to the gate. There was no doubt in our minds about the result of the request, nor the speed with which the guns would come.

Lieutenant Summerall, looking through the aperture, saw the location of the cross-beams, which he marked with chalk. He placed his guns within about twelve feet of the gates, and opened fire on them with shells. Hard and tough as they were, they could not stand this kind of treatment, and in a few minutes the cross-beams were cut off, the bolts broken, and the gates were swung open. The archways through the wall were about ninety feet long, the thickness of the wall. Beyond was a court, about seven hundred yards long and ninety wide. It was flanked on both sides by low, continuous brick buildings for about five hundred yards. At the farther end there was an immense wall forty-five feet high, upon which rose a tower fifty feet higher. At the farther end the court extended in wings to the right and left, which gave the wall a front of more than four hundred yards. On the top of the wall was a marble and crenelated parapet. In its front was a moat, spanned by a

marble bridge. This was the situation. Major Quinton was directed to send a platoon through the gate. He selected Lieutenant Murphy, with a platoon of his company, M, Fourteenth Infantry, for that purpose. The object of this movement was to develop the enemy. Lieutenant Murphy passed through the gate, deployed, and advanced about fifty yards, when a severe fire broke forth from the wall and tower. As quick as a flash these men dropped among the weeds and returned the enemy's fire, and with such effect as to materially reduce it. Being nearly hidden by the weeds, and using smokeless powder, our soldiers were not a conspicuous target. Our losses being very light, it was determined to increase the volume of fire.

Captain Martin, with the remaining platoon of his company, was ordered to reinforce Lieutenant Murphy's line. The movement of both Captain Martin's and Lieutenant Murphy's platoons into this dangerous place was one of the most interesting features of the campaign. The order and nerve displayed showed a discipline and control of troops which could not easily be excelled.

While the enemy's attention was being attracted in front, Captain Eastman was ordered to move on the Chinese left flank. He proceeded with Companies E and G, Fourteenth Infantry, on a street parallel with the wall of the Imperial City, and placed men on buildings from which they could reach the tower with their fire. Lieutenant Kilbourne, with a detachment, made a rush down a street to a barricade, from which he directed an effective fire. Lieutenant Burnside, with Company K, Fourteenth Infantry, also was sent around the enemy's left, and did effective work from the roofs of buildings and from trees. Lieutenant Sinclair succeeded in placing some of his platoon on trees and roofs to the Chinese left and rear of the gate, which was being attacked.

Major Quinton sent Captain Taylor, with his company, I, Fourteenth Infantry, round the Chinese left. Lieutenant Wagner climbed upon a building, to find a position where he

could deliver fire on the tower, and found it deserted. General Chaffee, being at that point, ordered Captain Taylor's company to return to the regiment.

While the flanking companies could easily reach the tower with their fire, they could not find positions high enough to bring their line of fire down to the enemy on the wall.

Let us return to the operations in front. The increase of volume of fire by adding the other platoon of Captain Martin's company to the firing-line practically silenced the fire of the enemy. The moral effect, however, of the flank fire that was being directed on them doubtless had its influence. Captain Martin's company expended its hundred rounds of ammunition in about twenty minutes. Lieutenant McClure, with his company, L, Fourteenth Infantry, was ordered to relieve Captain Martin's company. Proceeding through the archway, this company advanced to the firing-line. While Lieutenant McClure was in the act of relieving the company on the firing-line, our men must necessarily cease firing, unless the movement were executed in detail. The enemy took advantage of this cessation of fire, and opened a sharp fire on these two companies, which caused a momentary confusion on the left of Lieutenant McClure's company. Standing calmly while his men were lying down, Lieutenant McClure soon restored order, and quickly silenced the fire of the enemy. His company also expended its hundred rounds of ammunition per man in about twenty minutes. As the Chinese could lie behind the marble parapet in perfect safety both from the front and flank fire of infantry, it was decided to direct artillery fire against them. Lieutenant McClure, therefore, was withdrawn. The same may be said with regard to the behavior of this company as was said of Captain Martin's.

Lieutenant Summerall placed his two guns near the archway so that he could fire through it. His men were well protected. He opened with solid shot and shell on the parapet, and, when he got the range, he made things lively for the Chinamen. The

distance being only about seven hundred yards, the fire was very accurate.

Lieutenant Corcoran, with his Gatling gun, also came into action at this time, directing his fire through the left archway. He did good work.

Captain Cabell's troop of cavalry followed the artillery into the Tartar City and halted before the first gate of the Imperial City. Observing some "snipers" in trees to the right of the Chinese position, the Captain took five men and opened fire on them, and silenced their fire. The Captain dropped two Chinamen from the trees with his carbine. He had two horses killed in this court.

There being no appearance of the enemy on the wall, Lieutenant Mulla, with his company, H, Fourteenth Infantry, was ordered to deploy and advance to the wall, which he did without resistance. The whole Fourteenth Infantry followed. It should be borne in mind that only two battalions of this regiment were present. The First Battalion was in the United States.

While Major Quinton's battalion was advancing, a Russian company of infantry made its appearance, and was marching diagonally towards Major Quinton's line of march. As they approached the same line the Russians attempted to crowd the Major's battalion from their proper direction. The Major informed the Russian officer that the Americans had the right-of-way and that the Russians had no right in that court, as the Americans had undertaken the work, and were going to finish it. Of course the Russian objected, but the Major won.

## CHAPTER XXI.

After the advance to the second gate, a few shots were fired into the court, but from what point could not readily be discovered. Men were ordered to keep on the alert, and to mount such structures as it was possible to climb. They discovered Chinamen in corners and other places of concealment and on trees beyond. Those in the corners were shot or driven away. Lieutenant Summerall soon arrived with his two guns; the Ninth Infantry followed. Here were assembled the two infantry regiments and a platoon of artillery with its horses. The situation was dangerous. Had the enemy mounted that wall, as he could and should have done, and poured a fire upon that mass of soldiers, the result would have been disastrous. Men of both regiments were placed as quickly as possible on the low walls on the flanks, to guard against this danger. It was a difficult task, for there were no ladders. But one was improvised, and a few rifles were soon in effective positions, and that, the greatest danger, was passed.

The three gates and archways in this wall were like those in the first before described, but the apertures between them were wider, and a few shots were fired through them at our troops, before it was discovered where they came from. This is one of the perplexities caused by the use of smokeless powder.

The artillery was brought up, and blew open the gates in the same way as it did the first ones. These opened into another court, the same width as the first and about three hundred yards long. At the farther end were the same kind of wall and tower. On careful inspection, it was believed to be unoccupied by Chinese troops.

About this time some French artillery, being in position on the wall of the Tartar City, half a mile east of the Chein gate, opened fire on the gates we had just cleared, and their object

being only a short distance in front of us, our position was exposed. General Chaffee, seeing the situation, with some difficulty induced them to cease firing.

The Fourteenth Infantry and battery advanced to this wall. This third wall and gates were similar to the two former ones. The gates were blown open as before. Beyond was another court, flanked like the previous ones by buildings, and about five hundred yards long. This court was wider than the former ones, and had wings projecting about one hundred yards to the east and west, about two-thirds of the distance from the third wall.

Careful observation disclosed signs of troops on the fourth wall, but they lay low. Some officers, who had not observed as carefully as those in front, thought it was unoccupied, and entered the court. They returned.

Company E, Fourteenth Infantry, Lieutenant Gohn, entered the court and received a severe fire. It found cover for some of the men at the sides, and others ascended the wall by means of ramps on either side. Before the artillery could open fire, a wounded man was discovered lying at the further end of the archway, exposed to the fire of the enemy. Volunteers were called for to rescue the wounded man. Privates Kauffman, Company E, and Gloyd, Company H, stepped forward and took charge of a litter carried by Chinamen. They placed the wounded man on the litter, whom the bearers carried away on the run. Just as they had placed the wounded man on the litter, Kauffman was struck by a gingal bullet. Gloyd seized him and bore him to the rear of the archway. He lingered in great agony forty-eight hours, and died. He gave his life to save his comrade; but the latter died soon after he had been rescued. Private Gloyd was the means of rescuing both of his comrades from their perilous situations. And, though they died, his conduct was heroic, and reflected credit on his regiment, the Army, and his country.

The same means were employed as before, except that no troops were advanced into the court. The fourth wall having

been cleared, the Fourteenth Infantry and Lieutenant Summerall's guns advanced to the gates, followed by one battalion of the Ninth Infantry.

On looking through the apertures between the gates, it was discovered that they opened into the Forbidden City, sometimes called "The Sacred City," also "The Palace." The guns were about to be placed in position to blow open these gates. Preparations were being made by the infantry to enter this "holy of holies." It would have been accomplished in less than ten minutes, for those hours of experience had taught those soldiers how to do it. At that moment an aide came along. He said: "The General directs that you suspend all further operations." To the soldier, who looks only to the accomplishment of his object, there could not have been a greater disappointment. There was the Forbidden City, whose pavements, it is said, the foot of the white man had never pressed. The enemy had been driven away. American soldiers had sacrificed life. Only an undefended gate barred the way. The means were at hand. The skill and nerve to use them were there. Five minutes' time only intervened between those victorious soldiers and the fruits of their sacrifices.

But doubtless there were good diplomatic reasons why the Americans should not enter the Forbidden City that day. We turn away, the gates are closed, and everything restored, as far as practicable, to the conditions in which they were previous to the assault.

At a conference of generals held that afternoon it was decided not to occupy even the Imperial City. The Americans went into bivouac just outside the Tartar City. The Chien gate, however, was held by the Americans.

A stupendous work had been accomplished, when the means at hand are taken into consideration. The foreigners looked on with great interest. It is said that they did not believe that the Americans could drive the enemy from the Imperial City. But as gate after gate was taken, their interest became intense,



It was while the Americans were assaulting the third gate that General Chaffee was called to the conference which forbade entrance to the Forbidden City. Was it the success of the Americans during those eight hours that caused the conference to reach that conclusion?

A company of Italians entered the last court after all firing had ceased, and when the Americans were about to withdraw and close the gates, they showed some disinclination to leave. They left, however. It will be remembered that a company of Russians came in contact with Major Quinton's battalion in another court. What the motive of the Italians and Russians was in entering these courts after they had been taken by the Americans is best known to themselves.

The casualties during the 14th and 15th of August were as follows:

Fourteenth Infantry . . . . .	5 killed, 22 wounded.
Ninth Infantry . . . . .	1 killed, 4 wounded.
Battery F, Fifth Artillery . . .	1 killed, 1 wounded.
Fifth Regiment Marines . . . . .	0 killed, 2 wounded.
Total . . . . .	7            29

It was while the assault upon the gates was progressing that the American Army met with an irreparable loss. Captain Reilly was killed. At 8:50 o'clock that morning of August 15th, while directing the fire of his guns on the wall of the Tartar City over the Chein gate, a rifle ball passed through his head, and he died without a word or struggle. Thus ended a gentle and heroic life.

Captain Reilly, though young, made a fine record during the Civil War. Native ability, reinforced by conscientious application during the period between the Civil and Spanish-American Wars, placed him among the most intelligent and efficient artillerists in the Army. Joined to a fiery spirit and untiring energy, these qualities made him an ideal battery commander.

It was on the Imus River, Luzon, in October, 1890, where he rushed his guns within seventy-five yards of the enemy's rifle-

pits and drove them away. On that eventful 14th of August, 1900, he pressed his guns through the mass of confusion near the Tung-Pein gate, tore down buildings, and put them in action within two hundred yards of the tower filled with Chinese riflemen. It was a platoon of his battery that rushed at a gallop to the gate of the Imperial City on August 15th. These are only illustrations of the spirit with which Captain Reilly entered into the performance of all his duties. As a man, he was pure-minded, and possessed a genial and lovable disposition; as a patriot, none loved his country more.

The events of the 14th and 15th of August have been narrated in much, perhaps tedious detail for two reasons:

First, because of their importance. Eight hundred Caucasians and three thousand Mongolian Christians were threatened with torture and death; eight nationalities were interested in the relief of these human beings, although only five of them actually participated in the campaign; eight nations had never before had citizens exposed to a common destruction, and had joined in a combined effort to relieve them. Soon after the campaign was over, the Austrian, German, and Italian contingents arrived, the latter on the 15th.

The operations had been carried on, to some extent, in the presence of foreign troops, and naturally aroused a spirit of emulation. Comparisons must necessarily have been made. Each could learn from the merits and defects of the others.

Second, justice demands that what each organization did should be set forth in such a manner as to give credit for all it accomplished.

In the recital the Fourteenth Infantry seems to be prominent. But I think that no one who was on the ground will deny that it did just the things and just as related. Every effort has been made also to relate all that other organizations did. No act of consequence has been intentionally omitted. I am aware that one of the greatest faults of historians is omission. An event not recorded is presumed not to have transpired; so that as great harm may be done to an individual

or cause by omission as by willful misrepresentation. Especial effort, therefore, has been made to obtain all the facts that were worthy of record.

At a conference on the 16th the foreign ministers expressed their disapproval of the abandonment of the Imperial City. Yielding to the opinion of the ministers, the generals decided to reoccupy that city. General Chaffee ordered a detachment from the Ninth Infantry to take station there, which it did without resistance, and placed a guard at the gate of the Forbidden City. The guard was instructed to allow no one to enter without authority of the American commander.

The Forbidden City, however, was entered by the allied forces on August 28th, under the following circumstances:

A conference of foreign ministers and generals was held to determine what disposition should be made of that city. There was a division of opinion on the subject. Some argued that if the city should be left undisturbed, the Chinese would believe the gods had intervened and prevented those sacred pavements from being polluted by the tread of the hated foreigner. It was therefore thought best to occupy or at least enter the city, for the purpose of breaking down this superstition and teaching these people that they were at the mercy of the Allies.

On the other hand, it was said that the city had never been entered by the white man; that its invulnerability against the foreigner, superstition though it was, was so deeply imbedded in Chinese sentiment that to break and shatter it would crush the spirit of the Chinese, and that they might not recover from the blow. They might not be able to negotiate terms of peace with the Powers nor pay an indemnity. China might be partitioned. The former opinion prevailed.

It was decided that the city should not be occupied, but that a column should pass through the main street from the south to the north gate. The contingents from the eight nations had arrived, increasing the forces to something like 40,000 men. It would be impracticable to march so large a force through. Small details, therefore, representing each of the

nations, were selected to make up the "invading" force. The size of these detachments was intended to be nearly in proportion to the numbers of troops representing each nation, and in the following order: Japan, Russia, Germany, England, America, France, Italy, Austria. Considerable human nature was manifested in deciding the order in which the detachments should follow in the column. There was no dispute as to the propriety of the contingents that participated in the campaign taking the lead. Japan had led in the advance on Peking, and had the largest force present, and was entitled to the head of the column. Russia claimed it. After some controversy, Japan politely yielded, and Russia led the forces. Japan was second, England third, America fourth, France fifth, then Germany, Italy, and Austria.

The Americans guarded the south or main entrance to the Forbidden City. General Chaffee conferred with the chief attendant, who had been left in charge on the flight of the Empress Dowager. This attendant was horror-stricken at the proposition to march troops through the Sacred City, and protested against such a proceeding. But, after considerable conversation, he was informed that the Allies would enter at 9 o'clock on the morning of August 28th, and that, if no resistance should be made, the city would be left intact; if resistance should be made, the city might be destroyed. At the appointed hour the gates were swung open by the Chinese within.

The troops of the four nations that participated in the Relief Expedition were assembled in the large court between the first and second gates captured by the Americans two weeks before. The other contingents assembled in the adjoining court south and outside the Tartar City.

It was a sight not soon to be forgotten. Detachments from the armies of eight nations in their various uniforms were paraded for a common purpose; they flung to the breeze as many different national colors; they maneuvered by different systems of tactics; their bands played music peculiar to each nation; the trumpet-calls were odd and strange; only two of

them spoke the same language; and yet, when put in motion, military training brought about sufficient unity of movement in this body of troops. The route of march led through and around public buildings, which were approached by many marble stairs. Mounted officers were obliged to leave their horses behind.

Guards were stationed along the route to prevent persons who might have smuggled themselves in from looting.

The troops passed through and out at the north gate, leaving the city in as good condition as when they entered.

The attendants who were so horrified at the suggestion of the invasion changed their visage and conduct, and caused stations to be established along the route, to furnish to those who could stop to take it the inimitable tea, which only the Chinaman knows how to prepare. Other refreshments were also served.

When the rear of the column had passed through the north gate, all the gates were closed, and no traces of that memorable march were left behind.

## CHAPTER XXII.

On the 16th the American troops went into permanent camp in the Temple of Agriculture in the southern part of the Chinese City. This enclosure contained about four hundred acres of ground and was surrounded by a brick wall about fifteen feet high. It was divided into many sections also by brick walls of different height and thickness. There were many fine buildings within, but not well adapted to the sheltering of troops. They were used for store-houses, offices, and hospitals. Beautiful shade-trees abounded. A fine well of cool water was found. The ground was covered with grass; everything was clean. How refreshing it was for the soldiers to stack arms and throw off their equipments under these trees! They felt that they had earned, and at last found, a place of rest. But the Fourteenth Infantry had but few tents. The half shelter tent that each man started with had been thrown away in an emergency. One day some companies of the regiment had been called to hasten to a place where they were needed; under orders, they had divested themselves of everything that would impede progress. They had abandoned tents and blankets. The nights were beginning to be cool. No tents, no blankets. None could be drawn from the quartermaster for several weeks. Military necessity justifies an army in taking from the country where it is such things as are necessary for the soldiers' health and comfort. The men were sent, under the charge of an officer, into the city to procure blankets or quilts and any cloth that would shelter them from rain. In the course of a few days they had quilts enough, cloths of every kind and quality and color, red and yellow prevailing. Such a patchwork camp was never before seen, certainly in an American camp; it more than rivalled Joseph's coat of many colors. This applies only to the Fourteenth Infantry. If their conduct in scaling walls without ladders was unique, so

was it in making a camp without tents. Foreign officers visited the camp, and, if politeness would not allow them to remark on its picturesqueness, it was plain to be seen that they were puzzled at its appearance. I knew that General Chaffee was sometimes mortified at the appearance of the camp, and so was I, but not a word of criticism did he utter, for he knew how it all happened, and realized, as only a good soldier can, what those men had done.

But after a while tents came. A model camp was established, and the General was as much pleased as he was before mortified at its appearance. He frequently called attention to it, and recommended that others be made like it.

September had come. The weather was growing cooler, for it was the latitude of Philadelphia. The ingenuity of officers and men was taxed to invent means of heating tents. The Sibly tents and stoves were there, but how to place the stoves so as to get the benefits of an open fireplace, was the question. Some discarded the stove and dug trenches the full length or width of the tent and covered them with stones or the large Chinese bricks. Our good chaplain was very successful in this method of warming his tent. A line of warm stones extended under the whole length of his bed. Major Quinton also had his stove, like himself, so placed as to give out a genial and cheerful warmth.

## CHAPTER XXIII.

At a conference of generals it was decided to divide the city into sections and place each under the care of a national contingent for the protection of its citizens. The west half of the Chinese City was assigned to the Americans, also the section of the Tartar City bounded on the south by the south wall of that city from the Chein gate to the Chun-Chih gate, on the west by a street running north from the latter gate, on the north by a street running east from the Ping-tzu gate, and on the east by the Imperial City. The First Regiment of Marines was placed in charge of this section. Lieutenant Kilbourne was appointed chief of police for the section in the Chinese City. First two companies, then three, and finally four, were used for that purpose. There were but few Chinamen in Peking immediately after its surrender. It was filthy beyond description, and probably had been only a little less so for centuries. The streets were strewn with the bodies of dead Chinamen in different stages of decomposition. Dogs, hogs, and birds of prey were feeding on them. The few people then in the city soon left their hiding-places; those that had fled to the country returned. They had but little food. Disorder and plunder reigned supreme.

Lieutenant Kilbourne first organized a force to bury the dead and clean the streets. He discovered buildings filled with large quantities of wheat and corn; these he guarded and dealt out to the starving hordes. After one or two examples of severity, the people became docile; order and comparative cleanliness were restored. That section of the city was soon filled up by its own returning residents and many others; business was being resumed, and within a month the main street was lined with all sorts of wares for sale. Just across the street, thirty feet away, was the German section; it was deserted.



The most difficult problem Lieutenant Kilbourne had to deal with was looting by the Chinese. They were the most persistent looters, and they exercised an ingenuity in methods for which they are "peculiar." This, however, he practically suppressed.

On the 6th of September, Brigadier-General Jas. H. Wilson, United States Volunteers, arrived and was assigned to the command of all the American troops in Peking. He has a brilliant Civil War record, and has been a successful business man in civil life. He is the author of "Travel in the Middle Kingdom," an excellent and reliable book, and from which I have derived much information in the preparation of this work. General Wilson entered upon the task of governing the Chinese City with a fund of knowledge he had obtained in his previous travels and matured in the writing of his book. One could scarcely have been better equipped for this duty.

As a matter of propriety, it was decided to detail an officer of the rank of captain for provost-marshal of the American Section of the Chinese City. Captain Tilson was selected, and took up permanent quarters for himself and companies of the Fourteenth Infantry in buildings in a central location in his district.

Was there looting in Peking? Yes. Did Americans loot? Yes. Generals Chaffee and Wilson did their utmost to prevent it, and they were heartily supported by some of their officers. These efforts reduced this disgraceful practice to comparatively small proportions. This evil is contagious. Some of the foreigners looted apparently without limit. Under British regulations, it is the duty of the commander to detail officers to search the cities they have taken, to collect all valuables and sell them at auction, and to use the proceeds to defray the expenses of the army. This is a legitimate transaction, and tends to prevent indiscriminate pillaging. Many articles were bought by Americans at British sales, and they came into legitimate possession of those goods. But there were, I believe,

some instances of plunder by Americans, which brought the blush of shame to the faces of their comrades.

Rumors began to arise the latter part of August that a large army of Boxers and imperial troops was being concentrated southwest of Peking. An attack, it was thought, was impending. The Fourteenth Infantry and a platoon of the battery were assigned to the task of defending the south wall of the Chinese City, from the Tung-tung gate to the west wall, up that wall to the north wall, and east to the Hsi-pein gate, a distance of about four miles. This, in addition to police work in the city, imposed very heavy duty on these troops. In a few days, however, the German troops arrived, and relieved the Americans of one mile of the northwest section of the wall.

The troops guarding this wall did not feel much uneasiness as to their ability to hold it. The conditions were reversed. They were now on the wall and the Chinese on the ground. If the former had been able to drive the latter from the wall, they felt that they could defend it against any force of Chinese troops even with only the one battalion and two guns available for the purpose. While American soldiers are not "spoiling for a fight," it is probable that there was lurking in the breasts of some of them, as they stood on those walls watching the level corn-fields to the south and west for the advancing foe, a desire that he might appear. Patrols were frequently sent out, but never discovered a sign of the enemy. One day Major Quinton brought in four Krupp field guns, which he had found concealed under brush. They were in perfect condition. Expeditions were frequently sent out for forage, cattle, and sheep, until the country for a distance of fifteen or twenty miles was exhausted. Then Chinamen began to come in and make contracts to furnish supplies. It was impossible, however, for them always to fulfill their contracts. The cattle were of fair quality, and the sheep, for the most part, excellent. A plenty of hens' and turkeys' eggs were brought in. There was an abundance of good pears and some fairly good cherries and

grapes. A miserable thing called an apple sometimes made its appearance. Sweet potatoes were rather plentiful, but of a woody fiber. None of the vegetables were equal in quality to those raised in America. There were many blackbirds, but slightly different from the American; the robins also were modified by their environment. I saw two crows as white as milk, and many black ones with white rings around their necks. I did not see any "white blackbirds."

## CHAPTER XXIV.

A practice had grown up among the Allies of sending out into the country what were called "punitive expeditions." These expeditions were justified, it was said by those who ordered them, on the ground that barbarous and semi-barbarous people can be taught only by example. They had murdered the citizens of the nations represented, hence their blood must be shed. Whatever may be said in favor of this policy, it does not justify killing the innocent. If reports are correct, many hundreds of innocent Chinamen were killed by these expeditions.

Coal-fields were located about twenty-five miles northwest of Peking. The winter's supply of fuel, it was presumed, must come from that source. Between Peking and these mines were located an arsenal and Pa-ta-Chow, or Eight Temples, garrisoned by Boxers. General Wilson was ordered to drive the Boxers from that locality. He organized an expedition as follows:

### *General Wilson's Staff.*

First Lieutenant Charles D. Rhodes, adjutant-general;  
Captain Charles H. Martin, brigade inspector;  
Second Lieutenant Roy B. Harper, aide;  
Second Lieutenant G. S. Turner, aide-de-camp;  
First Lieutenant, H. B. Ferguson, engineer;  
Lieutenant-Colonel J. T. Dickman, of General Chaffee's staff, also accompanied the expedition.

### *United States Troops.*

Two battalions Ninth Infantry, Captain R. H. Anderson, commanding Companies A, E, H, I, K, L, M, 475 men;  
One battalion Fourteenth Infantry, Major Quinton, commanding Companies I, K, L, M, 375 men;  
Two guns Battery F, Fifth Artillery, 50 men;  
Detachment Sixth Cavalry, 15 men.

able to press the Chinese on our left. When this pressure was felt, the enemy began to move to their left. Captain Bloxom's line then advanced, changing front to the right, or half right, and soon threw the enemy into confusion. Lieutenant Marshall asked permission to charge; it was granted, and his troop was soon in the midst of the scattered and fleeing foe. The rest of the squadron followed, "charging in echelon as foragers and using pistols."

Captain Forsyth's squadron, I, K, L, supported this movement. When the firing-line came in contact with the enemy, Colonel Wint ordered Captain Forsyth to dismount two of his troops and get them into action as quickly as possible. He dismounted I and K Troops, and moved to the front. On emerging from a corn-field through which they had passed, he opened fire upon the enemy, changing position to the right to meet the enemy's movements. The squadron remained in action till 9:30 A. M.

The action was decisive, and prevented further trouble from that source.

The losses of the enemy were about 350 killed; number wounded, unknown.

Our losses were 6 men wounded.

About a dozen flags were captured.

\*Colonel Wint says: "Our decided success was due to the splendid manner in which Captain Bloxom handled his squadron, both on foot and mounted; to Captain Forsyth's management of his dismounted line; and to Lieutenant Marshall, Sixth Cavalry, and Lieutenant Gausson, First Bengal Lancers, for directing the advance until the enemy was found, and also for effective work later during the dismounted fighting and mounted charge."

The expedition returned to Tientsin, arriving there about 1:30 in the afternoon.

The fore part of September information was received by General Dorward that the town of Tu-liu, twenty-two miles

\*See Appendix.

southwest of Tientsin, was occupied by Boxers. He therefore organized an expedition of American and British troops to dislodge them. The American contingent was composed of Companies C and D, Fifteenth United States Infantry, commanded by Captain James A. Maney and First Lieutenant J. McA. Palmer, respectively; Major E. B. Robertson commanded the battalion, and First Lieutenant J. A. Lynch was adjutant; Second Lieutenants A. S. Cowan and E. M. Reeve were with their companies. All these officers belonged to the Fifteenth Infantry. Acting Assistant Surgeon H. D. Corbusier accompanied the expedition as medical officer. The expedition was carefully prepared for a campaign. Elaborate orders were given for the movement in three columns. It started on the 9th of September and reached its destination on the 10th. Finding no Boxers at Tu-liu, the expedition returned to Tientsin, arriving there on the 13th.

It was an excellent practice march, and no innocent Chinese were killed.

