

**IMPACT OF STRATEGIC CULTURE ON U.S. POLICIES FOR EAST ASIA**

**Frank L. Miller, Jr.**

**November 2003**

\*\*\*\*\*

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

\*\*\*\*\*

The ideas outlined here are the result of 16 continuous years of U.S. Army assignments in, or oriented toward, the Asia-Pacific Region. From 1986 to 2002, I have served in various capacities with U.S. Army Special Forces, as a Pacific Command Security Assistance Program Manager and Political-Military Analyst, and in the U.S. Embassy Hanoi as the Defense and Army Attaché. As such, I have been involved in the full range of policy formulation to its implementation for both Northeast and Southeast Asia. While the opinions expressed here are solely my own, they are a compilation of lessons and ideas garnered from the many men and women of all branches of government service and all walks of life who represent America in Asia, both in official and unofficial capacities. They are too numerous to identify here, and so I credit all for their collective contributions to the resiliency of U.S. interests in this dynamic region of the world. Our continued success in the region is due in great part to their ability to translate stated U.S. goals and objectives, which are often written for domestic consumption, into ideas understandable by their respective Asian counterparts. The ideas in this paper are intended to help them in this process. I would especially like to thank Dr. Andrew Scobell of the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute for his help in transforming my rambling thoughts into a coherent document.

\*\*\*\*\*

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of this report may be obtained from the Publications Office by calling (717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or by e-mail at *Rita.Rummel@carlisle.army.mil*

\*\*\*\*\*

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for electronic dissemination. SSI's Homepage address is: *<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/index.html>*

\*\*\*\*\*

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please let us know by e-mail at *outreach@carlisle.army.mil* or by calling (717) 245-3133.

## PREFACE

The U.S. Army War College provides an excellent environment for selected military officers and government civilians to reflect and use their career experience to explore a wide range of strategic issues. To assure that the research developed by Army War College students is available to Army and Department of Defense leaders, the Strategic Studies Institute publishes selected papers in its Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy Series.

Colonel Frank L. Miller, member of the Army War College Class of 2003, is the author of this paper. Using examples from the Asia-Pacific region, he illustrates the need for regional and, at times, subregional approaches to collective security. Colonel Miller concludes that treating these relationships from a global perspective, and thus ignoring local norms, can cause unnecessary friction. He provides a set of policy recommendations to achieve U.S. goals in the region.

STEVEN METZ  
Director of Research  
Strategic Studies Institute

## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

FRANK L. MILLER, JR., was commissioned in the Infantry in 1980, and served as Rifle Platoon Leader through Rifle Company Commander in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) before joining Special Forces in 1985. As a Special Forces Officer, Colonel Miller deployed throughout the Asia-Pacific Region while assigned to 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) in Okinawa, Japan, and 2d Bn, 1st SFG(A) in Fort Lewis, Washington. A Chinese linguist, Colonel Miller was selected to enter the Foreign Area Officer Program and has served three tours in this capacity: in Hong Kong; as the China Desk Officer, J5, U.S. Pacific Command; and most recently, as the Defense and Army Attaché to Hanoi, Vietnam. He is scheduled to assume duties as the next Army Attaché in Beijing, China, in early 2004. Colonel Miller holds a master's degree in National Strategic Studies from the Naval Postgraduate School and a master's of Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College.

## ABSTRACT

U.S. national security strategy calls in part for building on our alliances and friendships to enhance regional security. In so doing, our policymakers often treat these relationships from a global perspective, ignoring local norms and creating unnecessary friction in each relationship. This paper will demonstrate the need for regional and, at times, subregional approaches to collective security, using examples from the Asia-Pacific Region. A necessary comparison between the various styles of defining and achieving security leads to a set of policy recommendations that would best achieve U.S. security interests in the Asia-Pacific Region.



## IMPACT OF STRATEGIC CULTURE ON U.S. POLICIES FOR EAST ASIA

Every new administration enters office hearing calls for renewed emphasis on our relations with East Asia,<sup>1</sup> stressing the importance of that region to both the U.S. economy and its security. Often articles are published highlighting a recent poll or survey that places ethnic Asians as a growing force in the U.S. political landscape. Campaign rhetoric is replete with criticisms of the incumbent's East Asia policies. Invariably though, each new administration levels off its rhetoric to accept relations nearly equaling those of its predecessor. Why? Is it the relative stability of the region that allows us to focus on other, more troubling regions of the world? Or is it due more to a frustration in determining how better to deal with a region as diverse and mysterious as the Far East? Is the level of "inscrutability" still too high for westerners to understand? Perhaps the approach is wrong. Perhaps the concept of East Asia as a region is too broad. Or perhaps our European-based culture is unable to accept that we don't need to take a leading role in every region of the world in order for that region to achieve security and stability.

So what is our role in East Asia? How do we approach this region, lacking in homogeneity and common culture, language, politics, geography, etc. In fact, about the only factor common in the region is its history of interactions over thousands of years with just this same list of uncommon characteristics. As we enter the second decade of post-Cold War relations, it is time to assess how the end of that period affected the U.S.-East Asian relationship, whether the changes made were worthwhile, and whether further changes can and should be made.

Multiple studies were made of the U.S. policies toward East Asia following the end of the global bipolarity we commonly call the Cold War. Lasting 50 years, the Cold War was blamed for two of the three major wars the United States fought in Asia during the 20th century. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the accompanying abrogation of Moscow's ideologically based support agreements around the world, the time was never better to reassess our own policies concerning the security and stability of East Asia. The countries of the region were also reassessing their intra-regional relationships, especially those based on the defense against—or in support of—Communism. As alluded to earlier, these assessments continue, highlighting the ongoing importance of the region to U.S. national interests.<sup>2</sup>

## IMPORTANCE OF EAST ASIAN SECURITY TO U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS

Traditionally, the United States has called for a secure, stable, and economically viable Asia with which strong trade relations could be maintained.<sup>3</sup> The 2002 *National Security Strategy* (NSS 02) calls for a mix of bilateral alliances and cooperation with regional institutions to manage change in dynamic Southeast Asia, including the continued forward presence of U.S. forces.<sup>4</sup>

The goals for regional cooperation include establishing a global balance of power that favors freedom,<sup>5</sup> seeking to establish active agendas of cooperation in the fight against terrorism,<sup>6</sup> and ultimately creating a strategically stable Asia.<sup>7</sup> This must be done in an environment of both "competition and cooperation" with other countries, and in a region in which the 2001 *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR 01) posits a military competitor may emerge.<sup>8</sup> The recommended response to this challenge calls in part for placing emphasis on securing additional access and infrastructure agreements within the region,<sup>9</sup> while alliances and bilateral relationships are trumpeted as the "centerpiece of American security."<sup>10</sup> The implication is that *only* through direct ties can security be guaranteed.<sup>11</sup> It is just this U.S.-centric approach to security that will cause our strategy to eventually fail in Asia.

