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THE JOURNAL OF RACE DEVELOPMENT

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GEORGE H. BLAKESLEE AND G. STANLEY HALL

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JULY, 1912

No. 1

SOME OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF FEUDAL JAPAN TO THE NEW JAPAN¹

By K. Asakawa, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Japanese Civilization, Yale University

Feudalism as the ruling political machinery of Japan received its first imperial sanction about 1185. The long period from this date down to the fall of the Tokugawa Shogunate in 1868—an interval of nearly seven centuries—is popularly known as the feudal ages of Japanese history. This period may be divided into two, with the battle of Sekigahara fought in 1600 as the dividing point. The first part, about 1185 to 1600, witnessed a succession of civil wars, which occurred at first at long intervals, but, after the fourteenth century, continually and in growing intensity; the second part, 1600 to 1868, constituting a long reign of peace, coincides with the rule of the Tokugawa “Shōguns,” or suzerains, at Edo.

It is evident that so long a period of feudal rule could not pass away without making deep impressions on the national life and character of the Japanese. It is equally evident that the study of so colossal a subject as the contributions from feudal Japan to New Japan could not be compassed by any one student; and that even a very partial and cursory survey, such as I venture to present in this paper, of so vast a theme, could hardly be attempted without making serious omissions and without recourse to glaring generalizations.

To enumerate a few *political* contributions. It was under the feudal régime, that, late in the thirteenth century, Japan

¹ Address delivered during the Clark University Conference on Japan and Japanese-American Relations.

repelled the Mongol invasions, and thereby saved herself from a possible foreign conquest; and that, in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, she prevented dangers to her safety as a sovereign state that, it was feared, might come from the so-called "colonizing" nations of southern Europe, the Portuguese and the Spanish, by prohibiting their activity in Japan either in trade or in religious propagation. It was also under the feudal rule that, at the end of the twelfth century, Japan definitively reduced the two extreme northern provinces of the main island, Mutsu and Dewa, to submission to the central authorities; and that, four centuries later, she extended her suzerainty over the northern island of Yezo and the southern archipelago of Ryūkyū (Loo-choo). In short, feudalism created for Japan military forces such as the earlier bureaucratic régime had failed to give her, and, by this means, she was enabled to preserve her territory intact and to greatly extend it.

In matters of *culture*, also, the feudal ages made important contributions to Japan which a non-military society could hardly have made, in the form, among other things, of the Zen Buddhism with its extensive, subtle and profound influence upon national character and culture. It is true that the extremely rigorous methods of Zen were cultivated only by a chosen few who were capable of an intense and sustained application of the mind, and attracted even less followers in the peaceful period after 1600 than during the preceding epoch of civil strife. If the tenets of Zen were not popular, however, the spirit of Zen pervaded all classes of people, and directly or indirectly influenced all forms of Japanese culture. It was the spirit of reserve, collected force, and not primitive but deeply studied simplicity; it was a spirit which sought to compress the deepest meaning into the simplest form, and to put the most concentrated energy under the most perfect control. Zen both vitalized and chastened Japanese nature and its expression. This double influence may be amply seen in all the fine arts of the feudal ages—painting, specially of landscapes, calligraphy, architecture, and music; in all the martial arts; in literature; in the aesthetic and social taste and style; in customs and manners; and

in many details of common daily life. Zen, of course, was not the only controlling factor, but exerted its influence upon the Japanese side by side with other forces which had come down from the earlier ages and with still others which developed after 1600. Zen, however, constituted an ever-present ideal and heritage which is even now perceptible everywhere, and which could be developed only in so robust a feudal society as existed in Japan for seven long centuries. Zen is the great element of the Japanese character which has yet been the most inadequately interpreted to the outer world, and which, at any event, is perhaps the least intelligible to the American mind.

We cannot tarry longer on this point, for, important and precious as all these and other contributions are, and profitably as they may be enlarged upon, we are in this discourse concerned primarily with some other contributions of feudal Japan—with those contributions, that is, which have had a special bearing on Japan's activity as a *modern nation*. What does New Japan owe to feudal Japan that has promoted her national life under modern conditions?

Of some of the contributions of this character of which I may claim partial knowledge, it is possible to point out two aspects, moral and social. What peculiar *moral* life has been inherited from the feudal era, and what peculiar *social* organization had produced it and was sustained by it? The form of this question suggests, and the following discourse will show, how inseparably these two phases were bound up with each other; it is purely for the sake of discussion that I am obliged to divorce them one from the other as if they were not, as in reality they were, two sides of one and the same substance.

MORAL LIFE

The pre-feudal culture

The seven centuries of feudalism were preceded by about four centuries (794 to c. 1185) of court culture at Kyōto, the imperial capital. This culture was, in its essential characteristics, aristocratic, effeminate, and emotional. Its point of

view was mainly æsthetic, non-ethical; the denizens of the court, ladies and lady-like men, concerned themselves, not so much about the right or wrong of their conduct, as about the propriety and gracefulness of their behavior. Rather than asking *what* ought to be said or done under a given circumstance, they inquired *how* to say or do things approved by common consent to be good form and pleasing. Their culture was modal; while it excelled in grace and gentility, it lacked strength and variety. Its points of contact with the individual were dull and void of thrill, for it hardly touched his capacity for strenuous effort or self-denying enthusiasm. If you picture in your mind the French court life under the old régime as revealed in the memoirs of courtiers and in some of Dumas' novels, and in your imagination subtracted from this picture the qualities of dash and extravagance which were not absent in reality, you will have produced a likely replica of the court culture of the Kyōto of the tenth century.

The very religion in vogue had changed its nature: Buddhism had now become highly and elaborately artistic, and its ritualism developed to a point of complexity that has never since been equalled. This formal and æsthetic Buddhism was, in certain respects, further enervating the social fabric already enfeebled by the over-abundant culture of the time; it was absorbing the landed wealth and engrossing the personal devotion of the nation to an alarming extent. Had the condition been allowed to persist longer, Buddhism and Japan might not inconceivably have gone on corrupting each other, and in her archipelago history might have found another Ceylon or Tibet.

The feudal point of view

Fortunately this state of things obtained only at the capital. A step away from Kyōto, and everywhere over the land, one would see great social changes slowly but irresistibly taking place through the course of these five centuries, which were destined not only to save Japan from the fate that otherwise seemed to await her future, but also to enable

her to reconstruct the moral life of the nation on a radically new foundation.

For the first time in Japanese history there grew up a new class of warriors who were knit together by essentially personal relationships of fidelity and loyalty. For the first time, the men were inspired by a keen sense of individual honor, which they guarded with the sword; honor was valued higher than life, men staking their lives in contests for the honor of their lords, their families, and themselves, and even taking their own lives when it was thought that honor was irrevocably lost or that death alone could save honor. These two moral principles, personal fidelity and individual honor, were, as may be realized, needed by the very nature of the feudal society, and were cultivated by the men with incredible rigor. Then after the beginning of the feudal régime, these same qualities were put to a severe and sustained test during the centuries, first, of discipline, and then, of actual warfare, and thereby were much trained and tempered.

New Buddhism

New forms of Buddhism now prevailed among the warriors to meet their spiritual needs, for the old ritualistic forms, which once fascinated the courtiers of Kyōto, hardly satisfied the longings of the sworded men for virile doctrines and for direct roads to salvation. The Zen Buddhism, to which reference has been made, sought to gratify the former, and the Zhōdo and Nichiren the latter of these spiritual demands. Zen required a bold and intense mode of mental concentration. It was designed to break down the fetters that were said to bind the man to his blind and timid selfishness; it otherwise trained the disciple in the art of subduing obstacles that unenlightened mortals persist in throwing in their own paths, and of summoning one's mental and physical powers at a moment's call and bending them upon the execution of a given object in view. The methods of the Zhōdo and Nichiren sects were an antipode to those of the Zen; the former dispensed with self-discipline as a means of enlightenment, but taught an absolute faith in the saving power, respectively,

of a Buddha and of the truth embodied in a sacred book. It would seem that, before 1600, the robust methods of Zen gained greater popularity among the warriors than the gentle tenets of the other two denominations.

Confucian influence

To these spiritual factors were added, after 1600, moral teachings of Confucianism. They emphasized order and security to be obtained by the loyalty of the lower and the benevolence of the upper party in all human relationships, political, social and domestic. Of these relationships, the Confucianism adopted in the feudal Japan of this period considered as of first importance the relation between ruler and ruled.

The case of Confucianism affords a remarkable illustration of the truth, which is too readily forgotten, that no religious or moral doctrine that does not meet actual needs of society may be forced upon it; and that society in any given country and at any given period successfully adopts only such teachings as it has produced or has selected for their suitability to its material and moral welfare. Confucianism had begun to be studied in Japan at least one thousand years before 1600, but during this long interval there had been only individuals, not classes or communities, that accepted its more purely ethical precepts as their life-principles. That certain practical phases of Confucian ethics came to be universally studied in the feudal Japan in the late period under the Tokugawa suzerains was due to the general belief that they would serve now better than in any earlier age to secure the stability of the existing society; they were found to afford admirably clear and concise names and systems to the virtues that had grown up in Japan independently of Confucianism, and that had now been consciously employed, in a further developed form, as the foundation of the power of the feudal authorities and of the peace and order of the realm.

The Bushidō: History of its basic virtues

The code of ethics that resulted from the combination of these and other moral elements of the feudal ages is what is often called the "bushidō," the term familiarized to Occidental readers by Dr. Nitobe's interesting exposition. The "bushidō" was remarkably complex in its composition, for Japanese, Chinese, and Indian influences had contributed to its formation; yet it appeared singularly homogeneous and coherent, as its elements had been fused together during centuries of hard discipline and constant and universal practice.

Its foundation would seem to have been *loyalty*—loyalty to one's lord, or to any man or matter upon which he has set his heart—upheld by a sterling sense of personal *honor*.

Let us not forget for a moment, however, that the "bushidō," in its long history, was not always characterized by constant fidelity between lord and vassal. That there was a large element of opportunism among the "samurai" during the period of civil war (before 1600), manifesting itself too often in unnatural and revolting crimes of treachery and murder among men bound together by the closest ties of fealty or blood-relationship, may be seen by any cursory reader of the annals of these dark ages. The opening pages of the chronicle *Tō-dai Ki* present acts after acts that would parallel some of the blackest exploits of Machiavellian politics recorded of the sixteenth century Italy. That these enormities should be, as they were, perpetrated in Japan at the same time that noble acts of valor and loyalty were frequent, committed not seldom by the very same persons, suggests the deep interest of the social psychology of the time. And the same fact will also indicate the need of a *historical* presentation of the "bushidō," which has scarcely been attempted by any writer from a purely objective standpoint; it is obviously as impossible to present a true static description of so dynamic a growth as the "bushidō,"² as it would be to make

²Captain Brinkley's chapter on the "bushido" (*Oriental Series; Japan*, vol. II, chap. 5) appears to deal mainly with the two or three centuries prior to 1600, while Dr. Nitobe's well-known work (*Bushido*) seems to be based

a general analysis of Christianity that at once is true of any one period of its history and does justice to its central truths. The only conscientious method of describing any remarkable historical development would seem to be the historical one.

Were the changing phases of the "bushidō" studied in the spirit of seeking truth, it would be found, I think, that it was only after 1600 that the feudal rulers were, thanks to the peculiar social condition in which they found themselves, enabled at length to institute a rigorous and effective system of training designed to purge the "bushidō" as thoroughly as possible of the element of opportunism that had vitiated it. A tremendous machinery of education was it that was then elaborated with this object in view, but space forbids a description even of its larger features. Suffice it to say that this system of training proved remarkably effective in accomplishing its first aim, but somewhat at the expense of the true life and vigor of the historic code. Just as the exposition of the social ethics of ancient China by Confucius and Mencius was designed to compensate the actual decline of its practice then taking place by teaching an increased consciousness of its principles, so in a like manner the idealization and systematization of the "bushidō" in Japan under the Tokugawa shōguns indicated in fact a perceptible deterioration of its vitality. When the feudal classes learned to regard opportunism as hateful and unworthy of them, the whole body of this knightly code had become a little inflexible and punctilious. The long reign of peace after 1600, during which the martial arts were trained but not used, contributed to the same result in the "bushidō."

Even in this state, however, the "bushidō" was an immense potential energy; and it acquired an unexpected lease of life in the middle of the nineteenth century, when thou-

primarily on the perfected ideal code of the Edo period. Since they take up two different periods for the most part, these two works, mutually contradictory as their accounts may often seem, hardly correct each other. Nor may they properly be said to supplement each other, for, though largely concerned with different epochs, neither professes to be historical in method, but both treat the subject in a manner to lead the reader to suppose that they discuss it in its entirety. They serve, however, as valuable introductions to more accurate discussions of this subject which are still to come.

sands of men were suddenly animated by its thrilling power, and brought about the great upheaval that resulted in the destruction of the feudal régime. Feudalism was killed by the moral spirit it had nursed, when that spirit was liberated by revolution and fastened itself to the cause of national unity and imperial sovereignty.

Other factors of the "bushidō"

I have said that the "bushidō" was complex in origin though homogeneous in fusion. While its basic virtues were, it would seem, loyalty and sense of honor, it also was characterized, nearly at all times though in varying degrees at different times and in different persons, at least by the following moral tendencies:—contentment in simple material comfort, and disdain of lucre; the gallant surrender by the "samurai" of all that was of earthly value, including his very life, when it stood in the way of his fulfillment of a promised word of friendship and devotion, often resulting in sacrifices which would be considered unnecessary by Occidental observers; rigorous self-control and reserve; a habitually reflective and self-examining turn of mind, so that one's personal honor might be guarded, not with dense vanity and blind self-assertiveness, but with a clear conviction of its last irreducible claim; the habit of minute consideration and precise coördination of matters relating to the execution of any important plan of action—the training of a vision for the law of causality so habitual as almost to amount to a mental sport; the constant chastening of the mind so as to be able to meet more perplexing crises with greater coolness and assurance; the power to summon one's physical and mental resources at an instant's call, to intensify them if possible, and focus them on the consummation of one supreme act demanded by the exigency of the moment. To these must be added the delicacy of sentiment in regard to other members of society, attended not only by minute rules of etiquette, but also by quick adjustment of one's expression and behavior to suit different parties and varying moods and circumstances. The last but not the least factor, which had developed prin-

cially among courtiers at Kyōto of the pre-feudal period, but which was cultivated in new forms throughout the feudal ages, was often called by the historic phrase, *mono no aware wo shiru*, literally, "to be sensible of the pathos of things," and in fact denoted a cultivation of the heart. It meant capacity for ready appreciation and cheerful response to a call for human sympathy; it manifested itself in intimate love of nature, in aesthetic enjoyment of the beauty alike of art and of human conduct, and in applause of the enemy's valor and sympathy for his fall. The fundamental unity of these apparently incongruous phases of conduct may be felt only by the aesthetic-moral sense of the "samurai."

The whole "bushi"

It should once more be emphasized that these component qualities of the "bushidō" were in practice considered seldom as separate elements, but as one coherent body of moral values, a veritable moral atmosphere which surrounded all "samurai" and which was imbibed by each. There was to be no specialization of the different virtues among different men, but each and every man was taught and expected to realize in himself, according to his nature and training, all of the virtues as a simple code of conduct. This was the ideal of the whole man in feudal Japan, and the ideal was taught and practised rigorously and with large success. You will appreciate the difference between those ages and ours as regards both the ideal and the degree of its realization. We fail to observe in this twentieth century any ideal for an all-round man which is attended by a social sanction more powerful than that of religion, or a universal inculcation and practice of any, even a partial, ideal which thrills and unites all members of society.

Skepticism and blind praise

It is difficult, therefore, for us to portray in our minds the actual state of feudal Japan animated by the "bushidō." And the very difficulty is liable to lead one to fancy either that all descriptions of the moral life of that society must be

grossly exaggerated, or that, on the contrary, Japan under the Tokugawa rulers must have been a paradise in which the virtues of fidelity and honor were in perfect practice. I am afraid that the first skeptical view is largely justified as a reaction against the current dithyrambic tales of Japanese feudal perfections; it, however, falls short of true criticism, since it does not consider the historical fact that the needs of maintaining the peculiar form of feudal society in Japan, especially after 1600, made it imperative that its units should, as far as could be accomplished through human agencies, be well-rounded men of the "bushidō." Otherwise the society would have been unstable and have readily succumbed to disintegrating forces.

As for the blind praise for feudal Japan, it is necessary to qualify it with the consideration that there were many lapses from the ideal, and that these were usually followed by a swifter and sterner chastisement than is agreeable for us to contemplate in this comfortable age.

The woman and the "bushidō"

The "bushidō," excepting a few of its leading traits, was essentially masculine and martial in origin and in character, but, as might be expected, it also changed the moral status of the Japanese woman in a fundamental manner. Her social position, compared with that of her sister at the court of Kyōto in the preceding bureaucratic period, would seem to have been materially lowered. No longer was she, as was her predecessor, courted by rivalling lovers with solicitude and deference; no longer did her feminine taste and views of life exert a controlling influence upon the customs and culture of polite society; no longer could she express without reserve her personal feelings and emotions even in her limited sphere, much less could she play a leading rôle in literary productions or in political councils. On the contrary, the social yoke under which she found herself was heavy beyond the conception of her elder sister. The feudal family had reinforced the right of the house-father, and the woman was again completely under the *manus*,

in turn, of her father, her husband, and his heir. Out in the public, the man prevailed, for thither the woman seldom ventured. Her sphere of activity was coëxtensive with her home circle, and, within this narrow horizon, her freedom of expression was curbed. She eschewed her personal opinions when they conflicted with the interest of the house or the public duties of her husband. The onecommanding principle that ruled her from birth to death was self-effacement.

I fear such description will lead the foreigner, as indeed it has led many a well meaning observer, to the conclusion that the position of the woman of feudal Japan must have been one of unendurable misery. But it is a significant fact that, with the decline of her social status, her moral status rose immeasurably. Though seemingly more servile, she enjoyed genuine respect of the man to an extent unknown to her predecessor at Kyōto, for she performed an all-important moral service of which the latter could have no conception. Remember that the "samurai" was under constant discipline of fidelity and honor; his service was of arms, and involved, therefore, a possible sacrifice of his life at any moment. Every day as he left his home and mingled with the outer world, he should beware that any instantaneous call on his service must be met with clean conscience and untarnished honor. He should be absolutely certain that, if an unexpected death should overtake him, his wife would be able to control her grief, preserve her presence of mind, discharge the household obligations so abruptly thrust upon her, and rear her children in lessons of fortitude and honor worthy of their father. The great strain put upon her by the feudal society presupposed in her an adamant will. If the foreign critic must decry the social servility of the Japanese woman, he would do well to note that this constant demand on her moral courage exerted a thrilling influence upon the whole course of her life. Let him remember that, just as the social status of the Roman woman of the empire rose at the same time as their moral fibre weakened, so also, in a reverse process, the moral prestige of the Japanese woman of the feudal ages increased as her social freedom decreased.

Let the critic further consider that, but for her woman, feudal Japan could hardly have been what it was and have given to New Japan what it has. Since the woman was a tower of strength behind him, the man was enabled to go forth without care of home and do his work without the need of casting a backward glance. She effaced herself, so that he might serve his lord with honor; and he sacrificed his life, when need be, so that his lord might maintain his honor—a whole chain of duty and honor binding the entire feudal society. If one would criticize the Japanese woman, he should rather criticize the system of which she was so decisive a factor.

The chief defect of the "bushidō"

The chief fault of this social system, from the modern standpoint, may perhaps be found in its comparatively low estimate of the individual person. Not that, as superficial critics aver, the human life was cheap in feudal Japan; nor that the man as a being of honor was treated with a whit less respect and politeness than in our society. Life was dear; honor was dearer than life; and the man as the embodiment of honor had in a large measure been liberated from the thralldom of the clan and of the monotonous and non-ethical customs that in the preceding ages had stunted his moral individualism.

It seems essential to remember this great advance in the moral valuation of the individual man made in the feudal ages, as compared with the earlier period. It is, however, equally important to note that the feudal man was prized rather as an instrument of the "bushidō" than as a complex organism with his physical and mental qualities to protect or train, his special interests to serve, his temperament and predilections to cherish, his career to realize, and his personal character to develop. This organism would correspond to the individual person in the Occidental sense, who has survived all the levelling processes of the Middle Ages, has persistently asserted himself as an entity, and is actively developing his powers and remodelling his surroundings to subserve his interest. In comparison with his Western brother, the

Japanese "samurai" was conceived as a man largely in the abstract. The former is more individualistic; the latter was more impersonal, for he regarded himself essentially as a temple of honor. Aggressive self-assertion is the keynote of modern European civilization; self-control and self-sacrifice formed the pre-requisites of the Japanese feudal man. The more the "samurai" effaced himself and the more he lived away from his concrete individuality and lived in the abstract "bushidō," the more of a man he was held to be. For the society in which he lived was of such a nature as could be maintained only by the prevalence of this special view of life, and as could not engender a more individualistic ethics or prosper under its régime. Herein we see one of the real, great points of contrast between the modern Occidental and the feudal Japanese, not to say Oriental, civilization.

The question of the historical origin of this fundamental difference between the two civilizations is far too deep and complex for our comprehension. There is, however, no question to my mind as to the subtle and all-pervasive character of the effects of the contrasted points of view regarding the individual person upon the customs and morals, law and religion, in the respective spheres of the two civilizations. These effects, on Japan's part, will not be easily outlived, fast as she is adopting results of the self-assertive individualism of the West. Still do the Japanese retain some of their old reluctance to insist on their legal rights as against one another; still would they often yield their points and surrender their material interests rather than seeming to be too aggressive, for their fathers had been taught for generations to believe that nothing concerning one's own self alone, not even his rightful claims or high emotions, could be commendable. I have also witnessed cases of abrupt termination of friendships between Japanese and foreigners, to the complete amazement of the latter, when the former had silently and too long endured what seemed to them the selfish and mean insistence by their foreign friends on their feelings and interests, though the offence had been unintentional on their part and in no way touched the personal interest of the Japanese; these would as much disdain the seeming selfishness

in others as in themselves. The divergence of attitudes may sometimes result in less pathetic events. Who among you, for instance, have not experienced moments of surprise at the peculiarly impersonal and mechanical manner in which your Japanese acquaintances sometimes regard individuals and their affairs? In much the same manner that you yourselves often fall into the mistake of treating Japanese as general representatives of a race rather than as specific persons, the Japanese, on their part, may regard you perhaps as instruments of the occasion of contact and feel little or no genuine interest in your personal places in the human world. If they show you politeness and even have respect for the position you hold or the cause you advocate, you may not be certain that they also feel real interest in you as distinctive entities.

It would be a serious error to exaggerate the impersonal side of the Japanese attitude and to forget the existence of the reverse side in which devotion and sense of honor commanded all personal energy in their service. This latter aspect was the saving grace of the Japanese; indeed, it may have been largely responsible for the other, impersonal traits. Here the contrast between the Japanese and their neighbors, the Chinese, is instructive. If the Japanese had not been, as they were, trained in the school of loyalty and personal honor, had not been imbued with the hatred of opportunism, and had been obliged to fall back solely upon their non-personal view of life, there would have been little difference between them and the Chinese. The great quality of the Chinese would seem to be their dispassionate utilitarianism; the corresponding virtue of the Japanese was, it is clear, their sense of loyalty and honor. Witness how they continue to astonish the world now and then by the readiness with which they sacrifice their interest for causes they regard as necessary and honorable.

Nor should we be blind to the reverse of the picture. If the utilitarianism of the Chinese is sometimes liable to lead to crimes of opportunism, the Japanese habit of mind must inevitably conduce as often to acts of relentless coercion of others as to deeds of noble self-sacrifice. When the ruling

part of the nation sets its heart upon the execution of a great policy, the remaining part would be carried forward, whether cheerfully or reluctantly, along the common path of devotion and sacrifice. Illustrations of this kind of compulsion have not been absent in Japan in recent years. One has only to imagine this state of things, not as occasional, but as universal, during the feudal ages; the "samurai" were not only inspired with an abnormal sense of their own honor and fidelity, but also expected even the peasant and merchant classes to uphold it with enforced loyalty. Naturally this system frequently led to frightful abuses: honor as often cost freedom as earned it.

SOCIAL LIFE

Moral and social

The moral principles of the "bushidō," however instructive in theory, could neither have been the living force that it was in feudal Japan, nor have made the invaluable contributions that it has to the national life of New Japan, had it not been born in the heart of the feudal society, and had not, as a filial child, gratified the exact social and spiritual wants of the age. The "bushidō," that is, was neither grafted on Japan by a foreign propaganda, like the Catholicism of the sixteenth century, nor copied from abroad, like the Buddhism before the ninth century, nor yet formulated by a few men, like the Shintō of the Yoshida schools. The "bushidō" grew, as customs usually grow; it was the spirit of a great part of the compelling customs that struck root in that feudal society which itself continued to grow for at least seven centuries. Though the "bushidō" absorbed moral influences of Indian and Chinese origin, it selected them with extreme deliberation, and no alien factor made a permanent impression upon it which it did not completely and thoroughly assimilate to itself.

It falls far beyond the scope of this paper to present a full social interpretation of the "bushidō," but the following brief description of the social organization, not of the entire

feudal period, but of its last two and a half centuries under the Tokugawa rule, an epoch nearest and most intimately related to the new era, might be of some use. The description might perhaps aid you to appreciate something of the vital relation of the "bushidō" to the society which reared it and depended upon it; you might also feel prepared for the discussion, which you will meet later in this paper, as to how, after the end of the feudal régime, the "bushidō" adjusted itself to the changed social conditions of New Japan.

The Tokugawa policy and the two social classes

Few things were originated in the Tokugawa period, 1600 to 1868, either in feudal morals or in feudal institutions, but to it were handed down results of the moral and institutional growth of the past four centuries of feudal history. And these results were skillfully organized by the rulers into a great polity which, combining in itself, as it did, both feudal and absolutist principles in a masterly coördination, enabled the Tokugawa shogunate to endure in apparent security for more than two and a half centuries. The primary aims of this régime were: first, to prevent the recurrence of the civil war that had troubled Japan for ages, but to insure the peace and stability of the realm; and, second, thereby to perpetuate the political control of Japan in the hands of the house of the Tokugawa "shōgun." In the execution of this double policy, the two great social classes that had come down from the earlier period, the "samurai," or warriors, and the "hyaku-shō," or peasants, were carefully but in a natural manner so organized as to balance and offset each other's rights and obligations, and to substantially contribute to the peace of the land and the power of the rulers. Each class was accorded a rigid place in the whole social scheme, the "samurai" ruling the peasants, and the peasants supporting the "samurai." Neither was a caste, as the division of the classes was never absolutely insurmountable; each had, however, inherited its own customs and morals largely different from those of the other, and each was, in a different way from the other, granted a measure of autonomy,

and enjoyed, after its own fashion, the paternal care of the authorities. The keynote of the rule of both was Discipline, though it bore upon them in widely different ways. Let me illustrate these points by a brief survey of the organization of each class.

The peasantry

The peasant population, numbering probably twenty to twenty-five million men and women, formed the bulk of the nation. Though it was given no share in the government of the whole country, its social and economic position had greatly improved under the peculiar conditions that obtained in Japan during the century prior to the rise of the Tokugawa shogunate. The Japanese peasant of 1600 had in fact acquired a higher status, both in public and in private life, than the medieval serf of Europe: he had become the practical owner of the land he tilled, though his freedom of selling it was restricted; and he had learned step by step the art of the self-government of the village and the joint responsibility of the villagers. They usually selected village chiefs out of their own number, and often organized themselves in smaller groups within the village for the purpose of mutual aid and correction. The Tokugawa rulers utilized these customs and organs that had grown up among the peasants, elaborated and extended them throughout their own domains, and enforced the will of their government largely through the village institutions thus established. The example of the domains of the "shōgun" was also followed in the fiefs of the "daimyōs," or barons, so that by the end of the seventeenth century, the principles of village administration had become fairly uniform throughout Japan. Each normal village had its five-man groups, its peasant chiefs and councils, its regular mass meetings, its graded system of responsibility—the individual peasant to the group, the group to the village, and the village to higher authorities—and its constant vigilance and quick response to calls for mutual support.

All this freedom of the self-government of the village was, however, but a part of a carefully wrought system of paternalism which the Tokugawa rulers had devised for the entire

rural population of the country; the villagers were permitted to administer their own affairs even more completely than they had been wont to do, only in order that they would thereby be induced to submit all the more readily to the general policy planned for the whole of the productive classes of the nation. The peasants were to be satisfied and submissive; to be honest, diligent, and mutually helpful, as also patient and obedient. Agriculture was encouraged, but the peasant was restricted in his choice of the crops he would raise on his land. He virtually owned the land he cultivated, but was forbidden to sell or divide it beyond a certain acreage which must remain in his possession; natural economic causes, which I shall not discuss here, also helped to insure the small holdings of the peasant against the aggrandisement and eviction by his wealthier neighbor. In other words, the peasant should be neither too rich nor too poor; in fact, the land held by the average peasant was so small—so evenly small—that he could support his family only by dint of the most intensive farming and utmost toil and frugality.

In appraising this paternal-autonomous system of village government, one should not forget that its main object was, as I have already stated, to secure the peace of the country and thereby to perpetuate the political power of the Tokugawa. From a system built upon a principle in which the selfishness and the patriotism of the rulers were so closely blended together, one might well expect results neither wholly beneficial nor entirely harmful to the nation. The Japanese peasant emerged from the feudal period with little or no active interest and training in the conduct of the larger affairs of the country, but with the sterling virtue of industry, with a remarkable capacity for discipline, and with a secure though diminutive holding in land. We may see later in this paper some of the direct bearing of each one of these important results on the life of New Japan.³

³I venture to refer the readers specially interested in the condition of the peasant population in this period to my "Notes on Village Government in Japan After 1600," which began to appear in the *Journal of the American Oriental Society* in June, 1910.

The "samurai"

To return to the social organization under the Tokugawa. Over the supporting class of peasantry was the ruling class of "samurai," numbering, with their families, probably less than two million souls. Like the peasants of the villages, the sworded men under the one suzerain (shōgun) and the nearly three hundred barons (daimyō) of this period were, in ways different from the peasants but upon principles similar to those of their governance, granted a large measure of autonomy, and yet were controlled by a carefully built system of responsibility and paternalism. The barons of the fiefs ("han")⁴ were practically absolute princes in their respective territories, but any flagrant case of misgovernment on their part, or of internal dissension or family scandal, or an act of disobedience to the "shōgun," was swiftly and sternly punished by the latter's council. Likewise, the retainers of each baron, who were well organized for the enforcement of discipline and responsibility, enjoyed large freedom in the management of their own followers; yet they were accountable to their lord, not only for failures in their duties or disgrace to their honor, but also for any serious error in the conduct of their own household. The punishment of the "samurai," of whatever grade, consisted in enforced self-confinement, confiscation of the fief, severing of the ties of allegiance and support, or self-immolation.

Everywhere in this vast scheme were in operation effective devices of checks and balances, of responsibility and super-

⁴This word, *han*, is habitually translated, by both foreign and Japanese writers in English, as "clan." But the basic principle of the organization of any clan is blood-relationship, while the *han*, like the fief in the feudal history of Europe, was essentially territorial. Neither in the relation between the lord and the bulk of the people of the *han*, nor in the relation between the people themselves, there was and could be no semblance of any actual or traditional tie of blood. To call a *han* a clan is to confuse two radically different forms of social evolution and social organization, the distinction between which is familiar to every student of history and sociology. It is remarkable how sometimes, as in this example, the human good nature permits transparent errors to gain currency before it awakes to see the great harm they have done. It is urgent, for the sake of truth, to discontinue the prevalent use of the misapplied and misleading term "clan" in speaking of an organization which was to all intent and purposes a fief.

vision; and everywhere was made, with much success, a constant appeal to the sense of personal honor and the dictates of the "bushidō," which have been discussed in an earlier part of this paper. A little reflection will show how well such a moral life fitted the social form of the time; it is equally easy to see how well this whole system must have subserved the cardinal aims of the Tokugawa rule, namely, to prevent the recurrence of civil strife, and to prolong the political control of feudal Japan by the house of the "shōgun."

THE END OF THE FEUDAL AND THE RISE OF NEW JAPAN

The fall of the feudal rule

We have seen, I trust, some features of the old order of things in Japan which should guide us in our understanding, not only of the feudal period, but also of the transitional and the new age that followed. Wearisome as it may seem, I venture to reiterate the first aims of the Tokugawa rule: namely, to restore and maintain peace and stability, and to stake upon the success of this policy the very tenure of the power of the "shōgun." It was largely with a view to carrying out this double policy, that the founders of the régime made the skillful use of the existing social conditions that we have seen, elaborating and balancing them in a manner to compel our admiration for the statesmanship of the authors of the policy.

The student will be struck with the peculiarly half-selfish yet half-disinterested nature of this policy. Still more remarkable, there is evidence that these statesmen actually foresaw that, inasmuch as they had built the power of their descendants upon the degree of the efficiency of the government of the latter in maintaining the security of the realm, they might some day be obliged to forfeit their power, should they fail in this primary function of administration. That time arrived in the middle of the nineteenth century: a sudden access of pressure from foreign powers made it then patent to progressive men that, under the radically changed conditions, the old régime of the shogunate was no longer

adequate to pilot the ship of state against the tidal wave of national upheaval and international struggle that rose so ominously before Japan. As a matter of fact, the council of the "shōgun" rapidly lost its control even over the feudal classes. Indeed, its vision of the real situation confronting it was too long obscured by its natural desire to conserve its own interest. The "shōgun" awoke at length, only in 1867, to the fact which had become evident to freer thinkers in the previous fifteen years, that, if Japan would persist as an independent state, she should frame a more centralized form of government than feudalism. After this period of convulsion, therefore, the voluntary surrender of the Tokugawa rule and what is known as the restoration of the imperial government supervened, as we all know, in the years 1867 and 1868.

The old forces in transition

Who would dare say that this revolution could have been accomplished so successfully as it was, had it not been for the social-moral system that had been maintained under the Tokugawa? The "samurai" class, with its habitual hatred of opportunism and its ever present ideal of self-denial and loyalty, was happily suited for assuming the leadership in the new movement for national unity. The sworded man, who had for generations been taught to value his personal honor higher than his life, was able to leave all meaner things behind and to march straight to his new goal, regardless of the obstacles and perils that would have daunted a man of mere courage. On the other hand, the peasants, docile and well-disciplined for centuries, formed an exact type of population to be led by the new leaders and to support the new rulers. The transition from the feudal to New Japan came about, therefore, with a tremendous upheaval on the part of those "samurai" who had awoke to advanced ideas of national welfare, but with hardly a shock to the placid mind of the peasantry. The former experienced a sharp conflict with the more conservative "samuari," each side leaving records of thrilling acts of heroism and loyalty; the peasants passed from the old age to the new,

scarcely shedding a drop of their blood. The same condition has characterized the first few years that followed the revolution of 1868, when Japan, old as she was, was still but an infant as a modern state struggling for existence against the aggressive brother states of the West. The old "samurai" were able to lead, and the old peasants, to be led.

How different would have been the fate of Japan if the feudal ages had not provided her with the peculiar social and moral system that it did! If the "samurai" had been individualistic and utilitarian, there might perhaps have been an ultimate change in the existing order of things, and even—though this is doubtful—a progressive career of the race under modern conditions, but there could hardly have been the united, seasoned, and purposeful advance of the nation as a political body that has characterized Japan since the revolution. Likewise, had the peasants been critical and individually self-assertive, it seems extremely unlikely that the nation could have safely steered through the many crises, domestic and foreign, that have often appeared about to overturn it, united as it actually was. I believe that there would have arisen internal dissensions imperilling the very existence of the state.

It is well that there is variety in the ways of political salvation of nations: China's greatness as a race, as has again been strikingly demonstrated during the past months, as also throughout her historic ages, seems to consist in her largely impersonal sense of opportunism and utilitarianism. That remarkable quality may carry her through the present crisis. As for Japan, she has saved herself from an impending dissolution and possible foreign conquest by the qualities of fidelity and discipline that had been trained in different forms in her two social classes. From this standpoint, one might almost say that the feudal régime was destroyed by the very forces on which it had rested for centuries, as soon as they were set free by a national crisis.

The new age—amalgamation

We may now move a step further from the transitional epoch that followed the downfall of the Tokugawa, and enter into the new age proper, which may be said to date from about 1875. How have the social and moral forces bequeathed from the feudal period operated since that time? It will be remembered that the two great social classes had, during the earlier ages, grown so separately and acquired such distinctive characteristics from each other, as to seem almost to be castes. Their views of life were divergent, and their interests were largely independent and in part even antagonistic. Hence, there was in Japan no "nation" in the strict sense of the term. This state of things proved convenient, as I have suggested, at the transitional epoch, and materially contributed to the triumph of the principle of new centralization over that of maintaining the decentralized feudal régime. It was, however, evident to the more thoughtful men that the very ideal of unity, upon the realization of which the future safety of the nation seemed to them to depend, would be meaningless so long as the two classes remained as far apart as before. There might be coherence, but hardly unity. The late Dr. G. W. Knox once related to me the following story which he had heard personally from the mouth of Count Itagaki. In 1868, when the "shōgun" had lost his power, Aidzu was one of the fiefs in northern Japan that remained loyal to the memory of their suzerain and held out against the new government. The army of the latter, marching northward, invested the Aidzu castle so closely that loyal peasants of the vicinity could no longer bring provisions to their lords who defended the castle. After they had exhausted their wits in attempting to communicate with the besieged, the simple rustics finally presented themselves before the staff officers of the besieging army, and begged them kindly to forward their tributes to the castle. Though all were impressed by the loyal sentiment of the peasants, Itagaki alone, who was present, could not help thinking in the following vein. This act was commendable merely because it was done by peasants, for "samurai" would be

expected to fight to the last man before they appealed to their enemy for help; so long as the ethical standards so radically different in quality applied to the two classes, and so long as the lower was not raised to the level of the higher, the nation would be incapable of competing with the energetic Western powers.

Ideas like these dawned early on the mind of many a patriot, though in varying degrees of clearness. The very five-article oath pronounced by the young emperor in 1868 at the beginning of his reign foreshadowed the general principle. Both of the old classes were capable of a high sense of public service, but one, whose fathers had lived on hereditary status and had not been obliged to earn their livelihood by productive work, was economically imbecile, while the other class, having for ages been deprived of full opportunities to emulate the condition of the "samurai," was morally and intellectually undeveloped. It was necessary to enlighten both, but it was first of all urgent to let one impart to the other the virtues of the old "bushidō," and to let them together learn lessons of economic and other material adjustment. The immediate ideal was, therefore, as complete an amalgamation, physical and moral, of the two former classes as could be achieved by human foresight and effort. The life of the new nation should be based upon a careful welding together of the legacies that had come down from the feudal ages; out of their fusion should grow a great middle class, or a precursor of one, that should constitute the backbone of the new nation. Other things should come after and with this result.

Though it was only a part of the colossal work of reconstruction that entailed upon the imperial government, the proposed amalgamation was in itself a great task, requiring utmost care and skill. It is impossible for me even to refer to all the larger measures that have been made and the more serious errors committed in relation with this work during the last three or four decades. There will be critics who would deplore the following, for instance, as among the errors—the creation of a peerage consisting of the old court and feudal nobility and of newly appointed peers, which is not

in all cases limited in term, but is for the most part hereditary, constituting a perpetual social burden imposed upon the posterity; the introduction of a distinctly bureaucratic spirit among officials, a spirit which may be readily copied even by a private large organization or clique of whatever character; the inflexible and somewhat intolerant system of education of government schools in a country in which private institutions of instruction should be welcome to supply the excessive deficiency of the public ones, and which can ill afford the more or less antagonistic feeling that the system is breeding among an increasingly large number of persons against the official education; and the much criticized management of public finance which, though it has thus far insured the state against really serious embarrassments, has not prevented an inflation of the currency and a rapid increase of the cost of living, with the attendant social unrest. On each of these points, however, opinions might honestly differ. On the other hand, among the successful agents for the amalgamation of the old classes may be mentioned the following—the same system of national education, and the system of military training—the two great practical schools in which class distinctions are totally ignored and knowledge and merit alone rule; the grant of a conservative but expansive political franchise; and the growth of national wealth and of the general economic life of the people, the last factor especially leading also to a new social alignment. To these forces, I cannot help adding the great international events that have involved the nation in neighboring regions and on the American continent, which have served at once as tests and as lessons for the cohesion, the disillusionment, and the self-reliance of the nation.

Whatever may be one's opinion of the forces that have helped or hindered the amalgamation, there will be little question as to the large degree of its success. In their love of the country and devotion to the sovereign, which are new forms of the "bushidō," and in their growing ambition for their welfare, both individual and national, the Japanese people of today are to a remarkable extent homogeneous. And the lines of demarkation that are indeed being drawn

in their society with increasing distinctness are results of a new economic evolution, not a repetition of the old order of things. Amalgamation is already being followed by new division.

The emperor

There is yet another institution to be considered, the importance of which in our discussion is supreme. To speak of the feudal contributions to New Japan without reference to the institution of the emperor would be like drawing an eye without its pupil. This institution was not, to be sure, created during the feudal period, but, though antedating it, has been, as we shall see, deeply affected by social conditions of the feudal ages.

As a matter of fact, the emperor was, in the first place, the very founder of Japan as a body politic; and then, in the seventh century, when her society was in danger of a possible foreign conquest and a certain internal dissolution, saved his tenure as sovereign by taking radical measures of reconstruction, and thereby saved Japan as a state.

By this time, the foundation of the position of the emperor as the historic ruler of the country seems to have been firmly established. Although, during the seven long centuries of the feudal rule, his political power was almost totally eclipsed by that of the suzerain and his barons; although, in the second half of the sixteenth century, he was even reduced to a state of unspeakable penury; and although, when his material condition improved after 1600, his sovereign rights were hardly less nominal than before—yet it is a remarkable fact in Japanese history that not even the most rough-handed suzerain ever for a moment presumed to replace the emperor as the titular sovereign. Throughout the feudal period, the emperor continued to command the implicit deference of all classes of people as the sole fountain of official rank and courtly honor; no suzerain's title was valid who had not received imperial investiture. Nominal as its control was and varied as its career had been, the emperorship had after all proved to be the oldest and most enduring, as well as the most exalted, of Japan's political and social

institutions. Even at the depth of his poverty and helplessness, the emperor had never ceased to be a sacred and inviolable personage.

From this state, he rose suddenly to a commanding position when, in the last years of the shogunate, the movement for national unity was begun and carried on swiftly to triumph. The emperor was at once conceived by the followers of this movement as its soul; and, on the success of the cause, he was universally regarded as the center, the incarnation, of national traditions and national aspirations, embodying in himself Japan's past history and future destiny. The old principle of loyalty, tried and vitalized as it had been during the feudal ages, had now been disengaged from its feudal ties, and took up the emperor as its common object of expression. For many years after the so-called restoration of 1868, therefore, loyalty to him and patriotism to the country were thought to be interchangeable terms. As time advanced, his councillors have carefully nursed the general trend of the national mind to regard the emperor as the embodiment of the great policies of the nation. Otherwise these policies, however wise, would have lacked sufficient authority and dignity to enlist the undivided devotion of the people that they have shown.

Why is it, then, that the Japanese emperor has not turned a despot? In the constitution which he granted to the nation in 1889, he asserts in clear terms that the sovereignty of Japan rests in his hands, not in those of the people; that the cabinet is responsible to him; and that the national assembly, explicitly designated "imperial" diet, is not an independent law-making organ, but a helpmate of the emperor in his legislative capacity, even the representative character of the lower house being considered its incidental, rather than essential, characteristic. Would it be safe for Japan to have such an autocrat over her, constitutional though he is now said to be? The answer is that the Japanese emperor has never been despotic, and no one can fancy by any stretch of imagination that he ever will be. Let me not essay to convince you of the truth of this assertion, for it seemingly contradicts the universal human nature, and otherwise may

not be fully proven without an extended discourse. Let it suffice to point out rather dogmatically what might otherwise be logically demonstrated—some of the probable historical reasons for this extraordinary state of things relative to the Japanese emperor.

Both the emperor and the people in their attitude toward him have acquired in the course of Japan's long history a strongly marked common habit in their conception of his political power. Before the seventh century, when the organization of the state was largely tribal, with the emperor as the patriarch of the whole tribe, he was accustomed to regard the people in a paternal spirit, not as a tyrant, and their attitude toward him was deeply colored with something akin to filial sentiment. This mutual feeling, as of father and children, has, despite the important changes that have since occurred in the status of the emperor, come down from the ancient period, and is manifest to this day. With the seventh century began a highly artificial bureaucratic régime modelled after the Chinese polity, in which the sovereign, so far as his *political* life was concerned, was placed in a position in which he was bound to assume a largely impersonal attitude, his councillors bearing the major part of the responsibility of the government. Social and religious forces, none of which we have space to discuss here, also strongly contributed to this tendency. This bureaucratic period, which lasted for more than five centuries, is full of significant lessons of human history; and among them must be mentioned the gradual establishment, in addition to the older patriarchal sentiment, of the principle of what I call, for lack of a better phrase, the *political* impersonality of the emperor. Politically, that is, he must not assert his personal preferences and predilections, and, if he has a strong will, it must be exercised, not in translating it into positive deeds born of his own convictions, but in sinking his idiosyncrasies, and in sanctioning and giving effect to the counsels of responsible advisers. Such a mode of conduct would appear to the Occidental mind to indicate a weak individuality, and it cannot be denied that there were weak sovereigns; I content myself here, however, with suggesting that the world is wide

and contains many viewpoints, and that circumstances favored the very strongest of the Japanese emperors of the period to regard this principle of their political impersonality as wise and to act accordingly. Then during the subsequent seven centuries of the feudal régime, except in the brief space of 1333–1336, the emperor was politically so completely overshadowed by the suzerain that he could not, if he would, assert his personal will. You may readily see that this state of things, continuing for so long a period, must have powerfully confirmed the historic principle of the imperial political impersonality.

This, then, is the unwritten law much more than a thousand years old, that, socially, the emperor and his subjects shall treat each other with family-like attachment, and, politically, he shall be impersonal and let properly constituted authorities act as his responsible ministers. If this law is not committed to writing, it is older than any written law in existence in Japan, and also immeasurably stronger, even as the fundamental laws of the English constitution are strong though unwritten.

And the strength of the Japanese principle has been greatly increased by the promulgation of the constitution in 1889. Though it does not verbally refer to the principle, the constitution has firmly established the regular organs—the diet, the cabinet, the privy council, and the judiciary—through which the fundamental principle should operate in the future. The constitution, when examined closely, ceases to appear merely as another product of the blind imitation of Occidental civilization on which Japan is said by some to have built her new career. The idea of having a written constitution is Western, as also are the prototypes of the diet and other new institutions, but the broad principles underlying them will be seen to be very largely Japanese. The sovereign remains socially gracious and politically impersonal. The government by his cabinet and privy council still retains a large degree of the old paternalism, which depended more on the wisdom of the rulers and the unity and continuity of their policies than on the fluctuating suggestions of the people; the door has been opened only partially to the influence of the Western

idea—by no means the only political idea that humanity is capable of conceiving, and an idea whose merit is still under trial—that no one's interest would be considered who has no representative to fight and assert it. And the opening is so carefully controlled that it must widen only slowly with the increase in national wealth and political experience. In other words, the late Itō and the other framers of the constitution have elaborated it in such wise as to *train* the self-governing capacity of the nation, rather than *exercising* it before it was mature. The emperor, while reserving the theoretical sovereignty in his hands, has thus deliberately founded his future power upon the gradual training of his subjects, which shall at once be promoted and tested by means of his constitutional organs. The whole structure of the new régime may, therefore, be said to legalize and define the great national principle that has a history of many centuries. Thereby, it would seem, even the remotest possibility that might have hitherto existed, if at all, of the violation of the principle by a willful sovereign is to all intents and purposes eliminated.

From this point of view, it is most fortunate that, in the extremely important formative period since 1867, Japan has been blessed with an emperor who in temper and in training typifies what her constitutional sovereign should be. Frank and generous but highly conservative, the reigning ruler has loyally supported the policies of the nation as interpreted by his gifted advisers; and then, when the wealth and education of the middle classes were sufficiently advanced, he sanctioned the grant of a political franchise which is so designed as to be shared by a greater and greater portion of the people automatically with their progress in knowledge and material welfare. Future historians will be able to appreciate better than we the great confirming influence which the present reign will have exercised upon the constitutional career of New Japan in its very first decades.

CONCLUSION

We have now completed a general survey of the vital relation of feudal Japan to New Japan. In her we behold a well-disciplined, coherent nation which, with its steadfast common aims, and with its conservative but expansive constitution—all revolving around the Emperor as the heart and soul of the united existence of the nation—distinctly constitutes a strong organism and powerful moral force. Its activity thus far at home and abroad is a matter of common knowledge; its future cannot help bearing a vital relation to the history of mankind. But this nation could hardly have become what it is, had it not been for the fact that it has built itself largely upon the social and moral forces that have been contributed to it from the feudal period.

I conclude this paper by asking a few questions which its subject touches but does not include. May New Japan, made up at least in part of the elements and depending on the training of which I have given an inadequate analysis, be said to possess all the essential requisites to fulfil its functions as a state and as a society? If she has thus far proved a success as a state among states, will she be equally efficient in her duties to her individual sons and daughters? Will the latter be always as loyal to her as they have been? Does the foregoing discussion suggest the existence in her system of any ominous gap which time may widen into serious proportions, or do you discern in reality signs of coming difficulties already inferable at this date?

THE FOREIGN TRADE OF JAPAN

*By R. Ichinomiya, Manager of the New York Branch of the
Yokohama Specie Bank*

It is my purpose to present to you a brief review of what Japan has accomplished in her foreign trade, and at the same time to call your attention to a few points in the way of suggestions that may be of interest to students of the International relations of American commerce. There is no question but that Japanese foreign trade has made enormous strides since the breaking up of the policy of seclusion. Taking the total of the import and export trade during the year 1880, as representing a basis of one hundred units, and calculating from that the progress which the annual trade has subsequently made, we obtain the following results: 1880, 100 per cent; 1885, 102 per cent; 1890, 212 per cent; 1895, 408 per cent; 1900, 756 per cent; 1905, 1245 per cent; 1910, 1419 per cent; and in the last named year the grand total of imports and exports reached in value Yen 922,622,-804. That the rate of progress made in the initial stages was not as rapid as in later years is simply due to the primitive methods used then and to the many other difficulties to be met. It may not be amiss to mention a few of these difficulties.

The primary, and perhaps most serious, was in the ignorance of the foreigners and Japanese of one another's language and customs. Merchants, whether Japanese or foreign, could not, except in the rarest instances, confer with each other on business matters directly, and were compelled to employ special clerks, generally Chinese, as interpreters. The one aim of these men was to obtain their commission on the business done through their offices, just as now in the open ports of China, so that it was but natural that they should be indifferent to the development of trade. The only alternative was that one of the two parties, either the for-

eigners or the Japanese, should learn the other's language, trade customs and needs, with other relative matters, and so master the situation. And in this respect it would seem that the Japanese have taken the initiative. This tendency to do away with the middleman was extended to the Occidental merchants residing in Japan in so far as many of them were simply go-betweens, intermediaries between the *real* importers and exporters and not between the producers and consumers. They had little or no experience in actual trade, and usually lacked capital as well, but in the primitive stage of foreign trade they could get along nicely. Taking no pains to adapt themselves to the changing conditions, it was only natural that this class should have been gradually pushed aside when affairs became more orderly and real commercial competition came into existence, the result being the inevitable complaint against the winner of the business competition.

The reform of the monetary system was of very great assistance to the development of industry and the progress of trade. The national bank regulations, promulgated in 1872, modelled on the national bank act of the United States of America, being a total failure, an amendment to that act was passed in 1883 taking from the national banks the privilege of note issue and granting this exclusively to the newly-created Bank of Japan, a central institution, suitable measures being taken for the redemption of the outstanding national bank notes. Thus, by the end of 1885, there was no longer a disparity between paper money and coin, then mostly in silver, and in 1886 the system of specie payments was restored. The depreciation in the value of silver was always a great hindrance to the people in international commerce, however, and it was not until 1897 that this trade disadvantage, caused by an irregular and unstable fluctuation in exchange rates, ceased to exist when the imperial diet passed a statute on the currency and a portion of the gold received from China as an indemnity was applied to the national reserve. Thus the foundation of the gold standard system was firmly laid, and Japanese foreign trade entered upon its second stage of expansion.

With the development of transportation and communication both on land and sea, Japanese merchants were no longer dependent upon foreign firms established in Japan, but gradually began conducting the import and export business on their own account directly with foreign nations. The tendency of Japanese foreign commerce then took on a different aspect, and began to show a steady increase particularly in the importation of raw materials and in the export of finished articles, indicating the healthy growth of the home industries.

Apart from a consideration of the staple products of Japan for export, most important in determining the prospects of the country's foreign trade is the question as to what opportunities, facilities, aptitude and financial capacity Japan possesses for developing her industries. I may say without fear of contravention that the country contains practically all the elements essential for her great advancement industrially. Japan wants the raw material, for she cannot produce within her limited area all she requires for the industries which are bound to expand almost without limit. Her geographical advantage in lying between such countries as China, India, Australia and America, enables her to import at a moderate freight rate, such raw materials she may need as cotton, wool, the various minerals, etc. The only question that remains is for her to exercise a wise discretion in the choice of suitable markets in which to make such purchases. The supply of motive power is ample. Besides possessing extensive coal mines, the utilization of her fine water power is proceeding rapidly, the results to be seen in the electric-lighting, traction and many other fields. Japanese labor, skilled and unskilled, is plentiful, and in spite of the gradual rise in the standard of living, is still comparatively inexpensive. The increasing importation of the most modern machinery of all kinds, together with the increase in quantity of Japanese manufactured goods, certainly shows the knowledge and skill of the Japanese workman are not of low grade.

The only thing that Japan has lacked, and still lacks, for the development of her industries, is sufficient capital. In spite of the increase of national wealth it is to be regretted that the supply of working capital cannot keep pace with

the demand. The investment of foreign capital, therefore, is eagerly sought; and in this connection I may state that when foreign money is invested, the burden of the working end of the business should rest solely upon the Japanese, for the ability and trustworthiness of the younger generation in business affairs is beyond question, and the expense is very much less than for men of other nations.

Criticism of the commercial morality of the Japanese has been heard occasionally, and the employment of Chinese by foreign banks in Japan and China mentioned as an evidence. *The Japanese are not commercially unmoral.* To begin with, out of 2173 Japanese banks in Japan, with resources of 3634 million Yen, not one has ever employed a single Chinese with one exception, the Yokohama Specie Bank, Limited. This bank, it is true, did formerly employ a few Chinese in its Yokohama and Kobe offices, and for the one and only reason that those offices are engaged in the business of foreign exchange, especially in relation to business with China, but the bank has since discontinued the employment of Chinese, and no Chinese today employed by any bank or commercial concern in Japan. In European and American banks and mercantile houses conducting business in Japan the number of Chinese employees is very limited, if indeed any are still employed. These banks continue their employment simply because it was the Chinese who originally entered their service, and as long as they are willing to remain, there is no reason why they should be replaced by Japanese. These Chinese do not of course hold important positions, and were originally employed not because the Japanese were considered morally inferior to them, but for more practical reasons, one historical and the other commercial. China having for many years been a silver using country, and there being no proper coin of fixed weight, size and fineness, but silver bullion of every description as to fineness and size being used as a medium of exchange, the Chinese people have naturally become more or less experienced and trained not only to easily distinguish good silver from bad, but almost to tell its fineness by the ring of the metal when touched with a metal rod. It is

therefore quite natural that so-called silver experts are found among the Chinese. Considering the monetary system prevailing in China, these people are quite necessary for the banks that are carrying on business in that country. Before Japan adopted the gold standard, as I previously explained, silver was practically the only circulating medium in Japan. Even trade dollars were used to supplement the Japanese coinage. Japan having had legal tender notes and coin issued by the government for generations, her people naturally lacked the acquaintance with, and consequently the knowledge of silver bullion, and were not so well fitted to detect the variation in fineness as the Chinese experts. This is the reason why a few Chinese silver experts were at one time employed even in Japan by the Yokohama Specie Bank, Limited, a Japanese concern engaged in international exchange, and in similar lines; but with the gold standard firmly established in Japan, there was no longer a reason for the employment of Chinese silver experts in that bank or in any foreign banking institution in Japan.

There is also a commercial reason for the employment of Chinese by the foreign banks. According to commercial usage among the Chinese, the seller of a shipment of goods draws a clean bill of exchange upon the buyer, but not a documentary bill, i.e., a bill of exchange with the shipping documents attached. In other words, they do not hypothecate the goods to the bank as security for the draft. It is, therefore, difficult for the bank to determine whether a clean draft which they are about to negotiate, is actually commercial paper or not. To be able to act intelligently on this point, and also as there is no Chinese mercantile agency that can supply the desired information regarding the financial standing of Chinese merchants, as is practiced in Japan and elsewhere, it has been considered advantageous for the bank to employ a reliable Chinese whose influence and financial responsibility may be sufficient to safeguard the interests of the banks. But, as I have stated before, the tendency to do away with any kind of middlemen, and to reach the objective directly and straight, seems to prevail also in this direc-

tion; and as far as Japan and Japanese institutions whether banking or commercial are concerned, there no longer exists any necessity for Chinese employment.

In order to further explain the increase of foreign commerce along the lines of the fundamental principle of trade progress, I will take the aggregate import and export figures, for the year 1901, of raw or partly manufactured materials on the one side and the finished products on the other, the unit being 100, and compare them with the ten years following. Thus:

YEAR	EXPORT		IMPORT	
	Raw or half manufactured material	Finished articles	Raw or half manufactured material	Finished articles
	<i>Per cent</i>	<i>Per cent</i>	<i>Per cent</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
1901.....	100	100	100	100
1902.....	99	103	126	73
1903.....	103	124	150	75
1904.....	109	139	167	83
1905.....	95	137	193	127*
1906.....	135	157	149	129*
1907.....	152	147	198	131*
1908.....	132	124	164	92
1909.....	147	143	173	87
1910.....	153	168	217	85

* The increase in the years 1905-06-07 is due to the effect of the Russo-Japanese war and the subsequent post-bellum boom.

The progress and expansion of any undertaking depends internally upon the material influences and externally follow the lines of least resistance. When the above figures are analyzed it is interesting to note that while the raw or half manufactured materials have increased largely in both export and import generally, the manufactured articles imported to Japan, do not correspond with such an increase. On the contrary, in the case of exports, these will show a very large increase in the trade with those countries where the home industries are not much advanced, but a smaller increase, or rather a decrease, to those countries where home industries are in a flourishing condition. Even though making due allowance for the effect of the tariff, the following figures of

the trade with the United States of America and China will clearly indicate this tendency:

To the United States of America

YEAR	EXPORT		IMPORT	
	Raw or half manu- factured materials	Manufactured goods	Raw or half manu- factured materials	Manufactured goods
	<i>Per cent</i>	<i>Per cent</i>	<i>Per cent</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
1901.....	100	100	100	100
1902.....	114	101	122	76
1903.....	108	135	110	96
1904.....	134	158	144	97
1905.....	120	161	234	234
1906.....	174	171	177	130
1907.....	185	168	198	145
1908.....	179	130	183	171
1909.....	196	133	137	79
1910.....	204	180	133	105

To China

1901.....	100	100	100	100
1902.....	114	108	154	59
1903.....	156	193	173	68
1904.....	180	152	209	70
1905.....	260	221	202	35
1906.....	225	290	221	33
1907.....	261	243	257	23
1908.....	161	188	246	36
1909.....	140	229	251	37
1910.....	135	289	304	14

The antiquated idea that one may gain by underselling another is giving place to the belief that ultimate success must come through coöperation. Unhealthy price-cutting competition will naturally result in a deterioration in quality; and even if one succeeds, after a prolonged struggle, perhaps selling at a loss, in beating down his competitors, he will awake to a realization that his market is gone and that there is no longer a demand for his product at all commensurate with the damage done to it. In direct foreign trade Japanese merchants have had a number of such unfortunate experiences. For example, I may mention that Japanese mattings, imported into the United States of America, were subjected

to duty of 3 cents per square yard on quality up to a cost value of Yen 7.71 per roll, and on anything above that value were subject to a duty of 7 cents per square yard and 25 per cent ad valorem additional, the idea being to make the importation of the finer sort of Japanese matting absolutely impossible, so protecting the American carpet manufacturers. This arrangement put practically the maximum limit on the price of Japanese matting to be imported. In spite of the difference between the maximum and minimum limit, which is the cost of producing, being thus very small, the Japanese attempted a cut-throat competition with one another in the sale of mattings, this naturally resulting in the deterioration of the quality of goods and nearly in the destruction of the market. Reestablishment of the market and improvement in quality have since been in order, but even under the recent tariff revision, it seems to take a very much longer period and still harder labor to restore the old market.

I do not mean to say that there should be no competition, but I do mean that competition of a negative character always results in harm to the trade. On the contrary, if competition is directed toward the positive side, that is toward improvement in quality at the same price, more durability and usefulness, reduction in the cost of production, prompt delivery, better and cheaper transportation facilities, etc., the result may be altogether different. There is an old Japanese proverb which reads, "There is no poverty that overtakes a handworker," meaning that prosperity is only the reward of hard work. This is now obsolete, and does not hold good in our modern business. Hard work along the same old line does not bring satisfactory results; all it can hope to accomplish is the maintenance of the old position without advancement. Hard work accompanied by improvement in methods will alone obtain progress. In pushing the foreign trade, the most important qualification is the knowledge of the language and customs of the people that are met with in that trade. Wants and requirements of a local and particular character must from time to time be investigated and studied so as to leave no changes unnoted. In the trade with the Orient, especially with China, where a vast future is in store, it is not so easy a matter to meet the requirements. In this

respect I can safely say that the Japanese, owing to their geographical, racial and linguistic advantages, are the people best fitted to acquire the foremost position. Next to the Japanese will come the Germans. If you will notice how the German merchants both in China and at home are working along the line I have indicated, you will not wonder that they have made such remarkable progress in the Oriental trade during the past few years.

The Germans at home for instance have had a school of Oriental languages, including Japanese, for fifteen years, and are studying every method to push the sale of their merchandise in East Asia. Some of the German salesmen go so far as to adopt the Chinese dress and Chinese queue. You are aware how the Chinese cling to their calendar. The Germans have noticed this, and never fail to mark their goods according to it. If, for instance, it is the year of horse, the Germans print a figure of a horse on the goods to be sold to the Chinese that year. So, in what might seem trivial matters they seek the good will of their customers. These things are perhaps difficult for the Occidental manufacturers to understand; but unless they do try to understand them, they can never hope to obtain and retain a strong foothold in the Oriental trade. Chinese habits and traits, in particular, are difficult for Western people to comprehend, but so long as China is talked of as one of the world's greatest markets, then, intending traders will have to surmount these difficulties in one way or another. In this connection, what seems to me the most practical and natural way is to bring about coöperation of the Western manufacturers and Japanese merchants, the Western manufacturers attending to the productive end and the Japanese to the selling end of the business. A few of such coöperations has already been proved by experience. The General Electric Company is manufacturing and selling electric machinery in Japan in coöperation with the Shibaura Works of Tokyo. The Western Electric Company is in similar coöperation with the Japan Electric Company. These coöperative methods have been remarkably successful. Vickers and Maxim of England have established a steel foundry in Japan in coöperation with the Hokkaido Colliery and Steamship Company of Japan.

In any coöperation of American manufacturers and Japanese merchants, the Americans will probably have to supply the raw material, and skill of a certain kind, perhaps one or two superintending engineers and foremen. The Japanese must attend to the selling end in Japan and China. They are better qualified for that part of the business than the Americans, for they understand the customs and tastes of the Chinese, and have facilities in promoting the trade not possessed by the Western people. Successful manufacturers are not always successful salesmen, and no business can prosper unless it prospers at the selling end. This consideration seems to emphasize the advisability of the American manufacturers seeking Japanese coöperation. Frequent trouble occurs, however, when the Western people demand a controlling power in a company to be established in Japan upon such a coöperative basis. If the Western people insist upon such a controlling power, then it would be useless to attempt to start a coöperative business. It would defeat the object of the coöperation fundamentally. The usefulness of the Japanese in the coöperative arrangement comes from the exact knowledge of the requirements of the consumers, and how to comply with those requirements, a condition essential to the making of any business successful. Now if the Western people have the controlling power in the coöperative factories, they will not adopt the suggestions made by the Japanese in the way of satisfying the peculiar tastes of the Oriental consumers, and will model their manufactories and their products in the Western way. The desire of the Western people to have the controlling power in the factory to be established in the East, has been and will continue to be a stumbling block in the way of the successful execution of any coöperative business. If the American people attempt the coöperation on broad principles, and with a trusting spirit towards the Japanese, the system will prove one of the most successful of modern business methods. The Japanese, I can say without hesitation, are ready and willing to avail themselves of such opportunities; and they will stand for the principles of "the open door and equal opportunity" both in domestic and foreign trade.

JAPAN, AMERICA, AND THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

*By Frederick McCormick, Special Correspondent,
Peking, China*

The question of foreign influence upon the Chinese is more easily defined in the case of Japan than in that of any other outside nation. All through Chinese history, art and architecture, since the Middle Ages of Europe, is traced and scattered the impression and work of foreign men and ideas. From the Nestorians to the Italian legate at Peking, from Friar John and Rubriques to Marco Paolo; from the Italian, Belgian and French missionaries of the sixteenth century to the envoys of the powers and the modern traders, missionaries, physicians and educators; comes a curious patch-work of foreign and western influence curiously recognized and known by the Chinese. But Japan's definite and forcible impression upon China dates only from the Boxer war or later and is not ten years old.

When I first went to China, in 1900, I lodged for a time in the Provincial College of Chihli, at Paotingfu. I was a guest of the chancellor, who had a curiosity to know what was the place occupied by the Japanese among the allies in China. He said that the college several years previous to that time, had a Japanese student who made a very good impression by his work in the Chinese classics, but that he had been entrusted with 400 taels of the college funds, with which to buy printing paper in Japan, had taken the money, departed for his native land to make the purchase, had never returned, and had neither forwarded the paper nor accounted for the money. He was under the impression that the Japanese had borrowed their prestige from their western associates and slipped into China under the foreign mantle. Although the so-called Japan-China war had intervened, this was a fair sample of the

knowledge possessed among Chinese respecting the Japanese, and it may be said that in 1900 Japan was, to the Chinese, merely a country that had taken everything from China, except modern ideas, and warfare, and given nothing in return.

As beneficiaries of Chinese civilization, the Japanese have an intercourse with China extensive in its history. Japan's travelers, pilgrims, geographers, warriors and traders, however, appear to have left no great impression upon the Chinese, and in the light of China's revolutionary present situation, may be passed over. China took all too little account of the Japan-China war of 1894-1896, and in fact, began to realize Japan's importance only through the reputation which Japan had in the West. Japan's modern appearance on the continent of Asia came first in Korea, where she made a modern treaty in accordance with western practice (her first on her own initiative), in the seventies. What we call civilized diplomatic relations between Japan and China, and the establishment of legations by China and Japan in their two capitals, was brought about largely by an American missionary, Dr. Davie Bethune McCartee. Japan was only established on the mainland through events growing out of the conflict of foreign interests in Korea; and in Fukien, opposite Formosa, which she took from China by the Japan-China war, and it was only after 1900 that the Japanese may be said to have fully established themselves in all the treaty ports. At the end of the first decade of the century, Japanese were in the majority among foreigners at every treaty port and treaty mart north of Chefoo. At Tien Tsin their colony grew at the rate of 200 annually. An interesting exchange of official inquiry took place between Russia and Japan in 1910 respecting their subjects in the Chinese treaty marts on the Siberian frontier, that shows Japanese colonization to have become a political question of considerable acuteness. The complications of the Russo-Japanese question led Russia to ask Japan why she had sent a consul to Aigun on the Amur River. Japan replied that it was because she had 250 subjects there. She retorted by asking Russia why

Russia had sent a consul to Chientao on the Korean frontier. Russia could only reply that it was because she had 4 subjects there (including the consul). All this is a part of the expansion of Japan expressed in various words and phrases but best comprehended in the term, Greater Japan.

A corresponding apprehension in the Chinese, at Japan's expansion in this particular, has been expressed in almost innumerable protests on the part of China to Japanese expansion in Manchuria after the Russo-Japanese war, and in my observation and recollection reached a noteworthy stage, when in 1908, China complained of, and was alarmed by, Japanese military surveys in the region of the Great Wall, and in Mongolia. It was at this time that the government in Peking began to feel the full force of reform ideas among students returning from foreign lands, and in masses from Japan, and the late empress-dowager, coincident with the question of the education of Chinese in America, under the scheme by which America restored her share of the Boxer indemnity, stated that China must send fewer young men to Japan, because those going to Japan largely became revolutionaries.

There are no satisfactory statistics respecting Japanese origins in the Chinese revolution, nor any so far as I know, that are not misleading. But it will give some idea to state that perhaps 20,000 Chinese reformers and students have gotten their ideas for revolution in Japan. As disturbers of the Chinese system and of the central government at Peking, they have been to the front in China since 1903, when the empress-dowager had one of them, Shen Chin, beaten to death with a stave in the imperial prison beside the palace gates. They have grown to be the master revolutionists of China. Their unsuspected power of organization if not of agitation, coupled with the support of the gentry especially in Hunan, have made China into something remarkably new altogether.

The progressive movement in China embracing both the republicans and monarchists is a movement of Chinese enlightened by all western countries, but the facts are that the foremost revolutionaries in the rebellion of September

and November, 1911, and in the incidents where force and violence leading up to it, have been employed, come from the Chinese revolutionary and reform school in Japan. I recall a plot by Chinese students returned from Japan to assassinate the empress-dowager. It came intimately before my observation, because I had occasion to persuade a student friend, who had been educated in another land, to stay out of this particular conspiracy. Japan's influence over the Chinese student has been inevitable, and it is no derogation of the Japanese to say that influences developed on their shores have manifested themselves in revolution on the Asian continent, in political conspiracy, arson, assassination, murder and other crimes. These are the accompaniments of revolution assignable primarily to the leaven of western ideas. Certain chapters in the history of Japan on the continent have inspired Japan's critics to attribute to her certain responsibilities for this rebellion in China which they are doubtless not prepared to prove. There is nothing to show that Japanese have in China violated their right of sanctuary, as was done in Korea when the Korean queen was murdered. The rebellion in China, mainly due to the endeavors of reformers and revolutionaries, who had been to Japan, and whose organizations for revolution were developed there, furnishes records of events in the setting up of the so-called Republic of China that are quite clear. In Szechuan, the largest and wealthiest province of China where the rebellion opened, a large percentage of the members of the provincial assembly were students returned from Japan and one of them Pu Tien-chun their leader was president of the Assembly. No other assembly in China was more free in its criticisms of the imperial authorities. In constitutional matters it had a struggle with the viceroy and won. It espoused the grievances and causes of the revolutionaries in Hunan and Hupeh provinces who executed the main revolt at Wuchang, and its leaders organized the Anti-Foreign-Loan Society bringing about the first rebellious outbreak.

Rebellion found its first strong soil in Hunan which had long had the name of being the most incorrigible and anti-

foreign province of China, for ten years suspected of connection with important revolutionary outbreaks of which the destruction of a railway carriage by a bomb and wounding of several high officials at Peking, 1905, and the assassination of the Governor of Anhui province in 1907 were most noteworthy. Yang Tu a Japan-schooled Hunanese was then the leader of the younger or reform party whose agitation among the Chinese students in Japan (where anarchy had already established itself) caused the so-called "strong man of China" Yuan Shih-kai, to offer him office in order to arrest his revolutionary work, or control it. He attached himself to Yuan Shih-kai only after the rebellion was successful.

Hunan and Hupeh provinces furnish almost the whole history of the rise of the rebellion. Their reformers opposed the government's policy of central ownership of railways and industrial development of China by the employment of foreign capital. This opposition held up the famous "Hukang Loan" for the building of a trunk line railway in three directions out of Hankow. The gentry of Hunan who have always been the most powerful of the gentry class in China, convinced by the foreign or Japanized young men of their province took the responsible headship of this opposition and the outbreak of the rebellion, the most important rebellion from the foreign standpoint that China has ever had, resulted. It is of greater consequence to China than the mere change of dynasty and to a degree is a monument to the Chinese revolutionaries schooled in Japan.

The place of Japan in China's revolution now and the place which Japan will have on the continent of Asia hereafter, finds its definite, comprehensive explanation in the history of the question (since the signing of the Portsmouth treaty) of Manchuria, a word in which all discussion of the affairs of the nations in Eastern Asia ends. Japan's place in the affairs of Eastern Asia must be immense, as all can conceive. What is it?

I have already called attention to the fact that rebellion broke out in the industrial region that is the center of

foreign European and American loan operations due to revolutionaries largely of the Japanese school. Japan is not a capitalistic nation but a military one that leans upon opportunity. Her field since the Russo-Japanese war has been that of chance and fortunate opportunity out of which she has made empire. And now revolution has favored her policy and interests in this particular that rebellion has come in the center of the interests of the capitalistic powers, her antagonists, disconcerting them and absorbing their attention, while she is free with her right of military pacification in her own sphere in China to protect and promote her own interests and policies. I believe these have never been fairly nor with any degree of accuracy or completeness defined. They are as follows:

Two great railways traverse Manchuria, one the whole distance east and west, the other nearly the whole length north and south, both together forming a matrix and conveying Russian and Japanese territorial sovereignty to all Manchuria's vital parts. When the Portsmouth treaty was signed in New Hampshire, it became the immediate business of Japan and Russia, between whom these railways were divided, to keep apart. With their usual alertness the Japanese were foremost in this problem. Before Komura left the United States for Japan, Marquis Ito jumped to the solution of this problem by giving Edward H. Harriman, the American financier and promoter, a tentative agreement for lease to American financiers of Japan's railway in Manchuria, taken from Russia. This would have placed America between Russia and Japan. It would have solved, in a manner, the question of non-entanglement with Russia, so far as Japan was concerned. Ito believed Japan could not hold her Manchurian territories; he thought Japan was moving beyond her depth.

Immediately after the exchange of this tentative agreement, Komura arrived in Tokio and from thence date two Japans, the passing one that of Ito, the other that of Komura. Komura said Japan must expand on the continent in China, and this expansion had sufficient political basis only in the rights which Japan had acquired from

Russia by coming into possession of a share of her railways in Manchuria. Japan could not turn her railway over to others, she must cling to all she had acquired in order to share all the rights and advantages enjoyed by Russia; Russia must be supported and made to cling to all she held and had claimed in Manchuria, and on the Chinese frontier, so as to give a basis for Japan's continental expansion. Japan thereupon abandoned the Ito-Harriman agreement and found in her Manchurian railway a tie and not a breach with Russia. The reasons are as follows:

In the hour of Komura's diplomatic defeat at Portsmouth respecting a war indemnity, which the people of Japan demanded as a condition of peace, he secured the insertion in the secret minutes of the Peace treaty, the obligation, on the part of Russia (as a part of the transfer of the railway) to communicate to Japan upon ratification of the treaty, all agreements which she had with China, respecting Manchuria. When the transfer of these agreements took place, it was found that the contract for the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway, signed in 1896, contained a clause known as "Article VI" which gave to Russia the sole and exclusive right of administration in the railway zone. Komura saw, as well as did a majority of the emperor's advisers, that if this article could be appropriated for effect on the Japanese railways, and recognized by Russia, it was in effect a division of sovereignty among China, Russia, and Japan, in Manchuria. This fact, joined to the fact that Russia's special frontier trade rights were capable of similar extension so as to benefit Japan, gave to Japan her present "Plan of State" upon which Greater Japan rests. Japan now had new statesmen who saw that Russia and Japan possessed and could maintain a special position in northern China, perhaps in spite of all opposition. Japan's problem now was to bring about a written tie between Russia and Japan as against a separation which the ideas and policy of Ito involved. Japan passed, in her policy, to the Komura or so-called Katsura or war party, which was, in fact, nothing more than a Greater Japan party, whose program necessitated peace.

It took four years for Komura to bring about an entente and agreement with Russia which, after many vicissitudes, was obtained July 4, 1910, when Japan's aim was secured by a compact to maintain the status quo in Manchuria, which no power has yet essayed directly to disturb. The story of this four years is one of diplomatic pursuit of Russia by Japan, and is one of the most curiously interesting in the annals of diplomacy. Its details are too numerous to give here. Suffice to say that Russia evaded Japan's pursuit until forced by circumstances to accept the terms of the situation as viewed by Japan. There is one aspect of this, in the main subterranean, struggle between Japan and Russia which deserves to be noted here. Russia learned of the Ito-Harriman agreement, and essayed to imitate Ito's success in getting American finance into Manchuria. She offered her own railway in Wall Street, and failed at much expense to her pride. Russia's evasion of Japan in this issue was due to fear of the consequences of the Japanese invasion of northern Manchuria, and her diplomatic action showed that she was sparring for time.

It was not long before Japan then discovered Russia's intentions respecting the Russian railway in Manchuria, which clearly were in effect the annulment of "Article VI" by transfer of her railway to a country that would interpret its provisions favorable to Chinese sovereignty, thus preventing any wholesale exercise of Japanese sovereignty in Manchuria, and the wholesale extension of Japanese settlement there. The success of Russia's intention was the greatest blow which Russia could direct at Japan's "Plan of State." In consequence Japan did everything to prevent it. In 1908, after repeated failures to open negotiations with Russia on the subject, Japan sent Baron Goto to St. Petersburg, and another officer to Harbin, with a view to opening negotiations. Russia refused to be engaged. Japan tried in 1909, through her ambassador, Motono, to bring the matter up again at St. Petersburg and failed. Russia's situation from that point on was one of acute embarrassment. Japan invoked the complicated and almost omniscient weapons of the doctrine of equal

rights against Russia, and succeeded in pushing Japanese commerce and communications to the Amur River by way of its Manchurian tributaries. Russia was literally forced along by Japan. At the same time, Russia employed every means to dispose of her railway, and what Russia would do in this respect was in 1908-09 a burning question in Tokio. Fearful that Russia would give up the principle of administration in the railway zone, which, at that time, became an issue with all the powers, Japan sent Marquis Ito to Russian Manchuria to meet the Russian minister of finance, Kokovtseff (later the Russian premier). This is a strange story. Ito was assassinated before he had introduced at Harbin the object of his mission. Ito was opposed to expansion until Japan could recuperate from the effects of the war with Russia. Almost to the last as is well known he denied that Japan would annex Korea, believing that his advice and that of his associates, would prevail with the emperor. He was now a changed statesman. Japan had a new spirit, and he was on an errand for his late opponents. This is the great story of Ito's last days and of his assassination. He became a martyr. It was strangely fitting, strange as life itself, that he should, after being defeated in his own plan of state, lend a hand to that of his political adversaries and lose his life in behalf of their policies.

Ito's death saved Russia from one more embarrassment, and events followed that further delayed the inevitable rapprochement and compact with Japan. America was observing this drama, and, unable to promote singly the policies of these two contending powers, devised a plan to meet general necessities in Manchuria; not only of China and Russia, but of what she considered the best interests of Japan. This was the famous "neutralization proposal." The government at Washington proposed the purchase and neutralization of both the Japanese and Russian railways, by the powers. This proposal forced Russia to face the issue of a division of sovereignty in Manchuria, which was now so complicated by the formal representations and opposition of the United States, Great Britain, France and

Germany that Russia was isolated, and seeing no friendly hand held out to her but that of Japan, she accepted it. Fearing the consequences of abandoning "Article VI," and expecting more from its permanency under the Japanese, she signed with Japan, on July 4, 1910, as already stated, an agreement to maintain it and Japan thus established what she had set out to establish, the corner-stone of her empire in China.

Much paper has been written over by Japan and all the great European powers, setting up the principle of equal rights and the territorial integrity and sovereignty of China. It has been often said that these papers, called alliances and treaties, are the guarantee of these principles. But that is not the case. These papers so extensively written over are in a state of progressive cancellation and have become so contradictory that governments like our own now depend upon a reiteration of statement in the form of communiques, interpretations and other exchanges of correspondence after the drawing up of each new "entente," "agreement" or "convention," to determine where the parties to these numerous written papers stand on the questions of equal right and Chinese integrity and sovereignty. And the great fact brought out by the revolution is a special position which Japan has made for herself, both territorially and diplomatically, within the borders of the Chinese Empire.

Previous to 1909 the United States government was so negligent of eastern Asia that it was not in possession of the facts. It was so far behind the situation that it had to employ heroic means in behalf of its great principles there. "Article VI" had been exchanged by Russia to Japan at Portsmouth under its nose. When the government at Washington in 1909 started in to rebuild the "open door" structure of John Hay it didn't have that now famous article. It was only when it pressed Russia on the question of administration at Harbin in Manchuria where Russia had created a local Russian government on Chinese soil, that Russia gave to America that article. That was in 1909-1910, thirteen years after it was written. America

then put forward the "neutralization proposal"—a very great measure which it was better that it made and lost than that it should never have made.

These things altogether are the anatomy of the war scare in the Pacific and that almost entirely are the causes of the peace movement in its present aspect. A proper understanding of these things which to the general reader appear more technical than physical nevertheless are more important than any propaganda such as the peace movement for obviating war in the Pacific because familiarity with physical and diplomatic geography in eastern Asia will give confidence while peace propaganda is an opiate that will bring terror when the actual trial between facts occurs. Peace or war is neither here nor there. The idea that Americans know the things with which they deal and can settle them is an infinitely greater idea than the idea of peace.

The great bulking of Japan in the forefront of the Chinese revolution, in its various rôles and aspects, has led to a lot of thinking on the part of the western powers and notably of the United States government. And it is not to be marveled at that Japan's enemies have attributed to her the precipitation of rebellion in China, and aggressive aims and intentions. This subject is one in which time must have way, for few serious students of such great affairs would venture now to speculate upon it. I only wish to say that, to anyone acquainted with the nature of the machinery of a nation's expansion, and especially of the nature of the machinery of Japanese expansion which her statesmen themselves cannot control, the situation has almost every possibility. Japan must be, and I take it for granted that she is, leagues ahead of other nations in appreciation of, and interest in, the Chinese revolution and its responsibilities and opportunities. She has set firmly up the principle of a division of sovereignty in the Chinese Empire. With fine contempt she went to war to demolish it when it was merely a Russian assumption. She then set it up again not as a Japanese assumption, or a Russian-Japanese assumption, but by a Russo-Japanese compact contained in a preliminary exchange of notes and

in a formal convention. Any Japanese may well pause at his country's responsibilities on the Asian continent and the possibilities to which it is heir and to which it is bound.

The subject is one of great magnitude, and I have reached the limits in the discussion which I have intended. If it seems necessary in order to dispose of the subject to show the latest phase of its concern to us as Americans, I would say that now, when all issues between nations in Eastern Asia appear to have been thrown into the melting pot, America has been placed in a splendid position in China by the able diplomacy and enterprise of its government. Singular as it may seem the two countries of the United States and Japan at the opening of the revolutionary change in that ancient nation, aside from the special interests of Japan in China, actually occupy a common platform and position in eastern Asia respecting China's struggle to restore order and unity. It is because of the necessity of peace to Japan. There is in the situation resulting from this necessity the possibility at least for some time of a closer understanding and relation between the United States and Japan respecting China, certainly so if one or more outside powers do not precipitate military occupation of some part of China and Japan remains content to allow her continental interests to be developed by the natural course of events.

AMERICAN JAPANESE RELATIONS—A REVIEW

By George Heber Jones, D.D.

A notable book on the above title has been produced by Mr. K. K. Kawakami, the New York correspondent of the *Yorodzu* and is dated 1912, making it the latest utterance on this interesting subject. A perusal of it impresses one with the rapidity with which political alignments are changing in the Far East, for it knows nothing of China's upheaval and is written from the standpoint of a *de facto* Manchu dynasty with Yuan Shi Kai and Tang Shao-i in retirement. It is doubtful, however, if these changes would cause Mr. Kawakami to alter his conclusions as to American-Japanese relations, although they might result in a modification of some statements.

The author tells us that he wrote under a strong sense of duty, "believing that the cloud of misunderstanding between Japan and America which has been growing thicker every day and casting its gloom over the historic friendship of the two peoples, has now reached a stage where its clearing away can no longer be delayed if the two nations are not to be estranged beyond reconciliation." It is questionable, however, if the outlook is as dark as this would indicate. Possibly in some sections of society, both in America and Japan, persons who are the victims of unreliable information and influenced by incendiary and libelous rumors affecting the honor and good will of the two nations have a feeling of estrangement. But even the coolness of two years ago is giving way to better and more sensible views today. Mr. Kawakami, however, felt that the situation calls for heroic treatment, and acting under this sense of urgency he has rapidly sketched the movements and developments of the past few years, giving an inside view of Japan's policies and purposes and placing at the service of the public a valuable array of data.

Mr Kawakami contends that the misunderstanding and disruption in American-Japanese relations center around three principle foci: (1) Manchuria, (2) Korea, and (3) the immigration question. These three topics form the outline of the book, which is written in a lucid and entertaining style and well-worth reading. It is intended to serve as a corrective to the writings of Mr. Thomas F. Millard and Mr. Putnam Weale, for Mr. Kawakami traverses the ground covered by these writers and at times he indulges in censure of the views put forth by them as caustic as anything found in the pages of those doughty champions of anti-Japanese sentiment. This has betrayed him into a stalwartness of utterance which he condemns in others, as in the following:

It is strange that Americans, sagacious as they are, did not long before this awaken to the fact that their sensational vociferations could only recoil upon them and injure their dignity and prestige. While the jingoes and alarmists of this country have been busy chasing the phantom of an American-Japanese war, the little nation across the Pacific has invariably remained serene and equanimous. Never once have the Japanese press and people spoken to you in bellicose tones, but have borne the indignities, to which your whims have subjected them, with perfect dignity and calmness. So far as Japan is concerned, there is absolutely no reason to fear the rupture of amicable relationship between the two countries, for among the forty millions of the Mikado's empire not a single soul is to be found who even dreams of ever taking arms against America. I, of course hazard no prophecy that American interests will never conflict with those of Japan, but I believe that any controversy arising out of such conflict can be and ought to be disposed of in an amicable manner, by mutual restraint, tolerance and concession. It is time that America should conduct herself in a manner that becomes the power, wealth and culture that inhere in her. It is time that Americans should awaken to the grave situation which cannot fail to result if they persist in playing the *role* of a *provocateur*—unless, forsooth, they are really anxious to create a *casus belli*. These are plain words, but I say them in the name of international deportment, peace and amity. (Page 18.)

It is to be regretted that Mr. Kawakami did not more clearly distinguish between the small coterie of "Japanophobists" the real, "jingoes and alarmists" who have, like proverbial stray canines with tin cans attached, been chasing each other through the press, and the great mass of American people, with an ever increasing number of friends of Japan

among them who cannot help paying attention because of the din and clatter created, but who know the true value of such performances. Mr. Kawakami, however, does not claim infallibility for his own conclusions and concedes the possibility of divergence of opinion on the topics discussed. On the whole, his arguments will help to a sane and just estimate of the real situation in connection with Japan's and America's interests in the Far East. In view of the present developments in China we shall confine our review of his thesis to that part which relates to Manchuria.

Mr. Kawakami claims that the impression has been created in America that Japan is "by surreptitious means producing wholesale discrimination against American commercial interests and . . . dealing with China in an overbearing manner, encroaching at every point upon the sovereign rights of the Celestial Empire." Against the political delinquencies implied in this charge, he makes in behalf of his fatherland a vigorous disclaimer and proceeds to show the legal and moral grounds upon which the Manchurian record of Japan stands.

He first directs attention to the supposed invasion of China's sovereignty by Japan in Manchuria and in reply gives in detail the rights, properties and privileges in that region which through the fortunes of war were made over by the Portsmouth treaty to the Sunrise Empire by Russia and confirmed by China in the Komura-Yuan Shi Kai treaty of December, 1905. These consist of (1) the lease of Port Arthur and Tairen and the adjacent territory and territorial waters. This lease expires in 1923, of which, in view of the fact that Russia enjoyed it for seven years, only eighteen years accrue to Japan, unless the term be extended by mutual consent. (2) That section of the South Manchurian Railway running from Tairen to Changchun a distance of 436 miles and three short branch lines covering in all 512 miles of railway, created by Russia at a cost of R 76,222,000. The Chinese government may take over these lines in 1936 on paying the *concessionaire* country all outlays made on them; or if China waits until 1983, being eighty years from the opening of the road in 1903, the railways with their appurtenances revert to China

without cost. (3) The Antung-Mukden Line 189 miles long, the concession expiring at the end of fifteen years, or in 1920. (4) The right to police and exploit a zone fifteen versts wide on either side of the railway. (5) The Yalu timber concession which is now operated by a joint Chinese and Japanese stock company. In addition to these, by the Peking treaty of 1905, Japan secured China's consent to the opening of sixteen cities and towns in Manchuria, which, with five others already opened make twenty-one places for international residence, covering practically the entire Three Provinces and open to all nations as well as Japan. One other railway concession was secured for a line from Kirin to Changchun, penetrating northeastern Manchuria. The Japanese military line from Mukden to Hsinmintun was transferred to China in 1908. China also agreed not to build lines that would compete with the South Manchuria Railway. All these rights and privileges in Manchuria are temporary in character, there being a definite time limit and a modus for the recovery of them by China definitely indicated.