## CHAPTER XXV.

The Signal Corps of the Army has gained an excellent reputation for skill and efficiency since the breaking out of the Spanish-American War; it has attracted to its service an intelligent and enterprising class of young men, who compared favorably with those of foreign nations in the campaign in China.

When the Ninth Infantry was ordered from the Philippines to China, in July, First Lieutenant W. H. Stanford, Signal Corps, and 10 enlisted men were ordered to sail with the expedition.

Having just arrived in Manila from San Isidore, Luzon, he had but a few days' time in which to prepare for the work before him. He collected material for about one hundred miles of line, except poles. On arrival in Pechili Bay, a tug from one of our naval vessels came to the transport, and Lieutenant Stanford succeeded in persuading the officer in charge to take him and his men and some material ashore. By these means the Lieutenant was the first of this expedition to land. This was on July 8th. The Russians, having been on the ground several days, had pre-empted everything of value and controlled the railroad. Captain Wise, U. S. N., rendered great assistance and enabled Lieutenant Stanford to proceed with his work. The American Army in China is under many obligations to Captain Wise for his uniform courtesy and prompt and efficient assistance in forwarding men and supplies to the front.

The Russians caused trouble and delay until the Lieutenant conferred with Colonel Samoyeff, of the Russian general staff, who seemed to comprehend the situation, and gave orders which prevented further annoyance.

Lieutenant Stanford began to lay a line on rocks along the railroad embankment and on poles, whenever they could be found. He reached Tientsin on the 13th, the day of the battle.

During the following three weeks a more secure line was established between Tong-ku and Tientsin, and preparations made for the coming advance on Peking. Lines were established to different points in Tientsin, and in doing this the Pei-ho River had to be crossed. Insulated wire was used for a cable, which, of course, was frequently broken by dragging anchors. The following officers of the Signal Corps arrived at Tientsin on the dates specified:

- Major George P. Scriven, United States Volunteers, August 3d;
- First Lieutenant H. W. Stanford, United States Volunteers, July 13th;
- Second Lieutenant Peter Bartsch, United States Volunteers, August 3d;
- Second Lieutenant C. O. Hastings, United States Volunteers, August 1st.

Nine enlisted men arrived with Major Scriven, making a total of 19 Signal Corps men for the expedition. These men came from America and the Philippines. Some of them were new to the service and not accustomed to act together, 8 of them being operators, but indifferent ones. Most of the material on the transports could not be brought up in season for use in the expedition. As no wagon could be turned over to Major Scriven, he was obliged to collect such transportation as he could find in and about Tientsin. Chinese carts, which would carry about two hundred pounds, mules, and coolies were used for this purpose. But without the material on the transports it would be impossible to establish even a temporary line.

The British Signal Corps, while much better supplied than ours, was deficient in many things. They decided to join forces and material, and thus organized a fairly efficient corps. Lieutenant Lock, of the Royal Engineers, was in charge of the English contingent. It was pleasing to see how harmoniously the representatives of these two nations worked together.



As they could carry only supplies needed for immediate use with the column, they sent the larger portion up the river with the fleet.

One man was left at Taku, and Lieutenant Bartsch and 3 men were stationed at Tientsin. Lieutenant Stanford and 7 men were put in charge of the construction party.

The day before the expedition started Lieutenant Stanford established a line to a point where the Allies were to bivouac the next night, about four miles out.

On the evening of the 5th of August, the day of the first battle at Pei-tsang, the line followed closely and reached headquarters about as soon as it was located. The next day the battle of Yang-tsun was fought, and the line was in camp by sunset and used by the Army and press to send reports of the engagement. A rest of one day here gave an opportunity to put the line in fair condition. As the Army advanced the line lengthened and the difficulties increased. The light bamboo poles brought by the English were all expended; other material was running short. The river route was longer than that taken by the Army, and the junks were behind. Wire was being broken or cut; sometimes by careless or malicious teamsters and at other times by Chinamen. Sections from fifty to hundreds of yards would be cut out and removed; in one case a mile of wire was taken away.

On arriving in camp, connections would be established and in a few minutes broken. Then the lieutenant or sergeant must ride miles to find and repair the break. When the signal detachment arrived in camp, their work was not completed; it might continue all night in sending or receiving messages and repairing lines; sometimes the latter was done under exposure to the enemy.

On the night of the 8th a message was received by carrier from Minister Conger. The wire had not reached camp. Lieutenant Hastings was sent on the perilous journey to take the message back to the nearest connection for transmission to

Tientsin. Says Major Scriven: "This hazardous duty he accomplished well."

August 10th was an insufferably hot day; men of all the armies were prostrated by the heat; two of the signal detachment were overcome, and two coolies dropped dead. The line failed to reach headquarters that night, and did not succeed in overtaking the column before it reached Peking. It was about thirty hours behind the Allies in reaching that city. This delay was largely due to the non-arrival of the junks containing supplies.

But it had done splendid work with the scant means at hand. The wonder is, not that the line was thirty hours behind the Army in reaching Peking, but that it arrived there so soon. The duties, hardships, faithfulness, and intelligent perseverance, of the Signal Corps in this campaign have not been fully appreciated by the Army and public.

After the Legations had been relieved on the 14th, Major Scriven sent Lieutenant Hastings to Tung-Chow, fourteen miles distant, with a message from General Chaffee, giving to the world the first news of that event. As the lines of others of the allied forces did not reach Peking for several days afterwards, the American-English line was the only practical means of communication with the outside world for the armies, diplomatic corps, press, and individuals. Americans, English, French, Germans, Italians, Russians, and even Chinese, used this line. Within a period of less than thirty hours, 524 messages were sent over it.

Owing to the unbroken flatness of the country, and the impossibility of finding elevated positions, visual signaling was not practiced on the campaign.

The following extract from Major Scriven's report is quoted:

"In connection with the work of the construction party, I desire to commend most highly the services of Lieutenant Lock, of the English Engineers, and to recommend for bre-

vet First Lieutenant H. W. Stanford, United States Volunteer Signal Corps, for meritorious and fearless conduct in the field during the march of the allied armies from Tientsin, August 4 to 14, 1900. I desire also to recommend for certificate of merit first-class Sergeants Charles H. Trotter and Thomas P. Akers for fearless conduct in the field at the battle of Yang-tsun. Second Lieutenant C. O. Hastings I desire to recommend for the brevet of first lieutenant for meritorious and fearless services at the battle of Yang-tsun and at the assault on Peking, August 14, 1900. Second Lieutenant Peter Bartsch I desire to recommend for honorable mention, for meritorious service during the campaign in China."

## CHAPTER XXVI.

When it was found necessary to draw upon the Army to protect American citizens and interests in China, a detachment of the Army Medical Corps was organized to accompany that contingent. Major William B. Banister, surgeon, United States Volunteers, and First Lieutenant Charles E. Marrow, assistant surgeon, United States Army, and Contract Surgeons William W. Calhoun and Fred M. Barney, were selected to accompany the Ninth Infantry to China. One hospital steward, 3 acting stewards, and 16 privates were detailed for the expedition. Major Banister received his orders on June 20, 1900.

Dr. Calhoun reported on the 25th and the other surgeons on the 26th, the day of embarkation; also the steward and 12 privates reported on the 25th, so that Major Banister had to make all the arrangements for the expedition practically unaided. Subsequent events showed that there was no lack of medical supplies to meet the demands.

If these stores were not on hand at the proper time, it was because there was not transportation to carry them.

The expedition embarked in Manila Bay on June 26th, and arrived off Taku on July 6th. Two battalions and about two-thirds of the medical detachment arrived at Tientsin on the 10th and 11th of July and the other battalion, with the remainder of the Medical Corps, on the 13th, while the battle was in progress. Major Banister found the marine hospital in charge of Past Assistant Surgeon Oliver D. Norton, of the Navy. As this was the only available building at that time, they arranged for a joint occupation of it by the Army and marines. During the battle of the 13th the medical officers and men accompanied the troops to the firing-line, and gave prompt and proper care to the wounded; and although the number swelled to more

than 100, the Army and Navy surgeons had them all comfortably provided for by the morning of the 14th.

The wounded officers were sent to the hospital ship *Solace*, lying off Taku, on the 19th, and 54 men a few days later. It was observed that wounds made with the Männlicher rifle, with which the Chinese were armed, were similar to those made by the Mauser. There were cases of wounds through the "thoracic, abdominal, and pelvic cavities" which healed without suppuration or serious effects.

It soon became known that an expedition of allied forces would be organized to march on Peking. Major Banister was made chief surgeon of the China Relief Expedition. It was expected that there would be much sickness and many casualties on the campaign. It was determined to establish a base hospital at Tientsin with a capacity of 300 beds. The sick and wounded could be easily moved to it as the Army advanced. The location was healthful, and it was easy of access from the base of supplies at Tong-ku; it also avoided moving the very sick and severely wounded over the longer route to Tong-ku until they were able to endure the journey. Under the circumstances, the establishment of this hospital was a wise and humane provision. Considering the lack of enterprise and skill of the enemy, there was no danger of a successful attack upon this place. Had we been confronted by a formidable foe, Tientsin would have been the point of contention, and the base of supplies in danger of being cut off. It would then have been a very improper place for a hospital. First Lieutenant and Assistant Surgeon E. R. Schreiner was placed in charge of the hospital. He was assisted by 2 contract surgeons, 4 acting stewards, and 32 privates of the Hospital Corps; 1 professional male nurse and 16 female nurses were added also to the *personnel* of the hospital. Many other surgeons and men were added as they arrived from the Philippines and the United States.

This hospital was furnished with abundant supplies, and became, it is said, a model hospital. The Isabella Fisher Hos-

pital, with the surrounding yards, gave ample room for this purpose.

The following is the *personnel* of the Medical Department that accompanied the expedition:

Major Banister, chief surgeon;  
 Captain Lewis;  
 First Lieutenant Charles E. Marrow, assistant surgeon,  
 United States Army;  
 First Lieutenant Henry Greenleaf, assistant surgeon,  
 United States Army;  
 Past Assistant Surgeon George A. Lung, United States  
 Navy;  
 Past Assistant Surgeon George D. Castigan, United  
 States Navy;  
 Assistant Surgeon Joseph C. Thompson, United States  
 Navy;  
 Contract Surgeon William W. Calhoun, United States  
 Army;  
 Contract Surgeon Robert N. Wynn, United States  
 Army;  
 Contract Surgeon H. N. Van Kirk, United States Army;  
 1 hospital steward, 2 naval hospital apprentices, 5 act-  
 ing hospital stewards, and 25 privates of the Hos-  
 pital Corps.

Three ambulances, a four-mule wagon, and cart were assigned to the Medical Department, and 8 Chinese coolies as litter-bearers to each company.

Medical stores needed for immediate uses were carried in the wagon with the column; other stores were sent up the Pei-ho River in junks; the medical and surgical chests were carried in the ambulances.

The first battle in which the Americans participated was at Yang-tsun, August 6th. The wounded received aid soon after they had fallen, and the ambulances followed the advancing line of battle as near as due regard for safety would permit, gathering up the wounded and taking them to a place where they could receive more care. That night all were moved to the village, where two tents were pitched, and were comfortably cared for;

11 of them were sent in a junk to the base hospital at Tientsin that night; the next day the remaining 61 wounded and a number of the sick were sent to Tientsin, thus leaving the column unincumbered.

During the remaining six days' march the heat was oppressive; scores of men were prostrated and many in convulsions. The ambulances gathered up what they could and hauled them into camp and then returned for more, till all were brought in.

Camps were established at Ho-Hsi-Woo, Matow, and Tung-Chow, where many sick were left. Some of these joined their companies afterwards, and others were sent to Tientsin.

The number of casualties in the attack on the walls of Peking, August 14th, was only 13, and in the attack on the Imperial City on the 15th was only 25. From causes not fully understood, the wounded on the night of the 14th suffered greatly for lack of care. As there were only 13 in all, and the majority of these slightly wounded, it seemed strange that the 5 or 6 severely wounded should not have been properly cared for.

A field hospital of 150-bed capacity was established in the Temple of Agriculture in the Chinese City; Captain Lewis was placed in charge. At first, for lack of transportation, the supplies for this hospital were insufficient, but later on there was an abundance. For several weeks many complaints were made of neglect of patients at this hospital. There is reason to believe there was some foundation for these complaints.

The great majority of men admitted to hospital, except from casualties in battle, were admitted in consequence of intestinal disorders.

From this hospital patients were selected and sent by ambulance to Tung-Chow, about fifteen miles distant, where they were placed on junks and forwarded to Tientsin. The junks were sheltered by canvas, and made a comfortable conveyance for the sick. The journey down the Pei-Ho was rapid and smooth.

Lieutenant Schreiner was relieved from the charge of the hospital at Tientsin on August 20th, by Major William Ste-

phenson, surgeon, United States Army. Major William H. Arthur, surgeon, United States Army, was appointed surgeon of the Second Brigade, at Tientsin, September 14th.

September 25th Major Banister was relieved from duty as chief surgeon of the China Relief Expedition, by Major Francis J. Ives, surgeon, United States Volunteers, and assigned as brigade surgeon of the First Brigade.

During Major Banister's régime, from July 12th to September 25th, 2 officers and 44 enlisted men were killed in battle and died of gunshot wounds, and 6 officers and 161 men wounded. Of the number of deaths that occurred during this period, 66½ per cent were from gunshot wounds.

The following was the strength of the Medical Corps in China on September 25, 1900:

Medical officers . . . . .	10
Contract surgeons . . . . .	21
Hospital stewards . . . . .	4
Acting hospital stewards . . . . .	13
Privates . . . . .	137

When Major Ives took charge at Peking a new problem confronted him. Fighting and campaigning were over, winter was coming on, and field and temporary hospitals would not suffice in that rigorous climate. The means to construct suitable buildings were not at hand; tents would not afford sufficient protection for the sick, and the buildings in and about Peking were not suitable for hospital purposes. It was finally decided, however, to remodel buildings in the Temple of Agriculture—frequently called the Temple of Earth—and fit them up for hospitals. This was successfully accomplished, and what was designated as United States Military Hospital No. 1 was established. Its capacity was 85 beds, capable of expansion to 100; another, No. 2, of smaller capacity, was established in the American Section of the Chinese City.

A 20-bed hospital was established at Tientsin and one of 6-bed capacity at Tung-Chow.



These hospitals, especially those at Peking, were abundantly supplied in *personnel* and material, and compared favorably with those of foreign nations. While there were features of superiority in one, possibly two, foreign hospitals, the preponderance was in favor of the American, and easily gave them the lead.

In one respect the United States Medical Department was inferior to others, and that was in field transportation. It has to depend on the Quartermaster's Department for transportation of its supplies during campaign, and sometimes this has failed to meet the demands, and the Medical Department has been blamed for that for which it was not responsible.

Medical men have their failings as all of us have, and the Department in the earlier days of the war showed some grave defects; but, when the campaign and battle were on, they have been at the front, administering to the comfort and looking out for the welfare of the wounded.

## CHAPTER XXVII.

When the allied forces entered Peking, all Government officials and nearly all the inhabitants fled. There was no Government, and among the few that remained absolute anarchy prevailed.

The city was divided into sections and assigned to the different nations to control. Provost-marshals were appointed and military government established.

The southwestern quarter of the Chinese City having been assigned to the Fourteenth Infantry, Lieutenant Kilbourne was appointed chief of police of this district, August 18th. The inhabitants soon began to return, and in a few days this section was filled with a mass of Chinamen bent on loot and all sorts of thievery.

It was two and one-quarter miles long by about a mile and a half in width. At first the natives manifested some fear of our soldiers, but when it was discovered that they were there for the protection of the natives and treated them kindly, they misunderstood the intent of this conduct, and began to break open stores and houses and enter upon a general course of riot and plunder. When it was found that mild measures were ineffective, orders for severe measures were given and enforced. These means had their immediate effect, and order was restored and maintained.

Lieutenant Kilbourne found storehouses filled with wheat and corn and coal. These were used for Government purposes until sufficient supplies were received from the United States. These stores were then used to feed the poor during the coming winter.

Under Lieutenant Kilbourne's administration, the inhabitants of the American Section returned to their homes, attracting many others with them, until nearly all the houses were filled

with occupants. Business in a humble way was resumed, and the streets presented the appearance of returning comfort and prosperity. ¶ Lieutenant Kilbourne had won the respect and affection of those docile and simple-minded people, and many regrets were expressed by them when they learned that he was to be relieved. He received many presents from them, among which was the never-failing umbrella.

About September 7th, Captain Tilson, Fourteenth Infantry, was appointed permanent provost-marshal. Captain Tilson was given a larger number of troops than had been on this duty before. ¶ He instituted a system of government which renovated his section of the city, giving them, as the inhabitants voluntarily said, the most efficient government they had ever enjoyed. Sanitary regulations were made and enforced, which prevented a threatened epidemic: poor-houses and charity eating-houses were established, which prevented famine; and hospitals were established for the sick. A Chinese court was opened, which, having the support of American troops, was able to protect life and property. Through the influence of this court, crime became infrequent and at last almost unknown. No case of capital punishment arose, and only eight commitments to the penitentiary were made; and, strange to say, a school was established for the children.

Under these conditions business resumed more than its wonted briskness. Never were the inhabitants of this section more prosperous; and yet, not more than six months before, these same troops had come to rescue American and other citizens from massacre by the hands of probably some of these same deluded people whom we were now protecting and feeding. Where is the parallel to this? Is it any wonder that these people, when they learned of the intended withdrawal of American troops, should have petitioned for their retention?

The following is a petition presented by a mass-meeting of several thousand natives assembled in front of Captain Tilson's

quarters, March 28, 1901, and read by Professor Yuen Yu Ting, of the Hanlin College:

*“Captain John C. F. Tilson, Fourteenth Infantry, Provost-Marshal, American District, Chinese City, Peking:*

“SIR,—We, the people of and proprietors of two thousand business houses in the American Section, have the honor to beg you to intercede in our behalf to secure a postponement of the withdrawal of the United States troops from this section, as we have been perfectly protected by you from the beginning till now. After the relief expedition, the city was divided into different sections and we were under your jurisdiction.

“We are profoundly grateful because we have been so well protected. You have, under the wise government established by you, justly punished criminals, given us letters of protection that have saved us from molestation from bad soldiers, and enabled us to lead peaceful lives.

“You have opened charity eating-houses and saved the poor from starvation; you have employed policemen to prevent crime; gambling-houses and opium-dens have been closed, and thieves driven from the district.

“We have been made very happy, and we are grateful to you because you have protected us so kindly. We learned recently that your Government will withdraw her troops before the other nations withdraw theirs.

“We were very sorry to learn this, because we fear that criminals will prey upon us upon your departure. With the best protection you could give us there was some crime. Should the United States troops leave here, it is certain that criminals will again pillage the people.

“Though we may come under the protection of some other Power, we fear that that other Power will not be so efficient as the United States has been and the officer not so kind and just as you.

“From the beginning we have been perfectly protected by you; but after you leave, we may be robbed and harmed by bad men and badly treated by the new officer.

“That would be a case of a good beginning with a bad ending, which we would keenly regret.

“After mature consideration, we have concluded to beg you to ask your Government for us to kindly permit you to remain here till the negotiation is concluded.

"This will prevent our being harmed, robbed, and badly treated, and we can continue our business with content.

"If this our petition be granted, we shall be more grateful than words can express.

"For these reasons we have the honor to submit our petition with our names written on another sheet.

"Date: The second month of the twenty-seventh year of Kuang-Su, March, 1901."

For reply of Captain Tilson, see Appendix XXIV.

Petitions of similar import came to Captain Tilson from many different sources. The sentiment of the whole community was represented by them.

Not less interesting was the correspondence between Captain Tilson and Li Hung Chang:

"On behalf of the inhabitants and gentry of that part of the Chinese Quarter of the City of Peking at present under the jurisdiction of the United States Army, I have sincere pleasure in presenting this testimonial of appreciation and thanks to John C. F. Tilson, captain, Fourteenth Infantry, United States Army, American member of the International Board of Police Commissioners, and provost-marshal, American District, Chinese City of Peking, for the able and efficient manner in which he has performed his duty and protected their lives and property.

"Given at Peking, under my hand and seal, this 8th day of November, 1900.

LI HUNG CHANG,

*"Imperial High Commissioner and Minister Plenipotentiary, Senior Grand Secretary, Grand Tutor to the Heir Apparent, High Commissioner of Commerce, Viceroy of Chi-li, Earl of Su-yi, etc."*

#### CAPTAIN TILSON'S REPLY.

*"His Excellency, Li Hung Chang:*

\* \* \* \* \*

"SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's very kind letter of commendation of the 8th inst., and to return my sincere thanks.

"The Army of the United States of America enjoys the proud distinction of being the only army in the history of all the world that has never been used as an instrument of tyranny.

"If, in my brief exercise of arbitrary power, I have done naught to impair the reputation of the Army of my country, and have, at the same time, merited Your Excellency's esteemed commendation, while endeavoring to extend to your people, as far as possible, that protection to life and property and that equality before the law so dear to my countrymen, I am indeed proud.

"I have the honor to be, sir, Your Excellency's most obedient servant,

JOHN C. F. TILSON,

*"Captain, Fourteenth Infantry, American Member of the International Board of Police Commissioners, Provost-Marshal, American District, Chinese City of Peking."*

Lieutenant-Colonel Coolidge was provost-marshal of the American District of the Tartar City for a short time, and was relieved by Major Robertson on October 19, 1900.

This district did not contain as many inhabitants nor as many poor people as the Chinese District. The same order and good government were maintained here, and it was with much regret that the inhabitants learned of the intended withdrawal of the American troops.

## CHAPTER XXVIII.

The number of United States troops in China the latter part of September, 1900, was approximately 5,000 men. The main object of the Relief Expedition having been accomplished, and there being no further danger of an uprising by the Boxers or by any other force, the Government determined to reduce its force. The First Regiment of Marines was ordered to the Philippines, and began its movements early in October. The baggage of this regiment was sent to Tung-Chow, where it was placed on junks and transported to Tong-ku. The troops marched to Yang-tsun, from whence they were transported to Tong-ku by rail.

The following troops constituted the Legation guard during the winter: The Ninth United States Infantry; headquarters and 9 companies at Peking; 1 company at Tung-Chow as outpost, 1 company at Tientsin, and 1 at Tong-ku as outpost to Tientsin; Battery F, Fifth Artillery, and a squadron of the Sixth Cavalry, stationed at Peking.

The Fourteenth Infantry was relieved from duty in China October 19th, and left Peking on the 21st. Owing to the important work it had done in the campaign, it was given an unusual compliment on its departure.

General Chaffee and staff, General Wilson and staff, Minister Conger with members of the Legation, Battery F, Fifth Artillery, and a squadron of the Sixth Cavalry, escorted the regiment out of the city to a point near where it scaled the walls on August 14th. Line was formed, officers marched to the front and center, and the flag brought to the front, when the battery fired a national salute to the colors. General Chaffee made a brief complimentary speech, to which the Colonel as briefly responded. Rousing cheers were then given to Generals Chaffee and Wilson, Minister Conger, and the battery and squadron of cavalry.

The parting was one of mutual respect and affection and a glorious one for the regiment. The baggage had been forwarded by junks to Taku, except what was needed for the march to Yang-tsun. Sufficient transportation accompanied the regiment to give all the comforts required on such a march. The weather was clear and cool, with frost at night. Part of the way a new route, farther from the river, was taken; by this route a less dusty road was found, and clean camping-grounds and fuel. The old route, which had been traveled and occupied by all the allied forces for four months, had become filthy and denuded of fuel. The men had regained much strength and vigor in that cool climate. The march was made with ease, and was one of the most enjoyable of our experience. It was suggested that so wide a détour from the usual route might bring the regiment into contact with Boxers, but I think that in its state of morale and physical condition it would have made short work of any number of that kind of foe.

The Chinese living in the villages through which we passed were much frightened at the appearance of troops, but for the most part regained their confidence when they learned that it was a column of American troops, and showed a disposition to be friendly with them.

It is a custom in Chinese villages to fire off crackers, large and small, at intervals during the night, to keep evil spirits away, and, it is said, to intimidate robbers, but it is difficult to see how it could have the latter effect when all know of the custom. To the old soldier, who has served long in an enemy's country, and where the sound of firearms is associated with battle, it was difficult not to be momentarily startled when awakened in the night by these sounds.

An incident occurred on this march which shows the disposition manifested by some foreign officers and which Americans had occasionally to contend with.

Captain Martin being most interested in this affair, we will let him give it in his own language:



“On the return march from Peking and while approaching Ho-Hsi-Woo, the column of the regiment one evening was overtaken by a Russian officer of high rank in his three-horse buckboard, driven by his orderly. At the time the rear battalion of the regiment, temporarily commanded by myself, was entering a defile, bordered on each side by low, swampy ground, the road being just wide enough to accommodate the column. I suddenly heard a loud shout, ‘Watch out, Captain! watch out!’ but before I could even turn my head, I found my horse on his knees, with the Russian’s horses on top of us. After extricating ourselves, I found that the Russian, seeing the narrow road before him, and not proposing to be delayed by our column, had deliberately plunged into us, regardless of consequences. The temporary check which he had received by my being in the way seemed to infuriate the officer, and, with violent gesticulations, he ordered his orderly to drive on. Equally determined that he should not break up our column in this manner, I ordered two enlisted men nearest us to take his horses’ heads. This was too much. Taking the lines from his now helpless, bewildered driver, he forced his horses forward, but before he had completely gotten them away from the men holding them, I had ordered four more men to assist in stopping him and to keep him where he was until the rear of the column had passed. In spite of such a show of force, he persisted in violently urging his horses forward, and was only stopped by being knocked to the ground by the butt of a gun and having the horses unhitched from the conveyance. As he rose from the ground, he started to draw his revolver, when instantly several rifles were drawn on him. This seemed to bring him to a realizing sense of his impotency, and, putting up his revolver, he ran forward with tears in his eyes, and called out in French to the captain of the company then passing: ‘I am an officer, an officer! Look at my frightful condition, and the humiliation which has been heaped upon me! Can you not give me justice?’ He received this consoling answer: ‘That’s all right, old man; there’s only room on this road for one of us, and we got here first.’ From a turn in the road we looked back to see the orderly getting the wreck together. His only witness was his commanding officer, standing off in abject despair.”

The regimental commander did not learn of this incident for a long while afterwards; if he had, he would have heartily commended Captain Martin for his prompt, firm, and discreet conduct under these exciting circumstances.

The regiment arrived at Yang-tsun on October 24th. As there was not good camping-ground at Tong-ku, it was decided to go into camp here and await the arrival of the transport *Warren* in the bay. The regiment had to wait here six days. The weather grew cold, and a fearful dust-storm came up, which was in great contrast with the four-days delightful march.

Another incident occurred at Yang-tsun, which found its way into the newspapers, and which had better be correctly related in these pages:

The Russians had charge of the railroad from Yang-tsun to Taku. The United States quartermaster was stationed at Tientsin, where he was making arrangements with the Russian officer there for the transportation of the regiment. On the 30th the quartermaster wired the regimental commander that twenty cars would be at Yang-tsun the next morning for his regiment. The cars arrived the evening of the 30th; there were only nineteen cars. As the train was to leave at 8 A. M., orders were given to begin loading early the next morning. On beginning to load, the regimental quartermaster found some French horses occupying one of the cars. With some difficulty, he succeeded in having these horses removed. The baggage and most of the men were on platform cars. About 7:30 the regimental commander with other officers went to the station to board the train. They found one of the passenger cars occupied by French officers and the door locked. Thirty-five officers of the Fourteenth Infantry were not provided for. A Russian sergeant, who seemed to have charge, was appealed to; he admitted that the train was for the Fourteenth Infantry, but shrugged his shoulders and said he could do nothing about it. It was near leaving-time, and the train would start promptly at 8 o'clock. There was no time to waste. The regiment must not be separated from its officers; the officers *must* go on that train. In the meantime the door of the car containing the French officers became unlocked. The regimental commander entered the car and explained to these officers the situation, telling them the train was for his regiment and that they must

vacate that car. They made no reply. He again told them that he must have the car for his officers, having it repeated in French. They remained silent. He told them a third time that they must move from that car, as it was for the American officers, and if they would not, he would use force. No sign of moving appeared, but when the officer of the day with a guard appeared and was about to carry into effect the order to clear the car, a French officer said they would vacate. They did, but with much excitement on the part of some of the younger officers.

