

## CHINA'S MILITARY CLASSICS

A Review Essay by  
ARTHUR WALDRON

The difference between Western and Chinese ways of war, if there is one, will probably be found in differing emphases on the material as opposed to the mental aspects of conflict. Western military history is an account of ever larger armies and technological breakthroughs. The Chinese tradition, by contrast, with technology often changing very little over long periods of time, stresses strategy and psychological advantage as keys to success. Hence the verdicts of their theorists: for Clausewitz war is an act of force; for Sun Tzu—as will be seen in some of the translations—war is above all the art of deception.

This difference has more than academic importance. The Chinese approach to warfare has a certain attractiveness today as Western warfare seems to be reaching its limits, chiefly since key technology (that is, nuclear weaponry) makes the sort of total war which Clausewitz contemplated increasingly unthinkable. Those nations that could theoretically destroy the world realize that even, or perhaps particularly, such massive force is of little practical use in achieving the ends of policy. So strategic and psychological acumen, traditionally a Chinese forte, look more and more relevant.

These are not novel ideas: indeed some version of them has been part of Western military discourse since at least the period following World War I when the search for a way around the Western Front led thinkers like Liddell Hart to recognize the affinity between the revived Western interest in the indirect approach and the concepts of Sun Tzu

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### Three Kingdoms: A Historical Novel

attributed to Luo Guanzhong.  
*Translated and with notes by Moss Roberts*  
Berkeley: University of California Press;  
Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1991.  
1,096 pp. \$100.00.  
[ISBN 0-520-06821-1]

### The Book of Stratagems: Tactics for Triumph and Survival

by Harro Von Senger  
*Edited and translated by Myron B. Gubitz*  
New York: Viking, 1991.  
397 pp. \$24.95.  
[ISBN 0-670-83962-0]

### The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China

*Translation and commentary by*  
*Ralph D. Sawyer with Mei-Chün Sawyer*  
Boulder: Westview Press, 1993.  
568 pp. \$29.95.  
[ISBN 0-8133-1228-0]

### Sun Tzu: The New Translation

by J.H. Huang  
New York: William Morrow, 1993.  
288 pp. \$10.00.  
[ISBN 0-688-12400-3]

### Sun Tzu: The Art of Warfare

*Translated and with an introduction  
and commentary by T. Roger Ames*  
New York: Ballantine Books, 1993.  
321 pp. \$25.00.  
[ISBN 0-345-36239-X]

### Sun Tzu: Art of War

*Translated by Ralph D. Sawyer  
in collaboration with  
Mei-chün Lee Sawyer*  
Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.  
375 pp. \$9.95.  
[ISBN 0-8133-1951-X]

and other Chinese strategists. But it was impossible until recently for anyone but a China specialist to go much further. The reason was that for even the most serious and motivated specialist the necessary sources simply did not exist. English-language studies of Chinese warfare were sketchy and highly technical. The major text, Sun Tzu's *Art of War*, was available in the 1910 translation by Lionel Giles or the 1963 version by Samuel B. Griffith. And good

though the two translations were, they did not provide enough.

That situation has now changed dramatically. The last few years have seen a flood of good books on Chinese warfare. Within months of each other three excellent translations of Sun Tzu have appeared, and over the last several years new versions of other key texts on war have been published as well as a magnificent translation of *Three Kingdoms*, China's greatest epic on politics and conflict. At last the rich tradition of Chinese thought about warfare is becoming accessible to the nonspecialist.

The best point of departure for examining why the Chinese understanding of war differs in some fundamental respects to that of the West is probably the *San-Kuo yen-i*, an episodic novel of great length and complexity that is available under the title *Three Kingdoms* in a fine translation by Moss Roberts of New York University. Composed in the 14<sup>th</sup> century, yet based upon texts and traditions a millennium older, it is the story of a dividing China at the end of the 3<sup>rd</sup> century A.D. as the Han dynasty neared its end and war raged over whether to save or replace it. Generations of Chinese have come to know the characters in the *Three Kingdoms* just as well as Westerners once knew biblical stories or some know today's sitcoms. There is Ts'ao Ts'ao, the clever and amoral courtier scheming against his own sovereign, Liu Pei, the loyalist who perishes in what he knows is a futile struggle, and most importantly, Chu-ko Liang, the brilliant strategist who gives up a reclusive life of study and contemplation of nature to serve the dynasty.

Portions of Roberts's translation appeared in his 1976 publication of an abridged version of the novel (which is still a manageable introduction though it lacks the sweep and extensive notes of the 1991 edition). While the story is absorbing and full of social and military drama, the conflict described differs in many ways from the sort of war familiar in the West. There are warriors to be sure, but less time is spent on their clashes than in comparable western works such the *Iliad*. We remember the chief characters not so

much for feats of arms as for their moral and intellectual qualities.

Chu-ko Liang is perhaps the best example, for of his character there is no doubt. Although he has turned away from the world to seek peace as a simple farmer, he remains thoroughly loyal to the legitimate Han ruling house, and when asked reemerges to serve it. Of what does his service consist? Above all, his analysis of strategy. Liu Pei, a loyalist leader, goes repeatedly to Chu-ko's hermitage. When finally admitted he finds that Chu-ko Liang is totally familiar with the dynasty's situation and pulls out a map to sketch an optimum counter-strategy. Joining the loyalists Chu-ko serves with great personal bravery, dying on campaign. But it was his ability to get at the heart of strategic questions that brought the Han loyalists to him and that has kept his fame bright among Chinese ever since.

Is there a Western equivalent to Chu-ko Liang? To Clausewitz, Napoleon was the "god of war," but Napoleon never offered a systematic appraisal of the strategic situation as comprehensive as Chu-ko Liang did for the tottering Han dynasty. Before recommending an action Chu-ko Liang carefully analyzed its potential impact on relations among contending states, and it was this insight above all that led to his success. By contrast Napoleon won through a combination of numerical superiority and tactical brilliance, levying one army after another while gradually beggaring France, and moving with speed and cleverness to hit hard, but nevertheless with remarkably little attention to a comprehensive strategy—a weakness he shared with a host of Western military heroes.