In all her movements and exploitation in Manchuria Japan has kept within the limits of the freedom of action thus conferred upon her, although, as Mr. Kawakami says, this freedom has been grudgingly conceded by China.

I have stated that at the Peking Conference Japan made several important concessions in favor of China. She had fought China's battles as much as she had fought her own, sacrificing countless lives and spending hundreds of millions of dollars, and yet the Manchu Government did not hesitate to deny her a few railway concessions which she was fully justified in claiming. Not only this, but the Chinese diplomats opposed and disputed Japan's demands at every point. They seemed to have forgotten that had not the doughty islanders taken arms against the Northern Colossus, Manchuria, with its area of 370,000 square miles and its 8,500,000 population, would have permanently been lost to China, which in turn might have paved the way to the not impossible dismemberment of the hoary empire. I confess that it was one of the weaknesses common to humanity which caused the Japanese to presume that China would not ignore the appalling sacrifices they had made on behalf of the latter. And who could blame Japan? Disinterested she was not when she declared war in the name of the "open door" and the territorial integrity of China, for in this age of business and materialism, what nation can be so chivalrous as to jeopardize its own welfare and even existence from purely altruistic motives? At

any rate Japan ought not to be accused of selfishness and mercenary motives if she did expect China to recognize her claims ungrudgingly—claims which were ridiculously modest as compared with the gigantic concessions and privileges which some Western powers extorted from the Peking government in consequence of the killing of a missionary or some untoward incident of like nature. I have it upon good authority that it was Japan's earnest desire to settle all matters, which had awaited adjustment between her and China, without recourse to diplomacy but in a friendly manner. Had this desire been gratified, Japan might have cast her lot with China and exercised all her influence for the regeneration of the decaying empire, and for the maintainance of its integrity against foreign aggression. But China's attitude throughout the entire sessions of the Peking Conference was one of willful ingratitude and irreconcilable arrogance, and she tried to defeat Japan's aim by dint of diplomatic *finesse*, in which the mandarins excel the Japanese. Yet the Japanese envoys remained lenient and patient, and made many important concessions in favor of China, thus hoping to convince the Chinese of Japan's sincere wish for the welfare of their country. (Page 34.)

Summing up this phase of the subject, Mr. Kawakami points out that while Russia obtained her gigantic railway concessions in Manchuria by "bullying or wily diplomacy" the cost to Japan has been so enormous that she is driven to keep on playing the game in the hope of winning back what she has been losing. Japan's railway holdings in Manchuria meant a loss of one hundred thousand lives and Y 2,000,000,000, which constitute the cost of a mighty war upon which she staked her very existence. In the face of such an appalling sacrifice, the writer contends that Japan has a right, so long as she conforms to the principle of the "open door" to operate her railways so that the proceeds may assist in lightening the financial burdens under which she struggles because of this war. And it is regarded by Japan as hardly in harmony with the precedents of international intercourse and good understanding for a friendly power to interfere with her in realizing what she thus insists are legitimate aims. Having assumed responsibility in Manchuria, Japan has not shrunk from the obligations involved and has to her credit a list of achievements, in behalf of the welfare of the land, including railroad and mining developments, new towns, opening up of communication, increase of trade, establishment of helpful institutions and many other public and pri-

vate enterprises. In other words, having at enormous cost established stable control, order and prosperity in Manchuria it is difficult for the Japanese to understand why suspicion and misunderstanding of her action in Manchuria should have been created among the people of a friendly power like America.

In explanation of this Mr. Kawakami thinks that the present cabinet of Mr. Taft, under the leadership of Mr. Knox, is acting in obedience to the imperialistic tendencies in America today moving forward under the whiplash of commercialism. Mr. Kawakami says:

America had already been inclined to play fast and loose with her traditional policy of isolation. The annexation of Hawaii was the first step toward her political and economic expansion in the Pacific and beyond. Then came the occupation of the Philippines, and with it was tolled the knell of those happy days when American statesmen and people content with the enormous wealth which nature showered upon them, harbored no idea of territorial expansion. The call of empire had been heard, and the great Republic responded to it with booming of cannon that flashed from Admiral Dewey's flagship in Manila Bay. Once her traditional policy was so radically altered it was but natural that American statesmen, if not the people, should keep their eyes intently fixed upon the Orient. As the years rolled by, it became evident that the American nation came definitely, if unconsciously, to embrace imperialism, which is at once the glory and nemesis of modern times. The voice of imperialism is no voice of humanity; rather it is the gospel of commercialism and self-aggrandizement, and the imperialism of America is no exception to the general rule, however anxious some Americans may be to have us believe that American activities in the Philippines and China are perfectly disinterested. It is the animating desire to become great among the nations, to be respected in the council of the powers, to consolidate her foot-hold in the Far East, to secure markets for the products of her ever expanding industry—it is this desire which impels America to greater and greater activities in the Orient. (Page 62.)

This cause undoubtedly is operative, but it is questionable whether it really enjoys the importance Mr. Kawakami would assign to it. It is certainly re-enforced by other causes which for the time being may be more potent than imperialism, such as the appeal made to America by the new Chinese nationalism under such leaders as Yuan Shi Kai and Tang Shai-i, who have never been friendly to Japan and Russia in

Manchuria. This phase is referred to in a very interesting chapter on Chinese diplomacy in Manchuria.

As one reads the chapters in which Mr. Kawakami outlines this *impasse*, it becomes clear that American interest in Manchuria, encouraged by China in the desire to introduce forces which will restrain Russian and Japanese developments, has brought the American Republic into tension with Japan. Since this book was written, developments have arisen which indicate that this tension can be greatly relieved if the Six Power Loan can be established upon a satisfactory basis.

As to the contention that Chinese control has been superseded the conclusion which one must reach on reading Mr. Kawakami's statements is that Chinese sovereignty in the railroad belts of Manchuria is nominal rather than real, and that all those political enterprises which usually emanate from a sovereign government come, not from China, but from Japan, and in a less degree from Russia. This, however, in Mr. Kawakami's thought, does not constitute an encroachment, for the right to thus act has been conceded by solemn treaty stipulation to Japan by China. Neither is it surreptitious, but frank, open and above-board, working in the long run for the benefit of all concerned.

Turning to the charge that Japan is practicing wholesale discrimination against American commercial interests in Manchuria, Mr. Kawakami first undertakes to discover what those interests were before the war. He claims that they consisted in a growing trade in sheetings, drills, piece goods, flour, oil and tobacco. The growth of this trade has now been checked and the responsibility of this set-back is laid at the door of Japan. It is in this damaged commercial interest that Mr. Kawakami would find the real animus in the American feeling in regard to Japanese advances in Manchuria. American commerce hoped to benefit largely after the Island Empire had driven out the Russian Bear, but these hopes have been disappointed, and the lion's share of the trade has gone to Japan.

Mr. Kawakami freely admits the truth of this statement, but calls attention to the fact that this is true in regard to the

trade of other nations as well and is due to the operation of the ordinary laws of trade. The "open door" policy could not but result in this. Some people apparently so interpret the "open door" policy as to constitute it a ball and chain upon the progress of Japan, binding her to ignore and suppress her own interests in order that commercial opportunity might be given to other nations. If this is what the "open door" policy means commercially, then Japan certainly does not propose to adhere to it, but if the "open door" means that all nations, Japan included, are equally entitled to exploit the markets and resources of Manchuria, then Japan has held to it from the first and by methods unimpeachable. It is to this end that she has subsidized her steamship lines, sent commercial agents to study Manchurian markets, opened commercial museums in the trade centers and used every legitimate method to increase her trade. She has only done what America or any other nation would have done in her place and her success has been due simply to the natural advantages which she enjoys over all competitors. (1) Geographically she has in all trade relations with Manchuria the advantage of the "short haul" with its cheapening of the cost of transportation. (2) She has abundance of cheap labor which enables her to undersell her rivals. (3) She is the chief customer for Manchurian products which fact enables her to enter into intimate relations with native traders and consumers, encouraging the exchange of trade and the increase of trade relations. This is an item of no small importance, as will be seen in the following illustration. The chief product of Manchuria is beans, the annual crop amounting to 1,000,000 tons, valued at \$25,000,000. The movement of this crop determines trade supremacy in Manchuria, as far as the inhabitants are concerned. Japan is the only nation that has use for the products of this crop, and therefore is a great customer as well as a great seller to the Manchurians. (4) Japanese settlers and visitors give Japan a vast army of commercial agents who boost her trade. They live among the people continuously, and, as a rule, learn to speak the language. They are inexpensive, go everywhere and certainly get closer to the native life than is the case with Europeans and Americans.

With these and other advantages in her favor, it is easy to see that Japan in the sale of those articles which she elects to handle can have no successful rival commercially in Manchuria. It is these things which America is up against and which have worked to America's disadvantage, as they have contributed to the supremacy of Japanese commerce. There are other lines of trade, however, which Mr. Kawakami thinks it would be well for America to press the development of, and in which she could enjoy the supremacy, particularly in the matter of machinery and of railway materials. In these things Japan is no rival of America, although German and Russian concerns have entered into competition, pushing their interest skillfully at a time when the political and popular attitude of America toward Japan has reacted to the benefit of these rivals. Anyone familiar with the increase of cordial relations between the Japanese and the German, Russian and French communities in Japan itself, must realize that there is a commercial significance to this which it is unwise for America to ignore.

Russia is the chief rival of America in the trade in flour in Manchuria, endeavoring to find an outlet for her enormous milling interests at Harbin. Germany is also pushing her Sumatra oil as a rival to American Standard Oil. In tobacco America, through the British-American Tobacco Trust, is holding its own. The sum of the whole matter, as far as American commercial interests are concerned, is that in the commercial rivalry which the changed conditions have produced between Japan and America in Manchuria, Japan has won out in obedience to legitimate causes against the operation of which no just criticism is possible. As for the charges of unjust discrimination against America in the matter of freight rates and customs handling, Mr. Kawakami dismisses them as baseless slanders not worth a moment's consideration. Japan enjoys the supremacy in the commercial exploitation of Manchuria and proposes to maintain it, expecting that the treaty powers will adjust themselves to the situation. There seems to be no other way in view of the principles, forces and equities involved. Mr. Kawakami acknowledges that this must have its influence upon the historic intimacies of Japan. He says:

We realize that when once we begin to take away the Chinese trade of western nations, the latter will cease to be effusive, sympathetic and cordial toward us. But that is one thing we cannot help. We are poor, our natural resources are limited; we cannot grow wheat and corn, raise hogs and cattle and "live on the fat of the land," as you of great America can; no one has made us a handsome bequest so that we might live comfortably without worrying about the tomorrow. And like all poor families ours is increasing with embarrassing rapidity—such is the irony of fate. What will become of our ever-increasing children if we do not manufacture and export as best we can? If we entice away your customers by underselling, that is no fault of ours. It would be unreasonable—worse, it would be cruel—to condemn the man who lives by the honest sweat of his brow without in the least violating the dictates of justice and honor. Japan's case in Manchuria is the case of the poor man who is forced to toil hard and practice strict economy. If the western world cannot tolerate Japan's commercial advance in Manchuria simply because its pockets come into the reckoning, no more can Japan afford to stay home idle in order that the western nations shall have all the chance they want. (Page 139.)

From this very incomplete review of Mr. Kawakami's statements, it will be seen that Japan is thoroughly convinced that she is not transcending her legal or moral rights in Manchuria. The problem is, how to cause these conditions and circumstances to become a matter of popular knowledge. The Governments of Japan and America are in the most cordial relations. As to the feeling of estrangement between the peoples of the two countries Mr. Kawakami is disposed to emphasize this more than the present circumstances appear to demand. As a matter of fact, it is perhaps not claiming too much to say that the Manchurian question between America and Japan is historic rather than real, and all difference of opinion has become merged in the larger question of the fate of the Chinese nation. It is sincerely to be hoped that the peoples of Japan and America, who are endowed with such enormous potencies for good or evil, shall renew with increased ardor, and in the light of the new conditions in which each finds itself, the old time intimacy and understanding. The present is a critical time in the history of the world, and in view of the remarkable evolution through which the Chinese people are passing, cordial understanding between America and Japan is of the highest importance to the maintenance of peace in the extreme East.

A LITERARY LEGEND: "THE ORIENTAL"

*By Wm. Elliot Griffis, D.D., L.H.D., Educational Pioneer
in Japan, formerly of the Imperial University of Tokyo*

A literary legend has been developed, which sets in sharpest opposition the so-called Orient and the fondly named Occident. Poet, dramatist, sentimental writer, novelist and maker of sensational machinery for the stage, picture show and quick-selling newspaper, have created the "Oriental" of imagination, fancy, prejudice and bigotry, who has no counterpart in reality, or has ever existed. It has become a "vested interest," a staple and stock in trade, a permanent and ever-promising speculation to picture "the Oriental" as a being in human form whose nature is fundamentally different from the "Occidental." Such a delineation and contrast has mercantile value. It pays in what the American loves so dearly—money. It increases the sale of tickets at the box office. It enlarges the circulation of the newspapers. It delights the mob. The vote seeking politician approves as if it were soundest orthodoxy. It has ever been used in certain varieties of pulpit ministration and missionary propaganda to buttress the dogmas supposed to be of Christian origin.

The creation of this ideal person, "the Oriental," is a comparatively modern affair. We look in vain in the ancient literatures to find him. The greatest of all libraries throws no direct light on "the race problem." The first Christian saints know nothing of his whereabouts.

The religions came out of Asia. The thought of the mother continent is the basis of all European faiths. Yet, though religion is the deepest thing in man, the men who made our religions, the Orientals, are supposed to be separated from us proud Occidentals by an unplummetted abyss of mental differences. The binding thread of all human history is the reaction of "the East" upon "the West." Over and over again has "Europe" precipitated itself on

Asia, as in the raids of conquest by Alexander and the waves of wild fanaticism gendored during the crusades, when the European peoples weltered in ignorance and superstition. Huns and Mongols, Saracens and Moors have shown like energies in return. The legions have thundered past, but the European marauders have but slightly disturbed "the East" that "bowed in thought again."

History makes no denial of the fact that in the only belt of the world's area that has any notable history, there have been action and reaction; but these phenomena, so far from proving that Asiatics and Europeans are in any way fundamentally different, do but demonstrate that they are the same. Identical in the passions of animal instincts, greed, pride, ambition, conceit, and race hatred, they are one. In both the world of Islam, of India and of China, the poet, singer, fiction writer and maker of pictures, whether in word, by pencil, or in pigment do the same work of exaggeration and misrepresentation, by appeal to local ethnic or religious feeling that has no basis in science. Race-hatred, ignorance, instinctive, that is, animal repulsion of every sort and kind are increased by orator, writer, and artist for a purpose. Compare the mountain range of the literature of caricature and the appeal to passion and selfish motives with the paucity of truth, of knowledge and of exact information. In most popular or ever salable histories of "the world," one-fourth of the whole of it and of the race usually get a small fraction of the last volume in a series of twelve or more. Our atlases, that devote scores of pages to counties, states and countries, usually give to China and Japan, a corner and to all of Asia a single page. How many of our states know anything authentic, trustworthy or at first hand, of India's or China's history? What is "Orientalism" as depicted on the stage, in novels, popular magazines, or in books which are seriously read by other than a small minority.

The "Orientalism" which sells, for which editors will pay, which "goes" on the theatre boards, which gets up periodical war scares and from nervous congressmen compels votes for big battleships, or which is set forth by poli-

ticians bidding for votes is not intrinsically different from that which was and is dearly loved in Europe. Fashion, in Tom Moore's time, fed on it. It is still a "Frenchy" commodity, that is ever in demand in the literary and theatrical world. Yet probably in no country more than in the United States of America, is our legacy of prejudice against "the Oriental" so worked in the interest of dollars and cents.

Our grandmothers were thrilled by the sort of "Orientalism" dished up for them by Moore, Byron, Coleridge and Scott. We get our mess from Kipling, Brother Hobson, the Sand Lots, Mr. Hearst's newspapers, some senators, numerous editors and playwrights, and makers of photo plays.

What a pretty story Agnes Repplier has told of the Orientalism afforded by text-books—the kind that England loved. The staple consisted of the Lake of Cashmere, harems, slave markets, Georgians, dark-eyed Arab girls, and Moorish Lochinvars, with plenty of gazelles, poodles, etc. Pathetic indeed were the attempts of Moore to adjust Lalla Rookh and his other Orientalisms to the established conventions of London Society and the British constitution! It was indeed difficult to temper his particular variety of Orientalism so as to chasten its form for the reading of boys and girls, for whom "Sanford and Merton" was considered proper.

We today may laugh at the opinions of Tom Moore's contemporaries, that he was "familiar with the grandest regions of the human mind, that he showed "entire familiarity with the life, nature and learning of the East," and was "purely and intensely Asiatic" in the detachment of his mind and in his poetical delineations. Why not when turbans and "Oriental" drapery were worn at balls, when fine ladies sported the dress of sultanas and houris, and stout British matrons wore rainbow-striped gauze frosted with gold—until Thackeray mocked at such tomfoolery and drove the dim ghost of Lalla Rookh first into the rural districts and then out of educated England. Nevertheless it still persists at the country fairs and itinerant penny shows.

Yet behold what food our American gods feed upon, from the United States Senate to the San Francisco hoodlums. In quest of fame, dollars, votes, congressional appropriations for a colossal navy, what will not our newspapers permit and our fellow-sovereigns believe? Consult files of our journals, especially, and monthlies since the Russo-Japan war. Behold the unspeakable Chinese, who with "trickery" and "cunning," maintains a subterranean harem of white women. Descry that innumerable horde that is about to overwhelm us from China. Mark those regiments of Japanese ex-soldiers drilling in Hawaii! See the multitudinous kodaks which Japanese spies are leveling at our forts. See Magdalena Bay surveyed for the Mikado's fortifications. Can the valor of ignorance go farther than some of our half-dime picture shows, in depicting the set determination of the Tokyo statesmen to reduce the United States to a colony of Japan? One can almost descry Togo and his fleet off the coast while some possibly wait, in agony of alarm, to hear his chains rattle that let down the anchors of his warships in San Francisco Bay.

Hardly less sensational in their effect are the horrid phases and over-tinted pictures of Japanese life, country and people made by the lackadaisical school of writers. These picture the Mikado's soldiers as demigods, the Japanese harlots and geishas as paragons, and Japan as an unspoiled Eden. Of course the Japanese women excel Eve, Venus, Martha Washington and Queen Victoria, but the men are ugly, tricky and capable of all meanness and villainy.

As to the unreality of all this, an American at least not bound to take European tradition as truth, should be heartily ashamed. The exaggeration of falsehood, whether in praise or blame, should have no lodgement in the mind of one who lives on a continent, destined to be the middle term between Europe and Asia, and who loves the truth. I, for one, after forty-six years' knowledge of the Japanese people and nearly forty years' acquaintance with Chinese youth and men, do not recognize "the Oriental" of popular imagination. A scarecrow is not to be mistaken for a living man, nor a flatterer's version for a true translation. To

one who has lived among the Japanese and knows something of their history, literature, and art it is impossible to agree with the impressionist Hearn, or the vile traducer whose motive, directly or indirectly, is fame or cash. The writers like Hearn and Sir Edwin Arnold, who overpraise and idealize the men, women and things of Nippon do, in reality set store chiefly upon what the twentieth century Japanese is ashamed of and has justly banished to the moles and bats. Those who overpraise the Chinese in order chiefly, like the deists of the eighteenth century, to strike at the Christian religion, or, in our time, to sneer at the missionaries, belong in much the same class as those who raise the nightmare of a "Mongolian" invading horde, or a mass of "moon-eyed lepers" corrupting the guileless Americans.

After nearly the whole of an adult life spent directly or indirectly with "the Orientals," as in large part were the lives of my father and grandfather before me, and with an honest perseverance and fairly steady industry in research, I see absolutely no difference in the human nature of an Asiatic, a European or an American. From the point of view of science, no fundamental difference exists that should prevent mutual respect, appreciation, social intercourse and in time naturalization and full recognition of humanity. The ignorance and prejudice that now exist on this whole subject is a disgrace to America and to our Christianity. Sooner or later, we must acknowledge that Asia has been the great mother of inventions, art, science and religion and as she has always been the teacher of Europe while Europe has for the most part but developed and applied, so now. "The Orientals" have more to teach us than we can possibly teach them. Mutual respect of persons and civilization and interchange of ideas and products will stimulate the evolution of the race towards the perfect man and the intimate civilization. In this work, America which is neither in the Orient nor the Occident, should lead the world. To the man of science there is no East nor West, they being purely expressions for convenience of speech and thought.

THE CITIES OF JAPAN

By Hon. Harvey N. Shepard

The entrance of Japan into the family of nations, so that membership is confined no longer to people of European civilization, but, regardless of historical origin and religious preferences, embraces every state able to maintain an efficient and stable political organization, gives an added interest to the institutions of the Island Empire. When travelling there we all observe the dress and the manners of its people; admire the grandeur of its mountains and the picturesqueness of its valleys, and the beauty of its temples; and we know something in a general way of the national government; but it is not often we learn how the several communities are administered locally, although this page of their history is by no means lacking in value.

The local governments are of recent development, and are based upon French and Prussian models. It is a curious anomaly that the local governments, the codes of law, and the educational systems of the Japanese are French or Prussian, while in commercial undertakings English practice is the rule. In exchange, in insurance, and especially in shipping, the terms in vogue are English, and they sometimes have no equivalent in German or Japanese law books. A similar discrepancy exists in other departments of social life. While the government and the state are largely under German forms, the people and society work under English and American ideas. The British are perhaps the most respected, but Americans, I think, are rather more congenial. Naturally the people do not love Germans and Russians, as they do not forget that Russia and Germany snatched away the prize of the war with China.

The empire is densely settled. While the United States has a population of 28 persons a square mile, and Europe 101, Japan has 317. Everybody marries, and there is no race suicide.

Agriculture is the leading industry, and 60 per cent of the population find employment in the cultivation of the soil. Therefore one reason for solicitude, the density of the population, which is nearly twice that of China, is that not more than one-sixth of the soil can be cultivated. The mountains are too steep and too sterile; they catch an abundant rainfall, which, however, rushes out untimely, so that nearly all the rivers lie in broad and sandy beds, a mile wide at flood and a few yards in the dry season. As in China, much of the soil has been washed away, and the fields have been strewn with stones.

The tendency to city life, with which we are familiar in the United States and Europe, has shown itself of late also in Japan; and the farmers and other inhabitants of the country districts are moving into the cities and towns. In 1896 only 16 per cent of the population resided in cities and towns of over 10,000 inhabitants; now the number is estimated at 25 per cent, but the exact figures will not be known till 1915.

Up to 1878 the villages, towns, and cities, were mere subdivisions of the forty-three prefectures into which the empire is divided; their officials were appointed and were regarded as government agents. But in that year both they and the prefectures were given elective assemblies. In 1884, however, another law was promulgated that the village heads again should be chosen by the government, on the ground that those elected by the people were not qualified for their duties. This was a severe blow to the local government system, which was still in its infancy. Fortunately, the city, town, and village regulations, published in 1885, to further extend "the old customs of interrelationship between the neighbors," and to protect "the inherent rights of cities, towns, and villages," altered the title of the head man of a town, or of a village, and made him an elected official for a term of four years, subject to the approval of the prefect. The approval by the prefect has come to be a mere form, since a wise prefect, though he is an appointive officer of the central government, does not often put himself in opposition to public opinion. The head man may or may not be

a professional official and may or may not receive a salary, dependent upon the importance of the town or village.

A city government consists of a mayor or shicho, his assistants, one to three in proportion to the population, a council of six to twelve members, and an assembly. The assemblies were authorized in 1884 to nominate three candidates for mayor and report the nominations to the emperor, petitioning him to choose one of them. When these regulations were about to be put into operation, special regulations were established for Tokyo, Kyoto, and Osaka, as exceptionally large and prosperous cities; and so in these three cities the prefect took the place of the mayor. Subsequently in 1898 the administration of these cities was made to conform in the main to that of the other fifty cities. The department of home affairs now invariably selects the nominee who has received the largest vote in the assembly. The assistants and the councilmen are elected by the assembly. The mayor and his assistants, who need not be citizens of the city when they are chosen, hold office for six years, and are paid. One of them convokes the meetings of the council and is its chairman. The councilmen hold office for six years, one-third retiring every two years; and their functions include the preparation of business for the assembly, attendance at its meetings, the execution of the decisions of the assembly, the administration of the city revenue, and the general superintendence of city affairs. In November of last year an imperial ordinance made a change in the duties of the councils of Tokyo, Kyoto, and Osaka, which ordinance I have not seen; but I am told by Dr. W. W. McLaren, professor of economics in Keio University, that it deprives the council of its administrative functions and leaves it the mere ghost of its former self, since now it can do nothing except to give advice when consulted by the mayor.

All heads of departments, except the treasurer, who is elected for six years by the assembly, on the nomination of the council, and all clerks are appointed by the council. "The number of such persons shall be determined by the assembly." "The amount of salary to be paid to the shicho, to the assistants, and to other salaried officials as well as to

servants, shall be fixed by decisions of the city assembly." In charge of the departments are committees, elected by the assembly, and composed of councilmen, assemblymen, and citizens at large. "The city assembly shall be competent to examine papers and accounts relating to the city affairs and to demand reports in order to ascertain whether the management of affairs, the execution of the decisions of the assembly, and the collection and the application of the revenue, are properly carried out."

The city assembly is the popular representative body; and varies in number, in proportion to the population, from thirty to sixty. It is empowered to "represent the city, and decide on all subjects relating to the city affairs." The assemblymen hold office for six years, one-third of them retiring every two years, are eligible for reëlection, and, like the councilmen, draw no salary, but receive "compensation for the actual expenses needed for the discharge of their duties." All male citizens may vote for the assemblymen, if they are over twenty-five years of age, have resided in the city two years, and have paid one dollar a year in direct national taxes. The voters are divided into three classes, according to the amount of taxes paid to the city, and each class elects one-third of the councilmen. The object of this division, as in the similar Prussian system, is to give the highest taxpayers a power and a representation greater than they could secure by numbers.

"The elections shall be made by ballots on which shall be inscribed the names of those for whom the vote is cast, and, after having been safeguarded in a folded paper, shall be handed to the chairman by the electors themselves; the names of the electors shall not be inscribed."

"When the electors hand in their ballots, they shall orally give their full names and places of residence; and the chairman after having referred such names and places to the lists shall put the ballots unopened into a ballot box. The ballot box may not be opened until the polling is closed."

"No member of a city assembly may bind himself by the direction or request of any of his constituents." It elects from its own members its president and his deputy, one of

whom takes the chair except "when the matter of any question relates personally to him, or to his parents, his brothers, his wife, or his children." In the case of a large city it is permissible to divide it into wards each with its own mayor, assistants, council, and assembly. This provision is copied from Paris where there is a mayor in each ward, and from London where there are assemblies in the several districts. The local government units are not defined sharply. For instance, the Tokyo district, called Tokyo-fu, consists not only of the city and its suburbs, but also of twenty-two towns and one hundred and fifty-six villages contiguous to the city, and of hundreds of small islands, one of which is a thousand miles distant.

The law says: "A city shall be considered a juristic person and shall administer by itself its own affairs;" and it is given by general laws a wide grant of power, to do anything, within its area, which it may think fit, provided that its actions do not conflict with any national law and are not contrary to the public good, and also provided that the consent of the higher authorities be obtained for certain projects. This method of bestowing wide powers upon local authorities is borrowed from continental European countries, and undoubtedly it has many advantages when compared with the Massachusetts habit of bestowing only specific powers. It precludes the necessity of frequent petitions to the legislature, and the waste of a great deal of time and money to obtain for local authorities necessary powers.

The most important function of the assembly is to consider and vote the budget. This must include, among other things, suitable provision for the common school education of all the children for six years between the ages of six and fourteen. The imperial rescript enjoins that "education shall be so diffused that there may not be a village with an ignorant family, nor a family with an ignorant member." The number, therefore, of children in the schools is very large. In Yokohama, for instance, 89 per cent of the children of school age, boys and girls, are enrolled; and in Nagoya 97 per cent. In Osaka there are 42 public kindergartens with

6500 children, about 37 to each nurse. The official figures for the whole empire show that in 1870, 15 per cent of the girls of school age, and 40 per cent of the boys, were in school; but that in 1908, 95 per cent of all the children, boys and girls, were enrolled; and in some towns every child was upon the books.

Wandering about in Shizuoka I came to a boys' school; and it was interesting to see how in its furniture it conforms to our ideas. At home these boys have no chairs, but squat upon the floor. Here they had chairs and desks. The army surgeons have shown that the squatting position of the Japanese is the occasion of the shortness of their legs, which are out of proportion to the remainder of the body. The introduction of chairs and tables is intended, among other things, to alter this defect. Another illustration of thorough care is found in the fact that, before a schoolhouse is built, the site is examined to see if there is adequate space for playgrounds, and if there is a sufficient supply of good water. School books are printed in clear type, with standard spaces between the words and lines, to check the strain upon the eyes. The schools, moreover, have school physicians, to look after the general health and the sanitary conditions in their respective schools, and to make physical examinations of the pupils at fixed intervals.

While Japan is careful of the well being of its children with the one hand, with the other hand it is doing them a lasting injury. On account of their low wages, and also because they are less troublesome to manage than men, there is a big demand for them in the factories. But to attend school, and in addition to work in the factories, especially at night, inevitably lowers the standard of these little workers, and threatens a general deterioration of the nation. It is the children, whose tiny fingers paste match boxes, and put on the labels. A brush manufacturer of Osaka sends brushes to a thousand homes in country districts, in order that the bristles may be fastened into them by childish hands, practically the manipulation and straightening of each bristle in a tooth or hair brush. The most nimble of these industrious

little workers receive only 2 to 4 cents a day. The latest official figures, those of 1910, show over 40,000 children, under fourteen years of age, in factories and shops.

Thousands of young girls contract to live for three years in a compound, like so many peas in a pod and to work in the mills twelve hours a day one week, and twelve hours a night the next, at 10 cents a day, and on Sundays also. Some compounds are very bad. The places where food is served are mere sheds, with leaking roofs and gaping walls, and pools of water accumulate on the earthen floors. The seats are 4-inch bare boards, and the tables two 10-inch boards nailed together. The sleeping quarters are a trifle better, and the floors are covered with matting; but the girls sleep in rows, fifty, or even a hundred, in a room. Another sad feature in Japan is the employment of a million or more of bright and healthy men, capable of receiving an industrial education, in the performance of tasks which are delegated elsewhere to horses and mechanical traction.

A change is at hand. Many owners now make their factories homelike. A cotton mill in Osaka, which employs twelve hundred people, provides a hospital, with professional nurses and a physician in constant attendance. All the employees have one meal of excellent quality, each day, in a large and comfortable dining room. Also there is a large amusement room and lecture hall in which entertainments are given. Schools, libraries, bath rooms, recreation grounds, and flower gardens, are furnished in other factories; and facilities for saving and other methods of mutual help are provided. Some owners entertain their workers with picnics, and theatrical performances. These, however, are the exceptions. The great change will come from the factory act, recently passed by parliament, although it does not become operative for five years, in order that there may be no sudden dislocation of industry. Children under twelve then cannot be employed at all, and children under fifteen, and women, cannot work more than twelve hours.

There are many evidences of growing wealth. The savings bank deposits in Nagoya, for instance, have increased in ten years six fold, and the postoffice savings deposits have

increased twenty-five fold. The revenue of the city in the same period has increased three fold, and the expenditures in the same proportion. There is municipal progress in all portions of the empire. Old cities have taken new life, and new cities have come into existence. Public works of great magnitude, such as waterworks, sewerage systems, harbors, new streets, parks, and public buildings, have been undertaken. Thousands of houses have been destroyed to make straight and graded streets, from 60 to 100 feet in width, with good sidewalks, where formerly sidewalks were unknown. Sanitation and hygiene, including surgical and medical treatment for the poor, have not been neglected; for the Japanese are quite abreast of the times in these things, and in the control of epidemic or contagious diseases. Gas and electric lighting plants have been established, and excellent systems of electric tramways. Many of the streets are lighted at night, the more important with electric lighting. There are several new theaters, which are quite European in appearance, though behind the curtain all generally is still Japanese. But western plays are not infrequent, especially in Tokyo, where recently *Hamlet*, translated into Japanese, was the attraction. It also is significant that, while you cannot find a European who likes Japanese music, hundreds of Japanese enjoy Beethoven and Wagner. There are many excellent newspapers, and several of them are in English, although they are edited by Japanese. Quite a number have a large circulation; but, unfortunately, they are not free from the defects which characterize so many of our own newspapers.

I cannot recall being solicited once by a beggar in any highway or other public place; and, while this probably is not due to the absence of poverty, but in part to an energetic police, and in part to improved public charities, a considerable portion doubtless is due to better social conditions.

Whatever may be urged against the morals of Japanese traders, and of this matter I heard a great deal, not only in Japan, but in every portion of the Far East, though personally I came across nothing in the least suspicious, the administration of local affairs is honest; and the public works have been carried out without a charge of extrava-

gance. One of the commercial complaints against the Japanese is that they make and sell articles under the trade-marks of other nations; travellers have run across such articles in Manchuria which had been made by the Japanese and which bore English printed trade-marks. But German factories are doing this same thing in regard to Japanese goods, and articles made in Germany bear Japanese trade-marks and signs copied with all the care of German ingenuity. Is it the old story of the pot calling the kettle black?

Some of the cities, as does Oakland in California, provide a fund for the entertainment of visitors and for advertising their attractions. Nearly all maintain commercial museums, where you may inspect samples of their products, and where courteous attendants will give you explanations and prices, and tell you where to go to make purchases. At the end of 1910 there were no fewer than seventy commercial museums and exhibitions. By far the most interesting of these commercial museums is in Kyoto, the old capital. The building is well adapted to display the beautiful products of the city; and every effort is made, not only to secure for the benefit of the public fine examples of early Japanese arts and crafts, but also, in order to improve modern manufactures, by comparison with others, the museum collects, and exhibits samples of articles produced in other parts of the world. Moreover, public lectures are given free from time to time under the auspices of the museum. The spirit which has prompted municipal reform and organization has shown itself also in the establishment of chambers of commerce in nearly all the important cities. Tokyo and Osaka started these organizations, and today chambers of commerce are found in sixty principal cities. The members present to the authorities their views concerning the revision of laws and of institutions, reply to questions put to them by the authorities, act as arbitrators in commercial and industrial conditions, publish statistics, and render protection to commerce and industry. Nearly every city publishes a yearly statement, sometimes in English only, rarely in Japanese only, and generally in both languages, giving full information of the municipal enterprises during the year, the revenues and expenses, and school, health and trade statistics.

Nagoya has developed into a modern industrial city with 400,000 inhabitants, most of whom seem busy and prosperous. Its streets have been extended on a spacious scale; and along the center of its main thoroughfare, which is 7 miles long and 78 feet wide, runs a well equipped electric tramway. The shops and workshops are the best built, the largest, and the newest looking in Japan, and they are noted for a wonderful array of signs. Its factories also are well worth visiting. Corporations, combinations, trusts, and department stores, flourish there.

The story of the last five years in Osaka is one of continual progress and activity. Among many achievements worthy of notice are the completion of an extensive system of electric tramways; the extension of the water supply; the inauguration of a sewage system; the development of a net work of suburban electric lines and their connection with the municipal tramways; progress in the construction of a commodious harbor; and the improvements of the numerous bridges, which are a marked feature. Foreign trade has made great strides, and foreign visitors, for business or pleasure, have increased in numbers. Its merchant fleet now displays the flag of the Rising Sun in all parts of the world. The rapid growth in the population, no less than 50,000 a year during the last four years, has caused extensive building operations, the opening of new streets, and the constant introduction of new features in administration, and in civic enterprise. The streets and canals are thronged with people. Now you pass through a long street given over to pottery and porcelain; then through one for umbrellas and fans; and next through others for cotton fabrics, rugs, brushes, leather goods, bronze and metal work, provisions, and clothing. In addition to these enterprises, a good deal is done for secondary education, especially for technical schools and colleges. There also is a first class municipal library; and there are many temples, shrines and Christian churches. Here at least we do not find the "changeless East."

Unfortunately Tokyo, the capital, does not present so bright a picture. Its streets are poorly made, even the important thoroughfares are not paved, the lighting is inadequate, fire protection is furnished by antique appliances, and

the smoke nuisance grows unchecked. Newness and poverty are no sufficient excuse for these bad conditions, for since 1860 the large cities of Europe have demolished their walls, drained their moats, widened their streets, built new avenues, and generally changed their mediaeval aspect by taking on a modern appearance and equipment.

Tokyo in June last took over its tramways, at a purchase price double the cost of construction. Nevertheless Tokyo is not the first city in the world to pay an enormous sum for an unexpired franchise, nor is it the first city to begin to operate its tramways under a cloud of debt. Many British cities have gone through the same experience, and careful management generally has worked wonders in a few years. Manchester began to operate its tramways with the heavy handicap of a large franchise purchase, but in ten years the water was squeezed out and the renewal account on the sinking fund was kept intact. The same may be accomplished in Tokyo. Already the service has been improved, and, through higher wages and shorter hours, better employees have been obtained, who will cooperate with the management, for general experience shows that efficient labor, though the wages are higher, is always the cheapest.

Tokyo and Osaka are about to establish employment bureaus, with some financial aid from the national government. The government also has offered to Tokyo a yearly subsidy of \$5000 for each establishment capable of lodging 100 vagrants, if it also attempts to improve their mode of life. The Tokyo City Asylum for the poor was organized in 1872 to shelter beggars and outcasts and to give them employment; and, as a first step, 140 poor men and women were housed in the mansion of the former Lord of Kaga, now the site of the Tokyo Imperial University. The asylum was supported at first by the prefecture; but, when the city regulations came into force, it passed, and ever since has remained, under the superintendence of the municipality. Its cleanliness is a pleasing feature. The Japanese are a clean people. The very poorest does not live upon the ground as do the Chinese and the Indians; he lives upon a platform, raised above the ground. No hardened soil for him, no chilly

pavement of brick or stone; a wooden floor, a piece of clean matting, a broom, and a bathtub, the poorest Japanese will always have.

Everywhere, in the universities, the schools, the hospitals, the military posts, and the houses, even in the streets, and the country I saw from the car window, I was impressed by the neatness of it all. There is no rubbish in Japan anywhere. The atmosphere is pure, the sky hangs clear above the beautiful islands, and crystal streams murmur down the green hillsides. Born and brought up under the influence of such surroundings cleanliness is instinctive.

Japan is in many respects the most remarkable country on earth, combining all the fascination of an ancient civilization with the interest of a vigorous new nation. The intense, fiery, patriotism, of which it has given remarkable proof of late, and its willingness to borrow, whenever other people's institutions seem better than its own, mark it off in the clearest and most emphatic way from every one of its geographic neighbors. The abandonment of the old order, at the cost of rank, fame, wealth, and even livelihood, for tens of thousands of its foremost citizens, and the upspringing of a whole nation are amazing, and give proof of a widespread, unselfish patriotism, unequalled in history. Aristocracy gave way in a day to a constitution and a parliament; feudalism and its mediaeval retainers to an European army and navy; public schools, both for boys and girls, were established throughout the land; and its post, its telegraphs, and its railways, equal those of the west; and all this was accomplished, not by the slow growth and gradual development of years, but almost at a wave of a magician's wand. For a whole people to lay aside what they were born to reverence and follow, because alien customs promise a greater good, is a spectacle unparalleled. The stigma has been removed from trade, the peasant walks free, secure in the possession of inviolate civil rights, and, more wonderful yet, women have come out of the guarded seclusion of the east, and enjoy a social existence and legal equality. May it be a bright future which awaits this charming people, who win so quickly the admiration, the sympathy, and the affection, of the stranger within their gates.

THE NEW JAPAN

*By Arthur Judson Brown, D.D., Secretary Presbyterian
Board of Foreign Missions*

Japan is in some respects one of the most attractive countries in the world. One who has visited it can never forget the charm of its hospitality, the neatness of the homes and villages, and the courageous energy with which the people are grappling with their new and difficult problems. Evidences of the new life which is stirring the nation are apparent on every hand. Tokyo, the intellectual and political center of the nation, has become one of the influential cities of the world. Osaka is the center of the new industrial Japan and there the commercial and manufacturing enterprises of the country may be seen on a large scale. The occasional traveler too often neglects this city, which is one of the most distinctive cities of modern Japan. Kyoto continues to be the artistic and Buddhist heart of Japan. One does not expect to see much change in the sacred Shinto city of Yamada, or the shrines and temples of scenic and historic Nikko; but even there the traveler finds indications of progress. The new highway, three miles in length, connecting the two Shinto shrines at Yamada, is not surpassed by any road in Europe. Everywhere the traveler is charmed by the beauty of the scenery. Japan is a land of mountains and valleys, of streams and gardens. A journey through it is a succession of delights to the lover of nature, and even the humid heat of a Japanese August can be uncomplainingly borne when one can look upon scenes worth going far to see.

The contrast between Japan of today and the Japan which I found ten years ago is not so immediately apparent as one might imagine. Visibly there is comparatively little change. The charm of the Japanese scenery is still unmarred, save in a few places, by the crass materialism which in America lines our railways with huge signs advertising cathartics, bile beans,

soothing syrup, and pale pills for pink people. Japanese architecture is the same, save here and there a new public building is of foreign style. Increasing numbers of educated men wear European dress; but the native garments still predominate on the streets. The railway service is excellent; but the jinrickisha still awaits the traveler at every station, and the bare legged runner swiftly draws him over the smooth streets between the long rows of shops with their picturesque signs. The visitor can easily find external signs of changing conditions if he looks for them; and in some instances they obtrude themselves. Nevertheless, Japan, to the eye, is still Japan—the most beautiful land of northern Asia.

But as one moves among the people, he becomes conscious of subtler changes. Ten years ago, I found a militant Japan. The people had not recovered from their rage and chagrin over Russia's seizure of Port Arthur and Manchuria, thus depriving them of the hard-won fruits of the China-Japan war of 1894. The nation was thinking of revenge. It realized too that Russian aggressions must result in war. It was therefore drilling soldiers, building warships and accumulating military stores.

The Japan of today is not less militant than the Japan of former years. It understands perfectly that the Russians will not permanently acquiesce in the stinging defeat which was inflicted upon them. The Japanese know that the Koreans hate them and that the Chinese are jealous of them. They know too, that many foreigners throughout the Far East are suspicious of them. They discern, moreover, that the position which they have now won in the world in general and in the Far East in particular is one which can be held only by military force. The Japanese, therefore, are maintaining an army and navy at a high stage of efficiency. They do not need as large a standing army as some other nations, for in Japan practically every able-bodied man receives military training, and after his return to civil life, is amenable to his country's call at any time. One hears many stories to the effect that enormous stores of munitions of war are being accumulated. It is difficult to tell how far this is true; but no one doubts that

the Japanese are keeping themselves in first-class military condition just as the British, the Germans and the French are keeping themselves, and as a strong party wishes to keep the United States. All this is natural as conditions now are.

But Japan, while not less military, is more commercial than formerly. It understands war is a costly business. It spent \$585,000,000 in the Russian-Japan war, and the nation is staggering under the enormous debt of \$1,125,153,411, or \$21.50 per capita. People have to pay from 20 to 30 per cent of their incomes for taxes and a Tokyo paper (the *Kokumin Shimfun*) says that "the heavy debts of Japan are more than the nation can endure." Japan realizes that its material resources are greatly inferior to those of most other first-class powers, and that the position and ambitions of the nation require wealth as well as an army and navy.

The Japanese cannot get this wealth by agriculture; for not only is Japan a comparatively small country territorially but only about 12 per cent of its area is easily susceptible of cultivation. It is a land of hills and mountains. The valleys are unusually rich, but they are not extensive and there are no vast stretches of rich prairie soil like those in Manchuria and the western part of the United States.

So the Japanese have entered upon a period of commercial and industrial development. They have studied to good effect the example of England and are trying to make themselves a manufacturing people. Trade is being fostered on a large scale. Factories, the best modern machinery, extensive shipping interests, and great business enterprises testify to the zeal with which the Japanese are entering the sphere of commercial activity. When one considers the contempt with which trade was regarded by feudal Japan only a few decades ago, he is amazed by the skill and persistence with which the new Japan is striving for the mastery in the markets of the world. It is not easy for the white races to compete with them. The Japanese already lead in the trade of the Pacific ocean, and dominate that of Korea and Manchuria. They are competing with foreign and Chinese steamship lines on the Yang-tze River to Hankow, planting colonies in every

port city of the Far East, and running their steamships to Europe, America, India and Australia.

The advantages of Japan in this commercial rivalry are short haul, cheap labor, control of transportation lines both by land and sea, and government subsidies. Several of the great enterprises of modern Japan are controlled either directly or indirectly by the Government. In some instances, the government owns them outright; in other instances high officials and members of the Imperial Family are heavy stockholders. The *Financial Economic Annual*, issued by the Government, states that in 1905, out of a total of 4,783 miles, the state owned and operated 1,531 miles of railway. By the railway nationalization law and the railway purchase law, passed in March 1906, the Government acquired ownership and control of all the lines in the country, with the exception of a few of relatively little importance. Its holdings now represent about 90 per cent of the total mileage. Payment for the lines purchased is to be made by public loan bonds aggregating nearly \$250,000,000. The Japanese people are moving as a unit in the furtherance of their commercial ambitions. The business man does not have to fight alone for foreign trade, as the American tradesman must. He has the backing of the nation. Allied industries support him. Shipping companies give him every possible advantage. He is, to use an American term, a part of an immense "trust," only the trust is virtually a government instead of a corporation.

I heard much criticism of Japanese commercial methods. European and American business men spoke with great bitterness of their unfairness. They alleged that Japanese firms obtain railway rebates; that transportation lines are so managed that Japanese firms have their freight promptly forwarded while foreign firms are subject to ruinous delays; that foreign labels and trade marks are placed upon inferior goods, so that it is difficult to sell a genuine brand to an Asiatic, as the latter believes that he can get the same brand from a Japanese at a lower price. They also alleged that foreign traders in Manchuria are compelled to pay full duties upon all goods, but that the Japanese, through their absolute

control of the only railway, are able to evade the customs. It was said that of \$12,000,000 worth of Japanese goods which went into Dairen in a single year, only \$3,000,000 worth paid duty. For a long time, Japanese goods were poured into Manchuria at An-tung on the Yalu River. Then foreign powers encouraged the Chinese to place an inspector of the Imperial Chinese Customs at An-tung. The Japanese could not oppose this, but they did their best to have a Japanese inspector chosen. An American in the customs service, however, was appointed. His experience in endeavoring to enforce the laws against the Japanese would make interesting reading, if it is ever published.

The rage and chagrin of European and American business men in the Far East can better be imagined than described. A disgusted foreigner declared to me that there is not a white man in the Far East, except those in the employ of the Japanese, who are friendly toward them, and that their dominant characteristics are "conceit and deceit." He denied not only the honesty but even the courage of the Japanese, insisting that the capture of Port Arthur was not due to the bravery of the assailants, but to the incompetence of the defenders. He said that the Russian soldiers were as heroic as any in the world; but that their officers were drunkards and debauchees, and that the war department, which should have sustained them, was rotten with corruption. He stated that at the battle of Liao Yang, both Russian and Japanese generals gave the order for retreat at about the same time, each feeling that the battle was lost; but that the Russian regiments received their order first, and that as the Japanese saw them retreat, they moved forward. He held that the anti-Japanese agitation in the public schools of San Francisco was secretly fomented and made an international incident by the Japanese themselves, in order to divert attention from what they were doing in Manchuria; and more to the same effect.

I have cited these opinions as they are illustrative of many that I heard in the Far East. I need hardly say that I regard them as unjust. Their very bitterness indicates the prejudice which gave some of them birth and added exaggeration to others. Even if they were all true, the Japanese

are simply doing what it is notorious that some American corporations have been doing for years. Rebates, adulteration, evasion of customs, short weight, unfair crushing of competitors, and kindred methods, are not so unfamiliar to Americans that they need lift hands of holy horror when they hear about them in Asia.

The fact is that the white trader has had, until recently, his own way in the Far East. He has cajoled and bullied and threatened and bribed the Asiatic to his heart's content and his pocket's enrichment. He has dominated the markets, charged what prices he pleased, and reaped enormous profits. When he has gotten into trouble with local authorities, he has called upon his government to help him out of the scrape. The story of the dealing of western nations in Asia includes some of the most disgraceful incidents in history. Now, for the first time, the white man finds himself face to face with an Asiatic who can beat him at his own game. The Japanese are commercially ambitious and want those rich markets for themselves. They are going after them and getting them. It is rather late in the day for white men to go into paroxysms of grief and indignation over commercial methods they themselves have long practiced. I do not mean to be understood as excusing such methods in the Japanese or anyone else. I am simply calling attention to the fact that the Japanese are a strong, alert, aggressive and ambitious people, who have precisely those ambitions for supremacy which characterize white men.

The Japanese are developing almost as much of a colonizing spirit as the Chinese. Like the latter, they are seeking distant lands, and like them, too, they are succeeding in them. The pressure in population of Japan has already been noted. The Empire had 37,017,362 inhabitants in 1883; 39,607,254 in 1888; 41,388,313 in 1893; 43,763,855 in 1898; 46,732,807 in 1903; 48,649,583 in 1906; and it now has over 50,000,000 exclusive of Formosa and Korea. The cost of living is rising. The limit of the soil productiveness has been reached and Japan has to import food for her people. In a recent year she purchased abroad 4,296,418 piculs of rice, chiefly from China, Siam and Burma, and 4,294,267 piculs of beans, the

latter largely from Manchuria. She bought flour in the United States to make bread for her troops during the war, and her imports of this staple in the following year cost \$1,819,166. It will readily be understood that possession of Formosa, Korea and Lower Manchuria and a strong navy mean the very life of the nation.

Japan's new and rapidly enlarging foreign trade also involves the residence in other lands of some of her subjects. There is a large Japanese population in Korea, Manchuria, Formosa and the Hawaiian Islands, and an increasing one in the ports of China. The Japanese population in the United States was 71,712 in 1909 and is probably about the same now.

A discussion of the problem of Japanese emigration to the United States does not fall within the scope of this article. The agitation in California and the national complications that ensued are well known. Lest we be misled by newspaper reports about the danger of having "great numbers of Japanese men sitting beside little American girls" in the schools of San Francisco, we may recall the result of inquiries by Mr. George Kennan, as published in the *Outlook* of June, 1907. He found that of 28,736 pupils in the public schools of San Francisco, only 93 were Japanese; that 28 of these were girls; that 34 of the boys were under fifteen years of age; that of the 31 over fifteen years of age, only two were as old as twenty, and that the average age of the rest was seventeen. All but six were in grades with Americans of the same age. The number of "Japanese men sitting beside little American girls" therefore consisted of just six youths under twenty, and these were divided among four schools—one in each of three schools and three in the other.

The story of moral and spiritual development in Japan is replete with interest. It is difficult to realize that when Dr. James Hepburn arrived in Japan in 1859, he was not permitted to preach; and that the only opportunity he could find to do anything, except literary work in his own study, was to teach English to a few boys whose fathers were desirous of having them learn the leading language of Western nations. Now the Rev. Allen Klein Faust, Ph.D., in his

Christianity as a Social Factor in Modern Japan, says that there are 1,031 foreign missionaries in Japan, 1,847 Japanese ministers, evangelists, missionaries and teachers; 161,228 communicant members of churches, and half a million adherents. That is, 1 in every 100 of the population is an adherent of Christianity, and 1 in every 320 is a baptized communicant. These figures include the Greek and Roman Catholic and Protestant Missions. Protestants have 186 schools with 17,664 students; Roman Catholics 51 schools with 6,183 students; and Greek Catholics 3 schools with 328 students.

The influence of Christianity is far greater than these figures would indicate. In most countries, Christianity made its first converts among the lower strata of society, but in Japan it has won its greatest successes among the Samurai or knightly class, the class which has furnished the majority of the army and navy officers, journalists, legislators, educators, and leading men generally of the new Japan. It can readily be understood, therefore, that the Japanese churches have a strength out of all proportion to their numbers. Fourteen members of the Lower House are Christians. A former President of the House was a Presbyterian elder. Christians may be found among the influential men in almost every walk of life. At the semi-centennial Conference in 1909, the Rev. Dr. Imbrie said:

Fifty years ago, notice-boards were standing on the high-ways declaring Christianity a forbidden religion; today these same notice boards are seen standing in the museum in Tokyo as things of historical interest. Fifty years ago, religious liberty was a phrase not yet minted in Japan; today it is written in the constitution of the nation. Less than fifty years ago, the Christian Scriptures could be printed only in secret; today Bible societies scatter them far and wide without let or hindrance. Fifty years ago, there was not a Protestant Christian in Japan; today they are to be found among the members of the imperial diet, the judges in the courts, the professors in the imperial university, the editors of influential newspapers, the officers of the army and navy.

Count Okuma, former prime minister of Japan, in a remarkable address at the same conference, is reported in the *Japan Daily Mail*, October 9, 1909, as follows:

He was glad of this opportunity to express a word of hearty congratulation to those who were assembled to celebrate this semi-centennial of Christian work in Japan. Though not himself a professed Christian, he confessed to have received great influence from the creed, as have many others throughout Japan. This is a most important anniversary for the country. It represents the work of one whole age in our history, during which most marvelous changes have taken place. He came in contact with, and received great impulses from, some of the missionaries of that early period, particularly from Dr. Verbeck, who was his teacher in English and history and the Bible, and whose great and virtuous influence he can never forget. Though he could do little direct evangelistic work then, all his work was Christian, and in every thing he did, his Christian-like spirit was revealed. The coming of missionaries to Japan was the means of linking this country to the Anglo-Saxon spirit to which the heart of Japan has already responded. The success of Christian work in Japan can be measured by the extent to which it has been able to infuse the Anglo-Saxon and the Christian spirit into the nation. It has been the means of putting into these fifty years an advance equivalent to that of one hundred years. Japan has a history of 2,500 years, and 1,500 years ago had advanced in civilization and domestic arts, but never took wide views nor entered upon wide work. Only by the coming of the West in its missionary representatives and by the spread of the Gospel, did the nation enter upon world-wide thoughts and world-wide work. This is the great result of the Christian spirit. To be sure, Japan had her religions and Buddhism prospered greatly; but this prosperity was largely through political means. Now this creed has been practically rejected by the better classes, who spiritually thirsty, have nothing to drink. While extending congratulations upon the advance made thus far, he prayed for still greater effort and advance in the future and such advance as should be manifest in lives of lofty virtue of the Verbeck kind. To teach the Bible was all right, but to act it was better. Japan is well advanced in scientific knowledge, but head and heart are not yet on a level. Profession and conduct ought to go together. Only thus can evangelistic work be counted a success.

The secular press does not fail to note the trend, for we find in the *Japanese Advertiser* for December 25, 1910, the following editorial:

There can be no gainsaying that the Christmas season, quite apart from its religious significance, is making great headway in this country. A walk through the streets of Tokyo today gives abundant evidence of the influence of the season, for all the shops are stocked with goods that are associated with the foreign Christmas quite as much as with the Japanese new year. In the tram cars, one sees advertisements of Christmas novelties, crackers and the like, intended for the Japanese eye. Dotted throughout the city are the

Christian churches, each one of which is now engaged in celebrating the holy season with religious services, as well as sacred concerts and other entertainments suitable to the occasion. It must be conceded that Christianity is making great progress in a country where its principal festivals are coming to be accepted by the mass of the people, even if that acceptance is only concerned with the purely secular manifestations of the faith. It is a great stride forward compared to what it was only a few years ago when the attitude of the people was still antagonistic toward the religion which, together with all its associations, they regarded with contempt. Doubtless those whose memory carries them back a generation could describe vividly the changes that have come over the people in this connection.

I would not make too much of these facts. Japan is still far from being a Christian nation. The obstacles yet to be surmounted are numerous and formidable. But it is indisputable that Christian ideas are permeating the literature and the thinking of Japan to a far greater extent than is commonly realized.

I confess to a deep and sympathetic interest in the future of the Japanese. Irritating as some of their methods are, trying as it is for the proud and arrogant Anglo-Saxon to feel that at last he has met a competitor whom he cannot easily overcome, I confess that these things increase rather than diminish my respect. Here is a people whom it is worth while to reach. Are we to concentrate our activities on inferior peoples? Has America no message for the strong and masterful races of the non-Christian world? I like the Japanese the more because they are united, ambitious and aggressive. I do not defend their vices any more than I defend the vices of my countrymen; but I want to see the Japanese united with the best people of Europe and America in the service of Christ. Forces and temptations which prevail in America, but which numerous and powerful Christian churches help us to fight, are surging into Japan where the opposing forces of righteousness are still comparatively new and small. It is Christ alone that keeps the United States from utter moral lawlessness and disintegration. We ought to be profoundly concerned that the Japanese should have the same Christ to help them. I want to see Christian missions in Japan strengthened, not because I regard the Japanese as

inferiors, not because I feel that we deserve any credit for the knowledge of Christ which was brought to us from the outside, but because I regard the Japanese as fellowmen and because I know that they need the same Christ that I need.

The Japanese already have a political vision. They dream of the leadership of Asia, and they are preparing for it with a skill and energy which elicit the wonder of the world. They already have a commercial vision, and they are strenuously trying to realize it. They already have an intellectual vision and they have built up one of the best educational systems in the world. Baron Kikuchi says that 96 per cent of the children of school age in Japan are in schools, the highest percentage of any nation in the world. What Japan needs is a spiritual vision which will purify and glorify these other visions. This spiritual vision is vital to the future of Japan. Few foreigners have been so deeply in sympathy with the Japanese as the late Lafcadio Hearn; but in his chapter on "The Genius of Japanese Civilization" he wrote:

The psychologist knows that the so-called adoption of western civilization within a time of thirty years cannot mean the addition to the Japanese brain of any organs of power previously absent from it. He knows that it cannot mean any sudden change in the mental or moral character of the race. Such changes are not made in a generation. Transmitted civilization works much more slowly, requiring even hundreds of years to produce certain permanent psychological results. . . . It is quite evident that the mental readjustments, effected at a cost which remains to be told, have given good results only along directions in which the race has always shown capacities of special kinds Nothing remarkable has been done, however, in directions foreign to the national genius. . . . To imagine that the emotional character of an Oriental race could be transformed in the short space of thirty years by the contact of Occidental ideas is absurd. . . . All that Japan has been able to do so miraculously well has been done without any self-transformation, and those who imagine her emotionally closer to us today than she may have been thirty years ago, ignore the facts of science which admit of no argument.¹

The Japanese mind has long been adapted to war, to politics, and to certain kinds of industrial and scientific development. Knowledge of western methods and discoveries has simply enabled the Japanese to do more effectively and on

¹ Kokoro, pp. 16-18.

a larger scale what they had been doing after a fashion before. The spiritual realm, however, is a new world to them. Shintoism and Buddhism have not known, and therefore could not make known, a personal God. In his instructive book, *The Future of Japan*, W. Petrie Watson declares that religion, conceived as God and as a final and sufficient explanation of all phenomena, is not a Japanese notion; and that of a religion as it is conceived in Europe, there is little or none in Japan. The Japanese regard religion as subordinate in life, and the temper of their mind is such that it is usually difficult for them to acquire a just view of its authority and indispensableness in individual and national existence. His conclusion is that Japan is addressing herself to the great responsibilities of the modern world without any religion at all, in the proper sense of the term; and that the effort is pathetic and disappointing rather than heroic and inspiring, since there is no fresh beginning of history which has not been born from a new religion or from the new interpretation of an existing religion. He admires the administrative efficiency with which Japan is doing her work at present, and the splendid enthusiasm which it is bringing to its present tasks; but even savages are often recklessly brave and eagerly willing to die for their leader. There is therefore reason for profound anxiety as we study the relations which Japan has formed with the modern world and the power that she is exerting. Only as the Japanese grasp Christ's high ideals of life and build upon the solid foundation of Christ's teachings will they be able to maintain themselves as a great power. The Japanese must be brought within view of the necessity of a religious interpretation of life, ampler, clearer and more categorical than that which they have found or can find either in a religion of loyalty, or in Bushi-do, or in esoteric Buddhism, or in superstitious Shintoism. Japan can not hope to reap the results of the religion of Europe without an ultimate reckoning with their case.²

Thoughtful Japanese are beginning to see this. Various utterances of her leading men might be cited. Baron Mak-

² *The Future of Japan*, cf. especially chapters xiv, xxviii and xxx.

ino, minister of education, said to the secretary of the Young Men's Christian Association: "We are greatly distressed about the moral condition of the students and the low character of the ordinary lodging houses where young men live and shall welcome whatever help the Young Men's Christian Association can do to help solve the problem." Prince Ito, in a notable address, laid down the following propositions: That no nation could prosper without material improvement; that material prosperity cannot last long without a moral backbone; that the strongest backbone is that which has a religious sanction behind it.³ Equally significant was the remark of Baron Shibusawa, the distinguished chairman of the commission of representative business men of Japan which visited the United States some time ago. In an address at a dinner in New York he declared:

Japan in the future must base her morality on religion. It must be a religion that does not rest on an empty superstitious faith, like that of some of the Buddhist sects in our land; but must be like the one that prevails in your own country, which manifests its power over men by filling them with good works.

The very solidarity of the Japanese would make their influence for Christ more powerful than that of almost any other people in Asia. The spirit of self-sacrifice which is so prominent in the Japanese character, the absolute willingness to dare and to die for the nation which hurled the Japanese corps as one man upon the fortifications of Port Arthur and enabled them to capture what probably no other army in the world could have captured, would, if pervaded and inspired by the Vision of Christ, make the Japanese among the most nobly effective peoples that the world has known. To give them the Christ who can do this is worthy of every possible effort on our part.

³ *The Japan Mail*, September 4, 1909.

SOME RESULTS OF CHRISTIAN WORK IN JAPAN

By Rev. Charles M. Warren, for twelve years a missionary of the American Board in Japan

The great visible result of the Christian work which for fifty-two years has been carried on in Japan is the churches. Of these, however, another is to speak. The task of this paper is to call your attention to some other results of Christian work as a whole, irrespective of creed or race.

Japan has been a missionary country since the second entry of the Roman Catholic missionaries, and the first arrival of the Protestant missionaries. The country has been open to foreign residence since 1859. She still is a missionary country as may be seen from the fact that there are now about eight hundred foreign Christian workers, men and women, still at work there. And lastly, a very interesting fact, Japan desires to be considered for years to come a missionary country. In this I do not, of course, ignore the fact that there are Christian Japanese who consider it patriotic to urge that all the Christian work should be done by the Japanese themselves. But of these the number is gradually diminishing as it dawns upon them that it is rather a narrow selfish provincialism than a disinterested patriotism that causes this. On the other hand, there are three facts that lead us to believe that Japan desires missionaries. First of all, the missions of all denominations are requesting new missionaries from their home boards. Some missions are even requesting a doubling of their forces. This, of course reflects foreign judgment, but it shows, what for our purpose is the main thing, that the missionaries feel that the relations between themselves and the Japanese churches which are influenced by, and in turn influence the international feeling—that these relations are such that they can conscientiously, not to say enthusiastically, invite others to come to enter into these relations. Secondly, the individ-

ual churches desire more missionaries as is evidenced by the frequent requests which these churches are making that a missionary be located in their little town to work with them. They prefer, of course, an experienced missionary and frequently name their choice; but if they can not get a man already on the field they gladly welcome the newcomer from America. Again, the Japanese leaders in the churches are asking that new missionaries be sent out. To one familiar with the situation twelve of fifteen years ago, the revolutionary character of this position will be obvious. Then they did not desire this and this anti-missionary feeling was given expression to in word and deed. But now they have outgrown that feeling, experience having proved that in the continuance of the missionaries there is no danger to the independent status of the churches. In this connection it is interesting to note that the recent pro-missionary movement was launched by a Japanese pastor of Tokyo, who, having visited this country, went home so imbued with the idea and spirit of the brotherhood of man that he made this the basis of his action in appearing by request at the annual meeting of one of the missions and pleading for more missionaries. The statements on this last point are probably most accurately descriptive of the situation in the Congregational churches in Japan. But they are, though to a lesser degree probably, indicative of the general attitude of the Japanese churches on the missionary question.

In the above and in what follows, the missionary is differentiated from the Japanese Christian workers because our purposes in a paper at this conference necessitate our looking at the missionary not in his capacity as a Christian worker but as a foreigner. This is of course contrary to our desires and contrary to our method of procedure in Japan where the missionaries take such great joy in the solidarity of the work and in the unity of the workers, foreign and Japanese.

All this preliminary discussion of the missionary is introductory to, and explanatory of, the first point that I wish to make: namely, that the missionary has been a factor

in bringing about whatever of good feeling now exists between the *peoples* of Japan and the United States. The word *peoples* is used in contradistinction to *governments*. In this country the theory that the people are the ultimate rulers is pretty nearly substantiated by the facts. In Japan, constitutional in government though she may be, and a legislative parliament though she may have, yet the real government is not yet by the people.

The platform of this conference magnifies the truth that mutual understanding is of great importance in the establishment and maintenance of pleasant relations between peoples. What has the missionary been able to contribute towards this mutual understanding between Japan and the United States?

The first relations of the Japanese with Americans were diplomatic, which means that they were of governments. It must be an unceasing source of gratification to Americans that the first American ambassadors, who had in charge the work of establishing relations with the Japanese were men of the type of Matthew C. Perry and Townsend Harris. From the time of the sending of these men to Japan, as well as of the Iwakura embassy to the United States and Europe in 1871, the Japanese date their friendship for us. We do not mean that at that time the Japanese looked upon Commodore Perry as anything but a powerful barbarian to whose superior might they were compelled for the time to bow. Later and calmer judgment, however, has convinced them that not only do they owe a debt of gratitude to the United States for having compelled them to open their doors, but that they should also be grateful that it was Commodore Perry who did it in his tactful though firm way instead of a representative of a European nation. For, at that time at least, European nations were not in the habit of dealing with Asiatic peoples gently and tactfully.

So much for the diplomatic contact. After this the next force making for this great end was the missionary. The statement of four facts will serve to show the possibility of the missionary's helping in this matter:

First, the large majority of Protestant missionaries now,

about three-fourths in fact, are Americans. Second, the Christian schools have been largely carried on by the American missionaries. And third, the American missionaries encouraged by spoken word and financial aid the going of young Japanese men and women to America for purposes of study. No statistics are available but personal experience leads me to believe that nine Japanese young men and women are educated in America to one in Europe. Thus we see the especial possibilities for influencing Japanese, especially young, impressionable Japanese. These missionaries love their native land, absence only making it the more dear. They come also to love their adopted home, Japan. With these peculiar feelings towards the two countries the conditions for setting forth to the Japanese the good points of America are ideal; and the reasons being obvious and cogent, no opportunity is lost. And many and many a Japanese, from prime-minister and university professor down, is glad to tell how his warm regard for the United States began in his esteem of the missionary representative of America.

An excellent illustration of this point is seen in the address given by Professor Fujisawa of the Imperial University of Tokyo before the Jubilee Christian Conference held in Tokyo two years ago. The title of the address was "The Influence of Missionaries upon the Education and Civilization of Japan." Now a professor of an imperial university in Japan is considered to be in a certain sense a public official. So that it meant a certain amount of official recognition of Christianity for him to appear at the Conference at all. Among other things he mentioned a list of notable men of title who had expressed their appreciation of what missionaries had done not only for the country, but also for themselves personally. He also cited the fact that Prince Iwakura, whose mission to America and Europe has already been referred to, upon leaving America sent an official letter of thanks for what Dr. Ferris had done to help Japanese students in America. His comment upon this is as follows: "It seems to me that this letter of thanks for what Dr. Ferris had done to help Japanese students in

America is the voice of the nation." This Dr. Ferris was secretary of one of the mission boards.

In all the above I have been going upon the assumption that the Japanese people have towards the Americans a real warm friendly feeling. This assumption is the result of my few years of experience among the people. And I have been unable to find another missionary who does not share this feeling.

And not only in Japan but also upon his return to this country the missionary is in a position to reiterate his belief in the feelings and intentions of the Japanese towards the United States, and in some small way endeavor to replace by the truth as he sees it what seems to him to be the tissue of falsehood which has been woven by some Americans, whether sincerely or with unworthy motives.

The name that spontaneously arises to our lips as we hear this program of missionary activity is that of John H. DeForest, statesman-missionary. Probably no man among the whole missionary body in recent years has done more than he along the line we are considering. Of long experience with the people, having an oratorical vocabulary and style in Japanese attained by very few foreigners, he accomplished so much in his own field of labor, Sendai, that his name became known and the demand for his talents nation-wide in Japan. He addressed huge gatherings of Japanese students and officials in the interests of international peace, until at last he became almost missionary-at-large for the Empire. But while he was able to do so much among the Japanese in unfolding American customs and ideals, perhaps an even greater work awaited him upon his return to this country on furlough. All through his career he had been an expositor of Japanese character and ideals to the American people as correspondent of the Independent and other periodicals. While he was at home on furlough a few years ago the opportunity for platform work in the interests of international peace was thrust upon him and so conspicuous was his success that he was made Japan vice-president of the American Peace Society, and his printed addresses circulated as a part of their recognized peace propaganda.



Upon his return to Japan he was decorated by the emperor for his conspicuous services in the cultivation of good feeling between Japan and the United States. That this recognition of those services was sincere and shared by the people is shown by the great public reception given him upon his arrival at Sendai and by the immense assembly which attended his funeral last spring. It is shown by the exceptional treatment accorded him when he visited Manchuria in war time; and again when he visited Korea at about the time of its annexation. The Japanese officials realized that in him they had a friend to whom they might entrust the truth that he might interpret it to the American people. Dr. DeForest is the most conspicuous example of what is being done today, though on a humbler scale, by practically every one of the five hundred missionaries in Japan. And this is only the active and open, as it were the official side of the missionary's work along these lines. In addition there is the daily word of personal conversation or that spoken from the pulpit or the teacher's chair.

The fact that this conference ~~is~~ proves your belief in the efficacy of a good understanding between nations in the maintenance of right relationships between nations. In dealing with thought and feeling, especially the thought and feeling of a whole nation, it is practically impossible to furnish proofs. I have simply suggested for your consideration a few points upon which may be based an estimate of the usefulness of the missionary in this regard.

From the standpoint of the mission boards of fifty years ago this would have been regarded as a by-product. But the enlightened leadership of our boards today is proud to claim this as a direct result of the sending of missionaries. And if it is contributing one iota towards peaceful relations between Japan and the United States it may well be considered a not unimportant part of the work of missions.

A second result to which I would call your attention, though very briefly, is the work of the Christian institutions. In this portion of the paper the missionary and the Christian Japanese work is considered as one, for we are considering now some results of fifty-two years of *Christian* work not




of missionary work. Some of these institutions, then, you are to understand are carried on by the missions, some are almost entirely the work of the Japanese Christians, and some are the product of a combination of the two forces. This paper takes it for granted that you are acquainted with the splendid work which the Y. M. C. A. is doing all over Japan and therefore simply mentions this at the head of the list of institutions. These institutions are of nearly all the kinds with which we are familiar in this country.

The Japanese are themselves amply able to do their own medical work. As medical missions, then, play at present only a small part in Japan missionary work we are not surprised to find few hospitals and dispensaries on our list. There are *some*, however, and at the very beginning of Christian work this was a very important feature.

The most conspicuous and valuable of these Christian institutions are the schools. Nearly every mission has some schools connected with it of kindergarten and of high-school grade for boys and girls. The oldest, largest and most celebrated of these schools is the Doshisha University, which has had a history of thirty-five years and owns a finely situated plant in Kyōto. Next to the schools perhaps the orphanages are the most important. The most conspicuous of all these is the Okayama Orphanage. The founder of this, Mr. Ishii, professedly following the example of George Müller of Bristol, built up, with the help and counsel of the foreign missionary, an institution in which at one time twelve hundred children were cared for, entirely on a faith basis. Of the institutions of secondary importance we may notice rescue homes for women, homes for ex-prisoners, homes for old people, a factory girls' home, settlement work, day-nurseries and creches.


Such in outline are some of the institutions that express the philanthropic side of Christianity. But perhaps Christianity's best work has been in awakening the public interest, and in inspiring the public enthusiasm, in philanthropic institutions. The Y. M. C. A., to take a concrete case, soon proved to be meeting a deeply felt need. Before many years there was organized in competition a Y. M.-B.-A., a



Young Men's Buddhist Association. Buddhist workers for young men were compelled in self-defence to organize along similar lines. Again, the success of the Christians with their orphanages was the cause of the springing up of a host of imitators. If imitation be the height of flattery, the Christians feel flattered indeed when very frequently in imitation of their own methods there appears at their doors a subscription paper for a Buddhist orphanage three or four hundred miles away!

I also have a good authority behind me in saying that although the instructional form of service was not unknown at the Buddhist temples before, yet since Christianity's advent the sermon is much more common in the Buddhist temple than it used to be. One of the most authoritative recent publications on Japan is Count Okuma's *Fifty Years of New Japan*, which is a collection of monographs on various subjects by men whom Count Okuma esteemed to be the best qualified available men on that particular subject. The writer of the chapter on Buddhism is J. Takakusu, Doctor of Letters in Japan, and M.A. and Ph.D. from foreign universities, professor in the Imperial University at Tokyo. Let me quote: "The methods and attitudes taken by the Christians in their missionary work gave the Buddhists new incentives for the improvement of their organization, doctrines and philanthropic work." And again: "Another evidence of Christian influence upon Buddhism is shown in the establishment of sectarian schools of various kinds, and especially in an eagerness to start schools for girls and women—a point to which hitherto small attention has been paid." Thus does this fair-minded Buddhist authority, writing for Japanese readers, speak of the influence of Christianity upon Buddhism.

The lives also of the missionary and of the Christian pastor have proved in many cases a revelation; and the people are demanding in their Buddhist teachers a moral life. In self-defence, too, the tone of the non-Christian teaching has been raised. Christian preaching often results in more earnest living up to the light they have. For instance, a friend who has a very effective stereopticon talk



on the "Prodigal Son" tells me that as the non-Christians who come, attracted by the free entertainment, are leaving, they frequently remark to each other: "That's right. We ought to go to the temples more and be better men."

Now, the foregoing is simply evidence on my third point, which is the change in ideals due to Christianity. Ideals have been elevated. The instances adduced above are in the more visible realm. But the influence of Christianity towards the elevation of ideals in more intangible and spiritual ways is just as real, though harder to demonstrate. Ideals have been elevated. One needs only to go back fifty-two years to compare the condition of things then and now to see the truth of this. To enumerate some of these; there have been changes in the ideals concerning woman, personal morality, business morality, family life, and lastly, the value of man. Some, at least, of these changes in ideals were brought about in part by the flood of new ideas on all subjects that has been released in Japan during these fifty years. These changes are the resultant of a combination of forces at work, some will say. Very well. They were so caused and some of them might have come about without any help from Christian life and teachings as such. Take for instance the change that has come about—or at least is coming, slowly—in the ideals of business morality. As I return to America and meet people, I find that there is hardly any idea that has a wider acceptance with regard to the Japanese than the one which compares the commercial integrity of the Japanese with that of the Chinese greatly to the detriment of the Japanese. Now personally I believe there are two sides to that question; but without doubt there has been in the past a deplorable deficiency in Japanese business circles in their ideals of commercial honor. The beginnings of this are to be traced to the fact that in the old feudal régime the merchant was the lowest of the classes of citizens. He was expected to cheat—and he, of course, did not disappoint those expectations. That was considered not a trick of the trade, but rather a legitimate method in trading. Now these merchants are the ones who are most in contact with the

commercial classes of foreigners, and their ideas with regard to what is legitimate in business have necessarily been modified by that contact. They found that if they wanted to do business advantageously with the European merchant they would be compelled to conform more nearly to the European standards of business morality. Baron Shibusawa, Japan's greatest man of business, heading the deputation of business men to this country two years ago, was shocked at the bad name the Japanese merchant has among us; and seeing the basis of truth in the charges, upon his return to Japan strenuously urged in the widely read trade-journals the acceptance of a new code. It may be possible in this case that purely upon the honesty-is-the-best-policy principle this would have been changed in any case.

In the above I do not mean to imply that the Japanese merchants have already arrived. I believe there is still room for improvement. But anyone at all acquainted with the facts will admit this change for the better in ideals along this line.

From the above it will be seen that I am very ready to ascribe to other causes whatever of credit I can see that they deserve in bringing about this change of ideals. But allowing amply for all these other sources, the change in ideals, especially with regard to the highest matters, or if you prefer, the most spiritual matters, has only come about through Christian influence. Let us consider the ideal as to the value of the individual human being. In this I don't mean merely in the ancient sense of a soul to be saved into heaven. I mean the value of the whole man, body, mind and soul. Let us briefly note some of the changes in ideals concerning man that have come about in these fifty years. Fifty years ago, to begin with a stock illustration, the warrior with a new sword could order any member of an inferior class to kneel down in order that he might test the new sword in making a clean cut in taking his head from his shoulders. Not that this was done very often. But it could be done and actually was done. Compare with this the present law upon the statute books which says, "Thou shalt not kill," and says it equally to the prime

minister and to the common citizen. Ah, but you are over-turning your own argument, it will be said. These laws are based upon the Code Napoleon and bear no relation to the work of Christians in Japan. As far as that goes the Code Napoleon is based on the Mosaic laws which Christianity claims as its foundation and background; so that the result is the same whether the law was copied from the Paris law books of the Sinaitic. Of course I do not claim any peculiar credit for Christianity as such in the Japanese legal code. But, permit me to ask, whence comes the public opinion that lies behind those laws? For no one who knows the Japanese can for an instant think that if the police force of the country were withdrawn Japan would become an anarchistic aggregation of savages. The laws are enforced in large measure by public sentiment as well as by police force, though this public sentiment may not yet be so enlightened as that of countries which emerged from their feudal age three hundred instead of fifty years ago. Whence, I repeat, comes this public opinion? And again, how is it in some cases that public sentiment actually surpasses the laws? New laws of a high moral purpose are from time to time added to statute book or city ordinance. Of such a nature is the recent closing of the most flagrant of the five prostitute quarters in the great city of Osaka. After the conflagration of two years ago, by the circulation of petitions the authorities were forced to refuse the rebuilding of one section of the city for that purpose. And the leaders in the movement were Christians. The work certainly would never have been done were it not for the Y. M. C. A. and the churches of Osaka. And unless Christianity had been quietly at work for years sending forth its high ideal of womanhood and of personal morality the tens of thousands of non-Christians who signed that petition never would have done so. Without this new ideal of civic and personal righteousness among the masses in that great city it would have been impossible for this great cleansing to have been forced upon the city.

But to return to the ideals concerning man's value. Fifty years ago there *might* be someone to kill the body; there

certainly were few to aid, or cure, or care for that body. The hospitals, the lazarettos, the institutions for the orphan, the blind, the deaf and dumb have all been built since then.

And the ideals as to the method of conducting the already existing institutions have changed for the better. In one case we have absolute knowledge as to how this came about. An American medical missionary came to know conditions in the prisons of Japan and with an introduction from the American minister to Okubo, the minister for home affairs, he enlisted that statesman's interest. Prison doors throughout the empire were opened to him and his investigation was made the basis of a report to Minister Okubo himself. At that time the Japanese idea of the function of prisons was the punitive one with the added idea that if they were made otherwise than places of punishment they would be crowded by people glad of even such asylum. The report sent in to Minister Okubo stood squarely upon the modern humanitarian idea that the criminal is incarcerated for the protection of society, not to cause him to suffer for his crime. And in the report stress was laid upon the efficacy of Christianity itself as a corrective in the prison as in the nation. This book was placed as a text-book in the hands of persons responsible for prisons in the Empire and the results in a very few years were astonishing. This one book had changed in a remarkable degree the ideals of legal and penal circles as to the value of man. That the Japanese consider the above to be the facts in the case and that they hold in honor the man who did it is shown by the fact that the story is narrated in Count Okuma's book already referred to. Count Okuma's book remarks: "In conclusion there is one thing we must not forget for a moment, namely, the important part played by Christianity in these reforms," and then continues with the story as told above. And again when last year there was a prison congress in Washington, D. C., the Japanese representative told the story. When he learned that the man to whom his country felt such a debt of gratitude was still alive he expressed great surprise and gratification and made a special journey in order to visit that ex-medical missionary and

convey to him the official thanks of his government. The man who did this was a Christian gentleman serving as a Christian missionary and definitely endeavoring in every way that presented itself to spread Christian ideas. He accomplished his reform by means of a book that stood squarely upon Christian principles, and which definitely taught Christian principles and ideas. This conference being held at Worcester it is eminently fitting to state that the man who was responsible for prison reform in Japan is your honored townsman, Dr. J. C. Berry.

Fifty years ago if one were of the wealthy or warrior class he might obtain a very limited education. Today education is compulsory, with 36,000 schools of all grades and sorts in the empire. Such is the change in the ideal of man's value from the intellectual standpoint.

Fifty years ago where were the 92 rescue homes for women, the 100 orphan asylums, the 74 reformatories, the 37 homes for ex-prisoners and all the other institutions indicative of the present desire for the moral and spiritual welfare of the people?

This is only the merest suggestion of the different ideals now and fifty years ago concerning the physical, intellectual, and spiritual welfare of man. The difference is there: whence comes it? The axiom that water cannot rise higher than its source has only a limited degree of truth when transferred to the spiritual realm. Spiritual truth is to be likened to a developing plant rather than to running water. But in one sense as it is true that water cannot rise higher than its source, so it is true that reform cannot rise beyond the ideals of the reformers. These ideals are rapidly approaching the Christian. To what other source than the Christianity in Japan can they be traced? They were not brought from Europe and America by the Japanese themselves; for it is an interesting phenomenon that when the Japanese Christians come to America they are frequently shocked at the wickedness and worldliness of this self-styled Christian country. They were not obtained through diplomacy. Unfortunately the golden rule is not yet working between nations. The men from Europe and America who form

the commercial classes in the ports of Japan are certainly not responsible for inculcating any high principles of spirituality. For though, as we have seen, they might help in the development of a *commercial* morality, the high ideals concerning woman, for instance, are not traceable to the influence of the morality of the ports of Japan. If Christianity is not to be credited with these phenomena—if, as my subject puts it, this is not one result of fifty years of Christianity in Japan, then are we at a loss as to its cause.

I have endeavored to show that there is among the fifty millions of Japanese citizens an increasingly enlightened body of ideals along these various lines. We are not to consider this as a fixed thing, nor as up to the grade of some other countries. But it is growing and growing rapidly. While the general civilization, itself the result of Christianity in other countries, which Japan has absorbed, has undoubtedly played an important part in bringing this about, yet to some extent it is the direct product of the influence of Christian teaching and Christian lives. So deeply do I feel this that I believe that if there were not a single Japanese Christian or a single church building in Japan today — if, in other words, there were absolutely no visible or tangible result of these fifty-two years of Christian work—yet in view of this change of ideals alone every cent of money expended and every minute of time spent in the Christian propaganda would be well worth while.

POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LOAN IN LIBERIA

By George W. Ellis, K.C., F.R.G.S.¹

During the last few years the Liberian republic has been passing through a severe national crisis, but through the good offices of the government of the United States the Liberian people have been inspired with new hope, the unrest which has attended the jeopardy of her territory and the security of her independence has subsided, and the country has entered upon a new era. Perhaps the most notable fact in this new Liberian program is the international loan, which is one of the results of the interest taken by the American government in the recent Liberian crisis. The scope and influence of this loan upon Liberia may be somewhat gauged from some of the prominent features of the international loan agreement.

Certain banking institutions of the United States, Germany, France and Great Britain are to furnish the Republic of Liberia the sum of \$1,700,000 to be used in paying off its domestic and foreign debt in accordance with the terms of the agreement.

As security for this amount the Liberian customs revenue is to be temporarily placed in charge of a customs receivership, with a General Receiver from the United States appointed by and holding his office during the pleasure of the American president, and three Receivers, one each from Great Britain, Germany and France, appointed by and holding their respective offices during the pleasure of the appointing governments. The loan is further secured by the revenues derived from Liberian exports and imports, duties on rubber, and all head moneys.

Liberia is to open negotiations, assisted by the bankers, with all creditors to pay them off in cash or bonds or both.

¹Mr. Ellis was for eight years secretary of the American Legation to Liberia.

The loan is to be floated by Liberia's creating 5 per cent sinking fund gold bonds not to exceed \$1,700,000, in denominations of \$1000, \$500, and \$100 if required by the bankers, which are to be equivalent in value to the gold coin of the United States.

They are required to be registered and numbered and to contain a recitation of the revenues of the Liberian Republic which secure the bonds of the loan.

During the life of the loan the customs receivership shall have charge of the collection of those revenues which are subject to the payment of the loan.

The bonds are to mature in forty years and to bear interest at the rate of 5 per cent per annum. They are to be payable in New York, at the office of the fiscal agents of the loan; and also at the option of the holder in London, Paris, Hamburg and at such other cities as the bankers may deem necessary.

The bonds shall be subject to purchase for the sinking fund on any half-yearly interest date, not later than ten years therefrom, at a premium of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, and on any such date at par by six weeks notice. The bonds are permanently exempt from any tax within Liberia.

The Liberian government is pledged to consider the loan a direct liability, and to pay the principal, interest and such other amounts required by the international agreement, as they fall due whether in interest, sinking fund or expenses. The Liberian revenues subject to the loan are transferred for the service of the loan and are termed assigned revenues.

The customs receivership is to have charge of the assigned revenues and during the life of the loan any vacancy arising from time to time shall be filled by the government in whose receivership a vacancy occurs.

In order to further insure the efficient and faithful collection of the assigned revenues under the international agreement the Receivers are to be under the direction of the General Receiver. A majority of the Receivers may suspend officials in the customs service appointed by the Liberian government, and may make temporary appointments until the vacancies are permanently filled by the Liberian government.

For the further efficiency of the receivership the majority of the Receivers shall have power to prescribe rules and regulations for the administration of the assigned revenues, and to assure as far as possible the collection thereof the Liberian government shall maintain and place at the disposal of the receivership, an adequate customs guard and patrol at sea and on land; and in case Liberia fails to provide such patrol service, the majority of the Receivers shall have power to provide the same and pay the expenses thereof out of the assigned revenues, with the aid and assistance of the Liberian government. The receivership is to report and render monthly accounts to the Liberian secretary of the treasury, subject to examination and verification by the Liberian government. The salaries of the receivership are as follows: General Receiver, \$5000; three Receivers, each \$2500.

During the life of the loan the customs on exports and imports, the rubber tax and the head money shall be payable in gold and the rates and amounts shall not be decreased unless two years have elapsed next preceding any proposed change, and the amounts of the assigned revenues, after paying all expenses, are in excess of \$500,000 in United States gold; nor unless the amount of the assigned revenues for the preceding two years less expenses shall at the altered rate be in excess of \$500,000 for each of the two years; nor then unless such decrease, by its terms, continue only to the end of any fiscal year in which the amount of the assigned revenues collected for such fiscal year, deducting all expenses, shall be less than said sum of \$500,000 United States gold.

For further security of the assigned revenues Liberia forthwith is to establish a frontier police force, sufficient for the maintenance of internal peace within the limits of the Liberian Republic, and the President of the United States from time to time is to designate trained military officers to organize and drill such frontier police force at the expense of Liberia. The receivership shall set aside out of the assigned revenues otherwise payable to Liberia the expense of such force and pay the same out under the direction of Liberian government.

On March 29 ultimo Captain Charles A. Young sailed with three other officers of the American army for Liberia, where with the rank of colonel he will assume control of the re-organization of the Liberian frontier police force. He will later secure a half dozen or more sergeants from the United States. These officers are loaned to Liberia under the agreement. They will have charge of the barracks at Monrovia and organize and command the forces on the frontier.