These Frenchmen had no business on that train, and I believe they knew it, but were determined to force their way through. There was some room left in the car, which they could have occupied. Two Japanese officers were in the car, and politely offered to withdraw, but were not required to, as there was room for them.

The Fourteenth Infantry was a well-behaved regiment; it was very observant of the rules of courtesy to others, but it somehow had a strong feeling of self-respect and much independence of spirit. Its *morale* was fine, its *esprit de corps* excellent. It was not an easy matter, therefore, to trample this regiment or any of its members under foot.

Headquarters and Troops A, B, C, Sixth Cavalry, and Batteries A, B, I, O, Third Artillery, were relieved from duty in China on November 2d, and soon after sailed for Manila.

When hostilities broke out in China, it became an attractive field for military operations as well as for those who were drawn hither by curiosity. The campaign, however, was so short that not many arrived in season to participate in it who did not accompany the troops there. But on arrival they were assigned to various duties, and had an opportunity to see representatives from the armies of eight different nations and to witness some of the so-called punitive expeditions into the country round about Peking.

As winter was coming on and the season for active service came to an end, these officers requested to be relieved from further duty in China. Among these were:

Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph T. Dickman, Twenty-sixth United States Volunteer Infantry;  
Major Charles H. Muier, Twentieth United States Volunteer Infantry;  
Major William E. Craighill, Fortieth United States Volunteer Infantry;  
Lieutenant-Colonel Webb C. Hayes, late United States Volunteers.

Major Lee, now brigadier-general, and Major Scriven came to China with their organizations and participated in the campaign. After performing arduous duties when and where they were needed, their services could now be spared. The former was ordered by the War Department to Fort Leavenworth, and the latter, at his request, to Manila.

Major John Van R. Hoff, chief surgeon, was relieved on October 6th, and ordered to San Francisco.

Headquarters and First Battalion, Fifteenth United States Infantry, were relieved from duty at Tientsin November 25th, and sailed soon after for Manila.

JAPANESE TRANSPORTATION.



took the stand he did against punitive and retaliative measures; he but reflected the policy of his Government and the sentiment of every thoughtful officer of the Army. There were about fifty of these expeditions during the fall and winter and spring, and most of them by the Germans. They gave excellent opportunity for exercises in practice marches and formulating reports. As there was seldom any resistance on the part of the enemy, if enemy they could be called, the results, so far as the expeditionary forces were concerned, might be summed up: No casualties, voluminous reports.

## CHAPTER XXX.

All the American troops and officers, except the Legation guard, having left China, those remaining settled down for the winter. The number was reduced to 1,876 men.

The officers and men of five companies of the Ninth Infantry and the battery and squadron of cavalry were quartered in tents. A floor of Chinese bricks was laid; these bricks are gray and of different sizes and shapes. Those about 14x14 inches were most used, though some about 10x18 inches were found convenient in filling up odd spaces. The Sibly stove was converted into a coal stove by placing it upon an oven-shaped base of bricks about three feet square and eighteen inches high. An iron grate was fitted into the top opening of this base, and the stove rested upon that. By using coal a comparatively steady heat was maintained. When the base became thoroughly heated, it aided greatly in regulating the temperature.

Five companies were quartered in Chinese houses modified for the purpose. These troops had more room for exercise indoors and were not annoyed by the flapping of canvas and other sounds which the old soldier knows so well; but their sick-list was not smaller than that of their comrades who lived under canvas.

The camp was located in the Temple of Agriculture, an almost ideal place for a camp, situated in the southern part of the Chinese City and bordering on the street that leads from the Tung-ting to the Chein gate. It contains about four hundred acres of land, and is surrounded by a massive brick wall about twenty feet high. The land is slightly elevated above the surrounding country and is interspersed with a variety of trees.

Numerous buildings were found here, some ornate and pretentious after the Chinese style of architecture. These were utilized, as far as practicable, for headquarters, government storehouses,

hospitals, and offices. The ground is divided into several smaller enclosures, each surrounded by a red brick wall about twelve or fifteen feet high. In one of these enclosures is the large marble altar, fifty or sixty feet square and about six feet high, bordered by a balustrade and ascended by marble stairs on each of four sides. On this the Emperor was wont to stand once a year and give thanks for the fruits of the earth, and pray to the gods for "sunshine and rain." I can scarcely see the need of praying for the sunshine, for they are sure to have more than enough of that without the asking.

The duties of the officers and men during the winter were much like those of ordinary garrison life in the United States, except those attached to the provost guard, whose duties have been referred to in another chapter.

There was leisure for mingling with the troops of other nations; there were many exchanges of courtesies and pleasant and lasting acquaintances formed; especially was this the case with the English, and to a somewhat less extent with the Japanese; a different language being a barrier in the latter case. It gave an excellent opportunity for the younger officers to study the organization, equipment, *personnel*, etc., of foreign armies; it was a privilege which has never before been enjoyed by officers of our Army, and fortunate were those whose duties kept them in Peking.

The men of the different armies mingled much, and notwithstanding the difficulties of an unknown tongue, they somehow found ways of communicating with each other. Seldom was there any difficulty between those stationed at Peking, and this was rather remarkable where the soldiers of so many different nations came together. America, Austria, England, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia were represented.

Frequent conferences of the military commanders occurred and occasionally these joined with foreign ministers where important questions were discussed; these discussions were not for the public, and however interesting some of them might have



been, we must, of necessity, forego the pleasure of presenting them.

The long-drawn-out negotiations with the Chinese Government having come to an end, the Powers determined to reduce their forces in China to something like a peace basis. The United States fixed the strength of its Legation guard at 5 officers and 150 infantry, 8 men of the Hospital Corps, and a post quartermaster, and post commissary sergeant, Company B, Ninth Infantry, was selected for this purpose. Major Robertson was assigned to the command of the guard.

Four civilians were retained as engineer, blacksmith, and teamsters; 3 four-mule teams, 2 four-mule wagons, and 1 four-mule Red Cross ambulance were turned over to the Legation guard. An abundance of all kinds of supplies for eight months was left for their use.

It will be seen that this command was well supplied, and, had there been two companies of 75 or 80 men each, it would have been an ideal organization for this purpose. Should occasion require the commanding officer to send out a body of 75 men, a company, with its organization, officers, and compactness, would be a very much more effective force than a platoon; and the company remaining in the barracks would much more effectively defend them than a platoon. This is not sufficiently realized by persons of limited military experience.

And for drill purposes a company of 150 men is unwieldy and not adapted to our present system of tactics—or any other, for that matter. With two companies, there would be officers enough for a general court-martial, which is necessary for a post so far from other troops. Where there is only one company, a man cannot be tried by a general court-martial without the expense, loss of time, and trouble of sending officers more than two thousand miles to Peking, or the prisoner and witnesses the same distance to Manila.

This is of comparatively little importance; but when the authorities manifested so much wisdom, foresight, and common

sense in the management of that whole Chinese affair, it is to be regretted that this small matter should have been overlooked.

On April 1st specific and comprehensive instructions were given for the organization and guidance of the Legation guard. In all professional and administrative matters the commanding officer exercises complete control. In carrying out the purposes for which the guard is stationed in Peking, he is to consult the wishes of the United States minister. He can repel attack by force and can cooperate with foreign troops in defense of the Legations. In all these matters he must exercise his own judgment as to the manner of using his troops. Should the purpose of their use be ill-judged by the minister, he would doubtless be held to a reasonable responsibility for his action; but with a minister and commanding officer both having good judgment, a conflict could scarcely arise.

Information having been received that transports would arrive soon in Pechili Bay, on April 28th the squadron of the Sixth Cavalry and the battery of artillery, the wagon and pack-train were ordered to march to Tong-ku.

On May 3d orders were given for all the rest of the troops to be in readiness to leave Peking on the 12th. Owing to the non-arrival of transports in the bay, these orders were not fully carried out till the 19th; on that day General Chaffee and staff and all remaining troops except the Legation guard before mentioned left Peking, and at midnight of May 19th the China Relief Expedition came to an end.

This expedition was in many respects unique. Its purpose was unique. It was called together to rescue the Legations and citizens of more than eight different nations. Generally, the representatives of nations have been safe under the protection of the nations to which they have been accredited. In some instances individuals have been maltreated and were murdered, but in no case has there been a deliberate attempt to slaughter whole Legations and citizens of so many different nations. This expedition was composed of contingents from eight nations,

although Austrian, German, and Italian troops did not arrive in season to participate in the relief campaign; they arrived, however, a few days later. On the 28th of August, 1900, all these nationalities were represented in a column of troops that marched through the Forbidden City. This city had never before been invaded by foreign troops.

There was no commander for the army of relief. Frequent conferences of the commanding officers, where the majority ruled, determined the operations for the coming day or days. These were faithfully carried out, except in the one case previously referred to.

The kind of work that was done on that campaign was probably new to 90 per cent of the officers and men of that army. A majority of them may have been engaged in campaigns against a barbarous or semi-barbarous foe, but none of them, except a few of the Japanese, had been called upon to dislodge an enemy from formidable walls, especially such walls as surround Peking. Never before have soldiers scaled perpendicular walls thirty feet high by using cavities and projecting bricks in these walls for ladders.

In the campaign America bore a conspicuous and honorable part. Her soldiers were acknowledged to be the equals in fighting qualities, and in initiative, individuality, and brilliance of execution the superiors, of any troops in the world.

## CHAPTER XXXI.

Some criticisms have been made on the dress and appearance of our soldiers when off duty as compared with the soldiers of other armies. Some of these criticisms are just and some are not, and all leave out of view important considerations.

The Ninth and the Fourteenth Infantry and some of the marines had been serving in the Philippines. There were but few old soldiers in these organizations, probably not 10 per cent. Nearly all of them were young, some very young men, who had been in the service less than eighteen months and in the Philippines less than a year. They were at once sent out to the front, where there was little or no opportunity for drill and disciplinary exercises. They were dressed for tropical service. They were hurried off to China to meet an emergency; they were sent there for business, not for show; they were dressed and equipped accordingly. They went to China and brilliantly accomplished the object for which they were sent. When the campaign was over, their clothing was necessarily in bad condition. They had clean clothes stored at Tientsin, but there was no transportation for them. Necessities must always have the right of way in war. Duties were very burdensome for several weeks after the campaign was over, and left no time for disciplinary measures. But after awhile duties became less exacting, clothing arrived, drills began, and in a short time the men made a new and creditable appearance.

October 3d a review of American troops was tendered to Minister Conger, when many foreign officers were present. Sir Claud McDonald, British minister, was present, and afterwards wrote the following letter:

“BRITISH LEGATION, *Thursday Evening.*

“*Dear Mr. Conger:*

“I have been so busy all day I haven't had time to write and tell you how much I enjoyed the review of your troops.

“As an old soldier, I looked on with a critical eye, and think that nothing could have been finer than the appearance of the ‘boys in blue.’ As an old infantryman, it was to their branch of the service I particularly devoted my attention, and greatly admired the marching and splendid bearing of the men.

“I have spoken to some of our cavalry officers since, and they are loud in their praises of both horses and men of the cavalry.

“Thanking you again for a very great treat,

“Believe me, etc.,

CLAUD McDONALD.”

The soldier should be required to adapt himself to the circumstances in which he may be placed. In garrison, he should be thoroughly trained in all things pertaining to his duties and required to be scrupulously neat and clean in person and soldierly in bearing. This is the object of garrison life.

In camp, he is to learn to live out of doors, leaving many of the niceties of the garrison behind. It is a half-way house between the garrison and the campaign.

He has not as many changes of clothing as he had in garrison. There will be times when his duties are such that he cannot appear in polished shoes and white gloves. He is learning to live with limited means and conveniences, and should be required to present as neat and clean an appearance as possible with the means at hand.

Then comes the campaign, when the soldier must leave every ounce of unnecessary weight behind. His sole object is victory on the battlefield. Everything must yield to that one end. All his training in garrison and camp has been simply with a view to fitting him for that supreme moment. The Ordnance Department, the Quartermaster's Department, the Commissary Department, the whole machinery of the War Department, are but means to an end.

When the campaign is over the disciplinary measures should be revived as soon as good judgment shall determine it is best. And here experience in observing human nature must play its part. The soldier is a human being. He needs physical and mental rest after the terrible strain of campaign and battle. A period of absolute rest, the duration of which is to be deter-

mined by careful observation, should always be given to a command. During this period any unnecessary burden will tend to break the spirit of the soldier and make him morose; if persisted in, he will become a spiritless machine; he will never scale walls without ladders, perhaps not with them. A wise and observant commander will wait till he sees a cheerful and buoyant spirit appearing in camp before he begins drills and other exercises. Men will appreciate this thoughtfulness for their comfort, and will respond with cheerfulness to any calls that may be made upon them for the welfare of the service. Too many commanders forget the human element in their commands. If a man can see the necessity for hardship, he can and will endure it with much less fatigue than the one who sees it not. The officer who can infuse into the minds of the soldiers of his command the necessity for the hardships imposed upon them will be the most successful commander. If this process is begun the day the soldier enlists and is continued through his drill and disciplinary period; if the soldier can be made to feel that every command in the manual of arms, every duty required of him in garrison or camp, is but a necessary means of fitting him for battle, he will seldom fail to respond when the fatiguing march requires him to exert himself to the limit of endurance. Officers have been known to enter a camp-ground after a fatiguing march and have ten minutes' drill for disciplinary purposes! Such officers will never have disciplined commands, nor will they get any effective response from their men in emergencies.

There will be times when the commander must carry everything by the force of his will, whether men see the necessity or not, and, of course, he must be ready to meet that emergency. But an efficient commander will take advantage of every available element of strength, and the one discussed is an important one.

Thus far bravery, as a requisite of efficiency in officers and enlisted men, has not been mentioned, because it has been taken for granted that they are brave. The Army is no place for a man who is not brave. My experience is that most men are brave; the exceptions are rare. Some display it more than

others and in different ways, but all are about equally brave when occasion calls for it. Generally, when an officer or man is brought to public notice for some commendable act, he is spoken of as "brave," "heroic," etc., as if he were an exception to the rule. Of course he is brave, but no braver than thousands or tens of thousands of his comrades. Meade, and Hancock, and Sherman, and Sheridan were brave, but no braver than the thousands they commanded. If they had possessed no other qualifications, they would not have accomplished what they did. We often hear a person spoken of as "perfectly fearless"; but is he? If so, he is not a normal man. If a man has no fear of danger, he is not brave. What is bravery? It is a full realizing sense of danger, with sufficient will-power to overcome all fear and to enable one to exercise complete control of his intellect. A brave man engages in battle fully realizing its dangers, but retains control of his intellect and directs the movements of his troops as calmly as if on the drill-ground. An officer may be so absorbed in directing movements that for the time being he may not realize the danger he is in, but the situation will be constantly recurring to him.

I once heard a person, who was expatiating on the qualifications that make good soldiers, say that the moment a soldier felt like closing in on his comrade, he was worthless and had better not have enlisted. Well, if this were so, the battles of the Civil War would never have been fought. The Army of the Potomac had fought at Bull Run, on the Peninsula, at South Mountain, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Marie's Heights, Salem Church, Gettysburg, Rappahannock Station, and Mine Run. In May, 1864, it moved out on the Wilderness campaign. It was a jolly body of men that morning—talking, joking, laughing, as they were marching. Suddenly a distant gun was heard—that column was as silent as the grave. I looked back into the faces of those veterans, and they were as white as sheets. Having been in many long and bloody battles, they knew what that gun meant. They instinctively closed in on each other; they wanted to feel the warmth of comrade-

ship. And yet, when the hour of battle came, every man was at his post, and fought as only veterans know how to fight.

No, one campaign does not make a soldier, especially a short one. It is the repetition of campaigns and battles, with sufficient intervals between them to give time to digest the experiences gained from them, that makes the mature soldier.

This person reminded me of a letter I wrote to my father immediately after the first Bull Run battle, and which I read not long ago. It was an exhaustive essay on the art of war, and its far-seeing wisdom would have aroused the envy even of a Napoleon. I knew all about war then; I had been in a battle. I know far less about it now.

It may be asked if experience in many battles does not blunt one's sensibilities to fear. Generally, I think not. It is the experience of most men that they had least fear in their first battle. In the excitement of the novel situation, they may not exercise as much self-control. But as they engage in battle after battle they acquire more and more discipline, until they have complete mastery over themselves. Temperament has much to do with the appearance of men under fire, and especially in the first few battles. Some will be calm, while others will appear excited, and still others will begin to bluster. The latter are suffering from much fear and are endeavoring to drown or conceal it by boisterous actions. But they will not run away. As they gain experience they will gain more self-control. But they will never inspire men around them with confidence; there will be more or less confusion wherever they are. But there are men who have complete mastery of themselves; they remain calm and cool under the most exciting circumstances, and inspire all about them with the same spirit. They know that success against a formidable enemy is generally gained by intelligent direction. They, therefore, endeavor to restrain the impulsive nature in their commands up to the last possible moment; but when the moment arrives for the assault, they let loose their impulsive natures and rush like a thunderbolt against the enemy and carry everything before them. They use intelligence and



impulse; but, knowing that the effectiveness of the latter is of short duration, they husband it so that it shall not be exhausted before it has accomplished its contemplated work. Such men are born commanders. Fortunate is the company, regiment, brigade, or larger organization which has such a commander.



APPENDIX I.

EXTRACT FROM REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

WAR DEPARTMENT,

WASHINGTON, D. C., November 30, 1900.

*To the President:*

I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of this Department for the past year:

\* \* \* \* \*

CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION.

On the 14th Peking was reached. At 11 A. M. of that day two companies of the Fourteenth Infantry, under the immediate command of Colonel Daggett, had scaled the wall of the Chinese City, and the flag of that regiment was the first of the foreign colors to be unfurled upon the walls of Peking. After steady fighting until about the middle of the afternoon, the Tartar City was entered and the Legations were relieved. Our casualties during the day were 1 officer and 11 enlisted men wounded.

\* \* \* \* \*

Very respectfully,

ELIHU ROOT,  
*Secretary of War.*

## APPENDIX II.

### MARINES AT PEKING DURING THE SIEGE.

#### *Newark.*

Captain Hall, N. H. ;  
Sergeant Fanning, J. ;  
Drummer Murphy, J. A. ;  
Private Ammann, J. C. ;  
Private Barratt, R. M. ;  
Private Brosi, G. ;  
Private Carr, W. L. ;  
Private Daly, D. ;  
Private Davis, H. W. ;  
Private Donovan, E. J. ;  
Private Donovan, W. F. ;  
Private Gaiennie, L. R. ;  
Private Galligher, H. C. ;  
Private Gold, H. ;  
Private Hall, T. S. ;  
Private Kennedy, J. ;  
Private Kuhn, A. J. ;  
Private Layin, J. J. ;  
Private Martin, J. C. E. ;  
Private Schroeder, J. H. ;  
Private Silver, F. ;  
Private Tutcher, J. W. ;  
Private Tinkler, F. J. ;  
Private Zion, W.

#### *Oregon.*

Captain Myers, J. T. ;  
Sergeant Walker ;  
Corporal Dahlgren ;  
Corporal Hunt ;  
Private Boydston ;  
Private Butts ;  
Private Fisher ;  
Private Greer ;  
Private Harder ;  
Private Hobbs ;  
Private Horton ;  
Private Kehm ;  
Private King ;  
Private Moodey ;  
Private Moore ;  
Private Mueller ;  
Private Mullen ;  
Private O'Leary ;  
Private Preston ;  
Private Quinn ;  
Private Scannell ;  
Private Thomas ;  
Private Turner ;  
Private White ;  
Private Young.

### BLUEJACKETS AT PEKING.

Chief Machinist Peterson, T. ;  
Gunner's Mate 1 C Mitchell, J. ;  
Seaman Sjorgeen, J. ;  
Seaman Westermarck, A. ;  
Hospital Apprentice Stanley, R. ;  
Assistant Surgeon T. M. Lippitt.

### APPENDIX III.

FROM THE GENERAL COMMANDING BRITISH FORCES, NORTH  
CHINA, TO THE OFFICER COMMANDING UNITED  
STATES FORCES.

TIENTSIN, CHINA, July 15, 1900.

SIR,—I desire to express the high appreciation of the British troops of the honor done them in serving alongside their comrades of the American Army during the long and hard fighting of the 13th instant, and the subsequent capture of Tientsin city, and of my own appreciation of the high honor accorded to me by having them under my command.

The American troops formed part of the front line of the British attack, and so had more than their share of the fighting that took place. The ready and willing spirit of the officers and men will always make their command easy and pleasant, and when one adds to that the steady gallantry and power of holding on to exposed positions which they displayed on the 13th instant, the result is soldiers of the highest class.

We all deeply sympathize with you in the heavy losses you have suffered, especially with the Ninth Regiment in the loss of their gallant colonel, E. H. Liscum, while at the head of his men, and with the First Regiment of Marines in the death of Captain Davis, who met a soldier's death in the very front of the fight.

I blame myself for the mistake made in the taking up of their position by the Ninth Regiment, not remembering that troops wholly fresh to the scene of action and hurried forward in the excitement of attack were likely to lose their way. Still, the position they took up and gallantly stuck to all day undoubtedly prevented a large body of the enemy from turning the right of the attacking line and inflicting serious loss on the French and Japanese.

Among many instances of personal bravery in action, I propose especially to bring to notice in dispatches the conduct of First Lieutenant Smedley D. Butler, United States Marine Corps, in bringing in a wounded man from the front under heavy and accurate fire. Lieutenant Butler was wounded while so doing, but, I am glad to learn, not seriously. The regimental adjutant, First Lieutenant Henry Leonard, as Lieutenant Butler was suffering severely, volunteered to carry him out of the firing-line. This gallant feat he successfully accomplished, but, I regret to say, was very dangerously wounded in so doing.

The Ninth Regiment were fighting somewhat outside my sphere of action, so I am to bring forward only one instance of personal gallantry in that regiment, although, circumstanced as they were, fighting for about twelve hours almost alone and unsupported, and never giving back a foot of ground until directed to retire under cover of night and fire of the naval guns, such instances must have been very numerous. The one I would refer to was the bringing back to me by the acting regimental adjutant, Captain Lawton, of the account of the position of the regiment across a wide and fire-swept space, and returning with reinforcements to guide them to his regiment, when he was severely wounded.

The withdrawal of the regiment was a delicate military operation finely carried out, on which I congratulate Lieutenant-Colonel Coolidge and the officers and men under his command.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

A. R. F. DORWARD,  
*Brigadier-General.*

## APPENDIX IV.

No. 1.

TIENTSIN, CHINA, July 21, 1900.

*The Adjutant, Ninth Infantry:*

SIR,—In consequence of the death of Colonel Emerson H. Liscum, Ninth United States Infantry, on the field of battle on the 13th instant, and my succession to the command of the companies therein engaged, namely, B, C, D, detachment of E, and Companies F, G, and H, I have the honor to submit the following report, pursuant to paragraph 267 of the Regulations for troops in campaign:

The formation was made at 3 A. M. on the 13th instant at the Nong Po Quilo Mortuary, near the Tientsin University, on the south side of the Foreign Settlement. The command moved out in column at 3:30 A. M., following the British Naval Brigades. After a circuitous march of about two hours, we took position as a reserve in line of battle fronting the West Arsenal at a distance of about eight hundred yards. From dropping shots at long range we suffered considerable loss, the heaviest being Company C, the second company from the left. Captain C. R. Noyes, the adjutant of the regiment, was slightly wounded at this place, but continued on duty. We then moved forward about 7 A. M. to the protection of the mud wall at West Arsenal, the First Battalion forming on right into line all as a support to the Japanese, the Second Battalion being on the right. At about 7:30 A. M. we moved quickly over the wall, and the command re-formed a short distance forward under the protection of some mud huts. In a few minutes the men enthusiastically moved forward rapidly, crossing the bridge, and, by Colonel Liscum's orders, took a position in battle order to the right along the banks of a broad canal. Owing to the contracted space, Company B was moved from the right to the front on a road at an angle to the general

line, and followed soon after by Companies C, D, G, F, and H, it being the intention for this entire line to conform to the general advance of the Japanese toward the Taku gate. At this juncture a heavy enfilading fire was opened on the Ninth Infantry at a point about twelve hundred yards distant, and many casualties resulted. By Colonel Liscum's orders and personal directions, we fronted this fire and moved forward, Captain Brewster, Company B, in advance. This was about 8 A. M. The fire became hot and heavy from a fortified mud village in our front, which practically flanked the advancing column on the Taku gate of the walled city. We moved rapidly forward, suffering severe losses; Captain E. V. Bookmiller falling severely wounded at the first advance. Until about 9 A. M. the two battalions occupied an advanced position within one hundred to two hundred yards of the fortified village, where we were subjected to a deadly fire of musketry and shrapnel. The ground passed over was irregular, filled with dikes and ditches, the mud and water, varying from three to eight feet deep. I repeatedly met Colonel Liscum, who, with uplifted arms, coolly and calmly urged his men forward. When within about two hundred and fifty yards of the enemy's fortified position, which was protected by an unfordable canal or moat fifty yards wide, I met Major Regan, commanding the Second Battalion, where he fell severely wounded. After locating his wound, I directed the men to put him under cover, and moved forward. Captain Noyes, the adjutant, had received his second wound, a severe one, and was taken to a house for partial protection. Shortly before 9 A. M. I inquired for the Colonel, and was informed by Lieutenant Joseph Frazier that he had been hit and was in the trench mortally wounded. I then took command of the remnants of the First and Second Battalions, directing Captain A. W. Brewster to command the First, and First Lieutenant Joseph Frazier the Second. A further advance was impossible, and to retire was out of the question. About 10 A. M. I directed my gallant adjutant, First Lieutenant Louis B. Lawton, to go to the



rear, he being compelled to cross the field, swept by a most destructive fire, and report to General Dorward, of Her Majesty's service, our need and condition. This he did, and in less than two hours returned, and, though twice wounded, coolly reported the result of his perilous mission. He was afterwards again hit by a shot in the sole of his shoe. We remained in this position under musketry and machine-gun fire, many of the men lying in water from their knees to their armpits, with no hope of withdrawal, until 8:10 P. M., when, under cover of darkness, we withdrew by squads, under fire, with a loss in so doing of 1 man of Company C killed. Our final withdrawal was handsomely covered by the British naval troops and United States marines sent to our aid by General Dorward. These gallant men also aided us in the removal of our wounded, and we owe General Dorward and them a debt of gratitude which will never be forgotten by the American soldiers on that bloody field, and the high tribute given by General Dorward to the officers and men of the Ninth Infantry will be sacredly cherished as long as the battle of Tientsin shall remain inscribed on our colors. Having removed our wounded and the body of our colonel, we assembled at the south gate of the West Arsenal at about 9:15 P. M., where I reported to Lieutenant-Colonel Charles A. Coolidge, Ninth Infantry, the senior officer of the regiment. It is but just to state that throughout the trying ordeal of the day the officers and the great majority of the men behaved with splendid gallantry. When our ammunition was nearly exhausted and our force on the firing-line greatly reduced, there was a grim determination on the part of every officer and man there under my command to hold on through the long hours of constant and deadly fire until such time as withdrawal could be effected under cover of night. In this connection attention is invited to the accompanying sketch of the field of operations prepared by First Lieutenant Harold Hammond (Exhibit A); also to a report (Exhibit B) by Captain Charles R. Noyes, adjutant, made in response to my request. Company A of the regiment was

not under my orders during the day, having been ordered on the preceding day to duty at the north pontoon bridge as a reserve to the troops at the railroad station. This command consisted of Company A, 66 men, and 32 men of Company D, commanded by First Lieutenant M. M. Weeks, Eleventh Infantry, with Second Lieutenant F. R. Brown, Ninth Infantry, attached. This command suffered casualties of 2 killed and 5 wounded from a bursting shell. Attention is invited to Lieutenant Weeks's report herewith, as Exhibit C. At the 3 A. M. formation on the 13th instant the effective force of the command to which I succeeded was as follows: 1 colonel, 1 adjutant. First Battalion: 1 major, 1 adjutant, 1 sergeant-major; Company B, 2 officers, 64 enlisted men; Company C, 1 officer, 59 enlisted men; Company D, 2 officers, 41 enlisted men, and attached to Company D from Company E, 11 enlisted men; total, First Battalion, 7 officers, 176 enlisted men. Second Battalion: 1 major, 1 adjutant, 1 sergeant-major; Company F, 1 officer, 86 enlisted men; Company G, 2 officers, 75 enlisted men; Company H, 1 officer, 80 enlisted men; total, Second Battalion, 6 officers, 242 enlisted men. Recapitulation Ninth Infantry, 15 officers, 418 enlisted men.

