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IF JAPAN
AND
AMERICA FIGHT

Kojiro Sato

Lieut.-General Japanese Army



MEGURO BUNTEN
TOKYO



Kajiro Sato

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PREFACE



THE author, Lieutenant-General Kojiro Sato, is too well known in Japan and foreign countries to need any lengthy introduction. A retired army officer, he is a noted publicist on questions of national and international importance. He is known as "the Japanese Bernhardt."

In translating this book, the original Japanese text was closely followed with efforts made to express in English the force and beauty of the original.

The quotations from foreign authors were drawn from the original texts of such authors.

The foot notes here and there inserted in the book were prepared by the translator with the help of reference books of history and of comparative dates of Japanese and foreign historical events.

The responsibility for any error of translation rests with

JIHEI HASHIGUCHI

Translator

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The Author's Introduction



SOLDIER though he is, the author is by no means bellicose. He is confident that he is not so reckless as to use an extraordinary language thereby causing serious complications to the relations between Japan and America which may result in a disaster for our Empire. But our countrymen are unaware of the third great national crisis impending since the foundation of our nation, only indulging in the dreams of self-complacency. In order to awaken them by haranguing as did Shihei Hayashi before the Meiji Restoration, the author should be excused if he occasionally used somewhat strong expressions.

History repeats itself. Judging by facts on record, we find a striking parallelism that obtains between the Mongol invasion or the Russian aggression and the present relations between Japan and America. We therefore call the present one the third great national crisis. We are, however, considerably mystified, because, unlike in the two former crises, the spirit of our countrymen is low in facing the

present crisis, and because many of our countrymen are stricken with America phobia and confess that we are no match for America. Among the statesmen there is no great central figure like Tokimune or Takamori. They are temporizing and at each turn catering to the behest of America. Our China policy and Siberia policy are awkward and self-abnegating. Like a man choked with his neck strangled with silk-wadding, the Empire unconsciously finds herself in a suicidal condition.

Moreover, those Japanese who have lately visited America and returned praise the wealth and strength of America. Even military men loudly extoll the strong points of America and warn against the unwisdom of thoughtlessly pointing out weakness of America for a momentary fun, as such action is calculated not to conduce towards the advancement of the nation, but on the contrary to feed the self-conceit of the people, thus leaving them lagging behind the progress of the world. These military men tell of the American army which is to be feared even from the military point of view. No wonder that the fever of America phobia should rise higher and higher.

Visiting America and looking at the skyscrapers tens of stories high, and returning to

Japan, one will find our houses as if they were only match boxes. The author himself had that experience. But that is only a materialistic observation. There can be no such great disparity between the peoples themselves who live therein as there is between the houses. In point of mentality, Japanese are rather superior than inferior to Americans.

The great world war had lasted as if there was no end to it and the belligerent nations have been exhausted in strength, when America with her fresh energy rose and by exerting little efforts brought the record breaking war horrors to an end. America herself was certainly very much pleased with her success. The world was astonished. A man who attained a success is liable to brag and boast. So also is a nation. Even if America should still adhere to the Monroe Doctrine, her density of population is 31 per square mile. There remains a vast room in the confines of that country for further economic development. Why, then, should America try to hinder Japan's economic development in China and Siberia. Our Empire geographically and historically has a mission by all means to develop in the continent. That will not at all be an aggression. If her continental development were hindered, her very existence will be

endangered. Like a pot plant, the Empire may continue to exist and grow so long as her roots are stretching in the continent. Cut off from the continent, she will be compelled to die. Yet America cruelly tries to cut the roots off and to pursue her capitalistic imperialism in the east Asiatic continent in Japan's stead. Compared with the Russian outrage of years ago, this is rather much greater. Only the American method is not blunt as was the Russian. Homicide is homicide whether committed with a dagger or by administering a narcotic.

In any one of our national crises since the foundation of the Empire, the disparity in material strength between her and her foreign foe was very great. But she won her wars always by her moral strength. In the present national crisis, the material disparity is smallest compared with the case of the two which preceded it. But what about the moral strength?

The California question is nothing more than an issue involving the dignity of our Empire. The obstacles laid by America in regard to the Chinese and Siberian questions involve the great issue of the Empire's existence. Accordingly, we must perfect our preparations by means of the people's defense so that there will be no hindrance in the way of declaring

war at any time, and backed by the people's diplomacy, our Government may be enabled to take a decidedly firm attitude to steer clear of this national crisis. Yet our present day statesmen are insincere and beyond party interests have no thought of the country and of the national crisis. In this way, our Empire cannot but fall. We, however, warn strictly against reckless activities or anti-foreign demonstrations resulting from the just indignation of the people as was the case in the middle period of the Hojo dynasty or in the last days of the Tokugawa Shogunate.

The American reading this book, I expect, will realize for once the foolishness of attacking Japan and his attitude towards the California question will completely change. Even if the impending national crisis fortunately be averted, our countrymen should never be caught unguarded, for the Russian war, an extension of the second national crisis, came in about forty years' time. In short, in order to steer clear of this great national crisis, our countrymen should inaugurate a moral mobilization and concentrate the minds of the people in one thought. The author took the first step as a test of moral mobilization in view of a war with America and retreated to Inage, where concentrating his mind

he completed the manuscripts for this book in ten days.

A word to add here. Because the author is a military man, a section of our countrymen may misconstrue or entertain a suspicion as to the true purpose of the author as if he were trying to fan the Japanese-American war fever as a means of extending army and navy defense. Such readers are especially urged to read this book through carefully. The author certainly is not an advocate of restriction of armaments. But the army and navy expenditures should rather be limited to the present limits and efforts should be made to readjust the administration of defense organization. A fund saved out of such readjustment should be used for development of industry and education. Another word. The author for three years has rendered a service to the National Defense Society. He also listened to lectures by experts on defense in various directions. He believes that the knowledge he thus acquired has assisted much in writing this book. At this opportunity he wishes to extend his hearty thanks to the lectures.

KOJIRO SATO

at the Kaiki Kwan, Inage, a seaside resort.

October 14, 1920.

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IF JAPAN AND AMERICA FIGHT

By Kojiro Sato Lieutenant-General in the
Japanese Army

CHAPTER I

A GENERAL SURVEY AS TO A JAPANESE-AMERICAN WAR WHEN OPENED

1. *If Fought with America, will Japan Win or Lose?*

If fought with America, will Japan win or lose? That is the puzzling problem at present for the Japanese people in general. The military men maintain silence for fear of punishment in accordance with the military discipline. The Japanese people who are the foremost in the world for their lack of military knowledge are perplexed by the problem and are at a loss as to how to account for it. The knowing persons view the problem from the materistic standpoint and glancing at the splendid sight of the American paraphernalia of war decide that America can never be matched. They fall victims of the America phobia. That the Japanese policy towards China and Russia was brought to the present state of deadlock was due after all to this Americaphobia. The

Americans even outside of the military service are far advanced in comparison with the Japanese in military knowledge. They know full well that, should the Japanese become sulky and say, with a firm determination, "Go ahead, if you want to kill us or beat us," they will find themselves in an awkward position, not knowing what to do with the Japanese. They are victims of the Japanophobia. But while afraid they stealthily pulled the ear of the Japanese. As we did not complain, the Americans pinched our nose. As we maintained silence, they kicked us with their shoe. We were still silent. They thus arrived at the conclusion that the Japanese no matter how much insulted will not protest, thus forming a low estimate of the Japanese.

At the time of the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese Wars, the high authorities of the government, other than the military men, had entertained a pessimistic opinion of the result of the wars. No matter how much the military men had urged that the favorable opportunity which presented itself then should not be lost, the statesmen had hesitated to decide for war. That was due after all to their lack of military knowledge and because they were spell-bound by the outward show of

strength on the part of the enemy in both wars. A little before the opening of the Russo-Japanese War, when it was clear that to fight or not to fight was the parting of the way for our Empire to survive or to fall, our high government authorities had still hesitated in their decision, to our great chagrin.

The valor of ignorance we certainly should avoid. But the cowardice of ignorance is more to be loathed. That Tokimune killed the Mongolian envoy¹ or that the enemy war ship were fought against at Shimonoseki and Sakurajima² may have been expressions of the valor of ignorance.

But the anti-war advocacy at both the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese wars was, certainly an expression of the cowardice of ignorance. A stately main supporting column of a house if eaten up inside by white ants can readily be pulled down. In the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese wars, other persons than the military men had generally a super-

1. Tokimune Hojo of the Hojo dynasty, de facto ruler, killed Tu Shi-chu, Mongolian envoy, 1275 A.D.
2. The Satsuma clan government forces attempted to repulse the British warships from the Kagoshima Bay, in which the island of Sakurajima lies; the Choshu clan government forces fought the allied fleet of England, France, America and Holland, 1864.

ficial view of things without learning the fact of white ants eating up the core. The American resembles the Yedokko.* The Yedokko is known to make a show of authority with his characteristic caustic remarks, giving the devil to his adversary. But if the adversary should face him with pluck, the Yedokko will prove to be unexpectedly coward at heart.

2. *Only the Masterful Spirit Necessary.*

If the big plan of increase of the American navy is completed, America will have 40 or more of new and old battleships, 37 of battle-cruisers, 258 of destroyers, 300 or more of submarines, and 5,000 of sea-planes. If, again, the big plan of ship-building which was formed accompanying the big naval increase plan, the total tonnage of merchant ships of various descriptions, excepting the old vessels, will reach to 5,924,700 tons. The army which before the war numbered only 120,000 men now at a bounce increased approximately to 300,000. Besides, as a general military training 650,000 of American youths are annually being given a compulsory military training. In the public schools,

* Citizen of Yedo, now Tokyo.

the military education is accorded a rousing encouragement, thus accomplishing the policy of all the nation as soldiers. At the same time, physical exercises are earnestly encouraged. In the Olympic games, the Americans have acquired a name for their country in the world. Thus, judging from the materialistic view point alone, it appears as if we should fall in line with many of our pessimists and say that America cannot be matched and we should take off our helmet.

But how was the war of Bunyei with the Mongols?¹ Genghis Khan had risen in Mongolia and was heard to be overwhelming the continents of Europe and Asia. The intelligent section of our countrymen then had been watchful of the situation. Kublai Khan succeeded to the ambitions of Genghis Khan and conquered China. He then turned his attack upon our country. The materialistic disparity which obtained then between the two nations was so great that the disparity between Japan and America today can by no means stand a comparison. Yet Tokimune² killed the Mongolian envoy, thus showing his masterful spirit. Then

1. First Mongolian invasion, the Mongolian message coming in 1267.
2. Vide foot note 1, Page 15.

he prepared for a war and succeeded in repulsing the Mongolian invasion. What was the cause of that success? Many people attribute that success to the divine storm. Those who do so do not understand the efforts made by our countrymen at the time. How our ancestors then exerted their efforts for defense can be clearly seen through a perusal of history and a study of old ruins. Moreover, the fact should also be noted that the time spent in these efforts until the war of Koan¹ when the last decisive blow was dealt to the enemy extended in all for 14 to 15 years. At the time, had Tokimune shown a weak attitude like the Imperial Government, our Empire might have become altogether a part of the Chinese dominion. History repeats itself. In the Ansei Period,² our country met a similar national crisis. That crisis, too, was passed over, thanks to the masterful spirit shown by our fathers. How about the impending national crisis of Taisho?³ Are our country men now altogether lacking in the determination to pass over the crisis? I believe that even today, if we had men like Tokimune, Saigo or Kido⁴ who would exert their

1. Second Mongolian invasion, 1281.

2. 1854—1859.

3. Present period.

4. Saigo and Kido were leading statesmen of Meiji Era.

efforts to strengthen the determination of the people, it will not be difficult to show a strong united front of the nation.

Some may say that the minds of the people today have reached the extremity of indulgence and weakness, so that they have not the will power such as was possessed by their ancestors at the time of the Mongolian invasion and at the last days of the Tokugawa shogun. But between the middle period of the Hojo dynasty or the last days of the Tokugawa shogun and the present day, there was no great difference in that the people of the metropolitan cities and the upper classes of society were indulgent and weak. To sum up, whereas we yearn for the appearance of heroes who shall be the central figures it will not be difficult in this age of democracy, if only we should first create the public opinion for deciding our attitude towards America, to accentuate the just indignation of the people as in the case of the Nikolaevsk incident and to rouse the masterful spirit of the nation.

3. *The Country Impregnable, the People Brave.*

That in the middle period of the Hojo dynasty and in the last days of the Tokugawa shogun

when our Empire was placed in a precarious position the foreign enemies could not take any decisive action was due to the impregnable conditions of the country and the bravery of the people. Even if the present day people may not be so brave as the ancient men, they have not as yet lost the original character of the Yamato race.* The land of the country is nearly altogether unchanged since centuries ago and is still impregnable. Even if we possessed no naval strength at all, the enemy, no matter how strong he may be, will find it extremely difficult, from the geographical point of view, to conduct a landing operation on the main islands of Japan. Moreover, presuming that the enemy has succeeded in landing, we should imagine that, as the hostility of the people will be strongly roused, all of them, young and old, men and women, will rise in frantic efforts to hinder the activities of the enemy as if a hornet nest has been poked. Not only will the American army unaccustomed to battles in mountainous districts be unable to cope with our army, but it will find itself in an extreme difficulty regarding the transportation of supplies and the commissariat department activities, until it will be obliged to retreat.

* The Japanese are called the Yamato race.

However inferior our navy may be in strength, so long as our fleets still exist, an attempt by an American army to land will be almost absolutely impossible. Consequently, even if America possessed the greatest navy in the world, how could she conquer the Japanese army? As long as the defenders possess the will to resist at all, it is impossible for the enemy to take a fortress by storm by bombardment alone. Likewise, if the people of Japan in this island Empire resembling an impregnable fortress should be determined to continue to fight to the very last man, the American fleets, however powerful, will not be able to score any decisive victory. Besides, for a fleet operation a naval base is needed at a reasonably short distance. If our force should take a defensive position, the American forces will lack a suitable base of operation to meet the need. America has the Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippine islands as her bases. But are these islands advantageous bases in an offensive operation against Japan?

Should America come in an offensive operation against Japan with her main land as the base, she will have to sail thousands of miles across the ocean for days to engage in a warfare. With the Hawaii as a base, it will take about ten

days to sail here. If the base was nearer or each war vessel were to operate individually, a faster speed might be obtained. But an operation of a large fleet does not permit the desired speed.

The island of Guam is a suitable base for a fleet attacking Japan. But that island can accommodate only eight or nine of large war vessels. Besides, the promontories enveloping the naval port there are low and flat, so that the port can be seen through and bombarded from the outside. It cannot be considered as a suitable base for a big fleet. The Philippines are a most suitable base in point of distance and the conditions of the harbors and ports. But the line of supply which may be established will be threatened by our fleet from the flank of the line. Accidents like that which the Sado Maru* met may take place frequently. The Japanese are not sensitive about such incidents. But it is doubtful whether the Americans have the courage enough to disregard them with equanimity.

* A transport sunk in the Russian War in the Japan Sea off Gensan, Korea.

4. *Drawing the Enemy to the Gate, Shall Give Him One Deadly Blow.*

In time of war, the connections between our main islands and the continent must be maintained absolutely secure. To that end, the entire Tsushima Strait¹ was made a zone of fortification. When the work of fortification is completed, the connections between Japan and the Asiatic continent across the strait will become like those within one's garden. Not one submarine will be able readily to invade. At the Yura Strait,² the Bungo Strait³ and the Tsugaru Strait,⁴ the passage of enemy war vessels will sooner or later be altogether made impossible. Then the Japan Sea or the Chinese Sea may be left to children to watch, while parents may go out of doors to work. That is, these directions may be guarded by inferior war vessels, while the main strength of the fleet may be turned at will in any directions.

As for the directions of operation for the main strength of the fleet, they depend upon the size of the strength. Were the plan of

1. In the Strait of Korea.
2. Between Awaji island and Shikoku.
3. Between Kyushu and Shikoku.
4. Between Hondo and Hokkaido.

three units of eight battleships and eight cruisers completed, it would be an excellent idea to occupy Alaska, to say nothing about the Philippines, as Homer Lee feared. But if the American expeditionary forces are to be met with the present naval strength of Japan, there will be no other way but to resort to a similar method as that adopted at the time the Baltic Fleet of Russia was waited for in the Russian War. What is the method? It is for the main strength of the fleet to hide in a suitable rendezvous. There are any number of such rendezvous, everywhere. But we are here treading on state secrets.

Our main strength of the fleet will hide somewhere, while the American fleet will come sailing on with its port-side turned towards the Oceania islands, in a dignified fashion, nay, in fact, in a terror-stricken fashion. Wherever it goes no sound will be heard. On the dead sea, the avenue of devils, the captains will be horrified even by a flying albatros or a floating whale, thus sailing for ten days or more without sleep and without rest. Meanwhile, a submarine here and a submarine mine there will not fail to sharpen the nerves of the captains. Our men of the country surrounded by the sea, the officers and sailors of our Japanese

navy, will use islands which lie scattered everywhere to their advantage and sail past the enemy or turn to his rear or suddenly appear on the very flank of the enemy, thus showing the peculiar characteristics of the Yamato race. Our main strength of the fleet will resort to the method as suggested by Sun Tze "to wait in ease for the exhausted." The Japanese will wait while at rest for the exhausted American fleet to come.

In a lecture delivered at a meeting of the National Defense Society some time ago, Dr. Kamo of engineering told that the annual production of heavy oil in Japan is approximately 1,000,000 koku.* Presume that the unit fleet of eight battleship and six battle cruisers, accompanied by 12 cruisers and 48 destroyers, sailed at full speed, 1,000,000 koku of heavy oil will be exhausted in only 100 hours. 100 hours are a little over four days. Presume that an American fleet of a similar strength as the 8 and 6 unit were coming sailing from the Hawaii towards Japan, the fleet will exhaust an equal quantity of heavy oil as the annual production of Japan on its mid way from the Hawaii to Japan. No matter how abundant the American supply of oil, it will not be an easy matter

* Koku equals 39.7033 gallons.

for a fleet much larger than the 8 and 6 unit to be adequately supplied with oil. In order to supply oil needed, an oil station will have to be established in the island of Guam or other islands. That in turn will be a difficulty. It should be noted that a fleet of war ships, like a bullet, will become the weaker the further it is removed from the point of departure. If the American fleet should come near the gate of Japan, it will be like a bullet which goes in a tottering manner, so that it will be so weak that it can be sunk with a single blow. Such condition cannot be avoided in view of the relations with the base of operation.

5. *Fearful Are the Air Forces?*

The improvement of aircraft during the great world war has been astonishing. The following table will show a comparison between the beginning of the war and the present time in regard to the time of a continuous flight of an aeroplane and of the distance of a continuous flight.

	At Beginning of War	At Present
Time of Continuous Flight.....	4 hours	7 hours
Distance of Continuous Flight.....	583 miles	1,800 miles

Like the naval fleet, the air machines cannot engage in activities without their base, because they must obtain the supply of fuel, bombs, and other necessary war materials. In the art of warfare for the naval fleet, it is a principle that a fleet cannot be active in operation at a distance over one third of its continuous sailing distance. It is same in the case of air machines. As the continuous flight distance of an aeroplane as improved today is 1,800 miles, it will be impossible for an aeroplane to engage in an active operation at a distance of 600 miles from the base, that is one-third of 1,800 miles, because after flying for 600 miles and taking activities worth 600 miles more, to return to the base, the aeroplane must have in reserve the power of continuous flight for 600 miles more. The American naval bases are all situated at greater distances than that. It will be necessary to occupy some island as a base or to use the decks of war vessels as bases or to sail on the sea. Unless our fleet is inactive, will it permit the enemy to establish aerodromes and engage in a large scale flying activities at leisure?

The improvement of our air service and the arrangements for air defense may not remain forever at the present stage. When these ar-

rangements have been readjusted fairly well, how will America expect to use her 5,000 sea-planes, of which she boasts, against us?

But the recent improvement of airships has been phenomenal. It is reported that the R. No. 34 of England can fly continuously for 210 hours, while its continuous flight distance will reach to 14,770 miles. With such air machines, Japan can be attacked with the Hawaii or San Francisco as a base. But an airship is too large for activity. It will be difficult for it to beat a retreat, as witness the trying experience of the Zeppelins which they had in attacking England and the airships had to be replaced by aeroplanes. If a war should break out at once under the existing conditions, we must expect attacks by airships. But it is said that when one is hardpressed he will find a way out of the difficulty. If the American forces should actually come attacking Japan, a way will be found to defend against the attack. Nay, we must by all means perfect our air defense. But against an attack from the air there naturally is air defense to meet it. If that defense is perfected, it will be an easy matter to defend against the attack of airships.

6. *Immediate Practical Means of Defense.*

Since Russia disintegrated and the imaginary enemy of Japan became obscure, our national defense works, we have misgivings, have somewhat been departing from practicality. That the international relations are changeable was proven by the experience of the recent great war. National defense should be perfected so that there will be no hindrance in the way of engaging in a war with any foreign country. That is a proper thing from the scientific point of view. But that argument will not make us earnest. Let alone a far future, should there be an occasion for a war in a near future, the enemy must be America, a fact which every one believes at heart. But somehow or other, this subject is not generally mentioned. Even the army and the navy authorities do not appear to be regarding America as our imaginary enemy. Because of that attitude, our national defense works are tending towards theory, formality and vanity.

If America is to be considered seriously as our enemy, why do we not exert our full energy as the first step of our national defense towards developing the air machines? However backward our aviation circles may be, if only we

should exert our exclusive energy to prepare against the attacks by the American air machines, it will not be a difficult matter, even at the present stage of our progress, to perfect our air defense. To say nothing about establishing watching posts, observation maps drawn, searchlights and anti-aircraft guns along our coast lines and other important points inland, we should hold aeroplanes in readiness for offensive uses in neighboring islands. Then an attack by the American air machines will not be an easy task. Especially, airships when enveloped and attacked by aeroplanes will not be meet the fate of dropping down. That can be judged from the experience of the German Zeppelins which have been obliged to discontinue attacking England. Accordingly, attacks by airships need not be feared so very seriously, if only the air defense works are perfected. Why should not Japan exert a little more energy towards the immediate practical measure of national defense?

The same thing may be said regarding defense of the sea. Why do we not exert our energy a little more towards perfecting our underwater defense works with mines and submarines? We are informed that the Italian naval authorities have decided not to build

hereafter any more of the main war ships and to abolish those already possessed. Regarding this information, Commander Randolph of England remarked that, whereas Italy, although her coast line is long, being essentially a continental country, the idea may be acceptable there it will be inadvisable for a country, like England, which needs to maintain a widely extended naval influence, to abolish main war ships. In other words, the idea may be excellent for Italy which commands the line of supply on land for war time provision and war materials, it will be inadvisable for England whose line of supply is on the sea. From that viewpoint, it may be said that for Japan, which commands a line of supply on land, the immediate practical step for national defense works. If only that measure is perfected, an American attack may be met at any time with advantage.

7. Diplomatic Naval Extension Arguments.

When we are face to face with America which haughtily insults our Empire and is endangering our existence, we are not preparing the necessary practical means of defense which will enable the Empire to take a firm stand. Even among our naval circles, there are some persons

who are entertaining empty dreams which may be termed as diplomatic naval extension arguments. No wonder that the nation is perplexed. The article signed under the name of Chokushinan Shujin in an issue of the organ of the Kaigun Kyokwai, Navy Society, is an example. The article explains that sooner or later an Anglo-American conflict will be unavoidable and continues as follows.

“As long as marine transportation and commerce are the chief causes, there is no need to say that the great stage of the conflict will be on the sea. That is, the conflict will be begun by the navy and ended by the navy. Accordingly, to join one or the other side, it will be sufficient for the naval strength of Japan, which will be a third party to the conflict, to be of such extent as to cause a wide margin between the naval strength of the two nations, in order to be able to hold the Anglo-American conflict under control, thereby fulfilling the great responsibility of maintaining the peace of the world. Grant that England and America declared war against each other, and that the Empire was obliged to take part in the conflict on one or the other side. If the naval strength of the Empire was a reasonably excellent one, the Empire will be able to choose her ally at will.

If the Empire had ambitions such as the always attributed to her by certain suspecting countries, it will not be impossible for the Empire allying with England to occupy the Philippines, Guam, and other Pacific possessions of America in the Hawaii and elsewhere, or allying with America, to seize Hongkong and the Strait Settlement, as well as India."