The latest QDR formally called for a shift of defense focus from Europe to the Asia-Pacific Region. Reasons given for this change are obvious but long overdue. As a region, East Asia is the number one trading partner of the United States. In 1999 it had a collective GDP of U.S.\$6,475,879M,<sup>12</sup> an aggregate population of 1966 million<sup>13</sup> and four of the six largest militaries (including the United States).<sup>14</sup>




Figure 1. Importance of Asia to U.S. Trade.<sup>15</sup>

East Asia hosts the only true remaining hotspot from the Cold War. Other not so obvious reasons that have been postulated, though, include the need to counter recent relationship successes of the European Union in Asia, and recent acceptance of China by the nations of Southeast Asia. One author concluded that the alienation of Europe has forced the United States to seek closer relations in Asia.<sup>16</sup>

Southeast Asia is crisscrossed with vital sea lanes of communications, and has a recovering economic strength of its own that rivals that of the European Union in trade value for the United States. Four of the world's five remaining communist states are located in Asia (Vietnam, Laos, China, and North Korea), with three of them in or claiming territory in Southeast Asia. Two states are oligarchies with one benign (Brunei) and the other repressive towards its people (Myanmar or Burma); one state is a newly emerging democracy with no real means for self-subsistence (East Timor), and the remaining six espouse some form of democracy (Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, and Indonesia). Their militaries are all developed with internal defense in mind, with some being more capable than others. The defensive nature of the militaries, however, actually implies the shared perception of each other as major threats. This is especially true for those states with overlapping territorial claims such as in Sabah (Malaysia and the Philippines), the internal borders of French Indochina (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos), and the entire South China Sea.<sup>17</sup> The latter, called the East Sea by Vietnam, is also claimed in whole by China—including Taiwan—and in part by the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia. With these differences in mind, and in recognition of a very real ideological threat of communist insurgency movements with external support from China, the United States and the countries of Southeast Asia struggled to find ways to cooperate in the prevention of regional conflicts among themselves. No such attempt has been made in Northeast Asia.

Why did the QDR formally recommend shifting U.S. defense interests out of Europe to Asia? First and foremost is the ongoing standoff in Korea and its larger implications for Japan. Second, while on balance the trend in relations with the four communist-led governments is encouraging, the United States still maintains a security guarantee to current or former antagonists of each (South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand). Third is the large Islamic population in Asia, already known to have significant ties to regional and global Islamic-extremist terrorists groups. Fourth is the recognition of Asia's importance to the U.S. economy, and the increasing need to protect the sea lines of communication that support






Figure 2. Major Sea Lines of Communication in Southeast Asia.<sup>18</sup>

our trading partners. As the Asian economies recover from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, they will be more willing and able to address the West as equals. This was already becoming apparent prior to the crisis, during the time characterized by the World Bank as the Asian “Miracle.”<sup>19</sup> Their survival of the crisis will only make it more so. Finally, the potential emergence of China as a regional hegemon calls for our increased efforts to maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific Region.

### THE IMPLICATIONS OF NOT GETTING THE POLICIES RIGHT

The Ironic truth, Bandar felt, was that the [Gulf War] had been sealed by cultural misunderstanding.

Bob Woodward<sup>20</sup>

The above quote is attributed to the Saudi Ambassador to Washington upon learning the start time for DESERT STORM’s Air Campaign. His reflection clearly indicates that, while supporting the actions to be taken against Iraqi forces in Kuwait, he recognized other ways to deal with the larger issue that had been missed due to a lack of cultural awareness in both Washington and Baghdad. Failure to find a suitable approach in East Asia could be just as catastrophic to maintaining a peaceful Asia-Pacific Region, including open conflict in Korea, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea. Other, less dangerous threats to U.S. national interests in the region are also possible if the strategic cultures of Asia are disregarded or misunderstood. Among them are potentially:

- Increased Sino-U.S. tensions;
- The resurgence of a militarized Japan;
- An increasingly hostile Korean Peninsula;
- Increased factionalism across ethnic and/or religious boundaries;
- Reduced economic growth leading to increased intra-regional competition; and,
- Marginalization of U.S. influence in the region.<sup>21</sup>

Okimoto notes another danger on the U.S. domestic front. That “failure to appreciate East Asia’s achievement perpetuates the dangerous illusion that the world must always adapt to the U.S. and become more like us.”<sup>22</sup> This danger is in essence the clash of American and Asian (*writ large*) strategic cultures, a phrase defined as “a distinctive and lasting set of beliefs, values and habits regarding the threat and use of force, which have their roots in such fundamental influences as geopolitical setting, history and political culture.”<sup>23</sup> Developed by Jack Snyder in a 1977 report for the RAND Corporation, the term “strategic culture” pointed out that different nations have their own distinctive national strategic culture that affects their nuclear doctrine and decisionmaking process.<sup>24</sup> Snyder was writing about the Soviet Union, however, and did not consider general cultural traits and norms to have an influence.<sup>25</sup> I contend he is wrong on this point, that the general cultural traits of a country do have a great influence on the strategic culture of its national leadership. I also believe the ethnic homogeneity of the country influences the cohesiveness of a nation’s values, which in turn, helps define and strengthen its strategic culture.

## HISTORY OF ASIAN REGIONAL SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

### U.S. Attempts at Integrating Regional Security.

The United States has been a key player in the Asian region since Admiral Dewey defeated the Spanish Fleet in Manila Bay on May 1, 1898, annexing the Philippine Islands as a colonial holding.<sup>26</sup> Although, the U.S. Army fought the Moros to consolidate our holdings, the United States was never enthusiastic about being a colonial power, and actions were underway to transition the Philippines to independence when Japan attacked U.S. Army and Naval forces in Pearl Harbor and the Philippines. Following the end of the war, the United States attempted to shift its occupation forces north to Japan, and, despite earlier promises to the contrary, allowed the European powers to return to their South and Southeast Asian colonial holdings. The debate over this policy was weakened with the withdrawal of Chiang Kai-shek’s forces from Mainland China in 1949, and ended when Communist North Korea attacked across the 38th Parallel in 1950 in an obvious attempt to unify the peninsula under communism. Following this action, all similar anti-colonial forces with any ties to the Soviet Union or the Chinese Communists were automatically labeled threats to the free world. The Cold War was much “hotter” in Asia than in Europe, perhaps due to the solidarity shown by the newly formed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Against this backdrop in 1954, and at the instigation of U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was formed as part of the worldwide U.S.-led system of anti-Communist military alliances.<sup>27</sup> Its narrow focus on thwarting communist aggression doomed it to failure soon after its birth, as most members were reluctant to commit to a collective security obligation. Not only was Indonesia—Asia’s largest anti-Communist state—conspicuously absent, but so were South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, the “nations” in which the collective security was to be fought.<sup>28</sup> In fact, most members were not even in Southeast Asia, including Pakistan. Although SEATO remained on the books until 1977, it never garnered the support from within the region necessary to remain viable. In its failure, though, SEATO provides perhaps the best example of how difficult it is for a nation external to a region to encourage collective security of those countries within the region.<sup>29</sup>

## **Asian Attempts at Integrating Regional Security.**

The concern with one's neighbors not only inhibited all early attempts to form Western-styled anti-Communist blocs in Southeast Asia. Most Asian models also failed to find common ground for a cooperative security arrangement in Southeast Asia. In 1961 the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) was formed by Thailand, Philippines, and Malaya, but ended in 1963 when the British territories of Sabah and Sarawak joined peninsular Malaya to form (along with Singapore) the Federated States of Malaysia. The outcry by the Philippines—who also claimed portions of Sabah—ended ASA. The formulation of Malaysia and Indonesia's "Konfrontasi" campaign also ensured the end of a similar subregional arrangement, "Maphilindo," an association of Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia.<sup>30</sup> A South Korean initiative that attempted to create a second front against communist aggression throughout Asia in 1966 resulted in the relatively long-lived Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC). It was dissolved in 1973.<sup>31</sup>