In addition to the above were 2 medical officers and 8 men of the Hospital Corps.

*Casualties.*—Killed, 1 officer and 16 enlisted men; wounded, 4 officers and 67 enlisted men. Total casualties, 5 officers and 83 enlisted men.

#### SPECIAL MENTION.

The following-named officers are recommended:

##### *For Medals of Honor.*

Captain Charles R. Noyes, adjutant, for conspicuous gallantry for continuing on until twice wounded (special report forwarded).

Captain André W. Brewster, for conspicuous gallantry in rescuing, at great risk to his life, a wounded soldier who would have drowned.

First Lieutenant Joseph Frazier, for conspicuous gallantry in rescuing at great peril the colonel of his regiment, who had fallen mortally wounded, and conducting him to the trench.

First Lieutenant Louis B. Lawton, adjutant First Battalion, for conspicuous gallantry in carrying a message for relief over a field swept by a deadly fire, returning and reporting after having been twice wounded in doing so (special report forwarded).

*For Brevets.*

Major James Regan, as lieutenant-colonel, for coolness, courage, and heroic exposure under deadly fire until severely wounded.

Captain Charles R. Noyes, adjutant, as major, for constant coolness and gallantry under a deadly fire until disabled by a second wound.

Captain André W. Brewster, as major, for conspicuous gallantry, coolness, and heroism in the extreme advance and inspiring the men of his company and battalion by fearless example.

Captain Edwin V. Bookmiller, as major, for conspicuous coolness under a deadly fire, leading his company until he fell twice wounded.

First Lieutenant Joseph Frazier, as captain, for conspicuous gallantry and fearless example, inspiring the men of his company and battalion.

First Lieutenant Louis B. Lawton, adjutant First Battalion, as captain, for conspicuous gallantry, coolness, and efficiency in the discharge of every duty throughout the day.

First Lieutenant Harry F. Rethers, as captain, for conspicuous gallantry, coolness, and heroism, being with the extreme advance and inspiring his men by example throughout the day.

First Lieutenant William K. Naylor, as captain, for conspicuous gallantry, coolness, and heroism, being with the extreme advance and inspiring his men by example throughout the day.

First Lieutenant Edward A. Bumpus, as captain, for conspicuous gallantry, coolness, and heroism, being with the ex-

treme advance and inspiring his men by example throughout the day.

Second Lieutenant William H. Waldron, as first lieutenant, for conspicuous gallantry, coolness, and heroism, being with the extreme advance and inspiring his men by example throughout the day.

Second Lieutenant Robert S. Clark, as first lieutenant, for conspicuous gallantry, coolness, and courage throughout the battle.

Second Lieutenant Abraham U. Loeb, as first lieutenant, for conspicuous gallantry, coolness, and courage throughout the battle.

It is deemed proper to say that the conduct of all the foregoing officers came more or less under my personal observation throughout the battle of Tientsin on July 13, 1900, which subjected the regiment to an almost constant fire for fourteen hours' duration. A number of these officers have been previously recommended for brevets for gallantry in action in Cuba and the Philippines, and if such recommendations are ever acted upon, these recommendations are for one grade higher than may be bestowed. Major W. B. Banister, of the Medical Department, United States Volunteers, captain and assistant surgeon, United States Army, performed most valuable service under fire in removing and caring for our wounded as far as it was possible to do. Though not under my personal observation, wounded officers and men can so testify. I recommend him for the brevet of major, United States Army.

The following enlisted men have been recommended for medals of honor and certificates of merit, as per special reports submitted:

*For Medals of Honor.*—Sergeant Alfred A. Bernheim, Company D; Sergeant John Pleasants, Company B; Private John H. Porter, late Company D; Private John Gallagher, Company C; Private Robert H. Von Schlick, Company C; Private Taylor B. Hickman, Company C; Private Wilson C. Price, Company F.

*For Certificates of Merit.*—Sergeant Albert Davis, Company B; Private Max Klein, Company D; Private Edward Keenan, Company D; Private Harry Van Leer, Company B; Private Martin Doyle, Company B; Private Ezekiel Hale, Company C; Private James Pickett, Company C.

There may be others in addition to the above, and, if so, their cases will be duly investigated and submitted later for action.

Very respectfully,

J. M. LEE,

*Major, Ninth Infantry, Commanding First and Second Battalions, Consisting of Six Companies, B, C, D, Detachment of E, and Companies F, G, and H, on Field July 13, 1900.*

No. 2.

(EXHIBIT B.)

NINTH U. S. INFANTRY HOSPITAL, TIENTSIN HOTEL,  
TIENTSIN, CHINA, July 16, 1900.

*Major Jesse M. Lee, Ninth Infantry:*

SIR,—I have the honor to submit a brief report of the orders and operations of the regiment up to the time I was disabled by my second wound, reference being made to the operations on July 13th of the attack on the walled city of Tientsin.

On the morning of the 12th Colonel Liscum was informed by Colonel Meade, United States Marine Corps, that the Ninth Infantry would be called upon to furnish a detachment to protect the second bridge and to prevent a crossing being made there; he was advised to call upon the British general and obtain exact instructions; Colonel Liscum did so in the afternoon. He was directed to send 200 men there at dusk, but it was intimated that a more important movement might take place if the plans were completed. He was to be called to a meeting of the generals and the movement fully explained; he was so called at about 6 o'clock, and attended the meeting alone. In the meantime a detachment for the bridge was started out and was met by the Colonel as he was returning. He reduced the detach-

ment to 100 men; the detachment consisted of Company A, strengthened by a number of men from D. First Lieutenant Weeks, Eleventh Infantry, was in command, and Second Lieutenant F. R. Brown, Ninth Infantry, attached. I had been ordered to conduct this detachment to its proper place. I did so, and returned to the barracks, having been gone about three-quarters of an hour. Colonel Liscum had personally made the necessary arrangements for the movement the following day, and as he did not find occasion to ask my advice, he did not, when I returned, explain to me any details of the movement, except to say that we would move out at 3:15 A. M., and to show me a paper containing a list of the organizations that would compose our column, the order in which they would march, and certain other information which I do not exactly recall, but I think it pertained to the way in which we would join the column, and to a meeting of the generals at a designated point, soon after the movement began.

Company E was detailed to remain at the barracks, except 12 men, who were attached to Company D. The command formed at 3:15 A. M., and was composed of Companies B, C, and D, of the First Battalion, under command of Major Lee, and F and H, of the Second Battalion, under command of Major Regan; the total strength being 15 officers and 430 men. We joined the column according to orders, and marched to the fields near the West Arsenal, outside of the mud wall; the Ninth Infantry was the last organization in the column.

Column of attack was formed opposite the gateway through the mud wall to the arsenal; the Ninth Infantry formed in line of skirmishers, with intervals of one pace, being in rear of the English Naval Brigade. We rested at this point for some time, while leading organizations were getting up to the wall. There was very slight defense made from the wall, apparently, but in our position we were catching a severe indirect fire, and a number of casualties occurred. After waiting three-quarters of an hour in this position, a staff officer rode to the commanding officer of the English Naval Brigade, and from him to Colonel

Liscum. His words to Colonel Liscum, as nearly as I can remember them, were: "General Dorward sends his compliments, and says that if you are having casualties here, you can advance your regiment to the mud wall, where you will be perfectly protected. You will have to cross the canal by the causeway and bridge in front of the gate, and then you will move your command to the left of the Japanese." Colonel Liscum made some inquiries, and the officer made some explanation to the same effect.

The line was advanced, and the left of it, being opposite the causeway, crossed first, and was conducted by myself to the left; in a few moments I returned to Colonel Liscum, who was at the gate, and seeing that a portion of the regiment was still not across, but lying along the canal, I remarked to Colonel Liscum: "The staff officer said that the regiment should be placed on the left of the Japanese." An officer standing by, whom I had not observed, said: "What staff officer?" And I replied: "The one that gave the message." General Dorward broke in himself, and said: "It makes no difference which, to the right or left, as long as they get under cover." In a few minutes an advance was made by the Japanese through the gateway, to occupy the arsenal, and the Ninth Infantry was brought up to cross the mud wall in column of files. It did so, and formed by companies, under the protection of some buildings. The Japanese troops were assembled in the same manner near that place. Soon they moved across a bridge to the right, and advanced towards the walled city, which was in view at about one thousand yards; the Ninth Infantry followed, and, getting into a rather contracted position, extended along a raised roadway, finding shelter under the bank, the right being pushed well forward at a suitable position to support the Japanese, if that was the order. I never heard any order given as to the special part to be taken by the regiment in the affair. The regiment had no sooner taken this position than it was subjected to a heavy enfilade fire from native huts about one thousand yards

on our right. Colonel Liscum immediately changed front and ordered an advance upon these houses, holding fire for a long time and suffering severe losses.

The men responded wonderfully well, being inspired by Colonel Liscum's gallant personal exposure; he led the men forward, walking along the road himself, and never seeking shelter. It was finally found impracticable to advance further, and it was just before the last advance that I was wounded. I withdrew to the shelter of a house about fifty yards to the rear, and remained there until about 1 o'clock, when I started to crawl further to the rear, protecting myself by banks and in ditches. Very soon after getting behind the house, I decided to send a message to the rear explaining the situation, asking for reinforcements; Private Carrier, Company B, Ninth Infantry, carried the message and returned in safety. After he had gone, I saw Lieutenant Lawton going to the rear on the same errand. One company of the English Naval Brigade was first sent up, and as I observed they could accomplish no good result, I thought it imperative to send another message, saying that I thought reinforcements should come over the mud wall five hundred yards or so to the right, and thus extending our line beyond the flank of the enemy. This message was also carried by Private Carrier; returned also unhurt.

One company of United States Marines came to our assistance, but not in the way I had indicated, having started, I presume, before my note got in.

Lieutenant Lawton returned to my place of shelter in safety, but I believe he was wounded while getting forward the next one hundred yards, to report to his commanding officer.

Lieutenant Hammond, Ninth Infantry, got forward as far as my position with extra ammunition.

The officers commanding the company of the English Naval Brigade and company of United States Marines arrived at the same place, the latter officer being wounded severely, just as he arrived.



These acts of gallantry which I have mentioned should receive due recognition, but particularly should the behavior of Lieutenant Lawton and Private Carrier be given the highest reward.

Very respectfully,

C. R. NOYES,  
*Captain, Ninth Infantry, Adjutant.*

## APPENDIX V.

### HEADQUARTERS CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION,

PEKING, CHINA, September 1, 1900.

*The Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington, D. C.:*

SIR,—In compliance with my orders to proceed to Peking, China, I have the honor to submit the following report:

\* \* \* \* \*

At Tientsin at this time was the Ninth Infantry (Lieutenant-Colonel Charles A. Coolidge, commanding), which had a sick-list of something like 200 men, and the physical condition of the regiment generally bad. Six companies of the Fourteenth Infantry (Colonel A. S. Daggett, commanding); this regiment was in good condition, with a small sick-list. Two days later two companies of this regiment from the *Flintshire* arrived at Tientsin. There was also at Tientsin at this time a small battalion of marines under Major Littleton W. T. Waller, and on August 1st a battalion of marines, 220 men, under Major William P. Biddle, by the *Grant*, from San Francisco, arrived at Tientsin. The only transportation at Tientsin at this time was 19 wagons, 4 ambulances, and 1 Dougherty wagon belonging to the Ninth Infantry. The transportation of the Fourteenth was delayed some time after the departure of that regiment from Manila, and did not arrive in the bay until some days after my departure from Tientsin.

\* \* \* \* \*

Arriving within about a mile and a half of Yang-tsun, the enemy were discovered occupying the section immediately in front of the bridge and the bend in the road, the railroad and the river road converging at this point.

In consultation with Lieutenant-General Gaselee, and at his request, I placed the Fourteenth Infantry to attack along the west side of the railroad, where they connected with the British line. The Russians were at this time to the left rear of the British,

probably in column. I crossed to the east side of the railroad embankment with the Ninth Infantry, marines, and Reilly's Battery, and deployed to support the march of the Fourteenth Infantry and British troops. General Gaselee had lent me a squadron of British cavalry to operate on my right flank. While deploying to advance with the Fourteenth Infantry in the direction of Pei-tsang, the enemy opened on my right flank with artillery, and soon after the commanding officer of the British cavalry reported that in the village directly on my right there were eight companies of Chinese infantry and three guns; that he had personally seen that force. It was unsafe to leave my right flank exposed to a force so strong. I directed a move against it. Our guns very soon silenced the guns of the enemy and set the village afire. While moving toward the village indicated, I received two messages by staff officers from the British commander, requesting that my artillery be brought to bear on the embankment and village being attacked by his force and the Fourteenth; that the Fourteenth was suffering severely. This before I had completely cleaned out the village to my right.

On the second message being received, which was delivered most anxiously for my assistance, I abandoned the movement on the village with the artillery and marines which were on the left, and at once changed direction of the battery and marines and moved toward the bridge or village being attacked by the Fourteenth and the British. I was loath to do this because of the fact that I believed that the British had ample artillery—a battery as heavy as my own—and that the Russians were immediately on their left with artillery, and the space to be attacked was a very contracted one. In addition, artillery fire as well as infantry was delivered from various villages to my right and in front. Notwithstanding my reluctance to change my line of battle before having accomplished the cleaning of the villages on the right, I did so, and went into position to assist the Fourteenth, intending to fire over the railroad embankment, which was about twenty feet high. The battery had unlimbered and was about to fire, when I

saw men of the Fourteenth mount the embankment directly in front of the line of fire of the battery. I ordered Captain Reilly not to fire, and within a minute thereafter the battery was fired upon by Chinese infantry or dismounted cavalry, secreted in the corn-fields within short range. Captain Reilly opened fire upon them with shrapnel, and, with the aid of the marines which were arriving, dispersed this force.

\* \* \* \* \*

The Fourteenth assaulted with vigor the position of the Chinese, supported on its left by the British troops, who were also somewhat mixed with the Fourteenth in consequence of the contracted ground. The Fourteenth Infantry should not have been placed in the attack on the west side of the railroad, as there was not sufficient ground even for the British to operate properly: but I allowed it to attack on that side because of the request of the British commander, who wished me to support his right. In this attack the Fourteenth Infantry suffered considerable loss—7 killed and 57 wounded. I regret to state that probably of 25 or 30 of this number, some were killed, others wounded, by fire of the British and Russian batteries after the position of the Chinese was in possession of the Fourteenth Infantry and some of the British troops. The advance of the Fourteenth Infantry ended at the railroad embankment.

The Ninth Infantry, marines, and Reilly's Battery continued its advance northward through the villages lying to the eastward of Yang-tsun until we reached nearly the north end of the city, where opposition had practically dispersed, and I withdrew my troops to camp near the railroad bridge. During the latter stages of this advance the Japanese sent a battery and some troops, which entered into action upon my right and advanced with me to the point where the operations of the day ceased. During the advance of the Ninth Infantry, Lieutenant Lang and 5 men of that regiment were wounded; 1 man in the marines wounded; 1 man and 2 horses of Reilly's Battery wounded. The day was intensely hot, and our men suffered horribly for the want of water and from the heat;

quite a number were prostrated and only arrived in camp after nightfall; 2 of the men so afflicted died on the field.

\* \* \* \* \*

The following refers to the assault on the walls of the Chinese City of Peking, August 14th:

The British troops did not advance from Tung-Chow until the 14th, owing to the agreement previously referred to. On that day they marched for the line of concentration and found my force advancing on Peking; at noon a British battery was at work a mile to my left and rear. At 11 A. M. two companies of the Fourteenth Infantry, under the immediate command of Colonel Daggett, had scaled the wall of the Chinese City at the northeast corner, and the flag of that regiment was the first foreign colors unfurled upon the walls surrounding Peking. The two companies on the wall, with the assistance of the troops facing the wall, drove away the Chinese defenders from the corner to the east gate of the Chinese City, where the British entered without opposition later in the day.

\* \* \* \* \*

One company of the Fourteenth Infantry deployed itself in the buildings to the right of the gate and poured effective fire onto the Tartar wall. Captain Reilly got two guns through a very narrow passage to his left, tearing down a wall to do so, and found a position a few yards to the left of the road where he could enfilade the Tartar wall, section by section, with shrapnel. The Fourteenth Infantry crossed the moat, and, taking position paralleling the moat, deployed along a street facing the Tartar wall, and, with the aid of the artillery, swept it of Chinese troops. In this way, gradually working to the westward, the Tartar wall was cleared of opposition to the Hait-men gate and beyond. Orders were sent to the Ninth to follow up the movement of the Fourteenth Infantry and Reilly's Battery as soon as the wall was cleared of Chinese, also to follow the movement to the Chien-men gate of the Tartar City. The marines were to follow the general movement, but later were ordered to

protect the train. At about 3 o'clock P. M. our advance had arrived opposite the Legations, the fire of the Chinese having practically ended, and we drew over to the Tartar wall and entered the Legation grounds, with the Fourteenth Infantry, by the water gate or moat, Reilly's Battery passing through the Chien-men gate, which was opened by the American and Russian marines of the besieged force. The Fourteenth Infantry was selected on this occasion in recognition of gallantry at Yang-tsun and during this day. The British troops entered at the Sha-huo gate of the Chinese City, and, following a road through the center of the city to opposite the Legations, arrived there through the water gate or moat in advance of the United States troops.

\* \* \* \* \*

I was informed by Mr. Conger that a portion of the Imperial City directly in front of the Chien-men gate had been used by Chinese to fire on the Legations, and I determined to force the Chinese troops from this position. On the morning of the 15th I placed four guns of Reilly's Battery on the Tartar wall at the Chien-men gate, and swept the walls to the westward to the next gate, there being some slight opposition in that direction, supported by poor artillery. About 8 o'clock A. M. the Chinese opened fire on us at the Chien-men gate from the second gate of the Imperial City north of the Chien-men gate, whereupon I directed an attack on the first gate to be made, and in a short while Lieutenant Charles P. Summerall, of Reilly's Battery, had opened the door of this gate. Our troops entered and were met with a severe fire from the next gate, about six hundred yards distant. Fire was directed upon the second gate with the battery and such of the infantry as could be elevated on the Tartar wall and side walls of the Imperial City and act effectively. In the course of half an hour the Chinese fire was silenced, and Colonel Daggett led forward his regiment to the base of the second gate. Lieutenant Summerall was directed to open this gate with artillery, which he did. The course just indicated was pursued for four gates, the Chinese troops being

driven from each gate in succession, the fourth gate being near what is known as the palace grounds, which is surrounded by the imperial grounds.

At a conference that afternoon it was decided not to occupy the Imperial City, and I withdrew my troops into the camp occupied the night before, maintaining my position on the Tartar wall at the Chien-men gate.

The idea of not occupying the Imperial City was not concurred in by the ministers in a conference held by them the next day. In their opinion the Imperial City should be occupied; it was later decided by the generals to occupy the imperial grounds, and in consequence of this decision I re-occupied the grounds we had won on the 15th, placing the Ninth Infantry within as guard at the gate where our attack ceased.

\* \* \* \* \*

The following-named officers have served on my staff:

*Personal Staff.*—Second Lieutenant Roy B. Harper, Seventh Cavalry, aide-de-camp; First Lieutenant John W. Furlong, Sixth Cavalry, acting aide-de-camp; First Lieutenant Benjamin B. Hyer, Sixth Cavalry, acting aide-de-camp.

*Divisional Staff.*—Captain Grote Hutcheson, Sixth Cavalry, adjutant-general; Major Jesse M. Lee, Ninth Infantry, inspector-general; Major George P. Scriven, Signal Corps, chief signal officer; Major William B. Banister, chief surgeon; Captain William Crozier, Ordnance Department, chief ordnance officer; Captain Frank De W. Ramsey, Ninth Infantry, chief commissary; First Lieutenant Harley B. Ferguson, Corps of Engineers, chief engineer officer.

*Attached.*—Lieutenant-Colonel John S. Mallory, Forty-first Infantry; Major Samuel M. Mills, Sixth Artillery; Captain Cornelius F. O'Keefe, Thirty-sixth Infantry; Second Lieutenant Allen Smith, Jr., Ninth Infantry; Lieutenant Julian L. Latimer, U. S. N.

Every officer has been untiring in his respective duties, and in addition thereto has anxiously sought opportunity to aid in every possible way to further the object of this expedition.

My thanks are tendered to all. I shall take occasion very soon to make special report, with my recommendations, respecting officers of my staff.

I wish to invite especial attention to \*Colonel A. S. Daggett, Fourteenth Infantry, for his gallantry at Yang-tsun, August 6th, for energy and good judgment in the attack on Peking, August 14th, and for gallantry and excellent supervision of the attack on the gates of the Imperial City, August 15th. I recommend that he be made a brigadier-general, U. S. A.

Very respectfully,

ADNA R. CHAFFEE,

*Major-General, U. S. V.,*

*Commanding China Relief Expedition.*

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\*He was promoted accordingly.



## APPENDIX VI.

No. 1.

BATTLE OF YANG-TSUN, CHINA, AUGUST 6, 1900.

HEADQUARTERS, FOURTEENTH INFANTRY,

YANG-TSUN, CHINA, August 7, 1900.

*Adjutant-General, Army of Relief, Yang-tsun, China:*

SIR,—I have the honor to submit the following report of the battle of Yang-tsun, China, in which the Fourteenth Infantry participated, on the 6th instant:

One battalion, the Third, under Major Quinton, had been advancing for several hours in line of squads; the Second, under Captain Eastman, following; the right rested on the railroad leading to Peking. When within about one and a half miles of the village, artillery fire began from our front and right; deployment was made immediately, and the advance continued to within about fifteen hundred yards of the village, when the regiment was subjected to rifle fire. We soon overtook some British soldiers (Sikhs), whose right overlapped our left some thirty or forty yards. Arriving within about three hundred yards of the village, a slight cover was found, where I directed a halt and fire to be delivered at the houses where the enemy were, their fire being soon nearly silenced. I directed an assault to be made, which was done by Americans and British together; the former, being a little more rapid in their movements, reached the village first. Here we received a severe artillery fire from three directions, causing considerable losses. We advanced through the village, clearing the enemy from the railroad, where they made some resistance. We then crossed the railroad, and advanced to within about five hundred yards of a clump of houses and very extensive wall, surmounted by a pagoda. With a company of fresh troops, I could have taken this place, but our troops were so exhausted that it was

impossible to go farther. The line was halted and regiment collected here. I silenced the fire of the enemy from the wall and pagoda by a few well-posted sharpshooters. For reasons which it might not be best to embody in this report, but which I will state to the General verbally, I deemed it my duty to lead the assault on the village in person.

I was accompanied in the advance and assault by Major Quinton, Captain Iearnard, adjutant, and Captain Reynolds, quartermaster, whose conduct was gallant and splendid; the conduct of all the officers was creditable to American valor.

The character of the march had been such that the men were much exhausted when they engaged in battle. Captain Eastman's battalion was not engaged in the assault, but was much exposed, and lost many men. It was reserved by the commanding general for duty on the northeast side of the river.

Seven enlisted men were killed and 57 wounded; 2 officers were prostrated by the heat. About 430 men were engaged in the battle. Only about 200 rounds of ammunition was expended, the village being carried by assault.

Major Quinton's and Captain Eastman's report are inclosed.

Very respectfully, A. S. DAGGETT,  
*Colonel, Fourteenth Infantry, Commanding.*

[First Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS, CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION,  
PEKING, CHINA, September 1, 1900.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army.

I mention in my general report about the Fourteenth Infantry attacking the Chinese position in the village located in the angle between the river and the railroad embankment, which here bends abruptly to approach the river crossing. The resistance offered by the Chinese at this point was considerable, resulting in numerous casualties to this regiment. The gallantry and soldierly conduct of both officers and men are very commendable, in which Colonel A. S. Daggett, commanding the regiment, was distinctly conspicuous.

The Fourteenth Infantry, as the other regiments of the expedition, entered upon the engagement when greatly exhausted, following several hours' marching in the intense heat of the day; but, while greatly fatigued, both officers and men entered upon the battle with commendable spirit.

During the greater part of the time of this engagement the Fourteenth Infantry was beyond my view, in consequence of the railroad embankment lying between that regiment and the other forces in my command, to which I gave my personal attention.

Special attention is invited to the inclosed report of Colonel Daggett, Major Quinton, and Captain Martin, who speak with praise of officers and men mentioned by name, and in whose recommendations I concur. Detached reports of battalion and company commanders are also inclosed.

ADNA R. CHAFFEE,  
*Major-General, U. S. V.,*  
*Commanding China Relief Expedition.*

## APPENDIX VII.

No. 2.

YANG-TSUN, CHINA, August 7, 1900.

*Adjutant, Fourteenth Infantry:*

SIR,—I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by my battalion, the Second, in the engagement yesterday, August 6, 1900.

After being detached by the commanding general for some time, I rejoined the regiment about 10 A. M., and was directed to join the reserve of the firing-line in line of companies in columns of fours. I did so. When the Third Battalion advanced, the Second Battalion followed in that formation until we came within the zone of artillery fire, a few minutes later, when I formed two lines of squads, and later deployed Companies E and F in the first line, and G and H in the second line, E and H being on the right of their respective lines.

During the advance the right of each line rested on the railroad embankment, the left overlapping the English line a good deal.

The entire advance to the village was made under a very severe shrapnel fire and some infantry fire, without a halt and without firing a single shot.

On reaching the village of Yang-tsun, many men, both Indian and American, turned to the right, ascended the railroad embankment, and opened fire; but English officers ordered firing to cease, as it was reported to me at the time that the men were firing on Japanese troops.

Within a few minutes after occupying the embankment several shells from batteries at our left and rear—southeast—struck in our midst, exploding, killing and wounding a number of men

I immediately sent my adjutant, Lieutenant Brambila, to stop the artillery fire. He walked about one-half mile, when

he found a mounted messenger to send to the batteries, and then was overcome by the heat, and has not yet fully recovered.