This stress on stratagems in one culture and on material and operational strengths in the other is arguably a basic difference between Chinese and Western warfare. The very term *strategy* is derived from the Greek *strategia* meaning generalship, and thus conveys the notion of command. Equivalent words in Chinese—*chi*, *ts'e*, *mou*, and others commonly rendered as stratagem—have

no such operational derivation: they refer directly to plans, a fact which underlines the stress, even very early in China, on thought over action. Several recent publications make this point explicitly, among them Carl-Alrecht Seyschab's "The Thirty-six Stratagems: Orthodoxy against Heterodoxy" in *East Asian Civilizations* and Harro Von Senger's *The Book of Stratagems: Tactics for Triumph and Survival*. These works translate and explicate a recent Chinese text on a traditional subject, the "Thirty-six Stratagems," a collection of phrases which add up to only 138 characters encapsulating various approaches to conflict—such as "besiege Wei to rescue Zhao" or "lure the tiger down from the mountain"—that fascinate some Westerners while others dismiss them as "strategy by fortune cookie." Von Senger supplies either the story from which each phrase originated or a story which embodies the sense of each in a volume which is both interesting and culturally informative.

The making of strategy has been esteemed since ancient times in China above other military virtues, including ability to fight or develop new or improved weapons. Western history is full of warriors renowned for bravery and technologies noted for innovation, from Greek fire to precision guided munitions. But how many stratagems are remembered and celebrated? There are examples such as Cannae or Inchon, but they are exceptions. In the West battles have been won by the side that pushed harder. In China, by contrast, one finds fewer pitched battles and much more staked on the working of strategy.

The reason for this contrast is not an arbitrary cultural difference; the most distinct factor in the traditional Chinese way of thinking about war was the sheer scale of the battlefield. More than two thousand years ago the Chinese were not contending for local power (which may have implied control of a state the size of France), but for control of "all under heaven"—*t'ien-hsia*, which even in those days was probably more than a million square miles of territory. This area was too large to

be conquered by coercion alone, then or now. So from the beginning Chinese military thinkers had to ponder problems on a scale that Westerners have confronted only quite recently. China was and is too big to conquer militarily or rule by direct coercion. The technique of controlling it had to involve elements other than the purely military. The belief that operational skill could substitute for sound strategy—just plausible in Europe, and which undid Napoleon and doomed Germany twice in this century—never was credible in China. Those Chinese who were charged with military operations instinctively considered them within a complex cultural, political, and moral context.

Therefore ancient Chinese military works might appear rather modern to the Western mind. Since at least the beginning of revolutions in military affairs in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century there has been a tendency in the West to assume that increased power would make military solutions to problems easier. So time and again we have looked to weapons for decisiveness—be it rapid-firing guns, tanks, airpower, or current high tech. But with the advent of nuclear weapons and the expansion of potential battlefields to a global scale, we may reach a point where decisive force is increasingly difficult to achieve. This situation, however, is familiar to Chinese whose fundamental approach to warfare stresses the limits and hazards of relying too heavily on force alone.

For guidance on operating in such conditions, the Chinese regularly turned to specialists in *ping fa*, or the way of warfare, a number of whom have ancient texts attributed to them and who are not by any means adherents to a single approach. Five ancient works and one of later origin were collected about 1073 in the Sung dynasty as China faced a severe military threat; this collection became a standard work and has been influential ever since. Now it has been translated and introduced with great skill and clarity

by Ralph Sawyer, a businessman and scholar, in a tome that should be on the shelf of every officer with an interest in traditional Asian military thought.

By far the most influential Chinese military thinker is Sun Tzu, and three translations of the text bearing his name have just been published by J.H. Huang (a Chinese philologist now based in California), Roger T. Ames (a specialist in Chinese philosophy at the University of Hawaii), and Ralph D. Sawyer (the translation can be found in his *Seven Military Classics*, but a more extensive introduction and notes appear in a separate volume also listed above).

Each translation has a particular strength: Huang presents the text in two parallel columns, one unfolding the topic and the other giving Sun Tzu's particular insights, that makes the structure of text clear where it can be obscured when published as one short paragraph after another. Ames's edition is the most attractive, offering Chinese as well as English texts, and an introduction which will have particular import for those interested in Sun Tzu as a text of philosophy as well as strategy. Sawyer, however, is the only translator of the three to present, in addition to a very fine English version of the text, a comprehensive introduction that provides the necessary background on Chinese warfare of the period. This fills half the volume—pages which are well used—and is illustrated with helpful battle maps and charts.

The differences among the three volumes illustrate different approaches that can be taken to Sun Tzu. Thus there are certain key words in Sun Tzu which are not easy to put into English but are central to his whole approach. Dozens of examples could be given but a few will have to suffice.

One is the word *kuei*, found in the passage that Griffith translates "All warfare is based on deception." That sounds like a strong claim, and many war college lecturers invoke it to argue that Sun Tzu meant something very different than Clausewitz. Ames renders the passage "Warfare is the art (*tao*) of deceit" while Sawyer

translates it "Warfare is the way (*tao*) of deception." Huang, though, takes the phrase very differently: "Military operations entail unconventional means." From Huang's comments it emerges that the root meaning of *qui* (which others make *deception*) is *to go against*. The art of war is "to go against [what is usually done]" which is to say employ *unconventional means*. Huang buttresses this reading by referring to a Sung dynasty commentator who maintains that *qui* in this passage meant skill in using forces and did not connote deception.

The same is true of another celebrated passage that Griffith translates "What is of supreme importance is to attack the enemy's strategy." Here Ames is pretty much in agreement: "The best military policy is to attack strategies." Sawyer, however, is less abstract: "The highest realization of warfare is to attack the enemy's plans" and Huang more so: "So the best strategy is to crush their plans." Perhaps the most interesting example of such a word is *shih*, which is found in the title of the fifth book. Griffith translates this as *energy*; Huang makes it *combat power*; Sawyer renders it *strategic military power*; Ames translates it *strategic advantage*. Each has its warrant, but again the differences are revealing.

Huang's *combat power* (like his *unconventional means*) is the translation that sounds most like Western military language (though it is supported by references to ancient usages in the *Shuo-wen*, *I-ching*, and other classics). It contains little hint of Chinese philosophy, but rather suggests something quite familiar in the West: force or power (either latent as in a set crossbow or unleashed as in a flood able to move boulders). Sawyer's translation is similar, but Ames, who has written extensively on the term's meaning, takes a suggestion from the contemporary scholar Hsü Fu-Kuan that the word was first used to discuss contention over advantageous terrain. That is, as Ames reads the text, even a word which might sound intellectually congenial to a Westerner—the

rubric under which firepower or throw-weight might be found—acquires a rather abstract thrust. One is not looking simply for *power*, but rather for circumstances—whether terrain, correlation of forces, or psychological advantage or disadvantage—that are conducive to victory.