The General Receiver shall also exercise the function of financial adviser to Liberia. He is to assist in systematizing the Liberian finances. Before the meeting of the Liberian legislature the financial adviser is to approve the statement required of the secretary of the Liberian treasury containing the amounts of Liberian revenues from all sources, the amounts chargeable against said revenues and the residue available for appropriation. At no time are the appropriations to exceed the revenues. Within 10 days after the adjournment of the legislature the secretary of the treasury is required to prepare a statement of the appropriations, and if they exceed the receipts and revenues they are to be revised by a board of revision to equalize the revenues. This board is to consist of the Liberian president, the secretary of the Liberian treasury and the financial adviser. The revision of the board is binding upon the secretary of the treasury. The financial adviser is also to cooperate in establishing the economic and efficient administration and expenditure of public funds. He is required to report to the receivers all important matters in which his advice has been taken and accepted by the Liberian government. In all matters the decision of a majority of the Receivers must be regarded as the judgment of the receivership.

The loan agreement requires the application of the assigned revenues as follows:

1. For the cost of the collection by the receivership of the assigned revenues, and making exchanges, etc.
2. Payment to the fiscal agents of the loan monthly of 20 per cent of the gross receipts of the revenues, not less than \$8000 in

United States gold, to be applied on the loan, exchanges, etc., interest and to the sinking fund.

3. To any other amounts to which Liberia is obligated under the loan agreement.

4. To payment of appropriations that may be made by the legislature out of the assigned revenues of any amounts that may be due Liberia.

5. To payment of any residue to Liberia remaining of the assigned revenues. Any deficiency to be made up out of the revenues of succeeding months.

Liberia is required to maintain in New York a fiscal agency to be the transfer agency of the 5 per cent bonds. In case of vacancy in this agency, Liberia may appoint a successor, subject to the approval of the President of the United States. In the meantime until Liberia can appoint the President of the United States may fill the vacancy. To be qualified to hold this agency a trust company must be doing business in New York City, with a capital stock at least of \$2,000,000.

The 5 per cent bonds are to be redeemed by payments from a cumulative sinking fund as provided by the loan agreement, out of the amounts payable to the fiscal agents of the loan of sums not required for expense of service of the loan and for interest on the same; and Liberia covenants that the amount shall not be less than \$14,500 in United States gold. In the purchase of bonds Liberia may make additional payments according to the terms of the agreement in open market for not more than 102½ per cent and accrued interest to a certain date, and after that date at par and accrued interest.

Once in each year in purchasing the bonds, those to be bought are to be selected by lot at the office of the fiscal agents in New York City. Bonds drawn must be presented at one of the places payable with all coupons maturing after the day when they are to be purchased.

Upon the completion of all preliminary steps Liberia is to deliver to the holders of her external and internal indebtedness the 5 per cent bonds necessary to cover and meet the adjustment of her national debt, in part or whole, who have agreed to accept the same through the fiscal agents. To

those who require cash, bonds are to be given to the bankers equal to the purchase price of the bonds.

For the services of the bankers they are to have their out of pocket expenses, legal charges, a commission on the face value of all the 5 per cent bonds and 5 per cent on the bonds purchased by the bankers.

Any residue bonds are to be delivered by the fiscal agents, upon the order of the Liberian secretary of the treasury, to the holders of unadjusted indebtedness against Liberia as they may accept the adjustment, and from time to time these bonds reserved for such unadjusted indebtedness are to be reported.

The fiscal agents shall certify from time to time bonds not so reserved, and after a certain time any bonds still held against unadjusted indebtedness are to be delivered by order of the Liberian secretary of the treasury, countersigned by the General Receiver, and the proceeds from the sale of such bonds shall be held and paid by the fiscal agents solely to reimburse Liberia for any public improvements of a character and to an amount to be approved by the General Receiver.

Any question to be decided, pending decision by the joint Receivers, may be passed on by the General Receiver alone. The Receivers shall meet once a year before the meeting of the Liberian legislature, and at such other times as they may be called by the General Receiver or at the request of all the Receivers.

Notice to Liberia from bankers or fiscal agents must be given through the department at Washington and is completed in thirty days by mail. Any notice to bankers or fiscal agents from Liberia must be given at the office of the fiscal agents at New York.

The loan agreement is to be considered a New York agreement and its meaning in English is to control its interpretation. Liberia had to pass all legislation necessary to carry out the loan agreement by January 1, 1912, or the bankers might terminate the agreement at their option.

By January 1, 1912, Liberia had performed her part under the loan agreement under the administration of Presi-

dent Arthur Barclay, regarded in Europe as one of the ablest statesmen in Liberian history. Fortunate for the people of Liberia his unfinished work has been assumed by a worthy successor, President Daniel E. Howard, for years a national leader in Liberia and the capable and efficient secretary of the Liberian treasury under President Barclay.

In entering upon the high duties of the Liberian presidency January 1, 1912, President Howard surrounded himself with perhaps one of the ablest and most notable cabinets in the history of the Republic. Honorable C. D. B. King, secretary of state, was attorney general under President Barclay; Honorable Thomas W. Haynes, secretary of the treasury, was attorney general under President Gibson and was teacher of mathematics in Liberia College. Honorable James Morris, secretary of the interior, for some years has been governor of Montserrado County and speaks a number of native languages. Honorable Wilmot E. Dennis, secretary of war and navy, was for years a prominent business man and military officer with a splendid record on the field; Honorable Isaac Moort, formerly comptroller of the general post office department, has been elevated to the postmaster generalship; Dr. Benjamin W. Payne, educated in the United States, professor of science in the College of West Africa and a member of the Basa tribe is superintendent of the department of education. Honorable Samuel A. Ross, ex-speaker of the house of representatives, is attorney general.

When we consider some of the utterances of President Howard in his inaugural address concerning the loan agreement, taken in consideration with his character and his courage, it is very difficult to resist the thought and conclusion that Liberia is now happily on a career of national achievement, worthy of her betterself and a credit to the whole Negro race.

Among other things the new President said:

The financial agreement recently concluded between the government of Liberia and certain American and European capitalists through the kindly assistance of the state department at Washington, it is needless to say, has my strongest endorsement and

approval. The new administration pledges itself to observe strictly all of its provisions and to afford all necessary facilities for its smooth and effective operation.

The agreement, though in some respects it may appear to place a little restriction upon us in the management, collection, and control of our customs revenues, yet in its political bearings will, I am sure, prove to be of incalculable benefit to the Republic. Hence it becomes the solemn and imperative duty of every citizen to give his individual support to the government in its efforts to initiate and prosecute such a measure, which must tend to our national preservation and security. If the temporary management in the hands of others of a part of our government machinery will result in actual and permanent independence and international respect, which I firmly believe will be the outcome, then it becomes our imperative duty as patriotic citizens to make such a necessary and noble sacrifice.

NOTES AND REVIEWS

TUSKEGEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE NEGRO

Perhaps the most interesting thing about the International Conference on the Negro, held at Tuskegee Institute, Tuskegee, Alabama, April 17, 18, and 19, was the fact that it brought together for the first time representatives of the Negro race from every part of the world in which Negroes constitute any large portion of the population—from Africa, the United States, the West Indies, and South America. The effect of this first meeting of the different branches of the race will vary with the different countries, according to the conditions that prevail there. In the West Indies there seems just now to be a demand for some form of industrial education for the masses of the people, who are being driven abroad to find labor while their places on the plantations, in Jamaica at least, are being taken by coolies, imported from India. As Jamaica was represented by its director of education and some half a dozen other persons connected directly or indirectly with education, it seems likely that this Conference will have its largest influence upon social conditions in the West Indies, through the schools.

In West Africa the announcement of the Conference seems to have given a new impetus to the sentiment in favor of an African nationality, which is stirring in the back of the black man's head, in that part of the world. This is indicated by the numerous letters that were received from the leading natives. One of these was from Mr. Casely Hayford, a native barrister-at-law, at Sekondi, on the Gold Coast, the author of *Ethiopia Unbound*, perhaps the first book written by a native to give expression to the sentiment of African nationality. Mr. Hayford says:

There is an African nationality, and when the aborigines of the Gold Coast and other parts of West Africa have joined forces with our brethern in America in arriving at a national aim, purpose and aspiration, then indeed will it be possible for our brethern over the sea to bring home metaphorically to their nation and people a great spoil.

You have a great influence for good, under God, and I venture to hope that some of the thoughts which are moving West Africa as one body will appeal through you and other leaders of our race to our people on the other side of the Atlantic.

Another interesting letter was from representatives of the Ethiopian Church at Klipspruit, Transvaal.

The Tuskegee Conference was not primarily a race meeting. It was a meeting of all those who were interested directly or indirectly in the practical work that is being done to educate and uplift the Negro, either in Africa or America. Eighteen foreign countries, or colonies of foreign countries, and twenty-five different missionary societies, representing twelve different religious denominations were represented in some way, officially or unofficially at the Conference.

The discussions for the three days were divided as follows: the first day, "Conditions;" the second, "Missions," the third, "Methods." Under these three heads it was planned to give the members of the Conference first of all a general notion of the social situation in the different countries represented; some notion of the problems of the missionary organizations, in their relations not only with the native peoples but also with the governments of the different countries and colonies in which these missions are located; finally to discuss in a general way the manner in which education can be applied to the solution of the problem which the conditions have produced.

It is not possible to more than indicate the character of the papers which were presented. Dr. Patton, home secretary of the American Board of Foreign Missions, said there were sixteen railway lines on the west coast of Africa, starting for the rich countries of the interior. Several of these are to be trunk lines, either crossing the Continent or penetrating the lake regions. "Now for a Conference like this," said Dr. Patton, "the chief significance of its commercial development lies in the fact that our whole civilization with its wonderful content has descended upon Africa in a cataclysmic wave. These pagan tribes, which have been living in their simple and undeveloped state from time immemorial, are now called upon to adjust themselves to the Western way or be blotted out."

Central Africa, according to Dr. Patton, is now a battle ground of two civilizations—the civilization of Christendom, and the civilization of Islam. The missionaries of Mohammed and the missionaries of Christ are the advance guards respectively of the

two contending religions. Dr. Patton thinks it is of tremendous importance that Christianity should be victorious in this battle. There were, however, other points of view represented at the Conference. There is a school of thought in England which believes that the religion of Mohammed is best adapted to Africa. This view was tacitly expressed in a paper by E. D. Morel.

On the second day there was a discussion of the question that has arisen in some parts of French Africa, as to the right of the missionaries to teach the natives in their own language. France is trying to make Frenchmen of the people in the French colonies, because she expects to use some of them for soldiers. It is consequently important that they should learn the French language.

Another interesting paper was that of Maurice S. Evans, representative of the African Society, of London, England, who pointed out that if the natives should attempt in any large numbers to compete with the white man in the skilled trades, this would probably lead to conflict. The dilemma in which South Africa finds itself is this: that it can't allow the natives to remain uneducated and uncivilized because they are so numerous that they would constantly menace the lives of the white people; on the other hand it seems inexpedient to civilize and train them to be skilled workmen because this would be resented by the white population.

A considerable portion of the time devoted to Missions was given up to hearing of the work and hopes of the colored missionary societies from the United States. All of the Negro churches in the South are now sending missionaries to Africa, but these missionaries are not welcomed by the resident white people who are in control of the country, and this has become a grievous complaint among the colored missionaries in the United States.

Another subject for discussion was the necessity for a union of effort among the colored missionary societies of the different denominations. At a meeting held on the last day of the Conference the whole subject was frankly discussed by the colored and white missionaries. As a result it was decided to invite Dr. Booker T. Washington to go to South Africa to meet the members of the South African Union, and seek to find some working basis by which the colored missionaries of America can have their part in the redemption of the dark continent.

The paper of chief interest on the third day's meeting was that of Prof. W. I. Thomas, professor of sociology at the University of Chicago, Illinois. The subject was "Education and Racial

Traits." Professor Thomas reviewed the old question of the fitness of the Negro as a race to acquire the culture of the white man, and participate in the white man's civilization. His thesis was that culture and civilization generally were not inherited. Each generation has had to acquire it for itself. The fact that a race had not reached a high stage of civilization did not therefore prove that it could not do so, provided it succeeded in getting into the environment which was adapted for civilized life and provided also that it had some way of tapping the vast stores of knowledge accumulated by previous generations. The method by which each individual taps this vast store of accumulated knowledge and culture is education and all the evidence points to the fact that any race which has an opportunity for education can put itself into possession of this culture and share in this civilization.

The most important declaration adopted by the Conference provided for similar gatherings in the future: it read—

Impressed with the value of the opportunities for discussion and observation that this meeting has afforded, the Conference recommends that similar international meetings be held triennially; arrangements for the place of meeting and the preparation of a detailed program to be placed in the hands of a committee to be appointed at this conference. The Conference also recommends that efforts be made to appoint local committees or representatives for the collection of information along lines to be suggested by this central committee.

ROBERT M. PARK,
*Former Secretary of the Congo Reform
Association in America.*

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SANITATION IN THE PHILIPPINES

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ITS EFFECT UPON OTHER
TROPICAL COUNTRIES

*By Victor G. Heiser, M.D., D.Sc., Director of Health for
the Philippine Islands, Passed Assistant Surgeon,
Public Health and Marine Hospital Service*

It is now practically ten years since the health organization under the American civil régime in the Philippines was put in operation, and it may not be amiss to review some of the results that have been accomplished during that decade. It is proper to state, however, that prior to the formation of civil government, a board of health was organized under Army General Orders No. 15, under the authority of which army officers did good work and made an excellent beginning in reducing the ravages of the diseases which they found so abundantly present on every hand. This early work was largely concerned with protecting the health of the troops, and mostly confined to the city of Manila. When the civil health régime began, in addition to the deplorable sanitary conditions resulting from centuries of neglect, it found itself confronted with a severe outbreak of plague in Manila and in a number of the provinces. To add further to its labors, it had scarcely opened its offices before one of the severest epidemics of cholera that has been known in modern times had its beginning.

Forty thousand persons were dying annually from small-pox, while the number of deaths from beriberi in jails and

other public institutions was frightful. With the exception of the water system in the city of Manila, there was not a reservoir, pipe-line, or artesian well for the 7,200,000 people of the entire archipelago, and even the water for the city of Manila was known to be grossly polluted. The dead were buried in a most haphazard manner, it being a not infrequent experience to find as many as four or five interred in a grave. The bones of those who had died but a few months before were often ruthlessly cast out to bleach in the sun, in order to make room for a more recent death. The city of Manila, which had a population of over 200,000, had no sewer system, and foul human discharges found their way directly into the esteros, or canals, of which there are some twenty-three miles. The water in these was frequently stirred up by the lighters and other craft which are used so extensively in Manila for transporting cargo, with the result that nauseous gases were constantly being liberated.

There was no food law, and the vilest class of food products was shipped into the country without let or hindrance. Amoebic, and other forms of dysentery soon affected the troops and others who had come to the Philippines to aid in governmental work. Subsequent experience has shown that these same diseases were responsible literally for thousands of deaths annually among the Filipinos. There was no hospital in the entire islands which had modern surgical equipment, and persons died on every hand of disease which could have been easily relieved by very simple medical procedures. It was not uncommon to find many persons horribly deformed by the scars which resulted from injuries or ulcers that could have been easily cured if skilled attention and facilities had been available at the time when they had their beginning. There were some 300,000 wild people living in a primitive state, among whom no attempt had been made to furnish medical relief. The prisons throughout the islands were indescribably filthy and neglected.

In the days prior to American control, the maritime quarantine was conducted upon a basis of graft rather than upon merit, with the inevitable result that an outbreak of any of the dangerous, communicable diseases, like plague,

cholera or smallpox, in the nearby foreign countries, meant the early introduction of the disease into the Philippines. There was no proper inspection of animals before slaughter, and suitable slaughter-houses, where this work could have been done, were conspicuous by their absence. More than 5000 lepers were at large throughout the Philippine Islands. A few hundred were taken care of as objects of charity, but there was no attempt made to segregate lepers with the view of avoiding the danger of infection to others, or of lessening the ravages of this disease. Malaria prevailed in hundreds of towns in the Philippines, without quinine being available to combat it. It was no infrequent experience to find imitation quinine pills being sold at fabulous prices in the stricken districts, and the poor populace had no one to whom to apply with the hope of receiving any relief from this most intolerable condition. Sections of Manila, having a population of from 5000 to 25,000, were built up with houses so closely crowded together that there was no room for streets or alleys, and egress from these sections had, in many instances, to be made by the residents crawling under one-another's houses. Manila is located on a tidal flat, and formerly, at high tide, about half of the city was inundated. As this flat land consisted of soft, oozy mud, the conditions can be better imagined than described.

There was no governmental provision for the insane, and it was no uncommon sight to see these unfortunates tied to a stake, under a house or in a yard, with a dog-chain, and it often happened that during fires, which are so frequent in towns built of nipa, these unfortunates were burned because no one thought to release them. Foods and perishable provisions were sold under most filthy conditions, the common practice being to sell them from the ground, so that the dust and dirt of everyone who came to see was soon intimately mixed with the food that was on sale. There were no restrictions enforced in the construction of buildings, with the usual result so frequently seen in Oriental countries—small, dark interiors, with practically no light and air, abounded everywhere. It was a frequent occur-

rence to find small rooms, often no larger than 8 by 10 by 8 feet, in which from six to eight persons were sleeping. Street cleaning was most indifferently carried on, with the result that large quantities of garbage and other filth accumulated in back yards and upon the streets. Tuberculosis was responsible each year for perhaps another 50,000 deaths throughout the archipelago. No effort whatsoever was made to teach the people how to deal with this scourge.

MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM

The task which confronted the American sanitarian seemed indeed impossible of accomplishment. With a population that was fully satisfied with the conditions as they were, and not disposed to have any portion of the taxes which were being collected from them used for sanitary purposes, and with the determination to resist any change in their personal habits and the conditions which surrounded them, it must be admitted that the prospects for bringing about a better state of things were not very alluring, especially as the task had to be accomplished with an amount allotted to the board of health, derived from revenues collected in the Philippines. In addition, the foreign medical men of the East, good-naturedly, and sometimes not good-naturedly, ridiculed the efforts to bring about a better state of affairs. It was pointed out that in foreign colonies it was customary to take such steps as would safeguard the health of the persons who came from Europe to govern or to do business, and that the wisest policy was to let the masses live as they would; that it was impossible to reform the Oriental, and that it was effort wasted that could be used more profitably in other directions. Observation of the work done by Europeans in Far Eastern cities showed that this practice was almost universally in force.

RESULTS OBTAINED

But the American sanitarian was not daunted by these obstacles, and set to work resolutely. His first large task was to combat the severe outbreak of cholera which has

already been mentioned. It was then learned that the passive resistance of the Oriental is a very much more subtle and difficult force to overcome than the active opposition which is so frequently encountered in the temperate zone.

On the whole, it may be said that the campaign waged against cholera in the beginning was not as successful as could have been hoped for, but the experience gained paved the way for attacking future outbreaks with considerably more success. It was soon learned that there was nothing to be gained by using actual force. The opposition which was engendered caused far more difficulty than the good which was accomplished in an individual case in which it was used.

The early efforts to combat plague resulted in similar lack of success. With this disease not only Filipinos but the Chinese had to be dealt with, and the efforts to bring the Celestials to the ways of twentieth century hygiene would oftentimes have been ludicrous had the results not been so fatal. The lack of success of these efforts soon made it apparent that, before much could be accomplished in the islands, a set of laws would have to be prepared in which considerable deference should be given to local prejudices; that frequently a compromise would have to be accepted in order to gain the adherence of Filipinos who had large influence with their people. In other words, it became apparent that the sanitary regeneration of the Philippine Islands had to be brought about, not in spite of the Filipino people, but with their assistance. One of the first steps was to organize some three hundred boards of health throughout the islands, with Filipinos in charge in the majority of instances. In many cases the officials who composed these boards were brought to Manila and given a course of instruction in modern sanitation and hygiene, and to their credit it must be said that after they began to learn the whys and wherefores of things, much coöperation and assistance was obtained from them. It was but natural that a people should resist measures which they, in their inmost hearts, believed were being enforced by the governing power for the express purpose of making them miserable, unhappy and uncomfort-

able. As soon as the better class of Filipinos observed, however, that no cases of cholera occurred among the Americans who drank water that had been boiled and ate only food that had been cooked and was served hot, this simple plan had many imitators, and much of the success that was obtained in later cholera campaigns may be attributed to the measures which the Filipino people themselves invoked.

During the early years of the existence of the board of health, plans were made for the vaccination of the people of the entire archipelago. This was first attempted by permitting the local Filipino health authorities to take charge and vaccinate the persons in their immediate districts, but not much success followed these efforts. It was found that in most instances the health officer did not appreciate the necessity and importance of vaccinating every individual in a community. Often his friends or those whom he considered had political or other influence which they might use to his disadvantage, were permitted to go unvaccinated. The result was, that so long as soil remained for the implantation of smallpox contagion, the disease continued to exist. When it was demonstrated to the Filipinos that this plan would not work, partially with their assistance another plan was tried. It consisted in having an American physician, with some 20 or 30 vaccinators, begin at one border of a province and literally march across it, only going forward when all of those who were behind had been vaccinated. Upon the completion of the first work, the expected result became a reality. In provinces that before vaccination had from 2000 to 3000 deaths annually from smallpox there was not a single death or even a single case of this disease after its completion. The success of this plan was so overwhelming that the insistence for doing it by the former plan was largely withdrawn, with the result that all portions of the Philippine Islands to which it was possible to ship vaccine in a potent condition, have now been almost entirely freed of smallpox. In a province which has been vaccinated it is a unique sight to see anyone today who has any pits of smallpox received since the vaccination was completed. In the six provinces which immediately surround

Manila, where formerly there had been probably for centuries 6000 deaths annually from smallpox, there was not a single death from that disease in the year following the completion of the vaccination, nor have there been any deaths since that time among persons who were vaccinated in those provinces. This work is still going on, and the net result is, that there are now at least 30,000 less deaths annually than was the case before this work was begun.

Coincident with this work the island of Culion, which is roughly 20 by 10 miles, and, with the necessary deductions for indentations, has an area of about 150 square miles, was set aside for a leper colony. The property rights of such residents as were found on the island were purchased and the people removed to the nearby island of Busuanga. The construction of a modern town was begun, and when this had proceeded sufficiently far, the collection and transfer of lepers to Culion was commenced. By 1908 at least one collection of lepers had been made all over the archipelago, and in many provinces a number of collections had been made, but there were necessarily quite a number who escaped the early collections and went into hiding, and also a considerable number who were in the incubation period of the disease from an infection which they had probably received through their association with cases of leprosy, so that, up to the present time, cases still come to notice, and these, as soon as discovered, are isolated and, at frequent intervals during each year, are transferred to Culion. Although it is entirely too early to furnish data with regard to this matter, it is roughly estimated that there were formerly at least 1200 new cases of leprosy contracted each year, and it is believed that now, with the lessened opportunities for infection, this number has already been decreased one-half. If these estimates are correct, it means that at least 600 persons are being saved annually from contracting this most loathesome disease; that this number remain as useful members of society instead of being a burden upon the public during the remainder of their existence. The leper town of Culion, like towns in the United States, is constantly being improved and is assuming a more and more modern

aspect. Houses of reinforced concrete are being built. A modern water and sewer system have been installed. A commodious hospital with a capacity of 250 beds, where the acutely ill may be taken care of, has been provided, and there are constantly on duty the necessary doctors and nurses. The leper community has been made self-governing. No guards of any kind are employed. The people elect their own officials and govern themselves by laws which they make, so that, not only are the people of the Philippine Islands relieved of the danger and undesirability of having lepers among them in places where they are constantly liable to convey the disease to healthy persons, but, on the other hand, the leper himself is no longer made to feel that he is an outcast. He has a place which he can call his home, where he is welcome, and where he can indulge in most of those pursuits of human liberty which are held as necessary attributes to happiness.

In Manila a modern water system has been constructed at a cost of approximately \$2,000,000, for which the water is now obtained from an uninhabited water-shed. This improvement has already resulted in a reduction of approximately 800 deaths annually in Manila, from the gastrointestinal diseases. The quantity of water and the pressure has also been greatly increased, so that it is now available in all sections of the city, whereas, heretofore, it was limited to certain sections, and, unless storage tanks were placed on the roofs, water was not available above the first floor. At the cost of another \$2,000,000 a modern sewer system was provided. This is one of the most modern of its kind, and has been in very satisfactory operation for four years. The filthy latrine and cesspool are now rapidly giving way to the modern flush closet. Twenty-three miles of esteros have been cleaned of their accumulation of centuries, and, in most instances, are clean water courses and no longer canals for the reception of sewage. Hundreds of artesian wells have been bored throughout the islands, and work is under way for the installation of many hundreds of others. Wherever the water from an approved well has been exclusively used by a community, the death rate has often dropped

50 per 1000. In other words, in a town of, for instance, 3000 inhabitants, there are now 150 less deaths annually than occurred before pure drinking water was furnished.

The jails throughout the islands have been cleansed, and sanitary equipment installed. The loathesome skin diseases from which the prisoners suffered were cured, and the conditions have been made such that their contraction in the future is extremely unlikely.

Beriberi, which in former days caused frightful mortality in jails and other public institutions, and was responsible for 5000 deaths annually in the archipelago, is now being rapidly reduced owing to discoveries which were largely worked out in the Philippine Islands. It might also not be amiss to state, in passing, that it is estimated that there are at least 100,000 deaths from beriberi throughout the Orient each year, and through the efforts of the Far Eastern Association of Tropical Medicine, which had its origin and birth in Manila, the prospects are fair for united governmental action being taken with the view of greatly reducing the ravages of this disease, or perhaps, of stamping it out altogether.

The evidence is almost conclusive that beriberi in the Orient occurs mostly among persons whose staple article of diet is white rice, which means rice from which the outer portion, or cortical layer, has been removed. Numerous experiments have shown that the disease is due to the fact that an essential element, necessary to the proper nutrition of the human being, is lacking from rice from which the outer portion has been removed. When rice is used as a staple article of diet, there is no opportunity to obtain this lacking constituent from other foods. Europeans, for instance, seldom contract beriberi because they use a diversified diet. Exactly what this missing substance on the outside of the rice grain is, has not yet been definitely ascertained, but it has been repeatedly shown that if persons suffering from beriberi are given the outer portion of the rice grain, or, in other words, rice polishings, they soon recover from this disease unless they were hopelessly ill at the time treatment was begun.

Manila's streets are now swept daily, and it is the frequent comment of travellers that it is one of the cleanest cities of the world. Garbage is collected every night, so that there is no opportunity for the accumulation of filth of this kind, as was formerly the case. This condition does not apply to Manila alone, but to many of the towns of the provinces.

Rules for avoiding cholera have been put into such simple form that it has been possible to teach them in the schools throughout the islands, and the pupils are now able to repeat them like a catechism. This campaign has not only benefited the pupils who were directly taught the means whereby cholera may be avoided, but their elders have been appreciably influenced by the example which their children have set them. It is now of frequent occurrence that when cholera makes its appearance in a community, a request is immediately sent to the central government at Manila for the services of an expert who can advise the people of the stricken town as to the measures which should be invoked to bring the outbreak to a speedy close.

Plague has been completely extirpated, and no cases of this disease have occurred in the Philippines since April, 1906. Cholera has also been absent now for nearly a year, and even during the preceding year the number of cases was insignificant when compared with those which formerly occurred.

By making available better drinking water, and by active educational propaganda, the spread of amoebic dysentery has been greatly reduced.

Cemeteries, properly laid out, have now been provided throughout the length and breadth of the islands. All remains which are not cremated, are decently interred, one in a grave, 3 feet under the ground.

Streets and alleys have been cut through the congested districts of Manila, so that the houses can now be approached by a street or alley. The improvement in the health of the people where this has been done can scarcely be estimated. In the event of the appearance of a dangerous communicable disease, it is possible to reach it promptly and remove cases

to a modern "dangerous-communicable-disease" hospital and thereby greatly reduce the danger of the spread of such diseases. Garbage carts now enter these sections daily, and in consequence filth no longer accumulates. A noteworthy incident in connection with the improved living conditions in these areas, was the pride which the inhabitants themselves took in their new surroundings.

A modern insane hospital has been constructed in Manila, where there is room for at least all of the cases that are urgently in need of care. A large general hospital, with a capacity of 350 beds, has likewise been constructed in Manila. This is unquestionably the most modern and best equipped hospital in the eastern hemisphere, and will compare favorably with the most modern hospitals in Europe and America. Already patients are being treated at the rate of 80,000 a year in the out-patient clinic, which means that thousands upon thousands are receiving relief and are freed from pain, among whom only agony and distress existed heretofore.

A nursing school, with over 300 young Filipino men and women students, is in successful operation, and has already graduated two classes, the members of which have passed civil service examinations and received grades which compare favorably with those received by American nurses. A medical school, with modern laboratories and the latest equipment for teaching by instructors who are specialists in their respective branches, was established six years ago, and has already graduated doctors from its five years course. The entrance requirements, course of study, and practical hospital training are higher than the average in the United States. A modern hospital has been constructed in the very heart and center of the wild man's country, and with the assistance of the ministrations of the doctor and the nurse these people are being rapidly brought from a head-hunting, savage state to the paths of civilization, and are rapidly becoming useful, productive people.

A campaign against tuberculosis has been organized; camps for the treatment of incipient cases have been constructed at various places; many dispensaries have been opened; a hospital for incipient cases provided at Baguio,

and a hospital for chronic cases at Manila. A campaign of education has been waged on every hand; the aid of moving picture films has been utilized; in short, everything is being done that is customary in enlightened communities of Europe and America.

INFLUENCE ON OTHER COUNTRIES

The influence which this work has had upon other colonizing powers in the Orient it is almost impossible to estimate at this time. During the past four years, representative sanitarians and others, from Japan, China, Hongkong, Indo-China, the Straits Settlements, Java, India, the Federated Malay States, Australia, Ceylon, Siam and other countries, have come to the Philippine Islands for the purpose of studying the methods by which the results in the Philippines were brought about, with the view of having their governments pass upon the question as to whether similar measures should not be introduced in their own countries. Many of these countries would, perhaps, resent having it stated that many of their sanitary reforms, which they have brought about in the past few years, were due to the example which had been set in the Philippines. Nevertheless, it can scarcely be gainsaid that the work of the United States in the Philippines must have been a very important factor in stimulating other countries to attempt similar measures. The success which has already been had by the introduction of sanitary methods has had a great influence in paving the way to the introduction of additional reforms. The recently organized Chinese Republic is making a noble effort to bring about the introduction of similar sanitary measures in China. With the view of having intelligent criticism passed upon that which they have done, a sanitary official from the Philippines was invited to come to China in order to suggest and advise them further with regard to their plans.

Many of the countries of the Orient no doubt feel themselves compelled to join the van of modern sanitation because public opinion which is being slowly crystallized

throughout the world demands it more and more, as the results which America has accomplished in the Philippines become more widely known. Before the lepers of the Philippine Islands were segregated, no country of the entire Orient, with the possible exception of Australia, had made any plans looking toward segregating the lepers found among the native peoples, whereas, today, at least three countries are arranging for this step, and contemplate accomplishing it in accordance with the plans and model which were used in the Philippine Islands.

At a conference which was held this year in Hongkong, agreements have been reached among the Oriental countries to impose similar quarantine restrictions. The desire to protect themselves was largely due to the success which has followed the quarantine measures which were enforced in the Philippine Islands. It is generally conceded in other Oriental countries that the medical literature produced in the Philippine Islands is more voluminous, and has a greater scientific value than that of all the other countries combined. These writings have also had an important influence in moulding opinion with regard to medical and sanitary matters of other portions of the Orient.

The successful results in stamping out mosquitoes, achieved in Panama and in many sections of the Philippines have been a great stimulus to other countries in carrying out similar work. No doubt the day is not far distant when the number of deaths from diseases which are conveyed by mosquitoes will be greatly reduced in many of the lands of the Orient, and this day is being greatly hastened by the example furnished by America.

Instead of viewing the medical men of the Philippines with suspicion, their medical brethren in other countries now meet them in full fraternity, and the effect that this has had in promoting a better understanding, and the influence for progress can scarcely be estimated. The indirect effect of this has been excellent, because, before America's advent into the Orient, there was no fraternizing between the countries. Each remained within its own little sphere, and in many instances there was much wasted labor and

effort expended in solving problems that had already been successfully solved in other countries. By the free interchange of ideas which now takes place, the knowledge gained in one country is available in a very short time in others.

The fact that the traveller can now go in safety to sections in the tropics which meant almost sure death heretofore, and that commercial enterprises can now be profitably carried on where disease among laborers made it impracticable formerly, is largely due to the efforts of the American sanitarian in Panama, Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philip-pines.

THE AMERICAN INDIAN OF TODAY AND TOMORROW

*By Fayette Avery McKenzie, Ph. D., Ohio State University;
organizer of the Indian National Conference*

There are at least three fairly distinct views held in this country of the native race. Perhaps for want of better names they may be called the views of the conqueror, the historian, and the statesman; or those of the biologist, the ethnologist and the sociologist. None of these terms is accurate, but they will serve to start us on our way.

The conqueror is an old-school Darwinian who believes that this world belongs to the strong and that the melting of the primitive races before the arms and business spirit of the "civilized" peoples is a heaven-decreed justification of the whole process of spoliation, exploitation and conquest. Even a friend of the Indian at the Mohonk Conference in 1909, said:

The old problem of a century or three-fourths of a century ago was how to persuade the Indian to step aside for the onward march of civilization; and the savage must always step aside for the onward march of civilization, because it is not only human law but it is God's law that progress, civilization and Christianity shall march on. The United States government has always attempted to guard the interests of the Indians and treat the Indians fairly and honestly and to take their property only after giving full compensation therefor.

Such philosophy as this is the conscious or unconscious comfort of a nation which dispossesses an ancient people and enters into the inheritance of continental wealth. It is the justification felt by a nation which would arbitrarily move a group of natives, now started upon the upward path, in order to make room for an army post. It is the excuse of the white man who would take the Indian's water in Arizona, his lumber in Minnesota and his land in Oklahoma.

What the white man wants the Indian should abandon. The rules of civilized war do not hold in contests with primitive peoples. Deception and robbery, some would imply, may be even the chosen instruments of Providence to place the wealth of the world in the hands of the efficient agents of civilization. The fate of the dispossessed is pathetic but inevitable and necessary, if not directly deserved.

And it must be recognized that there are many signs adduced to show that the native is inferior and doomed. Judging the race by its independent achievements, particularly by its commonly reported achievements, and without taking into consideration its special handicaps of circumstance, it is easy to say that the accusation of inferiority is clearly sustained. And his history and fate since the coming of Columbus point in the same direction. For it must also be recognized that many well-intentioned efforts have been made to build out of the Indian race a higher order.

Henry Clay in his memorial to Congress to aid the Cherokee to migrate to Indian Territory, nobly voiced the best sentiment of the nation when he said:

Let us treat with the utmost kindness and the most perfect justice the aborigines whom Providence has committed to our guardianship. Let us confer upon them if we can, the inestimable blessings of Christianity and civilization; and then, if they must sink beneath the progressive wave, we are free from all reproach, and stand acquitted in the sight of God and man.

Whether we have or have not lived up to this program, it is not essential here to decide. Suffice it to say that the Indian step by step has retreated to the wilderness and to the confinement of the government reservation where he has all too frequently degenerated. The necessities of war and the intentions of kindness have combined in the reservation and the reservation system almost to compel degeneracy, and so to give a seeming justification for the character we had already put upon him. Ignorance, laziness, improvidence and vice were added to savagery as the qualities which gave us the proverb, "no good Indian but a dead one."

Even missionary zeal seems to have established no permanent, independent Indian communities. Massachusetts Colony might on its seal represent an Indian uttering the Macedonian call "come over and help us." Eliot might issue his tracts entitled "The Clear Sunshine of the Gospel" and "The Glorious Progress of the Gospel amongst the Indians," but who now can point to the communities established in Massachusetts by him? It is not possible here to call attention to the melting away of the mission Indians in New England and the Middle States. The disappointing results are suggested for all in Bliss' comment on Zeisberger (See *Diary of David Zeisberger* for sixty years a missionary among the Indians, page xxii):

His life is a sad one. It was his fate to labor among a hopeless race. In his last years he could see no lasting monument of his long labor. Even the Indian converts immediately about him were a cause of sorrow to him.

The Indian towns he founded a little over one hundred years ago in Ohio have long since been forgotten.

That these facts may not prove the incapacity of the Indian race or the inefficacy of the Christian religion does not concern us here. They are but isolated illustrations of a multitude of facts which have produced a wide popular belief in the inferiority of the native race. This belief has not, however, stood entirely in the way of Christian missions nor of educational efforts. As a nation we are far from being logical or consistent in our thinking or our policies. This popular estimate of the Indian, nevertheless, has not failed to prevent many forms of effort and, even worse, has not failed to rob many nobly intentioned efforts of their vitality and power.

But the responsibility of this philosophy of pessimism does not end even here. It works to rob the Indian of ambition; there is no salvation for a beaten people. It works to prevent any effective forward policy on the part of even the kindly-intentioned among the white race; it is folly to waste our energies upon a vain idea. Recently an official of high position in one of our western states ex-

plained his refusal to help a movement for self-help on the part of the progressive Indians of the country by saying, "I sometimes think they (the Indians) were sent only as a preliminary race on the continent. They have worked out their destiny and soon will become an extinct people."

The government appropriates about \$14,000,000 annually for Indian affairs. Is this money squandered merely to salve the conscience of a humane nation? Or is it spent with the hope and expectation of demonstrating the capacity of the native race to share in a real and substantial way in our civilization? Ought we not to accept one philosophy or the other, cut down upon our vain expenditures, or redouble our efforts to give our red brethren an equal share in our common heritage?

The second philosophy which we have suggested is more humane in its tone. It would partially waive the question of superiority and inferiority and would merely say that the Indian is different. Civilizations are natural products and are of slow development. They are the outcome of internal forces and can not be transferred by external means, no matter how benevolent. To the students of history and of ethnology who accept this theory in its entirety, it seems imperative that we should keep our hands off the natural races for two reasons. In the first place, they constitute a museum of great interest and of very great scientific value. Nearer the beginning of the process of social evolution their habits and customs, their traditions and philosophy, their morals and religion have a significance which no student of human progress can afford to overlook, can afford to have annihilated. If we are to hope to gain the keys to the secrets of social forces and social development we must conserve every bit of human data which we can save even momentarily from the overflowing rush of our own civilization. Why then should we suffer any agencies, whether governmental or religious, to uproot the natural institutions of these primitive people and attempt to substitute even the best of artificial culture for them? We lose a world of truth and gain merely the semblance of civilization. In the second place, as has been already intimated, if our belated brethren

are to be natural and are to make any genuine progress they must grow from internal forces, and not merely be clothed upon by a costume which, however valuable and handsome in itself, can not be retained because it is not the right shape and size.

Sad to say both the pessimistic biological, and the laissez-faire ethnological theories are not rarely echoed by the Indians. The better educated Indian will attempt to excuse the backwardness of his people by calling attention to the centuries of development which lie between them and the Caucasians. The uneducated Indian pleads to be let alone. Both positions tend to make rapid progress improbable or impossible. So long, however, as we have genuine believers in this philosophy, we shall expect them in all consistency to seek the complete isolation of the race.

The chief objection to any attempt to preserve this particular race free from all outside influence is found in the impossibility of the scheme. The white man would not stay out and the Indian would not stay in the region assigned him. Moreover if the white man's traditions and customs were completely unknown to the body of Indians when isolated, those traditions and customs would penetrate and permeate the group with strange pertinacity and success. The environment of the old Indian ideas has been changed and the Indian customs and traditions therefore no longer have their original vitality. These are the reasons why the let-alone policy generally would fail. Ours is a progressive world. The group that would live must adapt itself to the larger culture that surrounds it. The longer the attempt is postponed the wider the gap that must be bridged.

Without, however, attempting to argue further let us pass on to the third point of view or theory.

Certain anthropologists and sociologists provide the ground upon which an optimistic statesmanship can build a positive and progressive program. We may recognize lack of achievement in the Indian, we may even recognize the natural development of individuals and groups through internal forces, and yet see how progress may be accelerated through outside influences.

The problem leads to the question: Is culture a product of biology and blood, or one of psychology and tradition? The pessimist and the indifferentist work from the former premise, the optimist from the latter. If the mind, individual or social, is built up out of the environment and experience, we have great possibilities of racial mutation. We have only to effect a considerable change in circumstances (material and psychic) to bring about a corresponding change in ideas and culture. This is, of course, a considerable task and if to bring predetermined results must be done with the greatest of thoroughness and precision.

As a nation our policy toward the Indian has been confused. Pessimism, laissez-faire, and optimism have all had their time and place, holding us back and driving us forward as the case might be. But on the whole, optimism has prevailed in state and church. Hope has sprung eternal in the breast of the nation and out of the ashes of apparent failure each new period has found a voice proclaiming a policy which would avoid the mistakes of the past and assure success in the near future. In the long run the optimist has had his way. True he has generally had to wait a decade or two and has been hampered by opposing conditions and doubting administrators. Nevertheless today the United States stands at the close of the first stage of a great sociological endeavor. Perhaps no other nation in the world has ever undertaken so thorough a plan for the salvation of a race through the transfer of culture. No greater glory could come to a nation than to succeed in bringing a primitive people into full participation in the best of its own civilization. It is proverbial that a primitive race always dies in the presence of a higher culture. It is certain that the Indian can not survive except he come completely into the life of the nation.

It is the object of this paper to suggest what has been accomplished, what the present situation is, and to inquire whether as a nation, we will take the sufficient and necessary steps to realize upon the possibilities now so evidently within reach. For it should be borne in mind that the task is so

great and yet so delicate that a slight oversight of some one of the factors entering into the problem may render futile an otherwise splendid policy. We are engaged in a contest wherein the verdict must be either success or failure. It is a life and death struggle. It is the story of the swimmer rescuing a comrade from the waves. He may swim a mile and yet lose a precious life unless he actually reaches the land before his strength gives out. Land is in sight. Shall we keep on?

Let us measure the distance.

Common opinion regards the Indian as a vanishing race. The fear of extinction becomes a dream of terror to some of the Indians themselves. "We die! We die!" the cry of an Indian of the southwest, is made the central note of a popular magazine article. But statistics do not seem to justify the belief in any absolute sense. The last three census enumerations have reported 248,253, 237,196 and 265,683 Indians. Disregarding the apparent inaccuracy in 1900, there has been an increase of 17,430 in twenty years, or 7 per cent. This increase is, of course, very slight. By comparison with the native white increase of 15 per cent for ten years and the negro increase of 11.3 per cent it becomes clear that the Indian is relatively falling far behind. In 1890 the Indians formed 39/100 of 1 per cent of the whole population of the country. In 1910 that proportion had fallen to 29/100 of 1 per cent.

Disease is making a desperate attack on the race as it attempts to live under new conditions set for it by the nation, but the government is not indifferent to the situation. The present commissioner of Indian Affairs puts health as one of the three main objects of his administration. His last report tells of the organization and efforts of the Bureau to conserve and improve Indian health. The organization includes a chief medical inspector, 100 regular and 60 contract physicians, 54 nurses and 88 field matrons. Special campaigns are waging against tuberculosis and trachoma. The government maintains four sanatoriums for Indian consumptives as well as a trachoma hospital in charge of

two experts in diseases of the eye. The volume of effort, inadequate as it is, is suggestive of the magnitude of the health problem facing the Indian administration.

And yet with all the discouraging facts of birth, death and disease rates we must not forget that the army company which ranked highest among all those examined during the Civil War was one made up of Seneca Indians. And recent history has not failed to record an Indian as the world's best all-round athlete. James Thorpe is only one individual but his achievement will stir the ambition of his race. Physically there is no reason why the Indian should not live and compete so long as his blood is distinguishable from the composite race of America. The problem of disease, of course, is a critically serious one and demands much greater attention than it is now receiving. Better conditions and more complete medical attention must be matched by a wider knowledge and greater effort on the part of the Indians themselves. Fundamentally it is an educational problem. Knowledge and courage are the solutions. If it requires \$500,000 or \$1,000,000 at once to grapple with the situation, it will be the greatest of economies to spend that amount. It will save larger expenditures in the future. Health is cheaper than disease.

A matter of more general, popular interest is that of the legal and political status of the Indian. What are his chances to share in the life of his time? This is a question of increasing significance, for until recent decades it was generally true that an Indian was not a citizen and could not become a citizen. From the beginning the Indian has been "a perpetual inhabitant with diminutive rights." Not until 1870 was it certain that he was even a "person" in the light of the law and so theoretically entitled to the benefit of *habeas corpus*. The constitutional provision excluding "Indians not taxed" from the enumeration determining Congressional representation, practically excluded all Indians from even the possibility of both taxation and citizenship. Nevertheless custom gradually counted certain Indians among the taxed, especially in the east where they were relatively few in number. How many these were

no one can say. Not until 1890 was there any census report of Indians taxed. If we assume the term "civilized Indians" used in the census of 1880 as the substantial equivalent of "Indians taxed" we have a starting point from which to measure the progress of the last thirty years. If we draw a line from Missouri to New Jersey, we shall find that all the states crossed by that line and all the states to the south as well as all the New England States and Texas, twenty-seven altogether, at that time counted their Indians as "civilized" or as we would say, "taxed." Every state in the Union except Oklahoma had at least a few civilized Indians. Altogether there were 66,407 such Indians or 21.7 per cent besides the enumerated and estimated 240,136 Indians not civilized.

Large changes have come since 1880. By the Dawes act of 1887 there were created for the first time two general classes of potential Indian citizens. In the first place, every Indian who should take up his residence separate and apart from any tribe and should adopt the habits of civilized life, became a citizen. The second class was of more importance for it included every Indian receiving an allotment of land in severalty. By subsequent legislation every Indian in the present state of Oklahoma became a citizen.

As a result of this legislation the number of taxed Indians has in the last thirty years largely increased. Oklahoma, Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas, and Michigan have been added to the states where all the Indians are taxed. The taxed Indians now total 193,825, or 73 per cent, leaving only 71,872 Indians not taxed. In 1880 there were eleven states where less than 25 per cent were taxed. In 1910 there were only four—Arizona, Wyoming, Montana, and New York. The anomalous backwardness of New York is due to the disputed Ogden claim. The government would have done well long years ago to pay the claim, if it could not have been settled in any other way. It is incredible that an intelligent people should much longer allow \$200,000 to bar the path of progress for thousands of Indians.

Although the Burke act of 1906 postponed citizenship for twenty-five years for the grantees of allotments made

after that date, except in individual cases, the writer believes other forces at work will bring the very large majority of the Indians outside of the possible states of Arizona and Montana into the class of the taxed by 1920. This situation marks a great change but at the same time it emphasizes the necessity of a greater and more significant change.

It is vitally important that the Indian's status shall be exactly defined and that every one shall know what his privileges and what his duties are.

This leads us to the unfortunate fact that there is no necessary connection between taxation and citizenship. The Indian may swell the population for the Congressional district, he may be counted a taxable, and yet be substantially and apparently legally, debarred from citizenship. No one knows today what the status of the Indian is. Even such facts as we do know present such a diversity of situation in the different states that no general statement can be made for like classes in different parts of the country. But this might be condoned if the status of the Indian in each state was understood either by him or by the general public. Doubtless even Congressional enumeration as "taxed" carries an Indian (if only he knows he is one of the number so classed) far along the road to citizenship; he becomes relatively at least a "potential citizen." As the writer has elsewhere said:

So long, however, as we have taxed Indians and non-taxed Indians, citizen Indians and non-citizen Indians, independent Indians and Indian wards, and so long as we have every sort of combination of these classes, and further, so long as we have neither certainty as to classification nor definiteness as to the status when named, just so long we shall continue to have a condition of confusion in Indian affairs intolerable alike to government and Indian. Indians of like capability and situation are citizens in Oklahoma and non-citizens in New York. Allottees are citizens in Nebraska and non-citizens in Wyoming. In many cases in the same state some of the allottees are citizens while others are not.

All this merely illustrates how the form of privilege may not carry with it the substance. Fortunately, however, the situation is one of such unstable equilibrium and the balance is so surely tending in one direction that we can safely rely

upon a considerable forward step in the immediate future. Definition of status and uniformity of rule for the several classes of Indians throughout the country, together with simple and feasible methods for the early admission of individuals and groups of Indians into the full privileges of citizenship, seem to be the most important considerations at the present time. The Carter code bill, now pending in Congress provides for an expert commission to work out the plan.

The indefiniteness of the Indian's position has its good features as well as its bad. As a ward he remains under the protection of the government and can be protected from his own improvidence. Those who oppose citizenship do it upon the basis that the freed Indian will immediately sell his land and squander his money. We should then have an army of paupers upon our hands. Another objection raised to uniformity of rules is that the conditions and stages of development vary so from state to state that injustice would result from like treatment. To the writer it would appear that both of these objections can be met by some plan which is merely hinted at in a suggestion he wishes to make. He called attention some years ago to the fact that protection and privilege may sometimes go hand in hand.

That the granting of citizenship does not operate to prevent the government from reviewing the contracts of Indians is clearly shown by the decision of the Circuit Court, western district of North Carolina, against D. T. Boyd and others, which stated through Judge Simonton that though the eastern Cherokee Indians are citizens of North Carolina, vote and pay taxes, yet the national government has not ceased its guardian care over them, nor released them from pupilage. The federal courts can still, in the name of the United States, adjudicate their rights. Nor is this without precedent. The American seaman, born a citizen of the United States or naturalized as such, has extended over him the guardian care of the government and is a ward of the nation. The statute books abound with acts requiring his contracts to be looked into by officers appointed for that purpose and every precaution is taken to guard him against fraud, oppression and wrong.

A careful examination of the law and the circumstances of the several groups of Indians in the United States, as

provided for in the Carter code bill, would enable a commission of competent men to define (1) the status of the Native, and (2) the status of the Indian citizen. Parallel with these grades there might be established varying degrees of wardship; perhaps the advance toward unlimited citizenship might be accompanied by a decreasing paternal control by the government. The commission, after investigation, would know whether and how to make a large series of ranks, or possibly to recommend citizenship for all Indians. The relation of guardianship protection to administrative control will need careful definition. Without thinking that the scheme given below is in itself feasible, it is submitted here with a view to suggesting how some progressive scheme might meet the needs of the situation and at the same time stimulate the Indians to advance from grade to grade:

GENERAL STATUS	SPECIFIC CLASSIFICATION	GENERAL SITUATION	GOVERNMENT CONTROL
I. Native	1. Tribal ward	Communal land.	Land and trust funds. Agency administration.
	2. Allotted ward	Land in severalty. Allotted trust funds.	Federal supervision of land contracts and trust fund expenditures.
II. Citizen	3. Citizen ward	Land in fee. Control of funds. Legal standing in courts.	Federal review of contracts prior to signing or within three months thereafter.
	4. Full citizen	All privileges and disabilities of the rank.	

Since definition of his status is also going to mean increase of assured privileges, the Indian is henceforth to have a spur where he has had a check-rein. Ambition will supplant melancholy and hopelessness. If the Indian is to live it must be through that cordial appreciation and recognition of his genuine qualities which is involved in a defined status and general citizenship. The government will likewise profit immediately through lessened costs of litigation and administration, and ultimately and largely through the rapid elimination of the Indian problem.

Critically important as citizenship is, it is merely a circumstance, merely the open door, which makes possible or effective the working of more fundamental forces. The race itself must respond to the opportunity. It must develop into harmony with the new order. Character, attainment, achievement are the final tests of a race. That the Indian race is responding to larger opportunities for personal development even under existing conditions is most encouraging. The fundamental problem for the race to solve subdivides into the four problems of language, literacy, industry and religion.

Bitter as the truth may seem or sad, the fact remains that in all these matters the Indian must accept the forms set by the Caucasian, just as all the immigrant races coming to this country in the long run accept the prevailing English language. It is merely an expression of the economy of majority rule.

For this reason the school is the fundamental institution in the solution of all these problems, for it provides the common medium of communication and brings with it the atmosphere in which the Indian breathes health industrial, cultural, and spiritual. Because the Indian, like the rest of us, is in large degree the direct product of his intellectual environment, when he is given the same language and the same body of thought he will find adjustment to the new order automatic and easy.

The Indian schools have been a late and relatively slow development. Today, however, speaking extensively, the problem of schools and school attendance is practically solved. The annual appropriation has grown from \$20,000 in 1877 to \$3,757,909 in 1910. The proportion of expenditures for Indian schools as compared with the general Indian budget has increased from one-half of one per cent to 26.9 per cent. This proportion should continue to increase. Today 50,073, or 56.3 per cent of the 88,794 Indian youth between the ages of six and nineteen years are found in some school. Between the ages of ten and fourteen years the percentage rises to 71.4. The general average is brought down by six of the Rocky Mountain states, especially by

Arizona with only one-third attending school, New Mexico with only one-fourth and Utah with only one-ninth. On the other hand three-fourths of the children in Minnesota, Oregon and Kansas attend school.

It is easily seen that the great majority of Indians are now for the first time receiving some schooling. We may therefore inquire what results have accrued up to the present time. The ability to speak English and the ability to read and write are the first two tests which we must apply, not only because they are the two chief objects sought in the schools, but because they are the fundamental tools of our system of thought and culture. Unfortunately they have been too nearly the sole objects of the "literary" part of Indian education. Not infrequently twelve years have been spent with almost no other result than a formal knowledge of the art of reading and writing in English. Nevertheless even that result once universally achieved puts the next generation in a position for an immeasurable forward stride.

The following table will show the gross figures for the country as a whole. Not quite half of the Indians are illiterate, and only slightly over one-fourth can not speak English to some extent.

ILLITERATES: TEN YEARS OF AGE AND OVER		UNABLE TO SPEAK ENGLISH: SIX YEARS OF AGE AND OVER	
Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent
85,756	45.4	62,743	28.8

These figures may be astonishingly good in the eyes of the average reader but the real encouragement does not appear until we divide the Indians into age groups. Adult illiteracy is 56.1 per cent while the illiteracy of youth is only 22.4 per cent and even that is largely concentrated in four states. Inability to speak English averages 37.8 per cent for adults and 15.8 per cent for youth. Two-thirds of the youthful inability to speak English is found in the three states of New Mexico, Arizona and Oklahoma.

For the country as a whole it is evident that the backbone of the problem is broken. As the old are replaced by the young, ability to read and write English will become almost the universal rule.

As has already been intimated, these statistics represent formal rather than substantial education. They are vastly important but chiefly because they open the door for a real forward movement. It is evident that three demands press upon the country. In the first place the government should insist upon and secure highly trained teachers. Their task is not less but greater than is laid upon the high school teachers of the country. Standards of employment should be not less rigid. University education, even with special training in race psychology and Indian history and problems, would not be wasted upon the teaching service. Why should we not in our relatively small problem set as high standards as England does for her Indian Civil Service? It is evident that we can not raise our standards, however, unless we first raise our present disgracefully small salaries. The country should support the Indian Office in any efforts to multiply results and to cut down ultimate costs by efficiency secured through adequately paid, highly trained service.

In the second place the schools should be standardized so that as early as possible Indian youth could step into white schools without loss of grade or time. This will involve not only expert teachers but a sufficient number of teachers to give the personal attention which children handicapped by a strange language require. It is a great injustice to throw away one, two or three years of one child's time not to mention doing so for thousands of children. To insure the results here advocated will involve, moreover, adequate systems of records and inspection.

In the third place the scheme of education must involve higher education. Few Indian children get a grammar school education in the government schools; none get a complete high school course. This condition of affairs has been justified in the past. It will not be in the future. It reacts injuriously upon the individual and the race. With

the highest set so low, it is not strange that the youth does not see that there is much in education worth his while and attention. Nor does he see that he is permanently handicapped in competition with other men who secure five to ten more years than he. For the exceptional boy who aspires through the college to larger opportunity, lack of college preparatory training brings discouragement and defeat. It is true that there are honorable exceptions to this rule, but they are remarkably few.

It is true, also, that many people would consider it a mistake to advocate, at least to endow, college education for the Indian. This entire paper, however, is written on the assumption that whatever is advisable for white youth is equally advisable for Indians and that until there is a race appreciation of higher education the government will be justified in doing whatever is necessary to encourage and enable Indian youth to enter upon the higher paths. Moreover the race is critically in need of leadership. In the long run their leaders must be able to comprehend all the methods of their white competitors. They must have the widest of wisdom if they are to lead a race wisely to the highest goal. In a journal like this it is not necessary to explain that college education is not the only road to financial or other success. It is not a fetich, but it is safe to say that advanced training is the chief tool of power.

If any scheme could be devised which would carry any considerable number of Indian youth into the white colleges, that would be far better than the creation of a separate Indian institution. But at the present time two conditions seem to stand in the way. In the first place there is a great gap between the Indian school and the white college. College preparation itself involves a transfer to a white preparatory school under conditions of considerable strain to the doubting or diffident youth. In the second place there seems to be a very considerable reluctance on the part even of the older Indians to enter into daily competition or comparison with a large group of whites. Some special stimulus will be necessary if the forward step, now possible, is to be taken by large numbers of Indians.

It is fortunate that the government easily can, if it will, provide just the provisional or intermediary assistance which the situation requires. With the strong desire now existing to raise the standards of the local schools and so to render unnecessary some of the larger non-reservation schools, it would be perfectly feasible to select the boarding school best adapted and turn it frankly into a combination secondary school and junior college, putting it in its teaching force on a par with the best preparatory schools and colleges of the land. This plan would have the following values: (1) It would emphasize or re-define throughout the whole system the value of education. (2) It would provide college preparation. (3) It would give two years of standard college training. (4) It would make it feasible later to encourage attendance two years longer at a white college (if the proposed institution were located in a town of some standard university or college, the transition to the non-Indian college could be made very gradual and easy). (5) It would provide the training for Indians who should later become the teachers of their race all over the country. (6) It might be opened to Indians from the countries to the south and so work to international comity as well as start a movement for the welfare of the millions of natives still surviving on this continent. (7) Above all it would provide for the needs peculiar to the Indian and to those members of the race who aspired to teach and lead their people. Few white colleges pay any attention to Indian history or Indian problems.

Literate and with a language common to the whole nation the Indian will almost unconsciously swing into the industrial and religious life of the country. On neither of these points do we have information so recent or so complete as on those already given.

When the census data on occupations of Indians now collected in Washington, shall be compiled and published, doubtless it will show a most surprising diversity of occupations. The Indian seems to be less rather than better qualified for agriculture than for other lines of industry.

At least he is found doing almost everything from baseball to law and from fishing to preaching. The industrial

training in the boarding schools is turning out hundreds of Indians who are successes in the business world. Mr. J. M. Oskison at the First National Conference of Indians held last October said, "I believe the average Indian would rather work his brain than his hands. That has been accounted our misfortune. I think it will be our salvation. There is room for us in the professions, there is a wide market for brains." Superintendent Friedman in the *Carlisle Red Man* has furnished a gallery of the successful Indian workers, a gallery such as only Carlisle can as yet show. Enough has been done and enough shown to convince the world that the Indian can compete on even terms in many industries with white men, and that he will do so in all lines when equal training is secured for him. The distribution of Indians among the various industries will take care of itself as rapidly as the race is made partaker of the thought of the nation.

No adequate survey has ever been made of the religious situation of the Indians. The writer hopes within a few months to make at least a partial effort in that direction, but at the present time he must have recourse to the figures he collected and published in 1906. At that time, or just prior to it, the Protestant churches claimed 18,000 Indian communicants in their churches, while the Bureau of Catholic Indian missions claimed upward of 100,000 Indian members of the Catholic church; although their enumerated membership was said to be 56,774. It was felt fair at that time to multiply the Protestant membership by three as a means of estimating Protestant adherency. Adding this latter number, 54,000, to the estimated Catholic membership, we find that 150,000 or over one-half of the Indians of the country were under Christian influence and control. Doubtless the situation has grown more favorable during the last decade. The Indian is becoming, in name at least, essentially a Christian race. It remains to be seen whether the results in character are what they ought to be. This is hard to determine. Character is expressed in conduct. But when the modes and conditions of life are essentially different the expression will likewise be different. The

moralties of industry, of contract, of punctuality, of sanitation and of a thousand other matters will make little impression upon a people whose history has not suggested them. Only as the Indians come into the *life* of the nation will their religion or their morality take shape recognizable as such by the dominant forces in the nation. Christianity will appeal to the Indians and will express itself satisfactorily in Indian lives in increasing degree as the industrial and intellectual life of the nation becomes the industrial and intellectual life of the Indian country. The beauty and strength of the Indian faith will then be transformed and combined with the beauty and strength of the Christian faith.

The writer is an optimist. He believes in the Indian and in the great mass of Indians. He holds that perhaps the two most dangerous enemies of the race are first, those who believe that the Indians are inferior and unworthy of the best, and second, those who (more or less unconsciously) assume that the Indians are so superior that they do not need the same quality or degree of training and opportunity as white people. We need a public opinion which will justify and demand a much better quality of service for the Indian open to and reaching the whole body of the race. The capacity for progress is within the race. The stimulation to progress must come from those who have taken the forward step, whether they be Caucasian or Indian. Had we put as much intelligence and thoroughness into our Indian policy thirty years ago as we are employing now we should now be thirty years nearer the solution of our problem. At least it would be difficult to underestimate the amount of time we have lost by our extravagant parsimony of that date. We can see today the advisability and necessity of Indian schools as our public men could not see it a generation ago. The logic of the situation will carry our slow minds within the next thirty years at least as far as we have gone in the past thirty. In fact if our policy is anywhere near right, we ought to anticipate the future and do today what we shall know in 1940 we ought to have done. If we wait we shall lose a generation of Indians and

perhaps substantially lose the race. It is the last call to the leaders of both races to reverse the verdict of history and to prove through endeavor sufficient in thoroughness, intelligence and quality, that a primitive race need not perish in contact with modern life. Otherwise we shall have another sad, long-drawn-out and expensive spectacle of a race passing through poverty, pauperism, and disease into the graveyard of fallen peoples.

But we are not going to fail. We are going to ask and demand that the optimist philosophy be put into practical service by optimists for the welfare of the Indian and the credit of the nation. Each race has an important rôle to play.

The white race through the government must do with completeness and thoroughness what it essays to do at all. In the field of education it must bring a school within the reach of every child and must insist upon teachers who will make the school time count for its maximum possibilities. This means much higher standards (and correspondingly higher pay) for admission to the teaching service. Some plan must be devised which will actually bring advanced training to a considerable body of the race. Had we an Indian welfare college, as has here been suggested, it ought within ten years to insure an enrollment of at least 1000 (1.1 per cent of the school population) either for itself or on the rolls of white colleges all over the country. Such an institution could, as no other college, specifically train the ambitious and altruistic of the race for service and leadership. It should fit into its curricula those subjects needed to broaden the view and intensify the knowledge of Indian problems, while meeting at least the minimum requirements for standard college entrance and teaching. In a word it should revive the spirit of Hampton in a school of more advanced requirements. Not knowledge alone, but inspiration is needed for those who would teach and lead the race.

But why should a nation of nearly 100,000,000 people trouble itself about 265,000 people scattered all over its wide domain and hidden in its deserts and mountains?

The answer is plain. We owe something to the people whom we have supplanted. We owe the best of guardianship to our national wards. We owe that which the strong always owe to the weak. In themselves these people are worthy of adequate care. Rightly treated, they will shortly become a national asset instead of a burden; it is economy to invest in them. And beyond the few thousands under the American flag there stand the uncounted millions to the south of us who claim Indian blood. In addition to the natives of Mexico and Central America it has been estimated that there are 30,000,000 of people in South America having at least some aboriginal blood. If we can bring our own Indians into the national life we shall have learned the method and found the people to bring like progress and welfare to the many millions of the race under other flags, many of whom are in no less need of inspiration and help.

The rôle of the Indian leader is not less evident. He is the one who can appeal to his people without danger of misinterpretation. After the government has granted a just legal and political status, has safeguarded land and property, and has provided the absolutely best of educational opportunities, the great task remains to be done. To arouse a race deadened by subjugation, segregation and partial pauperization, to encourage the old, and to inspire the young to realize and to enjoy the privileges of the new era—this is the task laid upon the members of the Indian race who have seen the vision and who have the courage to sacrifice their time and strength to carry that vision to their brothers who may now be content to stand still. The need is met by the promise. The formation of the Society of American Indians last year was not an artificial happening. It was made possible by the developments of the past thirty years. It calls into its membership those who know the needs and have the devotion to labor and to give of themselves that their race may rise and face the East.

SOME LAWS OF RACIAL AND INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT

*By Charles E. Woodruff, M.D., Lt. Col., Med. Corps, U. S. A.,
Author of "Expansion of Races," and "Effects
of Tropical Light on White Men"*

There has always been a tendency to confuse the phenomena of intellectual development with those of racial development, and as a consequence we find a great diversity of sociologic theories which could be cleared up by the recent generalizations of a few advanced anthropologists of Europe. By intellectual development is meant that accumulation of ideas which is better expressed by culture, civilization, or social organization and it includes all the inventions which increase food and wealth. The advancement is the work of exceptionally intelligent men the world over irrespective of race, the mass having no part in it. Racial development on the other hand is almost exclusively a matter of the survival of the physical variations fittest for the environment in which that development takes place, and among physical variations we must include those of the brain by means of which the man can best make his living in a wholesome way in his particular environment and leave viable offspring. Racial development then is almost exclusively the result of the physical abilities of the mass of people best adjusted to the environment, exceptional mental ability having no part in it—beyond the ability to achieve mere survival and leave offspring able to do so in turn, whether or not they invent anything new.

These two processes are then so wholly different, that they can not possibly be compared, yet one is being constantly mistaken for the other. In ancient times a civilization sometimes decayed when the types evolving it died out; but not so often as we once thought, for it now seems that as a whole, culture has been steadily advancing for many

thousands of years in spite of its local death in the limited areas now being explored by archaeologists. In modern times no thought is lost and civilization advances in a steady grind whether or not the types or races advancing it leave descendants. In addition we are slowly coming to the opinion that the peasantry of many places in the old world, have not markedly changed in physical type for many thousands of years, in spite of being repeatedly conquered by migrants and almost exterminated; and, moreover, as in Egypt, this peasant may have witnessed the rise and decline of numerous cultures evolved by successive conquering invading races or types.

It is only within the last decade that we have fully realized that man as an animal is ruled by all the biologic laws known to govern the evolution of lower forms. In a general way, to be sure, we have dimly perceived that Darwin's great conception applied to us, but we have been obsessed with the curious fallacy that the possession of a brain somewhat larger than the nearest related species, has put us in a class apart from the rest of creation—something between the natural and supernatural. Discussions of climate formerly took for granted that man was superior to it and could live anywhere, but it is now being slowly realized that each racial "character," such as bulkiness or color has been evolved because it was necessary to survival in that locality. When we do not know the use of a character, we have no right to assert that it is useless, yet that is the general tone of old discussions. It is quite remarkable that the sociologic studies of Malthus gave Darwin the inspiration to reconstruct biology and yet sociology has benefited by it the least of all the biological sciences.

One explanation of the contradictory theories of sociologists and anthropologists is found in the perpetual migrations which have been going on ever since man evolved from the prehuman stage—migrations which only rarely took place in masses, military or otherwise, but were mostly by individuals or families; and at first they could not have carried the migrants far from their place of origin, so that lack of adjustment could not have been marked. Nevertheless,

there was a change and more or less unfitness from the possession of characters which were harmful in the new conditions, and the lack of those protecting the migrants from new adversities. By the ordinary laws of selection, the fittest variations survived and a new type arose from the primitive man who himself was undergoing another kind of change in the cradle of the race.

Expansion is an universal biologic phenomenon due to the enormous birth rate of every species. As soon as a species becomes adjusted to its environment, it produces more individuals than can possibly survive, so that migration is only one of the numerous methods of survival. Man therefore has always been on the move to survive or perish as his abilities permitted. The most fit to stay at home are the most successful of course. A few sociologists still assert that only the best leave Europe, but the facts point the opposite way.

The vital point as to race development in these incessant migrations, is the extreme rapidity with which the unfit perish. If the new environment is harmful to all they all perish like the Vandals in northern Africa; but if it is unfit to only a few, they die and the type changes as in the case of the French in New Orleans where the blonds disappeared leaving the creole solidly brunet, mostly the Mediterranean type. The process is rapid measured by evolutionary standards, but slow measured by generations. Consequently it is never noticed. The Creoles as a rule have not the slightest remembrance that many of their ancestors were blond, nor do the Canadian French, though we have evidence in the latter case that most of the women sent over by Louis XIV were blonds from northern France. There has been an enormous change in New England but the present day families of colonial ancestry do not suspect it. Nevertheless existing portraits often show yellow haired ancestors—an adult type now very rare though it is common in the children of brown haired parents. Indeed slow changes are never noticed. For instance, it has often been said that eight lives in succession could span the time from Chaucer to modern English, and yet any old man would strenuously deny that there was any change in the language in

his day. So how could we expect the Homeric Greeks to notice that the migrant northern yellow haired type which introduced the Aryan language into the peninsula was disappearing. These unlettered brainy conquerors did not even leave a clear tradition as to exactly where they came from, though we know from their customs that they had recently left the German forests, and their surviving portraits in stone are Baltic in every respect. In the time of Hippocrates the blonds were dying of tuberculosis and the same phenomenon occurred among blond intruders in southern France in historic times. This extreme rapidity of change of type of migrants or their complete destruction if they go too far, must be considered the solution of many of the puzzles of history.

It is now possible to form some definite idea as to the Aryan myths which disfigure so many of our text-books of history. Max Müller almost laid a curse upon ethnology by his unwarranted assumption that as he found Aryan dialects in India and Persia, therefore the men speaking those tongues were really Aryans, and had originated in Asia, some migrating to Europe later. The evidence is overwhelming that the Aryan is the tall, blond, longheaded or Baltic type of man, and that he is a mere local variety of the great western stem—the Eur-African race of Sergi. What concerns the present discussion is the evidence which almost proves that this type of man and all that he has created, language, culture and all, are very recent. He has had little or nothing to do with the origin of civilization, which existed in a high degree a long time before it was possible for the blond type to have been evolved. Though last on the scene, the transformation he has made is wonderful.

The present center of blondness is southern Norway, and if we draw a radius in any direction from this center we find the proportion of blonds to diminish and their morbidity and mortality rates to increase, until in the tropic lowlands they cannot survive three generations, and there are no blonds among the "natives." Sometimes these migrants wander into an environment similar to that of Norway, as

in the Alps or our Alleghanies, and of course survive there. This environment must be cold, with but little light, and in those conditions blondness is a great advantage—the reasons being too complicated to be detailed in this place (see *Effects of Tropical Light on White Men*). Now it is known that the glacial ice cap covering Scandinavia prevented its settlement until quite recent times—the glacial remnants are still there. Archaeologists have not found earlier remains than the neolithic and the estimates as to when that time was, vary greatly, some geologists putting it as late as 7000 years ago and some anthropologists even later. As we have no sure evidence that a Norwegian climate existed anywhere else, we must conclude that blondness arose during neolithic times in Norway; and from the positive evidence, as in Louisiana, that a mixed people can become brunet in less than two centuries, we are perfectly justified in asserting that the reverse process of becoming blonder could take place in ten centuries. It may have been possible for blondness to have originated in a cold cloudy climate on the continent in the interglacial times, but from some recent evidence to be mentioned later it is highly probable that blondness was not a marked racial character until about 3000 B.C., and that it began its evolution only a millennium or two earlier. The question will be settled when the geologists determine how recently the glaciers really did recede from the present center of blondness. What we must remember is the fact that it was a mere handful of men pushed out of the mainland, for until well along towards the Christian era Norway could not support many thousands—it cannot yet for that matter, as the present nation of a few millions imports some food. Being highly specialized to survive in a very special climate, the Baltic man is almost overspecialized. He cannot survive anywhere else, he melts away in the cities, factory life is deadly to him, and our sunny western climates are destroying him rapidly. He must have large open spaces and yet have plenty of shade, being wholly unfit for modern industrialism except in managerial positions. Yet it is unwarranted to state that he is bound to disappear.

present evidence indicated that it is a permanent type in proper environments.

Geologists have long recognized "critical periods" when changes are very rapid, and the paleontologists have likewise called attention to the same phenomenon in the evolution of living forms, but scientists who deal with human phenomena show a reluctance to apply the idea. Though it is now generally accepted that the tremendous change from the simian to human brain occurred in such a critical period of rapid geological change—the pliocene millenniums immediately preceding the glacial epoch—yet we fail to see that such "critical periods" are the rule in human phenomena. The evolution of the blond type was probably in one of them. The discovery of America began another, for it made available the tremendous stores of food and wealth which have created the dense population of northwest Europe, and the evolution of a new democratic social order, so vastly different from the pre-Columbian, with its "divine rights."

Nor have the anthropologists yet grasped the full significance of the increasing ability to migrate and the resulting extinction or change of type in a new environment and survival unchanged if the new is like the old. When they find very different types long settled in one place, say the Alps where blonds and brunets are apparently both adjusted, they have been inclined to deny that racial "characters" have any survival value, but such denials are worthless until it is determined whence and when the types came and which are holding their own. One place cannot evolve two types nor preserve them. Physicians in England have only recently realized that there is an appreciable difference in the viability of different types which we have heretofore assumed to be equally fit to live there. Some are unadjusted newcomers. The subject is bound to be more fully investigated as it has a practical value. For instance, in tuberculosis, some physical types are found to have the best chances for recovery at the seashore, others in the mountains; some north, others south and some—strange to say—in the hos-

pitals in the middle of London. American physicians are discovering that some cases are best treated in New England, others in the west, but they have not yet told us what kinds of cases. They too have not yet fully realized that physical characters confine a man to a very limited zone and that when ill, he is at a tremendous disadvantage if he is out of his zone. They know that we must send sick white men out of the tropics, but do not yet know that all cannot be sent to one place. The minor differences must be worked out as in England. It is amazing to find how often a type does stumble upon an environment permitting of survival, alongside of much earlier arrivals who have greatly changed—even in the most out-of-the-way places where one would presume purity of race. Movements east or west in one's zone are more liable to result in survival than those north or south unless like the "northmen" in the Alps, elevation makes up for lower latitude. Survival of type along parallels of latitude is possible even if there is intermarriage with "natives," for by Mendel's laws of heredity, the surviving children may inherit from but one parental stock and be of pure native type.

Recently it was found that in a place near Manila where an Indian regiment had been quartered when the British held the country, there were large numbers of Filipinos who were not Malays at all, but like some dark East Indians. There is no doubt that they are descendants of soldiers who settled there. Similarly I was greatly amazed to find in the interior of Cebu a number of people darker than Malays but in other respects typical Mediterraneans, short of stature and long headed with oval face. They are evidently descendants of the very numerous Indian slaves brought to Cebu by the Portuguese in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and sold to the Spaniards as farm laborers. The constant eastern drift of Mediterranean types through southern Asia fully accounts for that type in India, indeed we have actual records of the migration of Parsees, and the later movement of Arab missionaries still keeps up. I have seen a very dark American of Mediterranean type standing by a Filipino of identical type, and they may really have

been of the same race—but they reached the Islands by opposite routes. Von le Coq's recent archaeological researches in Chinese Turkestan have brought to light buried portraits of blue-eyed tall European types, dating from about the tenth century, and as there were very ancient trade routes to China, it is seen how easily we may account for the long headedness in China and Japan. There is much evidence that the Chinese themselves came as conquerors by that very route, and have darkened like the Creoles. We are quite likely to find by a thorough ethnic survey that there is the same racial melange in China as in Europe where the Asiatic intruders coming via Russia have lightened in color and thus complicated matters. Now these survivals do not mean that physical characters are of no survival value, but merely that the migrants reached an environment which was so little unsuited to them that minor variations could and did survive and constituted a new perfectly adjusted "race" whose relationships are not recognized.

Another process in racial development has still further complicated the matter. In early times when migrations were slow and culture was so primitive that everyone was compelled to be like his neighbor to survive—each man a hunter and fighter—we find that there was a remarkable uniformity of type in a restricted locality. The skulls of a "find" look as though they were cast in the same mould. Variations perished as unfit. As culture advanced, so did the ability to migrate, and by the time the Asiatic broad heads began to appear in European barrows, culture was so high that specialization was necessary to survive. This process has continued so greatly that now it is possible for a man to survive and leave offspring able to survive, though all are so limited in intelligence that they are capable of doing only one little industrial process to earn food and shelter. The result is an increasing variation in each locality, not only intellectually but physically within the limits of survival possibility. That is, a very stupid man of good physique or a very frail one of good intelligence can find something to do to support his family, whereas in a primitive culture they both would have perished. Similarly,

blonds and brunets are equally vigorous in a few places, not markedly unsuited to either.

This universal law of increasing variation within a race explains so many sociologic and anthropologic riddles that it is amazing so little use has been made of it. Let us take up the question of the relation of average brain weight of a people to its stage of culture, for here is where physiologists and anthropologists part company—temporarily let us hope. If there is any one thing biologists agree upon, it is the fact that the intelligence of any species is conditioned by the size of the brain. There are other factors, to be sure, but this is the main one. The distinguishing character of the human brain is the enormous complexity of the filaments connecting the cells into a highly organized machine. Brains of great men show much more “white matter” in proportion to “gray” than those of stupid men. So it is possible for one brain to be better than another of equal weight, but in averages of large numbers, weight does count; and, as a class, noted men have decidedly larger brains than the obscure. Nevertheless, statistics of higher and lower nations show so little difference in average brain weight that anthropologists are quite largely of the opinion that brain weight has no relation to intellectual development. An explanation ought to be possible, so as to harmonize these two bodies of scientists.

In the first place, there is still a general trend of increase of brain weight from the African tropics to the northwest corner of Europe, and it was more marked in ancient skulls. This is to be expected if the theory is true, that Europe is the cradle of the type, for those who were longest under that cruel selection of a severe environment, surely evolved the largest brains. Those who migrated the soonest, have now the least. This is why that little handful forced into Scandinavia became so intelligent that when it did begin to spread it carried all before it. These blonds did not have the monopoly of brains, of course, for the swarthy brunets in more sunny lands with an equally severe environment were undergoing a similar selection and gave us such types as Abraham Lincoln who was perhaps derived from the primitive race

which followed the retreating ice cap into the British Islands many millenniums before man could live in Scandinavia.

Since selection of the brainiest ceased with the evolution of a culture which permitted survival of the stupid, we now have plenty of dolts in every country in Europe of every shade of complexion. Nevertheless, the blond type has been dominant all over Europe, ever since it appeared on the scene, and even in England where the native brunets have furnished an enormous number of great men, the prominent families are almost always traced back to blond founders of more recent arrival.

At the present time almost every advance in culture is the conception of some man in the northwest corner of Europe, or one whose ancestors came from that place more or less recently. Even Marconi had an English mother and cannot be wholly claimed by the Mediterraneans. Of course the scholarly atmosphere of the north must be given due credit of bringing out (educating) the talents of brilliant men of very limited scope—specialists—yet it is very significant that modern advances originate where the biggest brains are found and the most complicated or highest evolved ones, and the only place where the blond variety can survive in great numbers. Consequently, though the dark types and little minds of all types are the authors of much, it is true that the really great ideas come as a rule from men of blond ancestry if not blue eyed themselves.

The broad-headed branch, by the way, furnishes some big variations of brain even in Asia. The European assumption of superiority, particularly of the long-heads, is due to ignorance of what the Asiatics have done and can do. Yet the percentage of long-heads which are big and well organized is far greater than that of the broad-heads.

Size of body also causes variation, for the larger bodies have the bigger brains. There is then no mystery in the fact that the average brain weight of big Patagonians is larger than that of little Parisians, and that there are more large sizes among the Patagonians than in Paris. Paleolithic skulls are often larger than those of modern specialized men. None of these facts are inconsistent with the

other fact that among a thousand civilized modern men there are many more very big sizes than among 1000 primitive men. As far as intellectual development is concerned these are the only ones which count, and that is one reason why advance in civilization goes by leaps and bounds nowadays—by men living where there are the most of the big brains.

Modern biology, Lamarckism and Darwinism, economics of Adam Smith and Mills, modern engineering from the steam engine to electric motors, Napier's logarithms and Newton's laws, modern chemistry from Dalton's atoms to the Curie's radium corpuscles, astronomy from Copernicus to Newton, modern medical means of curing people and military ones of killing them, peace societies and the art of war, state pensions and insurance, aviation and navigation, every brand-new idea indeed comes from northwest Europe—even "606." In Buckle's *History of Civilization in England*, there is such a wealth of material in this line that it would repay everyone to read that epoch making work to pick out the facts, though Buckle himself did not see their significance as he wrote before ethnology was a science.

What is of extreme importance to intellectual and racial development in America is the work of the migrants from northwest Europe. It is amazing to look over the list of our leaders, and see what an enormous proportion of them have names indicating origin in northwest Europe—the rest of the people originate practically nothing and are mere operatives of the inventions of others. Yet, it must be said, even though it hurts our self pride, that our genius is in the way of minor inventions. We do not produce many revolutionists like Franklin because such men, the Napoleons, Pasteurs, Faradays, Darwins, Mendels, Watts, and so on through the whole interminable list, are of families so brainy that they were able to struggle for existence at home, and did not have to migrate in search of a living. It is wise to be humble and acknowledge that we were elbowed out, and though we fell into a storehouse of inconceivable richness, we have not intelligence enough to keep our wealth which flows to northwest Europe in yearly amounts reckoned by

the hundreds of millions. That is, we are rich but not in great conceptions like northwest Europe, in proportion to population; and a fool and his money are soon parted.

The history of the racial and intellectual development of southern Europe, is so nearly the same as that of America, that it would be well to compare it with our own condition, keeping constantly in mind the perpetual southern drift the world over, carrying men of big brains into lands occupied by races of lower order. Buckle has a lot of such information of great importance to us especially as to Spain. There were numerous ancient streams of northmen into that peninsula, but at present and for many centuries the only survivors have been in the cold, cloudy northern mountains, and these people, very often big blonds whom one cannot distinguish from Germans, have kept alive that love of freedom so dear to the heart of the contentious Teuton. They drove out Mohammedanism and are now the republicans keeping a check on the tendency of monarchy to become despotic when dealing with the Mediterranean race. Buckle shows that in modern times, every advance of Spain was due to imported northmen. They sent to England for men to build up their machine shops, to Sweden and Denmark for scientists, and the fighting Irish have officered their armies. The large majority of the portraits of ancient and modern Spaniards I have seen, are northmen—even the next king is a sturdy yellow haired "John Bull."

Italy is far more to the point, for the Latin speaking ancient conquerors who called the conquered "plebeians," were northmen, as far as we can form any opinion at all, and every "citizen" was a warrior. Schultz (*Race and Mongrel*) shows by a wealth of facts that from the time of the Germanic invasions, down through medieval times, Italy like Spain and America owes almost everything to northern intruders, whose real race, like Marconi's, has been concealed under Italian family names—their popes, artists, architects, scientists, soldiers, teachers—indeed one almost receives the impression that the northmen did everything for Italy and the autochthones nothing; that is, the peasantry descended from paleolithic invaders are very low racially.

There is such a vast difference between the tropical south of Italy and the cold north, that the two parts can scarcely be compared, culturally or racially. In the south, where murder is a profession, the Mediterranean type is numerically dominant, in the controlling north which so resembles Teutonic conditions we find a great proportion of northern types, Lombardy and Piedmont extend beyond the 46° of latitude and their highlands are infinitely better to preserve "northmen" than our subtropical lowlands of the Delaware Valley, where the yellow-haired Dutch and Swedish colonists have left little trace, even in this short interval of two and a half centuries. The present Pope is a typical blue-eyed Teuton.

There are similar stories to be told as to Greece, Egypt, Persia and India, but the above are enough for the present purpose of showing how intellectual development is so often dependent upon migrant northern races, who disappeared from climatic unfitness.

The main generalization is that a race unaided creates a culture just as high as its brain weight and organization permit, but when a higher culture is thrust upon it by higher intruding or conquering races, the culture decays if the intruders die out from unfitness to the environment. This is beginning to be the accepted theory to account for Greek and Latin decay. The details do not concern us here, but it might be said that the unfitness is more climatic than lack of resistance to new enemies like malaria which Ronald Ross accuses of exterminating the blond Homeric Greeks.

Recently Angelo Mosso has attempted to give the Mediterranean race the sole credit for the origin of European civilizations—chiefly from recent Cretan archaeological "finds" and he asserts that the culture percolated north; but MacCurdy's review of the last decade's research in paleolithic and neolithic levels—proves that high cultures existed throughout Europe thousands of years earlier. There is no doubt of course that many advances were made in the south and borrowed by the north—iron for instance was not known in Scandinavia until many centuries after it was in general use further south, but the best explanation is found in the same phenomenon in modern times—intruding

northerners who worked up the art of iron making. Nor can the Spaniards in Cuba take the credit for the wonderful conception that yellow fever is transmitted by a mosquito, for that was the work of Dr. Charles J. Finlay, whose father was a Scotchman. The Latins all opposed Gallileo, Columbus and Finlay.

The most amazing of all recent "finds" is that of Piette, who has actually identified a dozen of the inscriptions in the upper quarternary (Magdalenian or upper paleolithic), and shows that they were really an alphabet representing sounds and have come down to us through the Asylian, Phoenician, Greek and Latin. Some of the "runes" are so nearly identical with primitive Greek or Phoenician, that they were long considered borrowings from the South, but now we must reverse our theories, for the alphabet is in fact a northern European invention, the runes being remnants.

Now we can discuss the most important corollary from the preceding laws and the stumbling block of sociologists and anthropologists. A great creator like Pullman or McCormick, may build up a manufacturing plant with processes so subdivided that each employee is not required to do more than one little process. Men make a fair living in such modern industries though wofully lacking in intelligence. The average brain may be very small in such a group, yet they turn out products infinitely better than the more highly skilled and more intelligent blacksmith of a few centuries back. The same rule applies to society as a whole. It is so organized that a few exceptionally able men, uphold and advance it, actually preserving the lower types of that vast majority never having an original idea in their lives. Most men let others do the thinking for them, and unconsciously repeat what they hear. Carlyle was nearer the truth than he imagined when he contemptuously referred to the English nation as composed of thirty million people—mostly fools. It is the increasing variation of brain civilization. Since a few able men can organize a host of operatives, and the lower types are in the great majority, the average brain weight must be very low. This has deceived a few writers into the belief that culture does not depend

on brain weight, yet the number of big types per square mile or per million of people, progressively increases in time (with culture) and also in latitude (from the equator to the north-west corner of Europe). That is the reason why culture, power, wealth, and population increase as we approach the favored corner of Europe, and always will. Averages are always deceptive. It may be remarked that these exceptional types, by their organizing ability, are responsible for the density of population in Europe irrespective of whether they must raise food or import it, and this very density of population increases the number of able men and multiplies the advantage. If Norway, for instance, had the population of the British Islands, Norse inventions would be more numerous, but as a fact, there are far more Norsemen living out of Norway than in it, and they are largely in the leading stock as before explained. If Norway had had the coal, iron and grain fields of England, there would have been a different history—but it would not have produced Norsemen by such conditions. Fate decrees that Norsemen shall breed there and then migrate, to call themselves by other names. This is due to the big brain necessary for mere survival in that severe environment where a peasant is fit to be a king of lower races, a conqueror of England, or a president of the United States, as might have happened to the late Governor Johnson of Minnesota—the son of a typical Aryan peasant, forced from “Arya” for food like every other Aryan emigrant. Present European royalty, from Russia to Spain, as far as we can trace them, are descendants of Teutons and mostly of leaders (vi-kings) of little Norse bands, some so small as to muster enough fighters for only a ship or two. It seems that in early times, it was only by migrating to an easier environment where lower races could be enslaved, that northern races could find the leisure and opportunity to think. In the north their whole time was spent in fighting for food. This has long been the argument to account for the fact that big organized nations—mostly slaves—first grew up in the southern food-producing valleys from the Nile to the Ganges, conquered

by northern invaders. There is a suspicion that this occurred in Yucatan, Mexico and Peru.

Though in former ages as explained above, a race could develop a civilization only as high as its average intelligence permitted when there were a few variations from the average, yet they could have a culture thrust upon them by intruders or conquerors. But in modern times when every nation is composed of many races and types, it develops a civilization only as high as its able men can do it, and at the same time control the lower types. It is this survival of specialized dependents which has so puzzled the anthropologists.

Take away England's exceptional men, and the result almost appalls us in contemplation. We have a terrible example in the French revolution, for whatever may be said of the vices of the aristocrats, they, as a class, were the able men. They had to be recalled from exile to control matters until the middle class could produce exceptional variations to recruit a new type of untitled leaders many of whom are really Teutons.