Soon after the shelling ceased, I received orders from regimental commander to assemble the battalion, but before it was possible to assemble the companies, General Chaffee's aide directed me to let the men rest awhile, then assemble them, and attack a couple of villages lying one mile to one and one-half miles to the northeast of my position.

Before the advance began the men had emptied their canteens, were suffering from thirst, and were greatly exhausted by their march over soft ground, so that after reaching the village all officers and men were so exhausted that it was impossible re-form the battalion. After resting an hour or more, I formed the battalion to carry out General Chaffee's orders, but before starting I could see that the villages to be attacked had already been captured by our troops; so I rejoined the regiment, and reported to the regimental commander.

I saw but little of the company officers during the advance, but all reached the village with their companies. Lieutenant Brambila was with me, and his coolness and conduct under fire could not have been better.

I am sorry it is my duty to find fault with the non-commissioned officers; they seemed, with few exceptions, to be of but little use in preserving intervals during the advance, and in my attempts to re-assemble the battalion they were utterly useless. All the duties of the non-coms. had to be performed by the company officers, causing useless and dangerous delay in forming after the engagement.

My battalion formed two lines of skirmishers at 10.45 and reached the village at 11:15 A. M., re-assembled at 2:30 P. M., and re-joined the Third Battalion at about 2:45 P. M.

I inclose herewith reports of my company commanders, marked A, B, C, and D, respectively.

Very respectfully,

FRANK F. EASTMAN,  
*Captain, Fourteenth Infantry,*  
*Commanding Second Battalion.*

## APPENDIX VIII.

No. 7.

THIRD BATTALION, FOURTEENTH U. S. INFANTRY,

YANG-TSUN, CHINA, August 7, 1900.

*Captain Learnard, Regimental Adjutant, Fourteenth United States  
Infantry:*

SIR,—I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my battalion in the action of yesterday against the Chinese who occupied this group of houses, called, by courtesy, a village.

On our side we have 10 killed and 53 wounded; of this loss, my battalion loses 6 killed and 33 wounded.

We broke camp at 3:50 yesterday morning and moved down the Pei-Ho River one-half mile, so as to avail ourselves of the pontoon bridge left by the Chinese, and over which they managed to escape yesterday afternoon from the pressing, eager, and active operations of the Japanese forces. Passing through the Russian camps, we crossed the bridge just at daylight, and after having moved on a line perpendicular to the Peking Railroad something less than half a mile, I was directed to deploy my battalion and halt. Here we halted for a greater period than one hour, and while halted other troops, mainly British Sikhs, passing by our left flank, moved to our front and deployed in line of skirmishers. In marching to Yang-tsun my battalion changed direction half left, and throughout the entire march, until it met the enemy, its right flank was protected by the Peking Railroad. As the grade of this road is from ten to fifteen feet above the plain, it made most excellent cover as against observation and protection to a certain extent from a flank fire.

Deploying my battalion first in line of squads, and subsequently, when within the zone of the enemy's fire, as skirmish-

ers, we were compelled to advance rapidly, as the artillery fire rained upon us was intense, and this was supplemented by a severe and fairly well-aimed fire from small-arms. My command was deployed as follows: Company M, Captain Martin, and Company K, First Lieutenant Burnside, composed the first line, with Company L, Lieutenant McClure, and Company I. Captain J. R. M. Taylor, as battalion reserve, the reserve being commanded by the last-mentioned officer.

Proceeding steadily to the front, my battalion soon found itself on the line occupied by the Sikhs. When we reached this particular point we were about three hundred yards from the Chinese village, from which a galling fire was directed upon the advancing Sikhs and Americans. It was evident this village would have to be carried quickly if we desired to avoid great loss. Indeed, this was so evident that the troops moved forward at a run to the assault of the village, and this almost without firing a single shot. This first impulse of attack brought us to a point where we were fairly protected, within one hundred yards of the angle of the village nearest the railroad. In passing through the corn-fields the troops did not suffer much loss, as their movements were masked by the standing corn, but the men were badly bunched up with every step of advance by the converging lines of the railroad and river which join each other at the village. Hence, there was considerable mixing up of commands, although the impulse that controlled each line was ever forward. Immediately with me was Colonel Daggett and his adjutant, Captain Learnard, and we all followed up the movements of Company M, Fourteenth Infantry, and a mixed command of Sikhs and Fourteenth Infantry to the assault of the right (our right) angle of the village. Finding cover, as before stated, at a point about one hundred yards distant from the angle before mentioned, we poured fire upon the doors and windows of the village by direction of Colonel Daggett. This fire was steadily kept up for a period of about thirty seconds, when it ceased and the line moved forward, led by Colonel Daggett, piercing the village and forcing the enemy to retire beyond

the railroad track. As we entered the village, Colonel Daggett and a portion of the force with him went through the village itself. I turned to the right, skirted the outer edge, found that the Chinese had passed the railroad track and were preparing to pour in a fire upon our right flank. I therefore directed a portion of my command to occupy the railroad embankment and hold down this fire. While this was being accomplished, and as men came up to join in the attack, I directed a fire from the point in the village where I was upon a small cannon that the Chinese were firing from beyond the village near the railroad bridge. As our men kept up a constant fire upon the gun, its fire ceased. We entered the village at 12:20, and so rapid were our movements that we were in complete possession in a few minutes. With Colonel Daggett, Captain Learnard, and myself was associated in these movements Major T. E. Scott, Third Sikhs. I desire to call attention to the cool, intrepid gallantry of this most courteous gentleman, who operated with us and aided us materially.

Our own officers behaved, as usual, with the cool bravery that everywhere distinguishes the American officer. We all fought under the eye of the Colonel. To mention one name where all fought so gallantly would be invidious. These are steady and coolly brave gentlemen, and every officer in my battalion earned and deserves special mention and reward. The officers with my battalion were as follows:

Major William Quinton, Fourteenth Infantry.

First Lieutenant L. M. Nuttman, Fourteenth Infantry, battalion adjutant.

Company M: Captain C. H. Martin, Fourteenth Infantry; First Lieutenant C. N. Murphy, Fourteenth Infantry.

Company I: Captain J. R. M. Taylor, Fourteenth Infantry; First Lieutenant H. S. Wagner, Fourteenth Infantry.

Company K: First Lieutenant W. A. Burnside, Fourteenth Infantry; Second Lieutenant W. S. Sinclair, Fourteenth Infantry.



Company L: Second Lieutenant A. N. McClure, Fourteenth Infantry; Second Lieutenant L. McL. Hamilton, Fourteenth Infantry.

Respectfully submitted.                      WILLIAM QUINTON,  
*Major, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry.*

P. S.—I respectfully join in the especial reference made by Captain C. H. Martin, commanding Company M, Fourteenth Infantry, requesting the honor of a brevet for Lieutenant Murphy Fourteenth U. S. Infantry.                      WILLIAM QUINTON,  
*Major, Fourteenth Infantry.*

APPENDIX 1X.

[From Lieutenant-General Sir A. Gasélee, K. C. B., A. D. C.,  
Commanding British Forces, Northern China.]

PEKING, August 24, 1900.

*General Chaffee, Commanding United States Forces:*

SIR,—I have the honor to forward, for your information, the  
accompanying extracts from correspondence relative to the  
engagement at Yang-tsun.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

ALFRED GASELEE, L. G.,

*Commanding British Forces, North China.*

[Extracts from a letter, No. 71, dated Yang-tsun, August 7, 1900,  
from Brigadier-General Sir [N. R. Stewart, Bart., to the  
chief of the staff, China expeditionary force.]

\* \* \* \* \*

I forward a report by Lieutenant-Colonel Pollock, command-  
ing First Sikhs, who brings to notice the following officers:

\* \* \* \* \*

Major William Quinton, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry;  
Captain J. R. M. Taylor, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry.

\* \* \* \* \*

[Extracts from a letter dated Yang-tsun, August 7, 1900, from  
Lieutenant-Colonel Pollock, commanding First Sikhs, to  
the deputy assistant adjutant-general First Brigade.]

\* \* \* \* \*

I should like to bring to notice the following officers:

\* \* \* \* \*

Major Scott has brought to my notice the following officers  
of the United States Army:

Major William Quinton, Fourteenth United States Infantry,  
for the great help he gave in the attack on the second village in

getting his men together and moving on with the First Sikhs, and the cool and collected way in which he worked with them.

Captain J. R. M. Taylor, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, for the very gallant way he led his men to attack the second village under a heavy fire, and also for the great help he gave in forming the men up for the second attack on the village.

## APPENDIX X.

PEKING, CHINA, August 20, 1900.

*Adjutant-General, China Relief Expedition:*

SIR,—I have the honor to inclose herewith reports of company and battalion commanders, and to submit my report as regimental commander Ninth Infantry, in the engagements around Yang-tsun, August 6, 1900.

The Ninth Infantry left Wang Chwang at 4:30 A. M. on the morning of the 6th with 12 companies—27 officers and 835 enlisted men. The regiment marched down to the pontoon bridge and, crossing the river, halted out on the plain in column of companies at close distance on the right of the battery. After waiting until about 7:30, the forces of the United States were advanced along the south side of the railroad embankment, the Ninth Infantry following to the right of the battery five hundred yards in its rear. Company G, with 1 officer and 62 men, had been detached and left at the pontoon bridge.

The enemy having been developed about 10 A. M., the battery, the marines, and Ninth Infantry were crossed to the north of the railroad embankment. The Ninth Infantry firing-line was then placed in support of the battery on its right—the Ninth Regiment line touching to the battery, and directed to march in the same direction as the railroad. The battery shortly commenced to fire across the face of the Ninth Infantry line of battle at a village somewhat to our right and front, which drew forth a shell fire from the Chinese, passing over the heads of men on the left of the regiment. Captain Crozier then came up, and said he had been directed by the commanding general to show me the line of attack of the Ninth Infantry—viz., to the village on our right. The direction of the line of battle was then changed more to the northeast, on the village, and the

regiment advanced to the front through the corn-field and into the village. Tracks of Chinese artillery were seen going to the northeast, but Captain Crozier informing me that it was not desired to halt there, but push on to the next village, the regiment line was straightened out again. On getting away from the village some distance, a severe shell fire, wounding Lieutenant Lang, acting battalion adjutant, was encountered, and also a fusillade of rifle fire, which the firing-line returned. Captain Hutcheson, adjutant-general, came up and directed me to change the direction of the Ninth Infantry line on to the water tower of the railroad and proceed toward that point, which I started to comply with, when another staff officer came up and directed me to move on to the village on our right. I again changed the line of attack upon the village referred to, upon which the United States battery to our left and a Japanese battery to our right and rear were firing. We advanced and entered the village, the Japanese battery going into it on the right of the village. Here the men, thirsting for water, congregated around the wells, endeavoring to obtain water to quench their thirst, in this and the adjacent twin village (three hundred yards to the left). The exhausted men sank down in the shade of the trees, and it required the energetic work of the officers of the regiment to gather them together and re-form the line for a farther advance, which being done, the regiment was re-formed on the right of the battery, which was firing just outside the village upon the Chinese forces a mile or two to the north, near the river bank. About 3 P. M. the fire of the battery was discontinued, and the regiment, with other troops, marched to the railroad crossing of the Pei-Ho River, where they were placed in camp.

*Casualties.*—Killed, 1 private. Wounded, Second Lieutenant F. R. Lang and 5 enlisted men.

The officers worked hard and did their duty faithfully during the entire day, as also the enlisted men who were not pros-

trated by the heat and thirst. I have no special recommendations to make for individual bravery.

Very respectfully yours, CHAS. A. COOLIDGE,  
*Lieutenant-Colonel, Ninth Infantry,*  
*Commanding Regiment.*

PEKING, CHINA, August 18, 1900.

*The Adjutant, Ninth U. S. Infantry:*

SIR,—I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my battalion on the 6th instant.

We broke camp about 4 A. M., crossed the Pei-Ho River, and advanced over an open country parallel to the line of the railroad for a distance of about five miles. About 10 A. M. the enemy was developed in our front. My battalion was ordered to cross the railroad track and form as support for the Third Battalion, which was formed for attack. As the lieutenant-colonel commanding the regiment went forward with the Third Battalion, I was placed for a short time in command of the First and Second Battalions, marching them in column in rear of the right and left center of the Third Battalion. After advancing a short distance in this manner, I was returned to the command of my own battalion, and as we were getting under a rather sharp shrapnel fire, I formed line of squads to the front and continued to advance with my left on the railroad embankment, directing my line on a village in front from which the enemy's fire came. After the enemy were driven from this position, we made a half change of direction to the left and continued our advance, passing through a corn-field for some distance and, swinging still more to the left, we halted for a short time at a well, where some water was obtained, the heat being very great. I then advanced the battalion and formed as support for a battery which was shelling the retreating enemy, passing through the village of Yang-tsun. We occupied this position about half an hour, until all firing ceased, when I formed in column of fours and marched with the regiment to the river bank at the railroad crossing, where we went in camp. The battalion was in action about four hours, maintaining a run-

ning fight with the enemy and under fire more or less most of the time. The heat was very great, but officers and men kept up in their places, and all behaved in a soldierly and becoming manner. The only casualty in my battalion was 1 man of Company D slightly wounded.

Very respectfully,

MORRIS C. FOOTE,  
*Major, Ninth U. S. Infantry,*  
*Commanding First Battalion.*

## APPENDIX XI.

PEKING, CHINA, August 18, 1900.

*The Adjutant-General, China Relief Expedition, Peking, China:*

SIR,—I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of Light Battery F, Fifth Artillery, during the engagement at Yang-tsun, China, August 6, 1900.

Soon after the engagement began, at about 11 o'clock A. M., the battery was ordered to cross to the east side of the railroad and open fire on the enemy's guns that were in action to the north and east of our position. Captain Reilly selected a commanding place about five hundred yards from the track, and opened fire on the enemy's guns that were shelling our troops from a small village twenty-four hundred yards northeast of us. After silencing these guns, the battery advanced with the infantry, and again came into action against the same village. Just then the enemy's guns north of us and east of the track were directed upon our troops, and the fire of three of our guns was turned against them until they were silenced. As the fire from the village first attacked ceased, an order came to fire upon the enemy's guns west of the railroad, and Captain Reilly advanced to a position eighteen hundred yards from these guns and prepared for action, but before we could fire our infantry were seen to be advancing too near the enemy for us to fire over them with safety.

About this time a sharp fire was directed against the battery from the enemy's infantry, located in a village northeast of us and in the intervening corn-field. The battery replied with shrapnel, sweeping the entire space and silencing the fire. Here a battalion of marines deployed, and the battery advanced with them against the village and opened fire upon the village and upon columns of the retreating enemy beyond. As the village was abandoned by the enemy, the battery continued its advance northward, again opened fire upon the retreating



enemy, and continued this fire until the end of the action, at about 2:30 P. M.

Private Andrew Bromm and 2 horses of the battery were wounded. The battery expended 192 rounds of ammunition.

Very respectfully,

C. P. SUMMERALL,  
*First Lieutenant, Fifth Artillery.*

## APPENDIX XII.

ENGAGEMENTS AT PEKING, CHINA, AUGUST 14 AND 15, 1900.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTEENTH INFANTRY,

PEKING, CHINA, August 19, 1900.

*The Adjutant-General, China Relief Expedition, Peking, China:*

SIR,—I have the honor to submit the following report of the battles of the 14th and 15th instant, so far as they were participated in by the Fourteenth Infantry.

Early on the morning of the 14th instant left bivouac, about five miles from Peking, and proceeded toward that city. After advancing about four miles, the column was halted. I was then ordered with two companies to operate toward the walls of the city. I advanced to within about three hundred yards of the walls, where considerable rifle fire was poured into our left. I crossed this zone of fire and caused the companies to follow rapidly, singly, and at three yards distance apart. We found two corners, about four hundred yards from each other, where bricks had fallen out, leaving holes where men could take hold with hands and toes of their shoes. The walls were scaled in this way by the men and officers. Rifles and ammunition were hauled up with cords and gun-slings. A few men were armed in this way before the enemy discovered our position. They opened fire on us, but our men, being well covered, stood their ground, and were constantly being reinforced slowly by other men climbing the wall. I then ordered the colors to be planted (about 11 A. M.) on the wall, which drew more rifle fire and a few shells. After nearly all of E and H Companies had climbed the walls, they were directed by Captain Learnard, adjutant, to clear the walls of the enemy, which was speedily and gallantly done. This gave relief to that whole section of the walls and country, so that free access was given to the gate blown open the night before. Company H was commanded by

First Lieutenant Mullay, aided by First Lieutenant Gilbreth; Company E was commanded by First Lieutenant Gohn, assisted by Second Lieutenant Hanson. Musician Calvin P. Titus, E Company, first scaled the wall, and was quickly followed by Captain Learnard, who conducted all the operations thereon with excellent judgment and to a successful close. His conduct in this brilliant operation deserves the highest commendation. All the company officers deserve high praise for their part in this remarkable assault. Dr. Winn climbed the wall among the first, to render aid to the wounded. His conduct in this affair was superb.

I then proceeded to a street running parallel with the south wall of the Tartar City with Companies E and G, latter commanded by First Lieutenant Faulkner, Eighth Infantry, aided by Second Lieutenant Kilbourne. This street varied between two hundred and four hundred yards distance from the wall. From the roofs of buildings a fire was directed on the openings of the wall, which drove the enemy away or silenced his fire. We proceeded in a westerly direction until our ammunition was nearly exhausted, and the men completely so, and I did not deem it prudent to proceed farther without more ammunition. I sent to the commanding general for the remainder of my regiment, and on its arrival I continued to work in a westerly direction until First Lieutenant Murphy discovered signs of a friendly flag. I ordered firing to cease, when American marines and civilians called out to us. They informed us that we could enter the next gate without opposition, as the British forces had so entered. If my whole regiment had been with me, I think I could have accomplished this work two hours earlier, and have been first to enter the Tartar City. It will be noticed that I had only two companies with me during the scaling of the walls and silencing the fire along the south wall of the Tartar City, except the last twenty minutes of that work.

About 7 o'clock the next morning, the 15th instant, I was directed to enter the Imperial City. We soon arrived without opposition in front of a wall about thirty feet high, surmounted

by a large brick and stone building, flanked by buttresses, giving the enemy a front fire of about one hundred and twenty-five yards. This wall was pierced by three archways, closed by very heavy gates and barred by timbers eight inches in diameter. Having no implements to break these gates down, a section of Battery F, Fifth Artillery, was sent to me under First Lieutenant Summerall, who quickly blew the gates down. Beyond was a court about one hundred yards wide and six hundred yards long, at the farther end of which was a wall and building similar to the one above described. Long, low buildings on either side connected the two walls. I soon discovered that the wall and building were occupied by the enemy in some force. I directed a platoon of M Company, Captain Martin and First Lieutenant Murphy, to deploy in the court, and soon reinforced it by the remaining platoon. It drew a rather severe fire. I sent First Lieutenant Burnside, with Company K, around our outer right flank to enfilade the enemy's position. Captain Martin had somewhat reduced the enemy's fire, and, having expended his ammunition, I relieved him with Second Lieutenant McClure's company, L. I soon saw that this front fire would not quickly silence the enemy, and withdrew Lieutenant McClure. The movements of Captain Martin's and Lieutenant McClure's companies and their conduct were almost perfect, reflecting great credit on these officers and their men. I then caused the two guns to open with shrapnel on the buildings and defenses on the wall. Lieutenant Burnside also about this time began firing on the enemy's left flank, and the enemy was soon dislodged. Three successive gates and courts similar to the above were entered in the same way, except that the frontal attack was not made till after the flank and battery work had been accomplished, except that at the second gate there was no opposition. At the first gate First Lieutenant T. M. Corcoran, Sixth Cavalry, did good work with his Gatling gun.

The conduct of all company commanders during these battles was highly commendable, and, with one exception, they were efficiently supported by their lieutenants.

Captain Reynolds, regimental quartermaster, not having many quartermaster's duties to perform, accompanied me on the 15th instant.

The casualties were: 1 enlisted man killed and 8 wounded on the 14th, and 4 killed and 14 wounded on the 15th.

About 15,000 rounds of ammunition were expended on the 14th and 31,100 on the 15th.

Lieutenant Summerall, Battery F, Fifth Artillery, did splendid work with a section of his battery during the battle of the 15th.

Lieutenants Gohn and Hanson were among the first twelve to scale the walls on the 14th, and Lieutenant Mullay, with his company (H), conducted himself with equal skill and gallantry at the point where they scaled the wall.

Throughout this campaign, on the march or in battle, Chaplain Groves has always been at the right place at the right time, attending to the sick and wounded; his labors have been arduous in the extreme, night and day. His conduct deserves the highest commendation.

Captain Lewis, assistant surgeon, has been faithful, kind, and untiring in his care of the sick and wounded.

Very respectfully,

A. S. DAGGETT,  
*Colonel, Fourteenth Infantry,*  
*Commanding.*

[First Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION,

PEKING, CHINA, September 1, 1900.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army, attention being invited to the within report of Colonel Daggett and those of his battalion commanders, Major Quinton and Captain Eastman, and the several company commanders' reports accompanying battalion commanders' reports.

I recommend that Major Quinton be brevetted lieutenant-colonel, U. S. A., for efficient services during the battle at Peking, China, August 14 and 15, 1900; that Captain Eastman be brevetted major, U. S. A., for efficient services during the battle at Peking, China, August 14 and 15, 1900; that Captain Martin, Fourteenth Infantry, be brevetted major, U. S. A., for gallant and efficient services at Yang-tsun, August 6, and at Peking, China, August 15, 1900; that Captain J. R. M. Taylor be brevetted major, U. S. A., for gallant and efficient services at Yang-tsun, August 6, and at Peking, August 15, 1900; that Captain Learnard be brevetted major, U. S. A., for conspicuous gallantry and efficient services in scaling the wall of the Chinese City of Peking, August 14, 1900. For First Lieutenant Mullay I recommend a brevet of captain, for scaling the wall of the Chinese City of Peking, August 14, 1900; for First Lieutenant Gilbreth I recommend a brevet of captain, for scaling the wall of the Chinese City of Peking, August 14, 1900; for First Lieutenant Gohn I recommend a brevet of captain, for scaling the wall of the Chinese City of Peking, August 14, 1900; for Second Lieutenant Hanson I recommend a brevet of first lieutenant, for scaling the wall of the Chinese City of Peking, August 14, 1900; for Second Lieutenant A. N. McClure, Fifth Cavalry (on duty with the Fourteenth Infantry), I recommend a brevet of first lieutenant, for gallant and distinguished conduct while commanding his company in the battle for possession of the gates to the Imperial City, Peking, August 15, 1900. I especially commend to the attention of the War Department the distinguished conduct of Acting Assistant Surgeon Robert N. Winn, U. S. A., who scaled the wall of the Chinese City at Peking, China, August 14, 1900, to enable him to render medical aid to the forces of the United States operating upon the wall of said city. I further recommend that Musician Calvin P. Titus be awarded a medal of honor for daring and gallant conduct in the presence of his colonel and other officers, also soldiers, of his

regiment, in that he was the first to scale the wall of the Chinese City at Peking, August 14, 1900.

ADNA R. CHAFFEE,  
*Major-General, U. S. V.,  
Commanding China Relief Expedition.*

No. 31.

PEKING, CHINA, August 18, 1900.

*The Adjutant, Fourteenth Infantry:*

SIR,—I have the honor to make the following report as to the part taken by the Second Battalion in the fights of the 14th and 15th of August, 1900, which resulted in the capture of Peking and the gates leading to the Sacred (or Forbidden) City.

Pursuant to orders given the evening of the 13th of August, I was ready to move at 5 A. M., the 14th, with a battalion composed of three companies, E and F of the Second Battalion, and Company K of the Third Battalion, to support the cavalry in a reconnoissance to the front, to be made under the immediate direction of the commanding general of the expedition.

At 5:30 A. M. General Chaffee ordered me to send the battalion back to their camping-place "to get breakfast." At 7 A. M. I was ordered to form the battalion in great haste to go to the relief of the troop of the Sixth Cavalry, said to be in a trap. Two companies, E and F, moved out as soon as possible. After marching rapidly about two miles, Company F was ordered off to take some position to the right and front, which had been designated by the commanding general. A few minutes later Company E was deployed to the left and front and advanced under the immediate direction and control of General Chaffee and staff.

A half-hour later, Companies H and G of my battalion, having been relieved from outpost, came up under the command of Colonel Daggett, and were turned over to me. A few minutes later I moved forward about one-half mile, and was halted. At this place, Company H was sent on to occupy some village to the left and front, but was halted after marching a quarter of a mile up the road, and Company F was designated and sent off.

I did not see Company F again until after reaching the British Legation within the walled city.

A few minutes later the regiment advanced, with Company H leading, followed at fifty paces by Company G. Company E had crossed to the right and front. A half-mile to the front Company G was halted by General Chaffee, and the Third Battalion marched to the rear. Company H followed the regimental commander out of sight, toward the city wall, three hundred yards in front.

Some firing being heard on our left front, General Chaffee ordered me to deploy Company G in that direction and advance toward the city. I refer to the report of the commanding officer of Company G, Lieutenant Faulkner. I remained with that company until I found Companies E and H on and under the city wall, acting under the personal direction of the regimental commander.

Between 12 and 1 o'clock Company H advanced along the top of the wall, and Companies E and G entered the city gate, followed by Reilly's Battery of the Fifth Artillery. We found the gate and short street for a distance of one hundred and fifty yards jammed with Russian troops and guns and exposed to a severe fire from the tower at the southeast corner of the Tartar City of Peking.

I sent the companies into alleyways to the left, and collected a few men to fire on the enemy to enable Captain Reilly to put his pieces in position to fire on the tower and to enfilade the south wall. While thus engaged, Companies E and G were taken by the regimental commander along a street parallel to the wall and within two hundred yards, whence they soon succeeded in silencing the enemy's fire from the wall.

I rejoined Companies E and G at about 3 o'clock, and soon after Company H rejoined the battalion. At about 5 P. M. we entered the city and proceeded to the British Legation; at 6 we camped under the city wall outside.



At 7 A. M., the 15th instant, Companies E, G, and H of my battalion followed the Third Battalion in marching out. A portion of that battalion soon became engaged in an attack on one of the gates to the palace, and I was directed to take a portion of my battalion to endeavor to flank the enemy and subdue his fire. I took Companies G and E and sent them down streets parallel to the walls, and soon succeeded in establishing small parties in advantageous positions, from which their fire soon drove the enemy from the gate-towers. Lieutenant Kilbourne, on duty with Company G, led his detachment under a sharp fire down the street to a barricade, from which he opened a very effective fire.

I sent my adjutant twice with messages to the regimental commander and to General Chaffee to the effect that a piece of artillery could soon force a gate which was practically in my possession, and secure entrance far in advance of the troops making the direct attack. An hour afterwards the gate was opened from within, and I rejoined the rest of the regiment with my detachments, and the companies acted the remainder of the day under the personal direction of the regimental commander.

The reports of casualties have been heretofore submitted. Reports of commanding officers of Companies E, G, and H are herewith forwarded. Company F took no part in the engagement of the 14th, and was on outpost duty on the wall during the night of the 14th and during the greater part of the 15th.

Very respectfully,

FRANK E. EASTMAN,  
*Captain, Fourteenth Infantry,  
Commanding Second Battalion.*

No. 33.

PEKING, CHINA, August 18, 1900.