## **Different Approaches in Northeast vs. Southeast Asia.**

The continued failure of regional or subregional security institutions and the ongoing fight against international communism forced the United States to establish a multitude of bilateral security relations in Asia. All were established in times of war and have remained in place since their inception. Two, with Australia and the Philippines, are left over from World War II, while Japan's alliance with the United States was a direct result of U.S. occupation following that war. The Korean alliance has been in place since the attempt of the Communist North Korea to unify the country by force in 1950. Thailand signed a defense treaty with the United States on March 6, 1962, when threatened by Chinese- and Vietnamese-backed Communist insurgencies.<sup>32</sup> Defeat and political intransigence ended two others, with the Republic of Vietnam and New Zealand, respectively. With each of these bilateral alliances, the United States committed itself to support one country over another in any future regional conflicts. Additionally, the United States is legally obligated to ensure the peaceful reunification of Taiwan with the mainland. While technically not an alliance, the Taiwan Relations Act has the same effect of forcing the United States to choose sides in any future confrontation across the Taiwan Strait.<sup>33</sup>

The result is a region with two coexisting styles of security relationships—the U.S. "hub and spokes" model of active defense obligations, and a more passive series of nonaggression pacts between the regional states. No overarching security institution exists in Asia that includes everyone in a bid to prevent conflict or, should deterrence fail, obligate others in the defense of one. In fact, the U.S. approach has delineated clearly a different set of policies for Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. Even the alliance structures are different, with those in the north much more robust than with the southern partners. In recognition of this (and possibly to prevent another great power conflict over influence in Asia) the six-member ASEAN agreed to expand and initiate a regional forum for the discussion of security issues. They did so in spite of then U.S. Secretary of State George Baker's specific opposition in January 1992 to abandoning the "hubs and wheels" approach to security relationships in Asia.<sup>34</sup> The key theme was the recognition in Asia that ASEAN could not continue to maintain its security in the post-Cold War environment. Their security relationships needed to expand to include all the regional powers.<sup>35</sup> In other words, the spider web had to grow. Despite the official position of the State Department, the Pentagon's 1998 East Asia Strategy Review (EASR) pledged support to "the development of security pluralism."<sup>36</sup>

The Clinton 1995 Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region (EASR) called for continued forward presence, strengthening of our bilateral alliances, and active participation in multilateral security fora, particularly the [then] newly-formed ASEAN Regional Forum.<sup>37</sup> It also called for

“enlarging” our engagement policy to include those nations outside our normal circle of friends and allies.<sup>38</sup> While recognizing that Northeast Asia requires a separate subregional security strategy, the 1995 EASR also admitted that North Korean participation had been limited. In fact, it highlights the only degree of success with North Korea—the bilateral Agreed framework—signed in October 1994.<sup>39</sup> While recognizing the inherent bilateral nature of security cooperation in Northeast Asia, the 1995 EASR also recognized the absence of a strong, unifying external threat to the region and encouraged Southeast Asia to take the lead in providing for their own security. It explained the continued U.S. military presence as symbolic of our continued commitment to the protection of shared interests with Asia.<sup>40</sup> But it reflected a bias toward Western-style alliances that even the President of the Pacific Command’s Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies continues to support by comparing Asian multilateral security approaches to NATO in terms of the “scale” instead of the “model.”<sup>41</sup> This bias, perhaps, also explains why consecutive U.S. administrations have failed to recognize the Agreed Framework for what I believe the North Korean’s intended it to be—a bilateral security guarantee with the United States.

Allies should be expected to help secure their respective regions. In Europe, NATO forms the basis for a stable, secure Europe. Each member state has a vote in the organization’s policies and is obligated to provide a portion of the military force that gives NATO its teeth.<sup>42</sup> In Asia, however, our dependence on allies primarily has allowed access for U.S. forces to provide regional security.

Unlike in Europe, our Asian defense agreements are typically not regional, and therefore not dependable in case of a regional conflict.<sup>43</sup> Japan is limited by its constitution and the continued distrust of its Asian neighbors. South Korea’s armed forces are focused solely on the defense of its territory from North Korean forces. While China also has historical baggage affecting its deployment of troops abroad, its availability for intra-regional security operations seems to be more affected by Beijing’s desire to maintain domestic tranquility.<sup>44</sup> Our Southeast Asian partners not only see each other as greater threats than any global ideology, but also have recognized since the end of the Cold War that their national security cannot rely on the “fickle” security strategy of “a large and distant power.”<sup>45</sup> This reduced dependence on a great power’s military umbrella has increased the importance of trade, educational, technology, tourism, religious, ethnicity, and other cooperative ties in the formulation of a nation’s “security.”<sup>46</sup> AsiaInt describes the current security arrangements as a “necessary evil” with which no country seems to be satisfied.<sup>47</sup> At a minimum, it is a clear renunciation of the balance of power concepts of “alliance and alignment.”<sup>48</sup>

## STRATEGIC CULTURE AND RELATIONSHIP STYLES

Culture is the root and foundation of strategy.<sup>49</sup>

Lieutenant General Li Jijun

The key to understanding the different security approaches is the recognition of Asia’s unique style of relationships. The Western style provides for a direct relationship between a militarily weak provider of resources and a resource-hungry dominant actor as guarantor of security. Also known as “hub and spokes” model, the graphic depiction of multiple client states with the same dominant actor resembles a wagon wheel. The security of a nation at the end of each spoke depends on the strength of their protector at the hub. Doctrinally, *Joint Publication 3-16, “Multinational Operations,”* recognizes this characteristic through the establishment of a military alliance with a “Lead Nation” organization.<sup>50</sup>

Asians tend to approach security in a broader sense than just military balance of power, with economic stability taking the lead in most cases.<sup>51</sup> The theory is that if a nation has enough relationships with multiple other nations, any threat to that nation is a threat as well to those relationships. This theory is based on the idea that common interests devolve not from threats to each other, but from

threats to their relationships. The resultant model of “overlapping and interlocking institutions”<sup>52</sup> resembles a spider web of bilateral relationships in each sector of national power.<sup>53</sup> In this model, an ad hoc collection of weak states could deter the threat of a regional hegemon through the multiplicity and strength of their relationships, without the need for a dominant actor.

As a consequence, most Asian militaries, while organized to deter aggressive behavior of neighboring states, actually spend the vast majority of their time conducting internal defense missions. This phenomenon is due in part to the relative weakness of the Asian nation-state in relation to other binding organizations such as ethnicity, religion, and cultural backgrounds. Of three major insurgencies faced by the Philippines today, only one threatens the political overthrow of the national government. The other two are struggles for religious freedom and political autonomy. The Communist New People’s Army (NPA) is Manila’s only ideological competitor for political rule. The island of Mindanao hosts two major Islamic factions; the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the more fundamentalist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The Abu Sayyaf Group is a further splinter of the latter, but seems to be more oriented on money, vice political power.

Religion is also a major factor in Malaysia’s unwillingness to openly embrace the War on Terrorism. The internal dynamics of a large Muslim population affects both Thailand and Indonesia’s ability to fight religious extremism as well.