We can now see why it is that the mechanical inventions of the northwest corner of Europe are beyond the mental grasp of the rest of the world—except where northern migrants can survive a while. Even with all her importations of northerners, Spain never has been able to manage steam warships, and as a fact she often filled the engine rooms with Scotchmen. No Mediterranean race can possibly manage a dreadnaught, and the supremacy of the seas is forever in the north. It is exceedingly doubtful whether even Germany has enough of these Norse types to wrest the control from their British cousins, who have been using Scotland and northern Ireland as a breeding ground so long. France of course is out of the running—her genius is in other lines. The northern Italians—so largely descended from aquatic Aryans—are splendid naval designers, but are dreadfully handicapped for operatives. The merchant shipping of the world is in the hands of this Norse type, no matter what the flag. The ships officered and manned by the Mediterranean race are in a very small minority yet personal ob-

servation seems to show that in most of the great sea-disasters, a Mediterranean crew is at fault. The *Titanic* was a rare exception. The aquatic Japanese seem to be second only to the Baltic sea-men. It isn't Britannia which rules the waves, but the blue-eyed type of man, for we always find him on the bridge and deck, whether the stoke hole is full of black, brown, yellow or white men. The Scotch of course manage the engines as well as design them—the steam engine itself is nearly a Scotch invention if not entirely so, from the very beginning.

In the book *Expansion of Races*, much data are given to explain the supremacy of the northwest corner of Europe, in which it is shown why this little spot of the earth is so prosperous, populous, powerful and progressive—it has the brains. Mr. Mark Jefferson has now reduced the matter to statistics per capita and graphically expressed the results in a series of remarkable maps published by the American Geographical Society of New York. It is truly amazing to see that wherever the northman has wandered to control, there is a maximum per capita of commerce, schooling and mail deliveries, and also railroads per area. British Islands generally show the maxima in everything of this sort as well as per capita and total of food importation and manufactured exportations—the reverse of the United States which has always been exporting its natural wealth like Peru and South America generally. Holland and Belgium are like Great Britain but Denmark is really an English farm. It is manifest destiny that the world must be controlled from this brain center of the world—northwest Europe.

Ultimate European control is only being hastened by the hordes of muscular brainless types flocking to America as operatives in the processes of extracting our natural wealth for the use of Europe. These lower types have been greatly multiplied in Germany by her modern industrialism, and her illiteracy is reported to be increasing, in spite of her school facilities. It is not true, by the way, that illiteracy is a pure matter of lack of opportunity—it is mostly lack of capacity and increases as the average brain weight de-

creases. In New York City the lower types drop out of school the soonest.

When the Scotch in Elizabeth's time were bemoaning their fate of being absorbed by the English, when the two kingdoms were to unite, a few far sighted men declared that the process would be the reverse. At present the English good-naturedly refer to the fact that it seems as though a Scotchman is at the head of every State department in London. Our Canadian cousins need not fear annexation—we are the ones to object to being annexed to Canada, for the same laws of northern domination might fill our faculties and offices with Canadians. They are at it already in fact.¹ Similarly when the time is ripe for the inevitable political union of all nations controlled by Baltic migrants speaking English, the Baltic type will still control. When the time comes for the union of all nations controlled from northwest Europe—the dominant Baltic type will still be dominant even if it cannot survive city life nor factory confinement. Racial development will still control intellectual development as it always has. At the present time Scotland is actually being “depopulated” by the foreign demand for its brains, and alarm is being expressed by “English” publicists who want to use those brains. There is no need to worry, as there will be plenty to replace those who go to melt away in unsuited climates—perhaps better ones too, as the best do not leave.

The point for us to remember is that races can not survive out of the very limited environment which evolved them, and that there is not such a thing as “development” for migrants who must disappear or change by selection. There may be places in America where the dominant type can survive—southwest Alaska for instance is identical with Norway—and there are other places where he will survive as long as he has in Switzerland and northern Italy—but the neighborhood of his place of origin must always be the main breeding ground. Poor as they are compared to the

¹Less than one-fifth of the makers of the Panama Canal are American citizens and nearly a half are British subjects. Though many of the latter are West India negroes, it would be interesting to know how many of the rest are white and what they are doing.

stay-at-homes, immigrants from northwest Europe will always fill our leaderships. The descendants of the invading stocks of 1830–1850 are now elbowing out the decaying colonial stocks. Woodrow Wilson is only of the second generation native born, and our great athletes are largely of new stock. We even send to northwest Europe now for experts as the Spaniards did and perhaps we always will while the old stock takes pride in ancestry, genealogical research and mere learning. Japan now rests on Teutonic ideas and is almost wholly dependent upon Europe for its advances, much more dependent indeed than America. There is increasing evidence that unaided they cannot properly use European machinery, which decays like her railroads. She must always depend upon foreigners as we do. The exclusion of foreign experts, would be as great a folly as to stop our immigration from northwest Europe.

The ultimate outcome of the modern migrations is beyond man's ken. There is nevertheless one fact which educators should popularize—education merely “leads out” the in-born faculties and never creates any. A fool is a fool even if he squeezes through college and his children are likely to be just as foolish. It is a popular pedagogic fallacy, which I have frequently encountered among young teachers, that education increases brains, morality and everything else good, by the process of making the next generations more brainy. Acquired modifications are no more transmitted to off-spring than an amputated leg, yet many people believe the Filipinos will become as able as Scotchmen by training the memory.

The acquired college knowledge and training are not transmitted nor is a blacksmith's son a blacksmith without a training. Education does not develop a race—it merely makes each individual more efficient and must be continued generation after generation, as the sons are as savage as the parents—until tamed. Recently in the Cathedral of Cebu I witnessed a wild savage Malay orgie of dancing before a sacred image of the “Holy Child” supposed to have miraculous healing powers. It is prayed to during the year in sickness, and for every recovery a promise is made to dance before th

altar on the "fiesta" day. Many of the dancers were well dressed and "educated." Three centuries of Christian teaching has not eliminated the savage. If we withdraw from the Philippines, the result is obvious. Ten million American negroes are kept alive by Aryan domination. Take every white man out of America, the negroes would kill themselves off; take the managers out of a factory, the operatives would die of starvation—remove the officers from a ship, the crew would be shipwrecked. In other words we cannot develop a race, we can only increase its numbers and make each individual more efficient. What is called the Aryanisation of the world, is its control from the north-west corner of Europe, by means of which life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness are within the reach of everyone, high or low. Half-breed negroes and Malays deceive us as to the capacity of the full bloods. Independence of lower races can no longer be tolerated.

The theory that education will fit a low race for self-government on a high cultural plain, is a beautiful dream, which fades on close contact with the race; but it should never have been dreamed at all, as history is all against it. The Mediterranean race would not have conquered yellow fever in a thousand years, nor beriberi, nor smallpox, nor amoebic dysentery. Present experience in the Philippines shows that when bridges or roads are to be built, cities improved, health preserved and criminals controlled—northmen must be employed to do the brain work.

Let us send school teachers to the Philippines by the thousands as we should, but tell each one of them that for every one sent now, two more will be needed fifty years hence. Remember also that children cry for the moon, and racial children demand a liberty which will kill them. Indeed it has recently been shown that our present problem in the Philippines is to prevent the half-breed officials from oppressing the stupid despised Malay. Half-castes always despise the lower parent, and yet they are the controlling element who always abuse their power. The proposal to give them this power is too horrible to contemplate, and those who advise Philippine independence do not realize what it means to the Malay.

THE JAPANESE RACE

*By Alexander Francis Chamberlain, Ph.D., Professor of
Anthropology, Clark University, Worcester,
Massachusetts*

1. In a certain sense, the Japanese are one of the newest "races" in the world, and their recent entrance into the ranks of the great powers makes it difficult to judge them accurately and assign to each of the factors responsible for their existence its proper and definite weight. The disputes among European observers (*e.g.*, ten Kate and von Bälz) as to the nature and significance of the intellectual and emotive characteristics of the Japanese, were reflected also in the earlier estimates of their physical constitution. Their small stature, for the most part, and a certain frailty inferred therefrom, led members of the white race to discount their future as, in all probability, of little or no consequence in the future achievements of mankind. The nature of their food, also, was held by some to settle this question to their disadvantage. They were a race of little account, and must naturally continue such. Many years ago (1839) Wernich saw in the physical and mental characteristics of the Japanese diverse weaknesses of the sort in question here. In what Dr. F. Boas (*Mind of Prim. Man*, 1911, p. 117) terms an "apparently excellent discussion of external influence on the character of a people," Wernich "finds some of the peculiarities caused by the lack of vigor of the muscular and alimentary systems, which, in their turn, are due to improper nutrition; while he recognizes as hereditary other physical traits which influence the mind." And, in 1896, even, Keane, the English anthropologist, could print, in his *Ethnology* (p. 316) the following curious statement concerning the Japanese (whose intellectual powers he considered equal to those of the more advanced European nations): "Compared with the average Chinese, and espe-

cially with the Manchus and Koreans, they are but a feeble folk, no doubt possessing considerable staying power, but physically weak, with slight muscular development, contracted chest and a marked tendency to anaemia, which, however, may be largely due to the innutritious national diet of rice, fish and vegetables."

Intellectually at the head of the Mongolian race, as the nineteenth century began to close, they were placed physically at its foot. But narrow race-estimates of the Japanese were soon to receive a rude shock. What Dr. Boas says of Wernich's views applies to those of many other writers as well: "And, still, how weak appear his conclusions after the energy and endurance exhibited by the Japanese in their modern development and in their conflict with Russia!"

Another theory of Japanese weakness sought to explain it from the fact that they were a people of tropical origin, who had not yet possessed themselves thoroughly, and with a full consciousness, of their new northern environment. They were thus necessarily physically feeble and, to a certain extent, mentally distraught, and lacking in the individuality which accompanies successful race-adjustment to environmental influences. Others, again, saw in them simply "thin-skinned Tartars," who, both physically and intellectually, would remain such. Even today some authorities doubt whether the Japanese will be able to stand the stress and strain incident to the acceptance of Occidental civilization and competition with the white race, regarding the display of "genius" with which they have just dazzled the world as ephemeral and not destined to be really permanent. Certain observers, *e.g.*, Prof. F. Starr, the American anthropologist, regard the Japanese as genially "shallow" as compared with the deeper Chinese, and their culture as more "showy" and considerably less solid. The acquisition of western culture by the Japanese, it is thought, will differ from its acquisition by the Chinese remarkably along these lines. Some, however, like Prof. E. S. Morse, judge the Japanese, as compared with the Chinese, much more favorably, seeing more of the "savage" in the people of the Celes-

tial Empire. Altogether, it may be said, of no great people, forming part of the world's active leaders, do we know so little racially with exactness as we do concerning the Japanese. A generation or so ago, they were in many respects a "curiosity;" now they are in the full current of human affairs. Their own ancient traditions claimed descent from the gods, but, like others of the children of men who have boastfully asserted such ancestry, they have plenty of human relatives still surviving to assure us of their rather modern anthropic origins.

2. That the Japanese were not the first and original inhabitants of their island country is a matter concerning which all authorities are in agreement. Their immediate predecessors were the Ainu, a primitive people, who still survive in parts of Yezo, Saghalin, the Kuriles, etc. Certain Japanese anthropologists have believed in the existence of a pre-Ainu, or non-Ainu population, during the earliest stone-age in Japan, but there is no satisfactory evidence for this view. The "Kurupokguru" and the "pigmies" of Japanese tradition may well enough have been the ancestors of the Ainu, who were probably the first inhabitants of the islands. Tsuboi's theory, which makes the "Kurupokguru" a sort of Eskimo people, is quite untenable, in view of the American origin of the latter people, now completely established by the investigations of the Jesup North Pacific Expedition (Boas). The modern Japanese race must therefore consist of the original "Japanese" intruders from continental Asia, with admixtures of Ainu, and of some intrusive race from the south (Malayan, in all likelihood), together with additions, from time to time, of kindred Mongolian blood from the continent of Asia. Any considerable influence of North American Indian types, assumed by some writers, is excluded by the results, again, of the Jesup North Pacific Expedition, which link the so-called paleo-Asiatic peoples of northeastern Asia (Giliaks, Kamchadales, Koriaks, Chukchee, Yukaghir) with the Indians of the Northwest Pacific Coast in what is now termed the "Bering Sea culture area," the tone of which is rather "American" than "Asiatic" as is the case with the Japanese. It remains

to be proved that "Bering sea culture" influenced Japanese culture, or vice-versa—neither, in all probability occurred. Physically and culturally, then Japan is at bottom Asiatic, that is to say, Mongolian.

3. The Ainu, the predecessors of the Mongolian Japanese in their island home, are a very primitive people, concerning whose racial affinities ethnologists have differed much and still continue to disagree. Deniker, the French anthropologist (*Races of Man*, 1900, p. 371), holds that "they form a group by themselves, different from all the other peoples of Asia" and gives them place (p. 289) as one of his 17 groups, including the 29 human races which he distinguishes as now existing on the globe. Many authorities, like Brinton (*Races and Peoples*, 1890, p. 217), H. Schurtz (*Völkerkunde*, 1903, p. 163), affine them closely with the Giliaks, making the latter a sort of link between the former and the primitive peoples of northeastern Siberia. Munro (*Prehistoric Japan*, p. 679) considers them "palaeo-Asiatic and proto-Caucasian." Prof. F. Starr thinks them "white, but not the ancestors of the modern Japanese" (*Iowa Journal of History and Politics*, 1908). Prof. O. T. Mason thought them "the modern representatives of the cave-man of prehistoric Europe." Prof. A. C. Haddon, the English anthropologist, has styled them "an outlier of the Alpine race" (*Wanderings of Peoples*, 1911, p. 33); and, in his *Races of Man* (p. 49), states that "in prehistoric times there appears to have been an extension of dolicho cephalic peoples (a branch of which group occurred along the plains of Europe) right across Asia, of which the Ainus may be modified descendants, and whose influence may be detected among the Manchus and upper-class Tungus." Prof. A. H. Keane (*Ethnology*, p. 419) calls them "this remote Asiatic branch of the Caucasian division," and thinks that "despite the attempts of some writers to affiliate them to the surrounding Mongoloid peoples, their claim to membership with the Caucasian family is placed beyond doubt by a study of their physical characters." Dr. E. von Bälz, the author of many monographs on the ethnology and physical anthropology of Japan, thinks they are the eastern part of a stock allied to the Caucasian, which

once occupied all northeastern Asia, but has been split up and driven apart by the Mongolian peoples (*Verh. d. Berl. Ges. f. Anthr.*, 1901). According to Dr. von Bälz, all of Europe and Asia as far as the Japanese Islands was occupied in early times by a Caucasian or Caucasoid race of man, which, in the prehistoric period, was broken into two branches by the irruption of a yellow race from the north. Of these two branches, the eastern section (*cf.* the Ainu) lingered longest in Japan, being driven back elsewhere in eastern Asia, while the other section (*cf.* the Alpine race) was driven back toward Europe. He is also of opinion that the Ainu and the Australians, whom they resemble in certain respects, together with a large portion of the Caucasian race, may have developed from a Neandertaloid primitive form (*Korr.-Bl. d. D. Ges. f. Anthr.*, 1911). O. Münsterberg, basing his views upon stone-age pottery, ornamentation, etc., sees in the "Caucasoid Ainu" evidences of a pre-Mycenean migration from Asia Minor eastward across the whole continent (*Z. f. Ethnol.*, 1908), but this is altogether venturesome—he assumes art-relations between the far Occident and China, etc., as early as the third millennium, B.C. Professor Franz Boas is inclined to consider the Ainu a variety of the Mongolian, rather than the Caucasian stock, the latter being, however, for him, a development from the Mongolian. B. Adler (*Int. Arch. f. Ethnogr.*, 1901, *Suppl.*, vol. xv) approves Peschel's rather curious theory that they are "a Mongolian branch of the Negritos of the Philippines." Others have sought to ally the Ainu more or less with the Australians, the Dravidians of India, the Eskimo and other aborigines of America, etc. Sergi, the Italian anthropologist, makes the Toda-Ainu one of the 8 varieties of his *Homo euraffricanus*, the Toda and the Ainu being each subvarieties (*Monit. Zool. Ital.*, 1911, vol. xxi, p. 273). Giuffrida-Ruggeri, in his neo-monogenistic classification of the human race (*L'uomo como specie collettiva*, 1912, p. 26), places the Ainu as a variety of the *Homo species oceanicus*, one of the eight elementary human species, which make up the one human race. He thinks they may have reached Japan from Indonesia via Formosa.

4. As to the area occupied by the Ainu in "pre-Japanese" Japan, the extent to which intermixture with the Mongolian invaders and their descendants has taken place, and the significance and importance of the Ainu factor in the modern Japanese, there has been considerable difference of opinion among ethnologists and others. The common belief is that practically the whole country was once in possession of the Ainu. This view is held by Koganei (*Globus*, 1903), Nakai (*Korr.-Bl. d. D. Ges. f. Anthropol.*, 1906), etc., who sum up the question by saying that "Japan was once an Ainu realm." Prof. F. Starr (*Op. cit.*) thinks they were once the sole population of Japan, but not the ancestors of the modern Japanese." Keane (*Op. cit.*, p. 419) says: "Although now confined to Yezo, part of Sakhalin and the southern members of the Kurile Archipelago, their territory appears to have formerly comprised a great part if not the whole, of Japan, besides large tracts on the opposite mainland." Dr. von Bälz considers that the Ainu once occupied all Japan, part of the continent, and perhaps also much of Indonesia—there is still a large Ainu element (especially male) in the Loo-Choo Islands, and Ainu types still occur in the Amur region, etc. The "Ainu type" among the Japanese is most marked in the north, where these pre-Japanese aborigines continued longest. According to Japanese history and tradition "the Ainu occupied the whole of Nippon from the seventh century B.C. until the second century of the Christian era; in the seventh century A.D. they still occupied all that portion of this island situated to the north of the 38th degree of north latitude, and even in the ninth century the chronicles still speak of the incursions of the barbarians" (Deniker, *Op. cit.*, p. 372). And Deniker goes on to say: "Thus the Ainu element enters very largely into the composition of one of the types of the Japanese people, not only at Yezo, but in the north of Nippon (province of Aomori) where several Ainu words still survive in current speech." Keane (*Op. cit.*, p. 314) minimizes the Ainu factor, observing that the intruding Japanese "gradually spread over the Archipelago, driving the Caucasian Ainu aborigines northwards to Yezo, and no doubt here and there mixing with

them, though nowhere to any considerable extent." Dr. H. ten Kate, however, is of opinion that the Ainu mixture is more important than is commonly thought and that it has produced certain physical improvements in Japanese man (*Bull. Soc. d'Anthrop. de Paris*, 1908). The condition of the Ainu in Japan (their numbers are more than 20,000) seems to have improved in recent years, with a more kindly disposition toward them on the part of the Japanese, and von Bälz (1901) expects for them a brighter future as sharers in Japanese destiny. The alleged "Caucasoid" characteristics of the Ainu have been made the most of by the Aryophiles and Aryomaniacs, who will not admit that any race can amount to anything in the world without being at bottom "white," and preferably "Aryan." In this connection the resemblance between the picture of Count Leo Tolstoi, representing presumably, the old Russian (Slavonic) type of eastern Europe, and that of an Ainu man (see von Bälz, 1901) has attracted considerable attention. But to derive alleged Caucasian or Aryan characteristics of the modern Japanese from the Ainu is carrying things altogether too far, since the Ainu cannot be considered "Caucasian," "Aryan," or "white," in any culture-bearing sense of these terms, their "Caucasoidness," if at all existing, being of such a nature as antedate all implications of language, civilization, etc., that could be used to explain present culture-phenomena and the recent achievements of the Japanese. The Ainu are rather to be regarded as descendants, preserved in a somewhat isolated environment, from early prehistoric times, of one of the ancient variable and plastic forms of man, which still resemble, much more than many other peoples, several other human races in certain respects, because their origin goes back to a period anterior to the fixation of some of these races. They are rather prethan proto-Caucasian.

5. The people, who invaded the Japanese Islands, conquered the Ainu, and laid the foundations of Japanese civilization, were of Mongolian stock. One proof of this is the nature of the Japanese language, which, as Winkler, in his monograph, *Japaner und Altaier* (Berlin, 1894), has

demonstrated, belongs fundamentally with the Ural-Altai family of speech, of which Korean and Japanese may be said to form a somewhat independent branch. Of Japanese art Buckley says (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 1905) that, "both fine and decorative, it is an exclusively Mongolian product." Other factors of Japanese culture, native and borrowed, bear also distinctively Mongolian traits. The physical anthropology of the Japanese likewise makes it certain that the dominant factor in the production of the type was that of the yellow race.

The population of Japan presents two types in which the Mongolian element is more or less predominant—these are styled by von Bälz the "Korean-Manchu" and the "Mongolo-Malay." The "Korean-Manchu" type, which von Bälz thinks is related to the primitive Chinese people, and is "nearer the European than is the real characteristic Mongolic," prevails in that part of Japan nearest Korea (*e.g.*, Idzumo), and the effect of this is seen in the following citation given by Keane (*Op. cit.*, p. 316): "The Koreans are notably taller than the Japanese; and it is on the islands of Tsushima and Iki, in which Korean blood predominates, that the height of the men averages one inch more than on the main island, Hondo."

Dr. von Bälz thinks that the "Korean-Manchu" type, prevalent in parts of northern China and characteristic of central and northern Korea, unites the peculiarities of the Turkic peoples (who have more or less Caucasian blood) with certain marks of the Mongolic, and perhaps minor strains of Ainu and also Semitic blood." This "Korean-Manchu" type occurring among the higher classes, is what is termed also the "fine" type as contrasted with the "coarse" type, met with among the lower classes—Deniker (p. 389) suggests that these two types "may have been the result of crossings between Mongol sub-races (northern and southern) and Indonesian or even Polynesian elements." The "coarse" type has been identified with von Bälz's "Mongolo-Malayan," F. Birkner (*Arch. f. Rassen- u. Gesellschafts-Biol.*, 1904) holding that the great extent of the Mongolian habitat has led to the formation of a fine and a rude type,

recognizable everywhere, the first being von Bälz's "Korean-Manchu," the second his "Mongolo-Malay." Concerning the "Korean-Manchu" type, Deniker (p. 389) observes: "It might be supposed that the representatives of the first type were the descendants of tribes who had come by way of Korea and the Tsushima and Iki-shima Islands in the southwest of Nippon at some period unknown, but at any rate very remote;" and concerning the other type: "As to the coarse type, its representatives are perhaps descended from the warriors who invaded about the seventh century B. C. (according to a doubtful chronology) the west coast of the island of Kiu-siu and then Nippon; these invaders intermixing with the aborigines of unknown stock, founded the kingdom of Yamato, and drove back the Ainus towards the north." The "Korean-Manchu" element has been of great culture-bearing importance in the history of Japan. The alleged "Semitic" strain in this type rests upon no satisfactory evidence, and the efforts of Dr. W. E. Griffis and others to magnify its significance (*e.g.*, by impossible linguistic arguments) are even more unjustifiable than their contention that the Japanese are "Aryan."

6. The question of the Malayan element in the Japanese has been minimized by some and exaggerated by other writers. Haberer (*Z. f. Ethnol.*, 1905) styles the Japanese simply "a Mongol-Malay mixture." Keane (*Op. cit.*, p. 315) says of the population of the Japanese Islands: "Some appear to have arrived from the southern Malay lands (Formosa, the Philippines), while others may have come from Polynesia." Schurtz (*Op. cit.*, p. 152) recognizes "a Malay element that came by way of Formosa to the southern islands." Von Bälz (1901) recognizes in eastern and central Japan the prevalence of a "Mongolo-Malayan" type, detectable also in southern Korea, part of southern China, etc. Dr. ten Kate also recognizes this Malay element (*Globus*, 1902), to which some of the peculiarities of Japanese character may be attributed. Besides the influence of Malayan immigrants upon the physical character of the Japanese, some authorities are inclined to see also notable influences of a cultural and a political and sociological nature

—architecture, clothing, ways of living, social and political organization, are thought to show marked traces of Malayan mixture. On this point Haddon (*Wanderings of Peoples*, 1911) says: "Schurtz, following Bälz, says, 'the peculiarity of the Japanese is best explained by an admixture of Malay blood; it is indeed not inconceivable that the political evolution which began in the south was due to the sea-faring Malays, who first set foot on the southern islands, and mixed with the existing inhabitants, and with immigrants from Korea.'"

If the political development of Japan owes so much as is here suggested to a Malay factor, the contribution of that stock is great indeed and the subject deserves careful and detailed investigation. The same may be said of Malay influence upon the Japanese house, etc. Influences of a psychical character have also been suggested. Dr. ten Kate (*Globus*, 1902, vol. 82, p. 56) cites the opinion of Dr. J. Harmand, minister of France at Tokyo, that the Japanese are "an originally tropical people driven northward, who have only partially abandoned the usages of their southern home."

7. Some authorities have seen traces of a Negrito element also in Japan. But concerning this matter, Keane (*Op. cit.*, p. 315) remarks: "But there is nowhere any evidence of the black or Negrito element that has been spoken of, and all the evidence points to Korea as the original home of the great majority, and especially of the dominant classes." Dr. ten Kate, nevertheless (*Bull. Soc. d'Anthrop. de Paris*, 1908), considers the existence of such an element probable, but is of opinion that it is Negroid rather than Negritoid, and really due to a somewhat recent *métissage* with slaves from the Philippines, Macao, etc. The Peschel-Adler theory, noted above, that the Ainu are "a Mongolian branch of the Negritos of the Philippines," deserves mention only here.

8. The question of possible American Indian influences in Japan has already been touched upon and its improbability indicated. Dr. ten Kate, however (*Intern. Cbl. f. Anthrop.*, 1902), would recognize, in addition to von Bälz's

chief types, two others, both of which he thinks are, in many characteristics, "American Indian." The improbability of an Eskimo element in Japan has also been pointed out above—this theory is still entertained by some writers, as, *e.g.*, Munro, in his *Prehistoric Japan* (1908). While on this matter it is worth mentioning the statement of Deniker (p. 372) that "in the Kurile Islands the Ainu are intermixed with the Kamchadals and the Aleuts introduced by the Russo-American Company about the middle of the present century." This is really the nearest approach to an influence upon the people of Japan on the part of the North American aborigines, on record, or likely to have ever occurred.

9. The history of Japan, ethnologically, begins with practically the whole land in possession of the Ainu, a very ancient and primitive people, who, whatever they may have been, were not "whites," "Caucasians," or "Aryans," with the culture-implications of such terms. Upon these Ainu intruded several successive invasions of Mongolian tribes from continental Asia, Korea, especially (as the chief type among the dominant classes indicates), who gradually subdued the aborigines and mingled with them to a large extent, particularly in the northern sections. There are evidences also of a Malayan or a Malayoid immigration in eastern and central Japan (the corroborative data are both somatic and ethnological), which may have exerted considerable influence upon the social and the political development of the country. The Negroid or Negritoid influence, if it exists at all, is probably not significant, and possibly rather recent in origin. Eskimo and North American influences are merely conjectural, as are the "Semitic" and "Aryan" elements of some very recent writers. Language, art, and other ethnological data, demonstrate the essential Mongolian character of the Japanese, confirmed likewise by their physical constitution, etc. In a word, the Japanese are somewhat modified Mongolians, and like all other great peoples of the world, are now a "mixed" race. They are, however, still a race, in spite of the careless assertion of

Munro (*Op. cit.*, p. 680): "The Japanese are not a race, but a loose mixture of variously assorted racial features, which have in times past found their way to this Ultima Thule of Asia." And they are a race with whom, at some future time, the white race may happily contract a lasting physical and intellectual union.

THE EVOLUTION OF JAPANESE DIPLOMACY

By Masujiro Honda, Litt.D., editor of the "Oriental Review"

Diplomacy is of absorbing interest always, for it often determines the destiny of a nation, of a continent—even of a race. If the result is sometimes unpleasant to one party or the other, or to both, this is merely incidental. To harm others is not its aim; the true object of this intellectual, international wrestling being to decide which of the parties concerned is the better entitled to the honor, and the responsibility as well, of promoting the welfare of mankind by standing for an ideal, for a system, for a form of civilization. It is true enough that there are intellectual games in which each move is in secret and the purpose of which is to befog the opponent as much as possible; but there are others which require no concealment of the hands or moves, and in which each player seeks only to do his best without desiring the ill of others. The medieval, military type of diplomacy is represented by the first kind, and the second stand for the modern, industrial type. This is, however, a general statement which does not apply to many individual cases. The diplomacy to be used with Russia, for instance, must necessarily be different from that with the United States; nor can the *modus operandi* applicable to Germany be successfully adopted in dealing with China. The nature of this paper compels occasional allusion to other nations than Japan, but any such allusion is not meant in the spirit of captious criticism, for the diplomatic game requires at least two players. Something of what had been accomplished in the dark between China and Russia, Japan inherited in Manchuria in the broad daylight of public gaze; and there is still a great deal left unsuspected and unearthed concerning what is taking place in Mongolia, Ili and Tibet.

All this, however, will become more intelligible when translated into the terms of American diplomacy. In this country of free thought and free speech there are those who do not hesitate to prophesy an eventual annexation or absorption, economically of course, of Canada or Mexico. But both the Washington authorities and the people in general have never planned or schemed for such an eventuality. Only "geographical gravitation," or the "finger of destiny," or "unavoidable circumstance" may thrust upon the United States the necessity of taking under American protection, not only the next door neighbors of the Union, but also some republics on this and the other side of the Panama canal. The Monroe doctrine claims to prevent other nations from acquiring territory on this continent, but it does not purpose to interfere with this country's obtaining new possessions either on this continent or elsewhere. Contrast this condition with that in China and Japan with their, if unpronounced, still worthy ambition of keeping Asia for the Asiatics, keenly awake as they are to the fact that the occidental powers are already firmly entrenched on the continent of Asia, while the United States presses for the territorial integrity of and the open-door in China. The two Asiatic powers must be left free to solve the problems which concern themselves, but when a question arises which concerns the common destiny of both—then whether China shall lead Japan or Japan lead China, becomes a consideration of minor importance before the appalling dilemma whether there shall be an independent Asia or not. It is a question for the Asian of life or death, for one-third of the population of the earth have no other continent upon which to settle, except the one that is already so thickly populated. Europe is of course for the Europeans; the continent of America is also destined apparently to be a land of non-Asiatics. The Asian is also barred from Africa, from Australia and from New Zealand. There is no open door for Asiatic immigrants in these countries and continents, but there must be free entrance for all mankind into Asia. Readjustment and revision of the relations of Asia to the rest of the world should be the highest aim of

Japanese and Chinese diplomacy, and this aim can be attained only through our gradual rise in national and racial efficiency on the one hand; and, on the other, through sincere efforts on both sides to understand one another. The following sketch of the evolution of Japanese diplomacy will, it is hoped, at once illustrate how the international dealing of a nation depends for its success on the material efficiency and moral vigor of that nation, as well as contribute something toward the mutual understanding of the east and the west by indicating what foreign policy Japan is likely to pursue in the future.

For the sake of argument, it may be admitted that diplomacy is the practice of maintaining and extending national power in international dealings; national power including honor, prestige and moral influence as well as material interests. Japan's earliest contact with the outer world was with Korea, China and India, and from them she acquired Confucianism, Buddhism and the Asiatic arts and sciences, while taking care not to be subject to either their political or intellectual domination. In the middle of the sixteenth century, the Portuguese began to visit Japan's shores, as a sequence to their attempt to extend not only their trade but also their religious and political influence. For about a century, Jesuit missionaries and European traders were welcome in Japan; the Japanese themselves were active in sea-faring and engaged in trade with South Sea Islanders. As a result of Dutch-Spanish rivalry in India and elsewhere, however, Protestant Holland warned Japan of the grave danger of falling under the carefully concealed political influence of the Catholic nations. Before, however, this alarm was sounded, the feudal authorities of Japan had already become aware that native converts to Christianity and their European teachers were more than likely to jeopardize the national integrity of Japan. The policy of the closed-door was adopted, native Christians were persecuted and Jesuit missionaries banished, only a limited number of Dutch and Chinese traders being permitted to come to a tiny island in the harbor of Nagasaki, while the construction of large ocean-going vessels was pro-

hibited to the Japanese. This policy of seclusion continued for two centuries down to 1853, when the flood-gate of western civilization was opened through pressure of the United States.

This retrospect suggests a certain speculation. Suppose Japan had continued in touch with Catholic Europe in spite of the Dutch warning, what would have happened? The land of the Rising Sun might have been reduced to the position of the Philippines, with more Christianity perhaps, but certainly not much of political independence left. What would have become of China, if Japan had been lost to Europe, say in the seventeenth century? When a Catholic monarchy was again pressing hard on Japan from the north, a Protestant republic came to our rescue from the western hemisphere as the same power later rescued the Philippines from Catholic domination. Suppose a diplomatic miracle should happen to Japan now, so that she would be guaranteed the undisturbed safety of the present position without spending a penny on army and navy, with what eagerness and determination the entire population of Japan would devote themselves to a higher attainment of all the arts of peace and lend their moral and financial support to the four hundred millions of their neighbors now struggling for a better government. Is this not practically what America and England did in Japan's conflict with the northern power?

From these and other endless reveries we must return to actualities to bring this paper within the required limits.

Early in the last century, Europe's attention began to turn from the Mediterranean and western Asia to the Far East. England's strong position in India necessitated the opium war which marked the beginning of territorial aggression on China in 1842. Russia, on the other hand, had become a Pacific power as early as the seventeenth century through the possession of the Amur region, and, when she proclaimed her ownership of Kamtchatka in 1707, Japan came in direct contact with her. The Island of Ezo, the Kurile group and Saghalien were frequented by Russians, and begun to be absorbed by them. In 1861, several years after the conclusion of the first Russo-Japanese treaty of

amity and trade, Russia occupied the island of Tsushima as a coaling station and it took half a year before she was persuaded to evacuate the place, through the joint-protest of the British minister at Yedo and the commander of the British East Asian Squadron. After the Restoration, in 1872, Japan offered to buy the Russian portion of Saghalien for a sum of 2,000,000 *yen*, but, instead, a nominal exchange of Saghalien with the Kurile Islands was eventually effected three years later.

Thus, the Dutch-British rivalry, which was partly responsible for Japan's refusal to trade with the English in the seventeenth century, gave place to the Russo-British competition for power in Asia in the nineteenth century. Excepting the fact that an English captain hoisted the Union Jack upon the Bonin Islands, situated on the sea-route from North America to south China, Great Britain had not affected Japan politically, because she was too busy with the opening up of China and planting her commercial interests there. This same group of islands above mentioned was subsequently claimed as an American possession, but the moderation of the United States government brought the controversy to a happy termination in 1875, when finally it recognized Japan's claim to its possession. Commodore Perry's idea of occupying a Japanese island, however, was not suggested by any motive directly antagonistic to Japan. The wonderful development of the Pacific states of this country and the discovery of California gold in 1848 compelled the United States to turn her attention to the Pacific trade, and it was most providential that Japan was introduced to the comity of nations by a peaceful and generous friend across the ocean. The vacillating weak foreign policy lent a suitable pretext for arousing the whole nation into a patriotic revolt against the feudal authorities, resulting in the restoration of full power to the emperor in 1868. Long before Japan's door was opened to western nations, France had warned, through a missionary on the spot, of British designs on the Loochoo Islands and told the islanders that the only way of escape was to treat with France to check Great Britain. The feudal government of Japan,

therefore, trained its soldiers after the French model, France being considered the strongest military power of the day. This marked the beginning of Japanese diplomacy being influenced by Franco-British rivalry in European politics. In the time of our revolutionary trouble, France naturally sympathized with the old régime, while England supported the strong clans espousing the imperial cause. In consequence, therefore, when the new government came into existence, the British minister, Sir Harry Parks, exerted great influence over the men whose political aims England had secretly furthered. It is indeed a matter for thankfulness that he did not take undue advantage of his position to endanger the territorial integrity of Japan.

The imperial government organized the foreign office as an independent department in 1869, but its work could not but be negative or defensive in nature, as was the case with our diplomacy under the feudal régime, its sole aim and effort being to endeavor to lose as little as possible of our material possessions and to maintain our national dignity, as best as we could. In 1871, when a newly appointed British chargé d'affaires arrived in Tokio, he desired that the emperor receive him in audience according to occidental etiquette, which demand was firmly rejected by the Japanese government as infringing upon international courtesy. When, however, the Russian minister requested an imperial audience, declaring that he would conform to any recognized rules of politeness adopted by the court, the emperor at once received him in European fashion. In the following year, 1872, a Peruvian steamer, with 230 Chinese laborers on board, anchored in Yokohama, whereupon the British representative heretofore mentioned, intimated to the Japanese foreign office that these Chinese coolies, being actual slaves, should be sent back to their own country. This advice was at once acted upon, although it is worth noting that certain of the cabinet members of the time opposed this emancipation lest it might lead to international complications, while the French minister at Tokio ridiculed the idea of Japan standing for humanity, and the United States minister also suggested the wisdom of non-interference in

the matter on the part of the Japanese authorities. In spite of all opposition and every possible obstacle, however, the governor of Kanagawa was instructed to seize the Peruvian vessel and send back the slaves to China. The government of Peru, on hearing of this incident, despatched an envoy to Japan to protest against it. The matter was finally referred to the arbitration of the Czar of Russia, whose award was entirely in favor of Japan. This created a new precedent in international law.

Some Loochoo islanders, stranded on the island of Formosa, were massacred by the aborigines in 1872, and in the following year a special envoy was despatched to Peking to demand satisfaction. The Chinese authorities claimed that the Loochuans were also Chinese subjects and that the Formosan savages were beyond the power of Chinese control. Seeing that nothing could be accomplished through diplomatic negotiations, the Japanese government in 1874 sent an armed expedition to chastise the Formosans. The Peking government resented this as an infringement on China's territorial rights; and the Japanese ambassador retorted that China having acknowledged her inability to punish these offenders, the Formosans, if left unchastised, would commit similar outrages so giving an excuse to some occidental power to annex Formosa, so that Japan's successful expedition was in effect practically in common defense of both China and Japan. China at length consented to pay an indemnity to Japan, acknowledging the latter's sovereignty over Loochoo, and admitting, also, that she was responsible for the acts of the Formosan aborigines. In 1879, however, when General Grant visited the Far East, the Chinese government applied to the ex-president for mediation because it was not satisfied with the way in which the Loochoo question had been settled. Eventually however, the two islands of Miyako and Yaeyama were ceded to China to remove any ill-feeling between the neighboring nations, who ought to be, as General Grant put it, coöperating in warm friendship against western aggression.

The so-called *exchange* of Saghalien for the Kurile group of islands was effected in 1874 after a prolonged and vexa-

tious negotiation with Russia. In fact the Russian descent upon northern Japan was a question that troubled the minds of the Japanese both under the feudal and imperial régime, and Japan was glad enough to agree to this sham exchange, a sham because she believed in her right to claim both, in preference to the perpetual menace to her territorial integrity.

The revision of the unilateral, unequal treaties made with the European and American powers occupied the zealous attention of Japanese diplomatists for more than twenty years, that is between 1871-1894, the main contention being the removal of extraterritorial consular jurisdiction and of a clause which deprived Japan of tariff autonomy, both imposed upon her through the inexperience of more or less impotent officials in the early days of her renewed intercourse with the occident. To this end, various diplomatic methods were tried in quick succession with the hope of impressing the western peoples with the fact that the Japanese were worthy of being considered as equals. At one time the adoption of the Roman alphabet was advocated by some as the simplest and so the best method of writing the Japanese language. An improvement of the Japanese physique and stature was suggested as likely to come as the result of mixed marriages with the Caucasian race. European dress and dancing were encouraged in official circles and elsewhere. All these measures, however, did not influence the attitude of the treaty powers, but merely fanned into a flame the conservative and reactionary sentiment of the people. Men were exiled from the capital or the country, but the idea of Japan for the Japanese grew stronger and stronger, until finally one minister of foreign affairs, who endeavored to secure a treaty revision through agreeing to place occidental judges in Japanese courts of law, was attacked by a fanatical patriot with a bomb and had to sacrifice his portfolio as well as a leg. At another period, a rigorous enforcement of treaty terms to the letter was tried, so that foreigners in Japan would realize the need of a revised bi-lateral treaty. This scheme also failed, because the foreigners merely complained of personal inconvenience,

while some indiscreet patriots went to the extent of insulting occidental residents in the country. A complete codification of laws, incorporating the best principles and usages of Europe and America, was accomplished in due time, and the first session of the imperial diet assembled in 1890 in accordance with the provisions of the constitution. As a finishing touch, as it were, to all these laborious preparations, the justice and success of the China-Japanese war of 1894-1895 accelerated the work of treaty revision, so that Japan has since been on the footing of legal equality with the great nations of the world.

With the Chinese war in 1894-1895 Japan entered her second stage of diplomatic experience, the stage in which an active self-assertion of her conscious power became the dominant note. It was, in one sense, a conflict of modernism and medievalism, because Japan wished to keep Korea independent and progressive as a buffer state between the two Asiatic powers, while China insisted upon her patronage of a conservative and subservient Korea. Diplomatically speaking, however, Japan's victory in arms ended in a signal defeat on the field of the political game, a triple combination of European powers stepping in and wresting from her a substantial portion of her acquisition from China. One blunder begot another. In the consternation of this diplomatic humiliation, Japan failed to think of restoring the Liaotung Peninsula on the explicit condition that China would never cede or lease her territory to any outside power, which alone would have obviated the necessity of fighting Russia ten years later. Through her victory in arms, Japan vindicated her claim to respect as an Asiatic power, and also testified to the superiority of occidental methods over oriental systems. Through her failure in diplomacy, Japan realized the need of political allies and friends in Europe and America, for after all Asia was not strong enough to be independent of European politics and the European balance of power. The triple intervention aforesaid claimed that Japan's possession of any part of continental Chinese territory was inimical to the peace of the Far East. Notwithstanding all this, one of the parties soon began to exact

from China material remuneration for ousting Japan, and proposed, amongst other things, an occupation of that very part of China whose ownership by Japan was represented to be subversive of peace and order in Asia. Another of the triangular league later "leased" another part of China for ninety-nine years for the murder of one or two missionaries. The deletion of European politics from Korea and Manchuria became an absolute and alarming necessity for the independence and integrity of Japan herself. With England as her ally, and the United States as her moral supporter, and with almost universal European and American sympathy, enabling her to raise war funds abroad, Japanese forces were victorious both on land and sea, but—Japanese diplomacy was again outwitted by its adversary over the chess board at Portsmouth, all this largely because Japan neglected to interest the press of the world in her cause and claims, while the Russian side of the story was ably, tactfully and appealingly presented to more than one hundred journalists of all nationalities. Newspaper men exist on the reporting or "making" of news. It is no cause for wonder therefore that they should have shown scant affection for the country which gave them, through its representatives—nothing. Russian diplomacy was particularly successful in so pleading its case to the American government, through its chief executive, and to the American public, through the press, as to arouse the vague but none the less disquieting fear that Japan might one day occupy both the Russian and Chinese coast of the Asiatic Pacific, and next descend upon the Philippines, Guam, Hawaii, and finally upon the Pacific slope of this western continent. This to our view was the true inception of the rumors of a pending conflict between the United States and Japan; disaffected journalists, labor leaders, big-army-and-navy-ists, better-national-defense-men, and even temperance orators invoking the name of Japan as scapegoat.

Political alliances, ententes and conventions, coupled with an intelligent interest and sympathetic attitude of the press, important and essential as they are to diplomatic success, must necessarily lead up to the higher stage of development

into which Japan is just entering; and this final culmination of diplomatic effort is nothing more or less than an assiduous cultivation of a mutual understanding by the masses, over and above the governments and the press, of the needs and necessities of each country, bound together with others in the bond of commerce and friendship. Through the immigration question, through the recent revision of Japan's treaties with the United States and with the European powers, through the boycotting of Japanese goods by Chinese, through Japan's negotiations with Russia to facilitate railway connections between the Japanese and Russian sections of the Manchurian Railway, as well as through the altering of the terms of the Anglo-Japanese alliance to make the Anglo-American treaty for general arbitration easier of accomplishment—all these varied experiences have driven home to Japanese diplomacy that most important lesson—that it is not by "saving one's face," in an abstract way, not by territorial acquisition and expansion, both of which have only resulted in inspiring the rest of the world with an altogether exaggerated sense of Japanese pride and ambition, but that it is only when backed by industrial and commercial expansion and prosperity that a nation can maintain and extend its moral and material influence in its foreign relations; and that national wealth can be increased only by making friends, sometimes rivals if necessary, with manufacturers, sellers and buyers of different nationalities, not certainly by frightening or fighting them. Some people may contemptuously call this "dollar diplomacy," but "dollar diplomacy" is nothing but the democratic, industrial, honest, peaceful, twentieth century type of diplomacy, in contradistinction to the bureaucratic, military, underhanded, belligerent, medieval type of diplomacy which must be relegated to the limbo of the benighted.

It may throw a side light on our main thesis, if we add here a phase of our diplomatic service. Aside from foreign advisers to the various departments of the imperial government (one of whom we still retain and treasure in the foreign office) Japan has been represented abroad entirely by her own diplomats from the very beginning. Naturally, trained

and experienced diplomats were few if any, at first, At one time, old nobles were made ministers and ambassadors to utilize the glitter of their gold and rank for impressing foreign nations with the importance of the country they represented. They failed in most cases, however, to enhance Japan's prestige abroad, because their wealth or rank was poverty or obscurity in the great countries of Europe and America. At another time ability was the only standard for our diplomatic officials, so some of them could do nothing but study books and newspapers in their legation offices, not having money enough to shine in society. At present all diplomatic and consular agents have to pass special examinations and begin their career from the lowest post, the system thus endeavoring to combine ability and experience. When a bright diplomat happens to have money of his own he is likely to be most successful in a foreign capital. A Japanese diplomat with a foreign wife is still a problem. Our practice of transferring diplomats from one country to another in two or three years is open to criticism; it has advantages and disadvantages of its own. One good sign at home, however, is a tendency to detach the foreign policy of the government from party dispute, the continuity of purpose and unity in methods being thus assured, without occasional disturbance from politicians who lack in expert knowledge and experience. The foreign office at Tokio, moreover, was more or less under the influence of the army and navy departments until quite recently, because, in matters relating to national independence and self-defense military and strategical considerations had often to precede or accompany diplomatic proceedings. Now that Japan's political status in the world is perhaps secure, our diplomacy is more directly representative of the economic interests of the people.

With regard to the further working of this industrial stage of Japanese diplomacy, we may better quote an English author as a fit conclusion of this paper, instead of venturing upon a risky attempt at prophesy:

Everything in fact tends to show that within a comparatively short space of time Japan will have asserted her position, not only as a great world power, but as a great commercial nation in the Pacific. What is to be the outcome of it all, is the question that will naturally arise to the mind. I think that one outcome of it will be, as I have shown, the capture by Japan of the Chinese trade, if not in its entirety, at any rate in a very large degree. Another outcome will, I believe, be the enormous development of Japanese trade with both the United States and Canada. Some people may remark that these are not essentially political matters, and that I am somewhat wandering from my point in treating of them in connection with the influence of Japan upon the world generally. I do not think so. A nation may assert its influence and emphasize its importance to just as great an extent by its trade as by the double-dealings of diplomacy or by other equally questionable methods. Of one thing I am convinced, and that is that the influence of Japan upon the rest of the world will be a singularly healthy one. That country has fortunately struck out for itself, in diplomacy as in other matters, a new line. It has not behind it any traditions, nor before it prejudices wherewith to impede its progress. The diplomacy of Japan will, accordingly, be conducted in a straight-forward manner, and its record so far in this respect has, I think, provided a splendid object-lesson for the rest of the world. The influence of Japan upon other nations will I hope as I believe, continue to be a healthy one. If that country sets forth prominently the fact that while aspiring to be great, it possesses none of those attributes of greed, covetousness, aggressiveness, and overbearing—an arrogant attitude in regard to weaker powers, it will have performed a notable service in the history of the world. For myself I have no doubt whatever that Japan will teach this lesson, and in teaching it will have justified the great place that she has attained among the nations of the earth.—*The Empire of the East*, by H. B. Montgomery, 1909.

JAPAN'S ANNEXATION OF KOREA

*By Toyokichi Iyenaga, Ph.D., Professorial Lecturer in
Political Science, University of Chicago*

Japan was prompted to take the decisive step of annexing Korea for reasons that are easily understood. They are: (1) to insure her own national safety; (2) to assure enduring peace in the Far East by eliminating one of the most fruitful sources of disturbance; (3) to promote the welfare and prosperity of the Koreans; (4) to do away with the disadvantages, administrative and financial, of a dual system of government—the residency general and the Korean government; (5) to consolidate the identical interests of Japan and Korea in the Far East by the amalgamation of two peoples whose similarity in race and past culture makes such a task possible.

From the strategic standpoint, Korea is to the Japanese Empire as a spear pointed at its heart. Whatever nation holds this weapon becomes supremely important to Japan. Korea, even in the days of junks, if in the possession of a powerful monarch, must of necessity have been a constant menace to the safety of Nippon; but in this age of steam, when the Korean Strait has been transformed into a mere ribbon of silver, the installment of a strong hostile power in the peninsula would prove the death-blow to the aspirations, if not the very existence, of the mikado's empire. No question, therefore, has exercised a more powerful influence upon the course of the New Japan than this Korean problem.

The history of the Japanese-Korean relations during the three decades that intervene between the conclusion of the first treaty of amity and commerce in 1876 and the establishment of a protectorate in 1907 is in reality the story of Japan's attempt to safeguard her security by the maintenance of Korea as a buffer state. The first trial Japan faced to test the strength of this political doctrine came naturally

from China, which has always striven to lay a shadowy claim of sovereignty over Korea. The China-Japan war of 1894-1895 resulted in the complete political effacement of China from Korea, and the definite recognition of Korean independence by the powers. Thus for a time the buffer state theory seemed vindicated. China ousted, however, Japan found herself confronted in Korea by another formidable power. The struggle of 1904-1905, undertaken at an enormous expenditure of blood and treasure, finally drove Russia out of Korea, and at the same time fully convinced Japan of the futility of an attempt to seek her salvation by dreams made of such stuffs as those of a strong Korean nationality. Through these two costly experiments Japan learned that something decisive must be done with this country, which, while its interests and destiny are so closely allied with those of Japan, cannot maintain its own independence.

So, after the Portsmouth and the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1905 had definitely recognized Japan's paramount position in Korea, the first task Japan undertook to accomplish was to eliminate from Korea the danger of any foreign complications that might again invite foreign intervention. By the agreement signed in November, 1905, the Japanese government took into its hands the management of Korean foreign affairs.

After this important step was taken, Japan began in good earnest to put the Korean house in order. For this purpose it was agreed that a resident general, representing the Japanese government, should reside at Seoul. At first his power was purely advisory. But it was soon found that the optional method was doomed to failure, for the Korean government, free to adopt or reject at will the advice of the resident general, usually chose the latter alternative, and as a consequence by the agreement of 1907 the power of the resident general was vastly increased. He was given the power to initiate as well as to direct measures of administration, to enact and enforce laws and ordinances, to appoint and dismiss high Korean officials, and to appoint to any public posts, except to the ministerial seats in the Cabinet,

any Japanese subjects of his choice. Korea, in short, was brought under the protectorate of Japan.

The importance Japan attached to the work of pacifying and regenerating Korea is shown by the fact that she sent as the first resident general her foremost statesman, Prince Ito. With sincere devotion to the cause of Korea, he brought to the task all the wisdom, experience, and prestige gained during his long service to his fatherland. After three years of arduous labor he succeeded in conciliating the court and silencing the opposition, in evolving some order out of chaos, and inaugurating many reforms the benefits of which have been lasting.

But even the statesmanship of Ito was not equal to the task of curing the cancer that had eaten deep into the heart of Korea. The surgical operation needed was left to Prince Katsura, the former premier. Throughout his administration, Prince Ito had hoped by pursuing the policy of conciliation and uplift, to make Korea capable of standing on its own feet. He was, however, forced to acknowledge, after the most sincere efforts to teach Koreans the science of statecraft, that they would never be able to govern themselves. The first public intimation of this conviction was made in April, 1909, when Prince Ito, speaking before Korean tourists said that Japan and Korea had hitherto stood side by side, but that they should now proceed together and form one empire.

Some publicists have asserted that the tragic death of Ito at Harbin sealed the fate of Korea. Nothing is further from the truth. That Prince Ito retired from the residency generalship some months before his assassination without any apparent valid cause, goes to show that he had already become convinced that annexation was inevitable, and that the performance of it would better be confided to another. In an interview with the writer, Prince Katsura assured him that the measure of annexation was decided upon after due conference with Prince Ito, and only after it had received his complete endorsement. This declaration is further emphasized by the fact that the first act of Count Terauchi, after signing the treaty of annexation, was to send from

Seoul a telegraphic message to the family of the late prince requesting them to convey the intelligence to the spirit of the deceased statesman. The suggestion was carried out on August 30, 1910, when Prince Hirokuni Ito, as the representative of the family, conducted a solemn ceremonial service at the tomb of the illustrious dead.

Such, then, is the short story of the successive steps leading to the annexation. The lessons of history, extending through three eventful decades, taught Japan most conclusively that nothing short of annexation could solve the Korean problem, and that only by this radical measure could the permanent security of Japan and the peace of the extreme East be assured. The imperial rescript proclaiming the annexation, therefore, begins with the declaration that the emperor, "attaching the highest importance to the maintenance of permanent peace in the Orient and the consolidation of lasting security to our empire and finding in Korea constant and fruitful sources of complication," had instituted a protectorate in the peninsula. The existing régime, however, having proved ineffective to preserve peace and stability, "it has become manifest that fundamental changes in the present system of government are inevitable."

Imperative as was the measure of annexation from the standpoint of Japan's self-preservation, still more urgent was its adoption from the consideration of putting an end to the spirit of unrest in Korea and advancing its true welfare. Since the establishment of the residency general, every effort has been made to eradicate the existing evils, and to promote the well-being and prosperity of the Koreans. The residency general can, indeed, present to us a formidable array of reform works undertaken under its auspices. A brief outline of these reforms is here needed, in order to give us a full realization of the points wherein the protectorate, in spite of its commendable efforts to introduce salutary reforms, has failed to bring peace and happiness to the Korean people.

PURIFICATION OF THE COURT AND FINANCIAL REFORM

Among the many ills afflicting Korea, no one was more baneful than the court, the hotbed of corruption and intrigue. The functions and properties of the court were hopelessly mixed with those of the state. Laws were enacted, and justice administered, often at the whim of the king or of his courtiers. Appointments of high officials were frequently made through the influence of court favorites. Sales of offices were openly advertised at the court, and, needless to say, the appointment went to that highest bidder, who knew best how to fill the royal coffers and then to reimburse himself with the squeezes exacted from the people. Bribes and the confiscation of private property for the benefit of court officials were common.

Almost as influential as the imperial household itself were its bureaus and offices which outnumbered those of the central government. These superfluous offices were filled with thousands of worthless officers, whose chief occupation was, when not engaged in hatching plots, to attend absurd state ceremonials and harmful religious rites. For these religious services there were employed, and often domiciled in the court, a crowd of soothsayers, geomancers, sorceresses, and others of their ilk, who through densest ignorance and unbridled vices added their deadly quota to the pollution of the court. To this long list of evildoers were further added unscrupulous foreign adventurers, who frequented the court, and busied themselves in devising grotesque schemes to defraud the royal treasury of its funds. What was its actual condition can best be imagined by the items of expenditure of the Imperial Household, given in the first report of the Japanese financial adviser, Baron Megata. Out of the total expenditure of 2,923,000 yen, the largest sum, 905,000 yen, is the item of expense for religious observances; the sums of 432,000 yen and 220,000 yen are respectively for food and the banquets of courtiers, while but a paltry 25,000 yen is for the use of the imperial family.

Out of confusion between the functions and properties of the state and those of the crown had resulted the chaos

in the public finance. Many of the legitimate functions of the finance department of the Korean government had been usurped by the financial board of the imperial household, in control of court upstarts. Owing to the lack of organized method of tax collection, the court and the government each sent out its own agents to collect taxes and levy compulsory contributions upon the people. The people were ground between the two millstones, the court and the government.

To make the confusion worse confounded, the currency system was in the most wretched state. The Korean metallic currency consisted of silver coins, a nickel coin of 5 sen and a 1 sen copper cash, the last two being most widely circulated. The court caring mainly for the profit derived from minting nickels coined the debased nickel coin to such an amount that its market value fell to one-half its face value. On the other hand, the copper cash, whose face value represented its actual value, often fluctuated from 100 per cent to 60 per cent premium. To cap all, the revenue derived by the state from its people of over 12,000,000 was only 7,480,287 yen for 1905.

To make a clean sweep of the court and to rescue the finances of the country from certain ruin, were, therefore, the prime necessities of reform. In spite of the persistent opposition and bickerings of the court officials, the delicate task of cleansing the imperial household was finally accomplished by the resident general. He "separated it effectually from the executive; differentiated its property from that of the state; purged it of a rabble of sorcerers, necromancers, and other scheming parasites; dismissed a host of useless officials; abolished many costly and worthless ceremonials—792 annually were reduced to 201, while 2900 employees were dispensed with; repaired the palace; replaced the old-fashioned sedan chairs with modern carriages and the ancient oil lamps with electric light; established a museum, botanical and zoölogical gardens, and a library; and finally, reorganized the household, and placed upon its staff several competent Japanese officials."

Meanwhile Megata and his worthy successors under the residency general worked hard for financial rehabilitation. They adjusted the state and crown properties by bringing under the control of the finance department the collection of all taxes and by transferring into the possession of the state all immovable properties belonging to the crown. In lieu of these transfers the State became responsible for the liquidation of the debts hitherto contracted by the imperial household, as well as for its future maintenance. The financial administrators further resuscitated and vigorously put in force the budget system; instituted the national treasury, and finally established the gold standard by withdrawing the old nickel coins and copper cash, and substituting them by the new sound currency. Whereas in former days pawnbrokers, innkeepers and the like carried on the most primitive kind of banking business, the residency general called into being various banks. Whereas formerly the Korean government had little or no credit to float state bonds, the residency general helped it to raise many public loans, the most important of which is that of 20,000,000 for the undertaking of various public works. By these salutary measures the revenue of the Korean Treasury has doubled itself within half a decade, and a brighter era has dawned upon the financial world of Korea.

REFORM IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AND PRISONS

In Korea the judiciary and the executive were formerly not separated. Provincial governors, prefects, and district magistrates discharged judicial functions in their executive capacity. Under such a system there was no limit to the evil done. "Civil cases were usually determined in favor of the longest purse, and criminal ones depended on the arbitrary will of a tyro sitting in judgment; a witness generally ranked as *particeps criminis*, and evidence was usually extorted by torture." Floggings were often so severely administered as to render the victim a cripple for life, if he did not die under the infliction. Innocent persons

were often thrown into jails by the executive, either to extort money or to wreak personal vengeance. Prisons attached to governor's yamen were shocking dungeons. In winter the prisoners were sometimes frozen to death, and in summer fell victims to suffocation or epidemic diseases.

All these abuses have been thoroughly reformed. Several well administered prisons have been opened, where sanitary measures are rigorously enforced; special rooms set apart for female prisoners and the sick; religious teaching given by Christian and Buddhist teachers; and out-door work introduced to give air and exercise to prisoners. The judiciary is now independent of the executive. Torture has been abolished; Koreans have been trained to serve as barristers; a penal code has been framed; temporary regulations for civil and criminal procedure enacted, which are soon to be replaced by a civil code and a code of civil and criminal procedure; and finally the rights of an individual to enjoy his life and property fully guaranteed.

ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

Until recently Korea had no regular system of public education. The institutions in existence were of the most primitive order. In a village there was a *Clu-pung*, where the village dominie gathered about him the children of the neighborhood and taught them the rudiments of reading and writing. In each district there was the *Han-gio*, maintained by government patronage or donations of private individuals, where were received the students of *Clu-pung* desirous for more advanced study of Chinese. And finally, as the highest seat of Confucian learning, there was in Seoul the *Syong-Kyūn-Koan*, where instruction was given in Chinese classics. The method of teaching in vogue in these so-called schools was patterned after that of China, and, while this was bad, the Korean was still worse. This is not surprising since the pedagogical profession had fallen into hopeless disrepute. "The traditional Korean school-teacher," says an eye witness, "is looked upon as more or less of a mendicant. Only the poorest will engage in this work,

and they do it on a pittance, which just keeps them above the starvation line." Modern education in scientific and useful subjects was an unknown thing in most parts of the country. The only beam of light that pierced the Korean night came from the lamp burning in the missionary schools.

The work of the residency general was thus nothing less than the creation of an entirely new system of public education. The educational authorities wisely planned not to destroy at one stroke the old educational structures but to utilize them as far as possible, and replace them gradually by something better, and to establish the modern schools which will serve as models to Koreans, hoping that they will come to build such schools of their own accord. The system of education inaugurated was somewhat the same as that adopted in Japan, with modifications adapted to the degree of intelligence and conditions prevailing in Korea. There are thus public common schools, high schools, and normal and technical schools. There were at the time of the annexation 60 common schools, 9 high schools, 1 normal school, 1 foreign language school, 1 medical school, 1 commercial school, 1 industrial training school, and 1 agricultural and forestry school.

The slowness of the educational pace was due to the lack of money, the scarcity of native teachers, as well as to the peculiar educational difficulty Japan had to face.

NATURAL RESOURCES OF KOREA AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT

While the financial, judicial, and educational reforms were thus vigorously pushed, the cause of material development was no less sedulously cared for. To facilitate transportation, 640 miles of railroads have been constructed; 7682 miles of telegraph, and 7931 miles of telephone wires laid; highways repaired or constructed; posts and parcel posts organized; and steamship lines opened.

The natural resources of Korea are not so limited as its present extreme poverty might imply. Gold, lead, iron, copper, and coal are found in the northern mountains. But

except the gold mines worked by Americans at Unsan, and a few coal mines at Pying-Yang and other localities, the subsoil is almost left unexploited. Manufacturing industry can hardly be said to exist. The Korean waters helped by the Black Current, teem with fish, and with the extensive sea coast, they are ideal fisheries. But the fishing method is so primitive that the annual catch by Koreans amounts to only 3,000,000 yen. The chief wealth of Korea lies at present in its agricultural products. Rice, barley, wheat, and beans are the principal products. Their total annual crop is about 14,000,000 *koku* (approximately 70,000,000 bushels) which at rough estimate is worth 110,000,000 yen. By improvement in agriculture this annual crop can be vastly increased, perhaps doubled. Further, incredible as it may seem, the indolence and stupidity of Koreans have left nine-tenths of their country as waste land or denuded mountains. Sixty-six per cent of the country's cultivable area lies fallow!

The residency general, therefore, bent its energy to improve agricultural methods, encourage industry, and develop other natural resources. It helped to organize the Oriental Development Company, whose business is to reclaim waste lands, to accommodate farmers with lands, seeds, implements, and shelters, and to engage in other undertakings deemed necessary for the development of the country. The residency general has also established a horticultural station, nursery gardens, irrigation reservoirs, and a model farm at Suwon, with four branches at Mokpo, Kunsan, Pying-Yang and Taiku. The director of the Suwon Station, Dr. Honda, told the writer that by agricultural improvements it will not be difficult to increase the present crop of cereals in Korea by 40 per cent.

No less commendable is the work of afforestation. No feature of Korea strikes its first visitor more than the ugly barrenness of its hills and mountains. This is, however, due not to the niggardliness of Nature, but to the reckless felling of trees by the people for fuel, and to despotism. It is said that when Tai-Won-Kun built his costly palace at Seoul, the people, in order to escape the forced contribu-

tions for tall trees, and for labor to convey them to the capital, cut them down and burned them. This deforestation of mountains is a principal cause of injury to agriculture. To mend this, model forests have been established where are planted millions of young trees imported from Japan, and every effort is made to afforest the bare mountains throughout the country.

How the reform work inaugurated by Japan stimulated the activity of Korea in various spheres of its life is plainly shown by the phenomenal growth of its commerce. The total of its foreign trade in 1903, the year before Japan's intervention, barely reached the mark of 28,000,000 yen, while the figures for 1910 stood at 59,500,000—an increase of 106 per cent within less than a decade.

RESULTS OF JAPANESE ENTERPRISE

The results of Japanese enterprise under the régime of protectorate in Korea above sketched, are summed up by Captain Brinkley, editor of the *Japan Mail*, in these words:

In less than a decade Japan has served up for her neighbor's nourishment all the fruits of her own activities during a cycle of unprecedentedly crowded life. . . . In their cities Koreans no longer live in perpetual contact with accumulated filth. In their passage from place to place they have ceased to rely solely on sedan chairs and ponies, as railways and electric trains have become available. In agriculture they have model farms to guide them, and the most fruitful seeds are at their disposal. In the hour of sickness they command expert medical aid or facile access to well-equipped hospitals. In their chief towns they drink pure water from modern aqueducts instead of the contents of contaminated wells. In educating their children they have the use of schools where the most serviceable branches of modern knowledge are taught. When they are wronged they can count on justice instead of extortion, and in their daily existence they are beginning to know the blessings of security of life and property.

FUNDAMENTAL REMEDY LACKING IN THE RÉGIME OF PROTECTORATE—ITS DRAWBACKS

Why did this enterprise bring no commensurate blessing upon Koreans? Why have they turned their backs upon all these gifts? Why was Japan forced to confess after the

trial of three years, that she failed to find in the régime of a protectorate sufficient hope for the realization of her object, and that the "condition of unrest and disquietude still prevails throughout the whole peninsula?" In spite of the utmost efforts which Japan exerted to cure the Korean patient, there was one fundamental remedy lacking under the old prescription. The patient's mind was ill at ease. Medicines and nutritious food produced little effect until the peace of his spirit was restored. Koreans had always looked with suspicion upon the doings of Japan. Their ideas of loyalty and patriotism could find no reconciliation with that of submission to Japan. Insurgency was, therefore, often looked upon as the act of devotion to the Korean emperor. The murderer of Prince Ito and the would-be assassin of Premier Yi were hailed in some quarters as heroes. These criminal ideas were further utilized by a host of thieves who infested the land, and now comfortably adopted the dual profession of insurgent and brigand. To cut down these robbers and stamp out the insurrection, Japan was forced to organize a large body of police and *gendarmérie*, in addition to the garrison army of a division and a half. During four years these forces have shot over 14,000 of these insurgents, which naturally accentuated the bitter feelings of Koreans toward Japanese. And yet the insurgency was far from being wiped out.

The régime of protectorate thus not only failed to bring peace to Korea, but carried with it certain drawbacks that tied down the hands of Japanese administrators. The following is a single instance. One of the serious difficulties Japan met in solving the Korean educational problem was how to adapt and apply its fundamental principle of education in Korea. Japan's cardinal ethic of a good citizenship is loyalty and patriotism. It is inculcated in the minds of her sons and daughters, from the students of common schools to those of universities. Taught to the Korean youths, this moral weapon becomes two-edged. Misapplied, it is suicidal to Japan. The Japanese educators in Korea were, therefore, extremely solicitous to impart to the Korean children the correct understanding of this moral teaching. They them-

selves compiled most of the text-books for schools, and prohibited the use of other books than those that had passed their rigid inspection. It is, however, difficult to see how such a temporary makeshift could succeed in preventing Koreans from their ultimate disillusionment. For so long as Korea retained its own king and semi-independence, it is but natural and logical that Koreans should devote their loyalty and patriotism to their own emperor and country. And who could blame them for that? The more Koreans were imbued with the spirit of loyalty and patriotism, the more they were fired with the zeal to liberate their country from the grasp of Japan, however utopian that might be. Such misguided youths either swelled the ranks of insurgents or turned assassins of ministers of state. The moral lesson taught by Japan was, therefore, in a sense, equivalent to adding fuel to the fire of insurgency. The difficulty of ruling Korea under the régime of a protectorate was, in essence, the same as Americans, who preach at home the doctrine of independence and state rights, experienced in ruling the Philippines, until to the Filipinos were given some measure of self-government and a hope of entire independence. In the case of Korea, the only exit from the dilemma was found in the measure, whereby Korea becomes an integral part of the Japanese Empire, and Koreans the loyal subjects of the Japanese Emperor.

DISADVANTAGES OF THE DUAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

Beside the fundamental drawback in the régime of protectorate above stated, there were other disadvantages that are more or less inherent in a dual system of government. These were administrative and financial. It might be imagined that the various reform works hitherto undertaken for the good of Korea were wholly at the expense of the Korean government. Far from it. The burden of defraying the cost of most of these reforms had been shouldered by the Japanese treasury. Such were the cost of initiating and completing the judicial and prison reforms, of establishing educational institutions, of sustaining the army and *gen-*

darmerie for the maintenance of peace and order, of constructing and running the organs of communications—railroads, telegraphs, telephones—of maintaining the residency general, and of undertaking various public works. For the latter purpose the Japanese government lent to the Korean government over 14,000,000 yen free of interest and without fixed period of redemption. All these imposed on the Japanese treasury an average annual outlay of 28,000,000 yen for the period of five years—1906–1910—making the total of 143,016,057 yen. This does not include the cost of building the railroad for which Japan spent another 90,000,000 yen. This financial burden had to be borne by the Japanese government without complete financial control over the Korean exchequer.

Further, there was an administrative disadvantage in the régime of a protectorate. Without dilating upon the details, it suffices us to say that the protectorate, consisting of the residency general and the Korean government, was a cumbersome governmental machinery. Each had its own department and bureaus; each its own staff of officials and employees. That such a complex machinery lacked smooth working even under the leadership of Ito is too well proved by the frequent changes made in the organization of its parts. It is then but proper that a way was sought to mend this lack of harmony in administrative organization at the first opportunity. That way was found in the simple and unified organization of the government general, which resembles in main the government of Formosa under Japanese rule.

PEACEFUL ACCOMPLISHMENT OF ANNEXATION AND THE METHOD ADOPTED

Count Terauchi has accomplished with consummate tact the work of annexation. To carry out the program there were two ways which naturally suggested themselves. One was by the exercise of sovereign power on the part of the Japanese emperor, which however, implied the use of

force. The other was by an agreement with Korea, with the full consent of the Korean emperor and government. It was obvious that the second method of procedure was decidedly preferable, and, as a consequence, the Japanese government, after formulating its policy in July, 1909, for the eventual annexation of Korea, waited only for an opportune time for its prosecution. In May, 1910, the government directed the resident general, Count Terauchi, who had succeeded Viscount Sone, to proceed to his post. He was in receipt of the necessary instructions authorizing him to arrange for the annexation. Early in August the count opened the discussion of the subject with the Korean government. Several other conferences followed, and the final phase of the negotiation is told by Count Terauchi himself in a document which he courteously sent me, and which, having a historical interest, is produced here:

The Korean Court and the Government, assured of the wisdom of our Emperor and of the liberal attitude of His Majesty's Government, came to repose implicit confidence in us, so that during the negotiations all our proposals were accepted save only those dealing with the new name of the Peninsula and future title of the Imperial Family. We proposed that its members should bear the title of Taiko (Grand Duke), but the Korean authorities demanded for them the title of Wang (Prince), and that the name of the Peninsula should be Chosen. These conditions were agreed to. In all other respects the negotiations were very smoothly conducted. A final meeting of the Korean authorities was held in the presence of the Korean Emperor, attended by all the members of the Cabinet, together with Prince Yi-Keui, the uncle of the Emperor, representing the Imperial Family, Kim-in-Sik, President of the Central Council, representing the Elder Statesmen, the Minister of the Imperial Household, Lord Chamberlain, Chief of the Body Guard, and Chief of the Emperor's aides-de-camp. At this meeting the Emperor dwelt on the amicable relation existing between Korea and Japan, and explained the advisability of amalgamating both nations in order to place their mutual benefit and welfare on a permanent basis. This was followed by the reading of His Majesty's proclamation, and the investment of the Prime Minister, Yi Wang Yong, with full power to conclude the treaty of annexation. Thus authorized, the Premier produced the draft of the treaty for imperial inspection. He explained its provisions clause by clause, and upon obtaining the imperial sanction to it repaired to the office of the Resident-

General. The Premier assured me that everything was prepared, and nothing was left undone which was considered necessary for the execution of the compact. The treaty was then signed by him and by me."

The annexation treaty was signed on the afternoon of August 22, 1910, and promulgated on the 29th of the same month. By the treaty the Korean emperor ceded all rights of sovereignty over Korea to the emperor of Japan. Korea is now re-christened Chosen, the ancient title of the peninsula. The security and dignity of the Korean imperial house are sustained by the guarantee of the Japanese government for its perpetual maintenance, with the generous annual allowance of 1,500,000 yen. Japan thus fulfills her pledge to maintain the safety and dignity of the Korean imperial house made in the convention of November 17, 1906, which replaced and superseded the agreement of July 23, 1905, in which it was stipulated that Japan would guarantee the independence and integrity of Korea. The last promise was not given in the convention of 1906. The Korean emperor now becomes Prince Li Wang. Upon the other members of the imperial family the appropriate titles are also given, with grants of sufficient allowances. Seventy-two peers of Chosen have been created to reward the elder statesmen, cabinet members, and others who have rendered meritorious services to the state, with generous gifts of money ranging from 25,000 yen to 100,000 yen. For this purpose, and to give employment to the destitute of the Yang-ban class, the sum of 13,000,000 yen was allotted. The membership of the central council, composed exclusively of Koreans, was also increased, so as to admit many statesmen who can reasonably claim a voice in Korean affairs. Local councils have been organized in various provinces for the purpose of consulting the Koreans themselves about the management of their own affairs.

In order to relieve the suffering of the people, and that they may appreciate the blessings of the new régime, the land taxes in arrears have been remitted, and the land tax for the year 1910 reduced by one-fifth of the rate. In addition, the sum of 17,398,000 yen was distributed among the

people, portioned out to 12 municipalities and 317 rural districts.

The object of this grant was to instruct Koreans in the means of livelihood, to promote education, and to provide against bad crops and natural calamities. For the first mentioned purpose there were established altogether 35 sericultural training houses, 21 training houses for weaving, 13 common sericultural workshops, 8 training houses for paper making, 3 fishery training houses, 37 seedling nurseries, 4 mulberry farms, 8 common industrial workshops, and 4 industrial training houses. Resident and travelling instructors for these institutions numbered some 150 in July, 1911. In the line of education 133 public primary schools and 7 industrial apprentice schools (a phenomenal increase from the time of the Residency-General) had been founded while a decision had been made that a grant-in-aid should be given to 217 various public and private schools.

Charity hospitals and their branches have been established in the chief towns and cities. An amnesty to prisoners and criminals deserving commiseration was granted, the number pardoned being 1711. At the same time 12,155 aged members of the Korean aristocracy and literati were granted imperial gifts, while 3209 filial sons and faithful wives were rewarded with suitable gifts as models to the people for filial piety and faithfulness.

Religious freedom has been proclaimed. It is well worth adding here that the attitude of the government general of Chosen toward Christian missionaries and native converts has not undergone any change since the time of Prince Ito. That attitude is announced by the present governor-general in these words:

It is beyond the sphere of administrative authority to interfere with the liberty of conscience. Confucianism, Buddhism, or Christianity, so far as they aim at the betterment of mankind, and the improvement of the mental and spiritual condition of the people, not only stand in no opposition to the administration of the country, but are calculated to aid in the good purposes of a government. For this reason my attitude toward any form of religious faith is impartial and without any prejudice. It is, however, absolutely necessary to separate the religious question from the civic, and I cannot permit any form of political interference under the guise of a religion.

This sane but firm attitude of the present governor general is intelligible to those who are familiar with the conditions

under the old régime of native converts, some of whom flocked to the standard of Christianity with the sole object of accomplishing their political aim, and so constituted an element of disturbance of civic order and peace. At the same time we can readily understand the solicitude of the government general that its position on the missionary question be fully appreciated by the missionary body, which forms not only the most powerful foreign element for good but the majority of the foreigners residing in Korea. Out of 800 foreign residents 500 are missionaries and their families. Coöperation, not antagonism, seems, then, to be the right principle of action to be adopted by both parties—the missionary and the government general. It will certainly be conducive to the good of Korea for each party to restrict its activity to its proper domain. Happily this seems to be the present-day working basis of the most influential portions of the missionary body.

With regard to the management of the external affairs of Korea, Japan declared at the time of annexation the rules to be followed by her. These rules, in substance, pledged the extension to Korea of Japan's existing treaties as far as possible; granted all privileges that are accorded to foreign residents in Japan proper; and guaranteed protection under Japanese jurisdiction of all legally acquired rights of the foreign residents in Korea. It is but logical that, since the treaties of Japan with foreign Powers have become operative in Chosen, the right of extra-territoriality hitherto enjoyed by foreigners in Chosen should cease to have force. Foreigners, as a matter of fact, are no losers by the abolition of the consular jurisdiction for, not only do they now enjoy the privilege of travelling, residing, and trading in any part of Korea, but they are relieved from certain disadvantages inherent in the old régime, as, for instance, in appellate cases the necessity of travelling to Shanghai for Anglo-Americans, and to Saigon for Frenchmen. And the standard of the administration of justice in Chosen will not fall behind that ruling in Japan proper. That the Japanese government has met the foreign governments with a very liberal spirit is shown by the fact that, in order to prevent

financial and economic disturbance, the old customs tariff is to be retained for a period of ten years, and further by the concession the Japanese government has made to the foreign owners of lands or mines in Korea in not subjecting them to the conditions and restrictions of the foreign land ownership law or of the mining law at present in force in Japan.

PRESENT POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT GENERAL OF CHOSEN

It now only remains for us to see the policy pursued at the present time by the government general of Chosen, for upon it rests the happiness of the new subjects of the mikado. "The fundamental policy of the government," said the present governor general at a gubernatorial meeting held at Tokyo on April 15, 1911, "is to give the people of Chosen the means of livelihood, to ensure the security of their lives and property, and to enable them to enjoy the blessing of an enlightened age." "The essential point," he further emphasized, "is that through eradication of the distinction between Japanese and Koreans the weal of the greater nation will be promoted, and the foundation of the State be even more solidified." Were Koreans as different from Japanese in race and past civilization as Filipinos are in these respects from their American rulers, or Egyptians and Hindus from the English, annexation might still have taken place, but not certainly in the spirit that actuates both Japanese Government and people. What is aimed at is complete amalgamation, so that "the two peoples whose countries are in close proximity, whose interests are identical, and who are bound together with brotherly feelings, should amalgamate and form one body." Whatever may be the ethnological origin of Koreans and Japanese, it is a plain fact that the intermingling of blood has produced such similar types of the human species in both lands that one often finds it difficult to discover any distinction between the two, when the conventionalities of dress and coiffure are made the same. Though language is dissimilar, the literature is not so. Chinese literature is our common

heritage, and with it came our common ancient civilization. This identity of race, literature and past culture, between Koreans and Japanese, places the annexation of Korea in an entirely different category from that of Madagascar by France, or Hawaii by the United States. The great stress is, therefore, laid to obliterate the distinction between the two peoples, and to make the Koreans as good and loyal subjects of the emperor as the Japanese themselves. The newly created Korean nobles are accorded the same treatment at the Tokyo court as their Japanese confrères. Koreans who have received sufficient education are employed in the civil as well as in the military services. Unruly Japanese are strictly enjoined to behave well toward their common nationals.

Nor are the Koreans slow to respond to this call to brotherly union. On the occasion of the emperor's birthday, his new subjects shout "banzai" as lustily as their brethren across the sea. But no better proof of the good feeling of the Koreans toward their new rulers can be afforded than the increase in the amount of taxes paid, and the expedition with which they were collected. In spite of the remission of taxes in arrears and a 5 per cent reduction of the land tax for the financial year of 1910-1911, the state revenue as well as the income of the local fund for the six months ending March, 1911, showed an increase in the aggregate of 938,000 yen as compared with the taxes collected during the corresponding period of the previous year.

Whatever the present pace in the work of amalgamation may be, there is, however, an element of history to be reckoned with. For, the long period of separate historical development has differentiated the characteristics, temperament, traditions and customs of two peoples. Moreover, centuries of misrule in Korea have created a great gulf between the intellectual and moral qualities of Koreans and Japanese. It is, therefore, only through the agencies of time and history that the two peoples can be completely amalgamated. "In view of certain differences existing in the manners and customs of both peoples," says Mr. Komatsu, chief of the bureau for foreign affairs in Chosen, "it would be inexpedient

to transplant to Chosen *en bloc* the legislative and administrative institutions in vogue in Japan proper." The legislative and judicial systems adopted in Chosen are, consequently, modelled after those in operation in Formosa. While all the ordinary rights and privileges of Japanese citizens are accorded to Koreans, they are denied the enjoyment of certain constitutional and legal rights, as, for instance, the eligibility for the franchise, and the privilege of serving as soldiers.

With the exception of the task of assimilation, which was made possible by annexation, other essential points of the policy adopted by the government general are either the enlargement of the work begun under the residency general or its completion. As these points have already been explained and exemplified, they need not detain us long. Taking a leaf from the history of other successful colonial endeavors, great importance is attached to the development of the means of communication and transportation. For these purposes the diet in the session of 1910 passed a measure for raising a public loan amounting to 56,000,000 yen. Of this loan 10,000,000 is to be devoted to the improvement of highways, while 37,000,000 is to be used for the construction of 174 miles of the Honan Railway, and 136 miles of the Seoul-Wonsan Railway, both to be completed within six years. The Seoul-Fusan and the Seoul-New Wiji Railways are also undergoing improvement in order to perfect the connecting service with the South Manchurian Railway. A plan for the improvement of Fusan, Chemulpo, and Chinnampo harbors has also been drawn up, at an estimated cost of 8,270,000 yen. At the same time postal, telegraphic, and telephone services are being steadily improved.

As to the educational policy, the governor general, in a speech delivered before the meeting of the Chosen provincial governors on July 1, 1911, said:

The guiding principle ought hereafter to be fixed upon the motto that through the cultivation of useful knowledge and a healthy morality should the Koreans be equipped with the capacity and character to become worthy of being subjects of the emperor of Japan. In conformity with that principle the machinery

for primary education should first of all be completed, and at the same time prominence given to industrial education, and finally provisions made for professional education so that one and all might have a respectable career.

The government general of Chosen has for some time been a target for the severe criticisms of the Japanese press for its repression of the public voice in Korea. Not only have the native papers often been suspended for the criticisms they ventured upon the government, but even some of the Japanese papers have been frequently prohibited by the press censor to enter the ports of Korea. There was doubtless good cause for the rigid enforcement of the press regulations at the time of annexation, when the preservation of order and peace was of prime necessity; but it is at least open to doubt whether the continuation of such a repressive measure for any length of time after the annexation, when quiet reigned in the land, was justifiable. The governor general himself has assured the world in many of his utterances that "the spirit of peace and acquiescence pervades the entire length and breadth of the peninsula." It is to be sincerely wished that the government general of Chosen will not turn its back upon the enlightened and liberal policy of Prince Ito, who, thoroughly conversant with the current of thought of the world, and always ready to pay due respect to its opinion, had secured its confidence and good wishes.

The annexation of Korea has imposed upon the Japanese treasury an extraordinary outlay of 30,000,000 yen, beside the need of supplying the annual deficit of the Korean exchequer. The Chosen budget for 1910-1911 totalled 48,740,000 yen in addition to about 7,830,000 yen for army expenditure, and 860,000 yen for navy expenditure, altogether aggregating to 57,420,000 yen. Moreover, 56,000,000 yen are to be spent as already stated for the undertaking of public enterprises in Chosen. These burdens are not light upon the Japanese nation. The cost is, however, small when we consider that the annexation has forever solved the Korean problem and, by eliminating a fruitful source of disturbance from the Far East, one more step has

been taken to ensure lasting peace in the Orient. There are those who may be inclined to doubt the wisdom of Japan in abandoning her invulnerable insular position, and entering upon the career of a continental power with all the consequent dangers and burdens, but for Japan there was no other alternative. She had to face her new responsibilities and face them with firm determination. The future of the new continental power depends upon the energy, the patriotism, and the integrity of the two peoples now forever united.

AN OFFICIAL CONFERENCE ON RELIGION IN JAPAN

By George Heber Jones, D.D., former Superintendent of Methodist Episcopal Missions in Korea

The keynote of the Japanese government during the past fifty years has been fearlessness. Wherever there has appeared a problem to be solved, a menace to be attacked or a peril to be met, the duty of the hour has been served without flinching, and the consequences incurred without complaining. It took courage to dismantle within one brief generation the institutions of feudalism, reform class distinctions, rebuild society, revolutionize industry and commerce, remodel education and reorganize the entire life of the people. But it has been done in a way that has challenged the admiration of the world, and this is the more significant because of the fact that while due credit should be given to the helpful relation of foreign influence and the large contribution made by the men of the West in bringing about these changes, it cannot be denied that the marvelous transformation wrought has been due to Japanese inspiration, initiative and effort. It was no easy thing for Kido, Saigo, Okubo, Ito and Inouye and the men of their day to break with the Japanese past, turn their backs upon its traditions and lay low in the dust its institutions, and only a conviction immeasurably deep in its purpose and mightily dynamic in its impulse, united with the boldness and audacity of the Samurai knighthood, could nerve them for the work.

It is a hopeful sign of present-day Japan that that same spirit of fearlessness and, we might say, political audacity still prevails. The nation is beset with problems as serious and intricate as those which confronted the men of the Restoration and to meet and solve them will require wisdom and courage of a high order. Among these problems that

of the development of the moral life of the nation is becoming more and more acute and insistent. To have ignored it would have been to stultify the political sagacity of Japanese leadership, but to meet it in some bold and striking way is only to continue the record of the past. We are therefore not surprised at the developments.

About the beginning of the present year (1912) the world was startled by an official summons issued from the ministry of home affairs, for a conference under government auspices of the religious authorities of Japan. There was no previous intimation of such a step. The traditions of the modern government of Japan were against the possibility of it, for the separation between state and religion has been rigorously enforced. It is true a condition of affairs prevailed which constituted a preparation for it. There has been much discussion among Japanese leaders concerning the state of moral life in the nation. The constant criticism of the commercial integrity, the discussion among thinking Japanese of the decay of the old ethical ideals, the discovery of tendencies among student communities toward moral license, and the uncovering of such moral enormities as the Kotoku anarchistic plot had alarmed society. On April 19, 1912, Mr. Haseba, imperial minister of education, in the course of instruction issued to the directors of the higher schools of Japan, is quoted by the *Japan Times* to the following effect:

The minister made a strong protest against the loss of robust and steady character among students of the present day, and the prevailing tendency to effeminacy and infirmity of will. Firm character and a spirit of self-reliance and self-exertion, being the quality forming the basis of moral and intellectual training, the directors should redouble their efforts in arousing this spirit in their pupils.

Without multiplying quotations of this nature, the above is sufficient to indicate the feeling of anxiety which prevails. A reading of the current discussions in the periodical press of Japan, indicates that there is a widespread conviction that there is something lacking in the national life which must be supplied, if moral decay and disaster are to be

averted. The government readily recognized this problem, and it was the conviction of Mr. Tokonami, vice-minister of home affairs, that religion could give special help to the state in its efforts to meet this growing problem in the body politic. In explaining the purpose of the government in calling the conference of religion Mr. Tokonami took the position that religion has a direct relation to the moral problems of a people and that there was nothing inherently dangerous in recognizing religion as a function in national life, to which even the government might turn for help, for religion must have a solution for moral problems if it has any reason for existence at all. The government therefore in view of the seriousness of the situation determined to enlist the power of religion and a conference of the representatives of Japan's three Faiths, Shinto, Buddhism, and Christianity was called for February 25.

The public announcement of the government's purpose, startled Japanese thought. Difficulties appeared. The ministry of education rather than that of home affairs was regarded as the source of the nation's moral and ethical training—how would it then adjust itself to this apparent invasion of its sphere of activity by another department of government. The line of cleavage between the government and religion was a wide one, but here was the government itself crossing this gulf and recognizing religion as a coöperative factor in meeting national questions. The project was so new and the idea underlying it so vague that misunderstanding of its real object was inevitable.

In the course of the discussion which resulted, it soon became clear that the religious leadership of Japan regarded the proposition with favor. The Christians led off to the surprise of all with expressions of unreserved confidence in the possibilities and character of the conference. Some were inclined to think that any project which involved the getting together of Shintoism, Buddhism and Christianity on a common platform was chimerical and absurd. How could the Christians consent to meet with the other faiths in a matter of such fundamental importance? But not for a single instance did the Christians debate the matter,

but responded heartily and courageously. The same thing is true of the Buddhists. The day before the session of the conference, a meeting was held in the Zozojo temple, Shiba, Tokio, attended by forty-one delegates, representing all the sects, except the Higashi Honganji, and it was agreed to participate in the conference and to do everything possible to make it a success.