The views expressed in the forgoing quotation may not represent our naval authorities. But we should keep in mind that the immediate problem with us is what is to be done to defend our country against America. With such arguments advanced, as quoted above, there is no wonder that the people are puzzled. Even by expending one-half of the entire national budget, the present standard of the army and the navy is made barely maintained. How are we to carry out so great an extension of the navy whereby we may be enabled to hold the casting vote in our hand? The national defense should be replenished not by any means for a diplomatic game. It is for the sake of defending the honour and existence of the Empire and because it is necessary for our self protection. If our naval extension program were formed for the necessity of diplomacy or aggressive designs, the nation will not support the plan of expen-

diture which is not urgent in this day of financial difficulties. Especially when England, possibly for financial reasons, has decided to rest the naval extension for five years and not to build main war ships, and France and Italy also will not undertake to build air war ships, Japan should carefully consider the matter.

8. *Bernhardi on a Japanese-American War.*
(Vide Supplement).

I contributed an article to the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun in August, 1919, entitled "Need the American Army be Feared?" in which I presented my views that an attack by the American forces need not be feared. Recently I read in the book by Mr. Heikichi Hiramoto, "Shall Japan and America Fight?" a chapter on "Bernhardi on a Japanese-American War." Again, about the time I published my views in the newspaper in August, 1919, I read an interview by General Bernhardi with Mr. Carl Wagant, an American correspondent, and I noticed that General Bernhardi's views have exactly coincided with my views. So far removed as we were, east and west, our views thus accidentally coincided. I could not but feel that I found in Bernhardi a man who knew me. But I shall

add here that when I maintain that we will not shun a war with America, I do so altogether from the viewpoint of justice and humanity, and that my motive is entirely different from that of General Bernhardt when he expressed his views before the war.

The general declared, "even if the two nations should one day appeal to arms against each other, there will be no final decisive point reached." He predicted that the Philippines, Guam and the Hawaii will finally be occupied by Japan. I hold a similar opinion.

Certainly, such a war will last long. It will not be an easy matter for the Japanese forces to attack the mainland of America. Likewise, it will be very difficult for the American forces to attack our country. Even though, as General Bernhardt said, it may not be impossible to occupy the Philippines, Guam and the Hawaii, we should not care to pay so great a sacrifice in occupying those islands. We shall enter the war with a ten-year plan, engaging in the warfare so as to spend as little money as possible. We shall strictly keep in mind economy in the use of powder, coal, heavy oil, gasoline, using these materials heavily, when they are absolutely necessary from the strategical point of view. At the same time, we shall exert

our efforts, in the interest of a permanent foundation for securing a lasting peace of the Orient which is the mission of our Empire, to cooperate with our neighbours across the water on the west, China and Siberia, to develop industry and to perfect the plan of supplying ourselves independently with provision and war materials. Accordingly, the Japanese American war will be fought only in the direction of the Pacific Ocean. The continent shall be maintained in peace as much as is possible, and utmost efforts shall be exerted to carry forward the plans of economic development. In other words, we shall pursue the war while earning money, so that however long the war may last we shall not lack our power of continuing.

Some persons say that no matter how our countrymen may strengthen the determination and earnestly prepare for a war with America, we may find ourselves in the first place lacking in the raw materials needed for building and manufacturing new style war ships and arms and also vexed by the slow progress in industrial art. But if our country sought the materials in the vast lands of China and Siberia as the sources of supply, if our countrymen sincerely planned the development of art, treated technical experts properly, and, if necessary,

employed British, French, Italian, German and Austrian experts before the war in question so as to develop art, these problems will be solved without any trouble at all.

9. *The Empire, at Parting of the Way to Survive or to Fall.*

A tree must have its roots. The further the roots extend the larger will the trunk become. A same thing may be said of a nation. England having her roots stretched far in Africa, India, Australia and Canada and possessing her lines of supply beyond seas, is wealthy and strong. Unless Japan let her roots stretch out to the continent across the pond, and if she remained like a pot plant, she will not escape shrivelling to death. To have the economic development of the Empire in China and Siberia hindered is a serious problem involving the life and death of the Empire.

Regarding the immigration question, as our countrymen are finding their way in the land under the jurisdiction of sovereign America, we should credit that country with some reasonable ground of contention. But as Americans have said there should be no national barrier in economic development.

The mission of the Empire to secure the peace of East Asia is after all to let the natives of that land and the peoples from foreign nations to engage in their industry in peace. so that all may be benefited thereby, and also to let the economic development of the Empire be carried out there. If that development is hindered, it is to have the roots of the Empire cut off which have stretched out in the continent. It will endanger the existence of the Empire. In regard to the immigration question in America, we should never permit anything which would hurt the dignity of the Empire. But even if our immigration in America were restricted or prohibited, it will have no effect upon the life of the Empire. On the contrary, the American meddlesomeness concerning our policy towards China and Siberia is a serious matter involving the life of the Empire.

As it is necessary for England to control the naval influence of the world, so it is necessary for Japan to control the land influence in East Asia. Should any one dare to infringe upon this land influence, the Empire must defend it with force of arms. But the area of the lands is vast and extensive.

Compared with Japan, exclusive of Korea, Formosa and Saghalien, the Far Eastern Rus-

sian possessions are about eight times and China about thirty times as large. In the event of a war with America on a ten-year plan, it will be impossible for America at once to infringe upon our land influence. Certainly, some third party may encroach upon it. As the area of the lands is so vast, a considerable army power will be needed even for maintaining peace and order and protecting interests in those lands alone. When we regard a reasonable army power as necessary for our Empire, we do so because of the principal necessity of safe-guarding the land influence, although upon favorable opportunities the army may be employed for expeditions into the distant American possessions. Yet Chushinan Shujin, whom we have quoted before, in his tone of the navy first and the army second, remarked sarcastically, "even if we had a large army of tens of corps of the peerless brave, it will not be able to strike a terror into the hearts of the people across thousands of miles of water." He was off his track.

10. *Final Victory.*

The relation between England and America today strikingly resemble the relations between England and Germany before the war. They

are becoming more and more strained. Judged by the utterances of the British and the Americans resident in the Orient, the two nations appear as if they were united against Japan. But the attitude of the people in the home country of England taking into consideration the relations of larger interests in the world is different. England would rather employ Japan to face America. She will not prevent Japan from fighting against America. But if Japan should be hasty in trying to gain a victory and undertake surprise attacks from the first, and as the result be perchance defeated, there will be no way of knowing how the crafty diplomacy of England will change its front. Therefore, from the time the Empire resolves to open the war, she should not trust England.

Even if the Empire at last engaged in the war, she should make it a point to fight economically only perfecting absolutely necessary preparations for defense. Mobilizations should strive to be altogether outside of American necessity. We should strive to be altogether outside of American restraint and to be able to act freely in developing economically on the continent. During the war, we should make special efforts to confirm our activities within the limits of justice and humanity, so as not to

follow in the footsteps of Germany to lose the sympathy of the world.

If America should become impatient for victory in the war, and try to conquer us at once, she will have to cross thousands of miles of the daily amount of war materials she will consume will be enormous. With her extraordinary wealth, America will find herself in a painful difficulty at last regarding the supply of the war expenses and war materials. On the other hand, if the American fleet should remain inactive, our fleet may be ordered to watch over the enemy fleet and let the communications on the sea with China, India and European countries be carried freely. That will not be an impossibility judged from the experience of the Russo-Japanese war, when Japan threatened by the Vladivostock fleet could continue her communication with the Yellow Sea regions. It will not be an impossibility to continue our foreign trade on one hand by means of the Siberian railways and on the other by the sea routes.

The war lasting interminably, the American forces will gradually be exhausted while our forces will pass the time in a state of ease. In the meantime, losses which will be inflicted from time to time upon the American fleet by our submarines and mines will all the more

exacerbate the heightened nerves of the American captains. Judging from the conditions in America, criticism will be made that an ignominious war has been entered into at the instigation of capitalists. The public opinion will be wildly roused like a boiling pot. In the meantime, many death-daring bands of 2,000 or 3,000 men each may be organized and various points in the mainland of America and her possessions may be attacked by surprise, as did the Wo-k'ou* in China, in order to terrorize the entire American people. America will then have to stop her fighting. Is not that the situation of which Sun-Tze, the ancient Chinese sage, said, "To wait at ease to take advantage of the exhausted enemy," or "To wait quietly to take advantage of the excited enemy"?

* The Japanese piratical attack on the coast of China, in 14th century.

THREE GREAT CRISES

CHAPTER II

THREE GREAT NATIONAL CRISES OF JAPAN

11. *First National Crisis.*

The Mongolian invasion¹ was the first national crisis of our Empire. Our country was in a precarious condition like an egg piled on top of another. According to historical records, the intrepidity of Tokimune² and the exerted efforts of the Kamakura Bushi³ enabled Japan to annihilate the Mongolian army of invasion in the fourth year of Koan,⁴ to make known the bravery of the Yamato race⁵ thereby giving a chill in the hearts of foreign enemies, so that they came to fear the will of the Yamato race. For 511 Years until the Russian fleet came to Nemuro, Hokkaido, in the fourth year of Kwansei, 1792 foreign enemies altogether abandoned the idea of taking advantage of our weakness. The credit for bringing about the condition should be attributed to Tokimune and the Kamakura Bushi.

1. The Mongolian Invasion, 1267 to 1281.

2. Vide foot note 1. Page 15.

3. Warriors of the Hojo dynasty period, 13th century.

4. 1281.

5. Japanese race.

About 50 years before Tokimune first drove the Mongolian envoy back, Tieh Mu-Chun of Mongolia extended his influence in all directions and called himself Genghis Khan. He planned to realize the ambition of unifying the world. He first conquered Nai Man. Then he took neighbouring districts. He captured Hsi Hsia and defeated Chin. Finally he entered the capital of Yen. In a manner of a hurricane or a thunder, he marched down southward. At once he held the countries north of the Hoan Ho River under his control, thus attaining a success in establishing a hegemony in East Asia. Thereupon, Tieh Mu-Chun with a firm determination went on his way of advancing thousands of miles for the conquest of the west. At that time, various Tartar tribes disputed sway in Central Asia, with varying success. About the time Teh Mu-chun or Genghis Khan annexed all of Mongolia, there were two countries, Hsi liao in the neighborhood of the Tien Shan mountains and Halazum in the neighborhood of the Caspian Sea. Their dominions were extensive in area and they formed veritably two great powers. Tieh Mu-chun commanded his subordinate offices to attack Hsi liao, while he himself led his men against Halazum. The offensive armies everywhere won

victory after victory. He commanded his four Imperial sons to pursue the fleeing enemies, and they pressed Muhamet, king of Halazum, to the Caspian Sea, where the king was compelled to die in a small island in that sea. Meanwhile, two generals, Cheh Pe and Su Pu-Tai, overran Persia and annexed Caucasus, entered Russia and administered a severe defeat to the Russian army on the banks of the Haraha River. They then entered Crimia and turning round appeared on the north coast of the Caspian Sea. They overran the Kilgis Plateau and there was no enemy in sight as if they were marching in an unpopulated region.

The extent of the area conquered by Tieh Mu-chun included beginning from the banks of the Hoan Ho in the east, Manchuria, Northern half of China, Inner and Outer Mongolia, north and south of the Tien Shan, the whole of Central Asia to be sure; and Tieh Mu-chun's forces annexed Russia and reached as far as the boundaries of Germany and Poland. It was only in western Europe, Arabia, India and the Southern half of China where his influence did not extend. Tieh Mu-chun, or Genghis Khan, was suddenly caught ill and died and his further ambitions were buried with him before one half of them had been accomplished. But his

grandson, Kublai Khan, was also a peerless hero. He annihilated the Kingdom of Sung and named his Empire Yuan. His ambitions were extraordinary hitherto unheard of in history. Kublai Khan, relying confidently upon the influence he gained after his many successes in wars, tried to absorb Japan with one gulp. That caused the first national crisis of Japan.

Japan in those times was a self-complacent country, communications with foreign lands across the sea having been almost altogether cut off. However, many Buddhist priests went to Sung in China to study. Some merchants traded with that country. There were of course not a few Koreans who came and went. In those days, the Imperial court personages like the titled nobilities and wealthy classes of today were daily indulging in passing their time in idle sports, singing of peace and contentment. In the Imperial Court, dances and music were encouraged. Even some high personages vied with one another for the skill in the art of dancing and music. But the sober Kamakura Bushi, the warriors of the time, and the intelligent men like Nichiren* knew of the great war which had convulsed Europe and

* Nichiren was a Buddhist monk and reformer, founder of the Nichiren Sect, first expounded in 1253.

Asia. The Hojo family¹ foresaw that sooner or later the evil effect of the great war will be felt by Japan. He exerted his efforts to readjust the national defense works. Nichiren published a book, entitled "National Security," thereby awakening the people.

12. *Expulsion of the Mongol Invaders not Work of Divine Storm.*

While the capital² sang of peace in the land, there was a hurried message from Kamakura³ in the spring of the fifth year of Bunyei⁴ that a Mongolian envoy had come. The Imperial government was weak-kneed like our diplomatic authorities of to-day. Morinaga Sugawara, a court official, was instructed to draft a reply, which was couched in a language of weak-kneed diplomacy. Tokimune⁵ destroyed the letter and did not show it to the envoy from Yuan. Not only that, branding the message from the Emperor of Yuan as lacking in courtesy he drove the envoy away. Some criticize this action of Tokimune in driving the messen-

1. Vide foot note 1 page.

2. The capital was in Kyoto.

3. Kamakura was the seat of the Hojo government.

4. 1268.

5. Vide note 1, page 15.

ger as a valor of ignorance. But had Tomimune not possessed that courage then, our country might have become a dependency of China, or she might have been absorbed by Yuan altogether. By driving the envoy from Yuan, Tokimune showed our country men the pluck of the Kamakura Bushi,* thereby enabling the nation to burn the bridges to defend the country with a deathdaring determination.

Later, in the eight year of Bunyei, 1271, the Emperor of Yuan again sent an envoy in the persons of Chao Liang-pi who came together with an envoy from Kao li, Korea, to negotiate for a treaty of amity. The Imperial government at Kyoto attempted to reply and showed a draft of the reply to Hokimune. Tokimune, said, "if this reply be sent, the national dignity of our ancestors' country will suffer." He again drove the envoy from Yuan away. It is recorded that the Emperor of Yuan sent envoys in all nine times.

Tokimune could not have been reckless in refusing to listen to these envoys. From the time the first envoy from Yuan came, Tokimune gave out orders for the readjustment of the means of national defense. The defense works in Hizen and Chikuzen, northern Kyushu, were

* Vide note 3 page 43.

made especially strong. How great the efforts of our countrymen were at that time can be imagined by studying the ruins of the water castles built then.

Since Tokimune first drove away the envoy from Yuan until the first Mongolian invasion, it took about six years. In those long years, the first line of defense was built up with assiduity. The efforts exerted for the work can well be imagined. Moreover, during that time the spirit of the Bushi, warrior of Kamakura was incalculated in the military men to strengthen their morale and strict training in the art of war was given them. We can imagine how splendid the morale among the officers and soldiers was then.

In October, the 11th year of Bunyei, 1274, the first Mongolian invasion took place. The Mongolian forces landed at Iki and Tsushima* and the islanders met the cruel disaster such as that of the Nikolaevsk incident. They fought to the last man at any rate. The Mongolian forces then landed in Hizen and marched on to Chikuzen as far as Hakata and attacked our army. The Mongolians having been trained by the experiences in the wars on the European and the Asiatic continents far surpassed our ancestors in the art of commanding large forces

* Two islands in the Strait of Korea.

and in training them. Moreover, the Mongolian forces hoisted their banners and beat their war drums, which frightened our war horses. In spite of that, our officers and soldiers daringly dashed against the enemy, thereby receiving considerable losses. Our army then retreated and took quarter at the water castles. The Mongolian forces, so it is written in historical records, fearing night attacks, left and returned to their ships and then suddenly a storm rose and all of the Mongolian war ships were sunk. That a landing army returned to the ships is something which we cannot quite understand from the point of view military tactics. It is possible that the Mongolians were taken aback by the bravery of our army and countrymen, and the landing army fearing dangers retreated.

Before crossing arms with the Mongolian forces, the attitude of our countrymen then might be criticized as a valor of ignorance. The Kamakura and the people in general indeed had gone through painful experiences in fighting against the Mongolians. In the first place, the Mongolian war vessels compared with ours then were far more superior than the present day dreadnaughts are in comparison with gun boats. Today, because our battleships or battle cruisers are fewer by 15 or 20, than those of

some other country, some people are discouraged. Compared with the Kamakura Bushi and the people of the period under review, the cowardice of our countrymen today is indeed despicable. Moreover, the Mongolians in that invasion of Japan already had rifles with them. We faced the enemy with bows and arrows. The present day Japanese are extravagant and talk about battleships, air machines or the new style of arms. It is because they lack the courage to face the enemy with even bows and arrows alone.

The Emperor of Yuan, Kublai Khan, with his confidence acquired after overrunning European and Asiatic continents, attempted to take the little island of Japan with a single stroke. He was insulted by this island Empire. Yet he was patient and maintained his self composure. He again sent his envoy to us in the first year of Kenji, 1275. This time, Tokimune had the envoy killed. Again, in the second year of Koan, 1279, another envoy came, who diplomatically admonished us and sought to enter a treaty of amity with us. The envoy was killed. Again, in the second year of Koan, 1279, another envoy came, who diplomatically admonished us and sought to enter a treaty of amity with us. The envoy was killed, also.

Thus insulted, the Emperor of Yuan still continued to approach us with diplomatic courtesy, to seek a treaty of amity. What was the cause? It was because, as I have said before, the country is impregnable and the people brave, and because he concluded that the Yamato race cannot be conquered with show of military power. It was indeed due to the fact that our Kamakura Bushi and the people then, with their masterful spirit, struck a terror into the hearts of the Mongolians.

As we have shown in the foregoing paragraphs, we can see clearly, judged by historical facts, that it was not the help of the divine storm alone that was responsible for repulsing the Mongolian invaders.

It may be argued that Tokimune had shown a valor of ignorance when he drove the Mongolian envoy for the first time. But when the first Mongolian invasion came, knowing that in materials and military equipments Yuan was far superior to us, Tokimune still showed his determination by killing the Mongolian envoy. He had something at heart upon which he confidently relied.

The second Mongolian invasion came in May of the fourth year of Koan, 1281. The number of the invaders was 140,000 who came aboard

3,500 vessels. The Japanese in those days were not weak-kneed men such as the present-day Japanese are, who are disheartened at the thought of 40 or more battleship and 37 cruisers old and new, which America will have when her big naval extension plan is completed, that is doing nothing but counting the number of war vessels, and say that America can never be matched. Tokimune estimated with confidence that the material disparity can be bridged with the moral superiority. The historical facts on record prove that he had the confidence to win. To illustrate by a few historical facts, under General Sanemasa Hojo* there was an officer called Shichiro Kusano. One night Kusano attacked the Mongolian war ships and burnt some of them, killing 1,000 or more Mongolians. The Mongolians were panic-stricken and collecting their vessels and tying them with iron chains, they defended themselves with rifles and large bows, thereby making it impossible for the Japanese forces to approach. Another officer, Michiari Kono, who was also brave man, went aboard a small vessel and approached the Mongolian war ships. By climbing the mast of his own vessel which was

* Sanemasa Hojo was appointed commander-in-chief of the defenders in Kyushu.

brought down and using it as a ladder, he jumped into a Mongolian war ship and killed tens of Mongolians aboard. The Mongolians were terror-stricken and withdrew their war ships to the neighborhood of Takashima. Even when such historical facts are cited, many of the present-day Japanese who are affected by degenerate thoughts would say that such bravery belonged only to the ancient warriors and that the present-day soldiers have no such courage. I shall not repeat in detail an account of a brave soldier who died as given in newspapers two years ago which should still remain in the memory of the people. In Siberia, our infantry soldiers attacked a gun boat commanded by the Bolsheviks and captured it. Our present-day titled nobilities and wealthy classes are like the court nobilities in Kyoto in the days of the Mongolian invasion. They are victims of extravagance and luxury. Our countrymen in general appear to be also affected by the degenerate thoughts like these nobilities and wealthy ceases. But not all of our countrymen are so degenerate. Especially among our officers and men there are not a few who are as brave as the ancient Kamakura Bushi.

13. *Second National Crisis.*

Russia decided her policy of eastward and southward advance 200 or more years ago. She had attempted to seize the Balkan Peninsula and failed. She had tried to conquer Central Asia and did not succeed. Her eastward policy alone which was inaugurated by Peter the Great was attended with a steady success. But when she was advancing eastward from the Baikal in Siberia, she was opposed by China which was at that time ruled by Emperor Kang Hsi of the Ching dynasty, known as a great ruler, whose government was steadily growing in prosperity and power. Russia's ambitious plans were disputed. Her war horses could not be fed with the water of the Amur River, that is the Russian forces could not find their place in East Siberia. The Nipsi treaty was the only gain. Since then the eastward policy of Russia was pursued steadily. In the meantime, in China the great monarch, Emperor Kang Hsi, had already died and Emperor Kan ling, the brilliant monarch, was also gone. The influence of the Ching dynasty had begun to decline. Russia was ready to take advantage of the opportunity thus presented to make an

inroad. Meanwhile, England conquered India and Australia and has been carrying out her policy of capitalistic imperialism.

In that manner, the Pacific Ocean was to be altogether occupied by England and Russia. America did not wait to watch idly by the struggle for supremacy of the Pacific Ocean. Thus Commodore Perry was ordered to come to Japan with a fleet in order to seek a treaty of commerce with our country. Perusing the diary of Commodore Perry, one finds that the justice and humanity which he had professed was only a pretence like that professed by the Americans at the recent peace conference in Paris. He had a plan, if an opportunity had presented itself, to occupy our Ogasawara (Bonin) islands and the Yaeyama group of islands, and convert them into a permanent base of operation for the American navy, so that America may participate in the struggle for supremacy on the Pacific Ocean.

When our Empire for over half a century had been in the center of the hurricane, she had not been aware of the dangers which were pressing nearer and had indulged in the dreams of self-complacency. But in the sixth year of Kayei, 1853, the American fleet commanded by Commodore Perry suddenly came to Uraga.

Thereupon the long dreams of our countrymen were broken. The American fleet which came to Uraga then was not a formidable one in the light of the present-day knowledge. But it struck a terror in the hearts of our countrymen at that time. It was not unreasonable that our fathers then had felt, when they compared the American fleet with our primitive war vessels, as if ours were a praying mantis against a chariot wheel. The people were perplexed and terror-stricken and knew not what to do with the situation. But fortunately Heaven had not yet foresaken Japan. Patriots like Toko Fujita appeared to rouse the people. He urged that the direct rule of the Empire by the Imperial government be restored, foreign aggressions be defended against and the Empire's dignity be maintained. After that, he urged, a far-reaching plan of opening the country and a forward policy may be adopted. Many patriots joined him. Especially Takamori Saigo, a great general, was particularly influenced by the teaching of Toko Fujita and exerted his energy to preserve the honor and dignity of the Empire at the time of the National crisis.

Toko unfortunately died in the second year of Ansei, 1855. When the foreign troubles thus vexed the nation, Japan lost the great cen-

tral figure. The people were agitated and arguments advanced varied and various. The public opinion was, however, centered for restoration of the direct rule by the Emperor and for expelling foreign enemies. Nothing short of that was acceptable. But contrary to this public opinion, Masahiro Abe, a high official of the Tokugawa Shogunate government, adopted a compromising attitude. He was succeeded by Masaatsu Hotta and finally Naosuke Ii was the center of the compromisers. Criticisms of Ii still continue today either as a patriotic man or as a traitor of the nation. That shows that he certainly had some reasonable excuses on his side for taking the position which he did. Today, concerning the American question, those who take a compromising attitude are the cabinet members in the government and, in the private circles, men like Viscount Shibusawa, Viscount Kaneko and many scholars, business men and religious workers. The reason why the division is created thus, the compromising and uncompromising, is because the former are pessimistic and the other optimistic about the result of a Japanese-American war.