The above definition does not fit very well in Northeast Asia, leading to the argument that perhaps they are more Western than Asian, when discussing interstate relations. This paper does not elaborate on why this may be the case, but some historical facts contribute to the idea. Japan’s Meiji Restoration period (1868-1912) was marked by a conscious decision to accept the ways—and power—of the West.<sup>54</sup> Combined with the traditional Bushido culture, Japan’s homogenous population is comfortable with a stratified relationship, and accepts their assumed place without opposition.<sup>55</sup> Korea, on the other hand, has known centuries of domination at the hand of one Asian neighbor or another, and understands the necessity of allowing the United States (a power disinterested in owning Korean land) to dominate its defense establishment. Korea and Japan are also recipients of strong Confucian teachings, which stress being satisfied with one’s station in life and paying proper respects to all relations.

## **THE EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION IN EAST ASIA ON U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY**

In “The Global Century,” a study by the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies, three scenarios were offered for the effects of globalization on East Asia. Ranging from optimistic to pessimistic support of U.S. interests in Asia, the scenarios provided a baseline for the authors’ analysis of globalization in East Asia and its effect on U.S. national security.<sup>56</sup> They are:

- Pan-Pacific Economic and Security Cooperation;
- Globalization and Unstable Security Environment; and,
- Economic Nationalism and Regional Power Rivalries.

Scenario One, while labeled optimistic and “visionary,” has a strong resemblance to U.S. goals for the region. In this scenario, matured economic integration reduces the desire of all to settle disputes by military means. The United States retains a leading military presence in the region, but without the dominance that current bases allow. In fact, continued need for the bases are questioned in this scenario, which closes with a repeat of the “places, not bases” motto from former Secretary of Defense William Perry.

Scenarios Two and Three are decidedly more pessimistic, both in terms of U.S. national interests and regional security cooperation. The second scenario envisions a continuation of recent economic woes for the region and posits particularly troubling reactions from key countries. China is faced with

a domestic economic downturn that forces a more belligerent attitude toward regional competitors while Japan turns inward, effectively snubbing globalization in general, and specifically downplaying its reliance on—and alliance with—the United States.

Scenario Three sees a subregional split, with Southeast Asia increasing its dependence on western markets while the industrial countries of Northeast Asia internalize their economies by increasing the percentage of spending toward defense-related ventures. This creates a fear-based weapons-buying spree, increasing tensions and forcing American businesses out of the region. As American business interests are reduced, so is our national interest, leaving regional powers the latitude to compete for dominance.

All three scenarios share a common point of view that only through close ties with the U.S. economy can East Asian security be guaranteed. They show optimism when ties are so intertwined that even our forward presence is not needed. Conversely, a separation of economies would force both U.S. investment elsewhere and a pull-back of American forces to more distant bases. Interestingly, both views envision a reduced security presence in the region, leaving the impression that our economic links, not our defense links, form the basis for East Asia's regional security. Neither view, however, considers the Asian point of view, which has developed unevenly since the United States first became an Asian power in 1898.

## VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA

On matters concerning security, defense and commerce, prudence and pragmatism should be the order of the day.<sup>57</sup>

K. S. Balakrishnan

As previously stated, Southeast Asia is a region of many dissimilarities. The dispersal of religious groupings reflect thousands of years of conflict, conquest, trade, and travel through this strategic crossroads. Southeast Asia's multiple cultures, ethnicities, and languages overlap national borders and create a cross-hatching that binds this region into a loose subculture of its own. Southeast Asians view their security in a much broader manner and are proud of their advancements in all aspects of society since the end of their respective colonial periods. Among countries of the region, Malaysia is an especially good place from which to view U.S. goals in Southeast Asia. Its stability also provides an especially good lens through which to view the U.S. goals from a Southeast Asian perspective. Kuala Lumpur's views are quite even-handed since it is neither a U.S. treaty partner nor a target of American ire.

### Malaysia.

Malaysia sees itself as "a champion in the cause for justice, fairness, and accommodation in the international arena."<sup>58</sup> This self-perception often puts it at odds with the United States, but for understandable reasons. Malaysia is a collection of 13 pre-colonial kingdoms with a very nonhomogenous population. Besides ethnicity issues, it must also address domestic religious and political differences. Malaysia experienced a break in the evolution of its indigenous strategic culture during the colonial period, has fought at least two insurgencies since World War II, and has border disputes with five of its neighbors.<sup>59</sup> As a consequence, the Malaysian armed forces are among the best in the region, as well as one of the most diversely equipped forces in Asia. Malaysia's Air Force alone has aircraft from at least four different sources, British BAe Hawk fighter/bombers; American C-130s, F-5Es, and F/A-18Ds; French Allouette helicopters; and Russian MiG-29s.<sup>60</sup> The author has trained with their Special Forces at the same time another Malaysian unit was training with British SAS. The issue is that while Malaysia appreciates U.S. military presence in the region, it does not want to become—or be seen as—beholden to that presence.

Following the September 2001 attacks on the United States, Malaysia agreed to co-sponsor a regional counterterrorism school. This was a very pragmatic move to get on the U.S. side in the war against terrorism, but was met with sharp criticisms from domestic groups on both sides of the political spectrum. The main opposition party, *Parti Islam SeMalaysia* (PAS), fears the school would be used to repress the increasingly vocal Muslim community, while others in the mainstream fear the loss of Malaysia's credibility as a moderating voice in the region. Both sides, however, are concerned with the school's role in increasing the U.S. "sphere of influence" in the region.<sup>61</sup>

Malaysia provides just one example of how the United States is viewed positively for its security presence, while simultaneously criticized for meddling in other aspects of Asian society. Their appreciation for the American military, however, does not automatically transfer to regional allies. ASEAN's massive denigration of Australia's recent Preemption Policy is a good example of this phenomenon, accusing Canberra of wanting to be Washington's "deputy sheriff" in the region.<sup>62</sup> In a thinly veiled message to Australia, Malaysian Defence Minister Najib Tun Razak vowed to defend against any country that implements "forward defense or launches preemptive strikes" in Malaysia.<sup>63</sup> Its being posted on the state-run Vietnam News Agency web site shows the regional popularity of this stance. Still, the United States has been very successful in garnishing support of countries in Southeast Asia without a bilateral security alliance, particularly Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia.<sup>64</sup>

### **ASEAN and ARF.**

ASEAN was formed in 1967 by the Bangkok Declaration to be primarily a social, economic, and cultural agreement. Political and military concerns were specifically left off the initial declaration.<sup>65</sup> Little progress was made through the intervening years except in forming a common desire to reduce the influence of great power politics within the region. The call for creating a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) at the 1971 Special Ministerial Meeting in Kuala Lumpur was finally agreed to as a "desirable objective"<sup>66</sup> which was strengthened in the Bali Summit by the inclusion of political disputes in ASEAN's agenda.<sup>67</sup> Thus, ASEAN confirmed a common stance against communism; not in the SEATO way that required an active struggle against Communist States, but only "in its aversion to a Communist movement taking over state power" of one of its members.<sup>68</sup>

Speaking after the November 2001 ASEAN Chiefs of Armies Multilateral Meeting (ACAMM), Philippine Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Jaime Delos Santos announced that the ASEAN militaries had agreed to cooperate against international terrorism. Reconfirming an earlier decision from the 7th ASEAN Summit, General Delos Santos stressed that "joint military action is not included in the agreement," and reiterated that "ASEAN is not a security organisation." The ACAMM resolution highlighted the need to address the issue of global terrorism before it "adversely affect[s] regional security and economic gains."<sup>69</sup>

In a uniquely Asian way, the nations of Southeast Asia ensure their collective security through a *lack* of cooperative security measures. ASEAN, unlike ASA and SEATO before it, became a loose forum to strengthen regional relationships along the other lines of national power as a deterrent to the forceful or coercive use of the military power. The establishment of its regional forum (ARF) brings to the table the extra-regional players in Southeast Asian security to discuss confidence-building measures and eventually "preventive diplomacy."<sup>70</sup> This forum is not at all a security alliance, however, since most of its members have overlapping claims against each other.