*The Adjutant, Second Battalion, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry:*

SIR,—I have the honor to make the following report of the movements of Company G, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry, in the attack and capture of Peking, China, on the 14th of August,

1900, and the engagement with the enemy on the 15th (14th) of August, 1900:

The company was relieved from duty on outpost about 7:20 A. M. on the 15th instant, and ordered by the regimental commander to follow in rear of the Third Battalion, the other companies of the Second Battalion having been ordered out to support the cavalry. The company, after several rests, was halted where F Company had advanced to, and was there placed under the battalion commander's orders.

The company was moved forward to a grove in plain sight of the walls of Peking, and received orders from General Chaffee through the battalion commander to connect with the cavalry; but before this could be accomplished orders came from General Chaffee to move to the left and meet a fire (which, in my opinion, was delivered by our own forces), and, if possible, silence it. The company was deployed in line of squads, and, after scaling a mud wall, was deployed in line of skirmishers, and advanced through a corn-field until stopped by a sunken road, which was very difficult to descend and much more so to ascend; but, having reached the top, the advance continued to within seventy-five yards of the wall. Seeing nothing, and believing that our own forces occupied the wall, the company was withdrawn to the road and ordered to advance to the wall, where we found Companies E and H of the battalion. At this point the company lost 2 men wounded, both slightly.

The company was then ordered by the regimental commander to proceed through the gate. Having reported to the regimental commander, he directed that it take a position in rear of some buildings, and await further orders. The \*regimental commander soon after directed the company to follow him across a creek, which was done in good order under a heavy fire from the enemy, who were firing from a large building. Having reached a street parallel to the south wall of the city, the company was ordered to attack the wall from the roofs and

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\*Colonel Daggett.

such other places as afforded cover. The company was placed in the best positions found, and their fire, in conjunction with that of Company E, soon had the enemy on the run, and after an hour and a half or two hours, the enemy's fire was silenced. The battalion was soon after formed and marched into the city.

The men in the company did their duty well, and responded to every demand made upon them. Sergeant John Howser, color-bearer, was wounded during the engagement. Lieutenant Kilbourne was of the greatest assistance, and had charge of the first platoon during the day.

In the engagement on the 15th, the company was ordered by the battalion commander to move to the right and take a position behind a barricade about three hundred and fifty yards from the first gate. This was accomplished by sending one squad at a time under cover of some buildings. Having reached the position designated, Lieutenant Kilbourne directed the first platoon to open fire on the wall which the enemy occupied, and in about thirty minutes silenced their fire. Here General Chaffee ordered a squad sent out ahead to find out what they could. They reported in a short while that nothing was in sight. The company was withdrawn and joined the battalion. The second gate having been taken, I was directed to occupy it, which was accomplished without any incident, and I remained there until relieved.

During both days the men did their duty splendidly.

Very respectfully,  
CHAS. P. FAULKNER,  
*First Lieutenant, Eighth Infantry,  
Commanding Company G, Fourteenth Infantry.*

APPENDIX XIII.

No. 35.

THIRD BATTALION, FOURTEENTH INFANTRY,  
CAMP U. S. FORCES,  
PEKING, CHINA, August 17, 1900.

*Captain Learnard, Adjutant, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry:*

SIR,—I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the battalion of the Fourteenth Infantry under my immediate command on the 14th and 15th days of this month.

The morning of the 14th found three companies of my battalion on outpost duty at a small village five miles distant from Peking. The remaining company (K, commanded by Lieutenant Burnside) was with me in person, occupying the central part of the village. At an early hour in the morning the battalion was concentrated and took up the line of march on a road that led direct to one of the main gates that afforded entrance to the Chinese Quarter of the city. I marched on this road until I was within two hundred yards of the walls of Peking, when I was stopped and directed by the general commanding to return and support Reilly's Battery, Fifth Artillery, which latter organization was one and one-half miles back on the road over which I had marched. I returned in compliance with this order, and almost immediately after reporting to Reilly for the purpose above indicated, Reilly was directed to move as rapidly as possible to the front, and I was instructed to report to the commanding general, with my battalion, at a point to the left of the road that I was on and immediately under the walls of Peking. During my absence the Second Battalion of my regiment had succeeded in planting the regimental colors upon the walls of Peking, and were engaging the Chinese inside the walls. Halting my battalion, I went inside the walls, passing through a gate that was

occupied by Russian infantry and along the line of a narrow, dirty, difficult street that was completely blocked by artillery and carts, and every species of conveyance loaded with ammunition and supplies, until I came to a point on the street near a bridge, where our troops were warmly engaged with the Chinese, who occupied an ancient and formidable structure upon the opposite side of the bridge. This structure was five stories in height, loopholed, and from every loophole fire was poured upon our troops. As the jam on the street prevented, temporarily, the entrance of my battalion, I was instructed to hold it outside the walls until such time as I received orders to enter. Subsequently I received orders to enter, and marched in column of files to the Chinese Quarter, and about one hour after entering relieved the Second Battalion of my regiment in a position that it occupied, and from which it was pouring a flank fire upon the pagoda, building, or fortification before alluded to. That evening we went into camp under the walls of the Consular Concession.

On the morning of the 15th we broke camp at an early hour. Every officer and every man was happy at the fancied conclusion of the campaign and the report that was generally spread throughout the command that we were to exchange the filthy camp under the walls of the Consular Concession for a pleasant place not far distant. We moved up the left bank of a dry creek that flows between and separates the walls of the Consular Concession from the Chinese City, until we came to a high-storied, gloomy-looking building, which we passed under through a dirty sally-port and over an extremely filthy piece of road. Emerging from the sally-port, we found ourselves in front of a peculiar-looking building, double roofed, and having three wide sally-ports on the ground floor. The building itself was flanked, both on the right and left, by some smaller buildings and that which presented the appearance of a wall, tile capped, and from twelve to fifteen feet in height. I placed my battalion in column of companies, at half distance, in front of this building, and was then directed by Colonel Daggett, the regimental com-

mander, to bring up two large pieces of *chevaux-de-frise* that were back on the road a short distance, for the purpose of forcing open the massive gates of the sally-ports of the building immediately fronting my battalion. The gate, to my surprise, responded readily to the blows inflicted by the *chevaux-de-frise* and flew open easily. Colonel Daggett, a few other mounted officers, and I then entered the sally-port, which led us into a rectangular enclosure about one hundred yards wide and from five hundred to six hundred yards in length. At the extreme end of this rectangle we saw another building, in manner and form and general outline a counterpart of the one which we had just passed under. The sides of the rectangle were made up of a long line of low tiled building, resembling a rope walk, and was continuous throughout. We had entered the enclosure on horseback, and apparently without attracting observation. After consultation, it was decided to throw in a platoon of infantry, to be deployed at as wide intervals as the ground would permit, and advance toward the next building. I directed, in compliance with this order, Captain Martin to deploy his second platoon, under Lieutenant Murphy. The platoon was marched through the sally-port, and, in the act of deploying, was met with a withering fire from every conceivable kind of weapon that can be fired from the shoulder. This fire was so severe that Captain Martin was almost immediately directed to reinforce the line with his remaining platoon, and instructed to hold the fire of the enemy down. This duty he performed most faithfully and gallantly, and under the strain of one of the most severe musketry fires that I have ever witnessed. It being evident that our front was too narrow, being limited by the walls of the enclosure, I directed, under orders from Colonel Daggett, Lieutenant Burnside to place a line of skirmishers on the roofs of the small buildings flanking the large central structure at our end of the rectangle. This duty was promptly performed, the men using the *chevaux-de-frise* to climb to the tiled roof of the buildings and the walls. This move was very successful for two reasons: first, it relieved to a great extent the fire that was directed upon our

skirmishers in the rectangle; and, second, it disclosed the fact that there was a lane to our right that led up to the enemy's position. Lieutenant Burnside promptly took advantage of this fact, and sent his second platoon, under Lieutenant Wagner, along the lane with the view of getting some work in on the left flank of the enemy. Subsequently Captain J. R. M. Taylor was directed to proceed up this lane, before alluded to, and place his company also upon the flank of the enemy. Meanwhile Martin's company, M, Fourteenth Infantry, had been replaced by McClure's, L, Fourteenth Infantry. In twenty-five minutes Martin had exhausted his one hundred rounds and he was out of ammunition. The company was relieved, brought to the rear, and through the sally-port, for the purpose of obtaining a new supply of ammunition, without loss as a result of the movement, and the new company, under Lieutenant McClure, placed on the line in a manner soldierly in the extreme. Following this movement a section of Riley's Battery (Fifth Artillery) reported, and, with a few well-directed shots, opened the remaining two gates of the closed sally-ports of the building that we were operating from. This gave us an unobstructed fire of artillery upon the enemy's position, which it was now very evident, was beginning to become untenable. The left sally-port was occupied by the Gatling gun of the Ninth Infantry. This gun was well served and did most excellent service. The fire of the enemy up to this time had been held down by the Fourteenth Infantry. The men fought with a coolness and pluck that was most admirable, cautioning each other when they observed any wild shooting upon the part of any man. As a result of this admirable behavior, nearly every shot fired found its way to the balcony occupied by the enemy, and if every bullet fired did not find its billet, it was no fault of the man who fired the shot, as the balcony was kept raked by a storm of bullets. Upon the appearance of Taylor's company upon the left flank of the enemy, the opening of the three gates giving entrance to the rectangle, the fire from the section of Reilly's Battery, and the handling of the Gatling gun by the Ninth Infantry, the enemy

retired to the next gate. We had six of them to pass. We had soon two. We had gained in *morale* as the Chinese became extremely timid toward the last. They were no longer anxious to expose themselves, but unhesitatingly sought cover. The loss sustained by my battalion is very small, when the fire that the confident enemy first concentrated upon it is considered. I can form no estimate of the strength of the enemy as to numbers. I could simply note that the balcony was crowded with men, and that in addition there were heavy groups of men firing upon us from both flanks of the enemy's position. The history of the carrying of the third gate is almost identical with that of the taking of the second. We followed the same tactics, except that, noticing that the Japanese had sent us two scaling-ladders, I had these joined so as to form one ladder, by lashing and using some extra pieces intended for scaffolding, and held this in readiness for the remaining gates, which we were ready and eager to carry; but orders came to us to suspend all operations, and here the story of the American attack upon the Imperial City, in so far as my battalion is concerned, ceases. The attack was made without adequate reconnoissance, without proper appliances for scaling walls, or for passing through them. Every difficulty the troops surmounted. I am under the impression that the walls of the rectangle that we first entered are hollow and were used at some time for domestic purposes. If I am correct in this impression, we could have entered them at our end of the rectangle and pressed right up to the enemy's position without the firing of a single shot or the exposure of a man, through the continuous line of building that I describe as presenting the appearance of a ropewalk. It is a matter of regret that the command was not supplied with pickaxes or with scaling-ladders, or rope even, so as to be able to at once pass over or through difficulties always to be calculated upon in an attack upon a fortified position.

I desire to bring to the especial notice of the general commanding for gallantry, coolness, and soldierly behavior in this action, Captains C. H. Martin and J. R. M. Taylor, and Lieu-



tenants W. A. Burnside and A. N. McClure. These officers kept such control of their men throughout the action that I never observed the American soldier, plucky fighter as he is, fight with more coolness and determined gallantry. It was a lovely sight to observe these men in action.

Very respectfully,

WILLIAM QUINTON,  
*Major, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry,*  
*Commanding Third Battalion.*

## APPENDIX XIV.

No. 40.

PEKING, CHINA, August 21, 1900.

*The Adjutant-General, China Relief Expedition:*

SIR,—I have the honor to enclose herewith the reports of company and battalion, Ninth Infantry, and to render my report as regimental commander, Ninth Infantry, as to the part taken in the engagements of August 14 and 15, 1900, against and in Peking, China, by the Ninth Infantry and the Gatling gun detachment, Ninth Infantry, which was under charge of Lieutenant Corcoran, Sixth Cavalry. On the morning of August 14th, about 7 o'clock, I received orders to bring the regiment forward and place it in support on the left of the battery; but, while marching to the front, Lieutenant Hyer, aide-de-camp, directed me to halt the regiment in the edge of a village to the right and rear of the battery. Upon the advance of the battery, the adjutant-general directed me to bring the Ninth Infantry up to its support; but on arriving near the battery the commanding general sent for it to come to the rear of the compound, where Chinese "snipers" had been firing on the battery. After being disposed there for about twenty minutes, and the artillery having been moved off, a staff officer informed me he was sent to lead the regiment into the city through one of the gates that had been opened by the Russians. The regiment was delayed at the gate, which was blocked by Russian carts for nearly half an hour, when it was able to enter and proceeded into the city behind a battalion of the Fourteenth Infantry, being halted for a considerable time. The command was finally marched northward into the Chinese City to the wall held by the Legation troops during the Chinese attack upon them, and the regiment, with the other American forces, encamped at the foot of the wall for the night.

Later the Ninth Regiment was called by General Chaffee to report to him at the Chien-men gate; but on arrival there General Chaffee decided not to make use of it, and sent it back to camp. On the morning of the 15th of August, about 7:30 o'clock, the Ninth Infantry (preceded by the Fourteenth Infantry) were marched to the Chien-men gate in the wall between the Chinese and Tartar cities, and then placed in closed order opposite the left of the first gateway leading into the Imperial City. The Fourteenth Infantry were massed just in front of the Ninth Infantry, and a section of artillery were at the gate, firing up the avenue leading to the second gateway. This was subsequently supplemented by the Gatling gun of the Ninth Infantry, under Lieutenant Corcoran, Sixth Cavalry, whose effective work along the face of the wall of the second gateway was later discovered by the visible pitting in the masonry, and I especially commend Lieutenant Corcoran to the notice of the Major-General. The regiment were under some fire by "snipers" from the west, and several men hit, but our sharpshooters soon silenced and kept the fire down. Upon the advance of the Fourteenth Infantry and battery, a body of Russian troops crowded in before the Ninth Infantry, but, swinging off to their right, I was preparing to connect with the Fourteenth Infantry in the "compound," when they withdrew. The second gateway being opened by the artillery, the Ninth Infantry followed the Fourteenth Infantry into the next enclosure, and, by direction of the commanding general, sent four companies up on the pagoda gateway and displayed their flags from its walls, and sent men on the side walls to silence any fire from "snipers" in the trees or side buildings. Upon the third gateway being opened and the fire of the Chinese on the fourth gateway being silenced and their forces driven off, the commanding general disposed the Ninth Regiment on and behind the second gateway, where it remained until 6:30 P. M., when it was withdrawn with the remainder of the American forces, and went into camp for the night under the Legation.

wall. The Ninth Infantry had 23 officers and 662 men engaged. Casualties: killed, 2 enlisted men; wounded, 4.

While the officers and men were zealous in the performance of the duties that fell to their lot, yet the position of the regiment, as second in a column where the front was very restricted, gave them little opportunity to display any marked acts calling for special recommendation, except in the case of Lieutenant Corcoran, Sixth Cavalry, with Gatling gun.

I am, sir, very respectfully yours,

CHAS. A. COOLIDGE,  
*Lieutenant-Colonel, Ninth Infantry,*  
*Commanding Regiment.*

[First Indorsement.]

PEKING, CHINA, September 1, 1900.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army, and attention invited to the within reports of the regimental, battalion, and company commanders.

Throughout the march from Tientsin to Peking, China, and in the engagements of August 6th, 14th, and 15th, the officers and men of the Ninth Infantry performed all the duties assigned to them in a soldierly and creditable manner.

Opportunity for especially conspicuous work by individual or company did not occur for any company of the regiment or member thereof, so far as I am able to observe from the reports submitted.

This regiment, as other organizations accompanying the expedition, suffered intensely during marches because of the heat and absence of water suitable to drink.

I recommend that Major M. C. Foote be brevetted lieutenant-colonel, U. S. A., for marked efficiency as an officer exhibited during the campaign for the relief of the United States Legation at Peking, China, while in command of the First Battalion, Ninth Infantry.

I recommend that Captain F. L. Palmer, Ninth Infantry, be brevetted major, U. S. A., for marked efficiency as an officer

exhibited during the campaign for the relief of the United States Legation at Peking, China, while in command of the Second Battalion, Ninth Infantry.

I recommend that Captain R. H. Anderson, Ninth Infantry, be brevetted major, U. S. A., for marked efficiency as an officer exhibited during the campaign for the relief of the United States Legation at Peking, China, while in command of the Third Battalion, Ninth Infantry.

ADNA R. CHAFFEE,  
*Major-General, U. S. V.,  
Commanding China Relief Expedition.*

No. 41.

PEKING, CHINA, August 17, 1900.

*The Adjutant, Ninth U. S. Infantry:*

SIR,—I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations and movements of the First Battalion of the regiment under my command on the 14th and 15th instant near and at Peking, China:

On the morning of the 14th the battalion marched with the regiment from the place where it had bivouacked, about three miles south of the city, to a point about one thousand yards from the south wall of the Chinese City. After a halt of some duration, we proceeded to the southeastern gate, where we again halted for some forty-five minutes. We then passed through the gate into the part known as the Chinese City, which was partially in the possession of our troops, and halted again. We then moved through the city, toward the Tartar City, halting during this march to place a few men of each company on the roofs of houses to fire at the enemy on the walls of the Tartar City. We next marched forward and halted in column of companies under the wall of the Tartar City adjoining the American Legation. About 6:30 P. M. we were ordered out, marched to the north gate of the city adjoining the entrance to what is known as the "Forbidden" or "Imperial City," and after a

brief delay, we returned to our former position, and bivouacked for the night.

On the morning of the 15th we marched about 7:30 A. M., and made an attack upon the gates of the Imperial City. We were under fire for some time from the enemy posted on an inner wall, but my companies were well protected by the high walls and sustained no casualties other than 2 men very slightly wounded in Company D. After an hour or more the gates were blown open by our artillery, and the enemy driven from their position. We then moved through a courtyard about one thousand yards in length and attacked the second gate, which was soon blown open, and we entered the next courtyard. My battalion was then placed on top of the wall over the gates, and opened a light fire on the enemy posted on a wall still farther on. The enemy seemed to be few in number, and were soon routed out of their position. My battalion was ordered to remain on post where it was, but about 6 P. M. we were directed to abandon the wall and join the rest of the regiment below, and about 6 P. M. we marched with the regiment out of the Forbidden City and bivouacked on the ground occupied the night before.

Very respectfully,

MORRIS C. FOOTE,  
Major, Ninth Infantry,  
Commanding First Battalion.

No. 45.

PEKING, CHINA, August 18, 1900.

*The Adjutant, Ninth Infantry, Peking, China:*

SIR,—I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the Second Battalion, Ninth Infantry, on August 14th and 15th, near and in Peking: 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

Broke camp about 7 A. M. and marched about three miles, where halt was made during bombardment of city. About 12 o'clock noon the regiment advanced to within sight of wall, then, after a short halt, was countermarched and proceeded to a gate on the eastern wall, arriving there about 1:30 P. M.

About 2 P. M. Company H, commanded by First Lieutenant J. Frazier, Ninth Infantry, was detached and sent into the city to protect the entry of troops from Chinese sharpshooters still on the walls. Company E, the only remaining company of the battalion (Company F being on duty as guard for the wagon-train), entered the city with regiment about 2:30 P. M., under slight fire from Chinese sharpshooters, to which we were also subjected *en route* to camp near buttress occupied by members of American Legation on south wall of the Tartar City, where we arrived about 5 P. M. About 6 P. M. the battalion with regiment was marched to the Te-cheng-men gate of Tartar City, where orders were received a few moments later to return to camp. Distance marched during day, about eight miles. No casualties.

About 7:30 A. M. on the 15th, the battalion, as rear battalion of the regiment, again marched to the Te-cheng-men gate of the Tartar City, which it passed through under heavy rifle fire, taking position on left of main road, and halted to await orders. It here became necessary to dislodge Chinese sharpshooters from the trees to the left and front who were firing on us, and from whose fire one casualty resulted, Private Martin A. Silk, Company F, being wounded in the head. For this purpose a squad under the direction of First Lieutenant W. K. Naylor, Ninth Infantry, was sent to fire upon said trees, soon stopping the fire therefrom.

About 9:30 A. M., the first gate to the Imperial City having been occupied, and the enemy dislodged from the next one, the battalion moved forward with regiment into enclosure between the gates. It was then directed to occupy the surrounding walls with sharpshooters to protect the left flank of the troops attacking next gate. About an hour later Company E was detached from my command by the regimental commander and sent elsewhere on a similar duty. Firing having ceased, companies went into bivouac about 12 o'clock noon, leaving sentries on walls. About 6 P. M. the battalion with regiment was withdrawn to camp of preceding night. Casualties for

day, 1 wounded, as above stated; none killed or missing. Distance marched, about three miles in all. The battalion this day consisted of Companies E, F, and H.

Very respectfully,

T. L. PALMER,  
*Captain, Ninth Infantry,*  
*Commanding Second Battalion.*

No. 49.

CAMP AT TEMPLE OF AGRICULTURE,  
 PEKING, CHINA, August 18, 1900.

*The Adjutant, Ninth Infantry:*

SIR,—I have the honor to submit the report of the part taken by the Third Battalion, consisting of Companies K (Captain Sigworth), I (Lieutenant Welborn), M (Lieutenant Schoeffel), and L (Lieutenant Waldron); Lieutenant Loeb, battalion adjutant, on August 14 and 15, 1900.

The battalion marched from camp about 7 A. M., August 14th, and proceeded with the regiment to assist in the operations against the city of Peking. Upon arriving on the left of the battery, which was stationed a short distance from the east gate of the city, Company I was detached and ordered to report to the commanding officer of the light battery. The remaining three companies entered the city with the regiment. At no time on the 14th was the battalion engaged.

The command went into camp for the night outside of the wall, near the Legations. At about 7:30 A. M., August 15, 1900, the battalion proceeded with the regiment to the Imperial City, and shortly after entering the first gate Companies K and M met with a hot fire from the front, resulting in the wounding of a private of Company K and a corporal of Company M. Detachments of Companies K and M were detailed to keep the street, which entered the middle of the yard, clear of the enemy's sharpshooters, which was successfully accomplished.

Upon entering the third gate, I was directed by the major-general commanding to take the above-mentioned companies (K and M) up on the pagoda and to open fire on the enemy.



About an hour after the fourth and last gate was forced open, I was directed by the regimental commander to turn over Companies K and M to Major Foote and to take command of the two remaining companies of my battalion, which had been withdrawn to the yard in rear of the pagoda. At about 6:30 P. M. the command was withdrawn from the Imperial City and returned to the site occupied as a camp the night previous. The total strength of the battalion was 6 officers and 245 men.

Reports of the company commanders are respectfully submitted herewith.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. H. ANDERSON,  
*Captain, Ninth Infantry,*  
*Commanding Third Battalion.*

No. 44.

PEKING, CHINA, August 17, 1900.

*The Adjutant, Ninth U. S. Infantry:*

SIR,—I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by Company D, Ninth Infantry, in the actions of the 14th and 15th instant at Peking, China:

On the morning of the 14th, about 9 A. M., the company was marched with the regiment to the gate of the city at the north-east side, where it was subjected to a considerable small-arms fire. This fire being quieted by a few shots, the train proceeded to the camp in the city and parked near the regiment.

On the morning of the 15th the company was relieved from escort duty and was ordered back to its battalion. At about 7:30 o'clock A. M. the company, with the regiment, marched to the gate of the Imperial City, and later participated in the storming. After passing through the outside gate, the company remained in reserve before the entrance to the city, and while here and during passage through the outside gate was subjected to quite a severe small-arms fire, but suffered but one casualty, namely, Private Martin A. Silk, gunshot wound in the head. As the remaining gates were successively blown open by

the artillery, the company, with the regiment, advanced as far as the second gate of the Imperial City, where the men were placed on the walls to prevent sharpshooting.

At about 6 o'clock P. M. the entire regiment was withdrawn and marched back to camp on the outside of the Imperial City.

During the operations of these two days the men conducted themselves in a soldierly manner, ever ready and willing to act when the occasion presented itself.

They performed the arduous duty of train guard with apparent zeal, and, although subject to unusual fatigue, never faltered.

No individual recommendations can be made, as each soldier, without exception, obeyed every order and did his full duty.

Very respectfully,

W. K. NAYLOR,

*First Lieutenant, Ninth Infantry,*

*Commanding Company F.*

## APPENDIX XV.

No. 55.

CAMP AT PEKING, CHINA, August 17, 1900.

*The Adjutant-General, China Relief Expedition:*

SIR,—I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of Troop M, Sixth Cavalry, on the 14th and 15th of August, 1900:

The troop, consisting of 2 officers and 60 men, with 8 men from each of I and L Troops, Sixth Cavalry, joined the expedition, after two twenty-mile marches, August 9th. The next two days it marched fifty-four miles.

August 13th it performed the duty of advance guard for the command. Captain Cabell, with 6 men, L Troop, while patrolling, struck a village containing some of the enemy. With Sergeant Riefer, I entered the edge of the village, dismounted, was seen by the Chinese, mounted the squad and charged through the village to ascertain their numbers. We were fired upon from fortified houses. Subsequently, when sent to attack the village with my troops, I found the Chinese gone.

August 14th the troop left at 5:30 with orders to reconnoiter toward Peking, to go to the wall or until checked. About 7 A. M., a mile and a half from the walls of Peking, my advance party was fired upon in a village. I dismounted the troop to fight on foot, taking a position on the left bank of a cut road. Sent Lieutenant Guiney with 6 men to develop enemy. He was fired upon by 10 or 12 mounted and a number of dismounted men, and retreated by my left. With me were 20 French infantry. We opened fire on the Chinese, following Lieutenant Guiney, and for twenty minutes maintained a hot fire, principally by volleys. The enemy, also firing volleys, appeared about equal in numbers, and I was preparing to advance when I received a considerable fire from another party on my right

rear. I then mounted and trotted five hundred yards to the rear, took a good position in a walled enclosure of houses, and sent word back I would hold it until relieved. About 9 A. M. the commanding general came up. I then covered the left front of the line as it advanced, having several small brushes with the Chinese, killing three. About 11 A. M. I was sent dismounted to cover the left flank and to fire upon three bastions flanking the wall of the Chinese City. I took position close under the wall, and for an hour kept up a steady fire on the bastions, silencing two of them and assisting the artillery in stopping the fire from the gate tower on my left. At 7 P. M. entered the city as guard to wagon-train.

August 15th, followed the artillery into the square within the Tartar City gate about 7 P. M. Was dismounted awaiting further orders here about two hours, having 1 horse killed and 2, including my own, wounded. While lying here I observed Chinese sharpshooters in trees about three hundred yards to the left front. Selecting four or five good shots, I opened fire on them, entirely stopping their fire. I dropped two out of these trees myself. Later the troop guarded the first court that had been previously taken.

When the troop left Tientsin, August 8th, the horses were just off the transport. We marched in the week one hundred and forty miles, foraged off the country, and lost but 2 horses from exhaustion.

The men behaved well under fire, and endured cheerfully loss of sleep and some hardship. I mention for unflinching courage Second Lieutenant P. W. Guiney, particularly in skirmish on the 14th, where he showed great coolness. Also First Sergeant Henry Weller, my troop, for excellent management of firing squad under wall of Peking, August 14th, and Sergeant Riefer, Troop L, for coolness and courage in reconnoitering and going through a village held by the enemy on the 13th.

Very respectfully,

DE R. C. CABELL,  
*Captain, Sixth Cavalry,*  
*Commanding Troop.*

[First Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION,

PEKING, CHINA, September 1, 1900.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army.

Captain Cabell joined the relief column at Peh-moon, August 9th. During August 13th, 14th, and 15th his troop was actively employed in the presence of the enemy, doing excellent service. For a short while on August 14th the troop was practically alone in the presence of a considerable force of Chinese troops or Boxers. Captain Cabell skillfully met the situation and held his ground until joined by other troops of my command.