Towards the last day of the Tokugawa Shogun, those who were spell-bound by the sight

of the materialistic progress of European and American countries and were astonished at the sight of the splendid defense works in the western countries warned against advocacy for expulsion of "foreign devils" as such course would only endanger the Empire. They urged that the Empire refrain from such recklessness but adopt a compromising attitude in order to pass over the difficult crisis and open up the country to foreign intercourse, thereby learning civilizations of the west, strengthening the foundation of the Empire in wealth and strength, and waiting for some other day to deal a decisive blow to foreign countries. Against these arguments, those who adopted an uncompromising attitude advanced extreme views as to the expulsion of "foreign devils." The leaders of thought, such as Toko Fujita, Shoin Yoshida and others maintained that in the existing conditions of the country it would be only to open the way for submitting to the foreign enemies if the country were opened up unconditionally, and urged that the nation engage in a war with the foreign enemies in order to awaken the people from the dreams of indulgence and idleness at home and to let foreign enemies know that Japan shall not be insulted. After that, Japan might reestablish peace, if need be, with

foreign countries. Their views were indeed excellent ones. They must have had in mind the lessons taught by the Mongolian invasion and have had a firm confidence that if the foreign nations had come to attack us, Japan, with the land unpregnable and the people brave, could give the foreign enemies a considerable amount of trouble.

li, considering it advantageous to conclude a treaty with America, before England and France, encouraged by their victory in the wars with China, should come to Japan to satisfy their insatiable ambitions, and he signed the treaty. The court nobilities and the roshi¹ were indignant. They called li a violator of the Imperial command. They raised loud outcries and roused the public opinion against him. Consequently, disturbances rose everywhere throughout the country. Finally, li was killed outside the Sakurada Mon². After that the internal strife continued. Meanwhiie, there were such incidents as the bombardment of Shimono-seki by an allied fleet of Europe and Ameirca and the bombardment of Sakurajima by a British warship. In defending against these for-

1. Roshi or rouin were patricts without fixed occupation.
2. Sakurada Mon was a gate to the castle of the Tokugawa Shogun, now the Imperial Palace, in Tokyo.

eign enemies, the bravery of the Yamato race was exhibited, as in the case of the first national crisis. A detachment of warriors repulsed at the point of swords and spears a force of British marines who landed at Dannoura,¹ while the warriors of Satsuma² carrying long swords in their belt swam to the British warship to attack it, thereby striking a terror in the hearts of the foreign enemies.

Had Naosuke Ii and his faction continued in power and temporized with their compromising policy, what would be the position of our Empire today? That the strong advocacy for reverence to the emperor and expulsion of foreign devils rose throughout the country at that time attested to the agitated condition of the people and the lack of unity of the public opinion, which was exposed, thus seeming to give foreign-enemies an opportunity to take advantage of our country. But these agitations frightened the foreign enemies and certainly had an effect of somewhat curtailing their ambitions. Had Ii remained firmly entrenched as the center of the adherents to the shogunnate, all the efforts made by Saigo in cooperation with Kido and reinforced by the combined strength of the

1. A point on Shikoku in the Inland Sea.

2. Southern end of Kyushu.

Satsuma and the Choshu clans might not have been able so readily to down the Tokugawa Shogunnate. It might have been that Japan was easily dealt with by foreign countries as they liked and the Empire stood in a disadvantageous position, that at home the great work of restoration of the direct rule by the Emperor and the unification of the country was impossible and a compromise policy was adopted to quiet the people temporarily, and that as China is today divided north and south so Japan was divided east and west between the adherents to the shogunnate and the royalists respectively, thereby permitting foreign nations to loot while the fire was burning; moreover, the people, not having received any stimulus as there was no war, the evil habits of idleness and indulgence such as marked the last days of the Tokugawa Shogun continued all the worse, so that in the end, Japan was subjugated by Russia. If not so bad, it might have been that Japan could not extend her influence across the water, the national prestige did not rise, and Japan was barely able to have a breathing space as a second or third rate nation. Dr. Segawa, an eminent authority on history, tells that Napoleon the Third of France offered to help the Tokugawa Shogun in the internal political

struggle in order to establish French influence in Japan, that England attempted to assist the Satsuma and the Choshu clans, that the two countries attempted thus to accomplish their designs while the civil strife was going on in Japan, and that, as Keiki Tokugawa, the last of the shoguns, did not request the foreign help and surrendered the government of the land to the Emperor, Japan could escape from the impending dangers. Had li remained in life there was no way of knowing what might not have taken place. At any rate, by the indomitable will of the patriots shown in facing the national crisis in the last days of the Tokugawa shogun, the great work of restoration of the direct by the Emperor was accomplished. By it, the national crisis was averted. After all, it was the indomitable will of the Yamato race which preserved the national prestige which otherwise might have suffered.

14. *The Russo-Japanese War, an Extension of the Second National Crisis.*

Takamori Saigo possessed an uncommon power of clear judgement. From the time of the Restoration, he had observed that it would be disadvantageous for the island Empire to

maintain a retrograding attitude if the southward advance of Russia was to be checkmated. He feared that the defense of Japan's northern gate was not secure. He urged that a large army corps be stationed in Hokkaido and volunteered his service personally to command it, and to have Kunimoto Shinowara and Toshiaki Kirino, his right-hand men, appointed to command the defenders of Saghalien. Before his suggestions were accepted, the incident which is known as the Saghalien incident took place. Saigo also urged that a friendly relations with Korea be established to assist in checkmating Russia's southward advance and incidently a continental expansion be planned. At that time, our government dispatched an envoy to Korea to renew our old friendship. But the Korean government rejected our proposals. Saigo was very indignant at this Korean attitude. He offered his service to go to Korea as an ambassador. That was the circumstance which led to the advocacy for a forward policy toward Korea.

Meanwhile what was the development of Russia's policy of southward advance? About 170 years have elapsed since the Nipsi treaty was concluded. Governor-general Muraviev's policy of threat was successful, and by the trea-

ty of Aihon the Chinese were driven to the right bank of the Amur river. Later, General Ignatiev's policy of trifling with China was a success, and by the treaty of Peking the territory all along the Usuri River, on its north and south, was also made a Russian possession. Thereupon, the new Russian possessions reached the coast of the Japan Sea and to adjoin the northern frontier of Korea across the Tumen River. That was in 1860. But neither Korea nor China would make efforts to be on friendly terms of cooperation with Japan in order to checkmate powerful Russia's aggression. They only engaged themselves in petty quarrels with Japan. Had Saigo's suggestions been carried out, that is Japan engaged Korea in a war with herself, and after that the relations between the two countries fundamentally improved, Russia's eastward advance might have been checked then by Japan and Russia might not have been able so speedily to accomplish her designs.

In spite of the forward progress made by Russia in her eastward advance policy, China failed to note the general situation and to foresee the future of East Asia. She recklessly caused troubles with Japan. Besides, she attempted to make of Korea a dependency of China when it was absolutely necessary for

the safety and existence of our Empire that Korea had preserved her independence intact. Had Korea become a dependency of powerless China, the peninsula might sooner or later have become a sphere of influence of Russia and the Empire might have been menaced. That was the circumstance leading to the Sino-Japanese war fought in order to preserve the independence of Korea.

Russia built the Siberian railways. But she had as yet no ice-free port in the Orient, and had an ambition to acquire one in Korea or north China. Consequently, when the Empire had acquired the Liaotung Peninsula as result of the Sino-Japanese War, Russia allying with Germany and France compelled Japan to return the Peninsula to China on the pretext that Japan's acquisition of it was a menace to the peace of the East Asia. General Motoharu Yamaji, who was known as one-eyed dragon, exclaimed "It is not a restoration of peace, but an amistice." From that time, all of our countrymen had regarded Russia as an arch enemy. They were determined, while waiting patiently, to retaliate against Russia some day. At that time, Russia was a first class power in the world. The disparity in power between Japan and Russia then was far greater in ratio than

between Japan and America to-day. Consequently, Russia scorned us and treated us as if we were children. Other nations of the world had regarded the situation as a case of a fly on the chariot wheel. Russia out of her contempt of Japan disregarded the international courtesy and trampled the honor of the Empire. Moreover, taking advantage of the powerlessness of China, she established a naval port in Port Arthur, and undertook various enterprises in Manchuria. The Empire's existence was daily being threatened. That was the circumstances which led to the inevitable war with Russia.

Saigo's advocacy for punishing Korea had already once been decided upon by the government. But Tomomi Iwakura, Koin Kido, Toshimichi Okubo and others who had visited Europe and America, returning, rejected Saigo's suggestions. Saigo was highly indignant and at once retired in his native city of Kagoshima. Since that time, our foreign policy has been obsessed with a fear of Europe and America. At every turn, it tended towards the worshipping of the western countries. The pressure of Russia's southward advance was felt all the more keenly, and a Russo-Japanese conflict was a foregone conclusion. Yet our govern-

ment abjectly endeavoured to avoid provoking Russia, thereby, daily giving a fresh lease of life to the evils, which grew the more serious the longer they were left unattended. But no matter how patient our countrymen were, the return of the Liaotung peninsula was enough to make them thoroughly indignant. This sharp stimulus was the motive which strengthened the moral force of our nation, so that Japan was enabled to defeat Russia which was far greater than Japan in point of material strength. If the hundred thousand of our countrymen in America should be obliged to leave that country, it will be as in the case of the return of the Liaotung peninsula, a stimulus to our countrymen, however unconcerned the present-day people of Japan may be. And it may become a ground for engendering a powerful moral force.

15. *The Present a Period of Third National Crisis.*

Japan has a long history of 2,580 years since the accession of the Emperor Jimmu, the founder of the Empire, to the throne until the present year, 1920. In those long years, Japan met the national crisis twice in the past, as we

have noted before. The crisis which will come as a result of the Japanese-American conflict will be the third. In both the first and the second national crises, the disparity between Japan and the foreign enemies in material strength has been very great, indeed. Yet Japan overcame the enemies by means of her powerful moral force. In both these crises, the foreign enemies were able only to invade Iki, Tsushima, Hakata, Shimonoseki or Kagoshima. Not a particle of our soil has even been occupied by the enemies. That is how we pride in the fact that our Empire is a stainless and perfect country.

The Yuan dynasty and the Romaniff dynasty, which had tormented our Empire, disappeared, and our country should now be able to enjoy a period of peace. But America on the other side of the Pacific Ocean has begun insolently to manifest her Imperialistic designs. America in the past, in accordance with the principle upon which the nation was founded, had paid little attention to her relations with the European and the Asaitic continents. But, since the Spanish-American war, her Imperialism has been steadily prosecuted. If one should look at a map of the world, one will at once note that this Imperialism of America is undeni-

able. The Hawaii, Guam and the Philippines, three naval bases, will prove to be valuable assets as bases of operation for the American fleet in a war on the Pacific Ocean. That should be clear to every one without experts' explanation. In deference to the Monroe Doctrine, America had hesitated for many years to occupy the Hawaii. But in 1897, when McKinley who stood for Imperialism became the president, the question of annexation of the islands was revived. While many of the inhabitants there had protested, the annexation finally took place in 1900. Certainly, when the annexation was contemplated there may have been no particular intension to use the islands when occupied as a base of operation in a war against Japan.

America had in the past entertained friendly feelings towards our country. She showed an especial favor in the matter of the issue of our war bonds during the war with Russia, and at the time of the Portsmouth Peace Conference. Otherwise, she was friendly to Japan in many ways, which our countrymen appreciated very heartily. But this America, which had shown her sympathy towards Japan, changed, when Japan won her war against giant Russia, annexed Korea, developed her influence on the

continent in place of Russia, and appeared to be a great powerful rival on the Pacific Ocean. she began to be jealous. Especially noteworthy was the hindrance placed at every turn of events regarding our policy in China. Then the anti-Japanese agitation concerning the immigration question became more and more violent. The sentiment of the people of both countries was heated. A certain American minister to China, publicly declared for a Japanese-American war. In America, not a few people exclaimed about the crisis of such a war. Later in 1908, America boldly made the proposal for the neutralization of Manchurian railways. Otherwise, the project for the Chinchow-Aigun railway and the four-power loan projects and other activities in China have menaced our policy towards China. I suspect that the intension of America at bottom was to carry out a gigantic economic development in the east Asiatic continent, and to fulfill her capitalistic Imperialism in a large scale in China and Siberia, as witness the activities of the American International Corporation. If that is true, possibly the sympathetic attitude shown to us during the Russo-Japanese war and the attitude shown to bring a pressure upon Russia was a game of diplomacy and it may have been resorted to because it

did not want Russia to monopolize power in East Asia. Not a few Americans are indignant that the principle of the national foundation of America laid by the puritans, their fathers, has gradually dwindled, and that commercialism has been poisoning the American society. Homer Lee, in his book, "Valor of Ignorance," on page 27, said, "Commercialism is only a proto plasmic gormandization and a thing that vanishes utterly when the element that sustains it is no more; Military or national development, on the other hand, is not only responsible for the formation of all nations on earth, but for their consequent evolution and the peace of mankind." So loud an outcry by intelligent men could not reform the corrupt society. Several of my acquaintances among American officers spoke to me concerning it in a tone of regret. The opportunity came. The world war awakened the American people, drunk in gold. Among the causes which led to the American participation in the war, were counted the disposition of the accumulated capital in America, unification of the minds of the people and necessity of centralization of Power and many other causes. But the chief object of the participation was to stimulate the hostility of the people, to rouse patriotism and

to propagate military ideas, such as would correct the society which was corrupted by the gold poisoning. Be that as it may, the American army which numbered only 200,00 at the time of the participation in the war numbered 3,600,000 at the time of the armistice. Of these, 1,900,000 were sent to the French war front. Unfortunately, these soldiers who went to the front had no opportunity to test their ability in actual warfare. But those who went to the front as well as the people in general were confident that they succeeded in turning out a splendid army. By means of the propaganda work conducted in the characteristic American style the war spirit of the American people was roused. To us the American method appeared somewhat unnatural and out of the ordinary. At any rate, the Americans had firmly believed that they were the foremost in the world in a military sense as they were the foremost in point of gold.

It was a case of adding strength to wealth. It made the Americans fear nothing in the world and confident that nothing was impossible to them.

After the war, the American prosperity and strength increased, so that our countrymen increased their fear of America all the greater. On

the other hand, the Americans became all the more haughty. They meddled with the Shantung question, or proposed a new loan consortium for China. The American soldiers dispatched to Siberia were insolent. America also protested to the Japanese occupation of Sagahlien Province in Siberia. She is indeed interfering with various weighty problems involving the existence of the Empire. America is trampling down the honor of the Empire regarding the California question and various anti-Japanese movements. America's insolence is far worse than Russia's before the Russo-Japanese war. The reason why the Japanese people are at a loss to know what to do, when the Empire was insulted and her existence was threatened, was because they are perplexed by the problem "If Japan and America Fight."

CHAPTER III

MATERIAL STRENGTH AND MORAL STRENGTH

16. *America not Second to Mongol Kingdom and Russia in Material Strength*

Yuan, or Mongol Kingdom, and Russia had certainly been our formidable enemies. Both in their time were bent on amalgamating the whole world under their sway. With the confidence they acquired thus, they faced us. The Empire was placed in a precarious position like an egg piled on top of another. Both Yuan and Russia had been powerful monarchies, far greater than Japan in material strength. Our countrymen were not daunted by the outward show of the powerful material strength, and we won the wars by means of the indomitable will power of the men of Gods' country. That was how our Empire has been able to maintain the national soldiarity peerless in the world with an unbroken lineage of the Imperial family kept intact since the foundation of our Empire. But lo! a stronger enemy than Yuan or Russia has appeared! He insolently insults our Em-

pire and is attempting to jeopardize our existence. How shall we meet that country? As Sun Tze said, "we shall know the enemy as well as ourselves." I shall here observe the material strength of America. But as it is rather too common a practice now-a-days to refer to the greatness of the American army and navy, I shall omit it. I shall chiefly review, for the benefit our countrymen the industrial and financed strength which form the fountain of strength for the defense works of that country.

Among the Japanese people there are some who do not know how large a country America is. The total area of the United States of America is $21\frac{1}{2}$ times as large as Japan proper. The total population is only $1\frac{1}{2}$ times as many as the population of Japan. Consequently, whereas the density of population per square mile is 400 for Japan, it is only 31 for America. If the density in America should reach to the level of Japan, America will be able to accommodate 1,200,000,000 people, a surprisingly-large number. In spite of the fact that America has enough area of territory and to spare, America annexed the Hawaii, made Cuba a portectorate, occupied the Philippines, Guam, the Panama

Canal Zone, the island of Porto Rico, and during the world war purchased the Virgin island in the West Indies from Denmark. She has thus been annexing lands valuable both from the strategic and economic point of view. What is America's true intension for all that?

America joined in the war in April, 1917. Although no preparation and no study worth nothing had been made in time of peace, and whereas the American army consisted altogether of small units each smaller than a regiment, and the total number of regulars was only 200,000, America at one bounce increased the number of men organized and trained as best she could. She prepared arms, powder, provisions to meet the needs of these forces. She built anew an extraordinary number of vessels for transporting these men and materials and across 3,000 miles of the Atlantic Ocean sent 1,900,000 men to the French war front. The reserve man power was plentiful, so that America would have been able to replenish the army at the front with picked young men of 21 years of age just enrolled, even if she should annually suffer losses in killed and wounded by about 700,000. If the age limit for conscription were extended, she was confident that she could raise an enormous army of 10,000,000 men,

about 10 per cent of the entire population. It is, however, doubtful whether America, judged from the conditions of that country, would have been able to regard with equanimity so great losses as hypothetically estimated. Among the Americans there were about 12,500,000 of German-Americans and about 15,000,000 of colored people (including mixtures). There were in all about 30,000,000 people of different race stocks. These had not necessarily been truly patriotic for America. When the war was conducted in so prosperous manner for America, no disturbance had taken place among them. I was informed that since America joined in the war, she gave immigration officers and policemen the gendarmerie service to perform. It was, to be sure, for the purpose of guarding against spies. But it is understood that another object was to guard against the disturbances among the mixed races.

America is an industrial country. No preparation had been made before she joined the war for industrial mobilization. After she joined in the war, within one year, rifles were manufactured at the rate of more than 10,000 per day and machine guns at the rate of about 10,000 per month. These records will enable one to imagine other achievements. As for

ships, they are built at the rate of about 10,000 tons per day, and since the American participation 490 vessels, aggregating 2,200,000 tons, were built. Not only was the demand at home filled, but even the demand of the Allied countries was met. Such record of enormous achievement in industrial mobilization was possible after all because of the industrial power in ordinary times, the extensive area of the territory and the inexhaustible resources of the land.

There is no need of saying that America is a golden country. At the time of America's war participation, the national wealth of the land was setimated at ¥440,000,000,000. The revenues from these resources which could be derived annually were ¥76,000,000,000. In an average year, about ¥20,000,000,000 of wealth was added to the sum total. Since the opening of the war, war materials have been exported to the Allies in great quantities. The excess of expts over imports was annually no less than ¥5,400,000,000. The inflow of gold was extraordinary. The increase of the national wealth and of the annual incomes was indeed very wonderful. The foreign debts owing by America at the time of the beginning of the war amounted to about ¥8,000,000,000. These

debts were repaid to the extent of about 2,400,000,000 before the time of America's participation in the war. At present, all of the remainder of the debts have been paid off and America is on the contrary a creditor against foreign countries to the extent of about ¥22,300,000,000 (of which about ¥18,000,000,000 was loaned to the Allies). The interests on these credits alone will amount annually from ¥800,000,000 to ¥1,000,000,000. America now has a reserve capital of which she can loan or invest in foreign countries annually about ¥3,000,000,000 to ¥4,000,000,000. That is the motive which impels the American capitalists to engage in activities in China and Siberia and to prosecute her capitalistic Imperialism.

In short, the financial and economic power of America can bear burdens of ¥40,000,000,000 or ¥50,000,000,000 annually for tens of years, as proven by the experience in the recent war in which America participated. On the contrary, the total wealth of Japan is estimated to be at most not more than ¥50,000,000,000. Moreover, America is far superior to Japan in man power, resources, and industrial power, as we have seen. Consequently, if our Empire should make a forward attack upon America, or engage in a pitched battle with American forces on the vast plains of east Asia,

our Empire may not be able to cope with the situation at the present state of our Empire. This I admit with regret as do the many Americaphobes. But the reason why we are not afraid of the great materialistic strength of America is that, as our ancestors have defeated the powerful foreign enemies in the first and the second national crises, we are confident that we can wait for the enemy to come thousands of miles across the ocean to attack us and take advantage of the position of our country impregnable and the people brave, by waiting at ease to take advantage of the enemy who comes exhausted. In order to attain that object, we must observe the situation of our moral strength.

17. *Courage or Cowardice are Decisive Factors, Strength or Weakness Subsidiary Factors*

In the Russo-Japanese war, the reports submitted by army commanders and the commanders of the fleets almost invariably contained the phrase "By the grace of Heaven." That the nation unites as one man whenever anything serious should take place for the country is due to the fact that we have the great national center, the Imperial Household. Every

victory at a battle was owing after all to the grace of His Majesty the Emperor. Indeed, it was won by the grace of Heaven.'

What is it that constitutes the cause of victory which is called the grace of Heaven? It is something invisible which has moral reaction. For instance, if our army of 10,000 men were to engage 15,000 men of the enemy, there should be no way of winning the battle if judged ordinarily from the material point of view. To divide 4 by 2 and obtain 2 is an ordinary material judgment. But if we should obtain 3, an invisible coefficient must have been multiplied by the visible quotient.

For instance, if we should consider that an invisible coefficient, such as $1\frac{1}{2}$, has by multiplied by the quotient, 2, it will be no wonder if we obtained 3 as the result.

In the Russo-Japanese war, at each battle the Russian army was always far superior to us. In the battle of Liaoyang, for instance, the Russian infantry numbered $1\frac{1}{2}$ times as many as our army, and the guns used by the enemy $1\frac{3}{10}$ times as many. In the battle of Mukden, the Russian infantry were $1\frac{6}{10}$ times as many as our army and the guns used by the enemy $1\frac{2}{10}$ as many. When our army of 10,000 men defeated the Russian army of

15,000 or 16,000 men, the victory cannot be explained by the number of men alone. Some invisible power must have been added.

The strength of our army must have been a quotient obtained by multiplying the number of men by 1-5/-0 or 1-6/10 or more of coefficient. In other words, if our number of men were 10,000 the strength represented by that number was 1-5/10 or 1-6/10 or more times of men multiplied by the coefficient, that is, 15,000 or 16,000 or more. That was why the Japanese army of 10,000 men could defeat the Russian army of 15,000 or 16,000 men.

"Courage or Cowardice are Decisive Factors, and Strength and Weakness are Subsidiary Factors," as Sun Tze said, is indeed an eternal truth. Sun Tze means that that number of soldiers and the quantity of the arms are only material elements and the factor which determines the victory or defeat is the moral strength. In the first and the second national crises, our forces were far inferior to the enemy in material strength. But we were able to steer clear of those crises. It was due to the moral strength of our nation. In a time of fire, frail women and children are able to carry heavy loads of furniture which they can never carry in an ordinary time. That is the work

of moral strength. In discussing a Japanese-American war, we should never disregard the moral strength of our countrymen. The phrase "By the grace of Heaven" refers to the influence of this moral strength. If unfortunately a Japanese-American war should prove to be unavoidable, it will be necessary to encourage moral education among the people all the more to increase the moral strength to the maximum point in accordance with the clause in the Imperial Rescript on Education, "Should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with Heaven and Earth." This moral education depends more or less upon gold, to be sure. But even if we had an enormous wealth like that of America, it cannot be bought with gold alone.

As we have said before, in the battle of Liaoyang, although the Russian army commanded an advantageous position in its own fortified ground, our army defeated the Russian army $1\frac{1}{2}$ times greater than our army. Had the situation been reversed, and our army commanded an advantageous position or a fortified ground, and the Russian army was obliged to attack us at all cost, our army might

have been able to face with advantage at least several times as great offensive army of Russia as was actually the case. A fortification is an artificial work whereby an ordinary ground is changed into an impregnable position. The greatness of value of fortifications has been amply proven by the recent great war. The German army, while fearing to win the ill feelings of England, was obliged to violate the neutrality of Belgium. It was because along the Franco-German boundary there were a line of fortresses and the Germans could not estimate that they could break through the line as speedily as they needed. The occupation of Verdun had been regarded as extraordinarily important from the strategical and political point of view. So the German army made desperate efforts to take it. But all efforts made failed. Even the brave Japanese army under the war god, General Nogi, in attacking Port Arthur had to engage in difficult battles and for a time the morale among our indomitable fighters was seriously damaged. That was another proof of the strength of a fortification. The coast of Japan is naturally impregnable and it is just as good as a fortification without any artificial work added to it. Besides, the Japanese people, young and old,

men and women, are intensely patriotic and their hostility will be aroused to a high degree. That is the strong point of the Japanese people and also the weakness. Because of that the Japanese, having resided in America for tens of years, cannot become assimilated with the Americans as other nationalities can and they not only are not liked by the Americans but are being excluded. Once this hostility is enkindled, the Japanese, although they are physically small, will become furious. The land is impregnable and the people brave, is a characterization of this point. It is cruel to say that the Kamakura Bushi in the middle of the Hojo dynasty and the faction for expulsion of foreign devils in the last days of the Tokugawa Shogun, when they were determined to expel the foreign enemies, were exhibiting a valor of ignorance. Among them there may have been some who had known, however vaguely, that the foreign enemies were very powerful beyond their imagination. But they were confident that if they had taken a policy of taking advantage of the land impregnable and the people brave, of drawing the enemies to our gate, and of giving them one deadly blow they did not need to fear them no matter

if the enemies were tens of times as powerful as ourselves.