And yet there was opposition of a strenuous character in certain quarters, though it proved impotent. Some denounced the conference as implying the first steps towards the reestablishment of a religious hierarchy; others contended that it was either an invasion of religion by politics, or an unwarrantable intrusion of politics into religion and therefore a real menace to the well-being of the state. A small section of the Buddhists came out in direct antagonism against it. Just previous to the opening of the conference a meeting was held in Tokio of representatives of metropolitan newspapers and periodicals which advocated Buddhism, which protested against the conference, and agreed to oppose the proposal. They called on all Buddhists to refrain from participation in it and appointed a committee of ten to induce the government to abandon the idea. They also passed a resolution to secure an interpellation of the government in parliament in regard to the matter. From this it will be seen that the conference created considerable debate.

On Saturday, February 24, the conference convened in the Peers Club, Tokio, seventy-two delegates being present, divided as follows: Buddhists, 50; Shintoists, 15; Christians, 7. There were also present the following distinguished members of the government: Mr. Hara, minister of home affairs; Admiral Saito, minister of the navy; Mr. Matsuda, minister of justice; Mr. Tokonami, vice-minister of home affairs; and Mr. Fukuhara, vice-minister of education. The home minister presided and made a brief address in which he stated that:

He recognized and appreciated the services rendered by the gentlemen present in their respective forms of faith towards the advancement of public morals. He believed that in order to pro-

mote sound spiritual progress parallel to the material development of the nation and to improve the social condition of the people, the state ought to depend very much upon the help of his audience.

Aside from hearing the address of the home minister and an informal discussion among themselves, nothing was done on the first day of the conference, except the appointment of standing committees, one from each of the three faiths, to formulate a statement of the recommendation which each religion would make to the government in view of the problem proposed. These statements were found to be in such practical agreement that the three committees met as a united committee under the presidency of Reverend Mr. Shibata, the leader of the Shintoists. The representatives of the three religions were here able to agree upon an unanimous statement which was presented to and adopted by the conference at its session in Kazoku Kaikan, February 26. This statement was as follows:

WHEREAS, we realize that the motive of the government which called the conference of delegates of the three religions, respecting the authority of religion, is rooted in the idea that the state religion and education should be true to their missions respectively, and coöperate for the improvement of national morality and the betterment of social conditions, and in upholding the imperial honor and glory, and in taking part in the progress of the age. These are in agreement with our platform. Hence, appreciating its spirit and being true to the principles of our faiths respectively, and hoping that we should endeavor for the great mission of the evangelization of the nation, and that the government should make efforts for the realization of the same purpose in a truthful and sincere spirit, we pass the following resolutions:

1. *Resolved*, that each of us should endeavor in the preaching of propagandism, to uphold the imperial honor and glory and further the progress of national morality.
2. *Resolved*, that we hope that the government will respect religion, promote harmonious relations of the state, religion, and education, and utilize them for the development of the nation.

The conference adjourned with mutual expressions of good-will and in the conviction that a broad base had been laid for effective coöperation among themselves, to meet the responsibility laid upon them by the government.

In estimating the results of the conference it must be confessed that the direct output was of such a general and

apparently attenuated character that little appears to have been achieved, and yet a closer view convinces one that such is far from being the case. The fact that a conference constituted of such diverse and apparently irreconcilable elements could reach a basis of mutual understanding and good-will is of itself of large significance. This fact was ably stated by the talented editor of the *Japan Times* in an article of March 1, 1912, in which speaking of the conference he says:

The keynote of the new movement and a new movement it must needs be if the conference resolutions are to be translated into fact—will be coöperation by the leaders of the different creeds. But this is only to say that those leaders should make new endeavor to arouse, foster and deeply and ineradicably implant in the minds of the followers of the different faiths the spirit of coöperation and fraternity. For in the exclusive spirit rife among their followers, as is the case at present, much of the effort for coöperation on the part of their leaders is bound to go to waste. From this point of view, it will be well, therefore, for the leaders to make up their minds before they launch on their movement, that it will mean a very radical mental revolution among their flocks. Yet no one will deny that such a revolution, if properly engineered and accomplished, would result in immeasurable good to the country for it will be the creation of a new united national force for the moral advance of the people. And the value and importance of such a force will be most evident to those who have hitherto seen with regret many worthy projects for the moral well-being of the country fall through or attain far less success than they deserved, just because they were promoted by the followers of one creed or another, thereby lacking the support practically of the whole nation, ensuring thus their complete success with far-reaching effect. It will be most important, then, for the leaders of religion, that while they adhere to their own creeds, they are determined first and above all to merge their efforts wherever they are called upon to act and make a common cause of their activity for the sake of the nation, and not for one creed, denomination, or sect.

It is still too early to gauge the real value of the conference in giving a more effective alignment to religious organization and power in meeting the religious problem of Japan. Certain things stand out in connection with the fact and composition of the conference, which are very significant.

1. It marks the beginning of a new attitude of the Japanese government towards religion and the religious life of the nation. The conference was given the dignity of an

official function. Its purpose, date and composition were fixed by government authority. Even the personnel of the delegations was not left to the respective religious bodies, but was nominated by government. Thus the body possessed a significance that it would not have enjoyed as a voluntary gathering to discuss the questions submitted.

2. In the conference Christianity was recognized on a plane of equality with the two great historic faiths of the people, Shintoism and Buddhism. When we recall the fact that many now living can remember the time when there stood official sign boards in the public highways prohibiting Christianity and setting a price upon the heads of its teachers we can get some idea of the revolution which has taken place in the religious conceptions and attitude in Japan, by this unquestioning and hearty recognition of the position now occupied by the once proscribed faith in the life of the nation. This fact is of special significance in view of a tendency in certain quarters to charge Japan with being infused with anti-Christian sentiments and determined to crush out Christianity. To all such the status accorded Christianity in the conferences is a full and sufficient answer.

3. It is peculiarly significant that Japan should recognize the responsibility of the government not only to stamp out crime and enforce statutory laws but to give attention to and conserve the development of personal character among the people. The conference marks a short and hesitating step in that direction but it seems to indicate that the thought of the political leadership of Japan is leaning that way. If this is carried out in some practical manner it may have results of large value. There is little doubt that lawlessness has its beginning in the formative years of the life of the youth of a nation. Secular education must necessarily confine itself to the training of the intellectual faculties, a training which does not involve the formation of strong moral character. When government turns itself to religion to supply the thing which is lacking in secular education, the great danger is that it may be betrayed into an alliance with one particular form of religious life to the

exclusion of other religious interpretations which may have their contributions to make. This danger has been avoided in the present instance by the recognition of those forms of religious life which have vitality and power and exercise undeniable influence in the life of the whole people of Japan. We await with interest the outcome.

4. It is significant that three such diverse religious forms could find a common ground of meeting as has been the case in this conference. Buddhism and Shintoism in all their fundamental conceptions of religious life and thought are separated from Christianity as far as the East is from the West. Christianity is certainly intolerant to many things in these historic faiths, yet in spite of these differences, the leaders were able to agree upon a policy involving mutual confidence, a common anxiety to promote the public welfare, and a determination to contribute the best things in each faith, to the solution of the common problem. This understanding was brought about with no surrender of the substantial verities for which Christianity stands. If the policy outlined is honorably and earnestly carried out it should result in an enormous gain to moral life and efficiency in Japan.

NOTES AND REVIEWS

Influences of Geographic Environment on the Basis of Ratzel's System of Anthrop-Geography. By ELLEN CHURCHILL SEMPLE: New York. Henry Holt and Company 1911. Pp. 683.

This is a book of eloquent pages and good literature. The authoress never allows her personality to be submerged in her facts and does not assume that interesting material is an excuse for poor style. Indeed, one is sometimes disposed to think that she is too delightfully enthusiastic and that she sometimes writes too well. It is no small task, however, to present one's problem so clearly and we should congratulate ourselves on not being asked—right often does it happen—to take obscurity for profundity.

It cannot be said that we are not given sufficient facts and well-authenticated ones; the facts are numerous enough but their interpretation seems to us often false and misleading. In a word, the writer is constantly endeavoring to make the evidence prove more than it can legitimately be asked to prove. As practically the same method of treatment applies throughout the work and the same criticism is applicable to each of them, we shall limit our discussion to the first chapter, though any other would answer our purpose almost equally well.

In this chapter we get a clue to the method of treatment followed throughout. She writes:

“Man is a product of the earth's surface. On the mountains she has given him leg muscles of iron to climb the slope; along the coast she has left these weak and flabby, but given him instead vigorous development of chest and arm to handle his paddle or oar. In the river valley she attaches him to the fertile soil, circumscribes his ideas and ambitions by a dull round of calm, exacting duties, narrows his outlook to the cramped horizon of his farm. Up on the wind swept plateaus, in the boundless stretch of the grasslands and the waterless tracts of the desert, where he roams with his flocks from pasture to pasture and oasis to oasis, where life knows much hardship but escapes the grind of drudgery, where the watching of the grazing herd gives him leisure for contemplation, and the wild ranging life a big horizon, his ideas take on a certain gigantic sim-

plicity; religion becomes monotheism, God becomes one unrivalled like the sand of the desert and the grass of the steppe, stretching on and on without break or change. Chewing over and over the cud of his simple belief as the one food of his unfed mind, his faith becomes fanaticism; his big spacial ideas, born of that ceaseless regular wandering, outgrow the land that bred them and bear their legitimate fruit in wide imperial conquest" (pp. 1-2).

From Draper (*History of the Conflict Between Religion and Science*) we have become familiar with the view that the desert wastes beget monotheism. And yet, if desert wastes are responsible for religious conceptions why not for any and every other conception? If responsible for all, then how account for such vital differences as exist between Central Australians and Arabs—a difference is in no wise consistent with the great similarity of climate and country? But if geographical environment is not responsible for all why single out religion? Can it be because that particular thing happens to fit the fancy of the theorizer, and gives *prima facie* support to her thesis? "Chewing over and over the cud of . . . simple belief as the one food of (the) unfed mind," is not the only condition in which "faith becomes fanaticism." Why not admit as much, even though it be to the prejudice of one's cause? Indeed we do not feel sure that either fanaticism or monotheism are part and parcel of a desert environment and can flourish no where save "up on the wind swept plateau in the boundless stretch of the grasslands and the waterless tracts of the desert." Indeed these desert roving, 'monotheistic' Arabs seem to have as many *Jinn* inhabiting their monotonous wastes as any people living in a most delightfully varied locality. The sprites of the wooded hills do not always outnumber the troublesome *Jinn* of the treeless desert.

Admit that "man can no more bescientifically studied apart from the ground which he tills, or the lands over which he travels, or the seas over which he trades, than polar bear or desert cactus can be understood apart from its habitat" (p. 2); still we should scarcely expect to learn much about the animals or plants of an unknown region—except by knowledge of proximate regions—from a study restricted to its climate and geography. For this reason we fail to see "the significance of Herder's saying that 'history is geography set into motion,'" or of that of the authoress informing us that, "what is today a fact of geography becomes tomorrow a factor of history" (p. 11). So, in the instance of political union in Switzerland (cited on p. 16-17) the efficient influence was the desire for self-preservation and protection and the geographic conditions were mere inci-

dents in the formation of the confederacy. The same political dangers transferred from one geographical environment to another give rise to similar means of self-protection among the same people—a fact which seems to make against rather than for the writer's contention. We have seen an attempt by a very respectable writer to show that the art of Pompeii and Herculaneum was due to the beauty of the surrounding region, but the view (quoted with implied approval) that "the absence of artistic and poetic development in Switzerland and the Alpine lands" is to be ascribed "to the overwhelming aspect of nature there, its majestic sublimity which paralyses the mind" (p.19–20), is to us a new one that outrivals its predecessors. To be sure "the facts are incontestable," but just now we are concerned with the interpretation of those facts, and in such a case a multitude of illustrations does not support one's contention any more than a single instance. Ten thousand instances in which long noses and red hair are associated with uprightness and zeal do not support a contention that a combination of long noses and red hair has a good influence upon character, any more than a single instance supports it. The sum total of influences must be taken into consideration before the really efficient ones can be singled out and emphasized; it is easy to confuse chance and condition with cause.

The impression one gets after reading through these more than six hundred pages is that they do not assist very materially in a solution of the problems with which they deal. Facts of rather heterogeneous ancestry and of more or less arbitrary classification are offered us in support of a given thesis, but scarcely ever do we get the facts which offset them, and which are indispensable in giving to any piece of evidence its true value. An intensive study of a given limited region or regions in which there was this attempt to determine the relative influence of geographic environment as compared with that of social traditions and prevailing religious convictions or political organization, for example, would, we venture to suggest, have had more value, in just that degree to which it took us nearer to the heart of the problem.

W. D. WALLIS.

The Chinese Revolution. By ARTHUR JUDSON BROWN, D.D.
Student Volunteer Movement. New York, 1912. Pp. 217.

To one who wishes an interesting, well-written yet reliable account of the Chinese revolution, this book is highly recommended. While it is based upon the author's earlier work, *New Forces in Old China*, the developments of the past few years and

the origin and early history of the revolution are fully described. Besides the information gained during two recent trips of investigation to China, Dr. Brown makes good use of many quotations from Chinese newspapers and from letters of resident missionaries. The analysis of the causes of the revolution is especially good. As might be expected from the author's position as secretary of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions, the work of the Christian church is emphasized—possibly unduly in making it the most potent influence in the political regeneration of China. The important part, however, played by the missionaries in the revolution itself is well described. Their compounds have been asylums of refuge for both imperialists and revolutionists; they have aided in arranging terms of truce and capitulation, and have carried on most of the Red Cross work on the battle fields.

G. H. B.

Flower o' the Peach. By PERCEVAL GIBBON. New York: The Century Company, 1911. Pp. 394.

The race problem in the United States has been a favorite theme for novel and drama from the days of *Uncle Tom's Cabin* to the present. This story, however, presents the race problem in South Africa; and is worth reading by anyone who wishes an introduction to the passion, prejudice and hateful injustice engendered there by the conflict of color, language and race.

To do away with the century-long bitterness between Boer and Englishman would be enough of a task for any country. At present the administration of South Africa is finding it almost impossible to reconcile the claims of Dutch and English to absolute equality in the government and the schools. But this antagonism will eventually disappear, just as the French-English antagonism in Canada has largely disappeared. The great race question relates to the native. It is similar in many respects to the negro problem in the United States, but is far more difficult of solution. There is the same insistence, by the whites, upon keeping the native, educated and uneducated alike, in a position of definite inferiority and upon ostracising any white who treats a native with even decent social respect. In some of the Transvaal cities, natives are now put out of the street cars and kicked off from the sidewalks. There, as here in the South, "the negro has no rights which the white man is bound to respect." But in the United States the whites outnumber the negroes, and can easily control them in any resort to physical force. In South

Africa, the natives outnumber the whites, eight or ten to one, and will continue to outnumber them for an indefinite future. They are rapidly advancing in industry, knowledge and power. There are already many native negroes who have returned to South Africa with the best professional training the schools and higher institutions of England can give. The native races are developing leaders, a growing race consciousness, and a resentment at their present status. The problem is—can the whites forever treat the natives as a despised race; can they win in the test of physical strength bound to come in a few decades, if present conditions continue, when the natives will have learned the secrets of western civilization?

G. H. B.

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THE MEANS OF UNIFYING CHINA

By Charles W. Eliot, LL.D., President Emeritus of Harvard University

I must tell the audience first that I am not an "expert" on China. I have only spent about two months and a half there. The country is immense; and when I was there it was in a state of prodigious confusion. I did not know a word of Chinese. So that I bring you tonight just the observations on China and its present condition of one American citizen who has had, during a somewhat long life, a good deal of experience in one form of administration—educational administration—and who has been interested all his life in the social and industrial conditions of the community in which he has lived. To have been interested many years in the social and industrial conditions of one's own country, if that be a free country, is a pretty good fitting, or preparation, for a cursory inspection of industrial, social, and political conditions in another country. That was all my preparation for my visit to China. I should also say that I was in the Far East on a special errand, intrusted to me by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. This was a strange year in which to be an envoy from a peace-promoting organization to study the conditions under which war breaks out or peace is maintained. I had no sooner started than the inexcusable attack of Italy on Tripoli took place. I had not been long in Ceylon before Russia invaded Persia with great violence; and Great Britain, Persia's neighbor on the south, calmly looked on. When I reached China that country was still in the throes of what had been a brief civil war, comparatively restricted in its areas, and yet a civil

war. And I had only just got home when a tremendous conflagration broke out in the Balkan States. This was, indeed, a queer year in which to be looking for the means of promoting peace in the civilized and semi-civilized world. Nevertheless, the fact that I had that special errand, and in the East, added very much to the interest of my journey; because it brought me into contact with a considerable number of educated Chinese and Japanese whose desires tended strongly towards the promotion and the maintenance of peace throughout the world, and particularly between the eastern and the western peoples.

I landed at Hong Kong, and after a short stay there went to Canton. There I had my first interview with provisional republican officials, the group then in charge of the province of Kwang-Tung, the most turbulent province in China, and that province which earliest and most ardently embraced the cause of the Republic. Having a good opportunity there to ask what is for me a fundamental question with regard to any people, I asked the then governor-general, himself a soldier by profession, and recently in command of a division of the Republican army, "Will the Chinese coolie make a good soldier, brave, obedient, and patriotic?" (You may think this was a strange question for an advocate of peace; but such was the condition of China that it seemed to me the primary question.) The governor-general reflected for a time, and then made the following answer: "The Chinese coolie will fight well, provided he knows what he is fighting for, and that thing interests him." That I thought a very good answer; and its accuracy I afterwards heard confirmed by many witnesses of the fighting which had lately taken place between the revolutionary and the imperial troops. The revolutionary armies were raw levies. An American woman of admirable qualities, who had already been twelve years in China, was at Hankow during the hard fighting that took place in and near that city; and she served for months as a Red Cross nurse in the hospitals of that vicinity. She told me that she always asked one question of the wounded who came under her care—boys most of them were, or very young men. She would ask the sufferer,

“How long have you been in the army?” And the commonest answers were, “One week,” “Two weeks,” “Three weeks.” Brave, raw recruits fought with desperation, with dauntless courage, under the most trying conditions. They had hardly any experienced leaders, and did not know their commanders; but they were ready to die for their country.

That same day in Canton about two thousand Chinese soldiers passed me in a very narrow street, so narrow that my chair had to be jammed against the wall, and the men filed by, two and two, and no space to spare. I did not see a single man in that long line that had what we call a martial bearing. They were all fully armed, but not fully uniformed, and many of them had on the left arm a white band. I asked what these bands meant; and was told that these men all belonged to a society pledged to give their lives at any moment for the country. The answer of the governor-general of Kwang-Tung province, so far as I can judge, was an accurate one. The Chinese coolie, or peasant, or mechanic will fight bravely, even desperately, if he knows what object he is fighting for, and that object interests him. These men who made up the revolutionary armies thought they were fighting for their country, for its freedom, for the coming of a just government; and that prospect interested them. Is not that just the spirit in which American youth are prepared to fight? Is not that just the spirit in which hundreds of thousands of young men went to our Civil War. Is not that just the spirit in which our Revolutionary armies were recruited? Our youth felt in both those epochs ready to die for the country, because they believed they knew what they were fighting for, and that thing appealed to them.

The young generations in China today seem to be the legitimate successors of the earlier generations (1860–81), whose fighting and marching qualities were so enthusiastically praised by such foreign observers as Swinhoe, Gordon, Wolseley, and Hamilton (British) and Ward (American). I started in China, therefore, with the conviction that the Chinese, though peaceable in their habits, will nevertheless make courageous, hardy, resolute fighters at need. There was a great need at the moment of a trustworthy public

force; but the Republic was not competent to enlist and train that force, because it had no money. There were disorders in several parts of the country, because the troops were neither paid nor properly fed; and these suffering soldiers broke out repeatedly in riots and robberies. Gradually the revolutionary levies were disbanded, and order was restored, with the help of the provincial authorities; but the poverty of the central government prevents it from organizing an effective national army.

The next question I asked of officials in China was, "What are the means of unifying this great country?" It has enormous extent. It is divided into eighteen original provinces; and the interests of those provinces are diverse in many respects. There is a condition in China like what prevailed in our thirteen colonies when the war of the Revolution was over—very different interests in the north and the south, on the coast and in the interior. The provinces are not used to acting together; they have no common language except the literary; on the contrary, people on the opposite banks of the same river are often unable to understand each other. People in adjacent mountain valleys may be unable to understand each other; the whole people is used to provincial government, but not to feeling the pressure of any national, centralized government.

The answers to the questions, "How can this great country be tied together, how can its people be brought to maintain a strong central government, what are the means of unification?" came to me only slowly during my ten-week stay in China; and it is those answers that I propose to lay before you this evening. The means of unifying China? They are the means, with one exception, which have unified this country, and made us one people, north, south, east, and west. The first means is a common language; and that the American colonies had in the Revolutionary epoch, and have had ever since, until the recent invasion by millions of alien peoples not speaking English. The New Republic took immediate measures to remedy this great lack in China. I say, "took measures." They made projects; they wrote out on paper what they would do if they

had the means. They have not had the means; they have not had the money which the measures they proposed must necessarily cost. A common language is the first unifying means China needs to employ. It is a great undertaking. It must be done through public schools all over the country, through making education universal in its elements. There have been provincial schools in China, few but good; there have been municipal and village schools; but except during the last years of the Manchu Empire there has been no attempt at universal education; and the Manchus got but little way with the project they formed. Only slowly can this need be met. Ten, fifteen, twenty years will be needed in order to diffuse throughout China among the children and young people a common language. And yet that must be accomplished before the varied populations of China can be brought, first, to a common understanding, and next, to such intercommunication that they gradually become more and more like each other, and come to enjoy the same literature.

The next means of unification that I inquired about is one which has proved to be unifying in high degree in many nations of the world. I mean a common system of taxation. You remember that the unification of Germany, which took place shortly after 1866, was preceded by common taxation methods. Duties were made the same by agreement among the many states into which the present German Empire was then divided. Posts or mails were operated by the same semi-public agency all over Germany. The same general system of taxation needs to prevail throughout a nation in order to unify its domestic habits and its industrial habits, to make them approximately alike all over the country. The condition in China has been, and is, almost such as would prevail in the United States if duties were levied at all our state boundaries on goods in transport. China collects provincial taxes on goods moving by rail or other conveyance from province to province. An English merchant in Shanghai who has long traded in the valley of the river Yangtse told me that the goods he sent from Shanghai often paid three, four, or even five duties before they arrived

at their destination, and that he could never tell how many duties or how much *in toto* was going to be paid on a given invoice. You see how difficult communication and trade are under such conditions. You see, too, how the price of goods will be affected by the operation of these local taxes. It is impossible for the same goods to be sold at the same price in different localities. A uniform system of taxation regulated by law is an indispensable means of unifying China. When I ventured to broach this doctrine to Chinese statesmen and scholars it always aroused in their minds painful recollections, and apprehensions about centralized taxation methods for the future. There is one department in which uniform taxation exists for all China, namely, in the Imperial Maritime Customs Service. On all goods coming in by sea the customs, or tariff duties, are the same for all China. But how are they collected? By the organization established and carried on for many years by Sir Robert Hart, an admirable organization, the service perfectly performed with honesty and accuracy, and the receipts applied exactly where they should be applied in accordance with existing treaties. But what is the application? To pay the interest on bonds which represent debts China was forced by western powers to incur, in order to pay indemnities to western powers, and to pay to western powers the war expenses of those powers in carrying on war against China. No Chinese official today, or at any time within a generation in China, can bear to think of this uniform tax for all China, the customs. When I spoke to three of the members of the present government about this tax, my reference to it was received with visible impatience and dislike. They simply hate to think that they have mortgaged their entire customs revenue to pay the interest on debts and reduce the principals of debts which China incurred in consequence of wars which western powers waged against her. They encounter another great difficulty in connection with this uniform tax, which is the product of a low, sensible tariff for revenue. That difficulty relates to one result of Sir Robert Hart's administration. In all the great services of the customs, which include not only the collection of the customs, but also the

construction and maintenance of the lighthouses and day marks on the coasts and rivers of China, and many works of conservancy in Chinese harbors and rivers, not a single Chinese man has been trained to responsible administrative work of that sort or any similar sort during the entire existence of the service. No Chinese has ever been appointed to anything above a clerkship in that service; and the consequence is now that the government cannot get from that service a single man, Chinese by birth, who is fit for the public service in similar departments. How natural that a Chinese statesman should hear with impatience even the name of the Imperial Maritime Customs Service!

The next unifying influence for China, as, indeed, it has been all over the world, is the provision of the necessary means of intercourse for travelers, pedlars, and traders, and of the distribution and exchange of goods. I never before was in a country without roads. I had lately visited several parts of the Far East which are under foreign supervision, as, for instance, some British colonies in the East, and had found admirable roads in great numbers, thousands of miles of hard, smooth roads constructed in the British colonies, for example; and suddenly I came to China and found it a country without made roads. The western parts of our own country existed for some time without anything that deserved the name of roads; railroads anticipated country stoned roads, and enabled us to communicate with new settlements along lines running east and west or north and south, and even crossing the continent. The railroad often preceded the settlement of the country through which it passed. Now China has not only no well-built common roads, but it possesses to this day only an insignificant amount of railroad lines. The number of miles of railroad in China now in operation does not exceed five thousand. Many a single state in our union has much more than that. I did not see a single macadamized, well-built road in China, outside a British or other foreign concession, except one. That one ran from the winter palace in Peking out to the summer palace, and was sixteen miles long; it was constructed for the passage of the imperial household twice a year. It

is impossible for us to imagine the close limitation of intercourse and traffic caused by this absence of roads. In order to unify China it is absolutely indispensable that an immense increase should be made in the mileage of railroads in that huge country. But what does that mean? That means the borrowing of thousands of millions of dollars for purposes of construction.

A long time has lately been spent in endeavoring to effect a trifling loan of \$300,000,000 for the Republic. Nearly a year those negotiations have lasted, and still there is no end of them. But that amount will not take care of the government itself for more than eighteen months. Now China is going to need railroads, long and many, and will need them urgently; and the railroads will have to be state railroads. The corporation is not sufficiently developed in China itself, among Chinese people, to be useful for the construction of the great mileage of railroads which the country needs. The state will have to do it. "When?" we may ask. Only when China has procured and set in operation a system of taxation that will yield a stable, sure revenue for the central government. That is the first thing that needs to be done in China. To this end laws are needed, public action of all sorts is needed, and foreign advisers are needed; indeed, they are indispensable, in order that the government may obtain a stable, trustworthy national income. When that is accomplished, then all things will be possible.

Sir Robert Hart in 1904 devised a plan for providing the imperial government of that day with a stable and sufficient revenue by means of a moderate land tax. It had never possessed such a thing as a revenue in the modern sense. The imperial government exacted tribute from each of the provinces; and about half the tribute in money, rice, and silks which started from each province finally reached Peking. But that tribute was for the support of the imperial household and the Manchu clan. It was never regarded as a national revenue in our sense or in the sense of any modern government, and when the Manchus abdicated they left to the new government no established system of collecting a

national revenue. They had never studied Sir Robert Hart's admirable scheme.

There are other means of national intercourse, of intercourse between the widely separated parts of a great country, of intercourse between city and city, village and village, and between town and country—posts, telegraphs, and telephones. Sir Robert Hart devised and organized a system of posts for China, and finally made it over to the government long before his retirement; and that system exists today. It is still presided over by a foreigner, but it exists. Also there are a moderate number of telegraph lines, and in some of the cities and towns a telephone system begins to be developed; but all these means of intercourse are still imperfect and inadequate. What can you expect in the way of posts in a country where there are so few railroads, no roads, and where most of the transportation is on the backs of men and animals? Here, too, you see clearly the urgent need of an immense expenditure by the central government of China, before the proper means of intercommunication can be had for unifying the nation.

What I have already said implies that the great need of China at this moment is a strong central government. The government is provisional. The elections for permanent officers are to take place next January. Up to this moment there has been only a provisional organization. What is its nature? They call it a republic; but it is a republic in a sense in which we should not use the word. It is a republic based in the first place on a very limited suffrage. Nobody knows how many persons really took part in the election of the first assembly which met at Nanking, or in that of the body now sitting at Peking; and nobody knows accurately the process by which those selections were made. Secret societies had much to do with the selections. The president is not a republican president in our sense. It was not possible that he should be. He is a dictator under republican forms. It was necessary that it should be so. It is not to be helped. Not until the next elections have been held will it be possible for us to say of China that even the form of government is genuinely republican.

When I landed in China nobody knew what the qualifications for the suffrage were to be. I asked a dozen of the officials I first met what they thought the qualifications for the suffrage should be, and found a serious division of opinion. The majority thought that the qualifications should be only educational. The others thought that there should be, as in Japan, first an educational qualification, and secondly, a property qualification. At the same moment no decision whatever had been reached as to the division of powers between the central government and the provincial governments. You will remember that one of the most serious difficulties we encountered after the Revolutionary War was to determine the division of powers between the separate states and the federal government. We finally obtained in our constitution a strict definition of that division. Unfortunately we did not make so good a one as our neighbor Canada made not long afterward.

A strong central government is indispensable to unification. The government is not strong. No government can be strong that has no revenue; and when I asked the then premier what dependable income the Republic had, he mentioned but one item, namely, the receipts from the government monopoly of salt, and he immediately added that the government manufacture of salt was badly conducted, that the salt was dirty and impure, containing many ingredients it should not contain, and that the manufacture would have to be reformed. That reform will take at least a year, and probably more; and it might be added that salt is one of the worst sources of revenue that has ever been resorted to; for it bears as heavily on the poorest as on the richest.

Nevertheless, in spite of its poverty the republican government is gaining strength all the time. It has repressed the early disorders, opened again all existing means of communication, advanced through discussion the adoption of a permanent constitution, reorganized the government bureaus at Peking, detached the government from the ancient popular superstitions, abolished the former official ceremonials, proclaimed religious toleration, and helped to free the people

from inconvenient or injurious customs like the wearing of the queue and the binding of girls' feet. It has made a large number of projects for great improvements in the public services and in education. It cannot carry out these projects until it has a revenue. Think how little the Manchu Empire, which has been governing China for centuries, left to the Republic! No elements of a strong government were transmitted from the Empire to the new government; no army, no navy, no school system, no national system of taxation, no courts or police of national quality. Indeed, the Manchu Empire transmitted to the Republic no government organization whatever. It was not a real government in the modern sense. It has not been for centuries. If the Republic, or the revolutionary movement, had done nothing else except to rid China of the Manchus, it would have fully justified its coming into existence. The deliverance of China from the Manchus was a necessary step to the coming of China into the group of great nations. The Republic gives promise of organizing a strong government if it can have as much time as we had in our country to organize the government which has conducted our national affairs since 1789. It took us thirteen years with all our experience of local government, with all our fighting quality, with all our trading experience. It took us thirteen years with a comparatively homogeneous people, and with a common language and a common religion. China will need at least as long a period of reconstruction; and the western world ought to stand by China with patience, forbearance, and hope, while she struggles with her tremendous social, industrial, and political problems.

But you will be thinking that all the considerations I have thus far adduced, and all these means of unifying China, have a very material look. They do indeed relate to language, means of transportation, and the organization of government agencies for carrying on the business of the people; and it is quite true that nations cannot be unified by such means alone. Nations are unified, and come to be strong moral units by common sentiments, feelings, and passions; and the first of those sentiments is that of national-

ity, the feeling of belonging to one group of kindred, sympathetic, united people. You may have a small nation animated by this sentiment, or an immense nation filled with the same spirit. Within the last twenty-five years among her widespread people with little means of communication, China has developed in the educated class an intense feeling of nationality; and it has proved in the end that this sentiment of the educated class was capable of being communicated to the uneducated in numberless millions. The secret societies which developed, fostered, and brought about the Revolution found it possible to enlist over a million men in the revolutionary levies. Many of these men were coolies, mechanics, and farmers; but they were capable of feeling intensely the sentiment of nationality, which had sprung up in the breasts of the educated few. The Chinese are an Oriental race, and they have now a full sense of Oriental nationalism as distinguished from Occidental. They have been roused by the sight of another Oriental race close beside them suddenly developing a tremendous force in the broad world—West as well as East—and asserting the right to control by force Oriental regions which did not originally belong to them. In short, they have had before them the example of Japan. That example has stirred deeply all the Oriental peoples; and it is impossible to see now how far that influence is going. It is plainly to be seen in India, and far beyond.

The foreign visitor in China recognizes several types of face and figure in the population, yet does not see in these diversities any strong racial differences; but the Chinese themselves count five races in China, and have put five stripes of color into their new flag. These are, however, kindred races, closely allied in origin and history. That is a very important fact with regard to the creation of this spirit of nationality. The Orient teaches the world that the pure race is the best; that crosses between unlike races seldom turn out well; and everybody knows that the cross between any Oriental stock and any European stock is regarded as unsuccessful throughout the Orient. Japan illustrates the value of a race kept pure. Wherever the Japanese go as

colonizers they keep their race pure. No European race has done that. On the contrary, the white race transported to the East has mixed with every native race it has encountered. It is the Oriental that has demonstrated the advantages of race purity.

Not only are the Chinese people penetrated with this spirit of nationality, they have been imbued with a fervent sentiment of patriotism. This, too, has originated in China with the educated class, and particularly with the young men who in recent years have been educated in Europe, America, and Japan. It was they who started the Revolution. Older people prepared it. Older people nursed it for nearly a generation; but it was fired by the Chinese youth, educated in other countries. I have never seen anywhere better evidences of a widespread and intense sentiment of patriotism than I saw in China.

Such are the chief means of unification for China. But consider for a moment what the obstacles are which this new government, now without any adequate resources, has to overcome.

In the first place, as I have already pointed out, the Manchu Empire left nothing at all to the Republic. I suppose that example is almost, if not quite, unique in the world. We have seen in Europe many transitions from one form of government to another, from one government to another. We are ourselves used to a transition every four or eight years, when the whole structure of government, with all its powers, is transmitted from one administration to another. Here is a case where an old empire went out, was extinguished, without transmitting anything of government organization or structure to its successor. Under these circumstances the poverty of China is a terrible obstacle to be overcome. It is poor not only in the sense that the government is poor, or has no resources, but that the whole population is poor. Under despotic government no people ever lays up any capital. That is one of the uniform failures of despotic government. Neither life nor property is safe under despotic government, and never has been. In China the rich man was always liable to be "squeezed"

by any official who discovered that he was rich. The Chinese who have become rich in Singapore and Penang do not dare to take their property home. They have given most generously to the cause of the Revolution; but they dare not take their properties home, because they believe that the property acquired with pain in foreign countries will be unsafe in China. Therefore there is no considerable amount of capital in China; and in this lack of accumulated savings China must borrow from outside, borrow from the western countries where capital has accumulated in huge amounts. The poverty of the Republic is the first obstacle to be overcome.

Then comes the dependence of China on the six powers that are sitting round about her and on her, each one except the United States really longing for a piece of China. What is the defence of China against that fear, that apprehension? Just the jealousy of one power toward another, or toward all the others. We are not liable to the accusation of self-interest and jealousy, because we want nothing in China in the way of a "concession," a piece of territory, or a sphere of influence; but all the other five powers want harbors, free access to the multitudinous Chinese with the products of western factories, and free opportunities for the profitable investment of western capital. Now that dependence is a fearful trial to all Chinese statesmen, to all Chinese lovers of their country. What escape from that dependence? No escape, except the invention of a national system of taxation which will yield promptly an adequate national annual revenue. That way lies the only escape from the dependent condition of China. How can such a system be established? Not by any action of the Chinese themselves unaided. There are no men in China competent for that task; no Chinese have been trained competent to establish such a revenue for the government. Therefore, foreign advice is indispensable. It must be disinterested advice; it must not come through advisers thrust upon them by any one of the six powers. It must be advice given by foreigners employed by the Chinese government itself as its servants. One of the most difficult problems before the Chinese government

today is, how to obtain disinterested foreign advisers for its service. It is encouraging that they have found one suitable adviser, Dr. George Ernest Morrison, a great friend of the Chinese people, a liberal, open-minded British subject, long resident in China, the collector of a unique library of books on China, and himself master of the library. There is a good beginning made. It is a great puzzle for the educated Chinese themselves how they can select the expert foreign advisers they reluctantly admit to be indispensable. One of the cabinet said to me, "We Chinese cannot select the right kind of foreign adviser by looking at him and talking with him. We have difficulty in discerning the character of a western person in his face and manner. His manners are sure to be different from what we call good manners; and we cannot judge by the aspect, speech, and bearing of the foreign person whether he possesses the needed qualities of integrity and good judgment." I have heard a good many Occidental gentlemen say the same thing about judging the quality of Chinese gentlemen. We feel quite alike, Orientals and Occidentals, on that subject.

What, then, are the grounds of hope for the Republic? How many Americans, Englishmen, and Scotchmen I met in China who had no hope at all for the Republic! How many who had really regretted the departure of the Manchus? I met several eminent diplomats who until the middle of April had hoped that the Manchus might return to power, and had done everything in their power to bring about that return; it was not until the middle of April that the diplomatic corps at Peking made up their minds that the Manchus had gone forever. They were taken wholly by surprise by the outbreak of the Revolution, and for months they believed that the Manchus could head a limited monarchy with constitutional adjuncts. Now the most difficult form of government to set up and carry on is a constitutional monarchy. It is vastly more difficult than to set up a republic, or a dictatorship with republican forms. Nevertheless, a great majority of the diplomats, consuls, and foreign merchants and barristers in China believed and hoped it would be possible to create in China a constitutional monarchy

after the Manchus had abdicated. There are many foreigners now resident in China who cannot bring themselves to believe that it is possible for a republic, even with a closely restricted suffrage, to be carried on in China. What ground is there for supposing, or imagining, that a republican form of government can be set up in China and be made stable? To my thinking, there is in the quality of the Chinese people as a whole strong ground for holding to that hope. The Chinese people have come through every possible struggle with adverse nature, and every possible suffering from despotic government; they have come through recurrent floods, droughts, and famines; they have been subject without defence not only to the sweeping pestilences like small-pox, cholera, and the plague, but to all the ordinary contagious diseases, to tuberculosis, and to all the fevers. Yet here they are by unknown hundreds of millions, tough, industrious, frugal, honest, and fecund. One hears of dishonest (at least, foreigners use that word in speaking of them) officials; but one seldom hears of a common Chinese man who is dishonest. They are notoriously honest in trade, in dealing with each other, and even with foreigners. They seem not to be liable to the alcoholic temptation, and as a rule are peaceably inclined, although liable, like some other peoples, to be transported by gregarious passions, superstitions, and panics. Now these are solid moral qualities in the Chinese. Their virtues are great, and high, and deep. Moreover, they have a producing value which is wonderful. They get everything possible out of the soil of China; and as a Western-trained, refined Chinese woman physician said to me in Tientsin, a woman who has been through everything that a woman can endure, and is now practising her profession in the midst of the Chinese poverty and desolation, "Here we are, poor, suffering, but indomitable!" Here is the ground for believing that it may be possible to create a free government in China. After all, the real foundations of free government all over the world lie in the character of the people. They must deserve to be free.

For an old American who has seen a good many changes of public feeling at home, and has seen a large number of alien races come into his own country by the million, it is impossible not to sympathize profoundly with the present huge effort of the Chinese people. It is impossible for a visiting American with any experience in administration and its normal difficulties not to sympathize with these few men who have taken their lives in their hands and risked their whole careers, and are trying to build up a free government in China. Who could fail to sympathize with men in such a dangerous position, trying to do this immense service to such a people? And yet I am sorry to say that the lay representatives of the western peoples, the Occidentals living in China, diplomatic, consular, commercial, or industrial, have seldom manifested during the past year genuine sympathy with this immense effort on the part of a few hundred thousand men out of the huge population of China. It is very possible, indeed, common, for a foreign merchant to remain a whole generation in China and never make the acquaintance of a single Chinese gentleman, or indeed, of any Chinese above the grade of a house-servant, a porter, or a clerk. An English merchant, who had been conducting thirty-five years a successful, widespread business in China, told me that he did not know a single word of Chinese, or a single Chinese man except his compradore. Hundreds of foreigners in China live there for many years without making the acquaintance of a single Chinese lady or gentleman. In the middle of the city of Tientsin in the British concession is a small municipal garden. On the gates of the garden there was posted until the Revolution had been some months in progress the following notice: "No Chinese or dogs allowed." The secretary of the two municipal councils in Tientsin, an admirable Scotchman who has lived there many years, told me that that notice had been on those gates during his entire residence in Tientsin, and that the practice continued, although the notice had been withdrawn. In the clubs organized and resorted to by English, Americans, and other foreigners in

the Chinese cities, no Chinese person is eligible for membership. Think what that implies concerning the probable ignorance of the Occidental resident in China concerning the Chinese people, their qualities, their hopes, and their aspirations. The western people in China who really know something about the Chinese are the missionaries, teachers, and other foreigners who go to China, and stay there, with some philanthropic purpose, or hope of doing good. They get into real contact and friendly relations with the Chinese, both educated and uneducated. One must not be surprised, therefore, if one finds among foreign business men who have lived in China only the most superficial acquaintance with Chinese conditions and qualities. On the other hand, the great confidence which foreign merchants and bankers in China exhibit in their Chinese cashiers and agents is a strong testimony to the fidelity and honesty of that class of Chinese employees. Knowledge of the Chinese language is all-important to make intercourse between Chinese and foreigners profitable and helpful. Failing that, English is the best language to use. I have seen two Chinese gentlemen, one from the north and the other from the south, give up trying to make themselves mutually understood in Chinese, and take to English as their means of communication. There they were successful. The foreign missionaries, both clerical and medical, and the foreign teachers learn something of the Chinese language, and so win access to the Chinese mind and heart.

I believe I have put before you, ladies and gentlemen, some of the difficulties, obstacles, and apprehensions which beset the path of this wonderful Revolution. I hope I have also suggested to your minds the hopes and reasonable expectations we may cherish. My journey gave me the most interesting stay in a foreign country that I ever had, or indeed ever expect to have. I could not have arrived in China at a more interesting epoch, if I had had my choice over two thousand years; and we all are living in a time when an intelligent interest in the affairs of China will add not only to the breadth of our sympathies but to the enlargement of our hopes and expectations for mankind.

THE NEW HOLY ALLIANCE FOR CHINA

*By Albert Bushnell Hart, LL.D., Professor of Government in
Harvard University*

From present day amenities we turn to speak of the Holy Alliance, a subject not precisely relevant to the addresses of the morning, or likely to fit with the addresses that are to follow. I come as an amateur to speak to persons already better informed, to those who know what they are talking about. It is the peculiar province of the scholar first to appropriate the materials laboriously collected by other people; second, to generalize upon those materials, but in a spirit different from that of those who have collected them; and third, to promulgate what he hopes may be the eventual truth.

The historical criticisms of the closet scholars have ages ago attracted the attention of the great writers of an older race. One of the early Chinese classics remarks that "scholars teach men what is contrary to your laws. When they hear that an ordinance has been issued, everyone sets to discussing it with all his learning. In the court they are dissatisfied in heart; out of it they keep talking on the streets. While they make a pretence of vaunting their Master, they consider it fine to have extraordinary views of their own. And so they lead the people on to be guilty of murmuring and of evil speaking." As such a discontented scholar, I feel too much like the schoolboy who was called upon to define figure of speech, and to give an example. This was the result: "A figure of speech is when you say what you do not mean and yet mean what you say. Example: 'He blows his own horn.' That does not mean that he has a horn, but that he blows it."

In 1815 was founded by three great European powers through their sovereigns, Francis the First, Frederick William, and Alexander the First, a solemn league which they

called the Holy Alliance. In course of time all of the European powers gave it their adhesion except three—the Papacy, the Ottoman Porte, and Great Britain, though the Prince Regent, caused it to be remarked that England was in sympathy with the combination. If the Holy Alliance had only been sincere there would have been no more wars, no pestilences, no strikes, no duns—it was a great universal sedative, a mutual political insurance company. The purpose was that there never should be any more disturbances of the then existing international status.

The sovereigns held several congresses, at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818; at Troppau and Laybach in 1820 and 1821; and at Verona in 1822. They issued to the world some remarkable statements of their high moral purposes. Thus in 1820 they declared that the "Powers are exercising an incontestable right in taking common measures in respect to those states in which the overthrow of the government may result in an hostile attitude toward all continuous and legitimate government." In the next year at Laybach they solemnly announced that "useful and necessary changes in the legislation and administration of states must emanate alone from the free will and enlightening impulse of those whom God had rendered responsible for power," that is, from themselves. This lofty spirit reminds one of the remark of a great railroad president a few years ago, that the commercial affairs of the country should be carried on by those to whom God had given authority over the property of the country.

The Holy Alliance very soon found its opportunity when revolutions broke out in Spain, in Naples, and in Portugal, and it set itself to restore the monarchs whose faithful subjects did not appreciate them. The most striking thing about the Holy Alliance is not so much that it existed, as that its whole effort was an abject failure. To be sure Austria as the representative of the Holy Alliance crushed out the revolution in Naples; but Naples eventually became a part of the free and united Italy. France restored absolutism in 1823; but Spain, after a period of ninety years is still going through a process of protest against absolutism. A revolution broke out in Greece in 1821, and then and there

began that century-long process which through the arms of four of the Balkan Christian powers is apparently just reaching its end. The attempt to subvert free thought was absolutely hopeless. That is the Holy Alliance assumed to determine what should be the proper type of government and political thought in Europe: it absolutely failed in maintaining its cherished type of government; and it became a laughing stock for the nations.

In the year of grace 1912 we observe a combination of European powers partly operating in China, partly operating at the headquarters of their governments in Europe, which is fairly comparable to the Holy Alliance in its form, in its purposes, and, we trust, in the eventual failure of its aims. The basal idea of the combination of European powers is that six associated foreign nations can better decide than the Chinese themselves what shall be the future government and the destiny of that great empire. This principle is not a new one. I see before me people who have lived for years in China, and they can tell you better than a visitor for a few months about the general relations of diplomats and commercial men to the Chinese government and people. They will however all agree that from the time that the European powers first broke into China, which was in 1840, the Europeans have in general adhered to the idea that their presence in China was not based on advantage to the Chinese, but on their own purposes, and for their own benefit. Thus Burlingame wrote in 1868: "Yet, notwithstanding this manifest progress, there are people who will tell you that China has made no progress, that her views are retrograde, and they will tell you that it is the duty of the Western duty powers to combine for the purpose of coercing China into reforms that they may desire and which she does not desire—who undertake to state that these people have no rights which they are bound to respect. In their coarse language they say, 'Take her by the throat.' Using the tyrant's plea they say they know better what China wants than China herself does." That, you see, was many years ago, nearly half a century, in a period of impatience with China.

One reason for this attempt on the part of the Europeans to control China is an ignorance of the real character of the Chinese. Of all the people who visit China and even who spend years there, few really become sufficiently acquainted with the Chinese to put them within the possibility of understanding the conditions of the Chinese mind or the ultimate purposes of the Chinese government. It is a standing criticism upon foreign business men that they associate so little with the Chinese; that so few of them ever acquire the language, that so very few qualify themselves to give an expert opinion on what is going on in China. Many years ago an English consul said, "There is perhaps no country in the world frequented by the English-speaking race in which merchants are so lamentably ignorant of the customs and resources of the locality in which they live as they are at this moment in China, and this is entirely to be attributed to a want of familiarity with the language."

Perhaps there has been a similar ignorance on the part of the Chinese. Thus Wo Jen, grand secretary of the imperial library in 1868 wrote, "As to observing the customs of the foreigners and learning from them—their customs are nothing but lasciviousness and cunning, while their inclinations are simply fiendish and malignant." Of course that is brutally insulting for an Oriental to say of an Occidental, but when we say similar things of the Chinese it is only a needed rebuke to an inferior people.

In 1868 or thereabouts a man named Robertson wrote in an English review: "If China will assent to progress and development of her resources under a system of well-considered pressure by the foreign ministers; even if its rulers are under fear of armed compulsion if they refuse, we cannot see that the exercise of this pressure in a reasonable manner by the foreign governments is objectionable. Any improvement in China is possible only under such a system. We have no desire to be unjust or unreasonable toward the Chinese . . . but we strongly object to any assurance being given the Chinese authorities that the time and manner of their progress are left to their own discretion, and that therefore, they need no longer fear to

disregard the demands of the British minister at Peking. . . . The judgment of the Chinese themselves on the perils that beset their future course is utterly worthless."

That, of course, is exactly in line with the present attempt of foreign powers to decide the destiny of China. I quote it simply to illustrate the underlying idea held by many of the diplomats, that China exists chiefly to furnish opportunities for the application of the advanced principles of the West, that God created that people, not in order that there might be a Chinese nation, but that they might furnish a field for Chinese investment.

The European powers were a long time, three centuries in fact, in obtaining access to the Chinese ports, because of an obstinate Chinese determination not to trade with exterior nations. Under great pressure the Chinese were prevailed upon to open up a certain number of their ports as points of contact between themselves and the outside world. Then began a system of European regulation of these ports, and then the ticklish business of a European power undertaking to say, "You must make even your customs duties to suit us." We must not forget that the bottom idea of all the treaty stipulations as to extraterritoriality, customs rates and intercourse is not the welfare of the people in Asia, but the profit and ease of doing business by the people in the West, and the prestige of the governments that thus intervene.

As soon as a foothold in the treaty ports was gained, began the process of seizing territory. Most of the powers wanted to push up into the country as far as they could back of the treaty ports. They were always demanding more privileges of intercourse, and of late years have made a determined and concerted campaign for concessions from the Chinese. The Chinese are not held competent to decide on their own means of transportation. And foreigners are eager to build railroads, not because they think the Chinese need railroads, but because the European and American bankers need the profit of the railroads. The imperial government was very ill-organized to resist such pressure; at the start it was not accustomed to relations with foreign

powers: it formed the Tsung Li Yamen with great regret, and stolidly held back in all negotiations for further power and influence to foreigners.

The whole situation in China is complicated by the foreign possession of so many pieces of territory which the Chinese fondly suppose are theirs. To say nothing about Cochin-China, Hong Kong, Kowloon, Tsintau, Wei Hai Woi and Port Arthur are now in the possession of the Germans, the English and the Japanese; and the Japanese and Russians are occupying parts of Manchuria and Mongolia. That is, four of the six powers that are now engaged in the attempt to manage and control China, are at the present moment in possession of large territories, every square yard of which the Chinese look upon as filched from them.

For a long time the powers engaged in single wars with China, each on its own account, and those wars were accompanied by a ruthlessness and destruction which can hardly be supposed to be a high moral lesson to the Chinese. If a foreign army should capture New York and plunder the Metropolitan Museum of Art and sell its irreplaceable treasures to peddlers, we should hardly think it a mark of Chinese civilization! Yet that was just what happened to the winter palace in 1860. Since 1900 the European powers have usually made it a point not to ask for individual privileges, but for joint privileges; so that the experience of China was that if Russia got a concession for a railroad, the French were instantly besieging for a like favor. And if Russia seized a piece of Chinese territory the Germans thought they must have a similar piece of stolen goods. Since the expedition to Peking in 1900 there has been a common military understanding.

The Chinese have always resented this form of diplomacy. They look upon their European friends as the Russian hero looked upon the king of the sea when the sea monster said: " 'Tis a long time since I have eaten fresh flesh, and lo! here it comes right into my very hands! Welcome, friend. Come here, and let me see at which end of you I shall begin!" Then the Tsarevitch began to say that among good people one behaved not so badly as to eat another up. "That is

too much,' cried the sea monster, 'he comes to force his own rules and regulations upon the homes of other people.'" Is it an exaggeration to say that the feeling of Europeans has been that any attempt of the Chinese to prevent the entry into and the commercial use of their country was regarded as an affront to Europe?

More recently has developed a common responsibility, particularly shown in the negotiations for indemnities after the Boxer outbreak. One of the interesting things about this combination is that a new European power has joined it, and that is Japan. The Japanese claim the privileges granted to Western powers—such as the right of intervention, extraterritoriality, and the right to trade on the Yangtze in subsidized vessels. They have put up a magnificent group of buildings at Hankow.

All this suggests the sublime purpose of the Holy Alliance, to do people good against their will; but the difficulty is increased by a commercial combination, the purpose of which is first of all to obtain concessions, for railroads, mines, and other needed enterprises. Anybody can see that China lacks capital, a need no more common there than on the Pacific slope of the United States, or on northwestern Canada. Such an infusion of borrowed wealth would enable the country rapidly to develop its means of transportation and its immense physical resources. The prime difficulty is that the powers conceive that they have an inherent right to invest money in China on terms which they themselves lay down; while in general the Chinese believe that the commercial agreements which they are asked to ratify are unfavorable to them. At the moment the burning question is that of loans. China has long been a borrower on not very favorable terms, and there is already a considerable national debt. The revolution has cost a lot of money and there is a demand for more loans first of all to pay off and disband troops. A group of bankers favored by the six powers have established themselves as a syndicate for this business, and propose terms on which they will place a \$300,000,000 loan.

The six-power loan under consideration in November,

1912, is practically the work of a commercial Holy Alliance formed to regulate Oriental affairs. The determination of the ministers of six great powers in consultation to push through a financial transaction which China does not like is an unseemly spectacle, not relieved by the undeniable fact that weak powers are frequently called upon to yield to stronger forces. A foreign administration of the loans is one of the conditions, though hard and humiliating—for it is urged that Orientals cannot conduct their native finances. The Japanese know better, for they have almost dispensed with foreign financial engineers and managers.

The next demand, which is at least evidently favored by the powers, is that if money is lent it shall be lent only by a combination of the bankers of the six powers. I regret that the United States should be one of the partners in such an enterprise. The American bankers are justified in looking after their own interests, and in finding a profitable investment for their money; but it is a serious business for the bankers to insist that they will lend the money only in case a foreign administrator is to follow it. For the power to supervise the expenditure of that money includes the power to control much of the finances and the public works of China. It involves an inspection and regulation of the internal financial administration of the country.

In the background the Chinese believe that they see the shadow of the armed man. A few years ago they gave Russia permission to build a railroad across Manchuria and to protect it with guards. The Russian conception of guards was an army of 50,000 men intending to stay on Chinese soil, and their descendants forever. The Chinese suspect that it is the intention of the powers, whenever they think it necessary, to send troops into the country to enforce the carrying out of conditions. In the six groups each group has its government behind it, which demands a share in the loan for its citizens as a matter of right. What is the reason for this pressure? Mainly that each group of bankers expects that the Chinese will spend at least a part of the loans for materials and supplies, and that the orders will go through the loaning bankers and to their friends and commercial connections.

I speak subject to correction by those who are better acquainted with the subject, but when I was in China in 1909 that was the point stated to me; and the negotiations for the loan now appear to turn on that issue.

Outside of finance, what is the relation of the New Holy Alliance to the Chinese republic? One reason for the present combination is undoubtedly that some of the powers are not pleased with the proposed democratic government of China. But it is no longer possible for any one European or American power seriously to affect the internal government of China, for the potential strength of that nation is coming to be more and more realized.

Of the six powers, two are themselves democracies, the United States and France. On the other hand an Asiatic republic is on the face of things repugnant to both Russia and Japan. And there is perhaps no country in the world that is so genuinely democratic as China, no country in which the affairs of the local communities are more systematically regulated by the people themselves. This distrust of democracy is combined with a feeling that the republic cannot stand; and this objection is confronted by the fact that there is no other kind of national government now in existence or in prospect in China, no royal dynasty, no acknowledged oligarchy. Granted the weakness of the present republic is stronger than any government which could be established by external influence and pressure.

The real objection is to the possibility of a permanent strong power in China which shall realize the inconvenience and national discredit through foreign domination. Any strong Chinese power will certainly address itself to the status of the concessions in the treaty ports in which the Europeans rule portions of Chinese territory.

Equally acute is the question of the government of the European colonies within the Chinese boundaries. If the Chinese government, republic or kingdom, is once aroused to the possibility of expelling the foreigners, the era of European domination is over. Hence the unwillingness to allow the low scale of import duties to be changed for it is intimately related to the trade of the treaty ports. Of

course the United States recognizes that a system of high duties on imports is inequitable to foreign powers and absolutely inconsistent with the principles of international law.

The privileges of the interior, especially those of the Yangtse Kiang, are also involved. Admiral Mahan says: "The close approach and contact of eastern and western civilization, and the resultant mutual effects, are matters which can no longer be disregarded, or postponed from any arguments derived from the propriety of non-interference, or from the conventional rights of a so-called independent state to regulate its own affairs. They have ceased to be its own in the sense of Chinese isolation—as the nations have insisted that we shall be allowed to sell and buy without pretending that the Chinese subject should be compelled to trade with us—so they will have to insist that currency be permitted to our ideas, liberty to exchange thought in Chinese territory with individual Chinamen, though equally without any compulsion. "This is substantially a doctrine that western powers have an innate right to exercise benevolent compulsion on the Chinese to compel them to receive foreigners on terms dictated by the foreigners.

The immediate evidence of this spirit is the indifference to the substantial Chinese interests in Mongolia and in Manchuria. While unready or unwilling to prevent the virtual conquest of these provinces from China, the six powers pretend to make far-reaching decisions with respect to the future government of China. For if you are going to put in an administrator to superintend a loan, that means that you have a right to keep order and maintain the value of your security. You must suppress revolutions—not every revolution, of course; only such revolutions as you think are undesirable for your interests. The underlying principle of the present Holy Alliance in the East is to keep China weak politically, while trying to make her industrially strong; and to see that the results of commercial gain shall not get out of the control of those who now take responsibility for its finances.

I submit that in such an Holy Alliance the United States has no rightful part. It is contrary to a century long policy

of avoiding combinations with other powers. It is contrary to the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine, which was a protest against the operations of the old Holy Alliance in America. It is contrary to our policy in regard to the Panama canal: this country admitted no European partner in that great enterprise. It is contrary to our economic interest, which is for a productive China.

Nor is it necessary for the United States to dictate to China in behalf of its own money power. It is no time for us, when we are trying to curb corporations which menace the existence of democratic government in America, to go out into the Orient to use the authority of the United States in aid of the projects of similar aggregations of capital. The old Holy Alliance failed, and the New Holy Alliance is destined to a like failure, because it is unnatural and topheavy. The United States through the Monroe Doctrine precipitated the collapse of the old combination and should stand by its doctrine of the independence of nations.

It is not for us to dictate to other peoples what their government shall be; we are not entirely successful in orderly and popular government here at home. Is it likely that by joining with five other powers, not one of which is sincerely sympathetic with our idea of government, we can help the Chinese to set up a solid government? To my mind the serious question and issue of the moment is: what kind of government will be most advantageous to the Chinese? No nation, no group of nations, has a right to insist that the commercial affairs of another nation shall be regulated for the benefit of outsiders.

The whole scheme really rests upon the supposed fundamental incapacity of the Chinese. That comes with ill grace from such moderns as we are. Many of the Chinese were living in cities with an elaborate civilization when our Teutonic ancestors were pursuing the aurochs for an evening meal and had not so much as heard of the Romans. The antiquity of the Chinese is a proof that they have some power to make a government for themselves. For their isolation they have had excuse: other nations have not been kind to them. The Chinese wall, typical in our speech

of an unreasoning and hurtful barrier, is one of the world's greatest achievements because it was successful, because for centuries it did keep out those mounted neighbors that were such a scourge to China.

In the long run the six-power system is against the interests of the six powers. What will be the effect on China if this week or next the European powers are swept into a general war? If it were impossible to reinforce the present scanty European garrisons how long would Tsintau remain German or, Kowloon English, or the Shanghai concessions European? If I were a Chinese I would stand as long as I lived for the doctrine that my country is entitled to its own territory and to its own control.

So far as the ability of the Chinese to maintain a government is concerned it is not within the compass nor the province of allied nations to alter their circumstances or character. Doubtless the governmental conditions are crude, clumsy and imperfect; but they will not be improved by a six-part tutorship. The Chinese deserve to be taken on their merits, as shown by experience; upon their ability or inability to maintain a government.

Hence it would seem in accordance with American policy to recognize the republic of China, instead of joining in embarrassing it. I do not claim that the Chinese are perfect people, or even that they are capable of maintaining a republican government; but they have become the greatest potential power in Asia. I predict that there will be a Chinese nation, a Chinese language and literature, and a Chinese influence, quite as long as there is an English or an American nation, language and literature. I believe that China is one of the prime forces in the world. It is simple morality that the United States of America should consider the interests of the Chinese in dealing with them as well as the interests of our citizens. Proper trade between any two nations is mutually profitable and hospitable. America ought to be the helpful nation to China, an uplifting and sustaining influence in the present great difficulties of that government. I believe that it is not our business to be part and parcel of a combination founded in part for the protection of Europeans

in China, but essentially based in selfishness. The commercial organization of the present Holy Alliance is at bottom a movement for making money out of the Chinese by Europeans and Americans. As a money-making enterprise the six-power financial scheme lies outside of our legitimate national interests.

THE EFFECT OF THE REVOLUTION UPON THE
RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE
UNITED STATES

By Ching-Chun Wang, Ph.D., Assistant-Director of the Peking-Mukden Railway, Delegate from the Republic of China to the recent International Congress of Chambers of Commerce

The Chinese people, heretofore silent and submissive, rose up so suddenly and simultaneously last year, that even careful observers were totally surprised. What was even more unexpected was the incredible brevity and unparalleled bloodlessness of the Revolution. In less than one-third of a year, they have removed a monarchical system which had been regarded as unremovable, and introduced a democratic government which has stood the test during the most dangerous period of the last eleven months. They have done all this with a moderation and sanity which have never been paralleled, thus setting a new standard in the fighting and winning of revolutions by peaceful methods.

What is going to be the effect of this upheaval upon the relations between the two largest nations on the Pacific? This question concerns us especially, for upon it largely depends the greatness of the one, the stability of the other, and the prosperity of both.

In order to ascertain this effect, we may first of all examine what this great change means. It has been repeatedly said that one of the most certain results of the Revolution will be the increase of China's foreign trade. In spite of all sorts of drawbacks, this trade has already reached the enormous proportion of 870 million taels¹ in 1910, as against 455 million ten years ago. In other words, even behind closed doors, this trade has increased almost 100 per cent during the short space of a decade. Enormous as this

¹ A tael equals about 75 cents in American money.

foreign trade may appear, it only represents two taels, or one dollar and a half per capita per year, which may easily be increased to five billion taels, if every Chinese consumes only one-half as much as each of his eastern neighbors, the Japanese. Therefore, we can see from all available signs that there is not the least doubt that this phenomenal increase of foreign trade will soon take place.

Side by side with commerce, China's industries will advance. She will bend every effort to utilize the enormous latent power of the millions and millions of her laborers for the development of her unlimited resources. When we recall that each one of these millions of the so-called coolies, who now idles his time away and proves to be a burden to society, on account of lack of productive occupation, has in him not only the power of making a comfortable living for himself and his family, but of adding a considerable share to the sum total of the wealth of the nation, if he is only given a fair chance to work, we may then have some idea of what these teeming millions mean. As the United States is gifted by nature with the inexhaustible power of Niagara and other falls, so China is no less blessed by God in having an equal, if not more precious amount of power in her immense industrious population. What China is now trying to do is to turn these millions to account, so that the misery and sufferings of which we have heard so much, may be changed into happiness and content, not by charity from outside but by making use of the worth of these sufferers themselves. The railroads—thousands and thousands of miles of them—must soon be built. Following the railway, the mines, which are not only extraordinarily rich but almost numberless, must be opened. Industries will in turn spring up. Forests will be developed and agriculture modernized. In short, China will be completely transformed.

Side by side with this material development, moral and religious advancement will also engage our attention. Indeed, from what the writer has seen and heard, he feels justified in saying that more effort will be devoted to the elevation of the moral and ethical standards of the people from now on than ever before, and that the belief in a single

Deity will be more rigorously revived, and eventually adopted as the dominating, if not the only, belief in China. This may sound impossible; but we must remember that the Chinese are a practical people, and that they are already beginning to see that there is no other religion which is more enlightening and practical than true Christianity. Moreover, true Christianity, more than any other religion, agrees with Confucianism. As a matter of fact, these two doctrines can well be moulded together so as to be mutually helpful. Christianity supplies the part which Confucius has omitted, while Confucianism, in China at least, could render Christianity not only easier to understand, but more up to date in every day life. The idea of God has been repeatedly, though vaguely, emphasized in the teachings which constitute Confucianism. Again and again, we find passages in the ancient books which refer to the Almighty as being omnipotent and omnipresent. By careful interpretation and with due notice of the difference in the religious temperament of the Chinese and in the characteristics of expression in the Far East, the true lovers of God could take advantage of the present change to Christianize China while the scientists and engineers are "materializing" her.

We said a moment ago true Christianity, because, like everything else, Christianity could be made to mean different things to suit various occasions, according to the degree of man's emotions or other circumstances. The apparently mechanical worship taking place all day and all over the streets in Russia does not seem to be the same thing as that shown by some of the reverent prayers offered in some of the churches elsewhere, and yet both are called Christianity. The heartless religious massacres of the middle ages, of which more than one sect were guilty, do not appear to be much more justifiable than the massacres recently reported to be taking place in Constantinople, and yet we understand they all were inspired by religious devotion and for Christian purposes. Therefore, we say true Christianity, for we do not need any more Christian superstitions in China than we need any other kind of superstitions. True Christianity must be that which only aims at the promotion of filial piety to God

and good fellowship among men. Anything that conflicts with this, to the writer at least, is not true Christianity. Therefore, we say true Christianity harmonizes, rather than conflicts, with Confucianism. The former attitude, harbored by some, of implacable hostility to all religions, ethics and philosophy other than Christian, and the persistent ignoring of the virtuous traditions and elevating customs which have acquired the dignity of venerable antiquity, is injurious to true Christianity itself; for such an attitude of disparaging one, deriding another and sneering at everything else that is found in the country, incurs the risk of defeating the very object which Christianity itself aims to attain. Indeed, such dogmatic efforts are liable to disintegrate the present social fabric and bring about the collapse of the existing morality without, or at least before, firmly establishing a proper substitute. Therefore, it is only by an enlightened method, that Christianity may be made to bear its proper share of fruit of blessing in the regeneration of China, while by continued dogmatism, we can only reap thorny disputes.

I have spent so much time on the question of religion for I believe that in the regeneration of China, material as well as moral and spiritual advancement must go side by side. What has saved China from disintegration during all these centuries and enabled her to stand the test of age is not material prosperity alone, much less military prowess, but her sacred inheritance of integrity in business, her unparalleled love of home and her tradition of avoiding going to extremes. In acquiring what is good in the western civilization, we shall endeavor to keep what is good in the civilization of our own.

Therefore, what we are aiming at now is to remove all defects in law or custom, to do away with all that dwarfs knowledge or stifles the freedom of thought, as well as to clean away all unworthy elements in pride of race. We want to remove all these obstructions to progress, and change the past supercilious contempt for Western learning and Western help into enthusiastic eagerness and genuine respect. In short, we want to make a complete "house-cleaning" so that we may be able to enjoy our own inheritance as well as

to contribute our share to the world. Instead of simply hearing people say it was our forefathers that first made gunpowder, invented printing, discovered the compass, and made many other useful inventions years ago, we want to do something ourselves. Many may have reasonably wondered why the Chinese should have stopped contributing to the material advancement of the world after their early and marvelous start, and some others may have even ridiculed us for being unable to keep up the record made by our forefathers, as shown by the absence of further important material contributions to civilization. We admit this failure with regret, but we must point out that it has not been due to our lack of capability but to its strangulation and wrong application. We have made little material advancement, because we have been applying our mind and energy entirely to the study of certain fossilized classics and the writing of a certain stereotyped system of essays. Think of what America could expect if she should make all her students study nothing but Shakespeare and use the ability of quoting passages from Cicero or Caesar as the criterion for selecting her officials! And yet, with few exceptions, that has been actually what China has been doing during the last one thousand years. Even our severest critics will understand why we have failed to advance materially as much as we should, when they know that we have been led by a false system to apply our intellects and energy in such a remorsefully wrong way.

Some may ask, why has China not found out earlier that she was in the wrong channel. The only excuse she can offer is that her self-sufficiency and comparatively high level of development, reached a thousand years ago, led her to feel that she could get along well without any more feverish struggles for material advancement. We are an original race, unmodified and unstrengthened during thousands of years by the introduction of any foreign blood. We have been separated and segregated from all of the growing portions of humanity during all those ages, and left to act and react upon ourselves. As a result, we have obtained a great fixedness in our own characteristics. We are said to be lacking in the faculty of true discrimination; but if we

were it is because we have long been deprived of all opportunity to compare or contrast ourselves with equals, much less with superiors. We refused to learn from others, because for centuries we had been in contact with few who could teach us. We are, you may say, too closely bred and rendered near-sighted by continually gazing upon ourselves. Our faculties have been over-developed, wrongly developed, and at the same time, perhaps, under-developed. We acknowledge all our shortcomings of the past; but we cannot yet admit that today our faculties are either too weak or too decadent. To the contrary, we have waked up and are determined to go forward and learn from all others. We may appear a little awkward in the beginning in adapting ourselves to western methods, but we feel certain that we can make progress and finally catch up. All that we need is a little time to readjust ourselves to the new order of things. With a reasonable amount of help from our friends, and taking advantage of our inheritance, we feel we shall soon be able, not only to take care of ourselves, but to contribute to the world as our forefathers did of old; and our only plea is that we may be permitted to work out our own salvation.

What China has already accomplished only proves that she is able to, and will accomplish more. Within the short space of six years, and under almost insurmountable difficulties from both economic drawbacks within, and diplomatic hindrances without, she has practically wiped out the devilish habit of opium smoking, so evil in its effects and so difficult to eradicate, that it makes all other kinds of habitual vice seem insignificant.² She has made unexpected progress in the abolition of the time-honored and universal fashion of foot-binding, and has almost completed the removal of the queue.³ Moreover, in the incredibly short time of forty-eight hours, she has accomplished the well-nigh impossible feat of changing her calendar of many hundreds of years standing. She has done all this quietly, modestly, and in a

² Consult also the author's article on "How China is Fighting Against Opium" in *The World Today* of July, 1910.

³ Also see the author's article on "The Abolition of the Queue" in the *Atlantic Monthly* of June, 1911.

business way. What China wants now is simply a chance to enable her intellectual, moral and material inheritance, which God has given to her and preserved for her during all these ages, to improve her own condition as well as to contribute the share which she owes others in solving the problems which are now disturbing the stability of mankind.

The Chinese have been known universally for their superiority as individuals and their weakness as a collective body. Writers say that the backwardness of China herself has been due to the lack of cohesion among the Chinese. Indeed, most of the struggles which China had heretofore were fought, not by China as a whole, but by three or four of her provinces. Once the Chinese millions unite, their collective strength will be increased in proportion to their individual superiority. If the recent Revolution has done nothing else, it has created a unanimity of sentiment and a feeling of oneness among the Chinese people. When the cause of the Revolution was understood, the northerner and the southerner, the man from the east as well as the man from the west, all rushed to the revolutionary camps, eager to fight shoulder to shoulder and ready to fall side by side. Indeed, as remarked by some correspondents, such united sentiment has never been seen in China before. When the time came for a compromise, these men were just as ready to lay aside all personal considerations for the safety of the country as they were ready to lay down their lives during the Revolution. The unparalleled self-denial exemplified by ex-President Sun and others in removing all misunderstanding and in bringing about a closer union between the north and the south, are but typical of the feeling of the thinking class. Indeed, it is the unprecedented oneness of sentiment of the Chinese people that has brought the Revolution to such a speedy and bloodless end; this unison of feeling is bound to grow and prove instrumental in the regeneration of the country.

Therefore, the recent change has brought China to a point where she can, and will, no longer remain the Rip Van Winkle of the Far East. During the coming generation, she will, to use the common expression, have either to make or to

break. We may see that selfishness has already led some of the powers to think that the awakening of China is not to their advantage. They believe it is to their interest that China should sleep always and remain ignorant eternally, so that they may satisfy their insatiable lust for grabbing other people's land and property. Indeed, some have already begun to take an unfair advantage of our situation to plunder, and have advanced arguments to justify their nefarious rascality in the eyes of the world. It is hardly necessary to comment seriously upon the validity of their arguments, since Satan never has any difficulty in quoting the Scripture, when he finds it handy for his devilish schemes. Therefore, we hear that Russia bases her claim to outer Mongolia upon her recent discovery, as the Russian press says, of an old document, somewhere in Siberia, which shows that Mongolia should be taken away from China.⁴ To a less degree, England also seems to think that by some divine right, she has a claim on Tibet, etc. But as said by many impartial observers and well-wishers of mankind, these arguments however plausible they may appear, and like poetry, however elegant they may seem to their authors, are not only false and unsound, but do not even contain enough substance of reason to disguise or conceal their real underlying motives of outrageous robbery.

Some of these vultures have been lurking around us for many years, and are now becoming more impatient than ever before, for they fear that now may be their last chance. On the other hand, after having emancipated themselves by both right and blood from the imperialism of the Manchu Court, the Chinese people are not likely to suffer the imperialism of the Russians or any other people. If we should inherit the foreign debts and enormous indemnities, much of which was iniquitously imposed upon the dissolved Manchu government, as the powers seem to take it for granted that we do, then by all laws of mankind, we feel we should also inherit the territories which were not only indisputably under the Manchu government, but have been rightfully inherited

⁴ See *Nineteenth Century Review* of October, 1912.

by us from time immemorial. Even filled with deliberate prejudice, the Russians themselves ought to know by conscience that Mongolia is ours, and that their argument⁵ in claiming that territory is not only untenable, but ridiculous, or even childish, when Russia herself urges that the obligations of the same Manchu government should be met by the Republic.

Here is the danger. If such greedy powers should purposely be so blind to the truth and actually take an undue advantage of our situation to plunder, and should the true friends of China be misled by some special interests to silently approve such plundering, they would only arouse the wrath of a people that may yet be able to protect and maintain what is right. The Chinese today feel and know what belongs to them, and are convinced by conditions in Siberia and elsewhere that subjugation by a foreign power only means strangulation of all possibilities of advancement, both materially and otherwise. They can tolerate anything and everything but further grabbing of their land. Therefore, by permitting or countenancing these powers to take an unfair advantage to slice territory from China, the civilized nations might drive the Chinese to revenge in such a way as to turn what is soon to become a great "hive of commerce" and prosperity into a cursed land of carnage and "Boxerism" as well as to endanger the peace of the world and paralyze the advancement of mankind, while by the exertion of a due amount of effort to maintain international justice to China during this period, they may enable the Chinese people soon to be able to take care of themselves and to contribute a great share to the promoting of honorable peace among nations as well as to the advancement of general human happiness. Today, therefore, is the time when the great nations like the United States can either make the Chinese millions a mighty instrument for promoting peace and prosperity, by helping them to make their intended progress, or else they can drive these same peace-loving

⁵ Their argument is, that as Mongolia belonged to the Manchu government, therefore it is free of China when the Manchu government is removed (see *Nineteenth Century Review* of October, 1912).

people, contrary to their will, to become bloodthirsty fiends for revenge, by countenancing the pending plunderings. Ought the Christian powers, above all the United States, to stand inert and see the vultures swoop upon China so soon after we have undergone such a serious "operation," and made a successful effort to recover and go forward? Would they drive us to desperate recklessness just at the moment when we begin to try as hard as we can to carry out the very reforms and accomplish the very ends which their own people and statesmen have been trying for more than sixty years to drag us to accomplish? By concerted action, not only China but even the strongest nation in the world could be wiped from the map! In this enlightened age of ours, should all nations show no regard for the common right of humanity, and ignore the just claims and inalienable inheritances of others? Should friendship mean words alone?

Of course we understand that nations are not benevolent institutions, and that their legitimate object is to promote the interests of the people within their charge, while the protection of the weak or the uplift of mankind are said to be only favorite expressions to suit certain occasions. But even from a purely selfish point of view, we can also see that it is of mutual and unqualified advantage that the two sister Republics should become closer and more sympathetic toward each other. Their aims, aspirations, needs, resources and many other characteristics, are extraordinarily harmonious and coöperating. All observers agree that the chief, if not the only, aim of the United States, is to develop commerce. As said Mr. John Foord, the able secretary of the Asiatic Society, the whole purpose of American diplomacy in China has been the furtherance of trade.⁶ American statesmen, business experts and veteran writers, have again and again emphasized the importance of the Chinese market. It certainly could not be of advantage to the American people as a whole, should China be Russianized or even remain weak.

On the other hand, the Chinese have made it long since clear that they welcome America's trade, and that, with

⁶ G. H. Blakeslee: *China and the Far East*, p. 114.

their own wholesome traditions and unlimited inheritance, they can certainly prove of considerable value and assistance to America, at least in this matter of commerce. Sending your first ship of trade to China in 1784, the American merchant has from the outset obtained a good footing.⁷ By leaps and bounds this trade has continued to grow until today it is second only to that of Great Britain and Japan, with a good prospect of catching up with both.

The existing trade of America, which is already approaching one hundred million taels a year, is but a small fraction of what may be expected to follow the opening up of the country. Those who know what possibilities lie in China's trade say that to increase the present figure ten times is but an easy matter, and that America should soon be able to compete even with Great Britain for the lion's share, if American merchants will only go after that trade which lies at their feet. Instead of the former closed doors which American statesmen tried so hard, for many years, to hammer through, today the whole country is ready to open. The Chinese are not only willing, but anxious to trade with America, for they know that she does not grab their land under the cover of trade or Christianity, and they also feel that the wider the sphere of mercantile relations between China and the United States, the more intimate the two countries will become. The writer is happy to say that the high type of business men of both China and the United States is going to contribute no small share to the unparalleled good relations between these two countries. The recent contact with so many leading business men of this country during the writer's tour from Boston to San Francisco impresses him vividly with their sterling worth as well as their capability and readiness to promote what is good. It is also gratifying to say that in this good effort the American business man may find in the Chinese merchant a worthy and, perhaps, helpful mate. Therefore, there is every reason to believe that as your trade with China began at the begin-

⁷ Portuguese merchants were the first to come to China in 1516; England came second in 1637; while the United States was the seventh. *China Year Book*, 1912, p. 74.

ing of your Republic, so it should take a new turn of prosperity from the beginning of our Republic, unless the United States should change her former square-deal policy.

It may also be mentioned that above all the United States is a power of the Pacific. The purchase of Alaska, the acquisition of Hawaii, the occupation of the Philippines, together with the construction of the Panama Canal, make it unmistakable that the future activity of America will largely be directed towards the Pacific Ocean. It is inevitable that it should be so, for the Pacific, as prophesied by William H. Seward half a century ago, is soon to become the center of civilization. Moreover, as it was the achievements on the Pacific in 1898 that gave the United States her place in the opinion of the world, so it will be what she accomplishes on the Pacific that upholds her position and prestige. China, in spite of her slowness, is yet able, and bound, to play an important part in determining the affairs on that ocean. The good will of that vast country, with her teeming millions, unlimited resources, and wholesome traditions, deserves not only to be maintained, but to be improved. The open door, which in reality means more than an equal opportunity to your trade and advancement,⁸ for which your statesmen have been fighting so hard, should not be slightly sacrificed and gradually closed by a silent approval of, or inert indifference toward, the land-grabbing which some of the Powers are planning. Because every foot of China Russianized or in any other way alienated, means just that much damage to American trade and prestige. The United States has so committed herself, and is so peculiarly related with China from the beginning of their intercourse, that the harm done to the one is bound to be felt by the other sooner or later. Indeed, "every blow aimed at the independence of that ancient empire," as remarked an able American writer, "is a blow at the prestige of this Republic, part of a deliberate attempt to make the position of the United States in 'the world's great hereafter' that of a second-rate power."⁹

⁸ This is perhaps why some nations prefer and actually brought about the closed door in some parts of the country.

⁹ G. H. Blakeslee, *China and the Far East*, p. 111.

Therefore, even if we cast aside the moral obligations which a strong nation owes to humanity, and change our question of what is best for China into what is best for the United States in China, or on the Pacific Ocean, we must still see that America is bound to profit by exerting substantial efforts to help China to struggle over her period of regeneration. In return China, as her traditions teach, will reciprocate a hundredfold.

There are, therefore, the strongest *a priori* reasons in favor of a closer and even more sympathetic understanding between the two great Republics in the world. China is slow, stupid, conservative, and everything else, but nevertheless, with her prodigious numbers, her vast extent, her unlimited resources, and her instinctive sense of gratitude, she can be a coadjutor in Asia of no mean value.

But, further, to judge the probability of close friendship between these two great Republics, we need only to examine the past. The relations between these countries have always been most cordial. They have never had even a quarrel, to say nothing of war. The United States is known to the Chinese as the only power which not only has never tried to seize our land, but has always endeavored to prevent others from committing such injustice. This feeling alone is enough to insure a lasting gratitude in the heart of the Chinese. The part played by John Hay in saving China from the clutches of the powers during the Boxer uprising in 1900, the unparalleled fairness of Mr. Roosevelt in influencing Congress to return to us the surplus Boxer indemnity, the recent efforts of President Taft in preventing interference during our Revolution, the unanimously carried resolution of Congress introduced by Governor-elect Sultzer for the recognition of the Chinese Republic, and the enthusiastic sympathy shown us by the best type of Americans all over the country, are but a few of the many favors from the United States which the Chinese people can never forget. Gratitude is not only an eminent virtue, as observed by many, but almost an inherited habit of the Chinese.¹⁰ As

¹⁰ Consult Herbert A. Giles's, *Civilization of China*, chapter on "Chinese and Foreigners."

soon as circumstances permit, China will, without the least doubt, demonstrate her appreciation of the favors shown her during the time when she is helpless. Indeed in a limited manner, she has already begun to show her appreciation. We still remember how the late Burlingame¹¹ was honored by China as her special ambassador to Europe in recognition of his friendly help. It was out of appreciation of America's fairness in returning the surplus Boxer indemnity that China has by her own will decided to use that money entirely for the education of her young men in the United States, the meaning of which act must be clear to every thinking American. Indeed, the feeling of gratitude of the Chinese towards the American people as a whole, and John Hay in particular, will become more profound as we progress. When China is free from obstructions of the greedy powers, and starts on her own way to progress, we can prophesy that the most majestic monument in honor of the Christian statesmanship of John Hay will not be found in the United States, but in China. For John Hay will become more beloved to the Chinese than to his own people.

Then again, the Chinese know perfectly well that America only desires greater trade facilities. As President Taft has recently declared, trade is the forerunner of peace and friendship.¹² The Chinese have always believed in this doctrine, and therefore they welcome the Americans. A trade that benefits only one side of the bargain will not last long, while that which benefits both is not going to be slighted by either. Thus as our commercial relations increase so will our friendship grow. With her geographical advantages, her enormous resources and her characteristic capacity in business enterprise, America should have the best advantage over all in distributing her commerce and disseminating her influence in the regeneration of China, which is bound to follow the Revolution.

¹¹ Consult Frederick W. Williams: *Anson Burlingame and the First Chinese Mission to Foreign Powers*, New York, 1912.

¹² Before the Fifth International Congress of Chambers of Commerce in Boston.

It must also be mentioned that America itself is directly responsible for the Revolution. Indeed some even go so far as to say that it was an American Revolution, because it was so much American. In the first place many of the leaders of the movement, such as ex-President Sun Yat-Sen, were either educated in America or lived under American influence. In every revolutionary center, there were numbers of American-educated students. Therefore as the French Revolution was inspired by America's success so China's Revolution was brought about and won by America's education.

There must be added the fact that many Americans themselves—missionaries, educators and merchants alike—were in no small measure personally responsible for what happened in China. Besides sowing the seed of the Revolution during the last sixty years, these Americans have shown unmistakable sympathy and rendered every legitimate help to the Revolution. Indeed the Christian efforts of these self-sacrificing men in leaving their own homes and coming over to China to preach the Gospel and to diffuse knowledge, as well as their help during the Revolution itself, have contributed no small share in making the Revolution so sane and bloodless. The good results of their efforts have won not only the confidence, but also the good will of the Chinese people, and there is not the slightest doubt that these Americans will exert even a greater influence in the future.

As the seed of the Revolution was sown by America thirty years ago in the hearts of our students who first came to this country, so the constructive work following the Revolution will be done under the influence of America which hundreds and hundreds of our leaders will receive. The handful of young men who received their education in this country have already done a great deal; but what may be expected of the hundreds of our students now found in every important educational institution of America cannot but be tremendous. These young men study not only American text books, but they themselves become Americanized. When they return to China they do everything they can to spread the good name of America.

Therefore, since the seed of the Revolution was sown by America, and the success and saneness of it made possible by American educated men with the help of American citizens, and since the constructive work will also be done directly under American influence as well as along principles laid down by America, we can easily see that every success China makes will mean just that much credit to the United States, while each failure she meets will no less reflect upon America.

As we realize more clearly the great influence which America has had upon this Revolution, we shall feel more grateful for our success towards her, the result of which will not only be the increase of American trade, but American ideas as well, in China. We have eight hundred students in the United States today; we shall probably have twice that number five years to come. In return, the number of your missionaries, educators, and merchants to China will increase in proportion to meet the greater demand. This exchange of goods, ideas and men between our two countries is bound to improve the understanding and mutual appreciation of each other, the result of all of which cannot but be a still closer relationship between our two nations.

We must remember, however, that there are some dangerous circumstances which might imperil our good prospects. We do not fear any political differences between our two nations, nor do we even need to mention the once possible irritation arising from the exclusion act. Concerning the difficulties arising from the latter, we believe that the best type of Americans regret the existence of such difficulties as much as we do. Moreover, we also believe in the good sense of the American people who have been endeavoring and will continue to endeavor to ameliorate all the obnoxious features until the act will no longer remain humiliating to us or unbecoming to you.

Furthermore, we also feel that we can take care of our own coolies. In the developing of our railways, mines, and manufactures, we certainly shall be in need of our own cheap labor. In addition, our uncultivated land alone will furnish employment to whatever labor we can spare, provided

Russia does not succeed in stealing too much of it from us. China proper itself is estimated, on good authority,¹³ to be sufficient to maintain a population of 650 to 700 millions. In other words, by simply developing our own provinces, we can increase our population 80 per cent, and get along comfortably for at least fifty or a hundred years, without requiring any relief by exodus. We may also venture to say that, if America keeps on increasing her population at the present rate, and with such help as Colonel Roosevelt's crusade against race suicide, and Dr. Eliot's recent preaching before the Harvard freshmen in favor of marriage, at the end of fifty years China might have to reverse the law so as to bar American emigrants. This may seem too much like a joke. Nevertheless, it is by no means impossible. At any rate, many may have already found out that the fear of the invasion of the Chinese immigrant is passing away from the hearts of even those who used to make the loudest cry, while many others are beginning to feel the need of the help of Chinese agricultural labor. As a matter of fact, China herself disfavors the unregulated emigration of her ignorant classes as much as the United States. Under such circumstances, we need not worry the least over this unpleasant question, because it will soon die its natural death.

What seems to be the real danger lies in the unduly selfish acts which may be committed by some of the financial "promoters" who hesitate sometimes neither to extract a pound of flesh for a pound of gold—to use the familiar expression—nor to sell the good will which others have won. This danger would become perilous should the governments be misled to sacrifice what is good for their people in the long run, for the immediate but short-lived gains of a few. I refer especially to the unfortunate act of the American China Development Company of some seven years ago,¹⁴

¹³ G. Curson, *Problems of the Far East*, p. 399.

¹⁴ Led by her confidence in America, China granted to the American-China Development Company the concession for the construction of the trunk line between Canton and Hankow, a distance of about one thousand miles, on the expressed condition that the controlling interest of the concession should remain in the hands of Americans. Soon after the concession was granted the American financiers sold the controlling interest

by which these promoters betrayed the confidence of China, sold the fair name of America, and incidentally brought down a widespread boycott against the innocent American people. A gigantic swindle is no word to express that near-sighted deal. Time and space forbid us to go into details of that transaction, which is regarded as unfortunate both by China and the United States. Suffice it to say that that was the only thing which has done much damage to the good feeling between the people of our two countries, and that all well-wishers of both countries should try in every way to prevent similar unfortunate acts from being repeated to mar America's fair name of the past or to damage her immense trade opportunities in the future. We call attention to dangers from such or similar sources, for it is well known that it is for such purposes that even good people may be led to misrepresent, to fabricate or to do everything else that proves expedient.

In conclusion, we may observe again that the relations between China and the United States have always been both cordial and sympathetic. As a result of the Revolution, their mutual responsibilities, as well as mutual obligations, have increased. These two great nations are bound to have a thousand times more to do with each other; and as this increased intercourse grows and multiplies, the relations between them will become more sympathetic and their friendship more intimate. Because the relationship between these two countries is not the result of mutual fear, but of mutual advantage, harmony in interest and identity of ideals.

directly to some Belgians, but indirectly to Russia, the very thing which China tried to avoid. As a result China was compelled to purchase back that interest at an enormous financial sacrifice, besides suffering other difficulties. Also see P. H. Kent, *Railway Enterprise in China*, 1907, pp. 96-121, and the author's article on "Why the Chinese Oppose Foreign Railway Loans" in the *American Political Science Review* of August, 1911.