In English we would use at least two different terms to express these two aspects of meaning: the one material, the other intellectual and psychological. The Chinese use only one, not because they are confused, but simply because they slice reality differently. They see the strategic aspect of *shih* (choosing terrain or a situation that is advantageous) as inseparable from the physical aspect (combat power). So *shih* is not something measurable although it has an objective component. Above all it is psychological, part of the Sun Tzuanian understanding of conflict which implies that victory and defeat are ultimately mental states.

Behind this lies a philosophical background—the distinctions between the ancient Chinese view of a single universe and Greek dualism, between the temporal and the absolute—which Ames illuminates in his fine introduction. Before dismissing all this as too abstract, it is worth noting that today, perhaps more than in the past, the American military is being used in environments that it cannot dominate by sheer force. Military strategists today must take the context in which they use force as seriously as Sun Tzu, and recognize that the *shih* of our military, however we measure it, is the product of a successful combination of inherent strength with an advantageous situation.

Similar patterns of difference run through all three volumes. Oversimplified they show that scholars do not agree on whether Sun Tzu essentially is a realist—whose fundamental concern is the use of force and who is thus largely understandable through Western analytical categories—or whether the text expounds an approach to war that in its fundamental definitions and assumptions differs profoundly from the mainstream of Western military thought.

This, of course, is a specific instance of a general question: is there a specifically *Western* way of war? Or, if there have been non-Western ways in the past, do they continue to exist today? Or is everyone adopting the Western model as manifested most recently in Operation Desert Storm? Even Sun Tzu's homeland, the evidence would suggest, has adopted the Western way. How else are we to explain the emphasis on weapons and technology (whether in Peking or Taipei) on which vast sums of money are being spent?

To make that assessment, however, is perhaps to fall into the trap of looking most closely at that with which we are most familiar. The concepts of war that underlie the use of new weapons which the Chinese are acquiring would be familiar to Chu-ko Liang and Sun Tzu. Why? Because they are appropriate to objective conditions, both physical and psychological, of Chinese warfare. Nor is their relevance limited. As mentioned earlier, the very quantity of firepower now available to the military has rendered obsolete a lot of Western thinking about war, in particular the notion of winning by a preponderance of force alone. It may be that the Chinese emphasis on stratagem—or to put it another way, on the autonomy and importance of properly understanding and conceiving of war—offers an intellectual context for modern weaponry that the Western tradition has difficulty providing. That is a question for military professionals to determine. Now, at least, thanks to the works reviewed here, nonspecialists in Asian questions will at last have a foundation on which to base that determination. **JFQ**

## FALAISE, THE HIGHWAY OF DEATH, AND MOGADISHU

A Book Review by  
STEVE E. DIETRICH

The Battle of the Generals:  
The Untold Story of the Falaise  
Pocket—The Campaign That  
Should Have Won World War II

by Martin Blumenson  
New York: William Morrow, 1993.  
288 pp. \$25.00.  
[ISBN 0-688-11837-2]

That history repeats itself is debatable; that history offers glimpses of recurring problems is undeniable. The parallels between Normandy and recent operations are haunting illustrations of recurring problems. Martin Blumenson's *The Battle of the Generals* is a provocative assessment of the final operation of the Normandy campaign in 1944. He argues that had Allied commanders not faltered, it would have been the final operation of the war.

Blumenson highlights demands on senior leaders in the tactical, operational, and strategic arenas. He describes difficulties of command, control, and communications in a multilateral force dominated by bilateral agreements. Normandy offers compelling examples of what occurs when national objectives are at odds with coalition planning. And he recounts disagreement over air support for ground operations which reveal flawed joint operations. Though the Armed Forces have made great strides in joint and combined warfare, the images recalled suggest similar recent challenges to commanders across the

sands of the Arabian peninsula and down the alleys of Mogadishu.

Blumenson is one of the last of a breed. His career began as an official Army historian serving in the European theater during World War II. He wrote two "green books",<sup>1</sup> authored over a dozen other works, and edited *The Patton Papers*.<sup>2</sup> Hunched over an antiquated typewriter, carefully crafting each sentence, Blumenson writes in a delightful style. With flowing but succinct prose he packs more information into a single brief paragraph than many authors cram into a thirty-page chapter—and he challenges the reader to think. Conceived for a wide audience, *The Battle of the Generals* is jargon-free and requires no special knowledge of World War II. Documentation is sparse, and serious readers will want to refer to better maps than those found in the book.

The Falaise pocket is not really an untold story. Blumenson himself told it in *Breakout and Pursuit*.<sup>3</sup> But "green book" authors were instructed to detail *what* happened. It seems Blumenson has written this latest book to appease that old veteran who said "We don't need you historians to tell us *what* we did, only we know that. We need you to tell us *why* we did it." Here he succeeds.

The first third of the book provides one of the best overviews available of World War II Allied opera-

Bradley and Patton.



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General Schwarzkopf and friends.



U.S. Air Force (H.H. Deffner)

tions in the Mediterranean and western-European theaters prior to the D-Day landings. The middle chapters deal with the first two frustrating months of the Normandy campaign. In the final third, Blumenson analyzes what happened at the Falaise pocket and critiques the generals. His assessment is fresh, almost shocking.

Blumenson portrays a “disjointed” alliance headed by inept commanders who were unable to properly control air forces or each other. Eisenhower was the overall commander; Montgomery was the ground component commander and also led 21<sup>st</sup> Army Group; and, under Montgomery, Bradley was the commander of First Army until taking over the newly activated 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group. Eisenhower assumed ground command from Montgomery on September 1, making Montgomery and Bradley equals just six days after the Normandy campaign ended.