Paul Dibbs notes that the ASEAN members try to include the United States in their discussions with potential threat nations, but that any rejection of the dialogue process would be seen as a "deterioration" of regional security.<sup>71</sup> Any attempt by the United States to establish a common coalition would just as likely bring calls against U.S. hegemony in the region. Michael Leifer takes a different

view of U.S. relations with the ARF. He notes that the United States missed an opportunity in 1992 to help shape the relationships and must now play catch up to internal Asian processes. Leifer also points out an inherent/potential weakness in this option. He notes that loose security ties may work well only because there is already a balance of power established in the region. Given the absence of a balance, he continues, ARF may only be capable of encouraging further economic ties to offset a security issue.<sup>72</sup> This, of course, is the basis for the Pacific Command's claims of being the regional security guarantor, without whom the ASEAN members would not have the luxury of "preventive diplomacy."

## **VIEW FROM NORTHEAST ASIA**

Northeast Asia cannot be represented by the views of a single country. Its history is one of rivalry, not cooperation, and the views of each nation are important for U.S. policymakers to recognize. The region is host to nearly all U.S. troops forward deployed in Asia. South Korea hosts about 37,500 troops of U.S. Forces Korea, while U.S. Forces Japan includes 47,000 troops throughout the islands.<sup>73</sup> The current U.S. position is to encourage the continuance of this forward presence into the foreseeable future. In one of his last public speeches as the Commander of all Pacific Forces, Admiral Dennis Blair testified before the Senate Armed Forces Subcommittee that maintaining U.S. forces in Korea is in the best interests of both Korea and the United States. He further noted that the key to a stable Asia was cooperation, not rivalry, between Korea and Japan.<sup>74</sup> Admiral Blair and the Pacific Command are given a great deal of credit for trying to instill more multilateralism into the Asia-Pacific Region, while still maintaining our bilateral ties. As one analyst has noted, "only regional cooperation can defeat the transnational threats that pose the major security concerns of today and the future."<sup>75</sup> To continue to be effective, however, U.S. bilateral relations must be seen by all as contributing to the entire region's security, not just a select few. A prime example of this is the continuation of U.S. troop presence in Japan, which serves to allay regional fears of the reemergence of Japanese militarism.

### **Japan.**

Japan is often called the linchpin of U.S. security in Asia, and as such deserves a special role in any discussion of Asian security.<sup>76</sup> A major policy concern for Japan is how to meet the demands of all interested parties while maintaining as close as possible the status quo. The population of Okinawa is becoming increasingly hostile toward the cultural and economic burden of U.S. bases in this Japanese prefecture. On the Japanese mainland, complaints of excessive noise in areas around U.S. bases are forcing the U.S. Navy to search for practice carrier landing fields as far away as Iwo Jima.<sup>77</sup> The Pentagon is demanding more direct investment by the government of Japan in its own defense—both in terms of helping defray U.S. expenses and providing for more Japanese involvement within the region. Japan must balance the still-strong pacifist feelings of its population against the outcry following North Korea's missile test across Japanese territory in 1998. The popular rhetoric seems to be divided. While few are calling for a resurgent robust military in Japan, the growing angst toward North Korea is rekindling the traditional Japan-Korea rivalry that threatens U.S. security plans for the region. The actions of the Japanese Coast Guard to engage and sink a North Korean ship encountered in their territorial waters attests to Tokyo's new way of thinking. This virtually unprecedented defensive act garnered immediate concerns from China,<sup>78</sup> which, according to one analyst, would prefer a demilitarized Japan, shorn of its security alliance with the United States.<sup>79</sup>



## South Korea.

U.S. forces in South Korea are also under attack from the local population for essentially cultural reasons. As the threat of open conflict with North Korea diminishes in the minds of the South Korean population, the need for a large military presence also diminishes. Therefore, when accidents occur such as the recent deaths of two young girls, the entire alliance is put under scrutiny. The failure of the U.S. military to follow local cultural norms immediately following the accident showed the continued inclination to place western norms over eastern, thereby literally adding insult to injury. This type of cultural insensitivity is a hallmark of U.S. forward presence and places all of our bilateral relations at risk. The United States cannot depend on our status as Seoul's security guarantor when the South Korean population no longer sees a threat from the North, or sees the United States itself as encouraging what threat remains. Regardless of the reality, perception reigns, and the United States must act quickly to ensure popular support for our continued presence on the Korean Peninsula.<sup>80</sup>

## China.

China traditionally has seen itself as a peace-loving nation that has suffered from western warmongering hegemons. Not surprisingly, the most recent Defense White Paper characterizes China's security policy as defensive.<sup>81</sup> Most Chinese defense scholars will describe nearly all of China's wars over the past 3,000-4,000 years as necessary and justified for the defense of the nation.<sup>82</sup> The absurdity of this genre of claim is well-recognized throughout Asia and impacts greatly on the trust provided China's stated intentions by their regional neighbors. This lack of trust is met by an equal distrust in Beijing of many Asian countries. China is especially distrustful of Japan, following the years of horrific occupation in the 1930s and 1940s. Andrew Scobell points out quite clearly that China attributes past atrocities committed by Japan as a part of its "Bushido" culture that has yet to be changed. Worse, the current writings leave no question that China will never trust Japan's overtures toward peaceful coexistence, and it has in fact become more wary of Japan's intentions since the end of the Cold War.<sup>83</sup>

The Chinese are also very wary of U.S. intentions in Asia, labeling U.S. hegemony in one case as the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) "public enemy number one."<sup>84</sup> In a thinly-veiled reference, their 2002 Defense White Paper calls the ongoing [U.S.-Japan] joint research on Theater Missile Defense "detrimental to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific Region."<sup>85</sup> Two well-known China analysts determined that the U.S. reaction to the PLA's March 1996 missile firing exercises marked a breaking point in China's approach to U.S. forward presence in Asia. Previously, Beijing "acquiesced" to the regional security architecture that was based on U.S. bilateral alliances and forward presence in Asia. Following the deployment of two carrier battle groups off of the Taiwan Strait in the midst of the PLA's then unprecedented military exercises, Beijing began lobbying for an arrangement that provided "equal security" for all Asian nations.<sup>86</sup> Scobell calls China's approach to another nation's intentions as "strategic culture imaging," which places more emphasis on China's analysis of historical trends toward the use of force than on current *realpolitik*. This method of imaging also blinds China from seeing itself from the perspective of its neighbors, since it characterizes all of its wars as necessary for the self-defense of China.<sup>87</sup> Overcoming the impact of strategic culture is an important obstacle the United States must face to gain China's support for a regional security institution in Asia.

## POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

### 1. **First and foremost, the United States must align its policies with each other.**

The 2002 *National Security Strategy* lists as a strategic principle the need to "invest time and

resources into building international relationships and institutions that can help manage local crises when they emerge.”<sup>88</sup> This obvious reference to multilateral activities is not matched by the latest draft of the *National Military Strategy*, which calls for activities “with other nations” to advance common defense or security relationships—an equally obvious reference to continued bilateral alliances. At no point in the *National Military Strategy* is any mention made of supporting or building regional security institutions. Theater Security Cooperation, the program under which this type of activity would naturally fall, is focused solely on increasing the supportive role that regional militaries could provide U.S. forces during a conflict. Nothing is mentioned about helping to provide a region the internal capability of solving—or preventing—its own problems.<sup>89</sup> While this approach may play well in the capitals of Europe, those of Asia are becoming increasingly unwilling to hand over responsibility for their security to an external power, especially one that doesn’t follow the region’s cultural norms.

## **2. “Put webbing between the spokes.”<sup>90</sup>**

The United States should strongly support and sponsor not only multilateral activities that enhance collective security in each region (Northeast and Southeast Asia), but also bilateral activities among the nations within each subregion. Collective security is already the long-term goal of the ARF’s “Plus 3” program, as well as the Pacific Command’s annual Team Challenge exercise. The latter effort in support of regional bilateral activities is equally important, though, to enhance a cooperative security that can only evolve through continuous confidence-building measures and mutual dependencies. Suggested areas of cooperation include sharing regional maintenance facilities for like equipment and weapons systems; opening training ranges to all regional security forces; and establishing of standing procedures (and eventually resources) to allow coordinated regional responses to humanitarian or disaster relief scenarios.

This would require the adoption of a strategy that Stuart and Tow refer to as “multipolarity,” in which U.S. interests are best served by maximizing the sharing of interests in all aspects of the relationship.<sup>91</sup> This strategy is one that Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly called in his confirmation hearing, “firm in goals, but flexible in tactics.”<sup>92</sup>

The problem, then, becomes a balance between having enough presence forward to maintain a balance of power amid bickering neighbors who are simultaneously paranoid of a regional hegemon, and becoming so assertive in that role that we are seen as the hegemon. If this can be achieved by maintaining our bilateral military alliances while promoting the more comprehensive security ideas of the region, it will only work if the latter takes the more public lead in Southeast Asia.

## **3. Separate Northeast and Southeast Asian Policies.**

The best way to meet both of the above needs is to consider Northeast and Southeast Asia distinct and separate regions, requiring equally distinct policies. Government analysts and academics alike must recognize that there are very few “East Asia” specialists. Most are specialists on either Northeast or Southeast Asia, but are often called upon to evaluate some aspect of the entire region. Doing so, however, implicitly biases the reports in favor of whichever set of strategic cultures with which the writer is more familiar.<sup>93</sup> The same can be said for the organization of our government agencies. More emphasis should be placed on separating policymaking and implementation for these regions, to include the creation of a Deputy Assistant Secretary at Defense and State for each region.

*Maintain the bilateral approach in Northeast Asia.* Our bilateral alliances are essential to maintaining a stable and secure Northeast Asia, but our interests for South Korea and Japan differ. While their interests may coincide in the desire for continued U.S. presence, this cannot be assumed indefinitely, especially post Korean reunification. Our direct ties with each nation will allow the flexibility needed to ensure each of the others’ cooperation. Despite 50 years of separation, the cultural basis of North Korea is still similar to South Korea. As such, the United States should recognize the benefits to a stable

Korean Peninsula that our bilateral relationship with North Korea provides. Threats to withdraw from direct talks only inflame the situation and invoke brinkmanship strategies with a well-armed and poised threat whose strategic culture we do not yet fully understand. Many in the United States paint Pyongyang as an irrational rogue regime that cannot be deterred. The possibility that North Korea's strategic calculus is very rational, but hidden from us by our own "mirror image" of rationality is one that cannot be discarded.<sup>94</sup> One thing is certain, though, with regard to North Korea—progress (frustratingly slow as it may seem) is made when negotiated bilaterally. U.S. policies with China have always been bilateral and should continue to be so. The strategic nature of our relationship with Asia's only member of the United Nations Security Council demands a separate, bilateral approach.

*Shift to multilateral policies for Southeast Asia.* All Southeast Asian nations should be equally treated as the friends they could be. The United States should take a serious look at abrogating the two mutual defense treaties with Thailand and the Philippines in recognition of their being out of date and exclusionary policies. In their place, Washington should seek stronger security relations with the region through the ASEAN Regional Forum. In this way, we would demonstrate our firm commitment to the security of the region, without being forced to pick sides in an intraregional issue. No tangible commitments or assistance programs should be cancelled. To the contrary, the current trend toward multilateralism should be expanded to include all countries in the region. Other western countries with interests in Southeast Asia—such as Australia—should be encouraged to follow this method as well.

#### **4. Maintain U.S. Military Forward Presence.**

The U.S. military's forward presence is essential to our regional and global security interests and should be maintained. Protecting the viability of our presence in Asia, though, is becoming more of a regional issue than a bilateral one. The United States requires the support of the entire region to maintain forces anywhere within the region. This necessitates a multilateral approach that not only encourages, but also embraces the cultural and relational norms of Asia. If we need Asians to work with each other for our sake, we must allow them to work in their comfort zones. Trying to impose western ideals or cultures will only serve to alienate those we wish to protect. Cultural identity will overcome the need for security to the detriment of U.S. national interests in the region. The United States must take steps to disprove regional concerns that the U.S.-ASEAN Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism is not used to reintroduce U.S. ground troops into the region.<sup>95</sup>

To support regional collective and cooperative security, the United States cannot be perceived as supporting one member over another. U.S. support of Australia's announcement of its own preemptive attack policy places the United States squarely at odds with the "regionalization" of Asia's security.<sup>96</sup> It is another good example of how our continued reliance on formal bilateral alliances skews our larger goals of maintaining a high level of influence and presence in the region.

Washington should continue to demonstrate benefits of U.S. forward presence by spreading the wealth. In other words, a de facto bilateral relationship with ASEAN should benefit all members of ASEAN. The support mentioned earlier to maintain a forward presence should therefore come from throughout the region. Singapore took steps in the early 1990s to replace the maintenance facilities lost with the closure of Subic Bay. Malaysia has since contributed maintenance facilities as well. Thailand long has provided a site to store ammunition in the region, but has restricted its use to within Thailand. The Philippines has recently agreed to sponsor another ammunition depot that would be available for worldwide deployment.<sup>97</sup> Malaysia is opening the Counter-Terrorism School discussed earlier, while both the Philippines and Thailand provide training areas for regional forces (including the United States) to train. All of these activities and more are funded in part by the United States and help to spread the economic benefits of our forward presence. Other countries in the region have a great deal of potential, however, that should be looked at for future use. Vietnam, for example, has numerous

airfields and the excellent natural harbor in Cam Ranh that could be used in support of regional security activities. U.S. policy should be to encourage the use of these and other facilities within the region for the good of the entire region—vice trying to secure bilateral access for U.S. forces.