A PLEA FOR FAIR PLAY AND THE RECOGNITION OF THE CHINESE REPUBLIC

*By Major Louis Livingston Seaman, M.D., LL.B., F.R.G.S.,
President of the China Society of America*

The problem of the Orient is the problem of the twentieth century, and today, China is its key. The most eventful year of modern times in the life of the Chinese people has just passed into history. They have escaped from the despotism of a corrupt monarchy to the freedom of a republic. The problems which now confront them are the recognition of their government as a republic by foreign nations, and the adjustment of their finances. Unless these are arranged to the satisfaction of a powerful syndicate of bankers, backed by the diplomats of their various countries, it has been intimated that the partitioning of the country may be apprehended as a probable eventuality.

It might have been hoped that the carnival of territorial lust, which for centuries caused untold bloodshed the world over, had culminated in the partitioning of Africa—the last of the continents to be parceled off by the world's looters, who in the division of the spoils, followed, as the robber barons of feudal times,

The good old rule, the simple plan,
That they should take who have the power,
And they should keep who can.

But look at China today—that grand old country, with its great wall which for over twenty centuries protected it from the hordes of Tartars and Mongols on the north, while its Thibetan ranges on the west, and impenetrable forests on the south, permitted it to live in peace and tranquillity thousands of years, with no fear of molestation by “foreign devils,” from land or sea. And in this time the beautiful but fallacious philosophy of Confucius, which taught the

rule of moral suasion rather than that by might, grew until its essence was expressed in the proverb, "Better have no child than one who is a soldier"—this, too, in a land where it is considered a disgrace to die childless.

And what was the natural result: A condition of insecurity, of defencelessness, of inability to enforce that first law of nature—self-protection—followed, which, when realized by the Occidental nations, resulted in their seizing great sections of her domains upon trivial excuses, and wringing most valuable concessions from her rulers.

As a direct result of this spoliation, the worm at last turned, and the Boxer uprising of 1900 followed, having for its declared purpose the forcible expulsion of all foreigners from the country, and the recovery by China of her despoiled possessions. I say, without fear of contradiction by those who are familiar with that issue (and I was there), that that uprising was one of the most splendid exhibitions of patriotism witnessed in modern times. The methods pursued by the Chinese, due to the ignorance of their misguided leaders, and the horrors that followed, have afforded the theme for many a tragic tale and numberless explanatory theories. But the plain fact cannot be gainsaid, nor too strongly emphasized, that the essential motive of that propaganda was the freeing of the land from the hated foreigners, who, in current phrase, had "robbed the people of their country."

It was then, that in reprisal and revenge, the so-called civilized world turned against them. The eight allied armies of the "great powers" marched to their capital, slaughtered their people, raped their women, looted their temples, their treasure and their habitations, committed brutalities that would have made Nero envious, and created a sentiment in China which fairly crucified Christianity, and which should rebound to the shame and humiliation of the Christian nations whose forces participated in the outrages; but which, instead, secured monstrous indemnities and subjected China to the most humiliating terms of peace that were ever inflicted upon a nation, and that have kept her poverty-stricken ever since. America, however, has reason for pride in that she waived claims to over half the indemnity, whilst

her great statesman, John Hay, succeeded temporarily in preserving the integrity of the country by his splendid policy of the "open door."

Never shall I forget that winter at Ching Wan Tao, following the war, where detachments of the allied army were gathered awaiting the fate of China. They reminded me of a pack of hungry wolves around the carcass of a dead animal—each fearing to set his fangs in the carcass, lest while so engaged his neighbor might do the same with him. And so during the long negotiations that finally led to the declaration of peace, the situation continued.

Four years later I again visited that scene, and there, in smaller numbers, were found the troops of many of the nations still waiting, ready to seize the first opportunity to partition the country and to secure their share of the spoil. But more pressing engagements were then imminent, involving the attention of some of the powers. The Russo-Japanese struggle was on, and China was given a temporary respite. From that time until the outbreak of the revolution which led to the establishment of the Republic, China paid the indemnity claims with such regularity that no opportunity was found for interference.

For more than three-quarters of a century, beginning with the unrighteous Opium War of England, down to the equally unrighteous Boxer War of 1900, and even later, China has been subjected to a series of squeezes and despoilment of her territory to an extent unequalled in history. The iniquitous indemnities wrung from her as the result of the Boxer campaign would have been reversed, and the countries now receiving them would be paying for the outrages committed, had right, instead of might, prevailed. The powerful governments and financial institutions doing business in the Orient have become obsessed with the idea that it is legitimate business to "squeeze" the country, regardless of right or justice, and in the present instance they are continuing that policy. The six-power group of bankers, backed by the diplomacy of the countries they represent, before advocating the joint recognition of the Republic, demand first, an excessive rate of interest for money advanced, and second, terms,

as to its distribution and expenditure, so humiliating that no proud nation could grant them without loss of self-respect. If these conditions are not complied with, the hidden threat is intimated that the intervention of foreign powers and dismemberment of the country may ensue.

The effect upon China of the spoliation of her territory and finances created among the leading minds of her people an appreciation of her weakness, and of the necessity for the adoption of Occidental methods for self-protection. They saw the absolute imbecility of continuing the policy of the Manchu dynasty, and the necessity for a change of government. The efforts of her scholars and statesmen were for a long time foiled by the opposition of the Empress Dowager, who never hesitated to decapitate those who presented too radical programmes for reform. But despite all opposition, the new spirit grew and spread all over the country, propagated by Dr. Sun Yat Sen and other reformers, until the revolution followed, and the Republic became a reality.

The Chinese Republic deserves formal recognition because of the character of the revolution which made it possible. It obtained the maximum of liberty with the minimum of blood-shed. It was an evolution rather than a revolution, the most potent factors of which were those of peace, and not of war. They were the results of trade with foreign nations, the importation of modern inventions, railroads, telegraphs, newspapers; the work of Christian missionaries, schools and colleges established by them; but, most of all, the influence of Chinese students who had been educated in foreign universities, and who carried back to their native land the high ideals of Occidental government. In comparison with the epoch-making wars for freedom in Occidental lands—the French Revolution, England's fight for Magna Charta, or our own great seven years' struggle for Independence—the Chinese Revolution was almost bloodless. It is stated that the total mortality of the war which secured the emancipation of 400,000,000 of people, was less than the number lost in the battle of the Wilderness, or in single conflicts in the war now raging in the Balkans.

The moderation shown by the successful leaders to their

late rulers was another striking characteristic. Instead of the guillotine or exile, they were retired with liberal pensions, and allowed to retain their empty titles. The leaders enjoined upon their followers the protection of life and property, both commercial and missionary, and these orders were strictly obeyed.

A people who carried to a successful termination such a revolution, deserve the respect and recognition of the world. There are many qualities inherent in the Chinese nature which entitle the present government to immediate recognition. The enemies of China today forget the traditions of the race—that China was old when Chaldea and Babylon were young, that she saw the rise and fall of Grecian and Roman civilization, and that she has maintained the integrity of her government and territory ever since; that her scholars discovered the compass and invented the intellectual game of chess, when our ancestors in Europe were groveling in the darkness of mediaevalism; that she produced her own science, literature, art, philosophy and religion, whose founder, Confucius, five hundred years before the birth of Christ, expounded the doctrine of Christianity in the saying: "Do not do unto others what you would not have others do unto you." They forget that for nearly a thousand years China has been nearer a democracy in many features of its government than any other government then in existence. The fundamental unit of democracy, the foundation upon which our own government rests, is embodied in the principle of the New England town meeting. All authorities on democracy, De Tocqueville, Bryce and the *Compte de Paris*, agree in this.

In China, local government is, in practically all its features, and for centuries has been, controlled by local authorities. The officials of the central government never interfere with the local administration, except for the collection of revenues allocated to imperial requirements. It is the opinion of many authorities that the government of China has given more happiness and more individual liberty to a greater mass of humanity than any other government in the world.

The Chinese have never sought territorial aggrandizement, but have loved the paths of peace where the law of moral suasion, and not of might, ruled. They possess qualities of industry, economy, temperance and tranquillity, unsurpassed by any nation on earth. With these qualities they are in the great race of the survival of the fittest to *stay*. They are to be feared by foreign nations more for their virtues than for their vices; and in their present struggle for the maintenance of liberty, they deserve our earnest sympathy and assistance in the solution of problems, seemingly so different, but inherently so similar to our own.

The noble qualities of the race are illustrated in the leaders of the present movement. President Yuan Shih Kai is a masterful statesman who inspires confidence in all who know him. Few other men in history have had such kaleidoscopic changes of fortune, and few men have met them with greater courage or possessed the transcendent abilities that lift one so high above the common level. The resignation of the provisional presidency of the Republic by Dr. Sun Yat Sen was "an act worthy of the finest traditions of patriotism in any land." The National Assembly in accepting it, said: "His act has afforded the world an example of purity of purpose and self-sacrifice unparalleled in history."

The Republic is an established institution of over a year's standing. An able statesman has been duly elected as president and the other machinery of its government is in operation. It has undertaken to observe all treaties, and to discharge all the international obligations of its predecessor. No one will deny that there are serious military, financial and political problems still to be solved, but they are matters of purely domestic concern. They do not alter the fact, which is involved in recognition by other nations, that China has changed her form of government, and that her representative and duly accredited agent before the world is no longer an emperor, but a president. In the analogous case of the recognition of Brazil in 1890, Senator Turpie said: "The success of a revolutionary movement is in itself a statement to the world that a majority of a nation has chosen a change of government; the following existence of

the revolutionary government, and under its authority, will come the question of the constitution, laws, statutes and ordinances of the new government, but these questions are wholly internal ones."

Many authorities on international law support the legal status of the present government. Hall says: "So long as a person or a body of persons are indisputably in possession of the required powers, foreign states treat with them as the organ of the state; but so soon as they cease to be the actual organ, foreign states cease dealing with them; and it is usual, if the change is unquestionably final, to open relations with their successors, independently of whether it has been effected constitutionally." Wheaton defines a *de facto* government as "One which is really in possession of the powers of sovereignty, although the possession may be wrongful or precarious." Phillimore states, "That the recognition of a new government should be preceded by an absolute *bona fide* possession of independence as a separate kingdom, not the enjoyment of perfect and undisturbed internal tranquillity (a test too severe for many of the oldest kingdoms), but there should be the existence of a government—acknowledged by the people over whom it is set, and ready to acknowledge and competent to discharge international obligations." The present conditions in China satisfy these definitions of a *de facto* government.

But the Republic of China is not only the *de facto* government, it is also the *de jure* government. As stated by Dr. Chao-Chu Wu, son of ex-Minister Wu Ting Fang, "the Manchu rulers were not illegally driven from the throne, but they abdicated of themselves, and with their last act legalized the Republic. The abdication edict transfers the sovereignty hitherto vested in the emperor alone, to the people; it legalizes the Republic, and, what is more to the purpose, it constitutes a recognition of the new government by the sovereign power." Hall says: "Recognition by a parent state, by implying an abandonment of all pretensions over the insurgent community, is more conclusive evidence of independence than recognition by a third power, and it removes all doubt from the minds of other governments as to the

propriety of recognition by themselves." When the fallen government of China has itself recognized the new government, what reason is there for other governments to delay?

For the reasons enumerated—the status of the present government of China, the virtues of the Chinese race, the character of the Revolution in which these virtues have found their expression in bringing about the change of government, for all these reasons, the Republic of China is deserving of immediate recognition by the nations of the world. But there are special reasons why recognition should be accorded by our government first of all.

Special obligations are laid upon us of the United States by our position in the eyes of the world as the most powerful republic in existence, and one of the oldest. The President of the United States is rightly regarded as "the champion and exponent of that form of government consecrated by the blood of our Revolutionary fathers." Our own republican principles justify China in looking to us for sympathy and support in this hour of crisis and of need.

Such an expectation is warranted by our dealings with other nations. Numerous precedents might be cited to show that it has always been the policy of the United States government to recognize the existence of a government which was capable of maintaining itself. Our relations with France illustrate this. On November 7, 1792, in reply to a letter from Gouverneur Morris, then American Minister to Paris, describing the bloody revolution which had just been effected in that capital, Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, wrote as follows: "It accords with our principles to acknowledge any government to be rightful which is formed by the will of the nation substantially declared." Later he added: "We surely cannot deny to any nation that right whereon our own government is founded—that every one may govern itself according to whatever form it pleases, and change these forms at its own will; and that it may transact its business with foreign nations through whatever organ it thinks proper, whether king, convention, assembly, committee, president, or anything else it may choose. The will of the nation is the only thing essential to be regarded."

The establishment of the Second Republic occurred on the 24th of February, 1848, and less than a week after our Minister to France, Mr. Rush, presented the formal congratulations of our government. Mr. Buchanan, in transmitting to Mr. Rush a letter of credence to the French Republic, said: "In its intercourse with foreign nations, the government of the United States has, from its origin, always recognized the *de facto* governments. We recognize the right of all nations to create and reform their political institutions according to their own will and pleasure. We do not go behind the existing government to involve ourselves in the question of its legitimacy. It is sufficient for us to know that a government exists capable of maintaining itself; and then its recognition on our part inevitably follows." Even as late as September 8, 1900, Mr. Hill, acting Secretary of State, sent to Mr. Hart, United States Minister at Bogota, the following instructions: "The policy of the United States, announced and practiced upon occasion for more than a century, has been and is to refrain from acting upon conflicting claims to the *de jure* control of the executive power of a foreign state; but to base the recognition of a foreign government solely upon its *de facto* ability to hold the reins of administrative power." In withholding recognition from the Republic of China, the present administration is departing from the policy of the great founders of our nation.

There are questions in expediency and advantage as well as of principle in this matter of recognition. We may well consider what some of these results would be. First, China would be encouraged and strengthened in her efforts for reform and education. Evidences of the educational awakening are coming from every part of the land. The Canton Christian college may be taken as typical. The number of students in that institution has increased from 256 to 418 in one term, and the Chinese residents there have recently given over \$80,000 (equivalent to many times that in purchasing power here) for new buildings and equipment of the college. The new Commissioner of Education in Kwang-Tung Province has secured the appropriation of

\$100,000 gold for the education abroad of the students of the province.

A second result of recognition would be the stimulation of trade between China and the nations of the West. When the international relations of China are restored to normal condition, trade, which has already regained most of the ground lost during the disturbances, will assuredly rapidly increase. By recognizing the Republic the powers will, without distinction, confer a boon on the business communities of their respective nations. Missionaries and other representatives of western nations in China, also, would be benefited by the recognition of the Republic. Though the Revolution has been guarded from assuming any anti-foreign or anti-missionary character, until perfect order is established there must be risk for foreigners traveling in the interior. Dr. Wu states: "It is within the power of the foreign countries to reinforce the hand of the government, to extend to it moral support, and give it added prestige to hasten the complete restoration of order, and to insure the safety of their citizens and subjects throughout the vast Republic."

The greatest advantage to be gained by the speedy recognition by all nations would be the prevention of intervention on the part of some which are only waiting an opportunity to appropriate Chinese territory, just as they did with the continent of Africa some thirty years ago. The partitioning of China would be a crime even greater than the partitioning of Poland, and one fraught with far more serious consequences to the human race as a whole.

The Chinese Revolution was not a *coup d'état*, without likelihood of permanence; the old monarchy is hopelessly dead. The Revolution was complete, and peace reigns throughout the land. The new government is without opposition. It is confronted with many difficulties, but they do not spring from the attachment of people to the departed monarchy. As stated by Dr. Morrison in the *London Times*, when referring to the danger of China's splitting up, "Where is the line of cleavage? Both parties

in China are equally republican. Those who allege that President Yuan is assuming a dictatorship are ignoring the facts of his career." And to the critics who charge that the President's Council is composed of hostile factions, whose quarrels threaten the continuance of the Republic, he says: "Nothing could be more misleading. These parties differ in their programmes as political parties do in all countries, but all are equally republican." To those who think it is a reproach and a danger that the new men active in the government are inexperienced, he replies, that the difference can be shown by comparing them with the "corrupt princes and degraded eunuchs who were in power under the Manchu dynasty."

Given recognition by foreign governments, freedom from overt acts of predatory powers, and the right to increase her own customs, now limited to 5 per cent—a right wrung from her by foreigners to secure their unholy indemnities—China will pay all her obligations, no matter how unrighteous. The ruling characteristic of the Chinaman is honesty. He never repudiates his financial obligations.

I hold in my hand a Chinese bank note for a thousand cash issued by the great Ming Emperor Hung Wu, in the year 1367. It is the most ancient piece of financial paper in existence, excepting some duplicates, one of which I presented to the British Museum several years ago. It is three hundred years older than a somewhat similar looking note for which the British Museum paid Pope Hennessy 500 pounds, and which, until this was discovered, was supposed to be the oldest in the world. The lower panel contains the following, as translated by Professor H. B. Morse, Commissioner of Customs and Inspectorate General of Customs of China: "The Imperial Board of Revenue, having memorialized the Throne, has received the Imperial sanction for the issue of Government notes of the Ming Empire, to circulate on the same footing as standard cash. To counterfeit is death. The informant will receive 250 taels of silver, and in addition, the entire property of the criminal.—Signed, Hung Wu." A seal in vermilion bears in character the legend: "Seal for circulating Government

Notes." It is shown as an authentic proof of the antiquity of the Chinaman's knowledge of matters financial, at a time when the ancestors of the six powers syndicate were groping in the darkness of feudalism—matters in which the Chinaman has always borne the unique distinction of being the soul of honor.

The integrity of the Chinese as a people is proverbial. Their former despotic government, despite its innate corruption, never failed to observe its financial obligations to its former creditors, however unjustly incurred. The government of the Republic has solemnly undertaken to faithfully execute all the obligations to the foreign powers, under existing treaties, notwithstanding the onerous burden entailed upon the people, and which, considering their enforced origin, might with some reason have justified repudiation. Apart from the credit for past performances, faithfully observed, and the normal revenues from trade, commerce and the usual taxes, the natural resources of the land are incalculable. Of their development, a beginning, by modern methods, has only yet been made; but where it has been, every encouragement exists for extensive exploitation to the great advantage of the people, as well as of capital involved in such industrial enterprises. The extension of railways also affords scope for large investments, which are attracting attention in all quarters, to provide means of internal commerce, now carried on by most primitive methods. These and other considerations justify recourse to the bankers of the world for assistance on equitable conditions toward their development.

With such a reputation for honor, and such tempting opportunities for the successful employment of capital in her domain, why should China be forced to accept humiliating and ignominious terms to obtain credit—terms never before demanded of any other nation? Consider Japan—that other great star of the Orient—whose natural resources are incomparably less than those of China. When her very existence as a nation was at stake in a war with one of the most powerful countries of Europe, it was my privilege as well as pleasure to appear with Count Kaneko before a syndicate of

bankers who were considering the advisability and risk of underwriting her loan—and to urge its acceptance. I had seen the Japanese army in action and believed in its final triumph, and that her people would ultimately pay her obligations. But were any such monstrous conditions demanded from her by the underwriters as are now sought by the sextuple syndicate in dealing with China? On the contrary, Japan secured the money necessary to carry on her campaign on easy terms, although her success in the titanic struggle in which she was then engaged was, at that time, by no means a certainty.

In the case of China, peace reigns, and yet, before the great financiers consent to the issuance of a loan, it is asserted that they demand the right of a close supervision of its expenditure, that it be ear-marked for purposes acceptable to them, that it shall not be available for military or naval defence, so essential for the future protection of the country; that no other loans or obligations shall be made by China without the consent of the syndicate, and that certain revenues be allotted for its security. These terms the statesmen of China refused and they have had the temerity to negotiate an independent loan for \$50,000,000 in opposition to the will of the six-power syndicate.

On the question of China's finances, the *London Times* said, after the floating of the first instalment of the \$50,000,000 loan, which was half of the sum, that it "rejoices that the British people have manifested a different spirit from that of their government." It condemns the government for backing up the monopoly; it declares that the six-power group had "sought to set up a monopoly in China under the aegis of international diplomacy." It also declares that the liabilities of the country to June next, including indemnity arrears, will amount to 10,000,000 sterling and that "much is dependent upon the generosity of the foreign governments and the banking interests."

According to Dr. Morrison, the political adviser of the Chinese government, China has entered upon a new era of prosperity, and by the skill and judgment of her financiers has shaken herself free from international complications.

The London *Morning Post* (Conservative) remarks gloomily: "The prospectus of the new Chinese loan has been duly issued. . . . The British government has been roundly accused of lending itself to a plot for placing China at the mercy of a syndicate of greedy financiers, and for establishing a degrading system of foreign control over her internal affairs. The breaking off of the negotiations between the Chinese government and the six-power banking group and the conclusion of the loan agreement with the London financiers have been hailed as a destruction of the selfish monopoly which was strangling the freedom of the young Republic." The London *Daily News* continues, "It is a battle of giants, for behind the six powers there is a greedy banking monopoly which has hitherto been unchallenged, and behind this monopoly there is a complicated network of international intrigue, partly German, partly American, partly Russian and partly Japanese," and I think we may add, *largely English*.

On October 30, 1912, one of the interested powers, Russia, proposed that a joint and pre-emptory demand be made upon China for the immediate payment of arrears in the Boxer indemnity, the sum amounting to \$50,000,000. It was privately intimated, and not officially denied, that this movement, made on October 30, was intended as an emphatic rebuke to the Chinese for their temerity in contracting loans with independent bankers; disregarding the warning of the powers, and their rejection of the proposed loan by the six-power syndicate. It is stated on high authority that the powers of Europe look favorably upon this proposal. In taking the initiative in the movement to compel China to accept the proposal of the six-power syndicate, and the refusal on China's part to accept the terms, Russia, as stated in reports received on November 7, has been led to negotiate with one of China's provinces, Mongolia, a treaty, signed on November 3, by which she agrees to aid Mongolia to maintain the autonomous government which she has established, and to support her right to maintain a national army, and to exclude both the presence of Chinese troops and the colonization of her territory by the Chinese.

In this act Russia is following the lead of her ally, Great Britain, who not long ago proclaimed what amounts to a protectorate over the territory of Thibet, just as, on a recent occasion, Great Britain joined Russia in their monstrous and disgraceful treatment of Persia. It is the consummation of the policy of "squeeze" that has been carried on ever since China opened her doors, at the mouth of the cannon, to the crime of the century, the opium trade of England, and later, to so-called modern civilization.

Thus it seems that the vivisection of the sick man of the Far East may proceed merrily, without consideration for the interests or sentiments of the patient under the scalpel. This at the moment seems to be the lamentable result of the action of the six-power syndicate. It seems apparent that the famous combination has signally failed in its financial policy, despite governmental assistance, and that nothing has been gained by the delay in the recognition of the Republic. *But what has been lost?*

By formally recognizing the new government as soon as it had demonstrated its right to such recognition, America would have followed the splendid traditions of our forebears, who enunciated and practiced the laws of justice and liberty which made our country great, and from whose teachings we have departed too far. We would have had the proud distinction of being the first to welcome the Republic in its hour of trial. We would have secured the eternal friendship and respect of a nation, which, no matter what adversity it may yet have to face, is destined to be one of the greatest and grandest on earth. We would have immeasurably increased our prestige in the Orient, and possibly, by proclaiming the policy of "hands off" and the "open door" in China, averted the tragedy that now seems almost inevitable.

Is there anyone present who believes that if John Hay had been in the Department of State during the past year, the republic of China would not have been recognized long ago? Had his policy been followed directly after the abdication of the Manchu dynasty, China, in the opinion of well-informed authorities, would have escaped many of the dangers now menacing her. Time was, in the history of American diplo-

macy, when our Executive acted upon the recognition of downtrodden nations which had emancipated themselves from tyranny and established Republican forms of government, without consultation or dictation from Lombard or Wall Street. The majority of our people are, and from the first have been, in sincere sympathy with China in her struggle for liberty. Is their will to be carried out or is liberty, and opportunity, to be throttled and made subservient to a group of capitalists who seek to monopolize the privilege of dictatorship?

Ill fares the land, to hastening ills a prey,
Where wealth accumulates, and men decay.

THE OPIUM ABOLITION QUESTION

By J. O. P. Bland, formerly of the Imperial Maritime Customs, Secretary to the Shanghai Municipality and "Times" Correspondent in China

I am deeply sensible, ladies and gentlemen, of the honor conferred and of my privilege in addressing so distinguished and representative an audience. I am also sensible of the fact that the opinions which I am about to lay before you in connection with the opium question in China are very different, on the whole, from those which you are accustomed to hear and to hold. The subject of opium production and smoking in China is one which many writers have discovered to be of an extremely difficult and thorny nature. Mr. H. B. Morse, an American who for many years served the Chinese government loyally and well, writing on this subject observes that he who tries to investigate the facts with no predisposition to either side is likely to find himself branded as a trimmer by the one party and a Laodicean by the other, with no opportunity to defend himself.

In bringing before you the present aspect of the opium question and the views and opinions which I and many other observers hold on this subject, I would ask you to believe that I am actuated by a feeling of sincere sympathy and regard for the Chinese people and that the views which I hold are entirely sincere, even where they differ from those advanced by the missionary bodies, the anti-opium societies and many earnest Chinese reformers in China. I am aware that one runs the risk of being misjudged in this matter, but it is a risk which must be faced by those who sincerely believe that the proceedings of the anti-opium societies, initiated with the very best of motives, are likely in the long run to aggravate the evil of opium smoking in China, even after the Indian trade has been completely abolished, and to a certain extent because of the abolition of that trade.

Speaking for myself and for many other observers whose opinions are based as much upon the political, economic and social aspects of the question as upon its high moral grounds, it seems to me a matter for sincere congratulation that Great Britain has assented to the abolition of the Indian trade, a traffic in itself highly demoralizing to the Chinese and therefore discreditable to Great Britain. Having said this much, however, it seems to me necessary that we should recognize the fact that the practical issues of the question of opium abolition as a whole have been very frequently confused by too general an acceptance of certain postulates loudly proclaimed upon high moral grounds. It seems to me that many of the philanthropists, missionaries and eminent divines who have taken a prominent part in the anti-opium movement are afflicted in their field of morals by the same persistent delusion as that which commonly afflicts reformers in the field of political economics. "They are all pervaded," as Spencer says, "by the conviction, now definitely expressed and now taken as a self evident truth, that there needs but this kind of instruction or that kind of discipline, this mode of repression or that system of culture, to bring society into a very much better state." Misled by laudable enthusiasms, blinded by benevolent hypotheses, it is a characteristic of the advocates of this good cause, that they are generally predisposed to ignore or to misinterpret those facts of the situation which militate against their own conclusions. Influenced by these enthusiasms, they fail to take into account, not only the structural character of the Chinese race in particular, but the inherent weaknesses of humanity in general.

If we turn to the history of the agitation against the Indian opium trade, we find that amongst the arguments most frequently advanced, two have been most persistent; first, the argument that Great Britain has forced the Indian trade upon China at the cannon's mouth, and secondly, that the recent anti-opium legislation introduced by the Chinese government opens up a new and particularly promising vision of reform. As regards the first of these two, the fallacy of the cannon's mouth line of argument has been so

frequently demonstrated by unbiased and competent writers that the facts are easily available. Nevertheless, it continues to figure prominently in all the activities of the anti-opium societies and is apparently not to be upset by any reiteration of historical fact. To give only one recent instance, let me quote to you from a work published a month ago, *Men and Manners of Modern China* by Dr. Macgowan.

Seventy years ago [he says] a great western power forced on China an opium treaty at the mouth of the cannon. Since then not a dead hand but a mailed fist has been held up threateningly to prevent its being evaded. Her merchants have carried on the opium traffic and her warships have patrolled the eastern seas, to see that they are not defrauded of their rights.

The years dragged slowly on for China, and during these opium was slowly weaving its web over the land, and its black fingers were fastening themselves round the hearts of countless thousands, and homes were being desolated by a curse which the government might never try to remove, for the iron fist was always on guard.

And then the great miracle took place. The passion that had been burning in the hearts of the best men in the country blazed forth with a mighty fire. The conqueror was appealed to some five years ago or so, and slowly the mailed arm was dropped.

The effect of well-meant but wholly inaccurate statements of this sort has been clearly reflected in the attitude of many Chinese promoters of the anti-opium movement and has resulted in diverting the attention of many from the real and vital issues of that question to the actually subordinate question of the Indian trade. This attitude of the Chinese was most remarkably demonstrated at the Hague Conference which took place at the close of last year. I was present, on behalf of the London *Times*, on that occasion and was struck by the fact that, although at this time the cultivation of the poppy was being rapidly reintroduced into many provinces in China, the attitude of the Chinese delegates was one of virtuous condescension and high moral superiority, so much so, that they were brought to book and rebuked on more than one occasion. At the end of 1910 when, as a result of a wave of public enthusiasm and concerted efforts, sincerely backed by the Manchu government, opium cultivation had been reduced by something approximating to twenty-five per cent of the area under poppy, the

adoption by the Chinese delegates of an attitude of moral superiority might have been condoned; but in 1911, with cultivation again in full swing it was certainly indefensible. The complete abolition line of argument, like the cannon's mouth theory, is based upon fallacies and on untruths easily disprovable. To refute the cannon's mouth legend, for instance, I may observe that amongst the events which led up to the treaty of Nanking in 1842, opium was only one factor and that the question settled by that treaty was not the question of the importation of opium (or other goods) at Canton, but the right of foreign envoys to treat directly with the Chinese government.

But be this as it may, the Indian opium trade may now be regarded as dead, England's present attitude in the matter amounting to recognition of the fact that the game is not worth the scandal, and that the abolition of a trade in which only a limited number of British merchants and bankers and a few millions of Indian agriculturists are concerned, will be politically and economically to the advantage of the British Empire, quite apart from all moral considerations. Economically, the substitution of grain cultivation for opium in India must in the end be productive of good, for the enormous increase of population in that country is already producing serious social and economic difficulties and it must be obvious that every field taken from opium and given to the production of grain will eventually afford a measure of relief to the pressing problem of the world's food supply. On the other hand, however, it must be evident that, now that as China resumes the cultivation of opium upon a large scale, the difficulties of the food supply problem in China are likely to be aggravated in the near future.

In order to gauge the future action of the Chinese Government and its people in regard to this question of opium, it is necessary before all to consider the question of the permanent sincerity of the governing class. At the Shang-Hai Conference in 1909, it was recorded as the unanimous opinion of the International delegates that they believed in the "unswerving sincerity" of the Chinese government.

The practicability of abolishing, not only the importation of the foreign drug, but the cultivation of all native opium, was from the first a question entirely dependent upon this matter of sincerity. By the opium edicts of 1906, drastic measures were introduced which, in the opinion of many observers on the spot, were construed as evidence of new and sincere intentions on the part of the Chinese government. Nevertheless, the whole history and record of that government precludes belief in the sincerity of the movement and on the other hand, contains evidence of a persistent and deliberate intention on the part of the mandarin class (as distinct from the earnest reformers) to take advantage of the enthusiastic public opinion amongst the Chinese and of the sympathy of foreign nations, to evolve, for its own ultimate benefit, a system of monopolies in the native trade, coincident with the abolition of the importation of Indian opium. That this has been the traditional policy of the Chinese government really requires but little proof; but I may cite as one remarkable piece of evidence the opinion recorded as far back as 1875, by Johannes von Gumpach. He wrote:

If the British government were to listen to the Tsungli Yamen's insidious arguments, supported though they be by ill-directed missionary zeal, and yield to the Yamen's intimidations by consenting to the prohibition of poppy culture in India, it would after all only sacrifice the legitimate interests of British commerce and the Indian industry and to what end? To the end that the government of China might, under the shading mask of its impotence, encourage the cultivation of the poppy at home; stealthily and gradually add to its salt monopoly that of the manufacture and sale of opium, and impose upon the people a deleterious drug, while excluding from the country a superior preparation.

If we turn now to the attitude of Young China toward the opium question, we find in the opinion of most observers and notably of the missionary bodies, between the years 1907 and 1910, a general consensus of opinion that a new spirit had been created, bringing with it the sure promise of better things and good hopes of the complete eradication of opium smoking throughout the country. Many observers on the spot, while accepting the opium edicts as evidence of

sincerity, still retained doubts as to the practicability of the measures proposed by the edicts of 1906. I myself was at Peking at that time and in frequent communication with Tang Shao-yi, the initiator of the opium abolition edicts and the most prominent of all the reformers. I shared with others the belief in the sincerity of the originators of this movement at the beginning, but as time went on, I was reluctantly compelled to modify my faith in that sincerity by reason of the indisputable evidence of certain facts which came to my own knowledge. For instance, one of the regulations by which the abolition of opium was to be secured within a period of ten years was that which prohibited the sale of any anti-opium remedies containing forms of opium, such as morphia pills. The manufacture and sale of pills, containing opium in any form was forbidden under strict penalties; this measure was obviously necessary if the abolition of the opium pipe was not to be replaced by something infinitely worse. At the beginning of 1907, it came to the knowledge of several observers of the movement in Peking and especially of the British Legation, which was naturally following the results of the edicts with great interest, that a large number of brands of so-called anti-opium pills was being manufactured and sold. Amongst them were many which after being analyzed in London, were found to contain a very large percentage of morphia. One pill was being sold at Peking and Tientsin under Government auspices; it was manufactured upon the prescription of a foreign-educated Chinese doctor, a Cantonese, nearly related by marriage to Mr. Tang Shao-yi. Upon ascertaining the facts, I called upon Mr. Tang and pointed out the foredoomed futility of opium regulations which could be violated in this way and the very bad impression which must be created by the fact that a person so closely related to himself should thus be making profit out of the illegal sale of these dangerous pills. No action was taken in the matter however and to this day the sale of anti-opium pills containing morphia continues practically unchecked in most parts of China, and the illicit morphia trade brings large profits to British manufacturers of the drug. A second disquieting incident occurred when the

American government, actuated by a laudable desire to assist the Chinese in their work of opium abolition, gave encouragement and letters of introduction to the Chinese authorities to an expert in the cure of drug habitués, Mr. C. B. Towns of New York. Mr. Towns came to Peking and asked to be allowed to cure Chinese opium smokers by a process of his own which he guaranteed to be effective within a reasonably short period of time. In order to test by practical experiments the nature and results of his treatment, I arranged, in consultation with the doctor of the British Legation to watch the cure in the case of a dozen confirmed opium smokers who would submit to the test. These men, all personally known to me, were treated for four days by the Towns method and after it they were certainly cured for the time being of any desire to smoke opium. For six months afterwards, during which time their movements were watched, they still remained free from the vice. Nevertheless, in spite of these and other successful experiments with private individual Chinese, no attempt was made to encourage the introduction of Mr. Towns's treatment on any wide scale and as a matter of fact, his own repeated attempts to secure premises for a hospital in Tien-Tsin city were blocked by the opposition of local Chinese officials. I mention these two cases as evidence of the traditional Mandarin attitude, many more instances of which might be cited, which effectively preclude any robust faith in the sincerity of the leaders of Young China in the national anti-opium movement.

The three years of experiment and test which, under the British opium agreement of 1907, were to demonstrate the sincerity and the ability of the Chinese government in the matter of opium abolition resulted, as I have said, in a reduction of about 25 per cent in the total cultivation of the poppy throughout the provinces. This result was very largely due to the fact that the Manchu government, regarding opium abolition as one of the things upon which Young China was keenly determined, and fearing to increase the unrest and disloyalty of the southern provinces, lent the whole weight of its authority to the movement for suppressing poppy cul-

tivation. Sir Alexander Hosie, reporting to the British government on the progress made in the suppression of cultivation in the various provinces, stated that the farmers themselves had accepted serious losses and given up planting the poppy for three causes. First, belief in the sincerity of the government intentions. This took some time to establish, but in 1910, it was widespread. Second, local influence of the *literati* and gentry, exercised in support of the government's programme. Third, the popular recognition of the social and economic evils arising from the opium habit. There is no doubt that the good will shown by the Manchu government in this matter was of very powerful assistance to the cause which the opium reformers had at heart, and that, without it, the expression of public opinion could not have produced any such good results as were actually attained in the summer of 1910. At this stage, however, Young China, carried away by its own enthusiasms and by its impatience to achieve still more rapid results, began to agitate for the complete abolition of the Indian trade as the most important thing to be secured. At the same time, it took the question out of the plane of philanthropy and morality into that of politics. The manner in which the question was discussed by the provincial assemblies afforded conspicuous proof of the change which had taken place. The violent agitation which was commenced in England and in China at this date for the immediate abolition of the Indian trade, eventually led the British government to agree to the convention which was concluded in Peking in May, 1911. By virtue of this new treaty, a heavy additional duty was placed upon the Indian drug and it was at the same time agreed, that any province in China which was able to show a "clean slate," that is to say, to prove that it had completely abolished opium cultivation within its own borders, should, *ipso facto*, be entitled to exclude all further importations of the Indian drug. By this eminently fair arrangement, it was left for each province to make good its own pledges and to give immediate effect to the reforms for which they professed to be anxious. Nevertheless, at this time, while the Cantonese were agitating in all parts of the country and

denouncing the British government for "forcing Indian opium upon China," the lamentable fact was becoming apparent that, in those very provinces where Young China had been most active in its propaganda, the treaty with Great Britain was being violated and native opium was being cultivated for the pecuniary benefit of the local officials. At the present day, whilst the leaders of the republic, Sun Yat Sen and Li Yuan Hung, continue to press for the abrogation of the treaty of May, 1911, and to demand that no more shipments of Indian opium shall henceforth be made, they remain curiously indifferent to the fact that the cultivation of native opium has been resumed on an unprecedentedly large scale. Even in those provinces of Shensi and Szechuen which in 1910 had been reported clear of opium cultivation, it is now unfortunately true that the poppy is grown in large quantities. More than this, there is every evidence of a widespread intention in many provinces to establish official monopolies for the control of the trade in Chinese opium. The province of Chekiang, for instance, which has for sometime past been illegally and arbitrarily prohibiting all movements of Indian opium within its borders on grounds of high morality, and appealing to the moral dignity and conscience of Great Britain to support it in this line of action, has, at the same time, gathered a large harvest of opium, cultivated up to the very walls of the prefectual city. In the provinces of Canton, Yunnan and Kiangsi, the republican authorities have officially organized local monopolies for the control and sale of Chinese opium.

The effect on trade and politics of the violation of treaties, such as have recently been manifested by the republican authorities in several provinces, cannot fail to create an exceedingly bad impression abroad and thus to place further obstacles in the way of the progress and prosperity of the Chinese people. If we consider only the disorganization of trade and finances which must arise from the illegal restrictions placed by the Shanghai and Chekiang officials on the importation of Indian opium, it is evident that, where a cargo to the value of about six millions sterling is arbitrarily held up and prevented from entering into consumption, the

consequences cannot be negligible, for the Indian opium trade, like other branches of commerce in the Far East, is conducted on credit handled by native and foreign banks, and any disorganization of that credit must inevitably react far and wide, to the general disturbance of the economic situation and to the detriment of the country's future trade.

Looking at the question from another point of view; that is to say, considering it in its political aspect, the cessation of the Indian opium trade, unaccompanied by cessation of the production of the native drug, must tend to increase and accelerate the movement, already marked throughout China, towards provincial autonomy. The Import duties heretofore levied on the Indian drug formed an important item in the central government's budget of revenue. These will now be cut off, and on the other hand the provinces, under their local monopolies, will collect large sums at the disposal of the local bureaus for provincial purposes. That is to say, at a time when all British and American opinion concurs in the urgent necessity for the creation and maintenance of a strong central government, the results of the anti-opium movement, as at present indicated, will aid in placing increased revenues at the disposal of the provinces and reduce Peking's control over what were national funds.

Finally, the Chinese government's real or professed inability to control the provinces, as regards observance of the British treaty of May, 1911, cannot fail to produce results seriously prejudicial to China's credit abroad and ultimately to her borrowing capacity; for, as has been pointed out by competent critics, if China cannot prevent the maritime province of Chekiang from defying the law and from violating the central government's obligations under the treaty referred to, it is not likely that the government will be able hereafter to exercise that control of *Lekin* or supervision of the salt gabelle, which it is understood, are to form the collateral security of future loans.

If we turn now to a brief consideration of the moral aspect of the opium smoking question, it is impossible to avoid introducing the commonplace comparison or analogy between the smoking of opium by the Chinese and the con-

sumption of alcohol in European countries. The uses and abuses of opium are undoubtedly very similar in their causes and effects to those with which we are familiar in the case of alcoholic drinks. That the excessive use of opium is a vicious and degrading habit, none will deny but the actual facts are that the Chinaman's tendency to consume opium in excess have been very widely exaggerated and generally distorted. Examining the facts in the light of such dispassionate and methodical inquiry as is available, we find, in the report of the Straits Settlements Opium Commission of 1907-08, evidence of a very detailed kind which appear to afford ample justification for that Commission's conclusion that "The opium habit is comparable to the European's use of alcohol and tobacco and that it must be regarded as the expression among the Chinese of the universal tendency to some form of indulgence." In other words, if we accept this conclusion even in a limited sense and with mental reservations, it seems to me an imperative and inevitable conclusion, from all European experience, that a reasonable recognition of the limitations of human nature and human weaknesses will be more conducive in the long run to the ends of public morality, than the attempt to give effect to the impossible idea of complete abolition of opium cultivation or any other doctrine of the extremists.

The Straits Settlements report, above referred to, embodies a systematic attempt to render a complete and impartial account of the question of opium smoking, and its conclusions emphasize the important fact, which the anti-opium societies have generally ignored, that the vast majority of Chinese opium smokers are habitually moderate consumers. Says this report:

The evils arising from the use of opium, were made the subject of specific inquiry from nearly every witness, and medical witnesses were practically unanimous, with the exception of those who held views strongly opposed to opium, that opium smoking in moderation was relatively harmless. Even if carried to excess, no organic change in the body could be detected, the results being chiefly functional evils. It was also found, as would be the case with alcohol, impossible to lay down a standard consumption which could be regarded as use in moderation or use in excess, owing to the varying physiques and constitutions of smokers.

Reporting to the House of Commons in the year 1872, the opinion of a large number of medical men was recorded: "That there is a certain aptitude in the stimulant of opium to the circumstances of the Chinese people, and that the universal use of the opium pipe among the Chinese must certainly be owing to some peculiarity of their mental and nervous constitution." That this weakness, or form of indulgence, is peculiarly indicated by the physical and nervous systems of the Chinese race is proved by the fact that the Thibetan, Mohammedan and Mongolian inhabitants of Kan Suh and other centers of opium cultivation are practically immune.

The tendency to smoke opium which the Chinaman carries about with him to all parts of the world, is logically and naturally comparable with the Anglo-Saxon's tendency or predilection towards alcoholic strimulants. The comparison is a commonplace one, I admit, and two blacks do not make a white, but many years ago a dispassionate and thoroughly competent observer of the opium question, Mr. Meadows, observed that, "Although the substances are different, I can see no difference at all as to the morality of producing, selling and consuming them, while the only difference I can observe in the consequences of consumption is, that the opium smoker is not so violent, so maudlin or so disgusting as the drunkard."

The opium problem appears to reduce itself naturally under three heads. *First:* Is opium necessary to the Chinese, as alcohol is to the European? On this point the evidence of the Straits Settlements Opium Commission appears to be conclusive, and there can be no doubt that so long as opium continues to be produced and available, either by legitimate trade or by smuggling, the Chinese people will continue to smoke it.

Second: Is the total abolition of opium smoking and opium cultivation possible? In the Straits Settlements report it was recorded as a generally recognized truth that "Without an international agreement to stop the growth of the poppy, the success of any prohibitive legislation would be highly problematical." At the International Conference held at

The Hague last January, the resolutions dealing with the abolition of the opium traffic were passed upon the tacit assumption that China would continue to justify Europe's faith in her "unswerving sincerity," and in her ability to put down opium cultivation; but it was unanimously admitted and agreed that the idea of any international agreement or legislation, to control and prevent the cultivation of the poppy throughout the world, was utterly impracticable and visionary. Even the measures proposed by the American delegates for the control of the movement and sale of opium, and the British suggestions for the control of the trade in morphine, cocaine and other drugs by means of an international agreement and pharmacy laws, were regarded by the majority of the delegates as counsels of perfection, Utopian schemes, suitable for presentation at The Hague but unattainable in practice. As regards any idea of an international self-denying ordinance to remedy the production of the poppy, Turkey, one of the chief producers, declined even to be represented at the Conference, and the attitude of other powers left no doubt as to the futility of the suggestion. But even assuming, for purposes of argument, that the total abolition of opium cultivation were possible, there remains the third aspect of the problem, i.e., once opium smoking has been eradicated, by what means would it be possible to prevent a rapid increase of the more dangerous morphia habit and the adoption of alcohol as a form of stimulant by the Chinese people? Personally, I consider that all the evidence goes to show that a predisposition to opium in one form or another is indicated by the physical and nervous constitution of the Chinese as a race, and I am not therefore inclined to attach great importance to the opinions of those who, like Sir Frank Swettenham, think that alcohol is likely to take the place of opium wherever opium is unobtainable. But the dangers arising from morphine as a substitute for opium are sufficiently real and immediate to have engaged the serious attention of philanthropists and medical missionaries in China and abroad. They formed the subject of special resolutions at The Hague Conference and a vast amount of interesting information was

submitted and recorded on the subject. Without going into details it may be said that, since the morphia duty was increased in China after 1906, the smuggling of this dangerous drug has increased by leaps and bounds, and doctors all over China now testify that many opium-smokers have taken to morphia, making the last state worse than the first. China proposed to regulate the morphine trade by the inauguration of pharmacy laws applicable throughout the Empire under official supervision, but I need hardly say that for many years to come, this proposal, like that of the abolition of opium cultivation, must remain an unattainable ideal. No such laws could possibly be framed or enforced under existing conditions.

To sum up: The futility of legislation and of philanthropic attempts to attain the complete abolition of opium cultivation and opium smoking in China must be obvious to every unbiased observer of the facts. Nevertheless, I hold that if, instead of discussing unpractical schemes, the activities of philanthropists and missionaries could henceforth be directed towards the introduction of practical restrictive legislation and regulation of the opium traffic, much good might be done in China, just as in Great Britain education, philanthropy and the moral effect of the temperance movement have greatly reduced the national tendency to drunkenness within the last half century. There undoubtedly exists in China a strong force of public opinion directed against the excessive use of opium.

By practical legislation, such as that which in Scandinavia has been adopted with such excellent results under the Gothenburg system, and by means of the education of public opinion, progress can and will no doubt be made. But there can be no permanently beneficial results from impulsive and Quixotic attempts to secure the root and branch elimination of a firmly established national propensity.

THE GENESIS OF THE REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION
IN CHINA FROM A SOUTH CHINA
STANDPOINT

*By John Stuart Thomson, sometime Agent at Hong Kong,
China, of the Pacific Mail and Toyo Kisen Kaisha
Trans-Pacific Steamship Companies*

Many have thought of, many have spoken on the Chinese revolution, but each onlooker probably sees it in slightly varying lights, as the matter has very many sides. With your permission I will add a few statements, trying to outline the genesis of the astonishing movement as it appeared to me, and selecting some salient points while the revolution was in progress. I lived longest in south China, which section has thought longest on revolution, and I will therefore speak largely as a neighbor of the southern Chinese, but I will always remember that every "National" has his inalienable right to free opinion and his opinion and personality I have hearty respect for. "A man's a man for a' that!"

A republic in place of the oldest monarchy! Preposterous. It would involve making a yellow man think as a white man, and that had never occurred. It would involve free intercourse with the whole wide world, and China had opposed such an innovation stubbornly for 400 years. It meant that the proudest and most self-contained nation should treat others as equals and interchange with them. It involved throwing 4000 years of continuous history and agglomerated pride and precedent to the winds, and humbly beginning anew as a tyro for a while. It meant the dealing with 400,000,000 kings, instead of one, and asking, "My lord! what is your will." An educational system 2000 years old to be at once forgotten! a religion 5000 years old at least, whereby every man had his own god (his father) to be made as cheap as the paltry sacrifices of wine, rice

and the painted stick of Confucianism, were in reality! The taking up of individual and national responsibility for 400,000,000 people, and entrance upon a wide path of world-influence, with its divided shame and fame. The taking and giving of blows for wrong and right. The giving up of the triple eternal Nirvana of father, self and son, in exchange for an exciting role limited to 55 crowded years in the individual. The scale of the action! A land as large as all Europe, and a people as numerous as the Caucasian race. The thunderous knock on the long-locked doors of science and medicine by 400,000,000 people, who had bowed to idol and charm alone. It shook the world. It was pregnant with Paradisial possibilities for mankind, because of the vastness of the movement, and the depth of its wellspring. The launching of this new Leviathan ship of state could not but raise a wave that would lift the already floating hulks of Europe and America, and give them added impetus, though temporary alarm. The rearrangement of commerce, manufacture, labor, finance, taxation, learning, agriculture, art, and possibly religion for the whole world. The adding of the most difficult language to the tongues and pens of men, and the call on the English speech to rise once more greater than the mighty stranger, or pale before the light of his march. The challenge to Palestine's Bible to conquer by truth and love, or retreat with half a world lost. The uprising again of the yellow ghosts of Kublai Khan, Batu, Timurlane, and the Khans of the Golden Horde. What would be the Caucasian's answer to Emperor William's question "The Yellow Peril?" It will be remembered that the brilliant Kaiser once painted a picture showing the nations of Europe gathering to defend the cross of Calvary and civilization against an incendiary Buddha lowering in the eastern sky. Would the stranger within the gates be protected, even while republican and imperialist fought out their argument? Would leadership arise, and would the great Mongolian mass be intellectualized now that it was energized? Since the vast body was suddenly displaced, would it henceforward move by mere gravity, or sympathetic volition? Could it collectivize and

not disintegrate? What would be the effect on the scores of trembling thrones, where Romanoff, Hapsburg, Savoy, Hohenzollern, Ottoman, Billiken, etc. said they ruled by "divine right," which is quite a different thing from noble England's "constitutional right." Dr. Sun Yat Sen and the Chinese republicans sent out this challenge: "Tien ming wu chang" (the divine right lasts not forever). All these questions presented themselves when the reformers startled the world with the announcement that there was to be a republic in China. It was to be a republic—not a monarchy—said even those Chinese who had been educated in Japan. Had there been no abatement of the opium habit through America's leadership of sentiment, and Britain's sacrifice of revenue from 1909 to 1911, there could have been no rebellion as early as 1911. The reform cleared the befogged heads of the nation, added a million men to agitation, and furnished a hundred million dollars directly and indirectly toward the independence of the agitators. How great a stone America and Britain set rolling in that Opium Conference of 1909 at Shanghai.

The great revolution of October, 1911, did not drop as a bolt from a clear sky. The clouds had been gathering, though many at home and abroad did not, or would not see them. In September, 1911, the Imperial Viceroy of Canton, Chang Ming Chi, sent spies along the new Canton-Hong Kong Railway to apprehend smugglers of arms. In the same month, troops under the command of Marshal Lung Chai Kwong suddenly surrounded the office of *Shat Pat Po* newspaper at Canton, and arrested several reformers, who had been blacklisted for opinion's sake. General Luk Wing Ting of Kwangsi province came down the Si Kiang (West River) in September 1911 in the gunboat *Po Pik* to Canton, and took back with him from the Canton arsenal, machine guns and ammunition to attack the "anarchists," as the Manchus persistently called all reformers. In the month previous the Ministry of Posts and Communications at Peking stopped the use of private codes, so as to censor messages to the reformers. Several viceroys, in secret sympathy with the reformers, had as early as August, 1911,

wired for gunboats, so as to disperse the fleet from the Yangtse basin, where the revolution was to strike, and the largest cruiser, the splendid *Hai Chi*, well known in New York, these viceroys suggested should be sent to King George's coronation review at Spithead. Even as far back as July, 1907, the Manchu government approached the powers, requesting that they make espionage on arms consigned to south China. Rather to our amusement, they used to arrive at Hong Kong as boxed pipes, condensers, plumber's supplies, bar iron, crockery, tracts, etc., anything but guns, but that was the humor of the freight classification which the shippers used. In December, 1906, the scholars of the Middle Class in Wuchow, Kiangsi province, at the head of navigation on the West River, decided to cut off their queues, and adopted khaki uniform, military drill and track races. They were independently preparing for strenuous times five years before the outbreak, and these boys were found in the first line of the attack in October, 1911, up at Hankow, led by Colonel Wen, who had graduated from West Point Military Academy in America in 1909. In August, 1911, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation reported that a large part of its \$9,000,000 gold note issue was being held, instead of circulated by the Chinese of Kwangtung and other southern provinces. This hoarding of safe securities always indicates lack of faith as to the business and political future.

The celebrated Manchu, Tuan Fang, Director General of Railways was ordered by the Ministry of Communications to proceed to Canton and Kung Yik, the new town of the Americanized Chinese, in August, 1911, to "pacify the people." Tuan replied that he would not go and gave as his excuse: "Canton is infested with anarchism." In the same month, the Regent, Prince Chun, asked the veteran Prince Ching to recommend an energetic general to be sent to quell disturbances in Kwangtung province, and the Tartar General, Fung Shan, was sent. Spying was not uncommon, impersonators going to a province ahead of new appointees, and reciting a record at the Yamen which seemed to identify them. In August, 1911, the Cabinet at Peking

decided to send photographs of new officials in a sealed envelope, so as to prevent this impersonating. As an indication of the new spirit which was moving among the Chinese of Canton for better things at this time, take the inception of the model town of Heungchow. Chinese returned from America, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Shanghai, could not bear the municipal restraint of the old Chinese city. They chose a site ten miles up the inner harbor of Macao. Dredging and a breakwater were begun for a harbor. Broad streets, drains, fine stores, temples, police and fire stations and equipment, water works, libraries, parks, reforestation in tree denuded China, Chamber of Commerce, tramways, electricity and gas, hospitals, schools, theatres, detached homes with gardens, launch and steamship lines, and a free port, all were in the scheme. When a government permits monopoly of food, and riots result because of justice ineffectually exerted, history shows that the government is about to fall. I instance the fierce Hangchow rice riots of July, 1906, under the leadership of Hung Pang (Red Association), and the Changsha rice riots of 1910, when Yale College in China was barely saved from the conflagration, in the very district which in 1911 was swept by the high tide of the revolution. In 1906 text books were issued to the modern schools of some of the southern provinces which contained a caricature of China, not as the "Middle Kingdom" of old, but as the "Middle morsel," from which all the nations took a bite. The intent of course was to arouse resentful patriotism in place of the old inert pride. Many of these school boys enlisted in the two bravest corps of the republicans: the "Dare to Die" band, and the "Bomb Throwers" regiment. In April, 1911, the rebels, under two of Dr. Sun Yat Sen's lieutenants, Hu Wai Sang and Wu Sum, operating in Kwangtung province, issued to the world almost the identical manifesto that President Sun and Foreign Secretary Wu Ting Fang issued in January, 1912. Desperate fighting took place, and had the rebels been sufficiently supplied with money and arms, the republic would have been declared at Canton in April instead of at Wuchang and Nanking in November, 1911. The United States gun-

boat *Wilmington*, and British gunboats like the *Moorhen* were rushed to Shameen island, Canton, to protect foreigners if need should arise in the excitement. Admiral Li, who was killed in the October revolution, was barely able to conquer this April revolution in Kwantung and Fukien provinces.

Nearly all the missions were informed by Chinese students and friends many months previous to the revolution, that serious and continued disturbances would occur. The Chinese saw that individualism had arisen in America and England and was battling with the privileged. Individualism at last arose in old China, and resented in this rebellion the quietism taught by the superstition of Taoism, the resignation of Buddhism and the obedience of Confucianism. "I am not a clan; I am a man"; "Homo sum, Humani nihil a me alienum puto" said the ambitious Chinese, as he saw the new ray of hope. American diplomacy was not altogether uniformed or unprepared. The American fleet was made the largest foreign fleet in Chinese waters in the first month of the revolution, Admiral Murdock having the cruisers *Saratoga* (the converted *New York* of Spanish War fame), *Albany*, *New Orleans*, *Wilmington*, the gunboats *Helena*, *El Cano*, *Villalobos*, *Samar*, the monitor *Monterey*, and the destroyers *Barry*, *Decatur*, etc. As far back as June 3, 1910, a year and four months before the revolution, the *Shanghai News* printed the following article: "All the legations and consuls have received anonymous letters from friendly revolutionaries in Shanghai, containing the warning that an extensive anti-dynastic uprising is imminent. If they do not assist the Manchus, foreigners are *not* to be harmed." It was difficult to hold the widespread feeling in restraint. In August, 1911, a rebellion broke out at Sining in far western Kansu province. The leader was given the name "Chiu Shih Wang" (Savior of his Country). Rich men cornered the rice supply in the flooded Yang Tze valley, and food riots broke out all along the river in August, 1911. On August 23, 1911, rebels boarded a Chinese gunboat on the romantic Si Kiang (West River) near Canton, shooting the commander, and seizing the arms and ammunition. On September 1, the Navy Department

strengthened the patrol of Kwangtung province waters, so as to stop the smuggling of arms, and the Army Board required miners to get permits to import dynamite, as they feared that the "anarchists" were importing the explosive. The awful floods and famines of 1910-11 in the basins of the Yang Tze River, the Hwei River, and Grand Canal had created much criticism of the government, which failed to alleviate suffering which their neglect had caused, and the famine stricken were willing to fight, because an army has a commissariat at least! "Every one that was in distress, and every one that was in debt, and every one that was discontented, escaped to the cave of Adullam." Newspapers, such as the oldest reform journal, the "Shen Pao" of Shanghai, related horrible illegal tortures of the "third degree" used by Manchuized officials.

Tin was largely financing the propaganda, the 400,000 Chinese tin merchants and miners of Singapore, Penang, etc. in the Straits Settlements being the largest contributors. Following them came the 100,000 American Chinese, and the 50,000 Australian Chinese. Even in 1898, Li Hung Chang was known to declare at Canton that it was not impossible that the spread of the new education would overturn the Manchu dynasty, of which he, a Chinese from Hofei in Nganwhai province, had been the strongest prop among the viceroys for forty-five years. Superstition was not inactive. Halley's comet flared in the sky. It had shone when Caesar fell; when Jerusalem fell; when Italy fell before Attila; when English Harold fell before William the Conqueror; when Rome fell in England; when Quebec fell before Wolfe, and now its awful flame must surely prophesy the fall of the Manchu dynasty. Omens were recited that red snow (snow and loess) had fallen in Honan province, and that the Hangchow tidal bore had risen 20 feet, broke over the bank, and poured water into the first gallery of the famous Haining pagoda. This always meant the fall of the dynasty, for had it not happened on the night the beloved Mings fell, and when the scholarly Sung fell? As with civil servants in some other countries, the Manchuized Civil Service of mandarins acted as though they were the govern-

ors and not the servants of the people, by allotting to themselves high salaries and peculations. The year before the revolution, the land tax yielded about \$150,000,000. Only \$30,000,000 reached the government exchequer. The Chinese held the Manchus responsible for this criminal neglect of audit, for at least \$100,000,000 should have reached the imperial and provincial exchequers. That would have allowed \$50,000,000 for the expected peculation of that kind of office holders who believe that "public office is a private graft." The same peculation occurred in returning the salt gabelle of \$20,000,000. In September 1911, the month preceding the great revolution, the *Chi Feng Po*, a native paper of Peking, reported that all wages were in arrears, and that even the tea coolies had humorously pasted an anonymous sheet on the Imperial Controller's door: "Not even a shadow of our wages yet: *why; why?*" There was some grinding of teeth behind the grin; there was more than humor in this facetiousness. Taxes were increased on long-suffering Kwangtung province; the brick kilns of Kochau, the silk sheds of Namhoi, the tea houses, and even the temple keepers being assessed "all the taxed would bear." I will instance a representative revolt. On September 6, 1911, the bonze at Shek Lung, near Canton, organized a revolt among the worshippers at his temple, which was as significant as if the rector of All Saints Episcopal Church in Worcester, in disgust with conditions, gave arms to his congregation and led them against the citadel of the powers that be. The Chinese mob demolished the municipal Yamen, the police station, and government distilleries, abbatoir, and fish market. As far back as 1898, the Emperor Kwang Hsu by edict declared that the lottery at Canton should day one-third of the up-keep of the far-away Peking University. There is a unique effigy of a kneeling figure erected in the Kwan clan temple at San Wui near Canton, which is and has been whipped by the worshippers to commemorate the defection of a member to the Manchu government's railway and tax program. There was always ill feeling between Peking and far away Kwangtung province, the Manchu and Manchuized viceroys often joking at Peking, when they were

ordered to assume charge at the Yamen at Canton: "Well, I'm off to boss Miaotszes (barbarians), which the refined and commercial Cantonese certainly were not. This superciliousness was deeply resented, in the south.

Repeated complaint had been made that an unrepresentative Manchu government gave away concessions right and left to foreigners, and that when these concessions were recalled or bought out, owing to the outraged patriotic feeling in the southern and central provinces, the foreigner in instances charged immense sums for good will and franchise in addition to his outlay and interest. I will not recite instances which I have on record, as it is the system that I am denouncing, not the persons. The Chinese rightly said, if we look at the matter charitably with his eyes, that he was not going to pay vast sums for the retrocession of his own franchise, which was in some instances coerced from, or wheedled out of an effete, governing, unrepresentative clique, the members of which never consulted the provinces which were concerned. "Taxation without representation" again. It was not like the repudiation of the bonds of the American southern States, for no money had been paid. "Compensation" and "indemnity" are two words the Chinese have learned to hate, and some day they may build an immense navy and equip a large army to interpret these words in the way the Occident interprets them, when they are synonomous with injustice and "grab." On the subject of railways, concessions, etc. the following remarks will be recalled in the American General J. H. Wilson's book *China* (1887):

The Chinese will build railways, open mines, etc. whenever they can be shown that this can be done with their own money, obtained at first by private subscription, and by their own labor, under the direction of foreign experts who will treat them fairly and honestly. They will not for the present grant concessions or subsidies to foreigners. They will not even take money from any syndicate by mortgage.

Complaint was also made that the Ming dynasty, 268 years ago, left as a heritage to the Manchu dynasty a land full of public works, bridges, roads, temples, pagodas, canals,

and that while the Manchu collected large taxes, he almost never repaired a temple, canal or road, so that China is now desolate of "the thing of beauty that is a joy forever." Objection was also made that the government shipyards, like the Kiangnan at Shanghai, were building luxurious ocean steam yachts for Prince Tsui and others of the imperial clan, an expense which the nation could not afford.

This most wonderful of revolutions seemed to break as a bolt from a clear sky on October 10, 1911, at Wuchang on the Yangtze River, in the center of the land, under the very guns of the United States gunboats *Helena* and *Villalobos*, which were steaming by. It was, as I have attempted to show, rather a carefully planned matter, the propaganda going on abroad and at home under bands and leaders, all of whose views did not stop at the same place, but whose opinion had one source in patriotic reform. Kang Yu Wei, the oldest and first of the reformers, commenced in 1897 by winning with his book *Japan's Reform* the emotional Manchu Emperor, Kwang Hsu, but when the Emperor fell in 1898 before the reactionary Dowager, Tse Hsi, Kang the Cantonese, with a Hong Kong education, was driven to British Singapore and Penang, from which places he has planned his travels and propaganda of the "Pao Huang Hwei" (Empire Reform Association), which contemplated a revolution of reform, but the retention of the Manchu dynasty as constitutional monarchs for the time being. This association was quite different from the Kao Lao Hwei, Ko Ming, Sia Hwei, and Tung Men Hwei associations of Dr. Sun Yat Sen, which aimed at a republic. In other words, Kang was a "standpatter," medium reformer, and Dr. Sun a thorough going, advanced, reformer of the progressive radical type.

Liang Chi Chao, the writer and translator, went first to the Straits Settlements and then to Kobe and Yokohama, where he edited the reform Chinese papers, the *Hsi Pao* (Western paper), and the *Ming Pao*. He too tolerated the retention of the Manchu monarchy for the time being. Dr. Macklin, an American missionary of Nanking, had translated Henry George's *Progress and Poverty* into Chinese,

and this book was in the hands of the reformers, and particularly appreciated by Sun Yat Sen. Chang Yuan Chi's *Commercial Press* of Honan Road, Shanghai, had since 1898 been translating western text books for the new Chinese schools. The American Presbyterian Press at Suchow, and at 18 Peking Road, Shanghai; the American Episcopal Press; the press of the other American and British missions and Bible Societies, had for years been issuing telling books of truth and progress in Chinese. Rich compradores of foreign houses at Hong Kong, like Ma Ying Pui, presented sums as large as \$1000 at a time to patriotic lecturing societies like the "Wan Yung." There was more than one Chinese student of the classics in America who thumbed his *Antigone*, and cogitated upon Haemon's argument with his father, King Creon, that "absolute rule was only fitted for the monarch of a desert," and not a people who numbered 400,000,000.

Yuan Shi Kai was deposed by the Manchu Regent, Prince Chun in 1909, but from his exile at Chang Te, his birthplace in Honan province, he kept in dignified touch with the formation of the new forces of opinion and arms. Yuan is a mighty man, quite on the style of Li Hung Chang, his preceptor. At Tientsin, the foreigners assisted Yuan, previous to 1909, with instruction in Occidental organization, and the best troops of the Empire in the matter of equipment, as well as the best schools, and almost the best mills, were organized by Yuan. Yuan has not been in close touch with the throbbing heart of the reform spirit in western, central or southern China, where he has never visited, nor with the foreigners of the great educational treaty ports of those sections, and of the brilliant British colony of Hong Kong in south China, which, with British and American Shanghai, has possibly done most for a reformed China. Yuan's only experience outside of China proper was when as a youth he served twelve years with the army in Korea, and in China itself he has traveled little. Yuan is practical and cold; swift in action and severe at times. An anecdote which throws a light on his mentality is the following. He jested with a Red Cross surgeon that he was taking a lot of

trouble; that while he had remade the man in sawing off his leg, he had not remade the soldier so far as he the commander was concerned; that generally in populous China, when the leg had to go, the whole man was let go. To err is human, to forgive is divine. In other countries than China, former standpatters are now enrolled as enthusiastic Progressives. A man should not always be judged by his past, for it is possible that he shall see a great light. Paul was indeed a converted Saul. Dr. Sun Yat Sen's greatest friend, Dr. Cantlie of London, who has recently issued a book, says that Yuan Shi Kai is overrated by the foreigners of north China, but Dr. Sun himself has time and again vouched for the sincerity and enthusiasm of Yuan. The future certainly is glorious with great possibilities.

Dr. Sun Yat Sen (I would like to Latinize his name as Sunyacius just as we Latinized Kung Fut Tsze into Confucius) is a Hong Kong product, and has been a revolutionist and a republican from the beginning. As a boy he was fed on thrilling stories of the Taiping rebellion by his uncle, who had served as an officer in that rebellion against the Manchus. Sunyacius was born at Fatshan, seven miles west of Canton in 1866. From 1884 to 1887 he was assisted by Dr. Kerr, of the Anglo-American mission, Canton, in whose office he studied medicine and English. He studied medicine and surgery under his greatest friend, Dr. Cantlie at what is now the medical department of Hong Kong University. In 1892 Dr. Sun became the first Chinese practicing medicine at beautiful Macao, and met with great opposition from the conservative Portugese doctors, who in 1894 drove him to Canton. His father was a Chinese Christian evangelist, a Congregationalist (London Mission) by denomination. Even two years before Kang Yu Wei's work at Peking, Dr. Sun in 1895 smuggled arms into Canton, got his revolutionary forces at work, and received his first baptism of fire. Owing to the Swatow men not meeting the Hong Kong men at Canton, Sun's plans collapsed in 1895. By the advice of Mr. Dennis, a solicitor of Hong Kong, Dr. Sun fled to Kobe, Japan; to Honolulu, to San Francisco, everywhere picking up threads of the theme of

liberty. The world is now familiar with his wanderings, disguises, privations, propaganda, through the long years, and his visits to bankers. Sun's headquarters have been at British Singapore and at Hong Kong, but he is as well known at San Francisco, Chicago, New York, London Vancouver and Yokohama. Incognito, he has walked into the dormitories of Columbia College, New York, and talked revolution and reform with some of the students under the unconscious eye of many a conservative. Dr Sun is a scholar, propagandist, organizer and republican. His example has had much to do with the change in the styles of clothing in China. He is an author having published in 1904 in London a book on *The Chinese Question*. The Manchus kept Dr. Sun out of China during the long years, and he is therefore not yet thoroughly known to the Hupeh and Hunan province guilds, who fired the first successful shot, but he is the pick of the southern and the alien Chinese, who have largely financed reform and revolution; the Chinese of Canton, Singapore, Penang, noble Hong Kong, Macao, America, England, Japan, Australia, and brilliant Shanghai. He has never held office under the Manchus at home or abroad, and is therefore not well known to foreigners in the salons of diplomats, in the capitals of the Caucasian race, or to the masses of the Chinese in the north and west provinces, but he is a coming man. The following incident will throw a pleasing light on Dr. Sun's character. On February 22, 1912, his elder brother Sun Mei, perhaps an ordinary man in equipment, was at a time of enthusiasm almost elected governor of the great province of Kwangtung as a popular tribute to Sun Yat Sen. The latter wired from Nanking, disapproving of the choice for the province's good, and urging "brother Mei" to confine himself to business, for which he was more fitted.

Another mighty man who prepared the way for revolution and whom America knows well was the Honorable Wu Ting Fang. Not a few perhaps held their breath when it was announced in November, 1911, that this courtly gentleman had entered the strenuous arena. Wu was the first of the reformers to insist on foreign acknowledgment of the rebel

government, and he formulated the most brilliant move of the revolution, the announcement that if foreigners advanced money to the imperialists, and the republicans won, the latter would repudiate such loans. This really won the revolution, for numbers of the foreign syndicates were at first heartily in favor of the Manchu statu quo. Wu has already codified the reform and penal laws of China, and is prepared to enter upon that difficult question, extraterritoriality. Watch the Honorable Wu Ting Fang; he is not afraid to take the side of "China for the Chinese," although he is one of the most polished gentlemen in western culture of all the Chinese officials. He aims to interpret the East to the West. Wu risked vast preferment, and he will grow in power with the masses of the Chinese nation. His brother-in-law is the exceedingly able Dr. Ho Kai, Commander of the British Order of Michael and George, the Chinese member of the Legislative Council of the royal colony of Hong Kong island, a thorough legislator, a brilliant man.

There were other reformers in China and abroad at work from 1898 to 1911, although the western press gave no attention to the really astonishing matter. The bitter Hunanese republican rebel, the irrepressible Hwang Shing, was also exiled by the Empress Dowager, Tse Hsi, in 1898. He fled to Japan with a price on his head. When the psychic moment was called at Wuchang in October 1911, Hwang was soon on the ground. He was one of the republican generals who captured Nanking, and thus crowned the revolution with success, and he is now frequently at Peking, urging the views of the Yangtze provinces.

In America, the editors of the *Chung Sai Yat Po*, the *Chinese World*, and *Free Press* at San Francisco, and the *Chinese Reform News* at New York, often visited by Sun Yat Sen's American representative, Wong Man Su, ably took up the propaganda, which was carried on in their own way by a thousand newspapers which arose throughout China from 1906 onward, first in the treaty ports, and later in Chinese cities. Reference was made to the fact that while China, the largest Oriental country, was without a real Parliament, other Oriental countries had successfully overthrown despot-

ism and oligarchism, and had popular assemblies, which granted some representation in return for the privilege of taxation. Japan had a Diet; even Russia had a Duma; the Filipinos had an Assembly; Turkey had an Assembly; little Persia had a representative Mejliss; native members had at last been admitted into the Viceroy's Council in India; and Hong Kong, with its 500,000 Chinese, had long had two Chinese as brilliant members of the Legislative Council.

Viceroy Seu Ki Yu's essay of 1866, praising Washington and republicanism as ideal, was reissued and distributed, and had its influence. By 1909 and 1910 the reformers had compelled the Manchus to heed the howling of the wind, and see the shadow of a cloud, at least as big as a man's hand on the horizon of internal politics. The Manchus granted provincial and national assemblies, but they were called and considered only "Tsecheng Yuan" (advice boards) and not legislative bodies in the free and full sense of the word. The pensions of the Manchus and bannermen in the various Chinese cities were decreased somewhat and land was offered them so that they might enter the industrial body of the nation. Many Manchus rebelled, as at Chingtu city in September, 1911. Argument increased. The cloud on the horizon grew larger. Objection was made to the court's monopoly of the rich copper mines of Yunnan province, and complaint was reiterated that while the southern provinces were the least consulted, and the weakest in representation in any governmental consultations that were held at Peking, the government overdeveloped the armies and schools of the three northern provinces of Pechili, Shantung and Shansi with taxes collected, largely in the southern provinces, where the government neglected schools, police and army divisions. It was hard to get the Stuart kings to call Parliaments, and when at a belated date they did, complaint was louder than ever, for there was something to complain of, and at last a constitutional place to complain in. These Chinese assemblies gave little representation directly to the masses, a high property qualification debarring them, but the gentry of the guilds in

many cases, espoused the reform sentiment of the masses, exactly as the Stuart Parliaments did to the disgust of the Stuart kings who hoped for monarchic support, and as the barons of the "Magna Charta" did at Runnymede to the disgust of Plantagenet John of England. One provincial Assembly President we might note at this point. He is Tang Hua Lung, of the Hupeh Assembly. When Hankow was taken on October 13, 1911, Tang jumped to the front as organizer of the first republican provincial government, with headquarters at Wuchang, the ancient viceregal capital of the illustrious Viceroy Chang Chih Tung. In the mother province of reform, the most progressive province politically of all the twenty-one, Kwangtung, Wu Hon Man agitated in his assembly for reform, and when the Imperial Viceroy, Chang Ming Chi fled to Hong Kong, Wu Hon Man burst into the Yamen at Canton with the rebelling 16th and other regiments, and took charge of that great province for the republican rebels. In its Nationalization-of-Railways scheme, the Manchus partially confiscated the Kwangtung railways, promising to pay the owners only 60 per cent of their investment.

China's army was a territorial one. Troops raised in this way are hard to control in local emergencies, but they are easier to recruit, mobilize, drill and discipline at the beginning than mixed corps. Among the generals of divisions, transferred from the Navy Department, was the famous Li Yuan Heng, on whom the republicans largely fixed their hopes as the man trained and true for the real deeds of deadly arms, which make new governments possible. Propaganda and patience are all right in their places, but powder needs a special man of a stern mould, fit to deal with merciless and terrible enemies. General Li was one of these men; General Hwang was another. General Hsu, who sent in the brilliant coup de grace at Nanking, was still another. You all know the details of the training of these men and that their success was not an accident. As general of the 20th division of the northern army, camped at Lanchou, east of Peking, was General Chang Shao Tsen (we will call him Chang the first to distinguish him from two other

Generals Chang of the Manchu camp at Nanking and elsewhere in the northeastern provinces). He will come forward in a moment.

In the province where Shanghai is located, the President of the Assembly, Chang Chien, who proposes to visit American Chambers of Commerce, and who is well known as the host in China of visiting Pacific Coast Chambers of Commerce, was more than ready to declare for reform. He, with Wu Ting Fang, was insistent on the abdication of the Manchu dynasty, and the declaration of a republic. At Lhasa, in far away Tibet, was an Imperial resident who had been trained in reform at Shanghai, and in law at Yale. He was the eminent Wen Tsung Yao, destined to be the Assistant Foreign Minister of the first rebel government. For the most part however the radical reformers were new men unknown to the world, as the Manchus had naturally never given office to them. Whenever there is a movement towards liberty in Europe you generally find an English book, or an England-inspired man behind it. It will be noted that nearly all these Chinese reformers have come under American influence.

Many causes, all important, helped to precipitate the crisis. Sheng Kung Pao and others had planned to compel the provinces and the gentry of the guilds, to sell out their many little railroads, many of which were paying well, to the central government, which intended to quickly nationalize the railroads under immense foreign loans. The local gentry feared that this meant the extinction of distributed small fortunes and opportunities; concessions of mines to foreigners; heavy interest; continuation of the unscientific Likin system of customs as a security; and payment of obnoxious bonuses. The bitter complaint written in blood, of the Hunanese of Changsha city on this subject was: "When a piece of meat is in the thief's mouth, it is hard to take it out." All may not agree with the Chinese position, but it is legal and wise to listen to the argument of the defense and not shout it out of court. "Why should we, with the richest mines on earth; the richest passenger, freight and labor field; with lands plethoric of water power

and grain; and the lowest debt, if the oppressive indemnities were wiped out, pay foreigners such immense bonuses, interest and concessions, discounts and profits, to go out of our country" rang the cry, not only in Hupeh, Hunan, Szechuen, Shansi and Kwangtung provinces, but I have seen it in native papers printed under the shadow of foreign banks on the Bund at Tientsin in the north, and there was one large meeting of protest held by the Chinese of British Hong Kong in the Chui Yin hotel on September 3, 1911, delegates attending even from distant Szechuen province, where the "Railroad Protection Association" of Chingtu city in August, 1911, had issued a famous placard of protest in which the four banking nations in caricature were made to say: "The wealth of the four provinces of the Yangtze and the south is all given to us four foreign nations to swallow down at one gulp." A representative native Hankow paper wrote: "The merchants of Hupeh urge the people to take shares in their own railways; use your own money and do not go to foreigners; there is need of independence if you would preserve your liberty." Egypt was cited as the example of not following this course. You will note the Chinese believe that money, as well as hostile arms, can make slaves. Even if a foreign banker, statesman, or merchant does not fully agree with the local feeling of the Chinese, it is wise to look frankly at their side of the argument in making educational, financial and political plans in the future. There was much complaint that the Manchu princes had accumulated private hoards from the taxes levied largely in the south. Something then was brewing, especially in the southern and central provinces. Not a hair of a foreigner was to be touched. I would like to quote the written guarantee of the "Sia Hwei" (Reform Association) of Fukien province to the foreigners of Fuchau if I had time. Its sentences will forever stand as a bond of friendship between the East and the West. These Fukien people were as good as their word, for besides sending levies to the revolution, the "Hsiang lao" (head men) of the villages organized home guards for the protection of both foreigners and natives. When the revolution broke out at Wuchang, the soldiers

of the brave 30th regiment escorted the American missionaries out of the line of fire from Serpent Hill, and when the missionaries sailed on the German freighter *Belgravia* for Shanghai, the revolutionary soldiers of Generals Li and Hwang shouted a peace message that will endure: "American republicans are brothers of ours." The heavy indemnities amounting to the awful sum of \$250,000,000 have been a heavy load upon the Chinese people of the south and central provinces, who had nothing to do with the persecution of foreigners in 1900. The Chinese of the taxed south greatly appreciated therefore American and British action in returning part of the indemnities, but other nations should do likewise. The *Westminster Gazette* of London now supports this position. It is a growing wrong.

Histories of peoples, not dynasties and oligarchies, such as John Richard Green's *History of the English People*; books which helped to bring about the American revolution; the American missionary, Dr. Macklin's Chinese translation of Henry George's *Progress and Poverty*; great paeans of liberty and political pain the world over, were translated and read. The book *Service* was re-read. It was written in 1897 by Tan Sze Tung, the son of a governor of Hupeh province. Tan was one of the martyrs for liberty, who were beheaded in 1898. Thomas Paine's *The Crisis*, which was good enough to be read by Washington before battle to the American regiments of 1776, was translated and read to the Chinese republicans. The preliminary dance was opened in September, 1911, by far western Szechuen province, Peking issuing this edict in the yellow *Peking Gazette*: "Whoever shall serve us by killing rebels, shall be rewarded regardless of rules;" a sort of Sicilian Mafia or Tammany Beckerism you see! The Peking government had practically confiscated the railways of the Szechuenese, as the paper which they were given in exchange, bore no guarantee of interest, and no reliance was put upon the value of the security by the provincial gentry, bankers and farmers. When provinces and states lose confidence in the sincerity of a fixed central government, which is not run by responsi-

ble parties which can be recalled, that government totters to its fall. A national anthem was given to the nation to sing.

May China be preserved!

In this time of the Manchu dynasty, we are fortunate to see
real splendor;

May the heavens protect the imperial family."

The south only sang it in parodies, and in September the men of Szechuen rebelled and "fired the shot heard round the world." In a month, the soldiers of General Li's 8th division at Wuchang "fired the volley that was heard around the world." What followed rapidly lives in everyone's mind; the rushing of northern troops by railway to the triple cities at Hankow; the rolling to and fro of victory and repulse. General Li's troops, especially the "Pu Pa Tsze" (Dare to Die Brigade) of shaven round-heads, fought bravely. They were a sort of Cromwellians. When ammunition ran out, the rebel troops used the bayonet charge with daring. It was a new era in fighting in China when yellow men would charge, with only cold steel, across an area swept by fire from machine guns. The cause and not the command, had given them the new courage. Many of these men were recruited from the most famous boatmen of the world, the Szechuen trackers of the wild rapids and sublime gorges of the glorious Yang Tze River, and from the indefatigable, cheerful mountain coolies of Hupeh province. Province after province seceded until fourteen were in the fold of liberty. Reform was as hot as a prairie fire, and almost as hard to administer. On October 29, a remarkable thing occurred among the divisions being massed for an attack on the rebel's capital. The 20th division, under Chang the first, as we have called him, mustered in the Lanchow camp, formed the famous Army League, and made reform demands on the packed National Assembly at Peking, just as Caesar's immortal 13th legion, before the rebellion, sent demands to the Roman Senate, whose orders they were supposed to take. The nineteen constitutional articles were granted and are a sort of Magna Charta in China. On Novem-

ber 3 at the front, the Imperial 3rd division made a bloody name for itself in the respect of massacre of non-combatants and arson. Hankow, a prosperous city of nearly a million was reduced to the appearance of a wrecked village. On the republican right wing at glorious Nanking, General Chang Hsun (we will call him Chang the second) was the imperial commander. He led his 9th division in similar bloody massacres as those which occurred at Hankow. On November 26, 1911, the republicans under Generals Hsu and Hwang Shing attacked the strong hill forts above Nanking with determination. Dogged charges were made across the open and up the zig-zag of Purple Hill. Who will sing the feats of the new Chinese arms—yes, the Chinese who the world said would never make soldiers, even if they had a great cause at heart. The fighting was not as magnificently solid and desperate as Pickett's gray charge at Gettysburg; Thomas' impetuous charge up Missionary Ridge; the shining Cuirassiers' wild ride into the valley of death at Waterloo; Linievitch's grim defense of Putiloff Hill; the shouting sweep of Oku's Japanese up Nanshan Heights, or the silent plunge of Oyama's massive ranks into the Liaoyang valley, or against the black Mukden lines. It was as determined, daring and brilliant however as any land engagement in the South African or Spanish-American wars, and far braver and stronger than the theatrical engagements, with air ship accessories of the Italy-Tripoli war. The world's critics must now change their criterions. A strong cause will make a strong battle anywhere the world over, no matter what the color of the soldier, or the cut or tint of his battle flag. Liberty is equally proud of the children she begets, no matter what the clime. The Canton artillery sang a rugged song of Liberty. It is worth quoting, not only because it has poetical merit, but because it shows the spirit that was and is working in the souls of men:

Freedom will work on this earth,
Great as a giant rising to the skies,
Come Liberty, because of the black hell of our slavery,
Come enlighten us with a ray of thy sun.

Behold the woes of our fatherland.
Other men are becoming all kings in equality.
Can we forget what our people are suffering?
China, the widest and oldest, is now as an immense desert.

We are working to open a new age in China;
All real men are calling for a new heaven and a new earth.
May the soul of the people now rise as high as Kwangtung's
highest peak;
Spirit of Freedom, lead, protect us.

The Americans of Nanking, Messrs. Macklin, Garrett, Blackstone, Bowen, believed in the Chinese saying "Chiu Ming" (save blood). They pleaded with the victorious republican generals Hsu and Hwang Shing for the first humanitarian surrender in Chinese civil war, as a thrilling example for all time that Chinese revolutionists, like George Washington's and Oliver Cromwell's men, were patriots and gentlemen at heart, and nor mere feudists fighting under the name of a great cause. Generals Ling, Hsu, Li, Hwang, etc., and of course Foreign Minister Wu Ting Fang, rose to the high level. They agreed to a surrender with honors. The panting troops held enthusiasm in control. Behind the walls the Imperialists breathed hard as well they might, seeing what they deserved, and the great populace of shopkeepers eagerly waited. Hurrah! A shout went up that lives would be guaranteed; yes, honor too. Fling open the pounded, riddled iron "Great Peace!" The steel muzzles of the hot Armstrongs; the deadly four-point-sevens; the spitting rapid fire, the 3-inch Krupp guns on Purple, Lion and Tiger hills held their smoky breath like good hounds in leash, but straining. The generals and captains marked time; the troops craned their heads; the Cantonese artillery hitched up the limbers to the gun carriages for their work of war was over. The American missionaries thanked God, and led on the way of peace for a China that would never forget the moving scene, where forgiveness towered over revenge.

Not all of us in the Occident had moved as fast as progress moved in China. Even in December some of the American journals surprisingly opposed the republic, despite Washington's recommendation in his farewell address that

Americans should recommend their form of government to "the applause, the affection, and the *adoption* of every nation." For instance, on the very day that Dr. Sun Yat Sen was named President, the New York *Outlook* December 30, 1911, (the writer of the article was not Colonel Roosevelt) stated that a Chinese republic could, would and should not be set up at present, and further that "Americans would do well to throw all their influence on the side of a monarchy." Nine-tenths of the *Outlook's* readers doubtless thought that if Homer could sometimes nod, such surprisingly retrogressive words as these might be forgiven the generally progressive *Outlook*. Similarly in England, mother of books and sons of liberty, the large London banking house of Montagu, which has been prominent in China, issued a circular stating its "satisfaction" when the republicans lost Hankow to General Feng under atrocious circumstances of almost unforgivable massacre and monumental arson. *Memoria longa; lingua brevis!* So far, the strongest move in the rebellion was the declaration of Foreign Minister Wu Ting Fang at Shanghai that if Britain joined certain monarchical powers in loaning the north money, a trade boycott would be instituted in the southern and central provinces against foreign trade, of which Britain held the largest share. This won Hong Kong, and Hong Kong was able to hold British diplomacy on Downing Street, London. It was a master move, as brilliantly effective as Napoleon's Berlin decree of November 21, 1806, blockading British commerce. Whatever comes in the next few years, this cry surely is forever in the heart of Lincoln's America: "Long live the republican idea of distributed wealth and distributed liberty in good old China, America's yellow brother across the narrowing purple Pacific." The harmony which prevailed between the missionaries and the republicans was inspiring. In a village of Hupeh province (Taiping), the people insisted that Mr. Landahl of the Netherlands Mission should head the local safety league which was maintaining order, and they pushed that astonished gentleman to the head in what was novel to him, of the successful pursuit of notorious pirates. The official birth of the Chinese republic came on Lincoln's

birthday (think of it, America), February 12, 1912. On February 15 the Christian Chinese Provisional President, at Nanking, Sun Yat Sen, performed a remarkable act of self-sacrifice to win the north for republicanism, and induce doughty Yuan to join the great cause. He was also able to induce the vehement south to accept the former reactionary, Yuan. Here was the man who largely had achieved republicanism laying by all its honors at the climacteric moment in favor of the man who had most powerfully withstood republicanism. Yet Sun was happy. China was happy. Yuan was happy. With the least bloodshed ever known on a field of liberty, Sun and his cabinet had achieved the widest revolution ever known. They had established a republic of twenty-one republics four times the population of America. They will be managed by a combination of the British and American systems, as their bulk is too great in the aggregate for the strong centralization which is now becoming popular in America to correct certain evils for the time being. The provincial republics will develop largely as units, until the individual is educated sufficiently for greater cohesion. For a while, the republic may seem to work out like the Mexican system, but a dictator-president is not the final aim. Sun Yat Sen will go down to history as the greatest dreamer, prophet, organizer, altruist and political philosopher, the modern world has known; not that he is brainier than the white man, but being a yellow man, he has been able to accomplish more than any white man. His reception to the hearts of all men, at least the reception of his cause, should be enthusiastic. He stands not alone. The scores of idealists and fighters of his cabinet, made the way for the constructive men who will now take hold, and some of these men are now our guests in America. Above all, Sun converted Yuan by his self-obliteration, and Yuan converted the obstructionist north. What if the Honanese Yuan is at the head of affairs for a while instead of the Kwangtungese Sun. They are both Chinese and now both are republicans. China now has the center of the world's stage, and America has built the Panama Canal to quickly reach a front seat at the stage.