To Blumenson the three generals “fumbled badly,” especially Montgomery. Eisenhower did not intervene when he should, Bradley interfered where he should not, and Montgomery’s involvement was unwelcome to the Americans. The generals erroneously focused their efforts on taking terrain, not defeating the enemy. Patton, who assumed command of the Third Army under Bradley’s 12<sup>th</sup> Army Group on August 1, “was the single comman-

der who grasped what needed to be done and how to do it,” except he was “unable to make his genius felt” and was consequently “lured astray” by his bungling superiors. As a result of command problems, Blumenson contends, thousands of Germans who should have been captured or killed in the Falaise gap—created after an enemy counterattack at Mortain drove a forty by fourteen-mile bulge in Allied lines in August 1944—escaped with much of their equipment through a gap that was closed too late. Surviving German troops later haunted the Allies at Arnhem, Huertgen Forest, the Ardennes, and elsewhere.<sup>4</sup>

Blumenson states that Patton should have had Bradley’s job before D-Day. Eisenhower’s classmate and six years Patton’s junior at West Point, Bradley had been subordinate to Patton in North Africa and Sicily. Eisenhower elevated Bradley over Patton as senior ground commander for the invasion of France only because Patton was in disgrace for slapping two soldiers in Sicily.<sup>5</sup> Inexperienced, Bradley was uncomfortable in his relationship with two old warriors, Patton and Montgomery. He knew that he had not earned their respect as a commander. Patton, however, could have met Montgomery as an equal. “The thrust of Patton and the balance of Montgomery would have produced a perfectly matched team.” He concludes that the Eisenhower-Montgomery-Patton relationship could have entrapped the Germans in the Falaise

gap bringing “a much earlier end of the war in Europe.” Instead, Allied discord caused the war to last ten additional months.

For the first three months after D-Day, Eisenhower had remained with his headquarters in England. He left Montgomery in command on the ground. Bradley rarely met with his temporary superior, a man whose arrogance he despised. Montgomery, failing to take his objective of Caen until the end of July, had his hands full with the multilateral 21<sup>st</sup> Army Group and exercised little operational control over Bradley. Eisenhower found that he was unable to motivate Montgomery to move aggressively enough, and Montgomery’s insolence nearly pushed him to relieve Britain’s most famous soldier. Lacking coordination, Bradley and Montgomery failed to close the gap at Falaise in time. But Bradley halted Patton’s advance before it crossed into Montgomery’s sector where it may have resulted in a friendly fire incident with distant Canadians. Simple coordination between Bradley and Montgomery or closer involvement by Eisenhower could have resolved the problem and allowed them to knock two German armies out of the war.

Earlier, a lack of proper coordination between the Army and the Army Air Forces resulted in costly friendly fire incidents. Bradley planned Operation Cobra to break through the hedgerows of Normandy, which had reduced fighting to a slug-fest reminiscent of the trenches of World War I. In an unusual operation, Allied bombers would dump a carpet of bombs on a long, narrow strip into the enemy lines in front of American troops near St. Lo. Two infantry divisions would rush into the gap created by the bombing and hold open the shoulders while two armored divisions charged through. Bradley wanted the bombers to approach the target parallel to his front lines to avoid the possibility of stray bombs landing on friendly troops. The bombers struck twice in two days, both times attacking perpendicular to the front lines and directly over the troops, both times dropping

bombs short and killing or wounding hundreds, primarily members of the 30<sup>th</sup> Division. The controversy over whether Bradley approved the perpendicular approach or the Air Forces simply ignored his instructions still rages today.<sup>6</sup>

Controlling combined operations in Normandy was even more precarious. In the British sector, under Montgomery's 21<sup>st</sup> Army Group, a Canadian army controlled a British corps with both British and Canadian divisions. Montgomery also controlled a British army with a Canadian corps consisting of Polish and Canadian divisions. The American sector was homogenous except for Leclerc's 2<sup>nd</sup> French Armored Division under XV Corps. Operations of these units offer examples of challenges to combined command. Differences in experience, equipment, logistical requirements, organization, doctrine, training, perceptions of other nations' soldiers, and further thorny issues reveal themselves for analysis. For example, Blumenenson accuses Leclerc of disobeying the attack orders of a U.S. commander by keeping his forces available for the liberation of Paris, a national political objective which was at odds with coalition operational needs. In the ensuing confusion, Leclerc's formations impeded an advancing U.S. unit, possibly preventing a timely closing of the Falaise gap.

Blumenson concludes that for British, Canadian, and American armies in Normandy "No coherent leadership bound all the parts together to form a unified whole." For the often impromptu multinational forces of today—organizing rapidly in response to global crises—cooperation among allies is vital to success. The recent disastrous Ranger operation in Somalia highlights one aspect of the problem<sup>7</sup> and Bosnia might provide parallels to flawed multilateral operations in Normandy.

Bradley's squabbles with the airmen during Cobra foreshadowed Schwarzkopf's problems with his air commanders in Saudi Arabia. According to one account, Schwarzkopf had ordered the Air Force to



Marines raiding Bakara Market, Mogadishu.

U.S. Navy (Terry Mitchell)

strike Iraqi Republican Guard divisions with B-52 bombers in the first hour of the war on January 17, 1991. Schwarzkopf was enraged to discover on January 15 that air planners had decided not to strike the Republican Guard formations until 18 hours into the war after enemy air defense systems had been destroyed.<sup>8</sup> In a situation eerily similar to the acrimonious exchanges between Bradley and his airmen Schwarzkopf accused the chief air planner and commander of all Air Force wings in southwest Asia of having lied to him.<sup>9</sup> As in Bradley's case, Schwarzkopf's problem stemmed mainly from a misunderstanding between air and ground commanders.

To improve coordination of air and ground operations and to ensure ground commanders received appropriate air support, Schwarzkopf had his deputy meet daily with the Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) commander.<sup>10</sup> Still, in early February the Army corps commanders "bitterly complained" to Schwarzkopf "that the Air Force was not hitting the targets they had chosen."<sup>11</sup> Again, a lack of agreement between the Army and Air Force on how best to employ available airpower was to blame. The debate continues over why the Air Force did not destroy at least 50 percent of Iraqi ground

forces during the 38-day air campaign as Schwarzkopf directed.

A chilling similarity between Desert Storm and the Falaise pocket was the failure of both Allied operations to encircle completely and destroy or capture the enemy's main force. Bradley accused the British of pushing the Germans out of the open end of the Argentan-Falaise pocket like "squeezing a tube of toothpaste." Referring to Bradley's comment as dishonest, Blumenenson points out that it was Bradley who failed to close the pocket and later defended his actions by arguing that he preferred to have a "solid shoulder at Argentan to a broken neck at Falaise." Whether the gap could have been successfully closed earlier, however, is also arguable.<sup>12</sup>

James G. Burton, a retired Air Force colonel, sparked a debate in the *Proceedings* over the past year with an article accusing VII Corps of failing at the end of Desert Storm to destroy the Republican Guard as ordered, instead "pushing them out the back door."<sup>13</sup> In a subsequent piece inspired by Burton's charge, a retired Army general insisted that Republican Guard soldiers and equipment survived to harass the

Kurds because Schwarzkopf failed to *plan* to entrap them.<sup>14</sup> Whether coalition forces could and should have completely captured or destroyed the Republican Guard is controversial. But the fact is that Schwarzkopf ordered the destruction of Saddam Hussein's elite units and many escaped.