18. *Japanese and American National Characteristic and Conditions*

In contrast to the American spirit of enterprise, the so-called strenuous life, the Japanese appear to be ease-loving. When the Americans are once determined, transcontinental railways are at once built, or the stupendous structures on the Manhattan peninsula, are erected, or the Panama canal is dug, or a great republic is founded such as can be seen no where else in the world, or great men of wealth like Carnegie or Rockefeller rise. Indeed, strenuous life is the common ideal of the Americans, rich and poor, young and old, men and women. Every one has got to be doing something. Leisurely retirement is something of which the Americans never dream. But in Japan, the rail connection across the Shimonoseki Strait or the underground tunnel across the Tsushima Strait can not be built readily, a regrettable thing. The life of Americans is developed in the direction of industrial enterprises and in any undertakings machines are employed. It is the direct opposite with the Japanese.

From this point of view, it may appear that it will be impossible for the Japanese to cope with the Americans in a modern warfare. But, because the American energy is over flowing, they attempt to do everything at once thus becoming quick tempered, and they often send their steamships on shoals, or let trains to go derailed. To illustrate, the Americans are the Yedokko* and the Japanese the people of Mito. Although somewhat sensitive and ordinarily quiet, and laughed at by the Yedokko as country folks, the Mito people are unexpectedly educated and know how to handle machines, and once understanding how to do a thing they can do it much better than the Yedokko.

The Japanese are a people who are like student taking an examination. They are apt to do anything in a volcanic fashion, that is in an intermittent manner. They can not continue their work steadily without rest like Americans. Our students generally can not study steadily. But when it comes to taking an examination, they go at it night and day without sleep and without rest. In the extraordinary energy they show for it, they are perhaps the foremost in the world. The people generally are also like the students taking an

* Vide note page 16.

examination. Whereas they are not adept in making preparations for war in times of peace, that is, "Not to forget times of war in times of peace." But in times of war they will show wonderful energy. In the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars, the Imperial Japanese Diet had always opposed vigorously any extension of army and navy up to the opening of wars. But in the special session at the time of the commencement of the Sino-Japanese war there was no one among the members of the Diet who was absent from the session, and immediately after the session was opened the war bill of ¥150,000,000 was approved at once and the Diet passed a resolution to memorialise the prime minister advising him not to fail to prosecute the war to the final victory in spite of any foreign interference which may come. Again in the Russo-Japanese war, the special session held in April, 1904, voted for a war bill of ¥380,000,000. Also the regular session at the end of the same year approved with a unanimous vote a war bill for ¥700,000,000. Compared with the approval given by the American Congress to a proposition to expend an average of ¥3,700,000,000 per month after the participation in the war the Japanese war bills were only insignificant amounts. But,

judging from the financial conditions of our country at the time, we should praise the Japanese people for bearing so great burdens. In both wars, as soon as the declaration of war was issued by the Emperor the hostility of the people was aroused to a high degree, the wealthy vied with one another to subscribe to the war bonds, voluntarily offered to pay increased taxes, exerted their energy in their occupations in order to raise the sources for such taxes. The whole nation stood as one man, all doing their best in showing their patriotism without failing in their duties to serve the Emperor. But, whereas the war spirit in America was spectacular like that of the Oyesiki,¹ festival of the Nichiren Sect,² the Japanese war spirit was gloomy and quiet as was the case of the night attack by the 47 Ronin of Ako,³ which will conduce towards creating stronger moral force for war, we shall resolve our judgment until after the next war shall have tested it.

The Americans excel in taking group actions. Our countrymen, as we have noted before, will also show their national unity in times of

1 & 2. The festival celebrating the birth day of Nichiren

Buddhist monk of the 13th century, on October 11.

3. The famous story of revenge.

war. But in times of peace, we are far behind the Americans in that respect. The Americans, also, have the habit of spending much time in discussing before a decision is arrived at for an undertaking, but once decided they show whole hearted loyalty for the undertaking, which is their strong point. America is composed of a large number of different race stocks, so that before the recent war it had been doubted whether America would be able to pull together. But as soon as the war participation was decided upon, the American nation stood as one man, as the Japanese did in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars, and helped the president to carry out his programs. Consequently, although the war time preparations were pushed forward in a rather autocratic fashion, though America is a republic, not second in that respect to Japan which has the Imperial family as the center, yet the people of America did not grumble. But, although the national unity could be attained in a normal condition of development of war as in the recent war, such unity can not necessarily be expected in an adverse situation as witness the case of the civil war in America.

There is something which needs to be especially noted down in order to warn our

titled nobilities, wealthy classes, scholars, statesmen, and others. The Americans generally are very strong in their sense of duty, especially the educated upper classes have the spirit to regard it as their honor personality to lead in going to the war in times of a national crisis, and also they regard it as an honor to call upon their sons or brothers to serve the nation. For instance, there were some senators who, as soon as America participated in the war, resigned and joined in the ranks of the army. A certain former mayor of New York joined in the war as an aviation officer. A former president and a former secretary of Treasury sent all their three or four sons to the front joining in the ranks of the army and navy. All the universities and colleges organized army corps of various ranks of service with their students and gave necessary training to the reserved officers. In the case of Japan, it is exactly the opposite. Both in times of peace and war, the sons of the educated classes and wealthy classes shun conscription. What is the reason?

The Japanese are a people who would at once decide to sacrifice their life. That many people commit double-suicides, or suicides for no particular reason, or kill other people for a

petty reason when they know that by killing other people they themselves will be executed, is because they do not consider death as a serious matter. Once they are determined to die, they show wonderfully desperate courage. That is the motive power of Japanese bravery. At the time of Russo-Japanese war, as I was one of those who were aboard the Sado-Maru, a transport, and encountered a disastrous situation for life and death, I had an opportunity to study the Japanese psychology when determining to die and after having determine to do so (Vide page 45, "Heiwa no Seinen," by the author.) The Japanese when they meet a desperate situation are lacking in the power of endurance to pass over the situation, and are liable to commit suicide. On the contrary, whereas it is well that the western people do not recklessly commit suicide, they lack the determination to die when they should and the motive power for courage is not in full play. That short-coming is not confined to the Americans but in general with all the Western people.

We come to next point to study. Many persons have misgivings that the Japanese people generally lack the power of endurance so that they do not show it in war, that when the war situation is adverse they are liable to cause fric-

tions, that while in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese war in which we took an offensive attitude and the war progressed favourably to Japan, nothing disadvantageous had happened, it will be different if we should fight with America, in a defensive position, because the moral among the soldiers will decline and if we should meet with adversities our martial spirit will decline at once true to our national characteristic, thereby causing internal strifes. That is a problem about which we are deeply concerned. As a general rule an offensive position taken will encourage martial spirit. A defensive position will discourage it. I regret that our country has not had experiences in defensive wars. In that national crisis in the last days of Tokugawa shogun, Japan assumed a defensive position, but our countrymen had not come in contact with the enemy very much, although many days had been spent in replenishing defenses and erecting coast defense works in which no decline of martial spirit was noted. The Mongolian invasion had lasted for ten or more years in all, but the Kamakura Bushi had always maintained indomitable spirit. While we had not much experience of adverse war situation, on May 15, 1904, the battleship "Kasuga" in a dense fog, sank. On the

same day the battle ship "Yoshino" colliding with the battle ship "Hatsuse" and the battle ship "Yashima" struck the mechanical mines laid by the enemy and sank, which were a record-breaking disasters. This fact had been absolutely kept secret, but not a few persons knew it and was able to maintain silence about it. When three Russian war vessels belonging to the Vladivostock fleet sank our transport the "Hitachi Maru," and damaged the "Sado Maru" in the sea of Genkai on June 15, the same year, the Japanese people were furiously indignant. Such an incident as storming the house of admiral Kamimura, the commander of the fleet, although it ended without any serious the development. In such occasion the psychology of our countrymen is shown by a wry face, saying "too bad." They do not say anything more. They are resigned to the inevitable. If Japan should fight against America, even if she may meet with an adversity, she may not encounter any worse disaster than that. Therefore, this problem should not cause any serious pessimism.

"Placed aboard a same vessel enemies become brothers"* so it is said. The Yamato race are unlike the Americans who are a conglomerate

* A Chinese saying commonly employed in Japan.

tion of different race elements. The Japanese are a great family having the Imperial ancestors as their fountain heads. From the first, they were not a conglomeration of heterogenous elements, but real brethren.

A country which takes an offensive position will take forward moves. To attack or to cease attacking is left to its free choice. On the contrary, a country which takes a defensive position, unless it chooses to surrender, will have no recourse but to unite as one man. There is no room left for arguments in that respect.

Homer Lee, himself an American, emphatically pointed out that it was a source of great weakness for America in time of war that her people are composed of various different race stocks. Especially, the colored people are a serious problem for that country. Everywhere in the land the movements are inaugurated every year by the colored people for their freedom. Every one knows that lynching is against justice and humanity. But no prohibitory law proclaimed against the practice by the President was observed. Should the United States meet a national crisis in an adversity, that which will become the cause of a conflagration of a civil strife in America will be the problem of the colored people, who will be

sympathized with by other alien elements in the land. When such complications rise, the pan-albinism advocated by the Latin Americans will show its head. Consequently the Pan-Americanism will be destroyed. The Mexicans entertain historical or hereditary hatred for Americans. There is no end of little quarrels at the Americo-Mexican boundaries. The Mexicans admire Japanese, so that should a Japanese-American war come it is not improbable that the Mexicans will cooperate with their fellow countrymen residing in the United States who will create disturbances there and assume an anti-American attitude. Moreover, there are the Germans and the Austrians naturalized as Americans who left the United States after the American participation in the war and fled to Mexico, of whom it is reported there were approximately 1,500,000. They will be a power by themselves in Mexico. The Americans will not but feel a sort of pressure from them. At a time of victory and favorable development of war as was the case in the recent great war in which America participated, a country, no matter if it is composed of different race stocks, may not be affected by any shake-up. But, as result of a Japanese-American war, if America should find herself in a disadvantageous posi-

tion, the alien elements in the land will be agitated and the country will be torn by internal strifes, the morale of the American expeditionary forces will be destroyed.

Those who belong to the Democratic Party include comparatively a large number of scholars and religious workers. Among these latter classes there are many who sincerely respect the principle of justice and humanity. The majority of student classes and laborers belong to that party. The justice and humanity advocated by President Wilson may have been a mere sign-board, but there are Democrats who love such sign-board. On the contrary, the Republicans are mostly tools of the capitalist classes. Among them there are many who entertain ambitions to prosecute the capitalistic Imperialism in a gigantic scale on the east Asiatic continent. That is the explanation why many of the noted statesmen, who expect a Japanese-American war and insist upon the extension of the army and the navy, belong to the Republican party. Consequently, if Japan and America should fight, it will be because America was moved by the advocates of war of the Republican party. In other words, America was instigated by the capitalists. At best a section of the people will believe it so. If even a section of

the people should believe that America was instigated by the capitalists into entering an ignominious war, and if after the opening of the war America should meet reverses, the grumbings in the land will boil, and as was the case in the Franco-Prussian war the expeditionary officers and men will lose their ardor for war and the moral strength of the entire forces at the front will at once be exhausted.

19. *True Appraisalment of Japanese and American Defense Forces*

(1) *Martial Spirit.* The martial spirit of the Imperial Japanese defense forces is encouraged in accordance with the Imperial Rescript granted to military men in 1882. Men are taught on every occasion and whenever there is an opportunity in moral education. Of all the countries in the world, there is perhaps none which pays so much attention to moral training of the men in the service of the army and the navy as Japan. While it is a problem whether it is proper or not to leave moral training work altogether to officers, it is also questionable whether it is advisable to leave it altogether to missionaries as is done in European and American countries.

The growth and decline of the martial spirit in a nation depend, as I have said before, upon

the characteristics of the people and the conditions of the country. The Americans have the Americanism. They have a kind of patriotism arising from the self-confidence in and attachment to the vast and fertile land. They have a kind of martial spirit to sacrifice their lives in order to defend glorious hills and dales of the country and to make the country great. It is similar to the patriotism in Japan where the people would defend the stainless and perfect country with the Imperial family of an unbroken lineage for ages as their national center. But our martial spirit has a peculiar quality to itself. It is the ardent devotion and courage born of the sense of duty to regard one's life insignificant in performing the service of defending the country with His Majesty, the commander-in-chief of the land and sea forces, as the leader, as he regards the military men as his right-hand men. That is now our officers and men are so full of martial spirit. Mr. Longford, an Englishman, commenting on the Imperial rescript to our military men referred, said "It expresses very well the national spirit and the training of the people. It is a most suitable lesson for the British who are now meeting the record-breaking national crisis." It is necessary to let the rescript sink in the hearts

of the people in order to develop the national spirit.

(2) Military discipline. It is a way of maintaining military discipline instead of depending upon rules, to resort to the method of moral commands by means of courtesies, as was as case in olden times. But at any rate, in the army and the war ships, the orders of the superiors should be carried out speedily and without fail. Otherwise, the army or the navy will be of no use in actual warfare, and their value may be said to be nill.

Looking at the American soldiers stationed in Peking and other foreign countries and also at the sailors of the American navy visiting Nagasaki and Yokohama, one will be astonished at their lack of discipline. The worst cases are that some of these men become heavily drunk and engage in quarrels, thus becoming charges of the gendarmes and police officers. In Japan, men in the military service who desert are severely dealt with heavy punishment. It is hardly necessary to explain why. If men are permitted to leave the war ships and army posts at will, the unity of the organizations will be weakened and the men will become useless in actual war. In the Japanese army, a commander of a regiment will have to tender his

tentative resignation in a suppliant manner, should one or two men under his command desert from the ranks. But in the American army the cases of desertion are many. That shows a lack of military discipline in the American army. Clancing at a passage in the book by Hmer Lee, an American author, one will note the degree of lack of discipline in the American army.

“Within a short time after the defeat at Fredericksburg 85,000 men deserted. This fact shows, to a certain extent, the actuating motive in the desertion of short-term volunteers and the disasters that ensue to the nation whenever its forces meet defeat on its field.

“All confederated forms of government are only durable in prosperity and success; in disasters the tendency is not to greater cohesion and unity but to disintegration. Should the armies of the Republic meet with a continuous series of defeats, as characterized the Russo-Japanese War or the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the probable culmination would be the dissolution of the present form of confederated government.

“Table of Desertion in the American Civil War.

Arms of Service	Number of Deserters	
	Officers	Enlisted Men
Regulars		
Cavalry	2	1,866
Artillery		3,162
Infantry	3	11,332
Total	5	16,360
Volunteers		
Cavalry	34	31,856
Artillery	4	11,942
Infantry	149	126,231
Total	187	179,029
Colored Troops		
Cavalry	4	674
Artillery	2	1,843
Infantry	18	923
Total	23	3,440
Grand Total	216	189,829
Grand Total		190,045

“While the Civil War shows, in its various activities, the fallacy of militia and volunteers, the Spanish-American War and Philippine Insurrection portray a progressive deterioration. The worthlessness of the American military system, however, does not alone adhere to these late wars, but has been co-existent with the Republic from its inception, as the three following tables, published by F. L. Huide Koper in the *North American Review*, show.

IF JAPAN AND AMERICA FIGHT

Battle	Date	Organization or Expedition
Long Island	Aug. 27, 1776	Parsons' Brigades
Evacuation of New York	Sept. 15, 1776	Parsons' and Fellows' brigades
Brandywine	Sept. 11, 1777	Sullivan's division
Gamden, S. C. ..	Aug. 16, 1780	Virginia and South Carolina brigades
Indian village near Fort Wayne, Ind.	Oct. 22, 1790	Harmar's Miami expedition
Frenchtown and Raisin River, Mich.	Jan. 18-20, 1813	Winchester's column
Sackett's Harbor..	May 29, 1813	General Brown's command
French Creek, N. Y.	Nov. 1-5, 1813	General Hampton's column
Chryster's Field Canada	Nov. 11, 1813	General Wilkenson's column
Evacuation of Front George. Naigara River ..	Dec. 10, 1813	Gen. Mc Clure's N. Y. Militia.
Burning of Buffalo and Black, Rock, N. Y.	Dec. 30, 1813	"
Bladensbury, Md.	Aug. 24, 1814	Maryland, Virginia, and District of Columbia Militia and Volunteers under Gen. Winder.
New Orleans, La.	Jan. 8, 1815	800 Militia under Gen. Morgan, posted on the left bank of the Mississippi.
Lake Okeechopee, Fla	Dec. 25, 1837	Missouri Volunteers and spies
Bull Run, Virginia	July 21, 1861	Gen. McDowell's entire force of militia.

“This partial list shows the character of the wholesale desertions and flights up to the time of the Civil War. Subsequent affairs are too well known to necessitate repetition.”

The Americaphobes may not believe the facts as give nabove as an illustration. That was an incident of the Civil War, nearly 60 years ago, and it may be contended that there is no such thing as desertion today among the American service men. But in Mr. Heigo Hiramoto's book "Shall Japan and America Fight?" the following passage was found. "When the American Atlantic fleet came to the Pacific last fall, it entered the port of San Diego, Lower California, in order to enlist men, as one of its object. But throughout the entire fleet there were several thousand desertions, thus resulting in the opposite of what was intended. A portion of the fleet could not sail to San Francisco and was obliged to remain in San Diego. Such comic opera was played, etc." That proves the Japanese saying "The soul of a three year child lives until he is 100 years."

(3) Training. Although the Japanese navy came into being later than the American, Japan literally translated the British navy, which is regarded as the foremost in the world. Later, through the Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War and the recent great war, Japan acquire much in the way of practical experience. Today we have come to have an art of naval warfare peculiarly our own which was

developed in the meantime. On the contrary, the American navy has not had any experience in a large-scale war seriously engaged in with its modern men of war. Consequently, the American navy is an unfinished product. No matter if America possessed the latest style of war ships or arms, it is doubtful if America will be able to manoeuvre them with advantage in an actual war in the face of an adversity. As for the adventurous actions like a landing of marines, a bottling up of the enemy, or a daring attack with surprise attack vessels, the Japanese navy is known in the world to possess the ability to carry them out. Our officers and men are reasonably confident of their ability. Besides, these daring movements quite fit in with the national characteristics of the Japanese. It may not be too much to say that we are peerless in the world.

The superiority of the Japanese army is recognized as the foremost in the world. Our army first learnt lessons from the French army and adopted the best parts of the lessons from the French army and then shifted to the German army, and adopted the best parts of the lessons learnt from the two nations in the art and science of war, thus perfecting our organization. Especially, in the art of warfare, although we

have learnt lessons from Germany, we have bettered our teachers. As for the ability of leadership and commanding, it may not be amiss to say that we are the first in the world. In fact, the army commanding in practical exercise has been improved by repeated training, so that it was brought to a state of such perfection that the Europeans and the Americans have sincerely praised our army. In November, 1913, I was in Tientsin, as commander of the garrisons stationed in China. At that time, a joint manoeuvre was planned with garrisons from seven nations participating. As I was the senior officer in point of service as a commander of the garrisons, I directed the manoeuvre. In a suburb of Tientsin, an imaginary enemy set up at some position. Against that enemy, the armies of the participating nations were lined up and they attacked him simultaneously marching forward. It was veritably an exposition of armies of different nations at display. The Europeans and the Americans, young and old, men and women, turned out in a large number to see the manoeuvre, and the visitors made a comparative study at a glance. They attempted criticisms. Among other things, they gave their opinion that in point of exactitude of the officers in handling their men, utilizing the

ground objects against the enemy's fire, and speed of forward movement, the Japanese army was the foremost and the American army the poorest. In the recent world war, the American army participated in the war only for half a year. It was, moreover, already in the period of victory. No serious fighting was engaged in by that army. Yet it was reported that the Americans suffered losses in killed and wounded numbering about 290,000, that is one in every 12 men. So large a number of losses must have resulted from defects in the movement of hostility such as were exposed in the joint manoeuvre in Tientsin.

(4) The Quality. General Fraytag Von Loringhoven, who was the chief of the German General Staff in charge at home during the recent war, in a book published during the war, emphatically contended that unless officers are superior in quality no victory could be attained. The strength of the German army altogether depended upon the superiority of the officer's corps. At the same time, the dwindling of the German army towards the end of the war was due to the lowering of the quality of officers owing to the difficulty of supplying the gap. Certainly, the quality of men should be good. But in point of the true value of the army and

the navy, the first importance should be attached to the quality and efficiency of the officers.

Before the war, the efficiency of the American officers was indeed insufficient. But the school system were changed in order to elevate the quality and efficiency of officers. An officer of the regular army is made an ensign after he has received an education for three years at a military academy as a candidate for officer. He then enters a special school for war and receives an education for one year in various lines of special war studies in the general course classes. Again, for over one year more, he serves in a division. After that he enters the higher classes, where he acquires necessary technics and art of war. After graduation, he enters a school of line and acquires tactics when all branches of a division are combined. Consequently, an ordinary officer is expected to go through a military education lasting for at least five or six years. But officers are men not of words but of action. Practice is preferable to learning for them. Are we, then, satisfied with the present degree of learning given in our country? Here I want emphatically to point out as a serious problem of our army and navy that recently the number of applicants for

officers has extraordinarily decreased in this country. Consequently, the quality and efficiency of officers has naturally declined. That is no doubt due to the fact that the pay of our officers is not good. We must at all cost improve that condition. No matter how much we may increase the army and navy power, and however excellently our war ships and arms may be improved, these things will not be of any avail if the quality of the officers is debased who are the main stay of the army and the navy. This is a serious problem for our national defense.

The pay of the officers in America is the best in the world at present. So I ought to believe that the quality of the American officers of today is excellent. But looking at the following table, giving the number of those in the service of the Northern army in the American Civil War who were obliged to leave the service, we cannot but be astonished at the greatness of the number, however great the difficulties of filling the gap at the time. If perchance that condition was based upon the national characteristics and conditions of America, we must conclude that the same situation obtains today as it did in the old time.

TRUE APPRAISEMENT OF DEFENSE FORCES 111

Arms of Service	Discharged With honor	For in capacity	Without stated Reasons	Cashed	Re-signed
Regulars					
Cavalry	—	1	25	1	97
Artillery	—	—	18	—	50
Infantry	—	1	79	5	253
Total	—	2	122	6	400
Volunteers					
Cavalry	12	330	394	38	3,055
Artillery	15	159	163	14	999
Infantry	150	2,586	1,536	200	17,036
Total	186	3,058	2,143	252	21,000
Colored Troops					
Cavalry	—	—	5	—	34
Artillery	—	8	9	—	68
Infantry	18	158	144	16	679
Total	18	166	154	16	781
Grand Total	204	3,226	2,423	274	22,271
Grand total	28,398.				

The resignations tabulated in the bottom column of the foregoing table did not differ in reality from the discharges tabulated in other columns. That is, these resignations were always for one or the other of the following two reason.

First. In order to escape being discharged under one of the four other classifications.

Second. After a great defeat, there were almost invariably a large number of resignations.

Carl Shurtz in his diary noted down the fact that after the defeat of Fredericksburg, there were a very large number of officers commanding regiments in the Northern Army who resign-

ed. That incapable officers had not been punished and were permitted to resign attested to the looseness of discipline at the time. Another thing which enables one to judge of the loose conditions of discipline most clearly refers to the disposition made of the deserters who should have deserved death. Although the deserters from the Northern army totalled 200,000, only seven of the number were executed.

20. *Machine Power and Man Power*

As result of the world war, there was a great revolution in the war ships and arms. At one time there were many persons who had thought that war can be conducted altogether by machine power. After many practical experiences have been gone through, it became clear that no matter how ingeniously machines used may be made, it will be impossible to let them show their value unless men employing them were skilled and brave. Again, however greatly the effectiveness of arms and powder be increased, however advanced the manufacture of poison gas, air machines and other instrumentalities may be, it will be impossible to deal a death blow to the enemy with such arms. In other words, in order to cause the enemy to discontinue his hostile activities altogether man power must after all be depended upon.

In the siege of Port Arthur in the Russo-Japanese war, as the strength of the cavalry forces was insufficient in comparison with the degree of security of the fortification, the first general assault was a complete failure, many human bullets having been sacrificed for it. It was a great regret, indeed. At that time, the preparations for siege operations were very poor in Japan. The number of siege guns which could then be called advanced and of the new style was very small. The majority were old style guns made of bronze or cast iron. Besides, each gun was provided with only 300 to 400 rounds of ammunition. It was indeed a daring feat to assault Port Arthur with such inferior forces of artillery.