The actors will have long and strenuous parts, and the house is filling up rapidly to hear, and see, and applaud, if all is done well, as it should be. When the Assemblies succeed each other, Dr. Sun's turn as Premier or President will doubtless come. A bas with personal jealousies, antipathies, or overleaping ambitions. Surely there is room for all in twenty-one republics, which are bound as one commonwealth. As Macaulay said: "All under the flag should serve the state." It is repression of individual resentment and ambition which has made England and America so governable, and it is something that China will learn as the years of stress surge about the ship of state. The title of captain or president amounts to very little in the light of patriotism; all aboard the ship are equal when it comes to manning the pumps and shortening or letting out sail according to the winds that blow. Parties will arise like Sun's new party the Tung Men Hwei (Sworn Brother); provincial feeling will be recrudescent and assertive; leaders and their followings will clash at times, but the Chinese must learn, as we all have to learn, that the striving must be one way o' the rope, and not a tug against each other because of personal greed, low ambition, or unruliness. In hundreds of documents issued during the rebellion, the republicans held up two men, Washington and Napoleon as representing successful protest against tyrants. But Washington laid the sword by the minute statesmanship could win. Napoleon used his sword to advance himself, and crush every will except his own: the way of an egotist. If China needs a foreign model to occasionally look at, let it be that of Washington, with his eminent moderation, his unselfishness, his charity, his honor, his true republicanism which sees in every citizen (man or woman) a king equal to himself, for the ballot and tax receipt have made all men equal kings. Do not think that all the severity you hear of in disturbed China at present is unnecessary and forebodes dark days. I will instance one parallel. Before the days of direct primary nominations in America we suffered from the machine system which advanced the incompetent sometimes and sometimes debarred the eminent and efficient from service

in the state. A saloon keeper, who brought 2000 votes would demand for instance the position of Secretary of State. "But you're not fitted for it; you're a hoodlum," The ward heeler would answer: "I must have it; I have to pay my 2000 brigands the 'graft,' which we say is ours; otherwise remember our revenge next election." The parallel! One, Shek Kam Chuen, a young stone cutter and human hair hawker of Canton was very successful in smuggling arms for the revolution, and on the declaration of independence he led a following of 2000 non-descript men who did effective work in fighting. They were men who loved a fight more than liberty, not liberty more than life, like Nathan Hale. When the republic was victorious, and his troops were disbanded and paid, Shek was unsatisfied. He, a hawker, wanted high office when even President Sun turned his brother down from politics back to business in Canton, because he was not eminent for political ability. Shek made demands for himself and his men that the State could not consistently grant. He smuggled arms to take up piracy in reprisal on the harassed State. The way the governor of Canton treated Shek and his legal adviser Chang Han Hing should be engraved on tablets in every city hall of every municipality over the round world. The governor under the constitutional pressure of public opinion, captured the men at their headquarters, and under military law, or the application of the popular "recall," he had them both shot to the great rejoicing of good citizens and tax payers. That ended one instance of heelerism, bossism, packed primary, professional office holding, "public office a private graft," piracy, or whatever you like to call it, in modern China. The "popular recall" was a success, despite the cynicism of the standpatters in Canton, and one of those standpatters was Shek's wily lawyer Chang, who shared his fate much to his disgusted surprise. I am sorry William Dean Howells was not in Canton at that time to write *A Modern Instance*. At times cables may come to us that may make it seem that in troubled China Confucius has abdicated to Confusion. The solution largely lies in three things: railways, education and a real republican congress,

none of the three to be interfered with by either a riotous or office-greedy army. There can be no doubt that the action of the ninety generals of the northern army in forcing the National Assembly at Peking in July, 1912, at the sword's point, to accept certain appointments against their will, was inimical to the vitality of constitutionalism in China. Macaulay's words should be remembered forever that "a constitution however faulty, is better than the best despot." The day however is bright, and despite Tennyson's dictum a "cycle of Cathay" will be as good as any other cycle, and to add Roosevelt's homely epigram, one's nation should be made as good for all of us as it has been for some of us—Manchus! The promise that America will help the new republican China is surely written on all our hearts.

So acute a historian as Macaulay (essay on Milton) has pointed out that the destinies of the human race are sometimes staked on the same cast with the destinies of a particular people. So much the more reason why we, like all other nationals, should be keenly and warmly interested in the present and future of China, because so many American affairs (the Panama Canal and the Pacific being the bonds) are wrapt up in Chinese affairs.

RACE DEVELOPMENT BY INDUSTRIAL MEANS
AMONG THE MOROS AND PAGANS OF THE
SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES

*By Major John P. Finley, United States Army, Governor
of the District of Zamboanga, Moro Province,
Philippine Islands*

The acquisition of the Philippine Islands was not the fulfillment of premeditated and deliberate commercial ambition or of national aggrandizement. In the movement of world-wide political events, affecting our national destiny, we were given this colonial problem to solve in the Pacific. No man or set of men coldly calculated the factors of this problem in advance and turned on the power that propelled the ship of state to the shores of Manila Bay, there to destroy Spanish authority in the Orient, and introduce our great western republic to the nations of the earth, as a full-fledged world power.

We may justly say that Providence in His omniscient wisdom allotted to the American people this new and vastly important task. The responsibility imposed is both individual and national. By three of the fundamental essentials of international law—conquest, purchase and treaty—we acquired and fixed our responsibility. We can not shirk our obligations if we would and we ought not to if we could.

On October 23, 1903, Governor Finley held at Zamboanga, Mindanao, the first American durbar ever assembled among Mohammedans and Pagans. It was a momentous event at which about four thousand of these people, embracing representatives from sixteen tribes, headed by the Sultan of Magindanao and his tribal chiefs, responded to the call for a great bichara (meeting). These people arrived by trail and by a vast number of native boats, the latter being highly decorated with native bunting. Their approach was heralded by the beating of agongs and kulintangans and

the firing of lantakas (native cannons of brass). As this vast assemblage drew near to the Zamboanga dock, the hum of voices, the shouts of command, the swish of paddles, all coupled with the noise of agongs and lantakas made indescribable din and a scene of matchless barbaric splendor. The Sultan and his tribal chiefs were received by Governor Finley with high military honors and escorted by troops to the audience chamber.

On the eve of assuming control of these people Governor Finley deemed it of vital importance, and as due them from the American people, that they, the effective proletariat of the Southern Archipelago and the potential voice of the country, should know, first hand, something of the causes that brought the American government to the Philippines, something of the purposes of the American people toward the native inhabitants, and something of our qualifications to undertake their control and guidance as a dependent people.

Passing over the details of this weighty conference it is sufficient to say that it continued with unremitting zeal for three days and nights and covered all of the essential points of immediate contact between these people of Oriental views and customs and the representatives of the great republic of the new western world. On the subjects of slavery, separation of church and state, equality before the law, prohibition of all things repugnant to law, the sovereignty of the United States in the Philippines, title to lands and the distribution of public lands, American rights under the provisions of international law, the liberty of contract as defined by the Supreme Court of the United States in its application to individuals, the American judicial system, the American military system, the powers of the insular government at Manila, the powers of the provincial government at Zamboanga, prohibition as to the possession and use of weapons, the American system of public education, the American principles of self-government, the Bates Agreement with the Sultan of Sulu, the American system of taxation, the pressing necessity for the observance of public sanitation and the importance of improved roads and trails.

Of course these important and rather complicated subjects were sketched rapidly and in the simplest manner, and adequate time given for discussion, and for the presentation of the inquiries, petitions and claims of the natives. The latter were tremendously impressed by the opportunities and consideration afforded them. The great majority of the assembly had never before been permitted to attend a public meeting of this sort, and to come in direct contact with the officials of the government. The opportunity thus afforded was most flattering to the intelligence of the Moros and Pagans, and most encouraging to their ideas of justice and fair play.

These people had not joined the Aguinaldo revolt for the establishment of an alleged Filipino republic, nor did they in any way sympathise with this movement in the northern islands. They had, however, been approached by representatives of Aguinaldo but deliberately refrained from participating in the rebellion, and more than that, offered their services and aided the loyal Christians to drive out the Filipino insurgents from Zamboanga and turn over the capital of the Southern Islands to the American troops. Many Moros and Pagans welcomed American control, as a contrast to Spanish and Filipino methods, on the basis of religious toleration and a high regard for the military power and great resources of the Americans.

The insurgent and independence element among the Filipinos early began to poison the Moro mind against the Americans by falsely warning the Moros and Pagans that the American government would use all taxes collected from them for the purpose of destroying their religion, to break up their domestic relations, take way their lands, and finally abandon the people to the control of some other nation, perhaps Japan or Russia. In consequence many Moro chiefs resisted the collection of the cedula and road taxes, and carried such resistance to open and persistent hostility against the government. Fuel was added to the flame of discontent engendered by the Filipinos by reason of imposing a higher cedula or poll tax than that demanded by the Spanish government. Ultimately the non-Chris-

tians began to realize that the greater requirement of the Americans really meant more and greater benefits to them individually and also as a people. That the American government was acting as their trustee and guardian in collecting the public taxes, and in their expenditure for public improvements, which were open to the equal enjoyment of all persons without class distinction of any kind. They also discovered, in spite of adverse comment, that the taxes were laid uniformly upon all classes of people, Americans, Europeans, Chinese and Filipinos, as upon Moros and Pagans.

Purely military occupation and control of the Moro country from May 19, 1899, to August 31, 1903, was absolutely necessary to lay the foundations for permanent peace and prepare the way for the advent of a semi-civil organization, modeled after the Dutch and Spanish politico-military systems, which finally took form on September 1, 1903, under the provisions of Act No. 787 of the Philippine Commission, known as the organic law of the Moro Province, and prepared under the personal direction of Civil Governor William H. Taft. The Moros and Pagans know Mr. Taft as the father of the American system of government in the Philippines. Military control still continued but strictly in accordance with the restrictions and limitations imposed by Act No. 787 which made the commanding general of the Southern Islands (Department of Mindanao and Sulu, embracing the Moro Province) answerable direct to the governor general at Manila for the civil management of the province, as he was answerable direct to the division commander at Manila for the military control of the department. The position therefore became a dual one (civil-military) for the department commander and for each and every army officer assigned to civil duty under his direction. Act 787 provided for a legislative council, consisting of five members of which the department commander was the presiding officer.

Within two months after the inauguration of this politico-military system Governor Finley ordered the celebration of the first American durbar at Zamboanga, as already

described. A month later, on November 24, 1903, he ordered another and smaller durbar or bichara at Zamboanga for the consideration of the plans devised by him for the establishment of the Moro Exchange system, as the foundation for the industrial development of the Moros and Pagans. Governor Finley had been formulating these plans during the preceding year, while stationed in the lake region of central Mindanao, where he came in contact with the Malanao and Ilanun Moros. An experimental Moro Exchange was established at Malabang in December, 1902, under military control, and the Moros manifested not a little interest in its operation.

After the second durbar at Zamboanga Governor Finley traveled extensively among the Moro and Pagan tribes and made a special study of the relations existing between these two important classes of non-Christian people, and also their relation to the Christian Filipino and the Chinese element. As a result of this study it was found that the Pagans were hill people and the natural producers of the country. They were necessarily agriculturists, and by reason of their habitat and environment they did not engage in piracy, slavery and war. They were peacefully inclined, enjoyed the solitude and grandeur of nature, worshiped nature and fed upon her bounteous returns from a faithful tillage of the soil.

In traveling among the hill people, especially the Subanuns, we always found them well provided with food, very industrious and invariably hospitable. Their houses were generally of simple construction and more or less temporary as to location, because these primitive farmers have never been able to acquire possession of and use such agricultural implements as would enable them to engage in intensive cultivation. They could contend with the forests by cutting them down and destroying the fallen material, when dry, with fire. The tillage of the rich, moist soil is followed quickly and easily with a blunt pointed knife and a sharpened stick. But when the second growth appeared and the ground became covered with kogon grass, and the soil hardened by evaporation, then the primitive farmer found that

his primitive tools could not successfully overcome the tough sod and the drying effect of the sun. He could forge knives and fell the forests but he failed to devise implements with which to rend the matted sod and expose the subsoil to tillage and seeding. This kaingin system of farming has proved very destructive to the rich and valuable forests of Mindanao. The Philippine Commission, in support of a policy for the proper conservation of natural resources has enacted a stringent law against the kaingin method of agriculture, but it is very difficult of enforcement against the isolated settlements of the hill people, who never assemble in villages but are segregated into family units, at widely separated points, whose houses are often the most temporary shelters and erected where approach is the most difficult.

Before the advent of the Moros and Dyaks, about A.D. 1475, from Borneo and the Straits Settlements, to the south and west, these hill people were coast people and gained their living from the sea, and from tilling the rich, alluvial soil of the small valleys and deltas along the shore line. Life was easier then and the daily pursuits more varied. But those sea rovers and traders (Moros and Dyaks) from the south and west began to appear upon the quiet scene and gradually wrought a most radical change. These rovers were skilled and hardy seamen and withal well armed and daring warriors. They enforced their trading schemes with the ready and violent use of the spear and knife. The peaceful aborigines of the rich and beautiful Mindanao shores were forced back into the interior to escape the merciless pillage and extortions of the Moros and Dyaks. About one hundred years later another horde of trading sharks came from the north, the southern tier of islands of the Visayan group, and settled along the coast line of Mindanao on the north, east and west. They were also raided by the Moros and Dyaks who from time to time employed the Visayans to travel in the interior and plunder the aborigines who had become, through force and circumstances, the original hill people. Thus these latter people became timid, suspicious, secretive and deceptive. They sought individual

seclusion because when grouped into villages they became more easily discovered and more easily plundered by the vicious Moros, Dyaks and Visayans. In different parts of Mindanao these hill people became known as Subanuns, Tirurayes, Manobos, Bogobos, Mandayans, Bilanes, Atas, Tagacaoles, Giangas, Bukidnons, Dulanganes, Tagabiles and Mangangas. In the Island of Basilan they are known as Yakanes. In round numbers these people aggregate 250,000 souls. Opposed to them are the Moros, including the Dyaks absorbed by them, and number about 350,000 souls, inclusive of the inhabitants, all Moros, of the Sulu Archipelago. In addition are the Visayans (Filipino Christians) numbering about 50,000 souls, whose villages now fringe the coast line of Mindanao.

The political and economic situation here disclosed was that of 250,000 Pagans hemmed in and subsisted upon by 400,000 mixed Mohammedans and Christians. Two hundred and fifty thousand hill people, the primitive farmers of the country and its real producers, held in bondage by 400,000 parasites and compelled to contribute to their support, in addition to the maintenance of their own families. Two hundred and fifty thousand nature worshipers and simple folk surrounded by 350,000 fierce followers of the prophet Mohammed, supplemented by 50,000 devoted adherents of the Catholic church.

Thus were these hill people hunted for their forest products on the one hand and persecuted for their adverse religious faith on the other. Their burdens were well nigh insurmountable and certainly most discouraging. In a region with less fertile soil and deprived of the benefits derived from nature's ever bountiful storehouse of available food supply the hill people would have long ago succumbed to the ravages of their industrial and religious foes.

This form of oppression became finally and firmly fixed upon the hill people. A system of taxation was established by the Moros known as Siwaka, (Buis, Buhis, Palai) and Pamuka (Sukai). The Siwaka was a direct tax payable in farm products, crops or stock, in return for a small gift of cloth made by the Sultan or one of his Datus. The

tax-gatherers sent by the Moros to live among the hill people were called Panguku. These agents were sometimes Filipinos and at other times Moros. They grafted upon the hill people over and above that which they were compelled to gather and turn over to the Sultans and their Datus. When the taxes were not paid, for any reason, at the appointed time they automatically increased to any amount, according to the decision of the Sultan and the hierarchy of Datus. Following the nonpayment of the fine thus imposed the unfortunate hill-dweller was called before his Datu who assigned him to the ever-increasing band of slaves.

When the Americans arrived such were the controlling conditions between the hill people and the coast people. It required two years of travel and investigation, under many perilous and discouraging situations, by Governor Finley before he could acquire the facts and formulate a remedy.

Many meetings were held, many persons interrogated and many rancherias visited, with a view to observing the people under natural surroundings, allaying fear and suspicion, avoiding prejudice and self-interest, and faithfully exposing to view both sides of each case. The Sultans and their Datus, together with the self-interested Filipino and Chinese traders were opposed to any investigation and warned the hill people against the evil-minded and dangerous American Governor. A certain class of self-interested and impecunious Americans and Europeans opposed the movement for the betterment of the hill people. Some other white men thought that the government should not interfere with the natural and alleged inalienable rights of the people, and that it would be very unwise to disturb existing economic conditions, the result of centuries of oppression. That Spain had tried and failed. That the second state would be worse than the first. That the people concerned were not worth the huge effort involved. That ignorance, superstition and long established custom could not be altered, and that finally the government had other and more important matters to consider and provide for in

promoting the interests of Americans and Europeans, who alone by their business acumen could develop and improve the country. The ignorant and savage masses must rise or fall by their own efforts. Government aid would pauperize and demoralize them. It is opportune to quote here certain remarks upon state aid by the Sales Agent of the Philippine Government in his annual report for 1912.

The commonly accepted American and English conception of the relation of the government and individual in continental Europe is one which is erroneous in the extreme. It includes autocratic control, strong centralization of power, and a merging of the rights of the individual into those of the state. Whatever justification this belief may find in such continental institutions as might properly be included in a political survey, it finds none whatever in those which bear upon the purposes of this discussion. The continental theory of material development seems to operate entirely apart from politics and to rest firmly upon some fundamental principle of development, the acceptance of which is complete. Monarchies of all classes recognize it as clearly as do republics and socialistic states. The conception of the function of the state is a broad one and in it individual rights are kept well in the foreground. The term "paternalism" carries with it no terrors when it conserves the interests of all concerned, and a class of paternalism which in its practical operation tends toward the development among a people of qualities of responsiveness and self-reliance represents a very high standard of excellence. The individual is recognized by the state as representing a unit of value which may, with profit to the state and benefit to him, be made the subject of direct or indirect investment. The nature and extent of the investment is measured by the degree to which it may be necessary to supplement his equipment in order to make his efforts most highly productive.

These critics all followed a narrow and selfish view of the situation. They could hardly be considered as sincerely interested in the successful and permanent betterment of a dependent people. They did not consider the problem from the broad humanitarian standpoint, and from the basis of a sound and progressive public policy, demanding the mutual coöperation of all interests. They even overlooked the urgent necessity for a rational economic policy which must provide for a large and permanent supply of reliable and efficient manual labor. They were unwittingly planning to strangle the goose that lays the golden egg. They were unmindful of the significance of that forceful expression of

the Filipino patriot, Jose Rizal, who said that "the future of the Philippines lies in the hands of its mountain people," and he should have added; in reasonable and helpful coöperation with its coast people.

Notwithstanding these and other discouragements Governor Finley launched his scheme of the Moro Exchange system and trading stores in May, 1904, which received the approval of the legislative Council of the Moro Province in Act No. 55, enacted June 14, 1904, and which finally obtained the sanction of the Philippine Commission.

Then followed a series of meetings with Moros, Filipinos and Pagans at which the plans and purposes of the Moro Exchange system were unfolded to the anxious and overburdened tillers of the soil, who longed for freedom from the terrors of slavery and the crushing burdens of the Siwaka and Pamuka systems of Moro taxation. It was of vast importance to both the coast people and the hill people that their trade relations be reorganized and adjusted on a business basis that would permit of healthy and progressive development. These two classes of people must get together and mutually coöperate along industrial lines for the betterment of themselves and of their country. Left to their own ingenuity they would have continued to wallow in the morass of conflict, oppression and despair for an indefinite period of time.

The history of the development of our great Northwest is especially applicable at this point. One population after another has settled, farmed, failed and moved away to other fields and perhaps other failures. The failure was due in most cases to the simple fact that the control of elements indispensable to success was in hands whose interests were confined to extracting from the situation the maximum of immediate personal benefit, regardless of either the general welfare or the rights of others. American methods of production are almost as far in the rear of those of continental Europe as is its system of credit. No soil is so ungrateful as to refuse to respond to proper treatment.

Spanish evacuation and American occupation weakened the bonds of oppression and degradation, and afforded the

opportunity taken by Governor Finley to lead these people to a common and harmonious basis of agreement, sink their differences into oblivion, correlate their powers for mutual good, make them appreciate the need of one class for the other in the direction of uplift, and start them off on the desirable way open to them, viz: industrial development.

There was imperative need at the outset for conditions and opportunities to make an honest and adequate living so as to preclude the necessity of reverting to the old methods of piracy, plunder and slavery. The Moro Exchange system presented a feasible solution that appealed to all. It was a system of fair play, fair profits and cash returns. The cost of maintenance, 1 per cent of the daily sales, was within the reach of all participants and placed no burden on the purchaser. There was no limit placed on the productive capacity of any member, for the demand was usually equal to or above the supply, and the government agreed to pay cash for any non-perishable products that appeared as an excess at the close of business on any day. The Moro Exchange system thus offered the advantages of a school of instruction to promote agriculture, commerce and friendly relations. It formed the clearing house for racial, social, religious and commercial differences between the hill people and the coast people, and laid the foundation for their future blending and coöperation in the progressive development of their country.

This vital principle of coöperation is the foundation stone of the Moro Exchange system. It had never been applied in Spanish times and after American occupation it did not meet with general favor from American investors. The principle favors industrial and commercial development along lines and by methods that will insure the protection of the rights of all participants, especially where any of them are handicapped by ignorance and lack of experience. On this question the sales agent of the Philippine government says in his report for 1912:

Coöperation, whose importance as a fundamental policy in agricultural, industrial and commercial development has been fully

demonstrated by the experience of continental Europe, is in America relegated to the class of institutions which are "interesting but not necessary". The trials which this institution has received in America have generally resulted in failure. This has been due to no fault of coöperation, but to the lack of proper government backing and support, or to the fact that its sphere of influence was not sufficiently large to furnish protection against its natural enemies, money and speculation, or that in organization or management the real science of coöperation was not sufficiently understood and considered.

The lack of true appreciation of the science and art of coöperation, influenced by the adverse elements of speculation, has greatly retarded the industrial and commercial development of our Indian wards in the states, and under similar conditions is experienced as an unreasonable restraint upon a like development of our Indian wards in the Philippines. A baneful influence of this sort germinates and grows with extreme insidiousness and therefore should be radically overcome at its inception.

In promoting their welfare along any line of action the Moros can not divorce themselves from their religion (Mohammedan) because the great mass of them have never known any other system of living. The principles of modern Christianity have not been introduced to them in a way to attract and hold their attention. Uncompromising eradication of long established customs, immediate change in the daily routine of life, baptism by force or deception, radical divergence from existing forms in the control of women and children, denunciation of what the people hold dear and sacred, unrestrained abuse of their feelings, ridicule of their customs, change of dress and of parental name, and various other practices engaged in through Christian missionary effort have failed to be successful in the propaganda of Christian proselytism.

The Moro is not convinced by any doctrine, policy or plan that seeks as a sine qua non of acceptance that he shall forego existing practices at once and show by outward and visible signs that he has done so. He stubbornly resists frontal attacks but may be dislodged from his position by discreet and considerate advances upon his flanks.

Although a Mohammedan and a pirate he is still human and subject to control. He keenly appreciates sympathy and justice.

If these benighted people are willing to say voluntarily, after ten years of labor with them, and they have said it to Governor Finley, "help us to avoid temptation and sin, and to regulate our customs and laws so that they may be brought into line and agreement with the customs and laws of the American government, and that we as Mohammedans may become better American citizens," then there is most encouraging hope that their complete regeneration along social, moral and industrial lines has made a strong beginning in the right direction. Under Spanish rule the state church existed without interruption and of course under Mohammedan rule no other form of government has ever prevailed. Although the Mohammedan religion is a large factor in the daily life of the Moros there is a reason for it. In this respect they differ little from the Filipinos who live under the rigid discipline of the Catholic church. The more intelligent Moros and Pagans understand and appreciate the real liberty of conscience accorded them under the American system of government.

General Wood made this fact very clear to many Christians and non-Christians during his régime as the first civil governor of the Moro Province. Governor Finley has repeatedly since then, to individuals and at public meetings explained to the natives the inviolable American policy of non-interference between church and state. This policy appealed to the Moros and Pagans from the start and smoothed the way for a closer and more influential contact with them.

These people are wards of the government and as such children of the state they should receive paternal care, more especially as they ask for it. It is vitally essential to their advancement while tribal differences prevail and until they have arrived, by social and industrial evolution, to that point where popular self-control in communities becomes practicable.

These people think in terms of their church as they under-



stand Mohammedanism and Paganism, and are groping for a way to make their religious life consistent with their obligations to the American government. Can we abandon these people after having won their respect, admiration and confidence? Must we compel them to retreat, discard our doctrine and fall under the control of another power whose policy and plans may likewise become for them a chimera also? Let us hope that we shall not be so recreant to our individual and national responsibility. Some Americans talk of such abandonment but our history shows that where we have established the American ensign as a symbol of liberty, peace, truth and righteousness we have never deserted it to escape responsibility for the advancement, cultivation and settlement of those ideas.

The rehabilitation of the Moros and Pagans is slow and difficult owing to their natural and acquired idiosyncrasies and to the many evil practices to which they are subject. The better class among these people, led by that sturdy and sincere patriot, Datu Hadji Abdullah of Taluksangay, the Abraham Lincoln of the Moros, are making a vigorous campaign in behalf of a better life and a more stable and progressive future for these natives of Moro land. Let us help them and stand by the trust until victory is won.

The long-suffering people of both classes acknowledged at the various bicharas (meetings) that their native system of government was bad and not productive of comfort, happiness, friendliness, coöperation, or prosperity. Some said they desired a change but did not know how to effect it. That if weapons were surrendered then one class might get the advantage of the other. If slavery was abandoned how could the chiefs and their families gain a living. If a change was effected under government control would the government continue such a policy until it was an assured success? All of these and many other questions by the people were discussed and answered to the satisfaction of the majority. Of course these people and others like them must have concrete and visible demonstration to secure conviction and clinch the scheme. It is an Arab proverb that "one day of absolute truth and justice is better than

seventy years of good wishes and promises." It was contended by Governor Finley that an evidence of good faith in the promises made by the people at the meetings would be demonstrated by such contributions from them to aid in the construction and opening of the first Exchange, as they could conveniently subscribe. That contributions could be made in money or in kind, and if of the latter character they must be of such articles, products or animals as could be readily transformed into the currency of the islands. That whatever they contributed would be added to by the government from available public funds until a sum was obtained that would liquidate all expenses of construction, and of maintenance for a period of three months.

These long-suffering people eagerly subscribed their mites, according to their possessions, and collected something over one-third of the total cost of the enterprise.

The first or parent Exchange was constructed at Zamboanga and opened with a great celebration and fiesta on September 1, 1904. All classes of people joined with the government officials in making the occasion a notable one. The Moros and Pagans crowded the large buildings and yard space with their products and wares, which by sundown were almost entirely disposed of. The natives came from far and near, by boat and by trail, some of them covering distances of more than one hundred miles. In that unique emporium of wild men, the first of its kind ever gathered under the tropical sun of Moro land, slaves jostled masters, hill people traded with coast people, sworn and bitter enemies forgot their feuds, timid women and children joined heartily in the excitement, new acquaintances were made, new agreements were entered into, new and strange things were purchased for loved ones, and the slave and the peon experienced the first thrills of freedom, and the quickening impulse of self-conscious control, in the possession of that which was lawfully and rightfully theirs, as the product of their own ingenuity and labor.

Thus began the first Exchange and trading store in the history of Moro land. The first public gathering of hill people and coast people ever witnessed in the southern

islands, when not a weapon was present except for sale, and not one was carried upon the person. Never before in Zamboanga had such an observance of regulation and good order been strictly adhered to. The Moros held their promises of good conduct inviolate and sacred. It was frequently commented upon during the exercises of the opening day and great wonder expressed that the Moros and Pagans would thus respect the wishes of Governor Finley.

At the large durbars in October and November, 1903, the Moro chiefs and their followers came armed to the conference and would not have attended it otherwise. They were not yet fully acquainted with the government, and had urged the governor to not oppose their wishes respecting the carrying of weapons on that occasion. There were no brawls and no need to make arrests for misconduct or violation of law. Americans and Europeans at Zamboanga were at first thrown into a state of great excitement and terror by the approaching horde of Moros and Pagans, all heavily armed. Women and children were collected at the military post and placed under guard. The troops were kept under arms during the period of the conference.

At the opening of the Exchange, about one year later, not a weapon was worn and many were offered for sale and such sales were only permitted to Americans and Europeans for keepsakes and personal use. These were evidences of personal control over savage races that astonished all classes of people who observed or heard of the results achieved. It was the beginning of a new era for these savages and they felt the strange influence coursing through their bodies with an effect that appeared to baffle explanation. Some called it a vision, others that the spirits (balian) were at work. Nearly all were agreed that the results would be beneficial to them and their families.

Since the opening of the parent Exchange on September 1, 1904, at Zamboanga, branch Exchanges and Trading stores have been established at thirty other rancherias in the District of Zamboanga and at several rancherias in other parts of the Moro Province.

As a consequence the volume of business has steadily

increased as has also a marked degree of general prosperity among the hill people and the coast people. More of the standard money of the Philippines is in circulation among these people than ever before in their history. These long-time enemies have grown to be more tolerant of each other, and the more warlike coast dwellers have found that there is more profit in friendly association and mutual coöperation, in conducting trade relations than by following the old methods of slavery, piracy and extermination. The old systems of extortionate taxation have been abandoned in the District of Zamboanga and adherence and support given to the lawfully established government system. The difficulty of making collections from Moros and Pagans is growing less every year. Their families are better clothed, their children attend the public schools with greater regularity and the homes are better constructed, and provided with more of the comforts of life. Christians, even the despised Filipinos, may now attend a public gathering of Moros and Pagans and feel assured that, manifesting due respect for the rights of others, will insure them a safe and hospitable reception. On the other hand failure to regard the decencies of life and efforts to resort to abuse of authority, and interference with native women will quickly lead to serious consequences.

By June 30, 1911 the volume of business of the Moro Exchange system had increased from a few thousands in 1904 to more than one million pesos annually. The speculative interests of the southern islands viewed this prosperity with considerable apprehension and considered that the usefulness of the Moro Exchanges and their trading stores, as a coöperative institution for the development of dependent peoples was interesting but a manifestation of paternalism wholly unnecessary and really detrimental to the best interests of the natives. That by encouraging and supporting such paternalism in behalf of the Moros and Pagans (coast people and hill people) the government was needlessly and wrongfully interfering with the alleged inalienable rights of a free people (Filipinos, Chinese, Europeans and Americans) under a democratic system of government, involving the

principle of the "liberty of contract," to use a dependent people according to local conditions and the peculiar surroundings of each case, the course of action to be determined independently by each employer, as against any general and supervisory system of government control. In the pros and cons of this situation we are beginning to cultivate a resemblance to the peculiarities that have developed in connection with the solution of our Indian problems in the West. With an immense accumulation of relevant and convincing facts filed away in our Indian Bureau, and in the operation of our public societies for the protection of the interests of dependent Indians, it would seem as though serious errors could be avoided in conducting the regeneration of our Indian wards in the Southern Philippines. Our constructive military policy has always favored the weak as against the strong and demanded that the ignorant and inexperienced be accorded government supervision and aid as long as such guardianship was helpful to the wards and consistent with the powers of the state.

Through the instrumentality of the Moro Exchange system the dependent people of all classes were brought into closer union and more mutually helpful relations.

The regular market and trading days gradually became occasions of public gatherings where members of different tribes made their first acquaintance, where methods of living, agriculture, boat-making and other native industries were compared and discussed, where family affairs were aired in good spirits, where native swain enlarged the vision of their opportunities, where differences in religious belief were amicably reviewed, where new ideas of all sorts germinated, and where the government could come in personal contact and helpful relations with its wards.

These people are naturally distrustful of every new proposition, especially if it involves a personal sacrifice. A nomadic life has unfitted them to submit to direct restraint. They have submitted to many persecutions from their own, but these practices have descended to them as a heritage of birth and custom, and therefore are gradually absorbed into the daily life. Under American rule many new things

have appeared, accompanied by what seemed irritating exactions, which have abruptly acted upon and to some extent changed the course of life, and made the new regime appear to be beyond the power of the native to assimilate unaided.

At this point in his new career the Moro Exchange system stepped in and concretely illustrated to the Moro and Pagan how they could get together and become mutually helpful. It was a great relief to the puzzled native who often protested that the American methods were impossible for him. But coöperation through the Exchange and its trading stores enabled the most ordinary native to pay his cedula tax and finally his road tax. These obligations were gradually imposed and the approach to them carefully explained as necessary public measures for the ultimate betterment of the people and therefore of the state. Industrial coöperation led to the introduction and successful operation of jinrickishaws by Moros and Pagans at Zamboanga in 1906. The use of such carriages in Manila where 500 were introduced in 1905 had been found to be practically impossible, and much of the property was destroyed by rioting Filipinos, who were enraged against the Chinese for pulling the carts, and competing with their native ponies in hauling the quilez and carromato. The Filipinos also pretended to resent the proposition of the American and Spanish owners that they should be employed as horses in pulling Japanese carriages. Thereupon the Moro Exchange at Zamboanga took up the jinrickishaw question with the Moros and Pagans who, after a full presentation of the matter, including the failure in Manila and its causes, deliberately agreed to operate such carriages in the capital of the Moro Province. The Filipinos made strenuous efforts to dissuade the non-Christians from operating the Japanese carts, but all to no purpose, and Zamboanga remains today the only city in the Philippine Islands where jinrickishaws are operated.

The Moro Exchange system under government supervision made them possible, furnished lucrative employment to

many needy non-Christians and finally converted the silly Filipinos to their daily use and enjoyment.

Friendly association in the Moro Exchanges had gradually cultivated many new ideas and desires among all classes of non-Christians and finally gave rise to the first carnival and exposition ever held in the Philippine Islands. This was opened at Zamboanga on February 7, 1907, and continued for a period of five days. Thousands of Christians and non-Christians participated in this native fair and displayed their products for observation and sale. Committees were formed to award prizes and many were declared for Moros and Pagans, who manifested the greatest pride in their receipt and placed the engraved certificates in their houses as valuable mementoes of the occasion. Many people assembled from the most distant parts of the Moro Province and the leading men of various and diverse tribes met in friendly and profitable intercourse for the first time in their lives. Old traditions were rehearsed, old practices revived and numerous games and feats of strength were engaged in which caused astonishment and merriment to both Christians and non-Christians. The utmost friendliness and self-control prevailed among people, who three years before could not have been brought together without violence and bloodshed. The fair closed with a grand baile (ball) of all nations which brought these savage people into even closer personal contact within the large provincial building and yet their self-control was perfect. Not an arrest of a native was made during the entire fair and no native appeared with weapons. A situation almost practically impossible of achievement in any civilized community with correspondingly diverse elements in the population. A splendid example of efficient and progressive development through the instrumentality of coöperation.

Since 1907, the Moro Exchange system, first organized in 1903 by Governor Finley in the Moro Province, has been carried into other provinces of the Philippines by the Department of the Interior. In his annual report for 1910 Commissioner Worcester, Secretary of the Interior, says:

In my opinion the next important step we should take in stimulating the development of the hill tribes of northern Luzon is to cultivate trade among them as actively as possible. With this end in view government Exchanges have been started at various places in the Mountain Provinces and in Nueva Viscaya. An effort is made to keep these trading stores supplied with the things the people in their vicinity most need.

Sales are made at 20 per cent above cost to defray expenses of maintenance. The Exchanges also buy basket work, wood carvings, weapons and articles of dress which can readily be sold as curios, paying a good price for them in cash. The vendor is free to spend his money, obtained from the sale of his wares, as he prefers.

In the province of Agusan, Mindanao, the Exchanges established for the use of Pagans are known collectively as Manobo stores. In the province of Palawan the Exchanges created for the benefit of the Tagbanuas and Moros promise considerable business in the near future.

When the American system replaced the feudal form of government of the Spaniards and the Moros, and generally subjected all classes of people to the same imposts, and applied the provisions of uniform law impartially, the native chiefs and their immediate followers protested their inability to conform to the new plan, because of class distinction and inability to labor. These special classes were promptly met with the declaration that the Moro Exchange system of markets, trading stores and tribal ward farms opened the way for them to engage in profitable employment. That, under the supervision of a patient, just and powerful government every man, woman and child would have equal opportunities to secure an honest living and enjoy the fruits of their labors, without unnecessary loss or violation of rights, so far as existing law and executive control could provide. These promises were made, accepted and fulfilled through the operations of the Moro Exchange system, which thus became the active agent for awakening and maintaining the industrial and commercial spirit among the uncivilized tribes of the Southern Philippines. It has become a powerful instrument for peace and unity among the hill people and the coast people; it has effected their disarmament without great loss of life and property, it has laid the foundations for education and self-government; it has

centered and solidified the aims and ambitions of these people, and marked a course for the accomplishment of their eternal betterment which has gained their confidence and acceptance. Surely such a system should not be cast aside on purely speculative grounds or for the purpose of selfish aggrandizement.

Industrial development through the Moro Exchanges opened the way for agricultural improvement by the agency of the tribal ward farms.

In 1907 Governor Finley began to develop this scheme in practical form, in order to encourage the non-Christians to understand, appreciate and benefit by the homestead privileges of the Philippine public land act. The homestead of 16 hectares (40 acres) is open for free entry to every male adult non-Christian who is a citizen of the Philippine Islands, and the cadastral system of surveys and titles inaugurated by Governor General Forbes has made it easy and safe for these people to become landholders under the law.

The tribal ward farm is established at each tribal ward headquarters in the District of Zamboanga and comprises the 40 acres of homestead authorized by law.

The proper cultivation of this little farm, under the supervision of the tribal ward officials, enables the natives of each tribe to observe and profit by modern methods of agriculture, their effect in overcoming natural difficulties in plant growth, and in the production of the best crops possible under existing conditions. The tribal ward farm can be so conducted as to distribute seeds, cuttings and plants, to improve poultry and stock, and by intensive cultivation secure such returns from sales of products as will materially aid in defraying the expenses of tribal ward administration. Thus the hill people and the coast people will be led by daily example, encouragement and incentive to adopt the homestead method of farming and thereby secure permanent homes protected by guaranteed government titles, guarding against the unlawful and expensive *kaingin* method, and thus become self-supporting productive agents rather than continue as vagrant parasitic nomads.

Lord Roberts during his long military service in India established and maintained chains of public markets in order, through their agency in the collection of the laboring classes, to get in touch with the wild tribesmen of the interior and lay the foundation for peaceful trade, agricultural development and self-government. These markets aided the English army in maintaining a useful line of communication and provided for friendly intercourse among tribes who for generations had been at bitter feud with one another. The hill people found in these markets a common ground on which they could meet without cutting throats.

These markets by stimulating trade with the troops and with neighboring people resulted in opening the adjacent country by means of roads, thus facilitating intercommunication.

It has been clearly evident to the American army during its occupation of the southern Philippines that the regeneration of the uncivilized tribes of that region must be accomplished along industrial lines. That to break the hold of piracy, slavery and other forms of oppression, and to substitute therefor honest methods of living, permanent homes, successful cultivation of the soil, the maintenance of the Moro Exchange system, and the gradual extension of a public school system adjusted to the needs of the Moros and Pagans, will require an indefinite period of military control, conducted in conformity with the accepted methods of dual authority, as exemplified in the politico-military system devised by Governor Taft, authorized by the Philippine Commission (Act 787), and now being worked out by the provincial government at Zamboanga.

In this connection it is well to keep in mind the very significant fact that the Moros and Pagans have informed the Secretary of War and the Governor General of the Philippines, in public meetings at Zamboanga, that they will not submit to Filipino control, but resort to arms against it should political changes result in supplanting American authority in the Moro country. Secretary Dickinson said after his official visit to the islands in August, 1910, that to unite the Moros and Pagans with the Fili-

pinos as an integral governing part of a republican form of government would require essentially the recreation of the entire non-Christian population.

In the last annual report of the Governor General of the Philippines attention is invited to the attitude of the Moros as being strongly opposed to Filipino control of any territory occupied by the former. That the Moros would resort to arms if any such movement was undertaken. The Governor General expressed his judgment that the Filipinos were not qualified to take over such control and that there existed no necessity for any such change in the form of government for the Moro Province.

Concerning this subject Commissioner Worcester says in his annual report for 1910:

At the outset it should be clearly understood that the question involved is not one of the fitness of the Filipinos to govern themselves, but is one of their ability and fitness to dominate, justly control, and wisely guide along the pathway of civilization alien peoples some of whom are warlike. It is true that the Filipino, the Igorot and the Moro are of common racial origin, but so are the Anglo Saxon peoples, and there exist between the Filipinos on the one side, and the Igorots and the Moros on the other, far greater differences than those which distinguish the Germans, the English, and the Americans. The Moro is not only of a much later and far purer Malayan origin than the Filipino, but he is as well a Mohammedan, with all which that fact implies.

Finally it should be clearly borne in mind that the Filipinos have been given an excellent opportunity, under the provisions of Act No. 1425 of December 16, 1905, to demonstrate practically their interest in the non-Christians, and their ability wisely to direct the affairs of primitive peoples. But to the best of my knowledge and belief, not one single measure, looking to the betterment of the condition of these non-Christian inhabitants was ever inaugurated by a Filipino during this period.

After Apayao was established as a sub-province of Cagayan, and the duty of providing funds for the maintenance of its government was explicitly imposed upon the provincial board of that province, the governor stated to me that, in his opinion, it would be useless to make the necessary expenditure, and that it would be better to kill all the savages in Apayao. As they number some 52,000, this method of settling their affairs would have been open to practical difficulties, apart from any humanitarian considerations.

Neither the Moro nor the Pagan are politicians. They do not seek or engage in agitation of that sort, of which

the Filipino is so inordinately fond. They want a firm, just, uniform, consistent, unchanging military rule and for such control they believe in the American method, after 12 years experience, and after having tried the Spanish method for about 350 years. They feel that frequent change in authority is not conducive to their well being, and as they have learned to regard the American Army as being rigorous but just, true to its promises, honest in its dealings with them, impartial in its judgments, and wholly tolerant in religion, it is to the vital interest of, at least the Mohammedan element, that such military control should remain undisturbed in the Moro Province. The continued exercise of such authority will avoid serious outbreaks due to racial and religious animosities, will propagate and encourage the confidence now well advanced, and escape the chief weakness of the Spanish system of intermittent control, and lack of permanent and well defined policy.

The American government in its relation to the Moros and Pagans does less in the way of courtesy, recognition of customs and indulgence of sentiment than any other nation having such people under their control. The English, French and Dutch recognize native titles, the improvement of the native religions, the observance of native customs and the acknowledgement of certain courtesies and honors to native chiefs. At the government prisons in British North Borneo separate cooks and kitchens, and special diets are provided for Mohanmedans, Malays, Hindus and Christians. While such consideration of native customs does not appear to endanger the maintenance of proper control by the home government, yet instituting comparison with the methods pursued by the American republic consideration must be had for wide differences in the forms, structure and policy of government and in the temperament of the governing people. Any degree of indulgence granted the subject people must always be clearly outlined in conjunction with the fundamental policy of the government. Indulgences are temporary but the policy must be fixed. The subject people are entitled to know and understand their limitations, which should be nicely adjusted to meet their

necessities, subject to the established policy of the government.

Italy in Tripoli, Spain in Morocco, France in Algeria, Austria in Herzegovina and Bosnia, England in Egypt, India, Borneo and the Straits Settlements, and the Dutch in the East Indies are in contact with the Mohammedan problem of government, in varying degrees of success, with probably the greatest advance having been realized, through a reasonable measure of paternalism, in the Dutch possessions.

The United States has made its advent in the East as a new power for good, not alone for the island races that come under her care, but also in that great settlement of European spheres of influence in Asia, where exists the greatest world problems of our day. We must accept the responsibilities of the new situation as a providentially imposed task upon a progressive and powerful nation. We can not shirk the trust imposed whether for the present or for posterity. From national birth to the present time our development has been westward. It is our destiny. Our industrial and commercial future is indissolubly linked with the destinies of the thousand millions of souls occupying today the oldest empires of the earth.

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CHINA'S LOAN NEGOTIATIONS

*By Hon. Willard Straight, Representative of the American
Banking Group*

It is the purpose of this paper to explain, if possible, three things: (1) the significance of Chinese loans; (2) the importance of securing and retaining an American interest therein, and (3), the peculiar difficulties encountered in the recent loan negotiations.

Dr. Arthur H. Smith, in that able and interesting work, *Chinese Characteristics*, pointed out that those who, understanding the vernacular, walk in China's streets will hear the passersby talk of little save money. As it has been with the daily life of the people so it is today with the political life of the nation. The question of money is all important. For the last ten years, and especially in the past twelve months which witnessed China's wonderful transformation from the oldest empire to the youngest republic in the world, there has been an incessant discussion of Chinese loans.

China's loan history may be divided into four periods:

The first, immediately after the Chino-Japan War—when funds were secured from abroad to pay the indemnity exacted by Japan at its conclusion.

The second, following the so-called "leasing years" when the great powers encouraged their bankers to finance railway construction in the regions which they had marked out as their spheres of special interest, and when besides acting as the politico-financial agents of their governments, these bankers secured for the industry of their respective countries the orders for the materials required.

The third, following the Russo-Japanese War, when likin was pledged as security for loans and when a combination to

which the American group was later admitted was formed by British, German and French financiers for undertaking Chinese loans, and for sharing the orders for materials required for their construction.

The fourth, and present period, in which a combination has been effected between the four groups named above and Russian and Japanese interests, for jointly financing the reorganization of the Chinese government.

American bankers were first interested in Chinese finance in the second period, in the Hankow-Canton Railroad; for business, not for politics. Their rights were sold back to China who financed the repurchase by a loan obtained from the government of Hongkong, which thus for obvious political, because geographical, reasons, secured for British interests a preferential right to finance the construction of this road in case foreign capital should later be required.

During the third period the American group was organized and became associated with the British, German and French banking groups. The American group, moreover, greatly contributed to the successful formation of the combination which marks the fourth period, a combination which is the financial expression of John Hay's "Open Door" policy, and which makes of international finance a guarantee for the preservation, rather than an instrument for the destruction, of China's integrity.

Before discussing the most recent phase of China's loan negotiations however, and the manner in which the American group at the instance of the Department of State made its entry into this field, it is necessary briefly to review the history of the past few years, and to consider the factors in the creation of what has been called "Dollar Diplomacy."

Because of this so-called "Dollar Diplomacy," President Taft, and his Secretary of State, Mr. Knox, have been subjected to no small measure of criticism. The administration one hears has formed an unholy alliance with the Octopus; and Wall Street, the property scape-goat of our national political drama, is accused of seducing a reluctant and hitherto well-domesticated government into the maelstrom of international financial adventure.

As if this were not sufficient, sober and intelligent journals have demanded why American capital should seek foreign fields when there is so much work to be done at home. Others admitting the desirability of foreign investment and the possible necessity of diplomatic support for those who undertake it, have objected to the administration's assisting certain institutions in Wall Street instead of American bankers in general. It must be remembered, however, that the success of any association of American capitalists undertaking this business depends primarily on their being of such standing as command respect from financial groups abroad and upon their willingness and ability to bear the expense of representation through tedious and too often unremunerative negotiations. Without these qualifications American bankers are not equipped to become the instruments which our government requires to assist in the extension of our foreign trade.

Another section of the press hails each and every oversea venture with indiscriminate enthusiasm and rhetorically preens the feathers of the Bird of Freedom, sneering at or condemning our rivals, and lauding American enterprise with an impartial disregard of the real facts.

There has been too much unjust criticism, too much unwarranted praise, and too general a lack of candid exposition and intelligent comprehension of the reasons for, and possibilities of, "Dollar Diplomacy."

"Dollar Diplomacy" is a logical manifestation of our national growth, and the rightful assumption by the United States of a more important place at the council table of nations. Our export trade is constantly increasing and foreign markets are becoming each year more and more necessary to our manufacturers. The new policy aims not only to protect those Americans already engaged in foreign trade but to promote fresh endeavor and by diplomatic action pave the way for those who have not yet been, but who will later be, obliged to sell either capital or goods abroad.

European diplomacy is engaged in solving a maze of complicated questions immediately political, ultimately commercial in character. France, Germany, Russia, Italy, Austria

and Japan are endeavoring to acquire fresh fields for colonization or to create preferential markets for their merchants. Great Britain with her world-wide possessions is involved directly or indirectly, in almost every international question that arises and with these powers too, diplomacy has for years been of the "Dollar" variety.

International rivalry of this character, however, is found only in those countries whose native administrations are either decrepit or which are still militarily too weak to secure that consideration, which, unfortunately, depends not upon international equity, but upon the power of self-protection. In such lands a government desiring to secure a market for its nationals must because of the pressure of its competitors either acquire territory or insist on an equality of commercial opportunity. It must either stake out its own claim, or induce other interested powers to preserve the "open door." There is no middle course. This is a statement not of benevolent theories, but of political facts.

The people of the United States do not desire fresh territory over seas. The policy of our government has been to secure for American merchants the "open door." American industry has until recently been too much engaged by our own domestic expansion seriously to set about the establishment of foreign markets. A far-seeing administration has therefore inaugurated a new policy, the alliance of diplomacy, with industry, commerce and finance.

This is "Dollar Diplomacy." It has been active in various ways. In South America it has aided our merchants and manufacturers. In Central America, politics have played a more important part, and the Department of State has attempted to bring about financial reform in these smaller republics, and to prevent the recurrence of the revolutions whose leaders have almost without exception been actuated solely by a desire to acquire control of the national revenues. In China certain very tangible results have been accomplished and it is to give a more accurate conception of this much discussed, but little understood subject, that this paper is written.

Prior to 1894, China had practically no foreign debt. In 1894-1896, however, she borrowed extensively from England, France and Germany, to finance the war with Japan, and to provide the indemnity which she was forced to pay at its conclusion. These loans were secured upon the collections of the Imperial Maritime Customs, a Chinese service under the control of that able Irishman, Sir Robert Hart. In 1898, however, China made a number of contracts for loans for railway construction, with British, German, French, Belgian and American syndicates. Under all these agreements the bankers were entitled to a certain share in the profits of the lines, which were themselves to be mortgaged as security for the loans, and provision was made in almost every case for joint foreign and Chinese management. The railway materials and rolling stock required were purchased from the manufacturers of the countries whose bankers undertook to issue these loans.

The cession of Formosa to Japan at the termination of the Chino-Japanese War, the occupation of Chinese territory by Russia, Germany, France and England, in 1897-1898 and the exchange of "diplomatic notes" between these powers regarding the protection of their respective interests in China, together with the signature of the railway agreements mentioned gave rise to a discussion throughout the European and American press of the imminent breakup of China and the partition of this ancient empire into "spheres of influence."

In China the broad significance of these events was probably appreciated by but few, even of the leading statesmen of the time, but these men, nevertheless, and the gentry and official classes throughout the provinces felt that their country was becoming dominated by the foreigner. Seaports had been wrested from them, and, not content with this, the strangers were binding their helpless motherland with rails of steel.

For some years prior to 1898, the Empress Dowager had been in comparative retirement. The attempt of the young Emperor, Kuang Hsü, however, under the advice of Kang Yu Wei, suddenly to introduce widespread reform, brought

this redoubtable lady to the front once more. Popular discontent, fomented by bigoted and ignorant officials was winked at if not encouraged by a court which feared that the extension of western influence might bring about administrative changes which would curtail their opportunities for illicit gain. The Boxer outbreak was the result, and in 1900 the reactionaries made one last attempt to sweep the foreigner into the sea. Peking was occupied by the allied troops, the Manchu court fled to Sianfu, and China was saddled with a fresh debt of about £60,000,000 to pay for her mid-summer madness. This was charged upon the Maritime Customs, upon certain likin collectorates and upon the salt gabelle.

In 1898-1899 the American Secretary of State, John Hay, anxious to prevent the partition of China and to protect the interests of general foreign trade against discrimination in the portions of Chinese territory already occupied by foreign powers, enunciated his "Open Door" policy. His proposition, favorably received at first and reaffirmed in the negotiations which followed the relief of Peking, won the adherence of other nations not because of any particular consideration for China but because of their mutual jealousy and their realization that partition would impose upon them responsibilities which they might find it difficult to bear.

They did not therefore surrender the ports which they had forcibly leased, but their acceptance of the "Open Door" doctrine nevertheless marked the beginning of a financial and commercial, rather than territorial, definition of their respective interests. The Russo-Chinese Bank had been created in 1895 as the chief instrument of Russian ambition in her Manchurian adventure. This institution and the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, the Banque de l'Indo-Chine and the Yokohama Specie Bank, now became more and more generally recognized as indispensable financial means to the political and commercial ends of their respective governments.

In contrast to the peaceful rivalry in China proper, the situation in Manchuria became more and more threatening. Russia despite her diplomatic assurances to the contrary

did not evacuate this region occupied after the Boxer trouble. She persisted moreover in an attempt to acquire control over northern Korea as well, until Japan, avowedly the champion of China's integrity and the "Open Door" for the trade of all nations, declared war.

Relieved by the defeat of Russia Peking breathed more easily. This satisfaction, however, was short lived, for the Chinese soon became convinced that Japan not unnaturally intended to reap for herself and not assure to China, the fruits of her splendid victory. She had taken from Russia the Liaotung Peninsula, from which she had herself been ousted after the China-Japan War. More than that, she succeeded to Russia's rights in the railway running north from Port Arthur and in the coal mines at Fushun.

When His Excellency Yuan Shih Kai, now President of the Chinese Republic, went to Tientsin as Viceroy of Chihli Province, he had with him a number of officials, notably Tang Shao Yi and Liang Tun Yen, who had been recalled from America in the early 80's, but who had not after their return to China been given much share in the direction of affairs. Yuan soon found himself at the head of what might be called a "Reform" party, and these subordinates of his, able, accomplished and well versed in American and European methods greatly aided him in instilling new force and intelligence into the Peking government. Administrative reforms were demanded, the Chinese press, hitherto practically non-existent, began to assert itself, and young men educated abroad returned to direct a "rights recovery" agitation which soon developed anti-Manchu propaganda and which found its final expression in the revolution of last year.

Peking became concerned about Japan's activity in Manchuria. Their Excellencies Hsü Shih Chang and Tang Shao Yi were sent to Mukden to establish, if possible, Chinese authority throughout the Three Eastern Provinces, and to exercise the right to develop this region under Chinese auspices, assured by the Portsmouth Treaty and the so-called Komura Convention, signed between China and Japan in the autumn of 1905.

They had no intention of interfering with the treaty rights acquired by Japan, but they wished, if possible, to induce

British, German, French and American capitalists to invest in the development of this region. ✓

In the autumn of 1907, Lord French, representing Messrs. Pauling and Company, the well known firm of English contractors signed with the Manchurian Viceroy a contract for the construction of a railroad from Hsinmintun a point on the Peking-Mukden Railway, to Fakumen, with the ultimate object of extending this line north to Tsitsihar on the Chinese Eastern Railway. Japan protested on the ground that the construction of such a road would violate the provisions of the secret protocol attached to the Komura Convention, stipulating that China should build no railway parallel to or competing with, the South Manchurian Road.

Subsequently in the summer of 1908, His Excellency Tang Shao Yi signed a Memorandum of Agreement for a loan of \$20,000,000, to be undertaken by American capitalists for the establishment of a bank which was to act as the financial agent of the Manchurian administration for development work. This marked the beginning of the negotiations which led to the organization of the American group, the signature of the Chinchou-Aigun Railway loan agreement, the conclusion of the currency loan and the formation of the present six-power group.

In May, 1908, Congress had approved President Roosevelt's recommendation that the United States return to China a portion of the Boxer indemnity. Senator Root, then Secretary of State, and His Excellency W. W. Rockhill, then American Minister to China, suggested that the remitted funds should be expended in financing the education of Chinese students in the United States.

His Excellency Tang Shao Yi was appointed Special Ambassador, ostensibly to thank the American government for its generous action. His real mission was to negotiate the Manchurian loan with American bankers. On arriving in Washington, however, he advocated a much more comprehensive scheme. He proposed to Secretary Root that China should issue a loan of \$300,000,000 to be utilized for a program of industrial development, for currency reform, and to finance the Chinese administration during the period fol-

lowing the intended abolition of likin and until the consent of all the powers to an increase in the customs tariff was obtained. Mr. Tang desired an international loan in which he wished the United States to take the lead and Mr. Root promised to support this plan. With the authority of Mr. Root and the sanction of President Roosevelt the matter was brought to the attention of American bankers, but it was necessary temporarily to abandon the project owing to the dismissal of His Excellency Yuan Shih Kai from the high office which he then held in Peking.

Following the inauguration of Mr. Taft, however, the President and Mr. Knox became keenly interested and the Department of State desired, as soon as an opportune moment should arise, to reopen the question of customs revision and likin abolition, as well as currency reform, in accordance with the stipulations of our commercial treaty with China of 1903. With a view to taking up the proposed loan at the proper time, the American bankers, who have been interested, closely followed the situation.

In May, 1909, it became known that the British, French and German financial groups were about to conclude an agreement, to be secured on provincial revenues, for the construction of the Hukuang Railways, i.e., the lines from Hankow into Szechuan and from Hankow to Canton.

The Department of State held the promise of the Chinese government that if any foreign money were required for the construction of the Hankow-Szechuan Line one-half should be secured from American and one-half from British capitalists. The fact that internal taxes, upon whose abolition the contemplated increase of the Maritime Customs tariff depended, were being pledged as security for the new railway loan, directly affected the fulfillment of the engagement which the Department of State had made to assist China in obtaining from the other powers their consent to customs revision.

In order, therefore, that the United States might be entitled to a practical, and not merely a theoretical, voice in this matter, as well as to assure to American manufacturers a share in the profits of Chinese railway construction and the

business arising therefrom, it was essential that representative American capitalists should participate in the Hukuang loan. The Department of State offered this opportunity to the bankers already interested in the loan proposed by Mr. Tang Shao Yi and the American Group was organized creating an instrument which it was hoped might enable the Administration not only to further the interests of American trade but effectively to assist China in obtaining the consent of the powers to the customs revision she so greatly desired.

In the autumn of 1909, immediately following the organization of the American Group, a preliminary agreement was entered into with the Viceroy of Manchuria, by the American group and Messrs. Pauling and Company, for the construction of the Chinchou-Aigun Railway. Much has been written regarding this subject and in Europe especially, our government has been criticised for the so-called Manchurian "Neutralization Proposals" advanced toward the close of 1909, and which were politely declined by Japan and Russia at the beginning of the following year. Although the story of the inception of this project does not perhaps fall directly within the scope of this paper, it may be well here to recite certain facts in connection therewith which, had they been known, might have given a very different complexion to journalistic comment at the time.

The scheme of bringing the Russian and Japanese railroads in Manchuria under the control of a great international company was first conceived by the late Mr. E. H. Harriman, as a factor necessary to the realization of his dream of creating a "round the world" transportation system.

At the close of the Russo-Japanese War, Mr. Harriman visited the Far East. In September, 1905, working closely with the Hon. Lloyd Griscom, then American Minister to Japan, he drew up with the late Prince Ito and Count, now Prince, Katsura then Premier of Japan, a memorandum stipulating that the portion of the Chinese Eastern R. R. from Kwangchengtze to Port Arthur and Dalny (now known as the South Manchurian Railway), which had been acquired by Japan from Russia under the provisions of the Ports-

mouth Treaty, should be financed by an American loan and operated under joint Japanese and American direction.

This project was never realized. It was blocked by the late Marquis Komura, who raised what appeared to be insuperable objections to Mr. Harriman's plan.

Mr. Harriman however did not give up his idea. Agents of the Russian government during 1906-1907 proposed to certain American bankers that they purchase from Russia the portion of the Chinese Eastern Railway which remained in Russian hands at the end of the war, i.e., the line running across northern Manchuria, with its branch from Harbin south to Kwangchengtze. The Russians stated that they were willing to sell in case Japan also could be persuaded to dispose of the South Manchurian Railway.

In this connection it should be remembered that the agreement between China and the Russo-Asiatic Bank for the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway, provided that China might repurchase the line after 36 years and that it would in any case revert to China at the termination of an eighty-year period.

Japan under the Komura Convention had been recognized by China as successor to the Russian rights, under this agreement, to the portion of the road acquired after the war.

It was proposed therefore that an international syndicate should anticipate the operation of this clause and repurchase the line on China's behalf, at this time, rather than later.

The scheme was discussed with Mr. Tang, during his stay in Washington, in the autumn of 1908 and he expressed the opinion that China would be glad to coöperate. An important Japanese financier who had been informally advised of the plan, however, stated that Japan would be unwilling to acquiesce therein.

Notwithstanding this fact the negotiations with Russia were continued and, in the summer of 1909, Mr. Harriman, through a leading Paris banker, approached M. Kokovtseff, then Minister of Finance, now Premier, of Russia, and was assured that on his return from a trip to Vladivostock, upon which he was about to start, M. Kokovtseff would recom-

mend the sale of the Russian Railway. This he did in a public address on his return to Moscow.

The existence of the Harriman memorandum, and the attitude of the Russian Minister of Finance aside from the broader political considerations involved, justified the American proposals. An entente had been arranged between Japan and Russia, however, in 1907. Both powers were greatly disturbed by the neutralization scheme and thanks to the understanding reached by M. Isvolsky the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Baron Motono the Japanese Ambassador in St. Petersburg, they refused to join in Secretary Knox's plan. Russian objections to the Chinchou-Aigun project, as well as the conditions imposed by Japan as precedent to her participation therein, moreover prevented the construction of this road.

Furthermore lest there should be any further misunderstanding as to their attitude these powers in the convention of July 4, 1910, agreed jointly to safeguard their respective interests in Manchuria—an arrangement which, though undoubtedly a natural one, was not, it must be admitted, calculated to assure to China herself the right to develop this territory.

In May, 1910, an arrangement was reached with the French, German and British groups for the participation of the American group in the Hukuang loan. At this time the three groups first mentioned invited the American group to join them in the combination which they had effected the year before for undertaking Chinese loans.

This invitation was later accepted and an intergroup agreement was signed in November, 1910.

On October 27 of that year the American Group had concluded a preliminary agreement for a £10,000,000 loan, to finance China's currency reform and to undertake certain industrial enterprises in Manchuria.

When the American Group was first organized, and actively supported by the State Department, was seeking participation in the Hukuang loan, Secretary Knox had declared that the American Government believed that the interests of China and of international trade with that country could best

be served by the friendly coöperation of the great lending nations and their banking groups.

It was in pursuance of this policy that the American group entered into the combination with the other groups and admitted them to equal participation in the currency loan, the final contract for which was signed on April 15, 1911.

The final agreement for the Hukuang loan was also signed with China by the same parties on May 20 of that year.

In the present negotiations with China for the reorganization loan, as in fact in all loan negotiations during the past few years, the banking groups have found their greatest difficulty in the settlement of the question of "control." It may be well therefore before giving the story of the recent negotiations to review briefly the history of this much discussed term.

The word "control" has for some time commonly been used to denote the guarantees against improper expenditure of loan funds which the banking groups, in a greater or less degree, have insisted upon securing, to which the Chinese government has from time to time reluctantly agreed, and constantly endeavored to modify.

"Control" in the at present accepted sense of the word was first embodied in the agreement made by the Chinese government in 1898, with the British and Chinese Corporation, for a loan to the Imperial Railways of North China.

Under this agreement, and in several others concluded at about this time, the lenders, besides securing a first mortgage on the railway whose construction they financed, were entitled to a share in the profits of the line.

For this reason and also because of the inexperience of the Chinese in railway matters, the bankers required assurances that the loaned funds should be so expended that the mortgaged property would constitute a sufficient security.

They furthermore obtained a certain share in the management of these lines in order that there should be secured therefrom an adequate return (to a certain percentage of which the banks were entitled), and to prevent the administrative inefficiency and fraud which they feared if the operation of these railways were placed entirely in Chinese hands.

The original railway loan agreements embodying the provisions above described were all concluded prior to the Boxer outbreak of 1900.

The final Shanghai-Nanking and Canton-Kowloon Agreements (the Canton-Kowloon Agreement slightly modified the "Shanghai-Nanking" terms) confirming these stipulations were signed in 1904 and 1907 respectively. The Tientsin-Pukow loan agreement concluded in 1908, however, substantially altered these conditions.

Its signature marked the first recognition by the banks of the increasing efficiency of the "Young China" party. These men demanded the radical modification of the old loan terms. They considered "control" subversive of China's sovereign rights and flattered by the blandishments of rival foreign interests, they were determined to exact from the world a consideration similar to that accorded Japan after years of patriotic self-sacrifice and conscientious endeavor. The avowed purpose of these officials to weaken the hold of the foreigner on China was heartily applauded throughout the provinces. It served as a patriotic issue on which an appeal could be made to the masses and a cloak under which the provincial gentry could cover their real purpose, which was to restrict the extension of the Peking government's authority by railways built with foreign loans, or otherwise, and their determination that if foreign loans were made, the chances for speculation should not be monopolized by the metropolitan mandarins.

Under the Tientsin-Pukow contract the Chinese government, by a cash payment redeemed the right held by the banks under the original agreement signed in 1898, to a share in the profits of the railway. No mortgage on the line was given. The loan service was to be met from the earnings of the road or from certain provincial taxes; and in this agreement it was for the first time stipulated that, in case of default on the loan service, the hypothecated revenues should be administered by the Maritime Customs Service. The principle of joint management was abandoned. The banking groups, however, insisted that the Chinese government should employ foreign engineers for the con-

struction of the line, and during the life of the loan, and that requisitions on loan funds specifying the purposes for which these sums were to be applied should be signed by the director general. The construction accounts of the railway were to be open to examination by foreign auditors to be appointed by the banks. Under former loan agreements the auditors had been empowered to stop the withdrawal of funds in case the Chinese officials were found guilty of peculation. This authority was not conferred by the Tientsin-Pukow contract and the effect of this modification soon became apparent.

The so-called "Tientsin-Pukow" terms, however, did not prove to be an effective guarantee against "graft."

From the commencement of the construction of this line there have been numerous scandals, the most flagrant instance resulting in the degradation of the director general and a number of his subordinates. The cost of construction has far exceeded even the most liberal estimates, and the loan service will therefore constitute a heavy charge on the revenues of the line.

Owing to the unsatisfactory operation of the so-called "Tientsin-Pukow" terms, negotiations were conducted in the winter of 1908-1909 between the British, German and French groups and their respective governments with a view to reaching an understanding as to the degree of "control" to be demanded from China as a condition precedent to future loans.

There are different versions as to the exact course of events in China at this time. It is, however, sufficient to state that in conducting *pour-parlers* with the Chinese authorities for a loan to construct the Canton-Hankow Railway,¹ the representative of the British and Chinese Corporation at Peking refused to agree to "Tientsin-Pukow" terms and insisted on more effective "control." The representative of the German group, however, accepted these conditions and secured the contract. The diplomatic protests and recriminations amongst the bankers which followed resulted in a compro-

¹ British capital had obtained a "preference" for financing the construction of this road. (See § 3, page 2.)

mise under which the British and Chinese Corporation was subordinated to the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, which with its French associates, combined with the German group, to negotiate a loan to cover not only the Hankow-Canton but the Hankow-Szechuan Railways. The agreement was initialled on the sixth of June, 1909, and the "control" provisions accepted by the banks were similar to those embodied in the Tientsin-Pukow Agreement.

The inclusion of the loan for the construction of the Hankow-Szechuan Railway in this operation entitled American interests to the participation which the American group eventually secured.

Rivalry between the British and German groups had enabled the Chinese in the original Hukuang Agreement to secure "Tientsin-Pukow" terms despite the fact that the operation thereof had demonstrated that more stringent "control" provisions were needed.

Furthermore, during the year which elapsed before an agreement was finally reached between the British, German and French groups and the American group, there was an ever-increasing "anti-loan" agitation in the provinces through which the Hukuang lines were to be constructed. Provincial railway companies² were formed and secured from the vacillating Peking government rights which violated the terms of the agreement initialled with the "Tripartite Banks," and in which the Chinese had agreed the American group should be given a participation.

The National Assembly, the forerunner of the proposed Chinese Parliament was convoked for the first time in the autumn of 1910. Its members from the outset interested themselves in the question of finance and showed a determi-

² Considerable sums, quite insufficient however to build the railways in question, were secured by popular subscription, and in Szechuan province by taxation also. Construction work was commenced, and abandoned, and in a number of well authenticated cases the funds obtained by the companies were either lost by the directors thereof, who speculated heavily in the Shanghai "Rubber Boom," or stolen by more simple and direct methods. The demonstrated inability of the provincial companies to do the work they had undertaken was used by the imperial government to justify its very sound policy of railway "nationalization."

nation to scrutinize government expenditures, which the bankers felt would serve to restrict, even though it might not prevent, official speculation.

The National Assembly, moreover, was entitled to pass upon all government loans and was known to be opposed to a foreign loan for the construction of the Hukuang railways by the central government, instead of by the provincial companies. Sheng Kung Pao, Minister of communications, was determined, however, to build the Hukuang lines, and in response to the protests of the Assembly he pointed out that in negotiating the loan in question, he was fulfilling an obligation entered into in 1909, prior to the convocation of the Assembly, by the Grand Councillor Chang Chih Tung. He was obliged therefore to adhere as strictly as possible to the terms of the original contract, and would not and could not have consented to any new "control" conditions at this time.

In this arrangement the bankers acquiesced, feeling that the punishment inflicted after the Tientsin-Pukow frauds and the surveillance of the National Assembly over the expenditure of loan funds, as well as the difficulties by which the central government was confronted, justified them in confirming the "control" provisions of the original agreement.

The Currency Loan was of a different character, coming under the head of "government" or "administrative" loans. Practically the only loans previously falling within this category had been required to pay indemnities abroad and there was no necessity therefore that the lenders should exercise "control" over their expenditure. The currency loan, however, was to carry out a definite program and not for general administrative purposes. The four banking groups now acting in harmony believed some form of supervision to be necessary, and it was thought that the "control" machinery devised for railway loans, could, with certain modifications be utilized for assuring the proper application of the borrowed funds under the currency reform program.

The Chinese had reluctantly agreed to various control provisions in railway loan agreements, but they feared

that to admit the principle of supervision over administrative expenditures would be to pave the way for foreign control over China's general finances. An arrangement was finally made, however, whereby China submitted to the groups her program of currency reform for their acceptance, and agreed to expend the loan funds only in accordance therewith, to publish quarterly reports of disbursements made, and to engage a foreign expert to assist the Bureau of Currency Reform.

The loan has not been issued but it is open to question whether this "control," in practice, would have prevented speculation, and insured the proper expenditure of loan funds, and the effective operation of the currency reform program.

Immediately following the outbreak at Wuchang, on October 11, 1911, which marked the beginning of the revolution³ in China the representatives of the four banking groups in Peking were approached regarding a loan to the imperial government. The Manchus, however, seemed unable to cope with the rapidly developing revolt and the groups were unwilling to advance funds to a government whose continued existence seemed problematical. Their governments moreover decided to observe absolute neutrality as between the contending factions and refused to approve any loans to either side. The financial history of the Revolution has been ably told by Mr. George Bronson Rea in the *Far*

³ It has been generally stated that the disturbances in Szechuan province in August and September last marked the beginning of the revolutionary movement. This is not the case except that the general unrest created thereby contributed to the rapid spread of anti-Manchu sentiment. The Szechuan agitation was directed against the "nationalization" of railways, and the banking groups therefore have been accused of being the indirect cause of the revolt. This again is not true. The agitation was not against railway "nationalization" which the most intelligent leaders of Chinese public opinion recognized as desirable, but against the manner in which it was carried into effect. Shung Kung Pao, the Minister of Communication, upon the signature of the Hukuang Loan Agreement took steps to repurchase the rights of the provincial companies in accordance with the "nationalization" plan. Incidentally, it is reported on the best authority, he bought up the major portion of some of the provincial bonds, and offered to redeem them at par. He did not acquire control of the Szechuan bonds and therefore offered only 60 per cent on the face value. Hence the riots.

Eastern Review and in this account those who are interested may read of the various negotiations, practically all of them unsuccessful, undertaken by both the imperial and republican authorities during this period.

The Prince Regent of China retired on December 6, 1911, turning over the reins of government to Yuan Shih Kai, whom he had dismissed three years before at a time when he stood out, as he does today, as the only man capable of coping with China's domestic troubles and the difficulties by which she is threatened from abroad.

The Emperor abdicated on February 12, 1912, and on March 10 Yuan Shih Kai was inaugurated as provisional president of the Chinese Republic.

The present loan negotiations with the Chinese government were commenced in the middle of February, when the acting Minister of Finance, His Excellency Chou Tzu Chi, approached the representatives of the so-called "Four Groups" (i.e., British, German, French and American) at Peking, and asked for an immediate loan.

On February 26, Mr. Tang Shao Yi, representing the republican authorities at Nanking, arrived in Peking for the purpose of arranging a coalition government. On the following day, at Mr. Tang's invitation, the representatives of the four groups discussed with him the question of the loan broached some days before.

Mr. Tang stated the immediate requirements of the Chinese government, and requested the representatives to ask their groups to finance the same. In addition he discussed the Chinese revenues available as security for a large loan to reorganize the Chinese administration, and to initiate a scheme of commercial and industrial development. He asked the representatives how much China could borrow on this security, and finally, himself suggested the figure of £60,000,000, which he wished the banks to loan in five annual instalments of £12,000,000 each.

Pursuant to Mr. Tang's request for an immediate advance, the groups on the following day paid in Shanghai the sum of Taels 2,000,000, to meet the urgent requirements of the Nanking authorities.

The four representatives had reported Mr. Tang's request to their principals in Europe and America.⁴ No reply had been received when on the night of February 29 a number of the Chinese troops quartered in Peking mutinied, looted and burned portions of the city, and openly defied the authority of the provisional government. On the following day, March 1, it was suggested to Mr. Tang that it would be desirable that he should make some statement to reassure the groups who were considering his proposition, regarding the probable effect of the outbreak, and the ability of the government to cope therewith.

Mr. Tang's explanation was unsatisfactory, and the burning and looting continued on the night of March 1. On March 2, acting under instructions from Yuan Shih Kai, the acting Minister of Finance, requested from the four groups an immediate advance of 1,015,000 taels. He stated in his letter that the President appreciated that in view of the critical state of affairs in Peking, the groups would not be prepared to lend this money without the authority of their governments, and requested the representatives to secure the necessary sanction from their ministers as soon as possible.

Though Mr. Tang in order to justify the signature of the "Belgian loan" subsequently stated that the groups had refused to render assistance when approached after the mutiny of February 29, no other requests for immediate advances other than that mentioned above was received by the groups at this time.

The seriousness of the situation at this time is shown by the fact that on the same day Mr. Tang Shao Yi had addressed a note to the British Minister stating that he feared the Peking authorities would no longer be able to control the situation, and requesting the Diplomatic Corps to take

⁴ A number of writers on this subject have stated that on February 27 the group representatives made a definite agreement to furnish certain sums. This is not true. The group representatives merely agreed to report Mr. Tang's proposition to their principals. They did, however, in view of the urgent need of funds in Nanking (it was feared that the troops might mutiny if not paid immediately) themselves assume the responsibility of making the advance of Tls. 2,000,000, referred to in the final paragraph of the preceding page.

steps to assist the Chinese in preserving order. Yuan Shi-Kai later denied having authorized Mr. Tang to take this action.

On March 9 the necessary authority having been received from the four governments, the groups advanced the sum requested under an exchange of letters, which (1) assured to the groups the firm option for furnishing "the further monthly requirements of the Chinese government for the months of March, April, May and June, and if necessary, July and August," and (2) in view of the assistance rendered the Chinese government in advancing the sums mentioned above as well as in undertaking the contemplated advances for monthly requirements and maintaining Chinese credit on the markets of the world (by paying Chinese loan interest coupon charges which the Chinese government itself had been unable to meet), the Chinese government assured to the groups the firm option on the reorganization loan (provided their terms were equally advantageous with those otherwise obtainable).

From the proceeds of this projected reorganization loan it was intended to redeem the treasury bills, which were to be issued to cover the advances.

So urgent were the needs of the Chinese government, that the four groups did not at this time arrange the terms upon which they would discount these bills, it being impossible to settle this point until after the conference in Europe of the four groups, which had been called for March 12.

The terms on which the groups were prepared to undertake this business were not, however, communicated to the Chinese authorities, for on the evening of the 14th the four representatives learned that an agreement had that morning been concluded with the so-called "Belgian group" for a loan of £1,000,000, carrying an option for a further large loan.²

² The Belgian loan was secured on the Peking-Kalgau R. R. the earnings of which together with the earnings of other "productive enterprises" controlled by the Board of Communications, had been pledged as security for the Anglo-French loan of 1908. The British and French Ministers successfully protested against the alienation of this security. The price paid by the bankers for the Belgian loan was lower than that which the four groups were ready to give—but there were no "control" provisions in the contract.

This transaction was completed at a time when the President and Mr. Tang knew that the representatives were hourly expecting a definite reply from the four groups to the proposals made by Mr. Tang on February 27.

The signature of the "Belgian loan" was virtually the first official act involving the new administration's relations with foreigners. It was a clear breach of contract. The groups, more especially the British, French and German, had since the outbreak of the Revolution in October, been themselves advancing funds to pay interest charges on Chinese loans which they had issued. They had done this to protect the public to which they had sold Chinese bonds, and to protect the credit of China where they had very large vested interests.

Despite the chaotic conditions throughout the provinces, and the absence of any really effective authority in Peking the groups with the support of their governments had been ready to advance to China funds sufficient to put the Peking administration on its feet at a time when no public issue of Chinese bonds was possible, in order to do their part in assisting the restoration of stable conditions.

The signature of the Belgian loan, however, affected the security for the large loan which the groups had been asked to undertake—and it carried no guarantee whatsoever that the funds furnished or to be furnished would be properly expended, it increased China's liabilities without insuring any increase in the effectiveness of her administration and instead of rehabilitating, it was calculated to prejudice, her credit.

The "Belgian loan" contract had been drawn subject to ratification by the "Advisory Council" at Nanking.

Despite the protest made by the four group representatives on March 15, Mr. Tang urged, and finally persuaded, the Council to ratify this agreement, on the ground that the four groups had refused to assist China after the outbreak of February 29. There is no evidence that Mr. Tang at this time informed the Council of the assistance which the groups had rendered, and were prepared to render, or of the existence of the letters of agreement of March 9.

The British, German, French and American Ministers on March 25 formally protested against the conclusion of the "Belgian" loan. Mr. Tang Shao Yi, then prime minister in the newly organized Cabinet, nevertheless attempted to secure further funds from the "Belgian" group. This failing, the Chinese government on April 15, replied to the Minister's protest describing the signature of the "Belgian" loan—and the violation of the letters of agreement of March 9, as a "misunderstanding" and requesting the ministers to instruct the group representative to resume negotiations with the premier on his return to Peking.

The four ministers refused to accept the explanation offered, and insisted that the government should admit its breach of contract with the four groups.⁶

This condition was accepted and negotiations were resumed. During the next few weeks the groups paid over further amounts, making the total sum advanced 12,100,000 taels, or approximately £1,800,000. Agreements covering these later advances were signed on May 17, and June 12 under which, after considerable difficulty, the Chinese had been persuaded to agree to the safeguards which the groups considered essential to assure the application of the loan funds to the payment of troops and to the other purposes for which they were borrowed.

At the request of their respective governments the original four groups with the approval of Yuan Shih Kai had agreed to admit banking interests designated by the Russian and Japanese governments, to a participation in these transactions, and after protracted and most delicate negotiations an agreement was reached between the six groups on June 20, 1912, in Paris, regarding the conditions upon which they were prepared jointly to undertake the proposed reorganization loan to China.

The groups were presented with the problem of financing

⁶ The "Belgian" group included the Russo-Asiatic Bank which was later designated by the Russian Government to participate in the "six power" syndicate. Under the Paris agreement of June 20, 1912, the members of the "Belgian" group were recognized by the combination as members of the "Russian" group.

the reconstruction of China on conditions which would be attractive to the bond purchasing public despite the disorganized condition of that country. To appreciate the difficulties the six groups were obliged to take into consideration, it is necessary to summarize the situation existing at this time.

They had been requested by China to furnish roughly 10,000,000 taels or £1,300,000 a month for six months and to provide other sums making the aggregate amount to be advanced 80,000,000 taels or about £10,000,000.

It would have been impossible to issue a Chinese loan at this time except at a figure so low as to prejudice the quotations for Chinese bonds already on the market, in the hands of the public not of the groups. To furnish the sums immediately required therefor the banks would have been obliged to discount treasury bills, which they would have either had to hold themselves, or dispose of to a very limited *clientele*.

These advances were required to pay the army, to finance the disbandment of superfluous troops, and to meet the current expenses of the government. The large loan was to be expended to redeem the treasury bills, to clear off arrears in China's indemnity and loan services, and to meet certain pressing outstanding obligations. Mr. Tang proposed to use the balance to make up the loss of likin, which he desired immediately to abolish, pending the consent of the powers to an increase in the customs tariff. In addition he had certain vague schemes for railway construction, afforestation, and the establishment of mills of various sorts.

For the advances and large loan requested the Chinese government proposed to pledge the salt gabelle as security. The service of the Boxer indemnity is a first charge on this revenue. It was estimated however that it now yields Taels 47,000,000 per annum—and could be increased to at least half as much again if honestly collected.⁷

⁷ Experience at Tientsin and Tsingtao has shown the enormous increase that might be obtained were this tax properly administered. In Tientsin a single station collected in six months as much revenue as the entire district had yielded in a year. At Tsingtao the collections of a station placed under foreign direction were at once increased six-fold.

The Chinese government at this time was powerless to collect the taxes which it offered as security and was unable to meet her indemnity and loan payments, to pay troops or to finance its current administrative expenses and its permanence was by no means assured.

During the course of the negotiations, from February to June, the Chinese officials had shown little appreciation of the magnitude of their financial task and had evinced little ability in dealing effectively therewith.

The groups nevertheless had advanced 12,100,000 taels in order to enable the administration to meet its most urgent needs and to prevent the disorders and mutinies which it was feared would occur unless funds, which the government could not secure from its own people, were obtained.

These advances had been made subject to certain conditions to insure their proper application to the purposes for which they were borrowed yet the Chinese officials charged with their expenditure had placed every obstacle in the way of a proper and efficient audit, to which they had agreed.

Patriotic Chinese, proud of their Republic and hopeful and confident of its future may regret the necessity of including such facts in this statement. These men, however, if they be fair minded, must admit that the banking groups, no matter how friendly they might be to China, would not have been warranted in disregarding them.

Because of these facts the groups were unwilling to undertake the business without the joint support of their respective governments. Because of these facts, moreover, they deemed it possible to proceed with advances and to undertake the reorganization loan only on certain conditions which were briefly as follows:

1. That the groups should have the right to satisfy themselves as to purposes for which funds were required.
2. That China should herself create a system of audit in which foreigners should be employed with powers not merely advisory, but also executive so as to ensure the effective expenditure of loan funds borrowed for the purposes specified.
3. That the salt taxes to be hypothecated for the service

of this loan should be administered either by the existing Maritime Customs organization or by a separate Chinese service like the customs, however, under foreign direction, thus safeguarding the proper administration of the security despite the possible continuation or recurrence of unsettled conditions in China.

4. That the groups should take the first series of the loan of £60,000,000, at a fixed price, and be assured an option on the subsequent series at a price to be based on the market quotation of the first issue, thus giving China the benefit of any improvement in her credit.

5. That to protect the quotation of bonds issued and to assure a successful marketing of subsequent series China should not borrow through other groups until the entire loan of £60,000,000 had been issued.⁸

6. That for a period of five years China should appoint the groups financial agents to assist the administration in its work of reorganization.

These conditions were submitted to the Chinese government and in reply the group representatives in Peking were informed that it would be impossible to China to accept a loan on such terms. Negotiations, however, though interrupted, were not formally broken off, and from the end of June discussions were continued between the Chinese officials and the group representatives, but without result.

The difficulty was not a question of the price at which the bankers should take the bonds. It was the question of "control." The Chinese particularly objected to placing the salt gabelle under the Maritime Customs, or any foreign directed service, and to the creation of a proper audit department to appointing the groups financial agents.

It has of late years become the fashion, particularly among officials, who like Tang Shao Yi, and Liang Tun Yen served for a short time in the Maritime Customs to criticise Sir Robert Hart and his administration. Mr. Drew will give

⁸ In the contract for the so-called "Crisp" loan of £10,000,000 China agreed to a stipulation which virtually prevented her from borrowing, except through the Crisp syndicate, for the period of one year or until the loan had been issued in entirety.

you an account of the life and work of this man, one of the truest friends China ever had.

The younger men, however, forget his splendid service—they do not realize that he did much to save their country, for them, from foreign aggression, and it galls them to admit that for years the Customs Service has been, and is today, with the exception of the Postal Service, also a creation of Sir Robert Hart, the only branch of their entire government which can, if judged by western standards, be termed efficient.

The suggestion that the salt gabelle should be put under the Maritime Customs therefore was refused, nor would the Peking authorities agree to create a similar organization to undertake this work. Chinese and many foreign critics have pointed out that the Customs Service functions at the ports—and that it would therefore be unsuitable for the collection of internal revenue. The Postal Service, also under foreign direction, however, has been successful in its work, conducted throughout China, while customs officials have shown great ability in dealing with likin collectorates and in solving customs problems in the interior of Manchuria.

The groups have not insisted upon the exact form the proposed administration should take. They have, and do, believe that the salt gabelle does not constitute, and cannot be considered, an adequate security unless by placing these taxes under a Chinese government service—but with foreign direction, inspectors, and auditors—an efficient and honest collection be assured.

In the present state of China when the Peking administration has by no means established its authority—when cabinets are formed and dissolved with kaleidoscopic rapidity, when revenues are not being collected, and when there are large bodies of armed men throughout the country, ready at any time to break into open revolt—the groups felt that before engaging to undertake so large a loan as that requested they should be able to be in a position to guide and advise China in her reorganization work, the success of which depends primarily on sound finance. It was for this reason that they asked to be appointed financial agents.

Many of the leading men in Peking have privately recognized the wisdom of the groups' conditions and the advantages to be gained should China accept them. Officially, however, these gentlemen have not dared recommend their adoption, fearing that their political opponents might make any concession to the foreigner the excuse for stirring up an agitation which they would be powerless to quell.

Hoping to obtain less onerous terms the Minister of Finance in July last proposed that the groups should continue advances to be redeemed from a loan of £10,000,000.

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This sum, however, would have been scarcely sufficient to meet China's outstanding and immediate obligations. The safeguards which were suggested by the Chinese moreover were inadequate. The groups therefore were unable to negotiate on this basis. The officials then stated that as the groups would not lend on "reasonable" terms they would be obliged to secure funds from their own people. The group representatives and the foreign ministers in Peking welcomed the suggestion, and urged them to make a "popular" loan. This was attempted but without success; the "people" contributed small sums, but not enough. The government next approached certain commercial houses and secured small loans, in return for large contracts for arms and ammunition. Tramway concessions were offered in return for cash advances, and other expedients adopted to secure funds sufficient to meet the government's running expenses, all of which while relieving a temporary necessity merely increased the difficulties of an already almost hopeless financial problem.

Early in September it was reported that on August 30 the Chinese Minister in London had signed a loan agreement with Messrs. C. Birch Crisp and Company of London. Enquiry addressed to the Minister of Finance in Peking evoked the information that he, the Minister of Finance, had had nothing to do with the conclusion of the London contract which had been arranged by his predecessor acting in an informal capacity. The Minister of Finance assured the representatives that China desired to deal with the six groups as the only combination capable of furnishing within

the next few years the enormous sums which China would need to reorganize her administration and finance the industrial development upon which the Peking Government wished to embark. At the time this discussion took place funds advanced by Messrs. C. Birch Crisp and Company had already been transferred to China and placed to the credit of the Chinese government in a Tientsin bank. This fact became known to the representatives who brought it to the attention of the Minister of Finance. He reiterated his former declaration that China desired to deal with the six groups and as late as September 23 handed the representatives a statement of conditions which he informed them China would be ready to make the basis for the continuation of negotiations for the reorganization loan. These terms were not considered acceptable by the group representatives. The Minister of Finance thereupon informed them that since they had refused the terms proposed by China he considered that the option which the groups had held, had lapsed and that China was free to negotiate with other parties. The so-called "Crisp" loan was issued in London shortly afterward.

From the above facts it would seem that the Chinese government was prepared to repudiate the contract signed with London bankers on August 30, in case the six groups were willing to come to terms.

This incident, in connection with others mentioned above, is not cited for the purpose of impugning the good faith of the Chinese government. Those familiar with the difficulties with which the provisional government has been endeavoring to deal are not inclined to hold China too strictly to account for what her real friends will regard as mistaken and unfortunate, rather than reprehensible, efforts to solve her financial problem. At the same time, with all possible consideration for China and every sympathy for her officials in the performance of their onerous tasks, it must be recognized that such actions will, if continued, make it impossible to maintain Chinese credit.