I recommend that Captain Cabell be brevetted major, U. S. A., for gallant and efficient services near Peking, China, August 14, 1900.

I recommend that Second Lieutenant P. W. Guiney be brevetted first lieutenant, U. S. A., for coolness and gallantry in action near Peking, China, August 14, 1900.

ADNA R. CHAFFEE,

*Major-General, U. S. V.,*

*Commanding China Relief Expedition.*

## APPENDIX XVI.

No. 56.

AGRICULTURAL GROUNDS,  
PEKING, CHINA, August 17, 1900.

*The Adjutant-General, U. S. Forces, Peking, China:*

SIR,—I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of Light Battery F, Fifth Artillery, before Peking, China, August 14, 1900, and August 15, 1900:

On the morning of August 14th the battery broke park at 7 o'clock from plateau five miles distant from Peking on road south of canal; marched rapidly about three miles and came into action on position to left of road thirty-two hundred yards from tower of wall, southeast corner of Tartar City. About twenty shots were fired at this tower from the right platoon guns, under command of Lieutenant Burgess. The tower was struck a number of times and set on fire by exploding shells. While in this position Private Nanney was sent to a small enclosure on left of battery to procure a small board with which to repair observation ladder; three shots were fired at him by skulking Chinese, one wounding him severely in left breast. Two guns, left platoon, under Lieutenant Summerall, were then sent forward a mile and came into action, directing its fire south of road, under orders of commanding general, upon enemy reported to be advancing toward Peking; remainder of battery soon came up and was directed to fire on same place. The left platoon was soon again advanced to corner of wall of Chinese City, along road leading to Tsung-Piang gate, and fired upon enemy south of that portion of the wall parallel to road. From this position the platoon again advanced and entered the Tsung-Piang gate. Here it was found a Russian gun was firing slowly, but was unable to keep down a vigorous fire from the south wall of Tartar City, which prevented any further advance

of troops without great danger. Captain Reilly immediately selected a position for the platoon to command this wall, and while one gun was forcing its way to the selected position the other opened fire upon the enemy from street in which Russian gun was located. As soon as possible both guns were placed in position selected by battery commander, and soon subdued the enemy's fire, so that the American infantry and other four guns of this battery advanced with safety across Tan-Sang bridge and ford into Chinese City. These two guns (left platoon) remained in action at this position till about 5:30 P. M., firing along the south wall of Tartar City and upon such places as the enemy could be located upon the east wall. Lieutenant Chas. Kilbourne, Fourteenth Infantry, rendered valuable assistance by covering the movement of the platoon to this position with a squad of infantry under his command. At 5:30 P. M. the platoon proceeded to the camp of American troops. As soon as the right platoon (Lieutenant Burgess) of the battery crossed the Tan-Sang bridge, it proceeded through the Chinese City, *en route* for the Chien gate. At a cross street, just before reaching Ha-Ta gate street, a hot fire was encountered from the south wall of the Tartar City, and one gun fired about six shots into the wall before it was safe to cross the street. The platoon proceeded to the Chien gate, entered, and fired one shot into the gate of the Imperial City, when orders were received from the commanding general not to fire into the Imperial City, but to proceed to the American Legation (?). The commanding general then gave instructions to return to the Imperial City, which was accordingly done, but further advance was obstructed by the Russian troops found drawn up across the main entrance. After some delay and discussion between the Russian and American generals, the right platoon proceeded to the camp of American troops about 6 P. M. After the center platoon (Lieutenant McCloskey) crossed the Tan-Sang bridge, it proceeded along a road parallel to the south wall of Tartar City to a point four hundred yards from Ha-Ta gate, and there fired about twenty shells into the gate. It then moved with the Ninth

Infantry down to this gate and along wall to the western opening and fired two shells through the opening, raising portcullis about eighteen inches from the ground. It then proceeded along south wall to camping-ground of American troops, and thence to join the right platoon about 5:30 P. M.

On the morning of August 15th the battery broke park at 7 o'clock and entered the Chien gate of the Tartar City. Four guns, right platoon (Lieutenant Burgess), center platoon (Lieutenant McCloskey), under command of Captain Reilly, were taken up on the wall over the gate entrance. Three guns were trained northward along the wall and opened fire on the Shun-Chin gate, where the enemy were posted in some force, with one or two field pieces. The other guns were trained on the Imperial City. After some time consumed in firing down the wall at the enemy posted there by the three guns already in position, the guns trained on the Imperial City remaining silent, a very severe fire was delivered from the Imperial City against the Chien gate, and it became necessary to open on that place with both guns of the right platoon. This firing was kept up until about 10 A. M., preparing for and covering the advance of the troops below, when the order to cease firing was given. At about 8:45 A. M. a bullet coming from the Imperial City struck Captain H. J. Reilly in the mouth, the wound resulting in his death at 9:05 o'clock. As soon as the fire was opened from the Imperial City, Captain Reilly ordered the left platoon (Lieutenant Summerall) to blow in the gate of the front wall of the Imperial City and open a rapid fire with both guns. After firing some time, the enemy evacuated his position on the second wall. After some infantry advanced and occupied this position, the guns were advanced to the second wall, blew in the gate, and opened fire upon the enemy at the third wall. It was then found that the fourth wall had been evacuated by the enemy, and the guns advanced with the infantry, blew in the gate of the fourth wall, and fired upon the fifth wall, where the enemy were supposed to be. As they made no reply, the infantry began to advance through the doorway, but



soon received a severe fire from the fifth wall. As soon as the way was clear of our infantry, the guns opened upon the enemy, who soon retired. The guns maintained a slow fire for some time to prevent the enemy from occupying the wall, as orders were received to proceed no further. Private Doyle, Light Battery F, Fifth Artillery, was wounded slightly in right hand. About 4:30 P. M. orders were issued for the battery to proceed to the camping-place of the night before.

LOUIS R. BURGESS,  
*First Lieutenant, Fifth Artillery,*  
*Commanding Light Battery F.*

[First Indorsement.]

PEKING, CHINA, September 1, 1900.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army.

The military service of the United States sustains a very serious loss in the death of Captain H. J. Reilly, Fifth Artillery, which occurred on the Chien-men gate of the Tartar wall, Peking, China, at 9 A. M., August 15, 1900. Captain Reilly at the moment he was struck down was standing beside one of his guns, field-glass in hand, observing the effect of a shot just delivered on the second gate of the south entrance to the Imperial City, whence a lively small-arm fire had opened on Chien-men gate. The ball which took the life of Captain Reilly first struck the top of the wall behind which he was standing, glanced upward, and entered his mouth. He fell instantly; did not speak or utter sound of voice after he was struck. Death ensued in a few minutes, seemingly without his suffering pain.

I cannot too highly praise the well-known capacity and ability of Captain Reilly. During the engagement at Yang-tsun, August 6th, and at Peking, August 14th and 15th (to the moment of his death shot), his skill as an artillerist and his excellent abilities as a light battery commander were frequently and conspicuously shown.

I recommend that First Lieutenant C. P. Summerall, Fifth Artillery, be brevetted captain, U. S. A., for gallantry in action and for efficient services while in command of his platoon, storming the gate to the Imperial City, Peking, China, August 15, 1900.

ADNA R. CHAFFEE,  
*Major-General, U. S. V.,  
Commanding China Relief Expedition.*

## APPENDIX XVII.

### OPERATIONS OF U. S. MARINE CORPS, TIENTSIN TO PEKING.

No. 57.

HEADQUARTERS, FIRST REGIMENT U. S. MARINES,  
CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION,  
PEKING, CHINA, August 20, 1900.

*The Major-General Commanding United States Forces, China  
Relief Expedition, Peking, China:*

SIR,—In obedience to your order of the 17th instant, I have the honor to report that the First Regiment, U. S. Marines, China Relief Expedition, left Tientsin the afternoon of August 4, 1900, as part of your column. The following was the composition:

Major W. P. Biddle, commanding; Major George Richards, commissary; Captain W. B. Lemly, quartermaster; First Lieutenant D. D. Porter, regimental adjutant; Surgeon G. A. Lung, U. S. N.; P. A. Surgeon G. D. Costigan, U. S. N.; Assistant Surgeon J. C. Thompson, U. S. N.; Sergeant-Major J. F. Lawler, regimental sergeant-major; Quartermaster-Sergeant Robt. Johnson; Hospital Apprentice Thomas Ball, U. S. N.; Hospital Apprentice G. D. Stillson, U. S. N.

First Battalion: Major L. W. T. Waller, commanding; First Lieutenant A. E. Harding, adjutant.

Company A: First Lieutenant S. D. Butler, commanding; First Lieutenant R. F. Wynne, Second Lieutenant C. C. Carpenter, 74 enlisted.

Company C: First Lieutenant R. L. Dunlap, commanding; Second Lieutenant F. M. Wise, Second Lieutenant W. C. Harlee, 74 enlisted.

Company H: Captain P. M. Bannon, commanding; First Lieutenant J. F. McGill, First Lieutenant William Hopkins, 73 enlisted.

Second Battalion: Captain F. J. Moses, commanding; First Lieutenant J. H. A. Day, adjutant.

Company D: Captain C. G. Long, commanding; First Lieutenant A. J. Matthews, Second Lieutenant W. McCreary, 73 enlisted.

Company I: Captain W. C. Neville, commanding; First Lieutenant S. A. W. Patterson, Second Lieutenant D. W. Blake, 87 enlisted.

Company F: Captain B. H. Fuller, commanding; First Lieutenant W. H. Clifford, Second Lieutenant L. McLittle, 68 enlisted.

Strength of regiment at leaving Tientsin: 29 commissioned, 453 enlisted; total, 482.

In the engagement of Pei-tsang, which occurred on the 5th, the United States forces did not come under fire. On the 6th the battle of Yang-tsun took place, a report of which is hereto appended, marked "A." Reports of the engagements around Peking on the 14th and 15th are also appended, marked "B" and "C," respectively. The distance marched was about eighty miles, from Tientsin to Peking. On the night of the 4th the command bivouacked at Shiliko, the night of the 5th at Pei-tsang, the 6th and 7th at Yang-tsun, the 8th at Tsai-tsun, the 9th to the south of Ho-si-wu, the 10th at Tshien-ping, the 11th at Chang-chia-wan, the 12th at Tung-Chow, and the 13th at Ting-fudsh. Though the distance covered daily was not great, the men suffered severely from the effects of the sun and extreme heat, but at Matow, about two-thirds of the way, when the order came to leave all men behind who were incapable of marching further, there were but four marines who were unfit to proceed.

I wish to commend my two battalion commanders, Major L. W. T. Waller and Captain F. J. Moses, who at all times showed great judgment in the handling of their respective battalions in action and had their men under excellent control. I also wish to commend my regimental adjutant, Lieutenant D. D. Porter, who was most zealous and efficient in carrying out

my orders. Surgeon G. A. Lung, P. A. Surgeon G. D. Costigan, and Assistant Surgeon J. C. Thompson were alert and zealous in caring for those overcome by heat and the wounded. The commissary and the quartermaster, Major George Richards and Captain W. B. Lemly, worked hard under many difficulties and succeeded most admirably in keeping their supplies up with the regiment. All officers and men performed their duties well.

The following were sent back sick, were missing, or were detached during the march:

*First Battalion.*

	Enlisted.	Commissioned.
Detached . . . . .	62	1
Placed on junks . . . . .	24	..
Sent to hospital . . . . .	6	1
Missing . . . . .	<u>4</u>	...
Total . . . . .	96	<u>2</u>
Grand total . . . . .		98

*Second Battalion.*

	Enlisted.	Commissioned.
Detached . . . . .	58	2
Placed on junks . . . . .	21	1
Sent to hospital . . . . .	6	.
Missing . . . . .	11	...
Dead . . . . .	<u>1</u>	.
Total . . . . .	97	<u>3</u>
Grand total . . . . .		100

The strength of the regiment to-day in Peking is:

Major W. P. Biddle, commanding; Major George Richards, commissary; Captain W. B. Lemly, quartermaster; First Lieutenant D. D. Porter, regimental adjutant; Surgeon G. A. Lung, U. S. N.; P. A. Surgeon G. D. Costigan, U. S. N.; Assistant Surgeon J. C. Thompson, U. S. N.; Sergeant-Major J. F. Lawler, regimental sergeant-major; Quartermaster Sergeant Robert Johnson; Hospital Apprentice Thomas Ball, U. S. N.; Hospital Apprentice G. D. Stillson, U. S. N.

*First Battalion.*—Major L. W. T. Waller, commanding; First Lieutenant A. E. Harding, adjutant.

Company A: First Lieutenant S. D. Butler, commanding; Second Lieutenant C. C. Carpenter, 45 enlisted.

Company C: Second Lieutenant F. M. Wise, commanding; Second Lieutenant W. C. Harlee, 40 enlisted.

Company H: Captain P. M. Bannon, commanding; First Lieutenant J. F. McGill; First Lieutenant William Hopkins, 40 enlisted.

*Second Battalion.*—Captain F. J. Moses, commanding; First Lieutenant J. H. A. Day, adjutant.

Company D: Captain C. G. Long, commanding; First Lieutenant A. J. Matthews, Second Lieutenant L. McLittle, 69 enlisted.

Company I: Captain W. C. Neville, commanding; First Lieutenant S. A. W. Patterson, Second Lieutenant D. W. Blake, 69 enlisted.

Strength of regiment to-day in Peking: 24 commissioned, 267 enlisted; total, 291.

In addition to the number that marched out with the regiment from Tientsin, there were left in Tientsin as guards and in the hospital: 6 commissioned, 2 surgeons, 177 enlisted; total, 185.

The reports of subordinate commanders are herewith inclosed.

Very respectfully,

W. P. BIDDLE,  
*Major, U. S. Marine Corps,*  
*Commanding.*

[First Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION,

PEKING, CHINA, September 1, 1900.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army.

With special pleasure I commend the First Regiment of Marines, serving with this expedition during the march from Tientsin to Peking, for fortitude shown by both officers and men during a march made most trying because of intense heat

and a general absence of water suitable to drink. Without exception, the fatigue of the march was borne to the extent of physical endurance without a murmur.

The operations engaged in by this regiment on August 5th and 6th were almost entirely in fields of standing corn, and rendered alignment and the keeping of direction very difficult and marching unusually fatiguing.

The regiment was frequently under my personal observation, and I commend it highly for soldierly qualities. Particularly do I desire to invite attention to Major L. W. T. Waller and Captain F. J. Moses, the battalion commanders, whose energy, good judgment, and capacity to command their battalions I noted with pleasure.

The further operations of this regiment with the expedition, including the taking of Peking, August 14th and 15th, was exceedingly satisfactory and deserving of high praise and commendation for services well performed.

My congratulations and thanks are extended to the officers and men of the regiment.

Attention is specially invited to the reports of battalion and company commanders for details of service by battalions and companies.

ADNA R. CHAFFEE,  
*Major-General, U. S. V.,*  
*Commanding.*

No. 58.

[Inclosure A.]

REPORT OF THE BATTLE OF YANG-TSUN, AUGUST 6, 1900.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST REGIMENT MARINES,

PEKING, CHINA, August 20, 1900.

*The Major-General, Commanding United States Forces, China  
Relief Expedition, Peking, China:*

SIR,—In obedience to your order of the 17th instant, I respectfully submit my report of the operations against Yang-tsun, August 6, 1900.

The marines acted as a support to Reilly's Battery throughout the day. During the early advance we came under the fire of both small-arms and artillery. At one stage of the fight the enemy's cavalry was discovered on our right front and were put to rout by several well-directed volleys. We then advanced on a village in line of skirmishers, throwing out scouts to the front and taking said village with little or no opposition and without loss. After a short rest, we again advanced and drove the enemy out of another village.

Owing to frequent changes of direction, flank movements and excessive heat, many of the men were overcome. In this engagement Corporal Brophy died from heat and Private Pruitt was wounded.

Very respectfully,

W. P. BIDDLE,  
*Major, U. S. Marine Corps,*  
*Commanding.*

No. 65.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BATTALION,  
FIRST REGIMENT U. S. MARINES,  
CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION,  
YANG-TSUN, CHINA, August 7, 1900.

*The Commanding Officer, First Regiment U. S. Marines, China Relief Expedition:*

SIR,—In obedience to your order of this date, I have the honor to submit the following report:

About 10 A. M., August 6th, the Second Battalion followed the First over the railroad embankment and was immediately separated from it. Upon separation we came under the fire of an enemy's battery stationed on our front and right, the first shell passing over our heads and falling about twenty yards beyond. It did not explode. Marching parallel and near to the railroad embankment, we took position, by your order, in a ditch in rear of the Fifth U. S. Artillery. We remained in this position for a short time, and were then ordered to support the



advance of the First Battalion, which was advancing to attack a village to the east of us.

As soon as the battalion was deployed orders were received to take position on the left of the First Battalion. Before this movement was completed the battalion was ordered well to the left to form on the left of the Fifth U. S. Artillery, which had moved its position to the left and front. While moving to this latter position, I received notice that the battery had moved to your left and was ordered to move upon a line with you and on your left. This latter movement being completed, the battery was shelled, and the battalion advanced with the First to the attack. The village was found deserted, and, after a short halt, an advance was made to a village beyond.

The second village was not attacked by the infantry, but at 2:30 P. M. we were directed to proceed to the site selected as a camp. Half of the battalion was sent to the new camp and the other half returned over the battlefield to take in those who had fallen out from heat-prostration.

Owing to the intense heat and long march, one officer, First Lieutenant J. H. A. Day, adjutant, and about 40 per cent of the men, became overcome by heat, and were not able to advance beyond the first village.

During the first part of the battle the battalion was under both artillery and infantry fire, the fire of the first falling short and that of the latter going beyond us.

Where both officers and men showed, individually and collectively, such commendable fortitude and spirit, many of them just dragging themselves along in order to be in the attack, it is impossible to discriminate.

Corporal Thomas Brophy, U. S. M. C., of Company I, died at about 2:50 P. M. from heat-prostration, and Private Norman Pruitt, U. S. M. C., of Company D, was wounded in the head.

Very respectfully,

F. J. MOSES,  
*Captain, U. S. Marines,*  
*Commanding Second Battalion.*

## CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BATTALION,  
FIRST REGIMENT, U. S. M. C.,  
CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION,  
PEKING, CHINA, August 18, 1900.

*The Commanding Officer, First Regiment Marines:*

SIR,—In obedience to your orders of the 17th instant, I have the honor to submit the following report:

About 7 A. M., August 14th, this battalion struck camp and moved forward with the regiment, and during that day remained with the regiment until about 3 P. M., when Company I joined Company D as rear guard of the pack-train. At about 10 A. M., in obedience to your order, Company D was ordered to act as guard for the pack-train. The battalion arrived in camp about 9 P. M. of that date.

On the 15th instant the battalion was under your immediate command the whole day. I inclose the report of the commanding officer of Company D.

Very respectfully,

F. J. MOSES,  
*Captain, U. S. Marine Corps,*  
*Commanding Second Battalion, U. S. Marine Corps.*

CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION, PEKING, CHINA.

SIR,—In obedience to your order of the 17th instant, I beg leave to submit my report of operations against Peking, August 14, 1900.

The marines advanced to a position near the north gate of the city under a slight fire, and halted while a platoon from two companies were sent to the top of the wall to stop "sniping" and protect the artillery, which was successfully accomplished.

The casualties for the day were 3 wounded: Lieutenant S. D. Butler, slight wound in chest; Private G. P. Farrell and Private F. W. Green.

We bivouacked for the night just outside the walls of the Tartar City.

Very respectfully, W. P. BIDDLE,  
Major, U. S. Marine Corps,  
Commanding.

No. 68.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BATTALION,  
FIRST REGIMENT U. S. MARINES,  
PEKING, CHINA, August 20, 1900.

*Major W. P. Biddle, U. S. M. C., Commanding First Regiment U. S. Marine Corps:*

SIR,—In obedience to your order of the 17th instant, I have to report that during the actions of August 14th and 15th, Company I, which I have the honor to command, was always with the regiment in the advance on and entrance into Peking.

Very respectfully, W. C. NEVILLE,  
Captain, U. S. Marine Corps,  
Commanding Company I.

No. 69.

CASUALTIES DURING THE SIEGE IN PEKING.

LEGATIONS.

NATIONALITY.	Number of	Killed and Died of Wounds.		Wounded	Casualties (in per cent).		Died of Diseases.	Volunteers and Independents.	TOTAL.
American	3 53	7	2	8	12.5	17.8	30.3	1	7 11
Austrian	5 30	1	3	8	11.4	31.4	42.8		4 11
British	3 79	1	2	8	3.7	24.4	28.1	3 6	6 26
French	3 45	2	9	37	22.9	77.1	100.0	2 6	13 42
German	1 50	12	15	28.5	31.4	54.9		*1 †1	13 16
Japanese	1 24	5	21	30.0	84.0	104.0		15 8	10 29
Russian‡	2 79	4	1	18	4.9	23.9	28.8	2 1	7 20
Italian	1 28	7	1	11	24.1	41.4	63.5		7 12
Total	19 388	4	49	9 136	18.1	35.6	48.7	2 12 23	67 167
				PEI TAN G.					
French	1 30	1	4	8	16.1	25.8	41.9		5 8
Italian	1 11	6	1	3	50.0	33.3	53.3		6 4
Total	2 41	1	10	1 11	25.6	27.9	53.3		11 12
Total	21 429	5 59	10 147	14.3	34.9	49.1	2 12 23	78 179	

\*Baron von Ketteler.  
†Mr. Cordes.

‡ Including Captain Ando.  
‡ Inclusive of Cossacks of the Legation.

## APPENDIX XVIII.

GENERAL ORDERS, } HEADQUARTERS CHINA RELIEF  
No. 7. } EXPEDITION,

TSAI-TSUN, CHINA, August 8, 1900.

The major-general commanding the United States force of the China Relief Expedition takes this occasion to commend the high soldierly qualities of energy and endurance so generally manifested under prolonged hardships of more than unusual severity.

In the battle of Yang-tsun, fought on Monday, the 6th instant, the Fourteenth Infantry, though suffering heavy losses from shell, shrapnel, and musketry fire, bore itself with steadfast gallantry, and while he laments and sympathizes with the regiment in the loss of so many brave men, the record made is one of which every true soldier may well feel proud. The entire command participated in the battle of more than five hours' duration, under the most trying conditions of heat and fatigue, from which large numbers of men were prostrated; but it is the exercise of endurance and fortitude by the soldier under such circumstances that contributes largely to success. Throughout the command there was ever a ready and creditable response to every demand.

While further hardships may await the command in relieving our beleaguered countrymen, the major-general commanding confidently relies upon the soldierly spirit so generally and conspicuously manifested, and believes every true soldier will be stimulated to renewed efforts in making the historic mission of this little army a complete success.

By command of Major-General Chaffee:

GROTE HUTCHESON,  
*Captain, Sixth U. S. Cavalry,*  
*Acting Adjutant-General.*

GENERAL ORDERS, }  
No. 8.

HEADQUARTERS CHINA RELIEF  
EXPEDITION,

PEKING, CHINA, August 18, 1900.

1. The south half of the western half of the Chinese City having been allotted to the United States forces for proper guard and police, its defense, protection, and proper police is confided to the Fourteenth Infantry (Colonel A. S. Daggett, commanding) and Light Battery F, Fifth Artillery. The major portion of the force to be stationed within the walls of the Temple of Agriculture. One company of infantry and two guns will constitute the guard for gate No. 61; one company of infantry and the Gatling gun will constitute the guard for gate No. 62. This guard may be changed and increased as often as Colonel Daggett may deem it necessary. He will also see that the section of the Chinese City referred to above is properly patrolled and order maintained. The northern half of the western half of the Chinese City, heretofore allotted to the United States forces, has been transferred to the care and protection of German forces not yet arrived, but gate No. 66 is to be guarded by a company of Russian troops until German troops arrive to take over the duty. Colonel Daggett will, for the purpose of maintaining order in this section, give the territory such police as he may deem necessary.
2. The Ninth Infantry will take up its quarters within the walls of the Imperial City, north of the Chien-men gate, from whence Chinese troops were driven on the 15th instant. It will also place one company at Chien-men gate and one company at Shun-chick gate, relieving the marines under Major Waller.
3. The United States marines upon being relieved will take station in the section of the Tartar City assigned to United States forces, and will take up quarters in that locality.
4. The headquarters of the expedition will be established in the vicinity of the quarters of the marines, where Troop M, Sixth Cavalry, will also take station.

5. This order will take effect at reveille to-morrow, the 19th instant.

By command of Major-General Chaffee:

GROTE HUTCHESON,  
*Captain, Sixth U. S. Cavalry,*  
*Acting Adjutant-General.*

APPENDIX XIX.

GENERAL ORDERS, }  
No. 10.

HEADQUARTERS CHINA RELIEF  
EXPEDITION,

PEKING, CHINA, August 26, 1900.

1. The following is published for the information of this command:

“WASHINGTON.

“*Conger, American Minister, Peking:*

“The whole American people rejoice over your deliverance, over the safety of your companions, of our own and of the other nations which have shared your trials and privations, the fortitude and courage which you have all maintained, and the heroism of your little band of defenders. We all mourn for those who have fallen, and acknowledge the goodness of God, which has preserved you and guided the brave army that set you free.

“WILLIAM MCKINLEY.”

Our nation's rejoicing because of the relief of the Legations and the good words of commendation of our President will cause to be forgotten the great hardships endured by all during the forced marches in intense heat which prostrated many and caused them to be left on the roadside.

This order will be published at retreat on the day following its receipt at all stations occupied by troops of the command.

By command of Major-General Chaffee:

GROTE HUTCHESON,  
*Captain, Sixth U. S. Cavalry,*  
*Acting Adjutant-General.*

GENERAL ORDERS, }  
No. 11.

HEADQUARTERS CHINA RELIEF  
EXPEDITION,

PEKING, CHINA, August 28, 1900.

The following cablegram is published for the information of this command:

“WASHINGTON, August 26, 1900.

“*Chaffee:*

“The President joins me in congratulations to you and the officers and men of your command on the brilliant achievement in which the courage, fortitude, and skill of the American forces in China have played so honorable a part. While mourning for your fallen comrades, the whole country is proud and grateful for your great success. ROOT.”

By command of Major-General Chaffee:

GROTE HUTCHESON,  
*Captain, Sixth U. S. Cavalry.*  
*Acting Adjutant-General.*



## APPENDIX XX.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF OFFICERS FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICES  
RENDERED DURING OPERATIONS OF THE CHINA RELIEF  
EXPEDITION FROM TIENTSIN TO PEKING, CHINA, JULY 29 TO  
AUGUST 15, 1900, BY MAJOR-GENERAL ADNA R. CHAFFEE,  
U. S. V., COMMANDING CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION.

HEADQUARTERS CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION,  
PEKING, CHINA, September 7, 1900.

*The Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington, D. C.:*

SIR.—In my report of the operations of the China Relief Expedition from Tientsin to Peking, China, I mentioned by name the officers who had performed staff duty and promised that a special report should be submitted later. Nearly all the officers named were several times under fire by the enemy during engagements; also when carrying orders along the roads, through fields of corn or villages, very often alone, seldom having more than one orderly. I regard their services as worthy of a special report and recommendation from me to the Department, requesting due consideration of the same.

### PERSONAL STAFF OFFICERS.

Second Lieutenant Roy B. Harper, Seventh Cavalry, aide-de-camp, has admirably discharged his duties at all times and under all circumstances and has shown himself cool and gallant under fire on several occasions. I recommend that he be brevetted first lieutenant, United States Army, for gallantry at the battle of Yang-tsun, China, August 6, 1900; that he be brevetted captain, United States Army, for gallant conduct in action at Peking, China, August 14 and 15, 1900.