The rest of the supply of ammunition was to have been sent immediately afterward following the mobilization. But the ammunition had not been shipped even after the first general assault was commenced. The first general assault was therefore conducted with the material on hand as best it could be done. To a great regret the assault had to be discontinued in the midst of it. It was a case of lack of ammunition in reserve rather than that of the great number of losses of men, killed and wounded. After that more than a month pas-

sed until the second general assault. While waiting for the arrival of the fresh supply, our siege guns could not reply the furious bombardment by the enemy with more than one or two shots per gun per day, so serious was the predicament in which besiegers were placed. Because metal shots were lacking they were replaced with human bullets. That was a case of neglecting the machine power and depending too much upon man power.

By the difficult experience in Port Arthur, we have discovered the following fact. No matter how much artillery forces bombarded, the enemy was undisturbed because he hid himself in the shelter which was built here and there in his position and which was covered with a roofing. When after our artillery forces have destroyed a greater part of the enemy's position, the enemy appeared from his shelter and taking his position in the fire line began to fire at us. With the magazine guns of today, our infantry men could have been mowed down to a complete annihilation before they had advanced 200 meters. Consequently, our infantry men, approached the enemy's position as near as possible while our artillery forces were firing, thus preparing for their charge upon the enemy's position. When the artillery men signaled that

their fires were turned in another direction, immediately our infantry men sprang into the enemy's position. Thus, success was assured as much as our artillery men continued firing until our infantry men were able to advance very close to be enemy's position. But sometimes our own shells injured our own infantry men. An infantry man engaged in the charge at the time remarked, "It was a rare occurrence that we were injured by our own shells. If the artillery men had stopped firing too soon, we would not have been able to escape a complete annihilation. If we must die, at all, let us by our own shell."

The method adopted in the recent world war in attacking the enemy's position was to destroy the enemy's position from the ground by means of heavy artillery, so that the infantry men could charge upon the enemy as if they were marching in a leisurely manner in an uninhabited land. Along September and October, 1915, when the French army attacked the enemy at Altna and Champagny, about 7,500,000 shells were fired and yet France suffered losses in killed and wounded, numbering about 300,000. With all that sacrifice made, the French could only advance less than 2.44 miles in front in a section. The object of the attack was not

attained and it was discontinued owing to the lack of supply of shells. These shells took France four months to manufacture at the rate of the manufacturing capacity of that country at the time. That incident may be criticized as a case of depending upon the machine power too much. What astonished us particularly was the comparatively large number of losses in killed and wounded when so large a number of shells have been fired. To fire so large number of shells, lose so large number of men, and fail in the attack, was indeed a height of bad tactics. The German army in its attack upon the enemy's position in the western front in the closing period of the war adopted a similar method which we devised in the siege of Port Arthur. The Germans did not depend upon the power of shells too much in attacking the enemy and yet secured a reasonable degree of success.

If Japan and America should fight, the Americans, judged from their national characteristics may depend altogether upon the machine power for gaining the victory. When they foresee that such a war is actually unavoidable, they will not mind spending any amount of money and will devise various kinds of machines. We need not be afraid so very much of the

American principle of almighty machine. But, whereas in the siege of Port Arthur there were unavoidable circumstances for what was done, we should admit that the attack made upon the fortification which was constructed in the most modern style at that time, largely with old style guns and not supplied with an abundant ammunition was a reckless method to adopt and it should be said that the machine power was disregarded too much.

CHAPTER IV

21. *The Powers' World Policy*

Of late years, European and American powers have criticized Japan as a military and aggressive nation, a Germany of the Orient. But what about the critics themselves? Looking back in history, one notes that those who were weak declined and those who were strong prospered. Nations have vied each with another for supremacy. The people whose minds were sound and whose physique robust tried to surpass other peoples. That was how the civilization progressed. In order to be a supreme power, wealth must be absorbed from different places in the world. This process was resorted to by means of aggression. Spain, Portugal, Holland and also England, France, Germany and America all resorted to it. Of late years, the term aggression was avoided and for it the words annexation, or protectorate have been substituted. But, while the name was variously different, the essential result was same. Certainly, as the Americans themselves have said,

there is no national boundary line in economic development. Such economic development is not hateful as the aggressiveness. Thereupon, the world policy of the powers tended towards capitalism. The capitalism will help to develop the resources and the civilization of the land where it is applied. It should not be avoided so very much. In order to carry out the capitalism, it is not considered wrong to resort to commercialism. But some nations take recourse to navalism or militarism or other sinister measures. That is called capitalistic Imperialism or capitalistic aggression. It is different in name, but essentially the same, that is it is an aggressivism.

The recent world war may be said to have arisen from the conflict of capitalistic Imperialisms. Germany had been seriously tormented by the capitalistic Imperialism of England. At the time the German Empire was first established about fifty years ago, the population of Germany has been annually increasing by 700,000. The problem of emigration of this surplus population was a vexed issue for that country. When the Kaiser Wilhelm the Second came to the throne, he with his youthful vigor was very anxious to solve this problem at once. He won over Turkey by

means of a conciliatory diplomacy and built what was the Bagdad Railway, in order to colonize the surplus population of Germany in Persia by means of the railway, as a step towards carrying the German capitalistic Imperialism. Germany, however, came into a conflict with Russia and England. The Balkan peninsula was thrown into the political whirlpool. The international relations became all the more embittered. A slightest motive would at once have caused a war. Then came the Sarajevo incident, in which the Austrian crown prince and princess were murdered, which led to the great world war never-heard of before, as the opportunity was ripe for such a war. What will be the future of the Far East? The situation in the Far East today is like that of the Balkans before the great war, as shown by various indications. We should be watchful with a serious attention.

The world politics of the Powers of the world today may be said after all to concern the development of capitalistic Imperialism by means of railway policies. One will at once note by looking at a map of the world that the railway net works have not yet developed in Afghanistan, east Siberia, China, Persia. Where the railway nets are not spread over, the natu-

ral resources remain undeveloped. Railways which are extended to regions where natural resources have not yet been developed are like the roots of a tree which stretch out into the soil to take in nourishments. By such railways, the wealth of undeveloped regions is gathered. Hitherto, the world policy adopted by England, France, Germany and Russia concerned the railway which corresponded to the roots of a tree, and by gathering the wealth of undeveloped regions by means of the railways the trunk of the tree, the home country, has been made great and strong.

22. *England, America and East Asia*

After the great world war, European and American nations felt a serious shortage of goods.

The supply to fill the gap must be sought in the Asiatic continent. Consequently, the eyes of all nations were turned towards that continent. Of the various nations, England and America are endeavouring to develop their capitalistic Imperialism.

England recently rekindled the Thibetan problem. She is attempting to establish an independence in a district west of China proper,

about one-quarter of the latter in size, and Thibet. There is no other country which won so great profits without doing anything in the recent world war as England. In the first place, Afghanistan became a protectorate of England. Afghanistan of her own accord recklessly invaded India and in turn was dealt with a great blow by the British aviation corps, as the result of which she became a protectorate of England. Again, in August, 1919, while other nations enthusiastically devoted their attention to the peace conference, England concluded a convention with Persia and winning her over by means of a conciliation made that country practically a British protectorate. Then Arabia and Mesopotamia coming under the British mandate were included in the British sphere of influence. The greater part of the colored races at last were brought in under the British sway. In Africa, the German colonies, which had been eye sores to England in the past, were altogether swept away. It is now an easy task for England to build a lengthwise railway line in Africa from Cairo to Cape-town. When that railway is built, connections will be established with the Indian railways, which in turn will be extended through Burma and Annam to the center of China proper. That has been a long-

cherished plan of England for the past 40 years. The Thibetan problem has connections with this railway plan.

America hitherto had been indifferent to the world policy by means of railways. But of late years she has been anxious to establish railway connections through Alaska, passing the Behring Strait by means of an underground railway, with eastern Siberia. Concerning this project, various rumors have been circulated. It was rumored that Mr. Elihu Root was sent as an envoy to Russia at the time of the Kerensky ministry for the express purpose of obtaining a concession to build railways in Siberia and that he failed to bring the negotiations to a success, that the corps of railway engineers of America who were staying in Nagasaki at the time were waiting for the result of the negotiations, that negotiations have been opened with the Omsk government for a concession to lease southern Kamtchatka and also a right to build railways with that peninsula as the starting point into different districts in Siberia.

These rumors could not be substantiated with proofs. But among the American newspapers, there were some which openly contended that the railway rights in Siberia must be secured by America by all means, or that an outlet for

America in Asia must be secured through the Behring Strait, or that if any nation should dispute the American privilege every effort should be made to defend the American privilege so that the plans can be carried out. As I have said before, America has now a reserve financial power to be able to invest annually ¥3,000,000,000 to ¥4,000,000,000. American capitalists will do everything to carry out their plans. If the situation were left to America as she wishes, it should be said that sooner or later the railways in questions will be built.

In that event, the railway nets in East Asia will be spread from America on one side and, in the direction of Europe, beside the Siberian railways, there will be the coast line planned by England, which will extend from India to the Yangtze Kiang basin. Another line will be extended in Central Asia, from Bagdad through Teheran, Ande-shan, Shinkiang, Su-chow, to connect with the Hailan railway. Such development of the nets of communication in East Asiatic continent may appear at a casual thought not an easy task to build. But on second thought it may not after all take a long time to complete the nets. If the joint control of the Chinese railways proposed by America was established and the new loan consortium

problem solved as America wishes, China will altogether be placed under the joint management of the Powers. The nets of communication in East Asia as explained before may be completed within less than ten years.

Even if for various reasons the railways were not so speedily built as America desires, railways will not be the only means of travel in the future. The roads for automobiles will extraordinarily develop, because whereas $1/40$ is the limit of grade of roads for railways automobiles can pass roads to the extent of $1/6$ grade. Moreover, railways need stations, sidetracks, etc., so that the building of railways is troublesome. But the roads for automobiles is rather very easy.

Accordingly, the automobile roads will develop considerably side by side with the railways. For instance, between Peking and Tientsin formerly it was difficult even for horse carriages to pass. But now an automobile road is being built by the Americans. Already an automobile road was built between Kalgan and Urga. Between Urga and Suiyuan, and automobile road is being built by the Americans. Otherwise, two or three other automobile roads are being built by the Chinese. Accordingly, even if the building of railways is not an easy task, the

communications by automobiles will rather be speedily developed. But even if the communications by automobiles by established, it will not be possible to send at once a large army from Europe and America to East Asia continent. But it will be convenient for marshaling cavalry divisions or dispatching a detachment as large as a division. Hitherto, a large army could not be sent to East Asia because of the insuperable barrier, the lack of means of communication and transportation. If this barrier is removed as it will be removed sooner or later, East Asia will feel dangers to itself all the more seriously.

Last year, 1919, when I visited China, I met Mr. Chin Yun-peng, the prime minister then, and other noted Chinese and addressed them briefly as follows.

“If the joint railway control and the new loan consortium were established, China will eventually come under the joint control of the Powers. The completion of the railway net will be speedily brought about. But China will be placed between the American pressure from north-east and the British pressure from south-west. Should England and America collide with each other, China will be sandwiched between the two pressures. On the contrary,

should the two powers maintain harmony between themselves, China will become an Anglo-American sphere of influence, and China will have to be content as a mistress in keeping for England and America. If China should oppose the will of England and America, a large army will be sent to that country within a short time from Europe and America any time when the nets of communications have been completed, and China will be made a slave of England and America. That China should develop her power strong enough to be able to defend herself single handed against the Anglo-American pressure is a most desirable thing. But I regret that such desire cannot be realized in a near future. Consequently, until China be enabled at least to stand on her own feet, a friendly nation should be sought which shall assist her in defending her against the Anglo-American pressure. There is no better friend which China can have than Japan of identical letters and race stock with which China has associated for thousands of years.

“To be sure, among our countrymen there are some who have forgotten the fact that China is their teacher from whom they learnt the civilization in ancient times. Because the na-

tional strength of our country is somewhat superior to China, they are apt to ridicule Chinese. While there are such thoughtless Japanese, at the same time there are many intelligent Japanese who realize the importance of a Sino-Japanese friendship.

“There are some Chinese who say that Japan acquired her rights in Manchuria and Mongolia as a result of her aggressive policy. But that is a misunderstanding. The Russo-Japanese war was fought by Japan in self-defence against the Russian aggression in Manchuria and Korea. Otherwise, the existence of the Empire would have been endangered. Self-defence for individuals is regarded in the criminal law as a non-punishable offense. There can be no criticism justified regarding the steps taken by our country. If China had been a little more powerful and had served as a buffer state to prevent the southward advance of Russia, it would not have been necessary for Japan to hold Manchuria under her occupation. To leave Manchuria like a vacuous zone would have been dangerous for the Empire. Consequently, the Empire was obliged to keep Manchuria under her occupation. Meanwhile, the roots have extended; that is, the economic development was naturally brought about and the foundation of the

land has been strengthened. Japan does not want to occupy the territory of Manchuria and Mongolia. It will be sufficient if only she could extend her roots and develop there economically.

“It is an injustice to try to cut off the roots of Japan which have extended to the continent, upon instigation by America and other countries. If China would cut these roots off by hook and by crook, she should recall to herself the price of blood spilt in history. If this price of blood is to be disregarded, the accounts of history must be altogether blotted out. Before the price of blood spilt by Japan and Manchuria, Mongolia and Tsingtau is settled off, the history of the relations of the Powers with China must be blotted out altogether.

“Rather than bandy words on such topic at this eleventh hour, will it not be a wise policy for China to recognize the priority claims of Japan in Manchuria and Mongolia, which fortunately stand as a firm wedge against the pressing forces of the British and American capitalistic Imperialisms which come from two sides in a torrentional manner. Will it not be a way to strengthen the foundation of China's independence and at the same time to preserve the peace of the Orient in permanence, if China

and Japan cooperated in those regions and built a fire proof walls?"

After my address was over, all those present heartily agreed with my views.

23. *The Empire's Naval and Land Powers*

A. *The Empire's Naval Power*

The extent of the naval power under control of a nation depends to be sure upon the geographical conditions of that country. But it principally depends upon the strength of the navy of the country. If our Empire commanded a powerful navy, we will, as urged theoretically by our naval officers, take an offensive attitude against an enemy, destroy the main strength of his fleet, or bottle him up securely within a harbor, and then conduct a naval blockade for stopping the trade of the enemy. Even if we did not command so powerful a navy, if only our navy was reasonably powerful, we may be able, as was pointed out in Chapter I citing the arguments of the diplomatic naval expansionist, be able to hold a casting vote between England and America and not only on the stage of the Pacific Ocean but also in the first-class stage of the world the Empire will certainly be able to conduct splendid performance.

Therefore, if only our financial conditions permit, it is no doubt desirable that we should secure a powerful navy at our command, so that our Empire may be able to maintain as broad a sphere of naval power as possible in times of war.

Even if the connections of the Tsushima Strait could be absolutely maintained and the supply of war materials and provisions secured from the Continent across the strait, it will be difficult, in these days of manufacturing these articles by an extreme international division of labor, to obtain all the best quality of such articles if they were obtained only from the continent in Asia. Consequently, it will be desirable to command as wide a sphere of naval power as possible in order to obtain the supply from across the seas. But if the naval expansion is conducted in a half-hearted manner, it may be that the line of communications for the purpose of securing the supply cannot be maintained absolutely securely. In that case, the plan should rather be abandoned and absolutely necessary articles obtained somehow by land routes from Russia, India and China, which would be more advantageous. In that event, the expenses of naval expansion may be cut and the fund thus saved devoted to the

encouragement of industry in the Asiatic continent, thereby laying a foundation of an independent supply of the necessary articles from the continent.

The battleship, Mutsu, which was recently launched in Yokosuka, was built at an estimated cost of ¥50,000,000. But the actual cost reached from to ¥70,000,000 to ¥80,000,000. A naval unit of eight battleships and eight battle cruisers of the latest type may be absolutely necessary for national defense, however conservatively we may plan for the navy, so that it may be well to built the war ships in accordance with the plan already decided. But the radical elements among the naval circles emphatically urge on an annual expenditure of ¥150,000,000 for new constructions in order to complete the unit of eight and eight. Moreover, they urge the completion of three units of eight and eight. But in Japan much criticism has be levelled at the serious defect of the arrangements for the means of communications, sanitation and education, in comparison with the expenditures for the defense works. I am in sympathy with the critics to some extent. Especially, today when the people's war is anticipated, expenditures for bettering the character of the people are needless to say

absolutely necessary from the point of view of national defense.

Various expenditures for developing industry on the Asiatic continent are also absolutely necessary. These expenditures are insignificant in amount. The cost of one battleship will be sufficient to maintain the undertakings for several years.

From the point of view of national economy, the naval expansion should be limited to the extent of the present plan. If, then, Japan and America should fight in the near future, we should be determined to meet the American forces with the preparations made in accordance with the present plan. The naval power of the Empire will then be confined to a very narrow limit, and the next naval expansion will have to be delayed until the national economy will permit it for which the completion of the three units of eight battleships and eight battle cruisers will be the goal.

B. *The Empire's Land Power*

The phrase land power was perhaps a new one used by myself for the first time. Perhaps because our navy is a literal translation from England, many of our naval officers in discussing

the problem of national defense literally apply things British, in spite of the fact that the conditions of England and Japan are different. For instance, there is a sentence "The fleet is the first line of national defense." That may truly apply in England. But for Japan which has territory or sphere of influence on the continent, the first line of national defense is on the land as well as on the sea. In the sea front, to be sure, the first line is the fleet. In the land front, it should be said that the first line of defense is an army. Again, our naval officers often say that because Japan is an island Empire she must maintain her naval power. But naval power is not the only thing needed to be maintained. Land power must be maintained. So I employed the phrase land power. Why Japan must by all means maintain her land power on the Asiatic continent was amply explained by Mr. Shunosuke Inada, an eminent authority on political history, in an article on "The Position of Greater Japanese Empire." I shall borrow a passage from him below.

"Our Greater Japanese Empire lies stretched narrow and long on the sea along the Asiatic continent. She feels considerably the pressure from the continent. Should there be a powerful

race on the continent who came to attack our cuntry, we will feel a great menace from such pressure. Of old, there was the civil war of Kumaso in Kyushu, who was supported by the Koreans. Consequently, Empress Jingo conquered the peninsula of three states of Korea, thereby maintaining the peace of Kyushu. Again, when the Ezoites, Ainus, taking their position in the northern part of the main island of Japan, opposed the Imperial forces, those who allied with the Ezoites and showed their power were the powerful tribes in the eastern end of the Asiatic continent; the Su Shens, the Mo Hos, the Tartars, who threatened us in turn. When Hirafu Abe was engaged in the subjugation of the eastern barbarians, he attacked the Su Shens by going forth with a fleet of 200 vessels. When Tamuramaro Sakanouye went to the northern part of Japan on a punitive expedition he killed King Akuro of the Tartars, thus and only thus attaining his success. These facts show that that the way to preserve the territorial integrity of our main island was to uproot the evils on the continent. When the Mongolians with their ambitions of the world conquest came to attack us they first conquered Korea and with the peninsula as their base of operation used the Koreans as their advance

guards. The attack was made upon Japan twice in 1274 and in 1281. Later, in 1419, when the combined fleet of Mongolia and South Sea powers composed of 1,300 vessels attacked our Tsushima, the guides were the Koreans. That shows that in order to maintain the territorial integrity of the main island of Japan no powerful foreign nation should be permitted to control Korea. Some historians regard that the conquest of Korea by Hideyoshi Toyotomi, known as Taico, was a reckless undertaking. But that undertaking was a natural expression of the national impulse of the Japanese race. The expeditionary army sent by Toyotomi subjugated Korea, ruled that peninsula for four years, meanwhile annihilating the army of the Ming Emperor of China in Korea, so that the Ming Emperor had no more desire to come again to fight. In spite of the fact that China had extended her domain in the days of Emperor Kang Hsi and Kang Liu and was engaged in wars of conquest, she could not put her finger on Japan. was due to the fear of Japan she had entertained since the time of Taico's Korean conquest.

“Since the Meiji Restoration, Japan had been busy making her internal administrative improvement and developing her civilization. She

had no ambition to extend her territory. Only our countrymen could not for a moment be equanimous if any other powerful foreign nation should establish its power in Korea. Consequently when China attempted to control Korea we objected to it, and the war with China ensued. Later, when Russia tried to control the Korean peninsula and to make the Japan sea her garden pond, Japan dispatched it, and the war with Russia ensued. In order to maintain the safety of our island Empire, we occupied Formosa and Korea; and in order to guarantee for the safety of the Korean peninsula, we made South Manchuria, which lies behind the peninsula. our sphere of influence. These things were done within the limit necessary for safeguarding the territorial integrity of the Empire".

Some years ago, many of our naval officers advocated a policy of guarding the north and advancing southward and urged abandonment of Manchuria and Mongolia. But when Takamori Saigo urged on a conquest of Korea, he did so on the fundamental ground that in order to defend the Empire against powerful Russia she must establish her foothold on the continent. In that point, Saigo's views agreed with those of Mr. Inada. Saigo's soul living will be thank-

ful that he found at last a friend who understood him in Mr. Inada. A strange development is that in a magazine, an organ of the Navy Society composed of many of these naval officers, such article on continental development just quoted was printed. Our naval officers have certainly made a great improvement along with the march of times. The reasons of the necessity of our Empire's continental development, that is, the reasons why Japan must maintain her land power on the continent, are as given in the passage just quoted. Besides, along with the increase of our population it has become necessary even in times of peace to import food stuffs from the continent. Not only that, when the modern warfare has come to be conducted in a gigantic scale, we must obtain the supply of war materials and provisions necessary in times of war. Thus it will be seen that not only in times of war, but also in times of peace, the Empire cannot safeguard her existence if she were separated from the continent. For these reasons, the Empire must by all means securely maintain her land power on the continent.

The existing organization of our army was based upon the principle of economical armament devised by Scharnhorst of Germany in an

olden time. Consequently, the Japanese military conscription service is divided into three classes, the regular, the first reserve and the second reserve, in all extending for 17 years and 4 months. A war time organization is perfected in the main by mobilizing all men in the three classes of service. Therefore, if a new division is to be added to our army, its organization cannot be perfected for wartime purposes until about 18 years after its start. When General Oshima was the minister of war, he referred to an 18 year plan in course of his explanation in the Diet. At that time, he was laughed at by the people for such reference. It was because the people did not understand this point. If the principle which has so far been upheld is to continue to be practiced, any new arrangement that may be planned for the organization of our army must be started 18 years ahead. The size of military strength necessary for safe-guarding the land power of the Empire depends largely upon the development of the communication nets on the Asiatic continent. If the communication nets of the Asiatic continent should be developed ten or more years afterward so that they will not differ much from Europe, the wartime military strength of the Empire derivable from the existing army

system will be sufficient to safeguard the land power of the Empire.

But this questions should be treated as a pure theory. As a practical proposition, we should not disregard the financial problem. The total national budget presented to the 42nd session of the Imperial Japanese Diet devoted ¥62,000,000 to the army and the navy out of the total national expenditures of ¥1,276,000,000, that is it was about one half of the total. Our defense expenditures were very large, indeed. If the expenditures for the army were, say only one-third, it amounted to about ¥200,000,000. After the Russo-Japanese War, General Kodama said to me "Before the war we were in the habit of talking about ten year plan. When times change so much, we cannot foretell the events of ten years after. A five year plan should be sufficient". There may be many reasons adduced to the army plans devised out of theory. But we cannot foretell the events of ten or more years. So, as I said in regard to the naval plans, we should attend wholeheartedly to readjusting the immediate means of national defense, and devote a surplus fund saved to the work of improving the quality of the people and to developing the industry on the continent.

24. *The Defense and Industry*

The most important lesson which we have learnt from the great world war was the fact that industry served as a most important element from the point of view of national defense. Formerly, the standard to judge the strength of a nation has been only the number of soldiers and their quality. Today, the military strength is measured by the industrial strength of the nation. No matter how great the number of soldiers, a country where industry is not developed is like a gun without ammunition. The army will not have the value to defend such country. Dr. Okochi presented me with a pamphlet, entitled "Fundamental Principle of National Defense Plan". What he said in the pamphlet is identical with what I have stated in detail in my work "General National Mobilization", and I should certainly agree with him in the views expressed. Regarding these views, Dr. Yoshino contributed an article endorsing them to the October issue of the *Chuwō Koron*, Central Review, Japanese monthly, which is here recommended to the readers.