Blumenson completed this book before the Persian Gulf War. It is interesting to ponder whether its publication at that time may have influenced the planning or outcome of Desert Storm. Perhaps a historically-minded planner might have provided for the entrapment of the Republican Guard to prevent an escape comparable to Falaise. Perhaps Schwarzkopf might have been more careful to ensure the Iraqi escape route was cut before agreeing to end the fighting. Blumenson's contentious book should stimulate a lively debate in this regard. The Eisenhowers, Montgomerys, Bradleys, Pattons, and Schwarzkopfs of tomorrow will be better joint and combined commanders because of their awareness of recurring operational problems. **JFQ**

NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Volumes in the *U.S. Army in World War II* series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History (ex-Office of the Chief of Military History) are known as "green books" due to the color of their buckram bindings. Blumenson's "green books" include *Breakout and Pursuit: U.S. Army in World War II, The European Theater of Operations* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1961) and *Salerno to Cassino: U.S. Army in World War II, The Mediterranean Theater of Operations* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1969).

<sup>2</sup> *The Patton Papers*, vol. 1, 1885-1940, and vol. 2, 1940-1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972 and 1974).

<sup>3</sup> Blumenson, *Breakout and Pursuit*.

<sup>4</sup> Blumenson, "Cantigny Discussion," a paper presented at the conference on Normandy sponsored by the Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation and U.S. Naval Institute at Cantigny in Wheaton, Illinois, on March 2-4, 1994.

<sup>5</sup> Eisenhower's biographer recently claimed that Bradley was selected over Patton because he had more confidence in Bradley's abilities; Stephen Ambrose, "Dwight Eisenhower: Command, Coalition, and Nor-

mandy," the keynote address at the Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation and U.S. Naval Institute Normandy Conference.

<sup>6</sup> In *Battle of the Generals* (pp. 129-41), Blumenson insinuates that the Army Air Forces ignored Bradley's instructions for bombers to strike parallel to friendly lines and later lied about it. In *Breakout and Pursuit* (pp. 231-33), Blumenson highlighted the "unsatisfactory . . . absence of firm understanding and mutual agreement" between Bradley and the airmen. But Geoffrey Perret in *Winged Victory: The Army Air Forces in World War II* (New York: Random House, 1993) claims that air commanders convinced Bradley to approve the perpendicular approach and that he later lied in blaming the Army Air Forces for disobeying his instructions and falsified a document to help prove the case. At the Normandy Conference in Wheaton, Illinois, on March 2-3, 1994, Bradley biographer Clay Blair pointedly stated that Bradley, as a man of honor, was incapable of such dishonesty. There can be no doubt, however, that Bradley agreed that the second bombing run would overfly his front lines. *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, vol. 3, *Europe: Argument to V-E Day: January 1944 to May 1945*, edited by Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), an official history, is silent on this subject.

<sup>7</sup> Rick Atkinson, *The Washington Post*, January 30-31, 1994.

<sup>8</sup> Rick Atkinson, *Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1993), pp. 105-06.

<sup>9</sup> Atkinson, *Crusade*, pp. 105-06; see also Robert H. Scales, Jr., et al., *Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 176-78.

<sup>10</sup> Eliot A. Cohen, *Gulf War Air Power Survey*, vol. 1, part II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 57-58.

<sup>11</sup> Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus, editors, *The Whirlwind War: The United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm* (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, forthcoming), p. 289.

<sup>12</sup> In a forthcoming article to appear in *Military History Quarterly*, Carlo D'Este supports Bradley's decision that, without major reinforcements, his forces were spread so thinly that if the gap had been closed they would have been vulnerable to attack by escaping German units.

<sup>13</sup> James G. Burton, "Pushing Them Out the Back Door," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, vol. 119, no. 6 (June 1993), pp. 37-42. See responses under the same title in the ensuing issues.

<sup>14</sup> John H. Cushman, *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, vol. 119, no. 10 (October 1993), pp. 76-80.

MUCH MORE THAN "FROM THE SEA"

A Book Review by JOHN N. PETRIE

How Navies Fight: The U.S. Navy and Its Allies

by Frank Uhlig, Jr.

Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994.

455 pp. \$34.95.

[ISBN 1-55750-853-4]

*More wealth than most nations command and more foresight than men normally possess are needed to produce a fleet suitable for all occasions.*

Frank Uhlig brings a lifetime of experience to this book. His research started when, at the age of seventeen, he joined the Navy as the Nation was engaged in the greatest maritime struggle the world has known. Since then he has been deeply involved in recording and analyzing the way navies fight. If one were to advertise for an authority to write a book such as *How Navies Fight* the qualifications would describe Uhlig. Consequently, this work is a superb piece of history and analysis presented in elegant but simple prose. It examines what navies do and provides a history of the U.S. Navy at war. The account spans three centuries of naval combat in every ocean and on the lakes and rivers of three continents.

Beginning with American and French navies and privateers operating against the British in 1775 and culminating with Desert Storm, *How Navies Fight* offers readers an unvarnished account of what the Navy has done, how it has done it, why it has done it, and whether it was done well. Along the way we learn things about allies, enemies, and in a couple

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of cases about friends who fought one another. The analysis is clear and concise which is rare in such literature.

But *How Navies Fight* offers more than it claims. A careful reading will reveal how navies operate with their sister services. Naval missions necessarily rely upon and routinely support other services simply because navies rarely fight alone. In this respect Uhlig has produced a clandestine primer on joint operations.

What comes across is that the critical business of navies is not widely heralded operations. Fighting on, over, and under the oceans involves more than projecting power ashore "From the Sea," though such operations are undoubtedly an important part of it. *How Navies Fight* captures the unglamorous but absolutely critical dimensions of naval warfare in the broadest sense. It deals with ensuring national security and successfully conducting operations both in and from a maritime theater if deterrence fails. Uhlig's conclusions come down to basic, yet often unrecognized facts. Since America gained its independence the Navy has regularly performed five wartime missions: strategically moving troops, acquiring advanced bases, landing forces on hostile shores, mounting blockades, and mastering the seas.