On August 4th, First Lieutenants John W. Furlong and Benjamin B. Hyer, Sixth Cavalry, were verbally detailed as acting aides-de-camp. They have splendidly satisfied the purpose of

the selection by a performance of duty worthy of high praise. I recommend that each be brevetted captain, United States Army, for gallant conduct in battle at Yang-tsun, China, August 6, 1900, and at Peking, China, August 14 and 15, 1900.

DIVISIONAL STAFF.

I invite the attention of the War Department to Captain Grote Hutcheson, Sixth Cavalry, acting adjutant-general of this expedition, as being an officer who has exhibited special efficiency in the discharge of his duties as acting adjutant-general and, in addition thereto, has shown fine soldierly qualities when under fire by the enemy. His services have been meritorious. I recommend that he be brevetted major, United States Army, for gallant conduct in battle at Yang-tsun, China, August 6, 1900, and at Peking, China, August 14 and 15, 1900.

The services of Major Jesse M. Lee, Ninth Infantry, acting inspector-general, were conspicuous for excellence every day. I have heard of his distinguished services at the battle of Tientsin, July 13, 1900, and while not personally cognizant of his actions during that battle, I take the liberty to recommend that he be brevetted lieutenant-colonel, United States Army, for bravery at the battle of Tientsin, China, July 13, 1900.

That he be brevetted colonel, United States Army, for gallant conduct in battle August 6, 14, and 15, 1900.

Major George P. Scriven, Signal Corps, chief signal officer of the expedition, is commended to the attention of the War Department for his efficient service. He succeeded, under many difficulties, in keeping us in telegraphic communication with Tientsin, thence to Tong-ku. Ours was the only line advanced with the armies daily. Adequate transportation for the work could not be given him, but he succeeded in some way, notwithstanding the deficiency, in getting forward his line. Major Scriven was present on each day of battle, August 6th, 14th, and 15th, and willingly performed the duties of an aide-de-camp when requested to do so. I recommend that he be brevetted a lieutenant-colonel, United States Army, for gallant conduct at

Yang-tsun August 6, 1900, and at Peking, China, August 14 and 15, 1900.

Captain William Crozier, Ordnance Department, arrived at Tientsin before me, having been for some time previous to July on duty at Manila. He was designated as chief ordnance officer. In addition to this duty, he actively assisted me in various ways which required from him, almost daily, very considerable physical exertion, to which he was able to respond readily. Satisfied with his quick comprehension of the situation at the battle of Yang-tsun, August 6th, and relying upon his good judgment, I directed him to overlook and if necessary direct, by my order, the movements of the Ninth Infantry, which, owing to the standing corn, I was unable to keep under my own observation. This duty he performed most satisfactorily. I recommend that he be brevetted major, United States Army, for gallant conduct in battle at Yang-tsun, China, August 6, 1900, and at Peking, China, August 14 and 15, 1900.

There was no opportunity for First Lieutenant Harley B. Ferguson, Corps of Engineers, to perform serious work as an engineer. He promptly provided copies of the best maps available. His services as an aide-de-camp were valuable; on all occasions cool and brave under fire. I recommend that he be brevetted captain, United States Army, for gallant conduct in action at Yang-tsun, August 6, and at Peking, China, August 14 and 15, 1900.

The foresight of Surgeon W. B. Banister, U. S. V., was at no time wanting, nor did his energy at any time fail to make temporary provision to meet some deficiency which our limited transportation could not provide for. His services were meritorious, and I can heartily commend him to the attention of the War Department for efficiency as chief surgeon of the expedition.

The duties of Captain F. De W. Ramsey, Ninth Infantry, chief quartermaster and commissary with the troops, deprived him of opportunity to participate in any engagement with the enemy, but, notwithstanding this fact, it is my duty to call the attention of the War Department to any officers showing efficiency and

whose services have been especially meritorious as well as arduous. Captain Ramsey was ably assisted by Second Lieutenant Malin Craig, Sixth Cavalry, a young officer showing promise of future excellence.

Lieutenant-Colonel John S. Mallory, Forty-first Infantry, U. S. V., was at Tientsin, under special instruction of the War Department, when I arrived there. As he wished to go with the armies to Peking, at my request he accompanied headquarters of the Japanese army during marches, in order that I might be informed day by day of the progress of the march and of any matter of interest occurring with that army. The lieutenant-general commanding the Japanese army did not wish to recognize any foreign officers as officially attached to his headquarters, but in an unofficial way cordially received Colonel Mallory. Commendation is due Colonel Mallory for his tactfulness and good judgment. By a due exercise of both he was able to gain satisfactory attention at Japanese headquarters, and accomplished the object which I had in view.

The commanding general of the British forces requested me to detail an officer to accompany his headquarters, he to send an officer of his staff to me. I detailed Major S. M. Mills, Sixth Artillery, an officer whose excellent abilities are well known in our service.

Lieutenant Steele, of the English army, reported to me. On several occasions he performed the duties of aide-de-camp, being very willing and always ready to do so.

Lieutenant J. L. Latimer, U. S. N., reported at my headquarters August 7, 1900. On August 14th, when riding near the walls of Peking, carrying a message to Colonel Daggett, being fully exposed on level ground, the enemy turned upon him a lively small-arms fire from the wall and a gate not far away. Fortunately, no harm resulted to Lieutenant Latimer, who on this occasion, as on others, proved himself to be a gallant officer.

Second Lieutenant Allen Smith, Jr., Ninth Infantry, was attached to headquarters to command a small detachment of

mounted infantry, orderlies. He very frequently performed duty as an aide-de-camp, always satisfactorily.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ADNA R. CHAFFEE,  
*Major-General,*  
*Commanding China Relief Expedition.*

APPENDIX XXI.

No. 1.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTEENTH INFANTRY,  
PEKING, CHINA, September 10, 1900.

*Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington, D. C.:*  
(Through military channels.)

SIR,—I have the honor to make the following recommendation—viz., that Captain Henry G. Learnard, adjutant Fourteenth Infantry, be brevetted major for conspicuous gallantry on August 14, 1900, in being the first officer to scale the walls of Peking, China, thirty feet high, without ladders or ropes, by placing his hands and feet in holes made by old bricks falling out, and knowing that the enemy's infantry was not far distant on the walls, and successfully directing all operations thereon.

Very respectfully, A. S. DAGGETT,  
*Colonel, Fourteenth Infantry.*

[First Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE,  
CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION,  
PEKING, September 12, 1900.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General, China Relief Expedition. I have no other knowledge of the circumstances connected with the gallantry of Captain Learnard than that set forth in the within communication, but it seems to fully justify the promotion recommended.

JAMES H. WILSON,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. V.*

[Second Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION,  
PEKING, CHINA, September 12, 1900.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General, United States Army, concurring in the recommendation within.

I have heretofore submitted my recommendation in the case of this officer in an indorsement dated September 1, 1900, forwarding the report of the commanding officer, Fourteenth Infantry, on the battle of August 14 and 15, 1900.

ADNA R. CHAFFEE,  
*Major-General, U. S. V.,*  
*Commanding.*

## APPENDIX XXII.

REPORT OF RECONNOISSANCE AND ENGAGEMENT IN THE VICINITY OF TIENTSIN, CHINA, AUGUST 19, 1900, BY LIEUTENANT-COLONEL THEO. J. WINT, SIXTH CAVALRY.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH U. S. CAVALRY,  
TIENTSIN, CHINA, August 20, 1900.

*The Adjutant-General, China Relief Expedition, Peking, China:*

SIR,—I have the honor to submit the following report of reconnoissance and engagement with Boxers and some imperial Chinese troops on the 19th instant, made in accordance with orders of Brigadier-General Dorward, C. B. D. S. O., commanding line of communication, attached hereto, marked "A."

Two squadrons, Sixth Cavalry, composed of Troops A, C, D, I, K, and L, with all available men, and detachment of Hospital Corps, left camp Sixth Cavalry, near Taku gate, at 4 A. M.; proceeded to the race-track gate and crossed canal at that point at 4:30 A. M. Lieutenant Gausen with twenty-five men, First Bengal Lancers, and an officer and twelve Japanese cavalry, reported to me for duty as part of my command.

Lieutenant Marshall, Sixth Cavalry, and Lieutenant Gausen, First Bengal Lancers, being familiar with the country for several miles in the direction of our proposed march, were assigned to duty with the advance guard, Blocksom's squadron (A, C, and D) being in advance, followed by the Bengal Lancers and Forsyth's squadron (I, K, and L). The Japanese cavalry detachment was attached to headquarters.

When the advance was about three and one-half miles in a westerly direction from race-track gate, it was fired upon by the enemy, and an engagement began, which lasted from about 6 to 9:30 A. M., during which the command was under constant fire and sometimes hotly engaged.



Having advanced over a mile from point where first fire was received, our line was opposed by a heavy force in front, and bodies of the enemy were moving to my right with apparent intention of passing to my right rear. A village occupied by enemy was to my left front, which had to be taken and occupied before my left made farther advance, and as that was the point of attack agreed upon for General Dorward's force, I held my line until his troops appeared and became engaged, in the mean-time delivering a heavy and deliberate fire against all of the enemy's line within range, particularly that part of it to my right front. As soon as General Dorward's force became engaged on my left, Captain Blocksom mounted his squadron and made a splendid and most successful charge, completely routing the enemy, who dispersed in all directions and no longer showed fight. Captain Forsyth with two troops followed in support of First Squadron. The charge having continued for a mile or more and there no longer being any organized resistance by the enemy, also for the reason that my horses had been worked to about their limit, as they were but recently landed and not yet in condition, had recall sounded and assembled command. Remained in vicinity of burning villages for about one hour, and there being nothing further to accomplish, I returned with command to camp, arriving there at 1:30 P. M.

I have nothing upon which to base a close estimate of enemy's force, but it, or a force of which it was a part, had been threatening our line of communications and to attack the city, causing uneasiness to the provisional government and to some of the commanders, and estimated from 3,500 to over 20,000. My estimate is from 5,000 to 7,000 engaged or in vicinity.

All the flags, a dozen or so, that were kept in sight were captured, also some large "jingals" mounted on wheelbarrows, some breech-loading rifles, lances, spears, swords, etc. The flags are held, but arms, etc., were only picked up or gathered by individuals, who took them as souvenirs.

Huadshiadsh and Yanshitsuai and four other villages were burned. The total loss of enemy in killed might be anywhere from 350 to 500, over 150 dead being on the ground passed over by the cavalry in charge.

The command, officers and enlisted men, are deserving of great credit for the satisfactory manner in which orders were obeyed and carried out, formations made, and for most cool and deliberate work throughout the action. It is difficult to make any distinction when all have done well, and, so far as I know, made their utmost endeavor to do their best; but our decided success was due to the splendid manner in which Captain Blocksom handled his squadron, both on foot and mounted; to Captain Forsyth's management of his dismounted line; and to Lieutenant Marshall, Sixth Cavalry, and Lieutenant Gausson, First Bengal Lancers, for directing the advance until enemy was found, and also for effective work later during the dismounted fighting and mounted charge.

The detachment of Japanese cavalry sent by Japanese forces to report to me did very intelligent and satisfactory service as flankers and as a combat patrol on my right flank.

The number of United States forces engaged was as follows:

Sixth Cavalry, 12 officers and 390 men; hospital corps, 2 acting assistant surgeons and 8 men; total, 14 officers and 398 men.

The total loss of Sixth Cavalry was 6 wounded. Report of medical officer hereto attached, marked "B."

Also attached hereto are: Report of Captain Blocksom, commanding First Squadron, marked "C"; report of Captain Forsyth, commanding Third Squadron, marked "D"; copy of report of commanding officer Troop A, marked "E"; copy of report of commanding officer Troop C, marked "F"; copy of report of commanding officer Troop D, marked "G."

Very respectfully,  
THEO. J. WINT,  
*Lieutenant-Colonel, Sixth U. S. Cavalry,*  
*Commanding Regiment and U. S. Forces, Tientsin, China.*

[First Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION,

PEKING, CHINA, September 19, 1900.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army.

The defeat and routing of the Boxers and Chinese troops, about five thousand, near Tientsin, August 19, 1900, was practically the work of the Sixth Cavalry, splendidly handled by Lieutenant-Colonel T. J. Wint, commanding the regiment, and Captains Blocksom and Forsyth, squadron commanders, who were ably assisted by troop commanders. Every officer was keenly intent on the work before him and watchful for his opportunity and the moment he might strike with vigor. The victory had far-reaching effect. It relieved Tientsin of the near presence of a considerable body of the enemy, which was daily increasing in numbers, and threatened the security of our base of supply and line of communication to Taku Bay. I recommend that Lieutenant-Colonel T. J. Wint, Sixth Cavalry, be brevetted colonel, United States Army, for gallant conduct in battle near Tientsin, August 19, 1900; that Captain A. P. Blocksom be brevetted major, United States Army, for gallant conduct in battle near Tientsin, August 19, 1900; that Captain William W. Forsyth be brevetted major, United States Army, for gallant conduct in battle near Tientsin, August 19, 1900; that First Lieutenant F. C. Marshall be brevetted captain, United States Army, for gallant conduct in battle near Tientsin, August 19, 1900.

ADNA R. CHAFFEE,

*Major-General, U. S. V.,*

*Commanding China Relief Expedition.*

No. 2.

[Inclosure B.]

REGIMENTAL HOSPITAL, SIXTH CAVALRY,  
TIENTSIN, CHINA, August 21, 1900.*The Adjutant, Sixth Cavalry:*

SIR,—I have the honor to report as follows:

On the 19th instant Troops A, C, D, I, K, and L, Sixth Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Theo. J. Wint, commanding, left camp at 4 A. M., and, acting in conjunction with English and Japanese troops, engaged a force of about three thousand Chinese Boxers at 6 A. M., about six miles southwest of Tientsin. The Sixth Cavalry made the frontal attack, routing and inflicting great loss on the enemy. The engagement was over by 10 A. M.

The casualties were as follows:

1. Trumpeter Fred Corrigan, Troop A, Sixth Cavalry, gunshot wound, severe, left of base of skull.
2. Private Hale McCormick, Troop A, Sixth Cavalry, gunshot wound, severe, left arm and chest.
3. Private Samuel E. Hartsfield, Troop A, Sixth Cavalry, gunshot wound, slight, through right hand.
4. Private John H. Van Sickle, Troop A, Sixth Cavalry, lance wounds, severe, right knee and back.
5. Trumpeter Edward E. Lyon, Troop C, Sixth Cavalry, gunshot wound, slight, left arm.
6. Private Loff I. McAllister, Troop D, Sixth Cavalry, gunshot wound, medium severe, left thigh.

The wounded were dressed on the firing-line and again at the ambulance station. Those able to ride were taken on horseback to the rear, the others were carried on litters to the ambulances, and, with the exception of Trumpeter Lyon, all were transferred to the United States General Hospital at Tientsin as soon as possible.

The following medical officers and members of the Hospital Corps were with the troops during the engagement:

Acting Assistant Surgeon Eduardo C. Poey, U. S. A.; Acting Assistant Surgeon John T. Halsall, U. S. A.; Acting Hospital Steward] Robert Leighton and Privates Robert W. Bender, Samuel L. Duffus, Ernest N. Farnum, Roy E. Libby, John T. McCulla, John C. Trovillion, and William T. Webb.

The conduct of all the American troops was spirited and decisive, and the Hospital Corps detachment under my command did their duty faithfully and well.

Very respectfully,                      EDUARDO CARLOS POEY,  
*Acting Assistant Surgeon, U. S. A.,*  
*Surgeon Sixth Cavalry.*

No. 3.

[Inclosure C.]

CAMP AT TIENTSIN, CHINA, August 20, 1900.

*The Adjutant, Sixth Cavalry:*

SIR,—I have the honor to make my report of the action with Boxers and imperial troops yesterday.

I was in command of the First Squadron (three troops, A, C, D), and had the advance. Shortly after 6 o'clock A. M. we reached a point between three and four miles southwest of this camp when the advance guard developed the enemy, who began a heavy rifle fire on our right and front at long range.

I dismounted the entire First Squadron, including the advance guard, and formed skirmish-line, 25 Royal Bengal Lancers under Lieutenant Gausson forming on the left. Moving forward, we slowly drove the enemy through a large corn-field for nearly a mile and entered an open plain, which was full of small undulations, rendering it impossible to tell the exact position and number of the enemy, although it was easily seen that the main body was in a line parallel to ours and overlapped our right flank by more than a mile and our left by nearly the same distance; from what we learned during and after the fight, they must have numbered over five thousand. In the corn-field they abandoned a number of improvised field pieces, each

consisting of a "jingal" barrel thrust through the back of a ricksha, giving it the appearance at a distance of a rapid-fire gun with its shield.

Nearly opposite our left flank in the plain was a battery of guns, which occasionally fired almost harmless volleys; it was found afterwards that the battery consisted of these ricksha guns.

I halted the line after advancing about eight hundred yards into the plain and tried different kinds of fire at ranges from nine hundred to fifteen hundred yards; it was impossible to tell which was most effective, as numbers of the enemy frequently jumped up and down around their banners, of which there was a great number (about a dozen were captured). The enemy attempted half a dozen charges during the fight, but never came closer than seven or eight hundred yards.

Shortly after the last halt the right of the line was extended by Captain Forsyth with two dismounted troops of his squadron, which did most effective work. His other troop was kept in reserve. For more than an hour the line advanced but little, and only fired when necessary, as we were waiting for Japanese and British infantry to take the enemy on his right flank. Their presence was felt before we saw them, as the enemy soon commenced a continuous movement to his left flank.

When the reinforcements appeared, we moved forward, and Colonel Wint soon ordered me to advance the left flank, which I did, pivoting on the right of the First Squadron. In about fifteen minutes Lieutenant Marshall, on the extreme left, discovered that it was almost uncovered by the enemy, and asked permission, by messenger, to charge. I had some time before brought up all the horses of the First Squadron to the firing-line to be ready for a charge. I gave Lieutenant Marshall the permission, and followed immediately with the other two troops, the three troops charging in echelon as foragers and using pistols.

We reached the first line of the enemy at about five hundred yards, and charged through them for more than a mile, killing about 150 and capturing 60; 3 of them wounded. Not more than one-third of the enemy were armed with rifles, the remainder carrying spears, swords, etc. Very few were mounted, and they disappeared before the charge reached their lines. They made a spirited resistance at first, but soon broke and ran to their rear and left. The Third Squadron, back on the skirmish-line, killed a considerable number fleeing across its front during our charge. More prisoners might have been taken after the mêlée, but at great expense of horse-flesh, as the day was warm and the horses not yet hardened.

From my own observation, and that of other officers who went over nearly the whole field of fight, 350 is a conservative estimate of the entire number killed; a great many wounded escaped. More than half were killed by skirmish fire.

A few slight discrepancies will be noticed, comparing my report with those of my troop commanders; these are due to the fact that their field of observation was less than mine.

The greatest praise is due the officers and men of both squadrons, a very large majority of whom were under fire for the first time; the cohesion and unanimity of movement of the different parts of the skirmish-line were remarkable.

Lieutenant Gaussen and his lancers gave most able assistance to the advance guard and skirmishers, and were in the first line all through the charge. Dr. Poey, the regimental surgeon, was also on the skirmish-line and gave prompt aid to the wounded, but I am afraid he participated in the charge.

The casualties of the First Squadron were 6 men wounded, 2 dangerously; 4 horses were killed, 1 under Lieutenant Marshall, 8 or 10 were slightly wounded, and 2 were lost in the charge, throwing their riders and running away.

Two hundred and two men started out in the First Squadron.

Very respectfully,

A. P. BLOCKSOM,  
*Captain, Sixth Cavalry,*  
*Commanding First Squadron.*

No. 4.

[Inclosure D.]

TIENTSIN, CHINA, August 19, 1900.

*The Adjutant, Sixth Cavalry:*

SIR,—I have the honor to report that, pursuant to instructions, my squadron followed Captain Blocksom's squadron out of camp at 4:30 o'clock, and when about three and a half or four miles southwest of the city (Tientsin), I received instructions from Colonel Wint, delivered by his adjutant, to keep within supporting distance of Blocksom's squadron, which had the advance.

A mile or two farther on a brisk fire suddenly opened, and I was ordered by Colonel Wint in person to dismount two of my troops and get them into action as soon as possible, leaving the third as a reserve and guard for the horses. I left Troop L, under Lieutenant Scales, and took Troops K and I, under Captain Paddock and Lieutenant Karnes, forward through a corn-field to a small village, and there, by Colonel Wint's direction, I sent Troop K around it to the right and Troop I around it to the left, and on the other or west side of it I formed a skirmish-line of both troops and moved toward the sound of the firing through a corn-field so high and dense that I could see nothing in advance.

As soon as we emerged from the corn-field, I discovered the enemy to my left front, and I moved my squadron to the left to connect with the First Squadron, Blocksom's, and opened fire. At this time I found Troop L on my left, and supposed it had been sent forward by Colonel Wint in a different direction from that I followed. As the enemy appeared to be trying to work around our right flank, I several times moved my squadron to the right and refused my extreme right. My squadron reached the firing-line about 7:15 A. M., and remained in action until about 9:30, when the First Squadron, having mounted and charged, I was ordered by Colonel Wint to send one troop to occupy and hold the village on our right rear



and follow with my other two troops] in support of Blocksom's squadron. I sent Troop K, Paddock's, to hold the village, and followed Blocksom with Troops I and L, until I was directed to halt my squadron and await the return of the First Squadron, which had been recalled.

All the officers and men of my squadron behaved with admirable coolness and courage. There were no casualties.

Very respectfully,

WM. W. FORSYTH,  
*Captain, Sixth Cavalry,*  
*Commanding Third Squadron.*

## APPENDIX XXIII.

GENERAL ORDERS, } HEADQUARTERS CHINA RELIEF  
No. 9. } EXPEDITION,

PEKING, CHINA, February 24, 1901.

1. The Lieutenant-General commanding the United States Army, in a letter to the undersigned, dated Headquarters of the Army, January 5, 1901, extends congratulations in the words following, viz.: "On the splendid manner in which your command (United States China Relief Expedition) has maintained the integrity and honor of the American Army while serving in remote parts where many temptations and difficulties exist. This, I think, has given the greatest satisfaction to the American people as well as to your superiors at the seat of government."

2. It is an especial pleasure to quote such words of commendation from so high an official source for the information of, and to convey them to, the troops composing the China Relief Expedition, as an inspiration to begin a new century with a firmer resolve than ever to maintain on a high plane the integrity and honor of American soldiery.

3. The China Relief Expedition was composed of the headquarters and First and Third Squadrons, Sixth Cavalry; Batteries A, D, I, and O, Third Artillery; Light Battery F, Fifth Artillery; Ninth U. S. Infantry; headquarters, Second and Third Battalions, Fourteenth U. S. Infantry; headquarters and First Battalion, Fifteenth U. S. Infantry; First Regiment, U. S. Marines.

This order will be read to each troop, battery, and company now in China, and a copy will be furnished to the commanding officer, Sixth Cavalry, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Infantry, Third Artillery, and First Regiment of United States Marines.

ADNA R. CHAFFEE,

*Major-General, U. S. A.,*

*Commanding China Relief Expedition.*

#### APPENDIX XXIV.

REPLY OF CAPTAIN JOHN C. F. TILLSON, FOURTEENTH INFANTRY,  
PROVOST-MARSHAL, TO MASS-MEETING OF CHINESE PETI-  
TIONERS, MARCH 28, 1901.

GENTLEMEN,—The compliment which you pay the people of the United States by this petition will be greatly appreciated by them.

I feel sure that this is the first time in the world's history that the invaded have begged the invaders to remain on their soil.

The United States Army came to China to relieve and protect certain citizens of the United States, whose lives and property were threatened by the Chinese.

That mission accomplished, it remained until satisfactory terms of settlement could be agreed upon by the Powers.

This agreement having been reached, the mission of the United States Army in Peking has been accomplished, and that army is now making preparations to leave China.

While awaiting the settlement of negotiations, the soldiers of the United States have not been idle.

Finding upon our arrival in Peking that the officials had fled and that general lawlessness and anarchy prevailed, we set to work at once to restore law and order and business, and to provide for the protection of life and property.

We established poor-houses and charity eating-houses, a school, and hospitals.

We organized a police force and established a Chinese court. We made sanitary regulations and enforced their observance.

This work has been so well done that threatened epidemic and famine have been avoided; thousands of your poor have been fed daily, and no one has been allowed to suffer from hunger; business has been more than restored, and to-day

there is not a more prosperous community in your broad empire than that part of Peking under the protection of the United States; while the protection to life and property has been so perfect as to almost preclude the possibility of crime.

In this district offenders have been invariably brought to punishment, regardless of their race, nationality, or position.

Nevertheless, it is our proud record that there has been no case of capital punishment and only eight commitments to the penitentiary.

There has been punishment for the law-breaker, charity for the poor afflicted, and protection for all.

It was our pleasure, too, to accomplish all this without taxing a people who had sufficient burdens to bear.

Let us hope that this generous, charitable, and magnanimous treatment of the vanquished may prove an example to the nations of the world, and a step forward in the world's progress toward a higher and nobler humanity. We are glad to know that this work is appreciated by you.

It is needless to tell you, however, that the United States does not maintain an army for the purpose of furnishing the city of Peking with good municipal government, and as a business proposition your appeal for the United States forces to remain longer in Peking has little to stand upon.

That you will need our protection there is little doubt, and as the broader principles of humanity most frequently sway the people of my country, your petition is not hopeless, and I shall be glad to refer it to our Government.

Whatever the result of your petition, whether we go or stay, it may be gratifying to you to know that the soliders of the United States, who by force of circumstances came to China as your enemies, are now your friends; and we hope that this friendship may endure.

JNO. C. F. TILLSON,  
*Captain, Fourteenth Infantry,*  
*Provost-Marshal.*

APPENDIX XXV.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
PEKING, CHINA, August 20, 1900.

SIR,—It affords me great pleasure to transmit herewith a copy of resolutions passed by the American missionaries besieged in Peking, expressing their hearty appreciation of the courage, fidelity, and patriotism of the American marines, who so bravely and tenaciously held the key to our salvation during the whole of trying the time.

I most heartily and sincerely join in this expression, and beg you to communicate to both officers and men my personal commendation of and gratitude for their heroic and faithful services.

Yours very respectfully, E. H. CONGER.  
MAJOR W. P. BIDDLE,  
*Commanding United States Marines in Peking.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST REGIMENT OF MARINES,  
PEKING, CHINA, August 23, 1900.

Respectfully forwarded to the brigadier-general, commandant, United States Marine Corps Headquarters, Washington, D. C.

W. P. BIDDLE,  
*Major, U. S. M. C., Commanding.*

PEKING, Saturday, August 18, 1900.

DEAR SIR,—At a meeting of the American missionaries held this morning at 8:30 the following resolution was unanimously adopted; and it was further voted that the resolution be drafted and presented to you:

“The Americans who have been besieged in Peking desire to express their hearty appreciation of the courage, fidelity, and patriotism of the American marines, to whom we so largely owe our salvation.

“By their bravery in holding an almost untenable position on the city wall in the face of overwhelming numbers, and in coöperating in driving the Chinese from a position of great strength, they made all foreigners in Peking their debtors, and have gained for themselves an honorable name among the heroes of their country.”

For the meeting:

ARTHUR H. SMITH, *Chairman.*

CHARLES E. EWING, *Secretary.*

HON. E. H. CONGER,

*Minister of the United States of America.*

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