Dr. Okochi argued that "The army and naval strength in wartimes should be estimated with Japan's industrial and agricultural strength,

natural resources, supply of raw materials, etc., as the basis of calculation". If "Japan" in his meaning had referred only to the island country of Japan, we would have to stop war altogether. If strictly Japan proper was meant, we shall come into difficulties in the first place with the question of iron. The demand of iron in Japan in peace time exceeds the supply by about 500,000 tons annually. If the supply from Manchuria and Korea and raw materials secured from China were set aside, the shortage of supply will be still far greater. Dr. Okochi argues that if no solution be found Japan will have to reduce the size of the army. According to this argument, Japan for the iron problem alone will be able only to have a few divisions for the army and a few battleships for the navy.

We have a little bolder ideas about this problem. We are firmly resolved that, in order to satisfy the demand for wartime materials and provisions, we should plan for the industrial development of the continent. That the iron foundry industry was encouraged in Japan proper in the beginning was a mistake. From the economic point of view, it will not be profitable to obtain ores by paying a high freight and to manufacture iron by paying high wages of labor and high prices for fuel. I believe

that from the fear that, if iron were manufactured in foreign countries, the national defense of the Empire will not be safe, that the make-shift plan was adopted. But will it not be a better plan to encourage the manufacturing industry in China and Siberia, where the supply of iron ores and coal is inexhaustible and to obtain the supply of products cheap and continuously?

Not only in the case of the iron problem, but also in the case of coal, wool, cotton and other raw materials for manufacturing implements of war, we should encourage the development of the industry on the continent. Of the war materials there are not a few articles, the raw materials for which are not produced in Japan proper.

But these materials are as a rule plentifully produced in China and Siberia. Only aluminium alone possibly is not produced in those countries. If Dr. Okochi means to have Japan engage in a war with the line of supply established on the continent, that will be an absolute impossibility.

The economic development of Japan on the continent is absolutely necessary not only for securing the supply of war materials for war-time, but also for securing the supply of pro-

visions for peace time. The population of Japan is increasing annually by 750,000. The density of population per square mile is 400 for Japan and only 31 for America. Yet our countrymen are not permitted freely to enter America. Besides, the Japanese may not be suited to be immigrants in foreign domains, for only 350,000 of our countrymen are residing abroad. But I am an optimist regarding the emigration of the Japanese people to foreign lands. In my opinion, we should regard Japan as a ship. A ship itself does not produce any food stuff. But if the supply can be obtained from elsewhere any number of people can live aboard the ship. As a large number of persons live on the hill side of the Onsen-ga-Take or Karuizawa resorts where food is not produced from the soil enough to feed them, so the Japanese people will do well if the economic development is carried out on the continent, money earned thereby and with the money food is purchased for their countrymen. For instance, referring to rice, the staple food stuff is short of supply in Japan proper, to our great embarrassment. But along the Yangtze Kiang, China, a short distance across the water, the rice produced in the year 1918 amounted to about 223,000,000 koku¹. The population of

the regions is about 180,000,000. Grant that one person consumes 1 koku per annum,² the remainder after the total consumption is deducted will be 40,000,000 koku.³ To be sure, in China there are still today in force the likin tax, the export ban on grains and other hindrances to exportation. But if some way be found to have the objectionable system abolished there will be no reason why Japan should suffer from the lack of supply of rice.

The cases of other food stuffs may be imagined by deduction from the example of rice. If only Japan could maintain her line of supply on the continent, there is no reason why Japan should suffer from inconvenience.

Thus it will be seen that, from the point of view of future relations between national defense and industry, Japan should economically develop on the continent more and more.

Horse raising is another matter to the point. It is unwise to encourage it in Japan proper as hitherto. It should be developed by all means in Manchuria and Korea. When thus the center of our national defense and industry shifts to the continent, it will be advantageous

1 Koku is 49,629 bushels, dry measure.

2 A rough average per person.

3 Japan's annual production is about 50,000,000 to 60,000,000 koku.

sooner or later to remove the capital of the Empire to Seoul, Korea, and to let the people of the newly acquired land to benefit all the more by the civilization of Japan.

25. *Campaign of Education*

The Japanese Empire was founded, as was revealed in the Imperial Decree on establishing the national capital issued by Jinmu Tenno, the founder of the Empire, upon the principle of righteousness, and the Empire has the great mission to develop in the world. As the Europeans and the Americans are making efforts in the direction of spreading the gospel, of education and charity and otherwise offering personal sacrifices for educational campaign, so it is the duty of the Yamato race, who have at their head the graceous Imperial family of unbroken lineage, to undertake to spread the benefits of the unbounding Imperial virtues to rescue the 600,000,000 people of East Asia. That is well indicated in the Imperial Rescript on Education, "The way here set forth is indeed the teaching bequeathed by our Imperial Ancestores, to be observed alike by their Descendants and the subjects; infallible for all ages and true in all places." That service is a work

of spreading the civilisation of the Empire to the Empire to other lands.

The China policy of European and American Powers changed completely from about 1913 and 1914. The age of the Powers dreaming about the partition of the Chinese territory has already passed. They are now single-minded for the preservation of territorial integrity of China, the open door and equal opportunity and are exerting efforts for educational work. Of all the foreign nations interested in the work, the American efforts and success have been wonderful. The educational work in olden times had been used as an advance step for aggressive designs. Even today there are not lacking those who take advantage of it for strengthening the ground for economic war. But the majority of the Americans engaged in the work are doing it self-sacrificingly.

I was in China for three years until 1914. During that time, Dr. Reinsch came as the American minister to China. Rather than a diplomatist, he is a scholar. When I met him, he emphasized that in order to rescue China from the existing condition the Powers should make efforts in the direction of educational campaign. Since then seven years have passed. Until he left Peking, last year, 1919, he has

been making self-sacrificing efforts for educational work in China. Judging from what he said to me, he did not seem to be making those efforts altogether for the sake of America's capitalistic Imperialism. He is indeed a true sympathizer for the Chinese. His words and actions did not at all seem to have sprung up from any selfish ambition. "Charity to other benefits oneself", as a saying has it. As the result of hidden benefits given to China, the influence of America has increased to the present degree. According to a report of Mr. Julian Arnold, American commercial attache stationed in Peking, there are over 3,000 American missionaries residing in China. Three-fourth of the educational and medical institutions in which religious workers are interested in China are conducted by the American missionaries. The amount of money sent to China annually for these enterprises from various organizations in America is surprisingly large, reaching to the figure of ¥12,000,000. America is interested in various educational enterprises not only for China but also for the people of Siberia.

But what is Japan doing in the way of educational work for China and Siberia? There are only the Toa Dobun Kwai (East Asia Identical Letter Society) and the Dojin Kwai

(Brotherhood Society). But the work of these societies have not produced any noteworthy degree of success. That is due after all to the fact that the ideal of the Japanese nobilities and wealthy classes is low and they do not keenly realize the necessity of such endeavors, and there are a few of them who invest their money to support such enterprises. But as I have said before, it is absolutely necessary from the economic and national defense point of view. The government should not leave the work altogether to the people, but give a thorough going protection to these enterprises and to guide the people in developing the enterprise. Especially, when there has been a great famine in northern China recently and Siberia is also seriously lacking in goods, the government and the people have not done as yet anything at all.*

It is indeed extraordinary. In that manner, it is too much to expect the spread of the civilization of Japan under the great principle of national foundation of the Empire.

* This book was originally written before any step was taken by the Japanese to relieve the Chinese suffering from famine.

CHAPTER V.

SINCERE WORK OF DEFENSE

26. *Preparations for General National
Mobilization*

When I published a book on "General National Mobilization in March, 1918, I prefaced the book with the following remarks.

" 'Sun Tze in the course of discussion of the stratagem of war said 'the first principle is to win the confidence of the people, so that they will resolve to die for and live for the ruler without any feat of him'. He meant that war should be conducted with a united support of the people. Judging from the recent great European war, the parting of the way for victory or defeat depends, as Sun Tze said, upon whether one side or the other conformed to the first principle. This fundamental principle laid down by Sun Tze several thousand years ago should be regarded truly unchangeable for ages. The Sino-Japanese war was only a wrestling with fingers, and the Russo-Japanese war a

wrestling with arms. How shall the Empire fight the next war when she should engage in it? It will be a wrestling in which the energy of the entire body shall be exerted. The people of the Empire in order to escape from the horrors of a defeat in a war should be resolved thus. From the times of peace, the people, high and low, should pay serious attention to perfecting preparations for a people's war". I described in the book how each and every one of the belligerent nations in the late war has conducted a general national mobilization, and how they have continued to fight amidst insuperable difficulties, and told the inside conditions of England, France and Germany without reserve, in order to awaken our countrymen. The phrase "General National Mobilization" was also invented by myself. At first, the effect of the phrase upon the people did not seem to have been great, perhaps because it was a new phrase to which the people had not been accustomed. But recently many persons have come to employ it. Especially, Dr. Okochi in his pamphlet on "Fundamental Principle of National Defense Plan" emphatically declared that the so-called general national mobilization is a most important element of na-

tional defense plan. I am overjoyed to note that.

General National mobilization is a very complete and far-reaching undertaking in its effect. Consequently, while I may briefly explain it here such a small book as this cannot exhaust the discussion. Those who are particularly interested are referred to my work on "General National Mobilization". In preparing for a general national mobilization the most serious defect of Japan will be the lack of close relations between the army, the navy and the people. When a section of the members of the National Defense Society bolted from it and organized a Navy Society, a separate organization, the late Mr. Buyei Nakano* who was the president of the National Defense Society then was of the opinion that "National defense cannot be perfected unless the army, the navy and the people should cooperate in studying the problem". He exerted his efforts for continuing the National Defense Society and for bringing the three elements closer together. But these three elements are still in discord today for various reasons. The lack of uniformity in the

* Mr. Nakano was a business man of note, president of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and of the Municipal Assembly; died a few years ago.

system of weights and measures is a great hindrance and economic waste in utilizing various products of machines. Likewise, the present conditions of the three elements referred not opening the door wide each to another and each separately studying the common problem in its own way not only shows a simple lack of unity but also it is a great obstacle to progress. For instance, in establishing an aviation corps, it is already very inconvenient that the army and the navy have their separate corps established each for itself. There is no reason why one should be instructed by French officers while the other by British officers. Referring to the manufacture of implements of war, if I were to point out defects one by one in detail, there will be no end of regret. I am informed that a uniform style of aeroplanes is to be decided upon. But looking at the list of names of the committee members to consider the matter, as published in the newspapers, I find that they are altogether the army officers. In this manner it is a long way yet to securing a unity of the army and the navy.

That England, France, Germany and America in the recent war were able to carry out the general national mobilization in an orderly manner attested to the advancement of the

industrial power of those countries. To our great regret, in Japan the industrial power has not yet been developed to the degree of these western countries. Besides, as I have said before, the army takes the lessons from Germany or France, the navy from England, the people from England or America or at home, each in its own way without any unity. We should let war ships, arms, air machines be manufactured by the private firms and encourage their competitive development, under the proper government supervision and guidance, that is showing a policy of unity in times of peace. Leaving the matter to shift itself in a loose manner as was done in European and American countries and suddenly conducting a general national mobilization, it is problematical whether we will be able to undertake an industrial mobilization, although we may not meet serious difficulties in mobilizing armies, horses or ships as we had a practical experience in the wars we fought.

Especially, in preparing to secure supplies of war materials, as I have explained in detail in a preceding chapter, Japan should make careful plans and preparations concerning the production of raw materials and their manufactures in the Asiatic continent so that she may be enabled

to establish an independence of supply of war materials in times of war. Such large scale undertakings cannot be accomplished by the efforts alone of a section of the Bureau of census. Let alone the question of other countries, Japan absolutely needs an independent department for war materials. For the same reason, we need an independent department of aviation in order to unify the service of supervision of the aviation enterprises of the army, the navy and the people. It may appear at first sight that such undertaking is rather very grandiose. But if we want seriously to prepare for a general national mobilization and to see that nothing shall be lacking in the way of national defense in times of war, these two departments should be permanently established by all means in times of peace. While every one recognizes the need of these arrangements, the will power is lacking to carry through the ideas suggested. It shows that the sincerity is lacking in preparing for the national defense.

27. *The Encouragement of Military Industrial Art*

The progress of military industrial art during the great world war has been wonderful. Such progress generally commensurates with the de-

velopment of industry among the people. But with the industrial power of our country which is far behind Europe and America so far, it will need a considerable amount of efforts to bring our progress to the European and American standard, upon which it is not necessary here to enlarge.

“Three persons gathered together will arrive at the wisdom of Monju,”* so it is popularly said. Our military industrial art has been studied by the army and the navy, each separately without any cooperation between the two services. The responsibility of developing the industry rests not merely upon the army or the navy. It should be shouldered by the nation as a whole. In Japan, in regard to the special art such as the manufacture of war vessels and arms, especially the latter, the private persons had almost no experience. Consequently, the army and the navy authorities have scorned very much the industrial power of our private parties. But today the private industrialists have very far advanced that they should not be lightly treated. If our army and navy authorities should be openhearted and encourage private undertakings, I believe unexpectedly

* Monju Boza:tsu was a wise Buddhist priest.

good results will be obtained. Regarding the manufacture of air machines, according to the experience of various countries in the recent war, the government factories have shown the worst records. It is reported that the progress of air machines of today was due to the result of free competition among the people.

For the improvement of arms which is the very foremost among the urgent needs today, we should as I have said before establish a department of war materials in order to secure a unity of service of the army and the navy in that regard. The experts should be civil officials, so that they may serve in common among the army, the navy and the people. If that is done, such experts may be able to serve the army, the navy and among the people interchangeably when an industrial mobilization is conducted. It will be a very convenient method. Not only that, but it will be convenient in encouraging military industrial art among the people of wider circles. One of the causes of lack of progress of our manufacture of arms in the past has been that too much secrecy has been maintained so far and only a very small number of persons were consulted secretly as to the improvement and progress of the undertaking.

Dr. Okochi said that there is no other institution which maltreats experts so much as the Japanese army. I am in accord with him in that regard. When the issue was raised as to the better treatment of experts, the army and the navy authorities have assiduously maintained an attitude of preserving in service the old, worn-out experts who had been pure military men. Our idea is that a great reform should be introduced in our system of experts, their pay increased to perfection, and as Dr. Shimomura has said in his work on "The Future of the Japanese Race" a law should be passed for conferring special medals of honor to scholars for their better treatment. At any rate, to those who have rendered meritorious service, medals of honor should be conferred so as to recognize their service. Whether in the government service or in the private employment, any one who has excellent ability should be decidedly promoted.

Whether in regard to war ships or arms, if there be need of invention or improvement, details of the expectations and the outline of specifications should be determined and a popular competition should be conducted in a rather wide circles, whether official or private. If any application is promising, an opportunity

should at once be given for testing it. Any one attaining a success should be rewarded properly, and if the successful person be willing he should be requested to serve as an official. In these and other ways the door of opportunity should be opened for experts.

In that way, the progress of military industrial art may be expected. If these suggestions be made to proper authorities, no one of them will disagree, but at the same time efforts to put the suggestions into practice are not readily made. That is due to the fact that various time-honored sentimental conventionalities have persisted and the authorities are resigned to the inevitable fate of new suggestions not being easy to put into practice. After all, they make light of the idea of a war with America and do not seriously study the problem of national defense. If it should be decided that there will be a Japanese-American War, these suggestions will at once be put into immediate practice.

28. *Relative Urgency of the Army and the Navy Armaments*

A competition between America and Japan in naval expansion would be like that of a vain wife who without regard for the financial condition of her own household would try vigorously

to compete with a wife of a narikin¹ in having fashionable clothes, obi² or haori³ of the latest style, spending for it thousands of yen; that is indulging in the Mitsukoshi Hobby⁴. Fashion changes from time to time. The wife of the narikin not hard up for money would at once abandon her former clothings immediately upon the change of fashion and buy new clothes. If she is to be caught up in the habit, a wife of ordinary means will soon have her husband declared bankrupt. The arguments for a surprise attack fleet by Mr. Hiramoto in his book "Shall Japan and America Fight?" are worth listening to. I once had entertained similar views. But as I had relied upon the ability of our naval authorities I had neither self-confidence nor courage to discuss the point raised by him.

No sooner than England had stopped her naval expansion for five years on the ground of financial readjustment after the war, Lord Fisher's views were made public, declaring that the future of the British navy should be under water and a main strength of a navy which does not command submarine power is now

1 A person who got rich quick.

2 A Japanese sash.

3 A Japanese surcoat for kimono.

4 Mitsukoshi is a fashionable department store in Tokyo.

useless. Lord Fisher has his supporters and critics. Why have the dreadnoughts of the former type become useless as Lord Fisher claims is because the power of a battleship to defend itself has been fairly strong against low trajectory fire, but against shells reaching high on the deck or dropped vertically, it was almost defenseless. As guns are now-a-days fired from a distance of 20,000 metres, the shell discharged falls almost perpendicularly upon the deck. No dreadnaught can withstand such attack. If a bomb is dropped from an enemy's air machine, a dreadnaught will meet a similar fate. Consequently, Lord Fisher argued, there is no other way for defense but to go under water. These arguments have been well known by the time the special session of this year, 1920, was held. Yet not one member of either the House of Peers or the House of Representatives of Japan asked questions regarding the tendency of naval construction, unless I failed to notice the questions reported in the press. Neither was there any one, as far as I knew, who proposed in the Diet that the construction of surprise attack vessels as suggested by Mr. Hiramoto be given precedence and the construction of vessels for the main strength of the fleet be postponed. Thus, the bill for con-

structing a fleet unit of eight battleships and eight battle cruisers of the latest type was voted straightway. The expenditure for defense works for the fiscal year of 1920 amount to about one-half of the total national budget, while the expenditures for the navy amount to about one-third. Are not the gentlemen of both the House of the Diet still caught by the old idea that the affairs of national defense are outside of their responsibility and that they should be left altogether to the army and the navy authorities? This is a rather lamentable situation.

Regarding the army, I suggest that the theoretical plan of armaments of which I made a mention in Chapter 4 be postponed for the time being. Regarding other matters I have various views regarding reform. But this little book has no space for them. I am now planning to publish a book "Reform of the Army". I recommend to the readers to glance at it when published. One thing I want to add here is that whereas by the martial spirit for which the Yamato race has been noted from olden times the method of war, which is called the skirmish among the army circles, that is a warfare by surprise attacks with small units, assaults, night attacks and other swift actions, which have been the strong point of the Ja-

panese army men, I hear that during the Siberian expedition, when the Japanese soldiers often encountered the necessity of such skirmishing, our men have not been up to the standard. Shihei Hayashi¹ in his work on *Kaikoku Heidan*, the naval warfare, described that the Japanese people were adept in skirmishes, giving a number of examples. If we were really determined to regard America as our enemy, what I especially wish is that our army authorities would exert their efforts in training our men as a part of the military education for skirmishes.

At the end of Chapt I of this book I suggested that when America is exhausted during the progress of the war a number of death-daring bands of 2,000 or 3,000 each be organized to attack the mainland and dependencies of America, like the *Wo-Kao*² of old, thereby terrorizing the entire American people. Some Americans may say that I am bluffing; so I shall below prove that I am not bluffing. There are many books which have been written concerning the bravery of the Japanese pilates in the *Wo-Kao*. I have decided to use an article written by Mr. Shudo Goto in an issue

1 Patriot before Restoration.

2 Vide Note page 42.

of the Asia Jiron, a monthly, which I happened to have on hand. It describes how a party of only fifty Japanese sailing on a so-called Yawata Bune, a vessel, landed in the neighborhood of Nanking and how they trampled upon ten or more provinces extending over a thousand of miles. In the Ming Period, cities in various parts of China were defended by means of strong fortifications erected. The bravery shown by only fifty Japanese who trampled like tigers released in the prairie cannot be regarded a mere human affair. My idea is that if bands of such death-daring men numbering about 2,000 or 3,000 each should be thrown in upon San Francisco it would be very interesting, indeed. I purposely mentioned these facts as examples, because if the facts had been written by our historians some Americans may suspect that the records were written specially in order to boast of the bravery of the Japanese. But what Mr. Goto wrote was amply substantiated by various historical illustrations furnished by the historical works by falsehood. I shall borrow a few passages from the article.

“About the time Shingen Takeda and Ken-*

* Two warrior daimyos in the middle belt of Main Island of Japan fought the battle in 1555.

shin Uyesugi" were engaged in a struggle for mastery in the decisive battle of Kawanakajima in Japan, that is on July 30, 1553, a pilatical band of fifty Japanese raided Nanking, devastating the city and in the evening of that day left the city for the east."

"They were returning to Shih lin, their base of operation".

"The Komei Jitsu Roku describes it as follows.

"The Japanese pilatical raiders went from Nanking to Mo Ling Kuan, where Generals Lo Chieh-hsiang and Hsu Cheng-sung with a force of 1,000 men defended the gates to the city. But these were afraid of the raiders and fled'.

"The raiders then pased the gate and reached Yang Liu Kau in Piao Sui Prefecture. General Ling Wen-ching at the head of a force tried to defend the city but in vain. Chao Chu-chih, the acting governor of the prefecture, abandoned the city and fled. The raiders then entered the city from the northern gate and held a banquet and passed the night in the house of a private citizen'".

Mr. Goto describes the raid as if the fifty Japanese raiders were passing an uninhabited land devastating it. We shall omit details. But

at the end of his article he added the following sentences.

“The Komei Jitsu Roku describes at the end of the narrative as follows.

“ ‘The raiders, consisting of not more than 60 or 70 men, escaped from Shaohsing and Kaohu and marching through Hang, Hen, Hui, Ning and Taiping arrived at Nanking, covering a thousand of miles. They attacked Nanking and massacred and killed in the battles 4,000 to 5,000 persons. They killed one supervisor, one acting governor of a prefecture, two commanders of the armies and two lieutenant commanders. They entered two other prefectures and after 80 days at last disappeared’.

“The names of those who were killed were given. Later, on account of the incident, 46 persons were punished with dismissal including Governor-general Chang Shih-che, Provincial Inspector Chen Chu, the two officials appointed by the Emperor of China, and other high officials.

29. *Realization of all the People as Soldiers*

Dr. Okochi, in his “Fundamental Principle of National Defense”, argued that “A country like England which is surrounded by the sea and detached from other countries and is invested

with a powerful navy has ample time at least to replenish the army after a war has been commenced. It is not necessary to maintain a large army in times of peace". He added that at least as far as the army is concerned the fundamental principle which Japan should take is the principle of replenishment of the army in war times. His arguments are at first thought rather plausible. But under the present condition of Japan it will be a difficult matter to organize a large army on short notice. If the people were fully public-spirited and trained in peace for organized actions as in England or America, the idea may be well applied. In a country like Japan where the unity of organization had been maintained hitherto by means of decorum which unity was destroyed by the reformation at the time of the Restoration of the direct Imperial rule, and where no public-spirit or orderly life has yet been developed to take the place of the old system, it is inadvisable to adopt at once the principle of replenishing the army on the spot in war times. It will be necessary in order to carry out the suggestion to militarize the people and to socialize the army, so that the two elements will become more closely related with each other, ultimately resulting in an ideal system

of six months of regular service. I have explained this matter in detail in a book "Social Problem of National Defense", which will shortly be published as a part of the series on the studies of modern social problems which are conducted under the auspices of the Japan Social Science Institute. I shall therefore omit details here.

In order to put the ideal system into practice, it is absolutely necessary for Japan as is done in England, America, France and other countries to encourage the Veterans' Associations, the Young Men's Volunteer Associations, and other similar organizations, make further efforts for encouraging physical culture, the military training in public schools and otherwise perfecting the system of military spirit education. A greater part of these undertakings should fall upon the shoulder of the minister of education. But these suggestions may not after all be carried out for financial reasons. For perfecting the system of military spirit education about ¥30,000,000 may be necessary annually in order to produce a tolerable amount of results. ¥30,000,000 is only five per cent of the total expenditures for armaments. If so small an amount can produce so great a result in the interest of national defense, I would not be

content, were I minister of education, with merely ranking in the cabinet like a camp-follower but would stake my position in my attempt to get that amount of money wrested from the army and the navy appropriations in order to perfect the system of military spirit education. But no one will make a minister of education out of me, a safe thing, indeed.