A rightsized force and the mixed blessing of a peace dividend means not expecting to have anything in excess. Without knowing the specifics of the next war, the lessons of history found in this book can serve as a guide for balancing maritime forces. After spending my career in frigates and destroyers it was no surprise to learn that the Navy has never had enough small combatant ships when war broke out. I also knew that we have always lacked sealift vessels—which we are now acquiring faster than any other type of ship. But now I have also come to realize that we may be short of amphibious ships as well. That potential shortage is especially worrisome considering the average age of our amphibious force. Many ships are nearing or are at the end of their effective period of service. Fortunately, a new vessel is far more capable than any



U.S. Navy (Ron Wimmer)

two that it may replace; but it can only be in one location at a time. Today the loss of one amphibious ship could remove enough capability to make a planned operation inexecutable or at least ill-advised.

Some relief is gained by the increased and improved use of near-term prepositioned ships carrying a generic unit's equipment. These ships allow forces to be airlifted into theater and fall in on identical gear to that on which they have trained.

A consistent dilemma made clear by chronicles of combat operations is that airlifting moves the first part of a force faster, but by the time the whole unit is airlifted it could have all been moved faster, cheaper, and with greater integrity by sea. So decisions on lift turn on how quickly forces need to arrive, adequate airfields with sufficient ramp space and maintenance, the character of the transportation infrastructure, and the availability of port facilities and sealift. Most situations can be expected to require both airlift and sealift, and few if any will require

only airlift. But we must remember that neither airlift nor sealift are useful in an assault on hostile shores.

That brings up the question of naval gunfire support. Modern five-inch gun batteries are exceptionally well suited to this mission; but there are not as many of them as we would like. Previous conflicts have repeatedly proven that even larger calibre guns were essential to difficult fire support missions. Those guns are gone. Hardened targets and bridges are tough to engage with five-inch ammunition. The Oliver Hazard Perry class ships have a superb 76 mm gun. But it is not the optimum gun for fire support missions and raises the question of how to kick the door open for opposed amphibious landings. Precision munitions delivered by attack planes can pick up some slack—but that is more expensive and less flexible than fire support afloat. And these missions will have to compete for priority with a complex target list which can only be carried out by precision munitions.

In World War II pre-assault bombardment grew longer as the



conflict went on, with some fire missions lasting days. In the Pacific Japanese defenders pulled out of range of naval gunfire thus surrendering the advantage to engaging forces when they were most vulnerable, crossing the beach. This was a great tribute to the effectiveness of bombardment. This and more is revealed in Uhlig's analysis of the war in the Pacific. In the near future we will have a smaller force which necessitates minimizing casualties. Both shore bombardment and fire support need closer looks.

Though we can expect that allies will make the facilities for administrative off-load of ships and aircraft available it is not a given. An enemy may try to either seize key transportation nodes or make them untenable. Not every potential ally has airfields which can receive C-5s or ports which can accommodate roll-on/roll-off ships. A smaller, more sophisticated force as advertised in the Bottom-Up Review needs to remember that the theater of war will define the options for entry. Sometimes the only way in will be across a defended shore.

Finally, in crossing hostile shores we should anticipate that sea denial forces will attempt to inflict a heavy toll. If an enemy can make the likely cost of an operation appear unacceptable, domestic political considerations could allow him to win without firing a shot. Today's force has been designed to minimize the effectiveness of most sea denial forces—but mines will continue to be a significant threat.

Conducting a blockade is tedious and frequently finds too few ships attempting to cover too much sea room. It is a naval operation characterized by days of boredom interrupted by a few minutes of intense danger which then quickly returns to boredom. Over the years a wide variety of applications and innovations have been made to fulfill the blockade mission. The classic operation used by Union forces to close Confederate ports in the Civil War varied little from the maritime interdiction as conducted by coalition

forces in Desert Storm. But U-boat campaigns in the Atlantic, U.S. submarine operations in the Pacific, the Cuban missile crisis quarantine, Operation Market Time in Vietnam, the current embargo on the states of former Yugoslavia, and the Haitian embargo all represent the mission of blockade in naval warfare. It is a function unlikely to fade into history during our lifetimes.

Progressive changes in technology have caused many aspects of naval combat to adapt over the years. For example, mastery of the local sea once meant a small area attendant to an ongoing operation. The area involved has been expanded to cover the operating radius of new weaponry and sensors, and includes air superiority and access to hostile shores. In Desert Storm coalition forces needed maritime superiority throughout the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and maritime approaches to both. Six carrier battle groups, two battleships, several cruisers, an amphibious ready group, scores of frigates and destroyers, many mine warfare ships, logistics support ships, and several submarines were committed to the fight. While it was assumed that they enjoyed total command of the sea, Uhlig makes the case that they did not.

Remarkably, the Navy did not do a good job in mastery of the seas in combat—a primary mission. U.S. and coalition forces swept the Iraqi navy into the dustbin of history, and allied air superiority was unchallenged after the first few days of combat. But mines sowed in the shallows off Kuwait and hardened batteries along its coast—emplaced during Iraq's six-month occupation in anticipation of an assault—constituted formidable sea denial forces. There were numerous, though apparently insufficient, mine countermeasures ships in theater, and clearing mines along a heavily defended shore could have been difficult. While a successful assault on the Kuwaiti coast was possible, a naval demonstration proved to be the best use of amphibious forces. It drew off Iraqi attention as the 'left hook' maneuver out-flanked them in the desert. This plan forced Saddam to

capitulate but circumstances in the future might not allow us so much flexibility.

This was better than the situation in Vietnam where America and the South Vietnamese only appeared to control the local waters for different reasons. Political intimidation—Khrushchev had warned that a blockade would have grave consequences—paralyzed our will. It prevented us from interdicting war material delivered by sea to North Vietnam. As a consequence the Navy and Coast Guard undertook a blockade of South Vietnam (Operation Market Time) which, though effective, largely intercepted and harassed vessels of the nation we were supposed to be assisting. But when Market Time forced Hanoi to divert supplies to the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville for overland infiltration to their forces in South Vietnam, political concern over widening an already unpopular war prevented effective interdiction. It was not until the 1970 coup in Cambodia that Sihanoukville was closed. By then the Ho Chi Minh Trail was operating every night and air interdiction efforts had only marginal success. So an enemy with no real naval or air power was able to achieve—as a result of our political caution—what it could never have done tactically. In Vietnam we never tried to attain mastery of the local sea even though essentially unchallenged after early August 1964.