##### **5. Recognize that Strategic Culture makes a Difference.**

The Asia-Pacific Region is too diverse to have just one set of policies governing the prosecution and protection of concerned U.S. security interests. So, too, is East Asia. The differences in histories, political and geostrategic evolutions, and cultural identities of Northeast and Southeast Asian peoples greatly affect the strategic cultures of their respective governments. Northeast Asian nations are more amenable to the “hub and spokes” approach to security. They are still experiencing the lasting effects of the Cold War and recognize a common threat for which national assets are insufficient to deter. Yet they also have traditional animosities which affect their willingness to cooperate for their own security. Our bilateral relations work well in this region and should be continued. Forward basing will continue to be essential for the foreseeable future.

Southeast Asia is a different story, however, and requires a different approach. These countries are farther removed from the effects of the Cold War and have, in fact, been “burned” by trying to remain aligned too long. This region has its traditional animosities as well, but the lack of ethnic homogeneity throughout the region forces them to seek compromise, rather than conflict. The nations of Southeast Asia are less inclined to seek, or adhere to, alliances, especially if the price is paid in flexibility. This attitude is reflected in their regional institutions such as ASEAN and ARF, which can best be characterized as “loose.” While increased security cooperation may not be attainable based on perceptions of a common threat, it can be enhanced if based on the common benefits of economic efficiencies. U.S. policy should reflect these trends of the region and seek to enhance the cooperative nature of the region’s security logistics effort.

Recognition of the different strategic cultures will enhance our ability to promote U.S. national interests in these two vital regions. Institutional and policy changes are required and must be supported by focused analysis on each region. Global crises such as the ongoing war on terrorism will still allow short-term demands to be met, but only through the understanding of strategic cultures can we assure continued promotion of our long-term national interests. As Alastair Johnston has warned:

Done well, the careful analysis of strategic culture could help policymakers establish more accurate and empathetic understandings of how different actors perceive the game being played . . . Done badly, [it] could reinforce stereotypes about the strategic predispositions of other states and close off policy alternatives deemed inappropriate to dealing with local strategic cultures.<sup>98</sup>

The importance of focused analysis—and focused policies—cannot be underestimated.

## **ENDNOTES**

1. For purposes of this paper, East Asia consists of the Northeast Asian nations of Japan, North and South Korea, Mongolia and China; and the Southeast Asian countries of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, Myanmar, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, Brunei, and the newly-established East Timor. Taiwan is treated as a separate entity for this discussion, while Russia and Australia play important, but ancillary roles in any East Asian policy. Any reference to the “region” is intended to include all, unless otherwise indicated.

2. Daniel I. Okimoto, *et al.*, *A United States Policy for the Changing Realities of East Asia: Toward a New Consensus*, Palo Alto, CA: Asia/Pacific Research Center, 1996, p. iii. This conference report by noted Asia scholars and foreign policy experts is touted as the best of its contemporaries on the subject.

3. William J. Perry, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, Washington, DC: The Pentagon, February 1995, p. 5. See also Okimoto, p. x.

4. George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002, p. 26.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

8. Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, Washington, DC: The Pentagon, September 30, 2001, p. 4. For a discussion on China as a "strategic competitor," see Aaron L. Friedberg, "United States," in *Strategic Asia 2002-03: Asian Aftershocks*, Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, eds., Seattle WA: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2002, p. 27.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

11. Italics added. For a succinct discussion on the dangers to our security policies of Asian perceptions of the United States, see H. C. Stackpole, "A US Security Approach in the Asia-Pacific Region in the Age of Globalization," *Asia-Pacific Review*, Vol. 9, No. 1, London: Institute for International Policy Studies, May 2002, pp. 82-84.

12. "Asia 2002 Yearbook," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Hong Kong: Review Publishing Company, Ltd., 2001, pp. 10-11. Taiwan data is from "Asia 2001 Yearbook," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Hong Kong: Review Publishing Company, Ltd., 2000, p. 12. Burma data is not available. Hereafter, "Yearbook."

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

14. "About U.S. Pacific Command" available on the U.S. Pacific Command Military Website, online at <http://www.pacom.mil/about/pacom.shtml>; accessed on January 21, 2003. Hereafter, "PACOM."

15. Friedberg, p. 19.

16. James C. Hsiung, "Pacific Asia in the Twenty-First Century World Order," *Asian Affairs*, Vol. 29, No. 2, Washington, DC: HELDREF Publications, Summer 2002, p. 103.

17. For a more complete and easy to read list of long-term territorial conflicts in Southeast Asia, see Paul Dibb, "Towards a New Balance of Power In Asia," *Adelphi Paper 295*, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 1995, p. 51. Many of these conflicts are also discussed in Amitav Acharya, "A New Regional Order in South-East Asia: ASEAN in the Post-Cold War Era," *Adelphi Paper 279*, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, August 1993, pp. 30-37.

18. John H. Noer, *Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia*, Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1996; Richard Sokolsky, Angel Rabasa and C.R. Neu, *The Role of Southeast Asia in U.S. Strategy Toward China*, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2000, p. 12.

19. Okimoto, p. 1.

20. Bob Woodward, *The Commanders*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991, p. 370.

21. Okimoto, pp. 16-17.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

23. Alan Macmillan, Ken Booth, and Russell Trood, "Strategic Culture," *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region*, Ken Booth and Russell Trood, eds. London: MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1999, p. 8.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
26. Frederica M. Bunge, ed., *Philippines: A Country Study*, Washington DC: The Library of Congress, 1984, p. 22.
27. Norman D. Palmer, "SEATO, ASA, MAPHILINDO and ASPAC," in *The ASEAN Reader*, K. S. Sandhu, et al., eds., Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992, p. 27.
28. The 1954 Geneva Armistice agreements barred the former French colonies from becoming members of international organizations prior to the agreed to national elections. See William Appleman Williams, et al., eds., *America in Vietnam: A Documentary History*, Garden City: Doubleday, 1985, p. 140.
29. Palmer, p. 28.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
31. *Ibid.*
32. Known as the Rusk-Thanat Agreement after U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman. This bilateral agreement also signaled Bangkok's apprehension of SEATO's viability for collective security. See Barbara Leitch LePoer, ed., *Thailand: A Country Study*, Washington DC: Library of Congress, 1989, pp. 214-215.
33. The Taiwan Relations Act was a Congressional reaction to the Carter administration's diplomatic recognition of the PRC, and is designed to provide the United States maximum flexibility in preventing a conflict between two major U.S. trading partners in Asia. As a policy, this act serves to deter aggressive actions of both antagonists. The author deliberately neglected to state which side would be chosen in order to continue the ambiguity that has served this policy so well since its passage. For a full text of the act, as well as the other key documents upon which U.S.-China foreign policy is based, see Kerry Dumbaugh, ed., *Taiwan: Texts of the Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S.-China Communiques, and the "Six Assurances,"* Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, May 21, 1998, pp. 1-18.
34. Michael Leifer, "The ASEAN Regional Forum," *Adelphi Paper 302*, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, July 1996, p. 24.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
36. William S. Cohen, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, Washington, DC: The Pentagon, November 1998, p. 1.
37. Perry, p. 3.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
41. Stackpole, p. 84.
42. Joseph Luns, *NATO Facts and Figures*, Brussels: NATO Information Service, October 1975, p. 8.
43. See for example, *Mutual Defense Treaty Between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America*, August 30, 1951, available on the internet at <http://www.dfa.gov.ph/vfa/content/mdt.htm>, accessed October 14, 2002.
44. Michael Chambers, "Rising China: A Threat to its Neighbors?" *The Rise of China in Asia: Security Implications*, Carolyn W. Pumphrey, ed., Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, January 2002, p. 69.