Referring to the principle of replenishing the army in war times, there will be no fruit unless the seed was sown. No matter how much our brain were ransacked, there can be no good plan devised which will actually replenish the means of national defense, unless we put money in the undertaking. That England succeeded in carrying out the principle of replenishing the army on the spot in the war time was due to the fact that an enormous amount of money has been invested in times of peace to lay the foundation for it. According to Dr. Shimomura's work "The Future of the Japanese Race," the British statistics before the war gave the amount of money appropriated in England before the war at ¥913,906,750 per annum, that is ¥10.50 per capita. Comparing with the war expenses, we are told that the annual army expenses were ¥150,000,000, and the navy expenses ¥335,000,000, totalling ¥485,000,000,

which was far less than the physical culture educational expenditures, that is about one-half of them. The British are a race who are most enthusiastic about sports. Annual expenditures for sports are 20 shillings or more per capita, the total investment aggregating ¥470,000,000, of which ¥450,000,000 is spent, surprisingly large amounts.

Turning to the condition of physical culture in Japan, we find that ours are very insignificant. It is not surprising that our delegates to the Olympic Athletic Contest could not win any place at all. The physical conditions of the Japanese people are that whereas their spirit is strong their body is weak, as if they were dogs suffering from hydrophobia. If we take the problem of national defense seriously, we should first encourage physical culture of the people.

IF JAPAN AND AMERICAN FIGHT NOW

CHAPTER VI

IF JAPAN AND AMERICA SHOULD FIGHT NOW?

30. *Can the Japanese Army and the Navy as They are Now Face the American Forces with Advantage?*

Taking for granted that America is our hypothetical enemy, and considering the state of our national defense seriously, we find that, as I have pointed out in Chapter 5, there are not a few things in our army and navy arrangements which need to be improved. Although we may awaken our countrymen by sounding alarmist note and conduct the so-called moral mobilization, as the result of which our people may become alert, it will not be possible to perfect our serious work of defense in half a year or one year. While some of us may boast about ourselves, will our country be able to meet the American expeditionary forces by confronting them with our army and navy in the present conditions, should America really come to invade our country? That is a problem which is agitating many of our countrymen.

The army and the navy preparations for defense of Japan being as they are at present, if the war should at once open, the situation will be as I shall describe below. It is not improbable that the enemy's aviation corps will at once attack Japan, or that Japan will suffer from shortage of the supply of war materials. While there may be a degree of difficulty experienced, in the main it is not necessary for Japan to become so very seriously pessimistic.

In the Sino-Japanese war and the Russo-Japanese war, we did a considerable amount of hasty preparations when they broke out. The unpreparedness in the siege of Port Arthur as I described in 20 was an example. In times of peace, no decision had been made for the siege of Port Arthur. Consequently, the materials needed for the siege had not been prepared ahead. It was decided only two or three months before the opening of the war; that is, from the Japanese plans of operations, Port Arthur was eventually to be attacked. It was not a final decision at all. At the time, the number of siege guns worthy of the name was very few. Consequently, the guns placed at the fortresses on the coast and the ammunition were collected and the materials for the siege were prepared somehow. While thus the

method adopted was a hasty one, the earnestness of the people was something extraordinary. They showed the zeal of students before an examination, of which I made a mention before. At once the preparations were completed. Among the arms and ammunitions there were some articles which needed to be newly manufactured. At any rate, the arrangements were perfected within a few days so that the army could mobilize. Not only in regard to the materials for the siege operation, but also in regard to other matters, there were many other similar affairs both in the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese wars, which there is no time to tell in detail.

From the experiences we had in the past wars, we have come to have a faith in the old sayings, such as "Hard-pressed, one will find the way out", or "Once determined to do a thing, there will be nothing impossible", etc. Perhaps because of this faith, I am firmly confident that so long as the people are in real earnestness our army and navy, as they are, will be able to meet the American expeditionary forces face to face without any fear. Especially, if we are to expect the American forces coming to attack us, we will be in a defensive position altogether, and we shall need only to keep the

watch in the direction of the Pacific Ocean by means of our army and navy in a perfect order. We may be able to wait at leisure for the enemy to come. In return, we should, as I have advocated, take a forward attitude in our economic activities in the continent with a ten-year plan.

31. *How Japan will be Attacked from Air*

I may be rather optimistic regarding the Japanese-American war. But though an optimist, I entertain anxiety about the condition of our air service. Especially, today, when we hear so much about the advancement of the air machines in America I cannot but entertain anxiety about the situation all the more. Seriously considering the question of national defense, we cannot but feel great dangers, if we should continue in the present state of slow-going progress in the matter. As I have advocated, an aviation department should be established at once, the relations between the army, the navy and the people made closer, and the entire nation should be united as one man, so that at least the air defense shall be perfected. But even if the suggestion be acted upon now, it will take several months or half a year to put the plan in operation. If the war should break out all at once, how shall

we be attacked from the air? We shall study that question first in order to make up our mind.

If we were defenseless in the air in the event of an immediate war, the American airships may fly over the capital city of Tokyo and drop bombs, which may not be a difficult thing to do. Having no base of operation near, the enemy may not be able to continue the attack from the air in any very large scale. But aeroplanes are liable to come occasionally to attack us. Imagining that Japan will be placed in that calamity, I do not believe that there will be no such thing as the people, men and women, young and old, being placed in such a state of excitement such as was the case when the German Zeppelins which appeared over the city of London. I have had various experiences in my life. I observed that the Europeans and the Americans, especially the women, meeting such dangers, are liable to become frantic in an extreme degree, some of them even losing their mind. But the Japanese people, whether men or women, young or old, are generally cool-headed and are indifferent to life. Besides, even if our country should remain in the present state of defenselessness in the air and the American

air machines should come freely to drop bombs, I am confident that the people will not be terrorized so seriously as to believe that the attack will be a death blow to the country.

After the surrender of Port Arthur, I asked for my own information a number of the Russians who had remained in the beleaguered city how they had felt the effect of the bombardment upon the city. Their collective opinion was that whereas the bombardment upon the city was rather painful thing from the mental point of view, the actual losses suffered from it were insignificant compared with the losses in killed and wounded in the battles of the line of forts. But, then, the beleaguered defenders of the city were gradually accustomed to the bombardments, and they knew that the only thing they would do was to hide in the shelter when bombarded and to come out when the bombardment ceased. Thus, in the course of time, they did not feel any mental pain at all, so they told. England was attacked 108 times by the German air machines throughout the war, suffering losses in killed and wounded totalling 4,820. While the losses from the attacks from the air are liable to be regarded as very large, the number of losses just quoted was after all only about

one-twenty-fourth of the losses in killed and wounded suffered by the British army in the attack upon the peninsula of Gallipoli and about one-fifth of the killed suffered by our army in the attack upon Port Arthur. Such losses, therefore, should not be regarded so very seriously as unbearable. But in the case of defense of a fortress, if the defending forces and the people of the beleaguered city were lacking in hostility and weak-kneed and should a large number of horrible deaths result from the bombardment of the city, movements for surrendering are liable to be started among the people, thereby necessitating the surrender. No matter how weak-minded our people of today may be, I trust that they will not surrender just because our country is attacked from the air. But there is a word to be added here in reference to the dangers from fire which may rise from the attack from the air, which had been exaggerated once in order to arouse interest among the people in the urgency of perfecting the air service. Such dangers may be averted if only the system of fire-extinguishing service is perfected. There will be no danger of an entire city being caught in a fire from such attack, because a fire usually becomes large in many instances when the

people do not know that the fire caught their houses. In the case of a fire caused by bombs dropped from the air it will be known by the people before-hand, so that they will not be slow to act in their efforts to put it out.

The foregoing situation applies to the condition where no air defense work is prepared. However imperfect, Japan has some air machines and air service forces. At present, exclusive efforts are made to manufacture perfect machines which are fit for long-distance flights, because our countrymen are not assured as to whether their hypothetical enemy will be really America.

If it were only to defend ourselves, we may manufacture simple and cheap machines. It will be advantageous to Japan to manufacture a large number of such simple and cheap machines. Then, when the American air machines come to attack Japan, our own machines shall wait at the gate of the country to meet the enemy, and, like a group of falcons enveloping an eagle, our machines shall repulse the enemy.

It will be an easy matter even at the present state of Japan's manufacturing capacity to produce a large number of anti-aircraft guns. It will not be a difficult matter to apply a

method to important buildings in cities for hiding purposes, or to build shelters in different sections of the cities, where the people may betake themselves upon hearing alarms. As for establishing anti-aircraft commanding bureaus in various cities, stationing look-out sentries and observation corps, erecting searchlights, or perfecting the system of alarm, it will be an easy matter to the people who are like the students before an examination, if they should seriously address themselves to the task. Thus considered, it will be safe to say that, even if the war should break out immediately, there will be no need of fear that Japan will be attacked from the air in such a way that we will be unable to meet it with composure.

32. *How Japan Will be Attacked from Sea*

In the event of an immediate breaking out of a Japanese-American war, however superior the American fleet may be, I should declare without fear of contradiction that it will be impossible for the enemy to attack Japan from the sea no matter how much the Americans may be anxious to do so, judged from the geographical condition of the country and so long as we have the navy of the present

standard in service. Americans hearing this declaration of mine may criticize it as a reckless declaration born of the mistaken views as to the greatness of one's own country. Even some of our own countrymen may doubt whether they should rest assured at the declaration of an army man. So I hunted for some views on a Japanese-American naval war by some English or American experts on navy. Fortunately, I found an ideal article to suit my purpose in the contribution to the "Naval and Military Record" of April 28, 1920, by Mr. Hector C. Bywater. I decided to quote from him and I believe there will hardly be any need for me to add anything to it. By the way, Mr. Bywater is a noted British naval expert. Before the war, he was in Berlin as a correspondent of the British magazine, and was well acquainted with the naval conditions in Germany. He has recently cast his eye in the direction of the Orient. The article I quote here was written in the "Naval and Military Record", under the title of "the Sea Power on the Pacific". The views on the Japanese-American naval war as expressed should be regarded as those by an authority on naval questions.

"Compared with this gigantic force, the

Japanese Navy is relatively weak. Reckoning only completed ships, it embraces the following:—Five Dreadnoughts, 4 battle-cruisers, 7 modern pre-Dreadnoughts, 7 light cruisers, 70 destroyers, and 20 submarines. There are many old battleships, cruisers, etc., additional to the foregoing, but they are too feeble to be employed in modern operations.

“As regards new construction, the position is as follows:—

	United States	Japan
Battleships	11	4
Battle-Cruisers	6	8
Light Cruisers	10	34
Destroyers	12	77
Submarines	67	80

“The figures for Japan are considerably higher than might have been anticipated, but they are vouched for by the Naval Office of Intelligence of the United States. Assuming them to be correct, and that all vessels now building in the United States and Japan will be completed within the next three years, the rival navies in 1923 will stand as below. All pre-Dreadnoughts are excluded, excepting only the Japanese Aki and Satsuma, which are approximately equal in fighting value to the early

United States Dreadnoughts Michigan and
South Carolina :—

	United States	Japan
Battleships	29	11
Battle-Cruisers	6	12
Light Cruisers	13	41
Destroyers	330	147
Submarines	166	100

“Within the near future, therefore, the relative position of the Japanese Fleet will be considerably improved, especially in regard to fast ships, and if such a force chose to avoid a general engagement it would be extremely difficult to bring to action. The large number of light cruisers which Japan is said to be constructing would prove a serious menace to American shipping in the event of a conflict, even though submarines were not used as commerce raiders. Japanese weakness in battleships and destroyers would to some extent be compensated by her geographical position. That she would adopt the suicidal course of sending her fleet to give battle in American waters is not to be thought of. On the other hand, the U. S. Fleet would be sorely handicapped in its offensive operations by the lack of adequate base facilities for a large force in

Asiatic waters, and by the necessity of transporting material to the war zone across seven thousand miles of ocean. The problem of strategy which American commanders would have to deal with would be complex and difficult to a degree, and without a very numerous force of light cruisers they might well prove insoluble. If, however, the struggle were prolonged, and the United States had time to mobilize its almost unlimited resources, the issue would hardly be in serious doubt. It is possible that the American papers, which impute warlike ambitions to Japan are doing a grave injustice to the intelligence of the statesmen and people of that country”.

The foregoing was the judgment of a British naval expert, a third party. It should be regarded as a true representation of the situation. The article just quoted presented what I would have said myself. It says that if the main strength of our navy should hide somewhere and adopt the policy of waiting at ease for the exhausted enemy, the American fleet will be placed in a perplexing position. It also says that if the American fleet should conduct an offensive operation it will be sorely handicapped. I only want to add a word. Whereas the chemical industrial power has

gradually conquered nature, the American navy with the present state of progress in that line, will not be able to conquer the natural impregnable geographical conditions of our Empire. Not only our mountains, rivers and islands are naturally impregnable, but the atmospheric current and the ocean current in and around Japan will be serious obstacles to the American fleet in its operation against Japan. If the American fleet should dare to counteract these natural disadvantage that fleet, while the war is being prolonged, will meet such fate as the Mongolian invaders of Japan met centuries ago.

33. *Can the Enemy Land on Our Soil?*

That if an enemy of Japan should attempt to conduct a landing operation on Japan proper, such attempt will result in a complete failure owing to the geographical conditions of the country and the rampant hostility of the people, was mentioned in Chapter 1. There are many persons who would not agree to any proposition unless it is scientifically explained. They may not accept an abstract statement. I shall here add a few words why the landing operations will be impossible scientifically explained.

I said that so long as we have a naval power

of the present standard, it will be impossible for the American forces to attack our country from the sea. It may appear superfluous for me to discuss at length the possibility of otherwise of the American army to land in Japan. Before the war, England, possessing a navy which is the foremost in the world, had been afraid of a forced landing which the German army might conduct simultaneously in a large scale. Consequently, the coast defense works against landing along the coast in England were made unusually secure. Germany, it was reported, secretly studied the plan of landing operation of the American army in Japan.

In the recent world war, the landing operation of the Allied armies of England and France in the Gallipoli peninsula left altogether a record of failure. The operations, however, were conducted simultaneously by force at various points. The operations of the Allies against Turkey was a record-breaking one, unheard of in history. It was a case of purely landing operations in front of the enemy. In them, a remarkable courage was exhibited by the offensive armies against Turkey, thereby the Allies having been able to occupy two points one on the eastern and the other on the western coast of the Peninsula. For various adversities, the Allies were obliged to evacuate

about one year afterwards. In the meantime, the Allies had increased their forces. The total British forces engaged there was about 11½ divisions and the total French forces 2 divisions. The British casualties numbered 117,500, of whom 28,200 were killed. It was a very high price to pay, indeed. The Turkish forces pitted against the Allies were only about 9 divisions. It is a hallucination, in view of this example, to jump at the conclusion that the American army would also be able to land in Japan, because in that war between the Allies and Turkey there was a wide disparity in naval strength between them. Besides, the Turkish army was inactive, and the Allies had the bases of operation near and had a large number of transports at their command. The conditions under which the American army will be placed if they should attempt at landing in Japan will be altogether different. It may be superfluous for me to explain in detail how the conditions are different. But there may be some persons who believe that America has more transports at her command than Japan. So I shall say a word about it. Indeed, America along with her big plan of naval expansion planned also for a big increase of merchant marines and that plan is being carried out. When it is complet-

ed, various vessels will number 1,319, the tonnage totalling 5,924,700 tons. If the American army should land only 10 divisions in Japan, it will mean a more suicidal operation than that of the Anglo-French armies in the Gallipoli peninsula. Now, when the plan of a large fleet of merchant marines is completed and America turned her 6,000,000 tons of ships, which she had already, for other purposes than the war and used the newly built ships for the transportation of the army, how large a number of men can be transported simultaneously? I shall make estimates below.

In Japan, in transporting by ships it has been estimated that $1\frac{1}{2}$ ton of ship space is needed per capita and $4\frac{1}{2}$ tons per head of horse. According to that estimate, 120,000 tons of space was needed for transporting 1 division. That was due to the fact that the distance between Japan and Manchuria over which the transportation has been conducted is only $\frac{1}{6}$ of the distance between Japan and America. In the South African war, because the distance of transportation was so great, England had to provide $4\frac{1}{2}$ tons per capita of men and 17 tons per head of horses, that is about three times as big as was the case of Japan. If the American army should transport their men to Japan,

the distance will be far greater. Not only that, as there is no port on the way to anchor, a much greater space will be needed. If one division of men needs, roughly estimated, 500,000 tons, it will not be able even if 5,924,700 tons of the American shipping was used altogether for the army transportation, to transport more than 10 divisions. Even if the Japanese navy were completely annihilated, the landing operation by the American army will be an impossibility from the point of view of transportation. In landing even only 10 divisions of men, where can be found points at which the men may be landed simultaneously when the geographical condition of Japan is considered? Even if such landing points be discovered, where can advantageous points be discovered after landing for further operations? If the American army should land 10 divisions or more men somewhere, they will be very good objectives for our attack and our army will be provided with favorable opportunity to annihilate the enemy. Some people may contend that America was able to send a large army of 1,900,000 men across 3,000 miles of the ocean to the French front. These men were sent to the front in a year or more of time little by little. They were sent facing the enemy in

front. If America, out of her pride in her power and believing "there is nothing that they cannot do in the world," should come across 4,500 miles of the ocean and attempt to conduct a landing operation against Japan which has a considerable amount of power both of the army and of the navy, she will certainly meet the suicidal fate similar to that at the time of the Mongolian invasion. If we consider that the distance between the two countries across the Pacific Ocean is 4,500 miles, six time as big as between Moij and Dairen, we need not enlarge in detail upon the difficulty of the undertaking.

34. *Is the Communications in the Tsushima Strait Safe?*

Compared with the time of the Russo-Japanese war, the communications of the Tsushima Strait has become very much safer. But unless the Tsushima Strait Zone were altogether converted into a fortified zone by readjusting the the forts, there will be great disadvantage in that we shall have to have a comparatively large number of defense vessels employed along the strait. Our ideal is to have a subway built under the strait, so that the communications be-

tween the continent and Japan proper may be maintained absolutely safe even in times of war. But even if a Japanese-American war should break out now at once, the communications of the Tsushima strait will be much safer than at the time of the Russo-Japanese war, because at that time the strait was menaced by the Russian fleet which held Vladivostok as its base of operation, whereas the American fleet has no suitable base like Vladivostok in order to menace the communications of the Tsushima strait. Accordingly, the safety of the communications of the Tsushima strait may be maintained if only a few of the defense ships at our command now were directed to serve as patrol ships there.

In this connection, I shall add here a few words. Among those who advocate naval expansion there were some who opposed the bill for readjustment of the forts which was presented by the army in the Diet, last year, 1919. The statesmen who listened to these oppositionists did not understand the value of forts, but merely supported the opposition in sympathy with the arguments advanced by the naval authorities as to the lack of necessity of such forts. They thus advanced wrong ideas. So here I want to add a few sentences to break down their wrong views.

As a rule, the forts on the coast serve as abiding place for fleets or as watch keepers for them and add strength to them. Large vessels do not need such abiding places so much as smaller vessels, the latter needing to secure supplies from time to time. If naval forts were perfected, they can hold the offensive enemy back for a time while our fleet is away, that is the forts will serve as watch-keepers. If the forts in the Tsushima strait were perfected, they alone will be able to prevent the enemy fleet from invading even when our fleet is away. The strength of our fleet may be turned towards other directions. Even if the fleet strength may be divided and inferior ships will be sufficient for the defense purposes. The fleet strength may be divided, inferior ships will be sufficient for the defense purposes. The fleet strength may be saved thus and the main strength may be increased and employed in other directions. For instance, if there were forts on the Ogasawara islands and the Yaeyama islands, they may be used as abodes for the fleet, so that even small vessels will be able to engage in activities far out of the forts. Thus it will be seen that the value of forts lies in their power to assist the fleet and to add to its strength. There is no reason why the navy circles should not like

to have the coast forts perfected. Yet there are some among the naval officers who maintain as if forts were unnecessary. It is difficult to know the reason why it is so.

Those who entertain the idea that forts are unnecessary contend that today when long-distance guns have been developed and aircraft has been improved, coast forts will not remain in usefulness very long. But even against the old style coast forts of Turkey in the Gallipoli peninsula the bombardment by the Anglo-French allied fleets was almost powerless. I once read a diary by a German who had been beleaguered in Tsingtau, which contained an account of the furious bombardment by our fleet upon the fort. At the end, the diary contained the following passages.

“The result of the bombardment was insignificant, otherwise than that the telephone instruments and telegraph wires were somewhat damaged. The damages suffered estimated in cash amounted only to about 100 marks. The cost of the ammunitions used by the enemy must have been about 1,000,000 marks. It was a high-priced bombardment.” No matter how much the power of the guns may be increased, the forts cannot be readily destroyed. Because air machines were improved, some people say

that forts can be destroyed. But forts must have defensive air machines and anti-aircraft guns, so that it will not be an easy thing to destroy forts. Viewed in this light, it is not clear upon what ground the arguments that coast forts are unnecessary are based.

35. *What About Provisions and War Materials?*

Even if a Japanese-American war should break out at once, and while the Pacific Ocean may become a scene of warfare, a peaceful condition will be maintained in China and Siberia, and commerce and industry there will be continued, without any change. I hear that in America there are some persons who maintain that in wartime the Philippine islands shall not be used as a base of naval operation. That is a sound argument. Even if America should station her fleet in the Philippines, it will be a feeble one. It will be overawed by the Japanese fleet, so that it will not be able to come out to the Chinese sea for any activity. So, even if a war should break out, the European route of steamships will be able to continue to be operated if the steamships are prepared to meet some degree of dangers. If the Ame-

rican navy should lay importance on the Philippines and dispatch a rather powerful fleet there, such fleet will only become a prey to the Japanese fleet. The American navy will not possibly resort to such foolish operation.

But imaging the worst that may happen and the European route, to say nothing about the American route, were altogether stopped, we will be able to obtain the supply of ordinary food provisions of any sort abundantly from the continent, if not luxurious food stuff. To be sure, if a nation should be suddenly placed in a state of complete blockade, that nation in this day of extreme international division of labour will suffer from the lack of supply of war materials. In Germany where it is extremely difficult to conduct independent economic enterprises due to the lack of the supply of raw materials, many scholars, such as Arndt and others, published their views before the recent war in order to give a warning to the government. But their warning was not seriously heeded, as the nation was blinded by immediate profits. Thus, although Germany was amply prepared for military and financial mobilization, she lacked seriously her commercial and industrial preparedness. It was as if Germany had been

suddenly attacked with surprise. Fortunately for that country however, there was Dr. Rate-nau, eminent authority on the subject, who at the beginning of the war urged upon the Prus-sian war office the necessity of immediately securing raw materials. The war office employ-ed him and was able to save the country from an immediate disaster. This matter is explain-ed in full in my work on "General National Mobilization," Part 3, Chapter 3. The authori-ties are urged to read my book and take care that we will not lack the supply of raw materi-als for war impliments so that Japan will be prepared at any time if a Japanese-American war should break out. If only we are prepared to a degree we will not be hard pressed for raw materials if a war should come at any time.

But even if we may store up raw materials in times of peace, if a war should continue in-definitely, we should take care that the industry is developed on the continent so that the supply will be made secure. The Central European Alliance armies were able to obtain the supply of war provisions and materials for five years, because they controlled a rather wide area of land. By holding on to the little specks of islands which are not larger than 1/10 of the area held by the Central Alliance armies, Japan

cannot expect to secure independence in the supply of materials in war time. If on the contrary our Empire possessed resources of food provision and war materials in China and the Far Eastern Russian possessions, there will be no fear that we will have any difficulty in the way of independence in the supply in war time, because the area of the two Continental Asiatic lands are about three times as large as that which the Central Alliance armies had controlled, although the industry in these two lands in Asia has not as yet been developed. In way of proving how promising China's economic development is, I shall here introduce to our readers the following passage from a book by Mr. William Collins, an English man, on "Mineral Enterprise in China."

"The mining industry in western countries compared with that of China is advanced 200 or 300 times or more in some respects. The foreign trade and the domestic commerce of China can be developed far more by the development of the mining industry particularly than by the development of other kinds of enterprises."

36. *What About War Expenses?*

Before the recent war, it had been thought that unless gold was kept in reserve in times of peace war could not be conducted. Thus, gold had been hoarded under the Julius Tower at Spandau in Germany as a war fund. The amount, however, was only ¥60,000,000. Germany as soon as the war broke out considerably increased the war expenses. Not only that, but the specie reserve of the Imperial Bank of Germany was extraordinarily increased and thereby the position of the Empire was strengthened. and paper money was circulated as currency. The German government authorities and scholars had studied the question of financial mobilization, that is how to obtain the war fund, since the Morocco incident of 1905. The financial policy which Germany has adopted upon the out-break of the war was explained in detail in my work "General National Mobilization", part 7

Even if Japan and America should fight now, the extraordinary war expenditures of the army and the navy will be small since Japan will assume a defensive position. The expenses of the Siberian mobilization were about ¥10,000,000 per month on the average, so I was told.