Other naval warfare functions which arise are less essential to victory at sea but are typical of naval activity. Among them are commerce raiding, naval raids ashore, fleets in being, cutting lines of communications, cruises against enemy raiders, protection of shipping, bombardment, fire support of troops ashore, movement of forces, scouting, communications intelligence, naval demonstrations, evacuation of endangered troops, operations in aid of friendly governments, rescue of civilians, and troop support and air warfare functions where airfields are insufficient or unavailable. In a

world where no major adversary has yet emerged, we should anticipate the Navy being called upon to perform a number of small but dangerous missions. They will undoubtedly include operations similar to those identified above. It will be surprising if a year passes without the Navy executing a rescue mission in support of an American embassy or providing relief to victims of a natural disaster. The Navy's role in non-combatant evacuation operations has now sadly become an art form. These extremely dangerous operations have been consistently executed without fanfare and without friendly casualties.

*How Navies Fight* is nearly flawless but it could benefit from the inclusion of additional maps. In particular, maps should accompany the discussions of operations in the Philippines after the Battle of Leyte Gulf as well as in the region from the Bay of Bengal to the Gulf of Thailand.

Overall this book is readable and thought-provoking. If Potter had not written *Sea Power*, then this work by Uhlig would likely be the standard text for naval science courses of the future. But its value is more than academic. It informs the uninformed and moves knowledgeable readers to question assumptions about naval combat and the Navy's contribution to warfare. In dangerous and uncertain times it is useful to question assumptions.

This book should be read by newly promoted general officers of the Army and Air Force who want to understand the relationship between their service's capabilities and those of the Navy. JFQ

## AUSTRALIA AND THE GULF WAR

A Book Review by  
ALAN L. GROPMAN

The Gulf Commitment:  
The Australian Defence Force's  
First War  
by David Horner  
Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University  
Press, 1992.  
238 pp. \$ 24.95.  
[ISBN 0 522 84511 8]

Australia's Gulf War  
edited by Murray Goot and Rodney Tiffen  
Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University  
Press, 1992.  
304 pp. \$ 24.95.  
[ISBN 0 522 84463 4]

Of the many books that have appeared in the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm, the two reviewed here look at operational and geostrategic aspects of Australia's experience in the conflict. *The Gulf Commitment* by David Horner is largely a campaign history while *Australia's Gulf War*, an anthology edited by Murray Goot and Rodney Tiffen, is an analysis of Australia's overall role in the war. The latter is a more valuable contribution to the literature on the war since Australia's part was limited to the activity of the three naval vessels which participated in the U.N. embargo of Iraq, while the geopolitical impact of the war had far greater consequences for Australia.

*Australia's Gulf War* is also important in understanding the domestic political and foreign demands which coalition warfare places on a country like Australia today. It could also serve as the model for a similar book about America in the Persian Gulf—one that treats such diverse issues as the moral, political, ethical,

and strategic factors of the conflict and their effect on minorities, the media, and long-term strategic interests. Such a comprehensive book remains to be written.

A few years before the Gulf War, Australia revised its defense policy during what was still a bipolar, Cold War world. After serious study under the ruling Labor Party, Australia adopted a course which called for self reliance within an alliance framework with much greater emphasis on regional associations. Militarily, the policy demanded defense in depth of the homeland, replacing a forward defense strategy. Australia's response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait would seem to have violated this new policy, given the end of the Cold War and the swift dispatch of Royal Australian Navy (RAN) ships to the Gulf in 1990 (along with discussions about sending additional naval or possibly air assets to the area). But apparently the Gulf War and participating in it did not change Australian policy as not long after the conflict a strategic planning document iterating it was issued with a statement that "there is no reason to rush into a major overhaul of our defence policy."

*Australia's Gulf War* questions the relevance of defense policy in the face of that experience while David Horner's *The Gulf Commitment* does not. Horner provides an introductory chapter in which the shift in policy is discussed and an attempt is made to place the Australian role in the Gulf in context but he fails to make a case. Leaders go to war for complex purposes and Australia, like the other members of the coalition, went into the Gulf for various reasons although that region fell outside the scope of the new defense policy. Prime Minister Robert Hawke told parliament that the Gulf commitment was "proportionate to the interests we have at stake and to our national interests. It is also a practical commitment." But the political dimension of Australia's Gulf War commitment is better treated in *Australia's Gulf War* and includes consideration of that nation's association

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with and belief in the U.N. approach to collective security, relations with the United States, and a need for precedent-setting action to defeat Iraq's aggression against Kuwait.

After examining the strategic backdrop Horner details the efforts of the Australian military in the Gulf. Following internal discussion and a conversation between Prime Minister Hawke and President George Bush, the Australian cabinet authorized the dispatch of two sophisticated guided missile frigates and a slower but technologically advanced supply ship to the Gulf. They deployed with a combined complement of six hundred men on August 13, 1990.

Because Iraq had a large air force and surface-to-surface missiles, the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) assisted in training the RAN crews in air and missile defense by running hundreds of simulated attacks on the ships. RAAF F-111s, F/A 18s, P-3Cs, helicopters, and trainers (the last simulating Exocet missiles) flew more than 400 hours in practice attacks. Lear jets flown by contractors towed targets to sharpen the skill of RAN gunners. Since the navy determined that the supply ship's air defenses were inadequate for the region, the Royal Australian Army dispatched a detachment from an air defense regiment to ensure the safety of ship and crew.

The mission was to "prevent the import or export of all commodities and products to or from Iraq or Kuwait," but the initial rules of engagement issued by the government were too tame to permit the ships to effectively carry out this role. After a good deal of message traffic back and forth the ships were permitted to act aggressively, first firing warning and then disabling shots at vessels which failed to yield and also boarding ships which might be carrying forbidden materials. Australian frigates did fire warning shots at suspected ships and also boarded several.