45. Mohammed Ayoob and Chai-Annan Samudavanija, eds., *Leadership Perceptions and National Security: The Southeast Asian Experience*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989, p. 52. This perception is mirrored by those nations in Southeast Asia on the other side of the ideological line. Vietnam, in particular, learned this lesson following the breakup of the Soviet Union, when the new Russian government ended their stipend to Hanoi and brought home much of their force based at Cam Ranh Bay. Interviews by author in Hanoi, Vietnam, 2001. See also Acharya, p. 49.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 53.

47. "The United States and the Challenge of Asia," *AsiaInt Special Report*, November 2001 (journal online), available from the internet at <http://www.AsiaInt.com>, accessed November 22, 2001. Hereafter as AsiaInt.

48. Dibb, p. 56.

49. Li Jijun, "Lun zhanlue wenhua," (On Strategic Culture) *Zhongguo junshi kexue (China Military)*, No. 1, 1997, p. 8. As quoted in Andrew Scobell, *China and Strategic Culture*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, May 2002, p. 1.

50. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, Washington, DC: The Pentagon, April 5, 2000, pp. II 10-11.

51. Macmillan, pp. 11-12.

52. Cohen, p. 66.

53. Acharya, p. 69.

54. Ronald E. Dolan and Robert L. Worden, eds., *Japan: A Country Study*, Washington DC: Library of Congress, 1992, p. 40.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 99.

56. Richard P. Cronin, "Asian Economies: The Dynamics of Progress," *Challenges of the Global Century: Report of the Project on Globalization and National Security, Volume II*, Stephen J. Flanagan, Ellen L. Frost, and Richard L. Kugler, eds., Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, June 2001, pp. 952-953.

57. K. S. Balakrishnan, "Problems in Malaysia-US Relations: Real or Otherwise?" *Asian Defence and Diplomacy*, Vol. 9, No. 2, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, February 2003, p. 37.

58. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

59. Chandran Jeshurun, "Malaysia: The Delayed Birth of a Strategic Culture," *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region*, Ken Booth and Russell Trood, eds., London: MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1999, p. 225.

60. Richard Sokolsky, Angel Rabasa, and C. R. Neu, *The Role of Southeast Asia in U.S. Strategy Toward China*, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2000, p. 51. See also *The Military Balance 2002-2003*, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 2002, pp. 156-158.

61. Anil Netto, "Uproar over anti-terror center in Malaysia," November 1, 2002, in *Asian Times Online*, available from <http://www.atimes.com>, internet, accessed November 4, 2002.

62. Grant Holloway, "Malaysia: First Strike an 'Act of War,'" December 3, 2002; available from <http://europe.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/auspac/12/02/australia.terror.us/index.html>, internet, accessed December 9, 2002.

63. "Malaysia Warns Sovereign Violators of 'Bloody Nose'," January 3, 2003, available from <http://www.vnagency.com.vn/Public/Readnewse.asp?FileN=frac0301.013>, internet, accessed January 4, 2003.

64. AsiaInt, p. 12.

65. Sandhu, p. 38.

66. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 454.

69. Gilbert Felongco, "Asean armies agree on joint action on terrorism," November 16, 2001, *Gulf News Online Edition*, internet, available from <http://www.gulf-news.com/Articles/print.asp?ArticleID=32713>, internet, accessed November 4, 2002.

70. Acharya, p. 74.

71. Dibbs, p. 56.

72. Leifer, p. 57.

73. PACOM, p. 8.

74. Admiral Dennis C. Blair, statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on FY2002 Posture Statement, March 27, 2001, as quoted in Carl E. Haselden, Jr., "The Effects of Korean Unification on the US Military Presence in Northeast Asia," *Parameters*, No. 32, Winter 2002-03, p. 125.

75. *Ibid.*

76. Cohen, p. 19.

77. Captain Dennis Mitchell, U.S. Navy, Interview by author, February 20, 2003, Carlisle, PA.

78. Sun Shenglin, "Incident of Sinking of Suspected Ship by Japan Cannot be Explained Clearly," *Beijing Renmin Wang*, December 24, 2001, Database on-line, trans. into English by *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)*, Document No. CPP20011224000080, Version 1, accessed February 23, 2003.

79. AsiaInt, p. 11. This objective is supported in Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, "China and U.S. At Odds Over Regional Security Architecture," unpublished paper dated May 1997 presented at the Conference, "US-PRC Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia," co-hosted by the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies and the United States Institute of Peace, Honolulu, May 26-28, 1998, p. 15, photocopied.

80. Two News Releases were issued by USFK Public Affairs Office regarding this incident. See USFK News Release No. 021103, "USFK Statement on Acquittal," November 21, 2002; and USFK News Release No. 021104, "Statement From USFK on Courts-Martial," November 26, 2002, available at <http://www.korea.army.mil/pao/news>, internet, accessed January 21, 2003.

81. "'Full Text' of White Paper on China's National Defense in 2002," *Xinhua*, December 9, 2002, p. 2, Database on-line, available in English from *FBIS*, Document No. CPP20021209000086, Version 2; accessed December 20, 2002. Hereafter as "White Paper."

82. See, for example, Colonel Fang Ning, "Defense Policy in the New Era," *Chinese Views of Future Warfare*; Michael Pillsbury, ed., Washington DC: National Defense University, September 1998, p. 48. This concept was also the theme of a speech given by the Vice President of the PLA's Academy of Military Sciences, LTG Li Jijun to the Army War College Corresponding Studies Class on July 15, 1997. See Li Jijun, *Traditional Military Thinking and the Defensive Strategy of China*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, August 29, 1997, pp. 3-4.

83. Andrew Scobell, *China and Strategic Culture*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, May 2002, p. 15.

84. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

85. White Paper, p. 32.



86. Garrett, p. 15.

87. Scobell, p. 3.

88. Bush, p. 9.

89. Richard B. Myers, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America: Pre-Decisional Draft*, Washington, DC: The Pentagon, September 19, 2002, p. 22.

90. Robyn Lim, "Toward a New Security Architecture for East Asia," *The International Herald Tribune*, August, 2001, Opinion section, p. 6, database on-line, available from Lexis-Nexis, accessed October 30, 2002.

91. Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow, "A US Strategy for the Asia-Pacific," *Adelphi Paper 299*, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, December 1995, p. 65.

92. AsiaInt, p. 2.

93. Macmillan, p. 11.

94. I am indebted to Andrew Scobell for this observation.

95. "Concern over ASEAN anti-terror treaty," *CNN.Com*, July 29, 2002, internet, <http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/07/28/thailand.powell.asean>, internet, accessed November 4, 2002. A complete text of the agreement is available on the U.S. Department of State website. See internet, <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/ot/12428pf.htm>, internet, accessed November 4, 2002.

96. Holloway, p. 2.

97. Foreign Correspondents Association of the Philippines (FOCAP) Press Meeting with Ambassador Francis Ricciardone," Manila, RP, July 16, 2002, internet, <http://usembassy.state.gov/posts/rp1/wwwwhfoc1.html>; internet, accessed January 23, 2003.

98. Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4, Spring 1995, p. 63-64; as quoted in Macmillan, p. 17.