In the Japanese-American war, the expenses of the army will amount that much and no more. The annual expenditures, therefore, will be about ¥120,000,000. The naval expenditures will amount the same. If the same amount is invested in China and Siberia for industrial development, the total annual expenditures for the special war purposes will be only ¥360,000,000. Comparing that total amount with the daily expenditures of the belligerent nations in the European war, we will find that it corresponds to the amount for five days in the case of America and for one week in the case of England. However poor Japan may be, will it not be possible to obtain that amount somehow?

How shall the amount be obtained? That may not necessarily be an issue at all. Either the British method of increased taxation or the European continental method of borrowing, or both may be resorted to. But the expenses for the Japanese-American war will be a productive investment for Japan. They may therefore be raised by issuing bonds, because, in the first place, the war will give Japan an opportunity thoroughly to develop economically on the continent; and in the second place, it will morally

brace the nation whereby the economic development will be remarkably hastened.

But issuing of national bonds is never an easy matter. First, there is the problem of the degree of national wealth. But Japan may have that much financial strength at least. Second, the financial agencies need to be active in service, in order to assist the government. As there were many examples for it shown in the recent war, the problem will be an easy one to solve. The Third refers to the determination of the people to be prepared and the Fourth to the confidence the people in the government. If, as was the case with the Siberian expedition, the government did not let the people understand the reasons of the mobilization and the favorable opportunity for mobilization were missed, the people will not become enthusiastic and they will not repose their confidence in the government. The result of it will be that the amount of money raised by bond issues will be limited. That is where the great ability of statesmanship is required.

37. What About Diplomatic Relations?

Those who are not acquainted well with the conditions in England and America may im-

agine that, because the British and the Americans are both Anglo-Saxons, the relations of the two nations must be friendly. But many of those who know the conditions of the two nations well observe that the antipathy between the two has been growing, like the Anglo-German antipathy before the European war. Certainly, no matter what attitude America may take, skilful England will not take a challenge for a war.

The British policy has been formed out of consideration of her own national interests. It England should see that it is disadvantageous to her, she will not scruple at all about breaking long-established friendships on a moment's notice. It is a mistake to think that the formation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was a success for our Japanese statesmen. At that time, England in view of her self-interests was obliged resolutely to abandon her traditional policy of "Splendid isolation," and to form an alliance with Japan. Japan owes not a little to England for what Japan is today, and we should by no means forget our obligations to that country. But whereas England feels offense at heart at Americans assuming an attitude of America first in everything, is surpassing England in every way and behaving in a

haughty manner, she will never assist Japan in opposition to America, unless some serious questions of interests should rise. Moreover, England will not hesitate to hold Japan down, if it were to assist America in part and temporarily, according to where her interests lie. The British and the Americans in China took a united attitude to obstruct Japan's policy in that country, for the consideration of the British interests there.

But the British at home regard the situation from the broad viewpoint of the British interests in the whole world. They fear that, if America should expand with the policy of America first, she will become a serious menace to England. The America first policy is fast being realized. The wealth of that country is now worth ¥280,000,000,000, which is already far greater than that of England. America has truly become the first and foremost nation. The money center has altogether shifted from London to New York. It is clear that in naval strength America will sooner or later surpass England. When the power of America increases so much, Canada and Australia will not but feel the effect of it at once. The Chinese and the Siberian markets will also be controlled by the America first policy. Viewd

in that light, the American expansion is indeed a great menace to England, which should be clear to every one. But England is too exhausted after the war to take initiative steps to hold America down. She has unfortunately no such courage. That is the reason for my opinion, which I have stated in Chapter I of this book, that England will not try to prevent Japan from fighting against America but rather will try to use Japan as a weapon to face America. When the psychology of the majority of the British people is such as I have explained, the public opinion in England, where the spirit of democracy is rampant, will at once boil against any ministry which tries to be on the side of America and will pull it down. Besides, the sore wounds received in the recent war have not yet been healed, and the people of England have not yet forgotten their sense of hatred of war. It will be impossible to drive the British people to participate in the war either for Japan or for America. If Japan and America should fight, England will probably adopt an attitude of watching it.

Although the wounds suffered by England from the war have not been slight, the British being a tenacious people are fast recovering their financial strength and are trying to restore

their former strength. During the war, England extended her hand to Africa, Asia Minor and Central Asia and is devoting all her energy in developing these countries. But, as the shortage of goods was serious after the war, England is again paying her attention to the treasure house of China. That is the reason why the British and the Japanese are jealous of each other. Some years ago, Marquis Okuma advocated an Anglo-Japanese economic-alliance. Such alliance is possible at least in China. For that purpose it is necessary to encourage education in foreign languages and internationalism among the people. I have had an ideal of maintaining the permanent peace of the world and promoting the prosperity of mankind by means of Japan, England and America acting tripodally. According to that ideal, America should return to her original Monroe Doctrine and refrain from interfering with the affairs of East Asia. In stead, she shall have her superior rights in all of the American continents, Japan her paramount power in China and Far Eastern Russian possessions, and England in her present spheres of influence. The world will then be controlled by the three powers. Japan and England shall still continue the alliance

and friendly compromise shall be made between the two nations regarding the mutual spheres of influence in China, and the two nations shall take initiative steps to contribute to the cause of the peace of the world. The Anglo-Japanese relations being thus while the Japanese-American war is going on, what will be relations of Japan with the people of Siberia and China? I shall study that problem here.

The Russians are a frank and simple people. It is relatively easy to maintain harmonious relations with them. Japan should not interfere with the questions of thought and domestic politics of Russia. Some persons fear Bolshevised Siberia. But thought should be met with thought. In the Tokugawa Shogunte period, Christianity was popularly called "Kirishitan" and was treated as an infectious disease. Yet it spread rapidly. On the contrary, after the Restoration when liberty of religion was guaranteed the people, Christianity has not spread so very remarkably. The minds of the Japanese people are filled with the old ideas of Japan and there is no room left for new thoughts. In that light, the Bolshevisation of Siberia should not give Japan any pain direct to herself. We are only anxious to help

the people of that land, so that they may be able to develop industry, establish a stable government as speedily as possible and maintain the peace and order of the land. We have no other ambition than that.

The Japanese policy in China does not differ much from that after all. To be frank, the Chinese are a very difficult people to deal with, as they always use petty tricks, such as "playing one devil against another" or "befriending the far and attacking the near." Since the Japanese diplomacy has been catering to the behest of America, it is natural that the Chinese whose policy is of truckling to the stronger power should play those petty tricks. But if the Japanese government should once resolve to engage in the Japanese-American war, the attitude of the Chinese will immediately change as readily as a man turns the palm of his hand. That has been the experience we had in the Russo-Japanese and the German-Japanese wars. Moreover, when the Japanese-American war actually break out and Japan drove the American influence from China, we can see that, the Americans who are now praised and adored in China will at once meet a sad fate, judged from the attitude of the Chinese towards the Russians after the

surrender of Port Arthur and towards the Germans after the participations of China in the European war.

Indeed, the relations of Japan with the people of Siberia and China after the outbreak of the Japanese-American war may be viewed with a considerable amount of optimism. I only want to warn the Japanese people as to this, that they should show their sincerity towards Russia and China, spread the Japanese civilization there and assist them in every way, to establish a stable government for themselves as early as possible, so that the people in those countries may be able to engage in peaceful pursuit of industry and happiness. When such stable-government was established, Japan may be able to cooperate with them and eventually form alliances with them for the purpose of maintaining the permanent peace of the Orient.

38. *What Will be The Final Outcome?*

As we have studied in detail in the foregoing six chapters the question "If Japan and America Fight" viewed from various points, it may not be necessary here to say much on the question "What will be the Final Outcome?" The readers may judge that question

for themselves. I shall here illustrate my views with a parable.

The Japanese American controversy today is like a verbal quarrel across a big river. On this side of the river live a goodly old couple. The old man daily goes to the woods to gather kindling wood, while the old woman, his mate, does her washing in the water of the stream, thus living a happy contented life together. But on the other side of the river live brawny ruffians, who day and night scold and talk harsh to the gentle old couple on this side, and accuse them of invading the land belonging to other people and stealing. They go so far as to to reprove the old couple of their means of livelihood and threaten to come across the river to kill the couple unless their warning is listened to. They are cruelly treating the grandsons and grand daughters of the old couple who live on their own side of the river. The old couple comply with the demands of the ruffians in an abject subservency and are now reduced to a condition of not being able to conduct their own living. The old couple are not so depraved as to stoop to reply to the aspersions of the ruffians. But they cannot bear to hear of the maltreatment of their grandsons and grand daughters and also

to be persecuted in the problem of living. Their grudge piercing to the marrow of their bones, they resolve to defend themselves by staking their life, the old man using his sickle and the old woman her tongs from the hearth. The ruffians who try to cross the river are drowned midway.

I believe the result of the Japanese-American controversy will be as illustrated by the parable, or it may end merely as a verbal quarrel.

I have a message which I want to deliver to the Americans. There is an old saying "Those who are boastful will not last long". This moral view I believe is true whether in Confucianism, or in Buddhism, or in Shinto, or in Christianity. That strong Russia was vanquished by our island Empire and has come to expose the internal corruption was a result of her arrogance. If America should continue to be too arrogant as she is today, and dare to come to attack Japan, that country will be forsaken by her God and follow in the footsteps of the Mongolian invaders in Japan of old. Even if her God should protect her to some extent, America's fleet will at least meet the fate of the Baltic fleet in the Russo-Japanese war. The personal letter from the German Kaiser to the Russian-Tsar sent at the

time the Baltic fleet was dispatched to the Orient, which was recently published, contained the following passage, "This plan of operation is a very correct one from the strategical point of view. Success is assured, etc." But reading the diary of Politowsky, a commanding expert engineer, aboard the *Kunyazvalov*, the flagship of the Baltic fleet, one finds that Politowsky had from the first misgivings about the success of the fleet. The diary adds that "the farther the fleet sailed out of the Russian port the clearer it became that the fleet will sink into the depth of despan." It is generally the case that a plan fails because of differences of views between the directorate and the ranks in each department of service, which are not made known to the public. Since the American participation in the war, the government of that country had become autocratic. Is it not because of the fact that no one dares to talk straightforwardly as to the unprofitableness and disadvantages of a Japanese--American war? The duties of Politowsky were very difficult one to perform. The vessels of the Baltic fleet, especially the torpedo boats, were very often damaged. In order to repair the damage, he was obliged to undergo a very difficult experience as he had

to do the best of his ability with the scanty supply of materials. For instance, when a torpedo boat had its rudder damaged in the ocean, the work to repair was very difficult to perform since the boat rocked violently on account of the billows. If divers were sent into the ocean to work, the little fish gathered around them to obstruct their work. Such difficulties could never be adequately explained. In a letter sent to his wife he gave vent to his despair in the following passage.

“If you could even to a small extent imagine our despair (of the fleet), and if I were at liberty to explain it clearly to you, you will certainly be astonished. If I should fortunately return to you alive, I shall tell you about it in detail. We have nowhere to go. We are in a circumstance in which we cannot but wave our hands (in despair). It’s our fate and we are resigned to it, only thus consoling ourselves”.

According to his diary, the Russian Baltic fleet, when it left Skagen on October 21 and went out to the North Sea, already the captains were in a great excitement, when they saw fishing vessels in the neighbourhood, mistaking them for Japanese torpedo boats. At Madagascar, they were also scared of the

attack by Japanese torpedo boats and a great excitement took place, on December 25, so it is written. When the American Atlantic fleet comes passing through the Panama Canal, and, joining the Pacific fleet, start on its expedition in a dignified manner, a layman might be struck with an impression that the fleet can never be opposed. But the sailing of a big fleet cannot be conducted so easily as a layman might imagine. The vessels of the fleet must advance forward slowly by keeping pace each with another. Until the Oceanic islands are sighted on the port side of the fleet, it will take a long time. About the time the islands of the Oceanic group are sighted, the American captains will begin to fear at each "gust of wind or the voice of a bird" that the Japanese surprise attack vessels have come to meet the American fleet. They will thus become nervous all the more. In the end, the fleet will meet a similar fate which the Baltic fleet met.

In order to place our Empire on a firm permanent foundation of peace, an Empire which had never once submitted to the insult of a foreign nation for 3,000 years of her history, we should not permit the Japanese-American relations of today to remain merely as a verbal quarrel across a river. We should by all means

appeal to arms and be done with it for once. If Japan and America should fight now the disaster to the Empire will be immediate. But nevertheless it will not be very great. Moreover, the position of the Empire on the continent will be strengthened and the foundation of the Empire made firmer. If, however, the dispute across a river should be settled with a sort of compromise, it will be a palliating peace and the roots of evils will be left imbedded for future calamity. If the present situation be settled with a compromise, the thoughtless people of Japan will not know that the roots of evils were growing. They will continue to dream complacently as before. On the contrary, the powerful people on the other side of the Ocean will continue their strenuous life. They will realize their ideal of America first in armaments and in industry, and in the end by means of the progress of science they may be able to devise a way of subduing nature which made the geographical condition of the Empire impregnable. That time will be the time when our stainless and perfect Empire will fall. Our countrymen, I urge on you to continue your moral mobilization, to be ready when a war will come now, and, if it does not come now and unfortunately a palliating peace is

established, until this third national crisis of the Empire shall have been passed over. I want to warn the Americans in conclusion. Among the Americans, there are men like Dr. Elliot, with whom I am acquainted, who understand well the position of Japan. I urge on the Americans that they listen to sound advises such as were given by Dr. Elliot and that they change their mind at once and return to their Monroe Doctrine. I urge on the Americans also that they take initiative steps for a movement among the three Powers, Japan, England and America, for the maintenance of the peace of the world. There will be no better course to follow in the interest of the cause of justice and humanity and for the advancement of welfare of humanity for all the world.

SUPPLEMENT.

Need the American Army and Navy be Feared?
(Reprint from the Article Contributed to the
Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, August, 1919)

(A)

There are a section of Japanese who may be called Americaphobes. They are mostly Christians. They are in collusion with the Christians in America who are ardent pacifists. They heartily welcomed the advocacy of world reconstruction based upon the principle of justice and humanity which President Wilson professed. Especially because America's financial power extraordinarily increased since the European War and her power of armaments is not to be regarded lightly, these Americaphobes have all the more worshipped America, and feared America's financial and military and naval power. They urge the advisability of the Empire altogether giving up the idea of competing with America in the armaments. Is it not

indeed a regrettable thing that the people of the Empire have come to take an attitude of truckling to the strong and to be content with assuming an attitude of a vassal people or a mistress in keeping for the wall-eyed, red-haired?*

Judging by a case of an individual, one who has gold and power is not necessarily always the victor. Even if one possessed gold and power in abundance, he will not escape a defeat if he is lacking in courage and skill. If unfortunately the Japanese-American war should come, we should consider that point carefully when we study the question which side will win.

But the Americaphobes view the situation generally from the simple question of financial and armament strength, and jump at the conclusion that the Empire will never be able to match America. This fear of America has gnawed into the marrow of the bones of these Americaphobes. The result has been that our diplomatic authorities dared not insist upon what they should if they were dealing with America. Our Yamato spirit has been exhausted. Beginning with the failure in the Peace Conference at Paris, our diplomacy has recently failed at

* The westerners, whose eyes are of wall color and hair red.

each turn of events. Consequently, even the Chinese have come to rely upon America and to scorn our Empire. For instance, in reference to the Shantung question, with which America should not interfere, China and America cooperated to force the Empire to the wall. In the meantime, the so-called three A policy of America has been planned and steadily pushed forward. I hear that the terms and conditions of the Kamtchatka lease, which America has been trying to obtain from the Omsk government, are to be that: the term of the lease shall be 36 years, the area to be covered by the lease the entire territory south of Petropablovsk Bay; a concession to build a railway starting from that bay and connecting various points in east Siberia. I want to call the attention of our countrymen generally to the fact that Petropablovsk Bay is an ice-free port. If the report is true, it will mean that an American naval base will be built in that ice-free port. At the same time, railway connections will be established from Asia, across the Behring Sea to Alaska and to the United States. In that event, the development of the capitalistic Imperialism will be greatly assisted by these means. Not only that, but the national defense of Japan will be considerably menaced. It is

a serious affair as the very existence of the Empire will be endangered.

Look at the map and study the location of Petropablovsk Bay which is situated rather to the southern end on the east side of Kamtchatka Peninsula. Should a powerful American fleet take its position there, the control of the sea on the North Pacific Ocean will altogether fall to America. Even if the Empire should possess three units of eight battleships and eight cruisers, our navy will not be able to do anything at all. Shall our countrymen out of their fear of hurting America's feelings listen to the talks of the Americaphobes and fail to take decided steps to prevent disasters beforehand and watch idly our Empire being placed in a position of perplexity? When the honor and existence of the Empire are threatened, the people should rise as one man and take arms to defend the Empire as a matter of proper self-defense. That our countrymen cannot make that resolution and are yielding to the American pressure is because they fear that under the present condition, the Empire will not be able to match America with advantage. It is therefore necessary to let the people understand whether the American army and navy need be

feared, so as to enable them to make up their mind.

(B)

Our countrymen are by no means bellicose. Our Empire had never once been engaged in a war of conquest of other nations, which is attested by history. The Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese wars were fought after all for self-defense. Had Japan not dared to go to these wars, the existence of the Empire might have been in danger, and Japan's national dignity might not have risen so high. The wars referred to could not be avoided. Yet the ministries of the times could not decide their attitude at once. They were patient and forbearing, whereby the Empire had been scorned by Russia and China. That was due to the fact that the laymen other than those in the defense service have not had the confidence to win in those wars.

Recently, the outrageous attitude of America towards Japan has been as much insulting to the Empire as was the attitude of Russia. As a menace to the existence of the Empire, both the southward advance policy of Russia and the three A policy of America are same in their

effect. Moreover, America is trying to alienate Japan and China and to carry out her capitalistic Imperialism. The effect of such attitude of America upon Japan is more serious than that of Russia's Far Eastern policy. Yet the government authorities and the people are down-spirited and are trying only to cater to the whims of America. What is the trouble with them? In America, even the Senate does not respect the feelings in Japan and the senators are indulging in wild talks. On the contrary, in Japan the government authorities are afraid even when an article like the present one appears in the press that the Empire might be all the more misunderstood abroad as a militaristic country. It is indeed laughable. That is because the government authorities, like the authorities at the times of the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese wars, are afraid that the Empire's forces will not be able to cope with the America's army and navy.

But Sun Tze said "Courage and Cowardice are of energy and the deciding factors and strength and weakness the appearance and subsidiary factors." Both in the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese wars, if the Empire had judged the situation by the appearance of things and failed to take thought of the deciding fac-

tors in calculating the probable results, the Empire would never have been able to arrive at the confidence in our final victory. This energy was the deciding factor in actual warfare for victory or for defeat. Unless one looked at the situation from the expert militarist point of view, the question cannot be understood. But that the Europeans and Americans can never compare favorably with the Japanese in point of the real value of the spirit in actual warfare, was fully brought home to laymen outside of the defense service by the recent European war. Such courageous actions as were shown at the Battle of Nanshan and in the Siege of Port Arthur could not be noticed very much in the European war, not even on the German side. The European and American method of warfare generally is to believe too much in the effectiveness of war implements and to waste ammunitions, and the results attained thereby are insignificant. Too much attention is paid to erecting defense works and to the sentiments among the men in the service. Consequently, in the recent war much was detracted from the power of activity. Moreover, the Allies generally have had their military discipline loosened more than was the case with the Germans. The orders issued had not been carried out

promptly. The American army joined in the war when the Allies had turned from the retreat to the pursuit of the enemy, a time when even cowards will become courageous. The real worth of the American army cannot be learnt by that experience. According to the book by Homer Lee, an American, in the American Civil War of 1861 to 1865 there were 200,000 deserters from the ranks of the northern army, which was $1/5$ of the entire strength of the army in the closing period of the war, and 1 in 12 men enrolled. The number of deserters were four times as great as the number of losses in the battle front, in killed and wounded.

By looking at the American army, one will come to the conclusion that, in point of discipline and skill in the art of war, the Americans are the worst of all the nationalities. Referring to the American forces who participated in the recent war, the eye-witnesses tell us that the Americans have not made much progress for improvement. Moreover, the method of command adopted by the American officers is infantile compared with that of the Japanese army. I have no hesitation in saying that even if the American army were superior in number to our army, we need not be afraid of America

so very much. Only, in reference to the navy, as naval warfare is largely conducted by machines, the situation may be somewhat different from that of the army. But machines are handled by men, so that there will not be much difference when one considers the real value of the Americans in actual battles.

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When the naval expansion program of America shall have been completed, it may seem that it will be a cause of worry for our Empire in view of national defense. But that question too may be settled by whether or not the people have a firm determination. As a negative national defense policy, we should be satisfied if our navy could guarantee absolute safety of the means of communication in the Tsushima Strait and defend Japan proper and the important strategic points on islands around the Empire against the enemy fleet. If only the forts along the coast were perfected and a comparatively large number of submarines and destroyers were built, it will be impossible for the enemy fleet to enter the Japan Sea, even if the American navy is considerably stronger than the Japanese navy. Moreover, if our submarines or destroyers should hide in between

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the Bonin island or the Yaeyama group or the Caroline group, an enemy which will come to attack Japan will feel very uncomfortably. Besides, if some part of the main strength of the Japanese navy should be hiding in between the Oceanic group of islands, the commander-in-chief of the American fleet engaged in the duty of attacking Japan will have a great deal more of difficulties than those which Admiral Rodyjestvensky* had in the Russo-Japanese war.

But regarding the aviating corps, the Japanese forces will not be able to cope with the American forces under the present condition of the service of the Japanese air forces. Yet, so long as the Japanese army holds the Japanese sphere of influence on the Asiatic continent, the Americans will have to undergo many inconvenience in the present stage of progress of air service, if they are to fly with the sea as their base of operation. It will be impossible for America to acquire a base of operation at a suitable distance from Japan to acquire a base of operation at a suitable distance from Japan in order to attack Japan proper. Consequently, the enemy air service will not be able to engage in any very remarkable activity.

* Admiral Rodyjestvensky Commanded the Baltic fleet which sank in the war.

If we are assured that we need not become pessimistic in the event of a most unfavorable development, even the Americaphobes will be able to steady their attitude towards America. Much more so if the Japanese people should perfect the arrangements of the forts, build auxiliary vessels, perfect the air service and improve armaments in general. At the time of the Russo-Japanese war, steamships were sunk under the light house to bottle the enemy port* and magazine mines were laid in front of the enemy. Such courageous fighters may not be lacking even today. Thus, even in submarine warfare, we may expect much more courageous actions from our men than those conducted by the German navy. We should judge that when such dangerous obstacles have to be met with, no such thing as the Americans coming to attack Japan will be possible with the present condition of American spirit.

Even if it is an impossibility for the American army to attack Japan, some people may fear that if the war once opened should continue interminably, the Empire will come across with the shortage of war materials and food provisions. If only the relations with China are not cut off, we need not fear in that respect, too.

* Refers to Port Arthur.

A section of the Chinese, to be sure, may take the American side and give some inconvenience to the Japanese forces by starting anti-Japanese movements. But these anti-Japanese activities, which may be effective and troublesome in peace, will not be an issue very much in war time when force is to be employed.

The American outrages of late are reported to have been perpetrated by the tools of the capitalistic Imperialists. That appears to be true. We cannot believe that the majority of the American people have altogether lost their conscience of justice and humanity. Accordingly, even if a section of the American political parties or factions gaining power should carry out their capitalistic Imperialism, trample under foot the Empire's priority rights, disregard the Empire's mission to save the 600,000,000 people of East Asia, and try to control the life and death of the Empire, and if the Empire should protest against such attempts, the majority of the American people on their part will certainly recognize the justice of Japans' attitude. If when the Empire takes up arms in self-defense, America should attack Japan, it will be an ignominious war. The labor men and students of Amercia, who are mindful of justice and humanity will certainly raise outcries

against the American authorities. Such a war will not last long, judged from the condition of America.

The foregoing remarks have been made because of my solicitude that the Empire shall not bend her knees. With her present state of defense works, the people should be encouraged to rise in self-defense. If the army and naval preparations were further replenished, the prospect of victory will become all the more certain. Not only that, if only defense works were strengthened, the American menace will be removed of its own accord, which in the words of Sun Tze means "to win without fighting is the very best method." I am in hearty support, to be sure, of the proposition for the increase of the army and the navy.

[THE END]



著者 東京市牛込區赤城下町六六 佐藤鋼次郎
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■ 英譯日米若し戰はば ■

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