The Australian contingent was indeed small—three ships as opposed to about 180 from the United States (including six aircraft carriers)—and only one of 17 national naval forces which

participated in the blockade. Yet their symbolic value far exceeded the military capability provided by these ships. Australia, a nation that sold Iraq wheat and other commodities, helped to enforce Saddam Hussein's diplomatic, political, military, and economic isolation, and also made a political statement at great cost in terms of trade which counted for much more than its military contribution.

Other Australian military elements did become involved. Eventually the first three vessels were replaced, one frigate by a guided missile destroyer, and mine-clearing detachments were sent to the area. In addition, some ground and sea force personnel who had been previously seconded to American and British units served in the Gulf. After Desert Storm, 75 Australian servicemen served in northern Iraq to aid Kurdish refugees. However, any thought the Hawke government might have had of sending RAAF combat units (with F-111s, RF-111s, or F/A-18s) was checked in part because of constrained resources, but mainly because of strident opposition from the left wing of the ruling party. The "convener of the centre-left faction . . . told the Prime Minister that he would face a party room revolt if the government tried to increase Australian forces in the Gulf."

The ships on duty in the Gulf from September 1990 to March 1991 acquitted themselves with a great deal of skill and pride. Horner concludes that in the Gulf War Australia "demonstrated . . . support for the role of the United Nations in protecting small countries, and in general showed that Australia would pull its weight internationally. However, the commitment also contributed to Australia's security by improving the efficiency and battle-worthiness of the ADF [the Australian Defense Force]." *The Gulf Commitment* is a graphic account of value to military professionals. While its purpose is limited, it fulfills that goal admirably.

In *Australia's Gulf War Goot* and Tiffen present a broader canvas. The book opens with a brief explanation by Minister for Foreign Affairs Gareth Evans on the strategic reasons for entering the war. Evans denies

that Australia followed the lead of the United States in the Gulf, but rather claims that it was acting only in its own interests. Next the case against Australian participation is made by two members of the left who make too much of the blunders by the American government in succoring Baghdad in the Iran-Iraq war and failing during the Reagan and Bush administrations to rein in Saddam Hussein's tyranny. The reality of the August 2, 1990 invasion and Saddam's unignorable threat to Saudi Arabia were facts that had to be dealt with, and prior mistakes were no justification for inaction in the face of a great menace. The authors, moreover, argue that continued economic sanctions and diplomacy versus the use of force would have worked to eject Iraq from Kuwait, surely a naive sentiment given Saddam's past and present actions. But this is not to say that this chapter does not score debating points on the effects of the Gulf deployment on Australia's democracy, and on its relationship with its neighbors, none of whom responded similarly. These two leftists also provide an example of the editors' approach to viewing issues from all sides.

As a tie breaker, the collection includes a chapter on the politics of Australian involvement by a neutral journalist who makes the point that Australia's long commitment to the United Nations weighed heaviest on the minds of the Hawke government, and not George Bush's requests.

The next five chapters focus on the home front. One treats experiences of Arab-Australians (the majority of whom are Lebanese and Christian) and their trial at the hands of native Australians. Another deals with the experience of Jews in the face of increasing anti-semitism also at the hands of native Australians. Both articles point out that attacks on Arab and Jewish institutions brought Arabs and Jews closer as both communities condemned attacks on any ethnic group or facility.

Another chapter covers the largely impotent peace movement

Puma helicopter  
hovering over  
HMAS Darwin.



U.S. Navy (John Bouvia)

that tried unsuccessfully to use the Gulf War to drive a wedge between Australia and the United States. The author argues that despite a nationwide effort by peace groups the war “left the Australian people more in favour of the United States, the ANZUS alliance and joint [U.S./Australian] facilities than they were before.”

Probably the most useful chapter in *Australia's Gulf War* treats the news coverage. Every type of media is richly considered, and the author, one of the book's editors, knows this territory well. He is most critical of the anti-war and anti-American biases in the state-funded Australian Broadcast Company. He is even more disparaging of the extremely heavy use made by Australian television of American network coverage.

The last chapter in this section is on polls. The author, book co-editor Murray Goot, is an expert on polling, and he writes an exceptionally detailed chapter on the successes and failures of polling during the build-up and war phases. He found that a lack of money hampered both the frequency and detail of polls. Nevertheless, support for the war went up after the fighting began, with 75 percent of Australians eventually favoring involvement.

Three chapters then deal with the impact of the war on Australian foreign policy. The first details Australia's historical involvement in the Middle East, including its ties to Israel, pro-Israeli Prime Minister, extensive trade ties with many Arab countries, and the effects of its middle eastern policy on Jewish votes and campaign contributions.

The second chapter delineates Australia's (especially the Labor Party's) close connection to the United Nations. It was through this attachment, argues the author, that Prime Minister Hawke was able to overcome anti-American sentiment in his party. In 1945 Australia's then Minister for Foreign Affairs H.V. Evatt, a Laborite, was present at the creation of the United Nations and also played a major role in drafting the Charter and later served as president of the General Assembly. Norman Makin, also a Laborite, was the first president of the U.N. Security Council. The chapter concludes with this judgment: “The importance of the U.N. factor in selling the Government's Gulf policy to the Party cannot be exaggerated.”

The final two chapters assert that Australia's participation in the Gulf demonstrated that the force structure developed for a self-reliant defense policy was ill-suited for distant force projection. A force structure more suited to the old forward defense force structure was needed. But Australia has not questioned its force structure, at least not publicly. Entering the Gulf War, moreover, also violated that part of Australia's defense policy that called for greater attention to regional concerns. Its neighbors were much more anti-American than Australia, much less pro-United Nations, and resolutely uninvolved in the Gulf War. Therefore, Australia may have wounded itself regionally as it tried to promote the idea that it is an Asian country not completely tied to America and its aims.

*Australia's Gulf War* is a thoughtful book with a serious end, and it deserves attention by readers on both sides of the Pacific. **JFQ**

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### WWII Campaign Medals



*The back cover reproduces the "European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign" medal (above left) and the "Asiatic-Pacific Campaign" medal (above right), both of which were authorized for service in World War II. The former medal was awarded to members of the Armed Forces who served in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East between December 7, 1941 and November 8, 1945. The obverse shows combat troops under fire coming ashore from landing craft with a plane in the background. The latter medal was awarded to those who served in Asia and the Pacific between December 7, 1941 and March 2, 1946. The obverse shows forces landing in the tropics with a battleship, carrier, submarine, and aircraft in the background. The reverse side of both medals has an American bald eagle with the dates "1941-1945" and the words "United States of America."*

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