It will be said perhaps that by concluding the so-called "Crisp" loan, China demonstrated her ability to borrow in

the markets of the world. This may be true, but the fact that China could in this case secure funds was due largely to public confidence in the stability of the Chinese administration based on the willingness of the six-power group to advance funds to the provisional government even prior to the inauguration of the President, Yuan Shih Kai, and the belief that the six groups would in the end come to an arrangement with Peking which would give value to all Chinese securities.

Many gentlemen in the United States have pointed out in discussing this subject that the American banking group in particular should remember the history of our own country and not be too exacting in its dealings with the Chinese Republic.

The argument is plausible but cannot be given too much weight when it is remembered that when our federal government was first established there was no large public debt while the resources of the young American Republic were enormous. The funds secured from abroad during our revolution, and immediately following its conclusion, had been advanced by the French government, not so much with the idea of assisting the struggling colonies as for the purpose of embarrassing Great Britain. Only when Alexander Hamilton had reorganized the finances of the country, securing the assumption by the federal government of the larger part of the debt of the states, and after he had put the administration of the Treasury Department on a sound basis, were the United States able to borrow from foreign bankers on satisfactory terms. The Ministry of Finance in Peking, however, is still operated on lines scarcely conformable to our ideas of a business administration, despite the efforts of able men like Dr. Chen Chin Tao, while the republican government has assumed the obligations of its imperial predecessor for which the revenues of China are to a very large degree already hypothecated, and for the service of which they are at the present time insufficient.

Not long ago I happened to be present when the loan question was discussed by a distinguished gentleman who had just returned from the Far East. He had been greatly

impressed by what the revolution had accomplished, was full of admiration for the Chinese people and confident of the bright future of the Republic. He felt that the bankers were mistaken in demanding terms which the Chinese considered so onerous and thought that the wiser policy for the groups would be to work for the future by now making concessions calculated to relieve the Chinese officials of their immediate embarrassments. He thought that for American merchants the fairest, and at the same time the ultimately most profitable, attitude to adopt toward China was to strive for the maintenance of the "open door" under which with a strong central government international trade would greatly prosper.

He recognized that the authority of the present Peking administration was not generally established in the provinces, that revenues were not being collected and that without money the central government could not become strong. He admitted that while he had met many officials he had seen few whom he considered competent to direct the expenditure of large sums in the manner most likely to assure the speedy restoration of normal conditions throughout the country and he believed therefore that the Chinese government should employ advisers and accept their advice.

The distinguished traveler had predicated his hope for the future on the establishment of a strong central government which would be able to collect sufficient revenue to finance its own reorganization. Unfortunately, however, this cannot be accomplished unless the Chinese government first secures from abroad money sufficient to give it the power to make these collections and pay off its pressing debts under safeguards which will protect it for the time being from external aggression.

If his conclusions as to the ability of Chinese officials now in power were warranted, and his observations correct regarding the present state of affairs in China, his recommendation that the groups "play for the future," by lending money on terms acceptable to the Chinese, would scarcely seem justified by his premises. Those who have lived in China and grown to know and admire the Chinese, however, will readily

understand this point of view. It is impossible not to sympathize with the aspirations of the young men who are now striving to do what they can for their country. At the same time American bankers would not be acting as true friends of China if they failed to look the facts of the situation in the face. They would not be "playing for" the best future for China should they lend money on conditions which might satisfy the vanity of Chinese officialdom but instead of assisting the establishment of a strong central government would encourage improvident financial methods and lead inevitably to foreign intervention.

The present financial situation in China is set forth in an article in the *North China Herald* of September 28, 1912, an abstract of which is given below:

The obligations that China is bound to liquidate are as follows. First of all, Tls. 12,000,000 advanced by the sextuple group from February to July, on the distinct understanding that the Chinese government would sign the loan with them, including this sum in the total amount for which the loan is signed. The Chinese government gave the banks treasury bills, and at the exchange fixed the total works out at £1,750,000 sterling. Secondly, there are amounts due to the shipbuilding firms in England and the United States for works executed by them on orders given by the Manchu government but completed during this year. In the list of their outstanding debts furnished by them to the sextuple group the Chinese government have £700,000 against this item.

Thirdly, there are the Hupeh and Nanking loans of about £300,000 each given by the banks to the Viceroys of the two provinces on the authority of Peking during the Manchu régime. These sums have been overdue for some time, and as the new government has undertaken responsibility for all the past obligations they must be paid the moment it obtains funds. Fourthly, there are two loans contracted at recent dates on the understanding that they would be repaid as soon as China signed the big loan. The Diederichsen loan of Mks. 5,000,000 and the Carlowitz loan of Tls. 6,000,000 come under this category. Part of these amounts was received in cash, although the major portion consisted of amounts due on arms and ammunition supplied by these firms during the revolution.

Fifthly, the Skoda loan contracted with Arnold, Karberg and Company during the revolution, the moiety of which was received in cash and the rest in the shape of arms and ammunition, amounts to about £450,000. Sixthly, as the currency loan was floated by members of the group, and as it is not likely to be floated by them if the present arrangements are continued, they will be entitled

to demand repayment of the advance of £400,000 made to the government last year in April, 1913.

In the seventh place, the amounts due on indemnities, which have been outstanding since October last will work out at over £2,500,000. The total to be paid by China on this account works out roughly at £250,000 per month. Making due allowance for last year's surplus from the customs revenue and the accumulation of native customs revenue, which Dr. Morrison referred to recently, there would still be outstanding the amounts due from January this year.

Lastly seeing that the Chinese dropped the Anglo-Belgian syndicate loan after taking an advance of £1,250,000, the syndicate will not have the least hesitation in demanding immediate payment of the amount. Besides there are a number of small Japanese loans, and small German loans, other than those we have mentioned, mostly for arms supplied during the revolution—the date of payment of which is long overdue. Everybody has been anxiously waiting for the big loan, especially as no security has been given besides the bond of the Chinese authorities.

Further, it is necessary to state in this connection that the merchants, banks and other rich Chinese who helped the new government, both during the struggle and after, now stand badly crippled from want of funds. They have been often told that their outstandings would be cleared as soon as the first loan with the foreigner was closed. Trade is badly in need of the funds spent on the revolution; and if a moiety of the debts of the government is not paid even after a foreign loan becomes an actuality, the failure may give rise to acute discontent. The amount on this score is not available, but the lowest estimate puts it at about Tls. 20,000,000.

Let us suppose that the London syndicate is able to float the whole of the £10,000,000⁹ in October. The loan is expected to be floated at 95, brokerage and other expenses incident on the flotation may be put at 3 per cent, and by the time the loan is floated, if at all successfully, China would have received and spent at least £150,000. The net receipts from the loan would therefore amount to £9,050,000. The total foreign indebtedness, of which China could not in honor delay payment, amounts to £8,950,000. Thus she will have a residue of £100,000 with which to pay her unpaid troops and disband them, and begin setting the Republic in order.

If China refuses to pay all her outstanding debts at present except the indemnity instalments that have fallen in arrears—in order to save the salt gabelle from being taken over by the powers—she will have fully £6,500,000 to pay her soldiers with and begin reforms at once—so it is suggested in some quarters. In the case of an individual such refusal would mean bankruptcy;

⁹ £5,000,000 was floated in September. The bankers paid 89 for the bonds—China received not more than £4,450,000.

in the case of a nation it would mean the utter ruination of its credit in the markets of the world. And China must necessarily borrow much more than £10,000,000. There is no disguising the fact that China has no security to offer—security in the proper sense of the word. Her performances in the past have not been such as to inspire confidence. And her hidden resources need an enormous amount of capital in order that any tangible result may be got out of them.

It may be remembered that in his speech in March before the Assembly at Nanking the then Premier, Mr. Tang Shao Yi, stated that £25,000,000, besides the revenue, would be absolutely needed within the next twelve months. What he said then was substantially correct, and remains true today. The interval has only slightly added to the total needs, as the soldiers are still being kept and paid from want of funds to pay and disband them—although in the interim a number of small loans and advances have all been received and spent. It is quite interesting to note the different items for which funds are needed although our list is not identical with that supplied to the Assembly by Mr. Tang Shao Yi.

If China wishes to preserve her credit as a power, she must liquidate her pressing debts before beginning any constructive work. First and foremost is the foreign indebtedness to the tune of £9,000,000—the details of which we have mentioned above. Secondly, her merchants, bankers and gentry, who supplied funds to prosecute the revolution and carry on the new government deserve better consideration than they have received; and the sums owing to them are estimated at about Tls. 20,000,000, or roughly £3,000,000. Thirdly, she must pay the troops, who are now eating their heads off, and disband the major portion of them. It was estimated that expenditure on this score would cost £5,000,000 some four months ago. A certain number of troops have been disbanded, but the cost of getting rid of the rest of them has not greatly been lessened, owing to the delay.

Fourthly, she will have to buy back the republican bonds, on which she has to pay interest half yearly at the rate of 8 per cent per annum, while the bonds are continually depreciating. Sums received on account of the "so-called patriotic loan," while of no practical utility to her, are depleting the resources of the trade in the provinces. These suggestions are made with the view to enable China to start with a clean slate, if she wishes to proceed with the work of reorganization without encumbrances. Thus before she begins any construction work she stands to have to pay out £19,000,000.

Now as regards sums needed for construction work and reform. The basis of all reorganization in China is currency reform, and so long as the currency is what it is there is no hope of making headway of any kind. It may be remembered that in the currency loan arrangement of 1911, £7,000,000 was set apart for currency reform; and that amount does not err on the side of extravagance. Whatsoever may be the final decision in regard to the

standard, there is no doubt that a considerable amount of silver would have to be purchased presently and coined; and one may rest assured that in working out the details in connection with bringing about a uniform currency throughout the length and breadth of the country, more funds may be needed later on.

Of equal importance is the immediate necessity for taking measures to minimize the effects of the famines and floods, which cause a perennial loss to the country and bring death and ruin to thousands, if not millions, year after year. Mr. Jameson's scheme of constructing dykes should be taken in hand immediately, and afforestation should be carried on simultaneously. An expenditure of £5,000,000 distributed during the next five years is not beyond the mark; and the loss averted during this period, judging by past experience, would be fully that amount. Of course, when a loan is arranged, it should be for the full amount, for the sooner the works are finished the more profitable they would be for the country. In so far as such expenditure would amply repay itself, it is hardly to be reckoned among China's debts. But it is a charge for which, in the first place, a large sum of ready money will be required.

The ideal of any loan to China at present should be to enable her to pay back the past and present borrowings. Of course, the basis of such an ideal are the untapped resources of China for taxation, the great industrial and agricultural possibilities of the land and the hidden resources of the country. But even to find these money is needed; to develop them much more. Development in this direction alone, under the aegis of a good government and a sound currency, would enable China to pay interest and principal of past, present and future debts. Expedients like those of the increase of the customs dues or the salt tax would prove only of temporary utility, and under certain conditions might even do harm.

The currency loan of last year included provision for £3,000,000 for Manchurian industrial development. And thrice three millions sterling for the eighteen provinces for industrial development and administrative reform would only err on the side of economy. Of course, this program does not take into account sums needed for railway construction in the country or private industrial enterprises. And in China's present financial state it would be ridiculous to dream of spending money for military or naval advancement. Thus, it would seem that if foreign loans should serve any beneficent purpose at all for China, a sum of £40,000,000 is necessary during the year ending, say, next June; and further amounts, into the details of which it is too early now to go, appear likely to be needed in the coming years.

This total of China's needs for the year is based on the supposition that the revenue of the country will meet its ordinary expenditure. Mr. Tang said there would be a deficit of Tls. 40,000,000 this year, and probably the same amount next—the obvious deduction being, of course, that borrowings will have to

be increased to this extent. Anyhow, there is no doubting that any syndicate proposing to lend money to China should be able to arrange for £40,000,000 during the next nine months, and be able to pay about £60,000,000 during the next three years. The original proposal of the sextuple group was arranged on this basis, and the total of £60,000,000 was agreed upon as necessary for the regeneration of the country.

Again it should not be forgotten that the annual payments on foreign loans by China will almost be trebled from 1916. The amortization of the railway loans starts from then, and the indemnity payments would then be more than double the present amounts. If China is not up and doing, with something in the way of reorganization she must be deeper in the mire than ever by 1916. At present everything in the way of reform needs large initial expenditure. To stop squeeze in the collection of revenue it is necessary to have good accounting, and officials with a salary which would place them above temptation. The land tax in China gives a ridiculously low yield; to increase it an effectual survey costing millions of taels is essential.

That the banks composing the sextuple group, with their respective governments at their back, would be able to supply China with this large total with more facility than any number of other syndicates is beyond question. The Chinese themselves know it, and hence their anxiety to keep on good terms with the group in spite of their latest action.

Apropos of the apparent success of the new loan we understand that already demands have been made upon Peking by several individuals and institutions in China. The funds of the Bank of China were drawn upon to further the cause of the revolution; and the bank naturally requires money to carry on its ordinary business. This bank is the best of institutions of a similar kind in China and deserves the help of the government—at least to the extent of receiving back what it paid out. But then, how far will £10,000,000 go?"

Such is the situation as seen by the Shanghai business man. The six groups because of the support of their governments, and because they believe that a loan properly safeguarded is the only means by which normal conditions can be restored in China, are willing to assist the Chinese government, in dealing with the conditions described above. They are criticised, however, because they are unwilling to loan funds except on terms which the Chinese regard as humiliating.

It has frequently been stated moreover that one of the chief Chinese objections to the "six-power" group has been the fear of any combination in which Russia and Japan is represented. Those who are familiar with Far Eastern

politics and who have considered their relation to European affairs, are aware that this grouping of the powers is a safeguard rather than a menace to China's integrity. They will realize that if this combination be maintained and China be willing to cooperate therewith, she will be able better to protect herself against the selfish designs of individuals which even though they may not be prevented will certainly be restricted by the necessities of joint action.¹⁰

Those who have criticised the attitude of the six-power group have in a measure lost sight of some of the elementary functions of a banking house which handles foreign loans. They have forgotten that it is not the bankers themselves who provide the money to finance a foreign loan, though they may for a time advance from their own resources certain preliminary payments. Bond issues, however, are sold to the public, the bankers receiving their commission on the sale and the reputation of a house of issue like that of any other commercial establishment depends upon the quality of the commodity which it sells. Bankers would not be justified in requesting their clients to take bonds on a sentimental and not a business basis any more than the president of an insurance company would be warranted in loaning funds for which he was responsible to a personal friend regarding whose solvency he had no guarantee.

The groups engaged in the present Chinese loan negotiations are institutions of the highest standing in their respective countries. The rupture in negotiations did not come because the bankers attempted to obtain an unreasonable commission but because they felt they could not afford to place upon the market a loan which they did not consider sound in the present state of China unless they obtained safeguards such as they have demanded, not to add to their own profit, but in the interest of the prospective investor.

¹⁰ Had it not been for the agreement between the six powers to take no separate and individual action during the Revolution Japan would have sent an expedition to China to keep the Manchus on the throne. She was prevented from taking this step by the representations of the British government which insisted that nothing should be done to prejudice continued joint action by all the great powers.

Fair-minded observers of recent events in the Far East recognize that the American banking group has during the past three years demonstrated its friendship for China. The American bankers personally wish for the success of the Chinese Republic. As real friends of China, however, it would be just as reprehensible for them to offer for sale bonds secured from China on terms which they did not consider calculated to restore and increase her credit, as it would be for them to issue to the public securities which they did not feel assured would constitute a sound investment.

It has been stated by men in authority in Peking that they would rather sell their country bit by bit than submit to the terms asked by the six-power group. Concessions have been offered giving to foreigners the right to construct and operate railways for forty years in return for a cash down payment of 5,000,000 taels. This indeed would be to sell the nation's birthright for a mess of pottage and to sow the dragon's teeth of financial bondage. Yet it is proposed by the very men who complain most bitterly of the conditions required by the six groups which are mild in comparison and which are calculated to build up a strong central government rather than create a nest of warring foreign interests which will cause China trouble and shame for years to come.

In these negotiations the banking groups have been charged with a very heavy responsibility. Their terms were submitted only after long and careful deliberation. China's difficulties were fully and sympathetically considered and the conditions required by the groups were prepared in her interest as well as in the interests of the groups and the prospective bondholders.

Recognizing, however, the peculiar difficulties of the present Peking government the groups have throughout been willing to consider any plan which the Chinese themselves might propose, calculated to free them from embarrassment, and at the same time carrying with it safeguards sufficient to make any loan based thereon a sound investment.

The six groups have been endeavoring to induce China to undertake real constructive work while the Peking authorities have either failed to realize the necessity therefor or

have been unwilling to assume the responsibility of undertaking a practical and comprehensive scheme. In following this course these officials are China's worst enemies for the reckless financial policy of the past few months if continued will lead to that very intervention, which in refusing the six groups' terms, these gentlemen have been avowedly trying to avoid.

The groups have not been attempting to force money, with humiliating conditions attached, on China. They have stated merely that they are willing, only upon certain conditions, to loan the money which China has requested them to furnish. The groups do not insist that China accept a loan if these conditions are unacceptable. They do say that they will not issue Chinese bonds on terms which they regard as unsatisfactory. The "six-power" groups do not constitute a monopoly but they are not willing to undertake any loan unless assured that they will be entitled to furnish on sound conditions funds to complete the transactions, the initiation of which they finance, and that they shall have a clear market until the different loan series for which they contract are sold.

For the sake of the preservation of China's integrity and the commercial "open door" it is to be hoped that some mutually satisfactory understanding may be reached between China and the "six-power" group. It is to China's interest that this combination should be maintained, and it is to the interest of China as well as of the United States, that we should retain our present position therein. China's great problem to-day is that of finance. It is to her advantage that we are entitled to a practical voice in its solution, and it is to the advantage of American trade that the United States continue to be an active party in Chinese loan negotiations. —

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE

Although the agreement for the Reorganization Loan was on the point of signature early in February, developments since that time have caused a further postponement of the conclusion of this transaction.

The terms agreed upon by the Chinese government and the bankers are substantially those outlined in the foregoing pages. The purposes for which the money is to be expended were specified by the Chinese government and deemed satisfactory by the bankers.

Provision has been made in the loan agreement to ensure the expenditure of borrowed funds for these specified purposes. The Chinese government has itself established an Audit Department and engaged to appoint a competent foreigner to introduce an effective system of accounting, while a Bureau of Foreign Loans will also be created which will, like the Audit Department, be under the direction of a foreign employee of the Chinese government.

The proposed agreement also stipulates that the Chinese government shall appoint a foreigner who shall act jointly with the Chinese Director General of the Salt Administration and provision is made for the appointment of foreign and Chinese district inspectors, who shall have charge of the salt production, the sale of this commodity to the salt merchants and the collection of the salt revenues, which it is stipulated shall be deposited with the group banks until provision is made for the service of the loan. The loan agreement also contains a provision, which, if the six groups undertake the reorganization loan, will protect the market therefor until it has been issued in entirety.

The negotiations resulting in the preparation of the agreement outlined above were undertaken by the banks on the understanding that the Chinese government would appoint foreigners to the positions mentioned and would satisfy the six legations in Peking that these employees would be engaged under contracts which would enable them to render effective service.

The Chinese government on the night before it was expected that the loan agreement would be signed nominated a Dane for the Salt Administration, an Italian for the Audit Department, and a German for the Loan Bureau. Certain of the interested governments desired that these foreign employees should be of the nationality of the lending bankers. These points were raised at the last moment and re-

quired a month to adjust between the various governments concerned. The program agreed upon by the six governments was submitted to the Chinese government early in March and refused by the Chinese. At the time of writing, however, negotiations are still in progress and it is to be hoped that a mutually satisfactory arrangement will soon be reached.

EDITORIAL NOTE

Since Mr. Straight completed this article, the American Banking Group has definitely withdrawn from further participation in the Six Power loan negotiations, due to President's Wilson's refusal to continue the moral support of the Government. The following are the official explanations of the attitude of the Administration and of the American group respectively. President Wilson gave this statement to the press:

We are informed that, at the request of the last administration, a certain group of American bankers undertook to participate in the loan now desired by the government of China (approximately \$125,000,000). Our government wished American bankers to participate along with the bankers of other nations, because it desired that the good will of the United States toward China should be exhibited in this practical way; that American capital should have access to that great country and that the United States should be in a position to share with the other powers any political responsibilities that might be associated with the development of the foreign relations of China in connection with their industrial and commercial enterprises. The present administration has been asked by this group of bankers whether it would also request them to participate in the loan.

The representatives of the bankers through whom the administration was approached declared that they would continue to seek their share of the loan under the proposed agreements only if expressly requested to do so by the government. The administration has declined to make such request because it did not approve the conditions of the loan or the implications of responsibility on its own part which it was plainly told would be involved in the request.

The conditions of the loan seem to us to touch very nearly the administrative independence of China itself; and this administration does not feel that it ought, even by implication, to be a party to those conditions. The responsibility on its part which would be implied in requesting the bankers to undertake the loan might conceivably go the length in some unhappy contingency of forcible

interference in the financial, and even the political affairs of that great Oriental state, just now awakening to a consciousness of its power and of its obligations to its people.

The conditions include not only the pledging of particular taxes, some of them antiquated and burdensome, to secure the loan, but also the administration of these taxes by foreign agents. The responsibility on the part of our government implied in the encouragement of a loan thus secured and administered is plain enough and is obnoxious to the principles upon which the government of our people rests.

The government of the United States is not only willing, but earnestly desirous of aiding the great Chinese people in every way that is consistent with their untrammelled development and its own immemorial principles. The awakening of the people of China to a consciousness of their possibilities under free government is the most significant if not the most momentous event of our generation.

With this movement and aspiration the American people are in profound sympathy. They certainly wish to participate and participate very generously, in opening to the Chinese and to the use of the world the almost untouched and perhaps unrivalled resources of China.

The government of the United States is earnestly desirous of promoting the most extended and intimate trade relationships between this country and the Chinese republic. The present administration will urge and support the legislative measures necessary to give American merchants, manufacturers, contractors and engineers, the banking facilities which they now lack and without which they are at a serious disadvantage as compared with their industrial and commercial rivals. This is its duty. This is the main material interest of its citizens in the development of China.

Our interests are those of the open door—a door of friendship and mutual advantage. This is the only door we care to enter.

The following was handed to the press by the American group, March 19:

The American Group, consisting of J. P. Morgan & Co., Kuhn, Loeb & Co., The First National Bank and the National City Bank, was formed in the spring of 1909, upon the expressed desire of the Department of State that a financial group be organized to take up the participation to which American capital was entitled in the Hukuang Railway Loan Agreement, then under negotiation by the British, French and German banking groups.

This group thus became interested in Chinese Loan matters, not primarily for its own profit, but for purposes indicated by President Taft and Secretary Knox. As stated in President Taft's message to Congress of December 1909, these purposes, in effect, called for the co-operation of the bankers as the "indispensable instrumentality" which the American Government needed to enable it

"to carry out a practical and real application of the open door policy." The Department of State considered that American co-operation with the Banking Groups of the several great powers enabled the United States to exercise a practical voice in China's affairs and constituted the best guarantee for the preservation of China's integrity.

In pursuance of the policy so advocated, the American Group, with the Administration's approval, entered into an agreement with the British, French and German Groups for the purpose of rendering financial assistance to China. In February 1912 these four groups at the request of their respective Governments and with the consent of the Chinese Government, admitted Russian and Japanese financial groups to the negotiations for the Reorganization Loan, thus constituting what has since been known as the Six Power Group.

Following the revolution and despite the fact that the authority of the new Republic had not been generally accepted, the American Group joined with the other groups in making to the Provisional Government substantial advances to enable it more firmly to establish its authority and to restore normal conditions throughout the country.

Meanwhile there had been in negotiation, during a period of many months, a loan agreement which, in its general terms, appeared last month to meet the approval of the Six Governments, of their banking groups, and the Chinese Government, and to be ready for signature.

These terms were intended to cover two points. The first was to enable the Chinese Government to reorganize its administration on an effective modern basis, to pay off its large outstanding debts and build up Chinese credit. The second was to protect the interests of American and European investors. For such protection, in the judgment of the Governments and the Groups, the only method was to ensure, despite any possible recurrence of political unrest in China, the proper expenditure of the funds loaned to China and to safe-guard the handling of the revenues pledged for principle and interest of the bonds.

As announced in the statement given to the press yesterday the present Administration at Washington, with a desire to be of assistance to China and to promote American interests in the Far East, has decided that these purposes may better be served by the adoption of a different and independent policy. As the American Group had been ready to serve the Administration in the past, irrespective of the heavy risks involved, so it was disposed to serve the present Administration if so requested. But deferring to the policy now declared, the Group has withdrawn entirely from the Chinese Loan negotiations and has so advised the European and Japanese banking groups.

THE WESTERN INFLUENCE IN CHINA

*By Edward W. Capen, Ph.D., Hartford School of Missions;
recently on special sociological and missionary research
in the Far East.*

The striking changes that have occurred within a twelve-month in the oldest, the most populous and potentially the most powerful nation of the Orient and of the world, are of profound significance to us of the West. We are in large measure responsible for what has occurred. Besides this, the political and social movements in China, which culminated last February in the abdication of the Manchu dynasty after a rule of nearly 270 years, and the inauguration of what has been characterized as the Imperial Republic of China, place upon western nations new obligations and open to them new opportunities. It is therefore fitting that the topic "Western Influence in China" should have a place upon this program.

The discussion of this paper falls into four divisions: I, What western influence has accomplished; II, What western influence should not destroy; III, Where China can learn from the West; IV, How the West can be most helpful.

There are four principal channels through which western influence has reached China. The governments of Europe and America have exerted a direct pressure upon the government of China and forced changes in its treatment of foreigners and those under their influence. For three hundred years western merchants tried to open China to foreign commerce. These efforts culminated during the nineteenth century in wars between China and the European powers, chiefly Great Britain, as a result of which China was opened to western influence as exerted by the trader and his agents. A third channel through which China has been influenced from the West may be called simply western example.

Especially in these later years, say within the last generation, a considerable number of Chinese, chiefly students and diplomatic representatives, have visited the West for longer or shorter periods, have thus become more or less familiar with western institutions and ideals, and have on their return taught many of these ideas to their friends and associates. The experiences of the Chinese who have settled in western lands, chiefly along the western shores of the American continent, and still more recently the introduction of western books and the publication in China of books and periodicals that give the facts about western life, thought and achievements, have spread the knowledge and influence of things western, especially among students and the progressive classes. To the influence of Chinese who have visited or resided in the West or who have become familiar with its life, should be added that of the personal example of the westerners who visit or live in China. This influence, though largely centered in the port cities, is by no means to be disregarded. Finally, perhaps the most important of all channels, is the Christian missionary. He has been the first to penetrate to the more remote parts of the country. He has come closest to the life of the people, and unlike many a trader or government official, has for the most part stood resolutely as the embodiment of the best elements in the life of the West. His—and I should add specifically her—quiet and pervasive personal influence has had very much to do with laying the foundations for the new regime.

Such are some of the channels through which western influence has reached China. What have been the results? The answer to this question forms our first point.

I. WHAT WESTERN INFLUENCE HAS ACCOMPLISHED

In general, the chief effects of the influence of western governments and commerce have concerned the industrial development of China. Those of western example have modified the educational and political systems of the country, while those of missionary work have affected the educational, philanthropic, and ethical ideals.

Until the middle of the last century, the Chinese government confined all its commercial relations with foreigners to the frontier. Canton was the center of the trade with Europe and America until the treaty of Nanking in 1842, which closed the so-called Opium War with Great Britain, ceded Hongkong to England and opened five treaty ports, Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai. As a result of subsequent wars or pressure otherwise exerted, the number of these ports has increased to forty-nine, located on the frontiers, along the coast, and on the navigable rivers. With the development of foreign trade came the adoption in 1854 of rules by which the collection of customs was placed in the hands of foreigners. Starting with the organization in 1861 of a department for the transmission of its own postal matter, the Customs Department began in 1876 to open its service to the public, and twenty years later the Imperial Post was organized and grafted upon the Customs. It was transferred in May, 1911, to the Chinese Board of Communications. While the government and large merchants had always had means of transmitting letters, the ordinary Chinese had none. The statistics for 1910 give the number of post-offices as 5,357, the articles transmitted 355,000,000, including 3,750,000 parcels and 25,500,000, registered articles. The money order system transported \$10,000,000. The postal routes covered 13,000 miles by railways and steamers, and 87,000 miles by regular couriers. The telegraph system, which has been independent of the customs service, has developed less rapidly, but during the year 1909 over 600 miles of new lines were constructed and twenty-two new offices opened. There are now 560 offices and 28,000 miles of telegraph lines connecting the principal cities and the neighboring countries.

Just about the time when the postal service was instituted, foreigners in 1875 opened the first railway in China from Shanghai to Wusung. Within two years the line, which had come into possession of the government, was torn up, everything, including engines and cars, dumped upon the shores of Formosa, and a temple erected upon the site of the station. Such were the unpropitious beginnings

of the attempt of foreigners to improve the transportation facilities of China. Later, under foreign stimulus, the Chinese took up the railway question again, but made little progress until the era of foreign concessions that succeeded the close of the war with Japan in 1895. So rapid was the construction that within sixteen years 5500 miles have been opened to traffic and 2800 miles of trunk lines are under construction, and these figures do not include the Japanese and Russian railways in Manchuria. The projected lines will connect all parts of the country, including even Thibet, with the political and commercial centers. The Chinese are as rapidly as possible taking over these railways and bringing them under complete Chinese control.

Added to the railways are the steamer lines along the coast and the internal waterways of the country. The Yangtse system alone furnishes 12,000 miles of water navigation, and in general there are 8000 miles of rivers in China navigable by steamers. Since 1898 the internal waters have been opened to vessels flying foreign flags. While this permission would not have been granted by a nation able to resist, it has resulted in securing for the chief river routes comfortable and speedy steamers that sail under the British German, French, Japanese and Chinese flags.

These improvements in means of communication have made possible the new China. When the unwieldy junk, the man or woman propelled river or canal boat, with a sail as auxiliary power, the sedan chair, the wheelbarrow or cart moving slowly over the egregious roads, were the swiftest means of communication, the virtual independence of the provinces was inevitable. The increasing unity of thought and action brought about by improved means of communication made it possible for the entire empire to throw off the rule of the Manchus within a few months. The effects of floods and famines can now be mitigated and speedy relief secured. On the other hand, thousands, or even millions, of river boatmen, chair coolies, carters and the like have lost their means of support. Important cities and towns situated on the old routes are losing business and population, while new towns and cities are developing at the new distributing points.

Western influence and competition are leading also to industrial changes, such as the opening of mines, the establishment of large manufacturing plants like the Hanyang Iron Works, managed by western-trained Chinese, and the growth of factories with power- or improved hand-loom. The inevitable suffering caused by industrial development is increased in the case of China by the pressure of population upon the soil, the relative immobility and conservatism of labor, and the lack of education and adaptability among the masses. It is reduced somewhat by the solidarity of the Chinese and their ability to exist upon a pitifully small income.

The millions of Chinese furnish, it is believed, an almost unlimited and unworked market, and the West is seeking to force the sale of its wares. The effect of this is not always good, even apart from the dislocation of industry.

The net increase in the importation of western liquors during the year 1909 as compared with 1908 was Taels 845,186. These threaten to take the place of opium among the wealthier classes. The western cigarette is further impoverishing the common people, the daily consumption being put at twenty millions. So serious are the consequences that certain regions have driven out the salesmen, torn down their posters, and destroyed all the cigarettes they could find. But with a courage and persistence worthy of a better cause, and aided, it has been alleged, by drugged cigarettes, the representatives of the British-American Tobacco Company are continuing their work of driving out the cheap and innocuous Chinese tobacco with this more expensive and deleterious western product.

The injection of morphia is another vice for the introduction and maintenance of which foreigners are responsible. There are no records before 1892, but during the ten years from 1892 to 1902, the importation increased from 15,761 ounces to 195,133 ounces, each ounce being good for from one to two thousand injections. In 1903 a prohibitory tax was imposed, and the imports declared to the customs at once fell off to 128 ounces in 1904 and 54 ounces in 1905. The explanation of this is smuggling.

In this realm western influence is decidedly a mixed blessing.

The chief effects of western example have been in the realms of education, political organization and administration, and social ideals.

For generations, China had an education that was based upon the study of the Chinese classics. It was remarkable for its antiquity, its democracy, and, as contact with the West revealed, its inadequacy. It did not produce men who could lead China successfully in competition with the rest of the world. Western education was introduced into China by the missionaries, Catholic and Protestant. In 1861 the Imperial Maritime Customs, which were under foreign control, started two colleges in Peking and Canton. These were taught by foreigners and were chiefly for the training of Chinese interpreters. The first systematic attempt to send Chinese students abroad for education was made in 1872, but ended in the recall of the students from the United States in 1881. After the war with Japan, 1894-95, the great Viceroy Chang Chih-tung advocated that upon the ancient Chinese education should be grafted western subjects. During the brief reform period of 1898, the late emperor by a series of decrees abolished the old literary essay as the standard for literary examination, and ordered the establishment of schools and colleges in provincial capitals, and in prefectural, departmental, and district cities, directed that existing schools should be altered into schools for practical Chinese literature and for western learning, and created the Imperial University at Peking, appointing as its head that veteran missionary, Dr. W. A. P. Martin. With the reaction that culminated in the Boxer uprising of 1900, all these changes were swept away, only to be renewed again under the late Empress Dowager during the last decade. Before the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty, it was provided by a decree of January 13, 1903, that a complete educational system should be created, extending from the kindergarten up through the primary, higher primary, and middle school, to the high school (or college), the university and the post-graduate college for higher studies.

Provision was also made for the education of girls and the training of teachers. This educational system was modeled upon that of Japan, which is along German lines. It called into its service foreigners and Chinese educated abroad. While many of the schools existed only on paper and the average efficiency was low, yet there were notable exceptions, especially in the imperial province of Chihli. Whatever the quality, the numbers of the new schools and of their students rapidly increased. At the close of 1910, there were in Peking alone 252 such schools with 15,774 students, and in the provinces 42,444 schools with an enrollment of 1,284,965. Because of recognized imperfections, the Board of Education last year called together in Peking the leading scholars and educators of China, who formed themselves into the Central Education Society and proceeded to discuss educational problems, and make recommendations to the Board of Education. Under the new government the movement is along these same lines, including even the recognition of English as an official language, and the proposed abolition of the compulsory worship of the tablet of Confucius, which abolition has actually been put into effect in the Kwangtung province. So serious was the reaction against the old education that at one time mission schools had difficulty in inducing their pupils to study the Chinese classics or cultivate a beautiful literary style. If the papers may be credited, a prominent member of the new cabinet is unable to read or write in his own language. A purely western education is, of course, only one degree less to be deplored than the old discarded Chinese education.

Similarly, in the political realm, contact with the West led the reform party in China to demand the reconstruction of government along the lines of western parliamentary institutions. Theoretically the government of the Manchus was that of an absolute monarchy but actually the provinces enjoyed a large measure of autonomy, and the local communities for the most part governed themselves. It is this democratic foundation of the empire that is one of the reasons for believing that the present political experiment of China will succeed. The graft and corruption which char-

acterized the old administration, its inefficiency and the lack of a real unity, led, with the growth of the spirit of nationalism, to a demand for political reforms. Pressure from western governments had already secured some changes that affected international relations. Such was the organization in 1861, after the capture of Peking by the French and British, of the Tsungli Yamen, changed forty years later into the Waiwu Pu, as the Board of Foreign Affairs. The great step forward was the appointment in 1905 of an Imperial Commission to study the administrative systems of foreign countries with a view to the possible establishment of a representative government in China. This appointment committed the government to a policy of reform. The commission reported the following year, and a little later a decree was issued promising the calling at some date in the future of a parliament. Administrative reforms were made, some useless offices abolished, certain boards consolidated, and new boards instituted. An attempt was made to remove the bitterness between Manchu and Chinese by abolishing some of the distinctions and depriving the Manchus of certain privileges. In August, 1908, an imperial decree laid down a nine year program for constitutional reform. From October 14 to November 23, 1909, provincial assemblies met, the first really representative bodies to be summoned by the government to have a share, but only as advisers, in the government of the empire. From that time on the government had no peace, for the demand for a demand for a responsible cabinet and the speedy summoning of a parliament was incessantly pressed. The first National Assembly met October 2, 1910, and immediately sought to arrogate to itself powers which the Crown had not dreamed of granting. The most that the Throne would concede was the promise of a cabinet the next year and a Parliament at the end of three years. This did not satisfy the people, and before the second session of the National Assembly was convened last autumn the revolution was in full swing and culminated in the abdication of the Manchus February 12, 1912. The object of the Throne in its program for constitutional reform had been to consolidate the empire,

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deprive the provinces of their virtual autonomy, nationalize finance, justice and education, and, by admitting the representatives of the people to an advisory position, quiet the demand for self-government. The Throne did not propose to divest itself of its legislative, administrative and judicial prerogatives; nor was it to be required to adopt the recommendations of the assemblies. At the present time in the construction of the new government, the influence of western example is clearly evident. Republican forms are being followed for the first time in the history of the Orient. In the new National Assembly, the upper house, or Senate, is to represent the provinces, the dependencies and the Chinese abroad, and each province is to have equal representation. The lower house will be composed of one representative for each 800,000 of the population. The primary elections have been called for December 10th.

China seeks more than representative government. The extra-territoriality upon which in the past Western nations have rightly insisted is most galling to the proud and sensitive Chinese. The leaders recognize, however, that it is useless to demand any change until the judicial system has been reorganized along western lines, with a true penal code, incorruptible courts, and properly administered prisons. The movement in this direction has been going on for some time. Five years ago experts began the compilation of a new penal code, which after several revisions was adopted in 1910. In January of last year were held the first of the regular examinations in law which were to be compulsory upon all new officials in the Board of Justice. Not long after, it was decided to establish a high court of justice in each province and this was done in the progressive ones. This does not necessarily imply that these courts are yet ideal. Only other pressing events prevented the carrying into effect of proposals for the better administration of the civil courts. Almost before the revolution was complete, the provisional government in Shanghai established a modern court with three well qualified judges, two of whom were trained in Great Britain, and in this court, for the first time in China, there sat a jury drawn by lot from lists of citizens.

The outcome of this first trial, however, was such as to raise a question as to whether China is yet ready for the proper application of the jury system. The Manchu government issued edicts abolishing torture, but the experience of the mixed court in Shanghai leads to a doubt as to whether the Chinese are ready to be governed and to see justice done without the use of the bamboo to extort confession. The prisons of China have been places of horror to a westerner but these are being reformed. China was represented at the last International Congress on Prison Reform by delegates who subsequently made a study of European prisons. As long ago as 1908 I was privileged to visit in Tientsin and Paotingfu what might almost be called model prisons, in which the prisoners were well cared for under good sanitary conditions, were given instruction, and were taught useful arts. This movement is spreading wherever want of will and of money do not prevent, and a model prison has been discovered even in distant Yunnan.

In addition to these fundamental changes in education and government, the leaders of the new China are imbued with western ideals and are adopting western customs. On February 22, 1910, the government issued an edict abolishing slavery and prohibiting the buying and selling of human beings in China. No maidservants or concubines were to be sold, and concubines had their position improved. There were loop holes and it was reported a year later that there was no evidence that the edict had made any difference to the large number of farm laborers who are slaves. Some of the most radical reformers have adopted the ultra-western views regarding the position of woman and the relations of the sexes. An extreme and far from admirable new woman had appeared four years ago in certain Chinese cities like Nanking. With the advent of the new regime this has been carried still further, with disastrous consequences to many young women, who have found to their sorrow and shame that Chinese society is not yet ready for that freedom of which they had heard and which they sought to exercise apart from the restraints and limitations which are insisted upon even in the West. Educated young Chinese here and

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there demand some voice at least in the choice of their future wife or husband, and a recent issue of a Chinese paper reports the case of an irate father in Canton whose feelings may be imagined when he discovered that his daughter was being courted by a young man in western fashion. There is one reform, however, affecting women that is wholly commendable. This is the natural foot movement which seeks to remove from Chinese women the incubus of suffering and disability resulting from the cruel practice of binding the feet. Begun by western ladies, missionary and civilian, resident in China, the Anti-Foot-Binding Society has been taken over by the Chinese, and this reform is now thoroughly naturalized. Western methods of salutation and western dress are being adopted, often with deplorable and ill-considered rapidity. Beyond these specific reforms, there has been noted an increasing humaneness in the public sentiment concerning various relics of a less advanced civilization than is now advocated for the new China.

There has recently come to my notice a copy of the program of the Social Reform Association, which was organized a few months ago by some of the leaders of the new China while they were on the steamer going north to take over the reigns of government. Among the leaders in the Association were the late premier Tang Shao-yi, the ministers of Navy, Education, Agriculture and Forestry, and many others. This association as reported in a Chinese paper is pledged to a list of reforms, thirty-three in number, of which I will quote a few:

2. Do not take concubines.
3. Advocate independent holding of property after coming to age.
4. Cultivate dependence on self, not on friends and on relatives.
5. Accord full equality between men and women.
6. Prohibit early marriage.
- 7-9. Advocate marriage by choice, the right of divorce and of remarriage.
11. Advocate small families.
14. Abolish kow-tow using a bow in its place.
15. Abolish foot-binding, wearing of earrings and face painting.
17. Receive no gifts while holding official positions.

18. Abolish the practice of
19. Abolish the practice of
20. Abolish the practice of

20. Advocate the giving of private property to benefit the public.
24. Prohibit idols and images.
25. Prohibit geomancy, or other forms of divination.
26. Prohibit appetites that are harmful to health, such as smoking, drinking, etc.
33. Prohibit indecent advertisements.

These and the other reforms concern themselves with morality and with simplicity and purity of life. Nearly every one is in harmony with western and with Christian ideals, and strikes at some established custom or institution of China.

Another side to this question of western influence should be noted, and that is that western example is not always helpful. The evil lives of many foreigners resident in China, the fact that the worst sides of our life are often the only sides seen by the Chinese students in the West, the demoralizing example of the social evils existing in the West with which the Chinese are familiar, and the influence of our yellow press and of our pseudo-scientific and atheistic treatises, not to mention our decadent literature, are to be allowed for as counterbalancing the otherwise helpful influence of western example.

The fourth channel through which western influence has reached China has been the missionary, both Protestant and Catholic. The missionary has affected China through schools, medical work, and the publishing of books and papers, as well as by the preaching of the Christian religion with its high ethical ideals.

The number of missionaries through whom the western influence is exerted runs up into the thousands. The latest statistics indicate the presence in China of over 5000 Protestant missionaries and of nearly 50 Roman Catholic Bishops, assisted by more than 1400 European priests. Associated with them as coworkers are, for the Protestants 15,500 Chinese clergy, unordained, religious workers, medical assistants and teachers, both men and women, and for the Catholics 700 Chinese priests and an unreported number of other helpers. The diplomatic and consular officials reside in the capital and in the port cities. The representatives of western industrial life have usually resided in these same centers, though

now they travel through the provinces advertising and selling their goods. On the other hand, the missionaries are found all through China. They remain for years in the same region (one missionary in Fukien has completed thirty-five years at one city), travel widely through the country districts, and win the support of the people. Such missionaries have done much to commend things western to the Chinese. Thus, a Chinese official, who had not been favorable to missionary work and who was noted for his biting criticisms of certain prominent missionaries, nevertheless made the following statement a few years ago to a missionary in Nanking, with whom he was intimate: "Why is it that the foreigners all like to come to Nanking? It is because you missionaries came first and made a favorable impression. In Canton it was a regular hell on earth until the missionaries came and tried to make things better." A sociologist who went to China a few years since prejudiced against the missionary soon discovered that the missionary was virtually the only foreigner who got into the heart life of the people and could give the traveler the real facts. The residence in China of so many westerners, who speak the vernacular, most of whom live in their own homes and embody western ideals of culture, purity, and service has had an influence that no statistics reveal.

The missionary has been the pioneer of modern education in China. The Protestant missionaries maintain 3700 day or primary schools with 86,000 pupils and more than 500 higher schools with an enrollment of more than 31,000. Up until recently the Christian schools have been the best in the country, and even now but few government schools can compete with the best Christian schools in the grade of their teaching, especially of English and western subjects, and above all in their moral tone. The ethical influence of most government schools, it is declared, leaves much to be desired, while the Christian school seeks by moral and religious instruction and by careful supervision and discipline to develop the pupils into strong and public spirited men and women. The direct influence of this educational work has been great but its indirect influence is even greater. Not

only have these schools trained leaders for the new China, but their success has helped to awaken an interest in a westernized education, missionaries were drafted into the service of the government education, and earnest Christian teachers have been employed by the government in its own schools.

Again, the missionary has been a pioneer in the relief of physical suffering. Even today China probably is the scene of more unnecessary physical suffering than any other equal area on the globe. Every since the days of Dr. Peter Parker, who nearly eighty years ago opened a hospital in Canton and within less than two years had treated more than nineteen hundred eye patients, the medical missionary has done much to remove prejudice, to commend western science and the Christianity that is taught and lived by the missionary physician, and to open the doors to other uplifting influences. From these small beginnings the work has grown until now there are reported more than three hundred medical missionaries, of whom nearly one-third are women, who have charge of 235 hospitals and two hundred dispensaries. The number of in-patients during the last year for which we have reports was more than 50,000 and the number of out-patients one and a quarter million. Not content with this, the physician has added to his other multifarious duties that of training Chinese men,—and women too,—as nurses and physicians. The finest medical school in China, located at Peking and patronized by the government, is under missionary auspices, and there are developing in other provinces similar advanced schools. The more elementary schools are also rendering noble service and there are many Chinese physicians who are proud to advertise the fact that they studied under a beloved and honored Christian doctor. There are some six hundred Chinese thus being trained as physicians and nurses in some eighty classes or schools. In these days the number of highly trained Chinese physicians is increasing, but the number is still so small that there is great need for further enlarging the Christian medical forces connected with the missions.

The first insane asylum in China was opened by a missionary, and a hundred opium refuges, some twenty leper hospitals and asylums, and institutions for the blind are other closely allied branches of Christian service conducted by missionaries. The maintenance of orphanages and the work of famine relief exhibit to the Chinese the humanitarian aspect of our western civilization. The Chinese have been stimulated to open hospitals of their own, either with western or with Chinese medical treatment. All this has done much to increase the humaneness of Chinese life and take away the feeling of helplessness on the part of sufferers. It need hardly be added that the missionary physicians did yeoman service with the Chinese physicians during the scourge of pneumonic plague in Manchuria in the winter of 1911.

Still a third line of missionary work is that of the press. Not only have the missionaries taught western science, history, and philosophy, but they were pioneers in publishing in Chinese not only religious works but also scientific books, translated or original. Text-books for schools and colleges, up-to-date medical works and books on such subjects as economics and international law have been produced by the missionary. The great Commercial Press of Shanghai, which is the largest printing establishment in Asia, employing more than one thousand hands with a capital of \$1,000,000 and net annual profits of \$200,000 Mexican, was started by Christian Chinese, who were trained in a mission press. Their business is conducted on advanced principles with profit sharing and welfare work. This press is producing the books for the new schools of China and is printing translations of the best western works. One object of this literary activity by missionaries is to reach those who are not otherwise directly reached. This object has been behind such efforts as that of Dr. Gilbert Reid and his International Institute, of a British missionary like Mr. White-wright of Shantung and his museum, which was visited in 1909 by 215,000 people of whom more than a thousand were officials, and of the scientific work carried on by the Y. M.

C. A. in various parts of China. In these ways, those ordinarily beyond the range of foreign influence are interested in western science.

Still further, through what might be called the primary work of the missionary, viz., the gathering of Christian churches, the missionary, both directly and indirectly, is a channel through which western influence reaches the people. The Roman Catholic Church reports more than 1,350,000 Chinese Christians, while the Protestant figures show a Christian community of about 325,000, with a larger number, perhaps three-quarters of a million, under Christian influence. While no attempt is made to westernize the converts, while every effort, in fact, is made to keep them as thoroughly Chinese in the best sense as possible, yet contact with the missionary and the adoption of Christianity as a religion inevitably gives these people the western point of view in those respects in which western civilization embodies the ideals of Christianity. The Christians stand against opium and gambling, the twin curses of China, insist upon the better treatment of women and the suppression of female infanticide, once so frightfully common, and advocate and practice the unbinding of the feet. Parents often desire their daughters to be married to Christian young men because they will be sure of considerate treatment. Non-Christian Chinese have testified to the higher moral standards among Christians, and the leaders of the Christian Chinese church, pastors, teachers, and physicians, are a body of men of the highest character, combining the best elements of Chinese civilization with the best elements derived from the West. For years the requirement that officials and teachers in government schools should be present and share in periodic ceremonies which Christians felt themselves unable for conscientious reasons to countenance, excluded them from public life, but now they have come to the front. Dr. Sun Yat Sen, the first provisional president, and General Li, commander in chief of the army of the revolution and first provisional vice president of the Republic, are among the Chinese Christians who have taken the lead in establishing a new government that embodies west-

ern political ideals. When the Province of Fukien went over to the revolutionists, the government was intrusted to eight commissions, the presidents of four being Christians. The commissioner of education for Kwangtung province is a Christian professor in the Canton Christian College. It has been stated that three-fourths of the leaders of the revolution were either Christians or favorable to Christianity. While not personally a Christian, President Yuan Shih Kai is favorable to Christianity, has had his family educated in Christian schools, and took early occasion to declare that the new constitution would grant the Chinese freedom of religion and of worship. This is included in Article VI, Chapter VI of the provisional republican constitution.

These are some of the results in China of western influence. We pass now to consider more briefly the remaining points.

II. WHAT WESTERN INFLUENCE SHOULD NOT DESTROY

No nation could have gone calmly on its way as China has done while Egypt, Assyria, Babylon, Persia, Greece, Rome, and all the medieval powers waxed, waned and disappeared, unless it possessed strong characteristics. A nation that has such sources of strength must never allow itself to be deprived of them, and the West must not seek their destruction.

Note, for example, the high ethical code. Whatever may be said of the practical morality of China, there is no denying that as a system of ethics Confucianism ranks next to Christianity. Practically all the Christian precepts are found there, and, unlike western philosophers who have sought to deduce their ethical systems from some abstract conception, Confucius rested his upon the relations which each individual sustains to those about, above, and below him.

One of the fruits of Confucianism has been family solidarity. It is true that this has been carried to extremes to the partial atrophy of initiative and of the sense of personal responsibility, but this loyalty to ancestors and relatives is one of the corner stones upon which Chinese civilization

has rested. With the population pressing as it does and as it must continue to do upon the means of subsistence and with the lack of surplus land, this is an element that must be preserved. It would be a calamity if the spirit of extreme individualism that has been characteristic of the West should ever come to prevail in China.

Closely connected with this fact is another, the ability of the Chinese to cooperate. While the typical Chinese has difficulty in standing or acting alone, his capacity for working with his fellows means that large undertakings will be possible as soon as public spirit, absolute integrity, and enlightened leadership are to be found. In family, social, business, and religious affairs the Chinese are able to cooperate effectively. Note the system of markets with ramifications throughout the country, the power of guilds in commercial life and the family solidarity already alluded to, if you would understand this strong asset in Chinese character.

The Chinese, above all other peoples, have honored scholarship. It makes no difference that we smile at the old *literati* who found themselves unprepared to fit into modern China. The fact is that China accorded its highest honors only to the men who had proved by competitive examination that they were possessed of the best education that China could furnish. Change the type of training required, but preserve irrevocably the principle that only properly trained and prepared men should occupy public office, and China will have a civil service that cannot be excelled.

Finally, there is one element in the political genius of China that should never be superseded. The absolutism is doomed, but the democratic basis, which meant that local officials were practically chosen by the local communities, and that each district was governed in a manner suited to its genius and its conditions, is that upon which alone an enduring republic can be built.

The patient industry of the people, their uncomplaining endurance of conditions that are inevitable, their tenacity in holding to that which has proved itself useful, their ability to assimilate extraneous elements, and their recently

demonstrated ability to adopt and adapt new methods, are other elements of Chinese character that should not be destroyed.

III. WHERE CHINA CAN LEARN FROM THE WEST

While China has important elements that should be preserved at all hazards and can teach the West many a lesson of importance, it is equally true that in many points China can learn from the West.

It is necessary that the individual should count for more in the new China. We of the West have cultivated the individual and have lost much of family and community solidarity. China, on the other hand, has so developed corporate responsibility as to sacrifice the individual. Take this instance: A man and his wife committed the awful crime of flogging the man's mother. The result: the pair, flayed alive; the grand uncle, uncle, two elder brothers and the head of the clan, executed; the neighbors, the woman's father, the head representative of the literary degree held by the man, flogged and banished; the prefect and district ruler, degraded; and the child of the criminals, given another name. The patriarchal family keeps the sons in tutelage until they have lost initiative. The man of ability, by the help of his family, may rise, but the ordinary individual counts for little, and hundreds are permitted to perish on public works or in time of famine and flood without compunction. Slavery has prevailed among farm laborers and the sale of women and girls has excited no comment, especially during famines. Here is a point where Chinese customs may be wisely modified in western directions. Education has been provided for an increasing number of boys and girls. This must continue until all the people of China are made literate and increasingly intelligent. This applies to the women as well as to the men. Other needs are the actual abolition of slavery and such modification of the family system as shall develop in the child progressiveness, adaptability and efficiency. China has proved that it is easier to issue reform decrees than it is to secure radical

social or political changes. This can gradually be overcome through increased education and the giving of opportunity to individuals.

On the political side, China needs more public spirit and more nationalism, in contrast to provincialism. Very encouraging signs of this are appearing. Many of the reform party have exhibited just this spirit, but the rank and file of office holders have not yet risen to this point. The gradual and often rapid deterioration in public works, such as roads, canals, and even railways, not to mention temples and other public buildings, is due to a lack of public spirit that bodes ill for the future. The Chinese desire to be let alone and not be called upon to sacrifice much even for the general good. The same spirit carried into another realm leads to provincialism. The Manchus rigidly enforced the rule that an official should never serve in his native province. This was done to lessen the possibilities of disintegration—and of graft, also,—that might result from an official's being among his own people. The reported repeal of this rule by the new government raises the question as to whether the national spirit among the officials as a body is yet strong enough to justify this change.

Closely allied to this need is that of strengthening the central government. The late government made an earnest effort to stop the use of opium, which was weakening the country. As a part of this campaign it attempted to suppress the cultivation of the poppy. Its success in this endeavor far surpassed all expectations. With a change in government, however, and the weakening of control from Peking, has come a serious reaction, and fields have again blazed with the poppy where last year wheat was growing. The reform of the currency, an imperative need if China is to become a great commercial nation, is hindered by provincial jealousies and especially by the possibilities of graft and squeeze that the antiquated system, or lack of system, puts within the grasp of provincial officials. Railway construction is halted by provincial jealousy. The rivers are becoming a source of constantly increasing danger, and the canals are becoming less serviceable because there is no

strong hand to insist upon repairs. It is feasible to control the rivers and check the awful destruction of life and property which now recurs at ever shorter intervals, but it needs an efficient central government to do it.

Again, China needs a civil service equal to that of Great Britain at home and in her colonies, or even as good as that of the United States, imperfect as that is. Under the old system, graft was all but universal. Offices were bought and the officials were expected to live on impossible salaries with the understanding that all deficiencies could be wrung from the people or taken from the taxes at the expense of the central government. One of the chief causes of the revolution was this official corruption, but the habit of squeeze is so ingrained in the Chinese that it will be a hard struggle to raise the tone of the civil service to where it must be if China is to secure the funds she needs for her development. It is not only incorruptible officials that are needed, but also efficient men who can execute as well as plan. The weakness of the new system of education has been the impossibility of securing a sufficient number of well-trained teachers to man the schools. China must learn that adequate results cannot be secured from the expenditure of adequate funds, unless these are administered by well trained men. One of the encouraging things about the new régime is the appointment of competent foreign advisers, men who know the needs of the country, understand the difficulties of the problem and bring to bear upon its solution the results of generations of western experience.

Most important of all, China must be willing to learn and adopt what is best in western experience and civilization. The Chinese has every reason to be proud of his nation; no person in the world more so. The Chinese has every reason to feel sensitive because of the treatment accorded by other nations; treatment that no self-respecting nation could fail to resent. But the Chinese must recognize, as the new leaders willingly do, that times have changed and that if China is to assume the place that is hers by right of history and inherent and demonstrated capacity, she must willingly learn from her younger but more aggressive

rivals of the West. And when she seeks to learn from us, she must be quick to discern the things of real value. I have seen in Chinese schools most elaborate collections of scientific apparatus, larger than most American schools can boast, but they were useless because the teachers could not use them to advantage. Railways, factories, schools, westernized political institutions are necessary and good, but the Japanese have learned to their sorrow that the material elements of civilization are not enough, and they are now seeking to discover the secret of true greatness and permanence. China bids fair to be spared some of this disillusionment because so many of the leaders have adopted the very heart of western civilization in its ethical aspects, and have grafted it upon the old but rather fruitless stock of Confucian civilization.

This leads naturally to the last point.

IV. HOW THE WEST CAN BE MOST HELPFUL

The most fundamental thing is this. The West must be willing to treat China as an equal just as rapidly as she demonstrates her worthiness of such treatment. The attitude of the Chinese up to within a generation was one of proud superciliousness. The government regarded all the rest of the world as barbarians. It was even claimed that what civilization the West possessed was derived from China. The West resented this attitude, and rightly so, and compelled China, at the mouth of the canon, to change, and then the western nations adopted a somewhat similar attitude. They forced China to open her ports, prescribed her customs duties, secured foreign supervision of the customs, insisted that coast and inland trade might be carried on by vessels flying foreign flags, boldly plotted the dismemberment of the empire, and even now in certain quarters are seeking to prevent China from strengthening her control of her outlying territory. The pathetic thing is that many of these acts were really in the interest of China. Nor is that all. The western people have thought C good field for exploitation and in matters of conce

not always played fair. The Chinese have been excluded from our country and maltreated here and elsewhere. The Chinese coolie trade while it lasted was only an improvement upon the old African slave trade. The white man almost unconsciously and automatically assumes an attitude of proud superiority to the Chinese in China or the West. A good expression of what many persons feel was the address from President Tyler to the Emperor of China, written in 1843, which was so patronizing in its tone that an American can hardly read it now without blushing for the honor of his country. As the people and nations of the West have come to know the Chinese better, their attitude has improved, but yet there is enough left to make difficult the most cordial relations between China and her western sisters, and this lack of cordiality detracts from the influence that the West might easily wield. Especially in these days, when the new government is gradually but successfully solving the almost insoluble problems which confronted it, it is time to give tangible evidence of a sympathy with the efforts of the Chinese to prepare themselves for entrance as self-respecting partners into the family of nations. The threat of territorial aggrandizement, the insistence upon very onerous conditions in financial transactions, make the task of China almost unbearably hard. It almost forces her to devote to military purposes a large sum of money, every cent of which is needed for education, the improvement of roads and waterways, the building of railways, the development of resources, and the improvement of administration. The powers should do more than merely cease their threats. One of the inducements for Japan to improve its civil and judicial administration was the desire to get into a position where it might properly demand that the foreign powers abandon the right of extra-territoriality. It was a proud day for Japan when it ceased to be an inferior state like Turkey, and could look the whole world in the face as a recognized equal of the western powers. The Chinese are likewise affronted by the fact that they have no jurisdiction over foreigners. No one can blame the powers for being unwilling to intrust their people to the old corrupt courts

of China, with their barbarous penalties, their torture, and the like. Just as soon, however, as China has proved her willingness and her ability to secure justice for all resident within her borders, then the powers should relieve China from wearing the badge of inferiority. A similar position should be taken with regard to foreign supervision of revenue and expenditure. A certain amount of supervision is probably necessary for the sake of China itself, but it should be reduced to a minimum, and should disappear as rapidly as is compatible with safety.

Another way in which western influence may be made more helpful is by improving the example that the western nations set China and the way in which the Chinese are received and treated in the West. Our civilization is often brought into disrepute by its toleration of elements that are anything but praiseworthy. Many a foreigner, including Chinese, has visited this country, seen the darker side of our civilization, and either been corrupted or disgusted thereby. Such a man returns to decry the boasted superiority of the West or to exert a positively evil influence. Aggressive and successful efforts to remove the moral and social blots upon our western civilization will do much to commend it to others. If Chinese residents and visitors are treated in a just and brotherly manner and are given the opportunity of seeing the best sides of our western life, it will do much to commend western civilization to the Chinese and will furnish both incentive and direction for improving the conditions in China.

The West can also assist China by enlarging the educational, medical, and philanthropic activities conducted by Christian agencies in that country. While the new government and the people, moved by the spirit of the new era, will do much along these lines, these are points at which the people of the West can give material assistance. Experience elsewhere proves the value even to government education of the presence and the competition of efficient, well-staffed and equipped Christian schools, which can accomplish more in the way of character building than is possible in government schools. They can train leaders,

whether avowed Christians or not, who can contribute an element of upright, disinterested and self-sacrificing service that the secular institution finds it more difficult to secure. By using a certain number of western teachers, they can give the students a sanity and breadth of view and an appreciation of the difficulty and slowness of social development, that is next to impossible in a school none of the staff of which have a background of centuries of struggle with just these problems. This means that the Christian forces should deliberately direct their energies to the training, not only of distinctly religious workers, but also of Christian leaders in the industrial, commercial, yes, and the political life of the new China. There is a chance, also, by sending out more doctors to assist the small but increasing number of well trained Chinese physicians, who for many years will be unable to overtake the physical needs of 400,000,000 people living under poor sanitary conditions. Then, too, the Christian physician can minister to the mental and spiritual needs of these people and bring to them a comfort and inspiration that is beyond the power of the non-Christian doctor, however competent he may be professionally. In the realm of Christian philanthropy there is a further opportunity. The call upon the spirit of brotherliness that arises from the poverty and squalor of millions of Chinese homes in thousands of villages is beyond the power of the present generation to meet. Experience in India and Japan abundantly testifies to the fact that while the non-Christian can imitate the activities that have been developed in the West under the inspiration of the Christian religion, there is a flavor, an atmosphere about the Christian orphanage, asylum, or settlement that is peculiarly its own, and that gives it a success beyond the reach of the non-Christian. A tree is known by its fruits, but we have not yet learned to produce the fruit apart from the tree.

This leads naturally to the declaration of my belief that one of the greatest services the West can render to the new China is by the more vigorous effort to develop a self-supporting and self-directing Chinese church. It has already been noted that a goodly proportion of the leaders of the

revolution in China are Christians and those who have adopted Christian ideals. They are seeking to make China a more righteous as well as a more powerful nation. The difficulty with China has not been the lack of a high ethical code. China has been weak, among other reasons, because of the lack of a moral dynamic to make those ideals realizable. A century of Christian work in China has proved beyond a doubt that Christianity can furnish this dynamic. It has changed the lives of thousands and sent them forth to serve their fellow countrymen. China needs many things. Without industrial development, without political reform, without a more general spread of education, the dreams of the new China cannot become actual. Nevertheless, if China gets or is given these things but fails to secure this new ethical power, they will count for little, as Japanese leaders are now coming to realize. It is at this point that the Christian West can make its most valuable contribution to the life of China and through it to the life of the world. The doors are open now; they may later be closed.

We have thus sketched the part that western influence has played in preparing the way for the radical changes that have occurred in China within a twelvemonth. We have noted some of the outstanding points of strength and of weakness in the Chinese people and some of the specific ways in which the West can be most helpful to the new China. It is all summed up in this: China needs the help of a good example and of a spirit of brotherly assistance, especially along ethical lines, as she is seeking to adapt her ancient Confucian civilization to the new environment into which she finds herself plunged, against her own wishes; to the end that the most populous as well as the oldest nation may have her share in the unified development of the human race as it struggles towards the ideal of perfect self-realization through a life of achievement and service.

These words formed part of the admirable address of Judge Kungpah T. King of the Supreme Court of Justice, Peking, at a dinner in his honor in Boston in 1910.

While your complete war equipment and unexcelled facilities for preparing great engines of war are very wonderful, I must say that I am most favorably impressed with your great commercial supremacy, your tremendous natural resources and your great factories which stand as monuments to your national industry. The development of commercial interests between America and China would be mutually beneficial.

America is the natural source of supply in many lines, and proper attention to the development of commercial relations will surely bring about a great increase in trade, to the mutual advantage of both countries.

These quotations may be said to be fairly representative of the sentiment of the leading men of China on this subject.

In view of all our past relations with the Chinese, America may justly claim the title of "China's best friend." American business men have been strangely indifferent to the unparalleled opportunity presented through the gateway of the great Far East. America is the one country from which China does not fear armed invasion, but cordially welcomes invasion of trade and commerce. With this record of fair dealing to our credit, it would seem the height of folly to neglect the great opportunity that confronts us for advantageous occupancy of the field. America, by virtue of her extensive Pacific Coast line is nearest neighbor to the Far East, while the opening of the Panama Canal will afford the manufacturers of the eastern states the opportunity of reaching that part of the world with their products on a very favorable basis.

In considering trade opportunities with a country, many factors must be taken into account. It is as easy to over as to underestimate the extent of these opportunities. Meagerness of information is responsible for false conceptions of conditions. It is, perhaps, not strange that ignorance of true conditions is so prevalent, in view of the vast amount of misinformation and misrepresentation that has been spread broadcast by ill-informed, narrow-minded, in-

We hear much of the slowness of the Chinese, but in view of the startling rapidity of development during the past two years, who will be so rash as to say that trade development will be slow? Less than eighteen months ago Mr. C. D. Jameson, than whom few have had better opportunities of studying actual conditions from the inside, in an article published in the *Outlook*, on "The Future of China," commenced as follows: "To make clear the utter hopelessness of renaissance in the Chinese as a nation until several generations have passed, I must give a slight sketch of Chinese history." And, lo, the unexpected has happened, the oldest monarchy of the world has crumbled to dust and a republic has been firmly established, while the whole world looked on amazed.

Now some would-be prophets are predicting slow commercial development. In the light of former mistakes, these prophecies seem rather presumptuous. The natural resources of a country have a most important bearing on its commercial activity. These resources of China are almost wholly undeveloped. Her vast mineral deposits have scarcely been touched. A single province is estimated to have a world's supply of coal for a thousand years and coal exists in at least fifteen provinces. The present annual output of the mines is upwards of 10,000,000 tons. There is a great abundance of iron, and the manufacture of steel and iron products has already assumed quite large proportions. Pig iron is now being shipped to the United States in considerable quantity. The precious metals are being produced in ever-increasing quantities, adding greatly to the purchasing power of the country.

The agricultural productiveness is large and if proposed plans for a comprehensive system of protective dikes is carried out, will be greatly increased.

A trade that is largely one-sided is not likely to assume large proportions, and nations wishing to transact a large business with each other must each be prepared to give and take. As we increase our purchases of China's products, so will she buy more largely from us. In this connection it is well to point out the fact that a large proportion of the ship-

ments to this country from China are made through foreign firms and nearly all come in foreign ships. This is very detrimental to American prestige. In view of the approaching opening of the Panama Canal, it behooves Americans to awake to the importance of rehabilitating our merchant marine, not simply for the profit arising from the carrying trade, but as a means of building up our foreign commerce, especially in the Far East.

In this connection the following table giving the nationality and tonnage of the various steamers entered and cleared at Shanghai in 1910 and 1911 will prove illuminating, if not pleasing:

NATIONALITY	1910		1911	
	Number	Tons	Number	Tons
American.....	135	475,628	107	454,467
Austrian.....	48	190,120	48	192,824
British.....	3,899	7,097,783	4,112	7,311,167
Danish.....	66	81,669	80	103,096
Dutch.....	31	72,998	47	113,608
French.....	628	1,207,959	338	747,229
German.....	779	1,621,977	694	1,600,051
Japanese.....	3,962	3,453,652	3,853	3,986,523
Norwegian.....	244	237,151	307	295,551
Russian.....	142	277,988	148	266,950
Swedish.....	22	50,924	14	34,752
Chinese.....	5,352	2,910,707	5,056	3,073,254
Total.....	15,308	17,678,556	14,804	18,179,472

Again, taking the statistics of the great interior port of Hankow, the number of steamers entering the port in 1911 was 1833, with an aggregate tonnage of 2,220,402 tons. British ships led with 959,284 tons, with Japan second with 670,873 tons. German, French, Russian, Danish, American and Norwegian shipping followed in the order named. America's total was 7376 tons!

Those of us who have had the opportunity of studying the situation in European countries are only too well aware of the great preparations that are being made and the extensive work now in progress to secure for them commercial

supremacy in China. Which of the great countries of the world shall most largely profit by the increasing foreign trade of China will depend largely upon the relative activity, intelligence and perseverance of the manufacturers, exporters and business organizations of these countries at the present time and in the immediate future. What shall be the part of the American business man in this development? What, indeed, shall be the part of the great American nation therein? We hear much these days, often in derision, of "dollar diplomacy." We are really only children learning the a,b,c's of the game. For real "dollar diplomacy" let us look to Germany, the country which by intelligent study of conditions, the careful training of men, and the lavish expenditure of money has built up a great foreign commerce that is bringing to her wealth and a great world influence. Under the auspices of the German government large numbers of young men are taught the languages of foreign countries to which they are subsequently sent as missionaries of commerce. The recent activity of our government through its consular and diplomatic agents in coöperating with commercial organizations in developing and extending our trade with foreign countries is greatly to be commended.

In considering trade relations with the Chinese it should be borne in mind that they recognize as their ideal the highest standard of business honor. It is probable that of no other people is this so true, and it should prove a strong incentive to the extension of our commercial relations with them. To quote again from Mr. Jameson:

No people are commercially more honest or have a more exalted idea of the sacredness of a contract—either written, verbal, or merely implied—than the Chinese merchant, banker or contractor of any kind, unless contaminated by dealings with unreliable foreign *hongs* at the open ports. The non-official word of a Chinese is usually as good as his bond, and his bond is as good as the wealth of his family. In fifteen years of dealing with Chinese merchants and contractors of all sorts I have never found them maliciously doing work contrary to the specifications or attempting to break their contract even if it was a losing one for them.

During the past year, as was to be expected, there was a considerable decrease in the volume of foreign trade in cen-

tral and southern China, the districts most seriously affected by the revolutionary movement. Recent reports, however, indicate a present practically normal resumption of shipments. While in the Manchurian, Chihlian and Shantung ports there was a considerable increase in the volume of foreign trade, in the Yangtse ports, where the most severe fighting occurred, there was a great decrease in business. In the seventeen southern ports tributary to Hongkong, the comparative figures of 1910 and 1911 were as follows:

	YEAR	AMOUNT
Net foreign commerce.....	1910	\$97,647,378
	1911	84,439,949
Net native imports.....	1910	39,173,035
	1911	33,199,810
Exports abroad and to native ports.....	1910	83,015,314
	1911	80,424,000

The chief loss during the period accordingly came in imports of foreign goods and to a considerable extent represented cancellation of foreign orders. The more serious loss in exports later, came in January and February 1912.

In view of the recent disturbed condition of the country trade statistics do not possess the face value that they otherwise would, and need careful analysis in order that their true significance may be understood. In many lines, such for example as piece-goods, American drill, flannels, jeans, sheetings, shirtings, etc., the markets became seriously congested because of the stoppage of orders as a result of the revolutionary disturbances, but the finely organized coöperative trade guilds made it possible to carry these enormous stocks without serious resultant financial disturbance, and there is now renewed activity all along the line. The accumulated stocks having been finally disposed of there is every prospect of a resumption of trade in large volume. Recent reports indicate a rapid change in the attire of the Chinese and the adoption of western styles. So marked is this movement that it is reported that sewing machines cannot

be imported rapidly enough to satisfy the demand. There is also a lively demand for fabrics of various kinds, particularly the cheaper qualities of woollen and cotton goods.

Organization and coöperation are necessary factors in the successful introduction of American goods. As an example of the efficient and effective organization for trade in China we may cite the Standard Oil Company, with its constantly expanding trade, especially in the interior districts. A system of coöperation that would build up a similar organization to handle American cotton goods and other sundries would go far toward solving the problems of American export trade.

A comparison of the exports of cotton piece goods for the past four years from the United Kingdom and the United States to China and Hongkong follows. The British figures are for calendar years, while the American are for fiscal years ended June 30:

	1909	1910	1911	1912
United Kingdom:				
Yards.....	572,443,000	471,334,200	647,449,700	527,636,800
Value.....	\$35,593,313	\$35,383,266	\$48,027,011	\$39,445,896
United States:				
Yards.....	121,562,469	93,397,596	78,585,021	101,260,519
Value.....	\$7,057,224	\$5,696,010	\$5,183,900	\$7,192,344

With the starting of factories there is also a great demand for machinery of all kinds. With this in view what should be the attitude of the American manufacturer and exporter in the matter? How shall he proceed to take advantage of the situation and develop an export trade with China?

Comparative statements of the years 1910 and 1911 of the import and export trade of leading trade centres have recently been received through consular channels. These are too elaborate for incorporation in full in a paper of this scope, but some excerpts from them may prove interesting and enlightening.

Shanghai is, of course, far ahead of other ports in the matter of imports and exports. It is interesting to note notwithstanding the serious effect of the revolution

during the latter part of 1911, the gross value of the merchandise arriving and departing, according to the report of the national maritime customs, amounted to \$314,731,444, an increase of \$3,824,174 over 1910, and constituting a record.

The following table gives the gross and net trade of Shanghai in 1910 and 1911:

ARTICLES	1910	1911
Opium, cwt.....	7,006	2,120
Cotton manufactures:		
Piece goods, pieces.....	345,268	743,847
Towels, dozen.....	34,696	8,468
Yarns and waste, cwt.....	10,124	518,451
Nankeens, cwt.....	113,505	113,030
Woolen and cotton mixtures, yards.....	44,705	31,918
Antimony and ore, cwt.....	117,083	130,317
Pig iron, cwt.....	386,976	460,765
Arms and munitions of war, value.....		\$222,301
Bags, gunny, pieces.....	1,540,518	2,954,295
Bean cake, cwt.....	1,146,441	1,711,469
Beans, cwt.....	2,152,374	2,106,737
Bran, cwt.....	455,412	474,141
Cotton, raw and waste, cwt.....	1,738,208	1,108,138
Curios, value.....	\$290,381	\$351,256
Eggs:		
Albumen and yolk, cwt.....	138,524	136,882
Fresh, pieces.....	117,833,678	88,365,977
Preserved, pieces.....	8,396,208	7,531,415
Salted, pieces.....	704,350	773,580
Fiber, ramie, cwt.....	266,490	223,026
Flour, cwt.....	1,669,017	955,270
Groundnut cake and pulp, cwt.....	471,591	470,054
Groundnuts, cwt.....	190,077	271,240
Human hair, ctw.....	16,524	10,270
Hats, number.....	4,343,581	5,028,375
Medicines, value.....	\$1,351,647	\$1,268,202
Oils		
Bean, cwt.....	154,996	214,088
Cottonseed, cwt.....	69,876	44,312
Groundnut, cwt.....	361,008	380,253
Rape, cwt.....	18,130	16,345
Sesamum, cwt.....	4,950	7,122
Tea, cwt.....	14,761	19,048
Wood, cwt.....	540,340	460,534
Pearls, real, value.....	\$4,361	\$42,959
Rice, cwt.....	2,136,285	3,624,490

ARTICLES	1910	1911
Seed:		
Cotton, cwt.....	283,070	217,980
Sesamum, cwt.....	2,846,996	2,078,476
Seedcake, cwt.....	1,550,360	1,424,332
Shoes and boots, silk and cotton, pairs....	158,942	196,094
Silk:		
Raw, spun, cocoons, waste, etc., cwt....	282,844	285,606
Piece goods, cwt.....	18,707	17,702
Pongees, cwt.....	14,472	11,958
Skins:		
Goat, pieces.....	8,894,333	7,699,309
Lamb, pieces.....	707,136	441,173
Sheep, pieces.....	320,871	235,697
Weasel, pieces.....	881,133	706,874
Straw braid, cwt.....	101,408	83,114
Sugar, cwt.....	293,187	337,690
Tea, cwt.....	628,162	636,780
Tobacco, leaf and prepared, cwt.....	216,500	162,968
Varnish, cwt.....	20,047	20,465
Wheat, cwt.....	74,894	38,308
Wool, sheeps, cwt.....	242,501	395,282

The exports from Shanghai to the United States decreased from \$14,669,206 in 1910 to \$12,878,281 in 1911.

The following table gives the value of the principal articles thus exported:

ARTICLES	1910	1911
Albumen.....	\$143,493	\$226,061
Antimony.....		3,473
Books, Chinese.....	1,699	2,520
Brass ware.....	1,233	1,086
Bristles.....	34,016	49,014
Camphor.....	47,317	
Chairs, rattan.....		2,271
Chinaware.....	4,172	27,589
Coal.....	9,773	
Coke.....	12,368	20,710
Cotton, raw.....	513,633	298,290
Cottonseed cake.....	2,324	
Curios.....	5,322	14,523
Eggs and egg yolk.....	2,096	4,205
Feathers.....	13,713	31,041
Fibers, China grass.....	5,781	12,793
Furs, dressed.....	50,599	15,468

ARTICLES	1910	1911
Hair:		
Animal.....	1,086	
Human.....	46,621	27,500
Hats:		
Raffia.....		554
Rush.....	21,685	25,080
Straw.....	2,251	26,288
Wood-shaving.....	809	39,303
Hides, cow and calf.....	288,018	65,660
Hog products.....		2,327
Household and personal effects.....	10,454	23,370
Iron, pig.....	91,788	26,471
Jade.....		20,789
Musk.....	55,516	223,021
Nuts:		
Gall.....	7,381	23,192
Ground.....	43,194	3,360
Pea.....		5,355
Walnuts.....	16,762	91,072
Oils:		
Bean.....	110,258	127,174
Cottonseed.....	144,558	169,778
Rapeseed.....	5,247	11,433
Vegetable.....	17,108	
Wood.....	16,978	39,488
Ramie.....	6,764	
Rhubarb.....	20,713	14,246
Silk:		
Cocoons, pierced.....	9,052	
Piece goods.....	457	2,038
Pongees.....	63,966	11,458
Silk:		
Raw.....	6,897,922	6,970,067
Tussah.....		14,764
Waste.....	157,810	118,431
Wild.....	548,741	373,774
Manufactures, n.e.s.....	1,127	1,260
Skins:		
Dog mats.....	42,292	71,731
Dog robes.....	36,894	7,837
Goat.....	1,633,133	1,021,187
Lamb.....	56,987	42,599
Leopard.....	13,637	663
Sheep.....		43,222
Tiger.....	10,627	
Weasel.....	131,811	18,811
Other.....	36,751	2,157

ARTICLES	1910	1911
Straw braid.....	611,575	431,225
Tallow.....	10,067	51
Tea.....	2,144,881	1,352,033
Wool.....	491,743	751,560
All other articles.....	151,754	42,346
Total.....	\$14,669,206	\$12,878,281

While the foreign trade of Hankow, passing through the maritime customs, makes this port the second in China, in direct foreign trade it stands sixth, although this classification is misleading owing to the fact that of goods shipped to Chinese ports a large share represent shipments for foreign countries.

The reports from Manchuria and ports of Tientsin, Canton, etc., are quite similar to those of Shanghai, and taken as a whole form a mighty argument for increased activity on the part of American firms.

It may be well to briefly point out some of the causes of failure on our part to fully realize our expectations in the volume of business done, and to suggest some improvements in methods. Ignorance and apathy go hand in hand as twin causes of failure to control our rightful share of China's foreign trade, import and export. A systematic study of present conditions and the adoption of methods suitable to meet these conditions is a prerequisite to success.

Ignorance of correct methods and of the fact that business may be successfully conducted without prohibitive expense or great risk, prevents many from entering what would prove a very profitable field, while the fallacy of the sufficiency of the home market for present and future absorption of products blinds many to the great opportunity awaiting them.

Consular reports are of value in furnishing statistics and general information regarding local conditions, but the appointment of special government commercial agents competent to study and report the situation in all its bearings and to make recommendations of real value to the manufacturers of the country, would be a most important and helpful move in the right direction. The great commercial

turing a positive prediction, it may safely be said that it is the general opinion of trade authorities of the world that the present high value of their coinage is but the beginning of an extended period of high exchange which cannot fail of a stimulating effect on her import trade.

Many factors enter into the exchange situation in China in its relation to imports and exports, but it is not the province of this paper to speak of them in detail. Suffice it to say that the question of a suitable currency system that shall bear such relation to the systems of the great commercial countries of the world as to insure something approaching stability and dependability in rates of exchange is being deeply studied by Chinese authorities in such matters, assisted by foreign advisers of recognized ability, and while it may be too much to hope for the speedy bringing of order out of chaos, it is reasonable to expect a continual advance in the direction of ideal conditions.

A strong effort is being made to establish a uniform system of keeping and auditing public accounts, which is sure to have a good effect in reorganizing, systematizing and bringing into being a uniform system of taxation, which is an essential to the upbuilding of a great interprovincial and international trade. One of the chief obstacles to trade extension in China is the almost absolute lack of anything resembling system in the assessment of taxes and *liken* or customs duties. In many instances goods in transit are subjected to repeated assessment en route from province to province and sometimes from town to town, in order to furnish "squeeze" for the officials. This, of course, greatly hampers and limits the extension of trade, and while it is too much to expect that this will immediately be done away with, I am in receipt of recent personal communications from high authorities giving assurance that as a result of study of the situation now being made by native and foreign experts, a change for the better is confidently looked for in the near future. I dwell thus at length on this point because of its important bearing on the foreign trade of the country. The fact that such abuses exist should not deter us from active effort for trade increases, for it

tain that under the new form of government, and as a result of the investigations now in progress, existing conditions will eventually give way to modern and equitable methods of taxation.

A demand for our goods must be created and this cannot be done without the expenditure of money, but a small percentage of the amount expended by the average American manufacturer in securing an outlet for his products in the home market would, if wisely applied, secure for him a foothold in the Chinese market that would have a future value far greater than would result from the expenditure of the same amount at home. If ever American exporters and manufacturers were justified in establishing the agencies which are the primary requirement of trade in China, it is at the present time.

For many reasons the ideal method is the maintenance abroad of one's own office and sales force, but excepting in the case of a few of the largest concerns, this involves prohibitive expense. Another method that is much more extensively employed, and with good results, is the sending of salesmen direct from headquarters. This method may be employed where there is a sufficiently large market for the goods offered, but the only practicable method for the average manufacturer is to place his goods before the prospective customers through the medium of some one of the large importing houses of the country.

And right here is where many of our American concerns make the initial mistake that eventually costs them dearly and not infrequently discourages them and causes them to relinquish the field. The mistake referred to is the placing of agencies with foreign individuals or firms. The usual European custom so familiar to American travelers in Europe of decrying everything American, prevails to an even greater extent amongst the foreign houses in China. They have no good word for Americans or their products, and it is a rare exception where an American is employed by any of these concerns. It is a humiliating spectacle to the American business man traveling in China to find the great majority of American concerns represented by foreigners. These for-

eigners are, if possible, more patriotic in China than at home, and it is too frequently the case the American agencies secured by them are used to advance the sale of competing lines from their own countries. Instances are not lacking where samples of American goods have been sent by these agents, with prices and full particulars, to their home countries to be reproduced there and introduced into China at the expense of the American manufacturer. Nor is this the only unfortunate feature of the practice. It is distinctly detrimental to American prestige in China. In a country where the American flag is almost never seen on the ships of commerce and where American manufacturers are so largely represented by foreign concerns, it is not difficult to understand why our country and its products suffer by comparison with those of some other nations.

There are some representative American houses in China handling American goods, but there is room for more, and American manufacturers should see that their goods are handled by Americans. Too often the eastern branches of American financial and industrial concerns are managed by foreigners or largely manned by them. This is looked upon by the Chinese as a confession of weakness and inferiority on the part of Americans and an acknowledgment of the superior business ability of the foreigner.

From patriotic, no less than business motives, Americans should speedily bring about a change in these conditions and employ Americans only in the exploitation of their goods. It will be a fortunate day for American trade with China when our manufacturers are represented by American houses employing none but Americans in their service, for it is a well-known fact that foreigners seek employment with such concerns for the sole purpose of acquiring inside knowledge of their goods, methods, etc., to be later used to the advantage of their foreign competitors.

Coöperation on the part of American manufacturers of goods in similar lines, but which do not compete, in the establishment of a house for the sale of their respective products would doubtless prove profitable if carried out on a broad scale, with able management and a complete corps of

competent salesmen. In the great interior districts nearly all the trade is in the hands of the native merchants who purchase their goods in the markets of the great ports, and are largely guided in their selections by their correspondents in these distributing centres. Here is another argument for the establishment of distinctly American houses on a scale to create and uphold American prestige. In some of the inland districts there are British, German and French firms engaged in the importation of foreign goods, but no Americans.

We must learn one thing if we are to secure our rightful share of the Chinese business, and that is that we must not be too impatient for immediate profits. Our foreign competitors are willing to plant the seed and carefully nurture the young and growing trade until it is ripe for the harvest, while too many American firms are like the amateur farmer who digs up his seed every day or two to see if they are sprouting.

Again, in order to create and maintain intimate and permanent commercial relations with China, we must acquire the eastern point of view and seek to meet their ideas of their requirements rather than to seek to foist our own upon them.

China purchases each year from foreign countries more than 250 varieties of goods. The United States participates in less than half of these, and ranks third or higher in only 27. This can hardly be said to represent our fair proportion of the trade. It may not be practicable for us to compete with other countries in all these lines, but there are doubtless some in which we do not now participate in which we could secure a portion of the trade, and in the lines in which we are already represented, increased sales would doubtless follow the adoption of vigorous selling methods.

Among the articles which are enjoying an increased demand, with every promise of a rapid and continued increase for many years, may be mentioned the following: Clothing, boots and shoes, cotton and woolen goods, bicycles, clocks and watches, hats, caps, gloves, hosiery, haberdashery and underwear, phonographs, photographic and optical

supplies, lamps, machinery, railway and electrical appliances, automobiles, hardware and building material.

The importance of adequate American banking facilities in China cannot be overestimated. The coöperation of leading financial interests with large business concerns, with branches in Peking, Shanghai, and other large business centres, for the purpose of financing great industrial undertakings, as well as furnishing all material, engineering and construction, is one of the great needs of the day, and one in which Americans are sadly behind their British and German competitors, who have far superior organizations in China, and make a more careful study of the requirements of the market. In Germany, in particular, the banks and manufacturers combine their interests and are thus prepared to secure profitable business by granting longer credits than it is possible for American concerns, to give under existing conditions.

This question of credits enters very vitally into our trade relations with China. It is of the utmost importance that we develop as speedily as possible this coöperation between our financial and industrial concerns, if we are to maintain our rightful position in connection with China's foreign trade.

In connection with railway construction and equipment, electrical and mechanical installations and general construction work, it is of the utmost importance that the representatives on the spot be competent to give intelligent information, specifications and quotations without delay. Many a good contract has been lost to a foreign competitor because of the absence of these requirements on the part of the American representative.

Illustrated catalogues printed in the Chinese language are a necessity in the introduction of many lines of goods, and where prices are quoted, they should always be c.i.f. Shanghai or some other Chinese port, as the people there have no way of ascertaining the cost of transportation from interior cities of the United States.

There should be established at Shanghai and possibly other important trade centres, permanent exhibitions of

ORGANIZATION AND RECENT WORK OF THE CATHOLIC MISSIONS IN CHINA

*By Rev. Father Leo Desmet, for Thirteen Years a Missionary
in Mongolia*

The Chinese Empire is divided into five ecclesiastical regions, and each region is subdivided into vicariates apostolic corresponding to our American dioceses.

Vicariates are presided over by vicars apostolic, who bear the title of bishop, but are directly dependent on the Congregation of the Propaganda in Rome.

The vicars apostolic of each region meet together every five years, to discuss the problems of administration, education and propaganda, and to ensure uniformity of method and discipline in the different vicariates. The result of their deliberations is sent to the Congregation of the Propaganda which appoints a commission to examine the proposed regulations. When approved the rules suggested become law for the missions represented.

ORGANIZATION OF THE VICARIATES

Generally speaking the central organization of each vicariate is at the bishop's residence about which are grouped, as in the early ages, the higher educational institutions, namely the high school, the training school, the seminary.

In these schools the teachers aim to give the pupils a thorough knowledge of Chinese literature so that they may compare favorably with those of the public schools. Through the adoption of modern methods and text books, the pupils learn now-a-days as much Chinese in one year as they formerly did in three.

Outside the Chinese literature the course embraces bible history, church history, apologetics, history of China, geography, mathematics, physics, chemistry, Latin and

French or English. Mathematics, physics and chemistry appeal most strongly to the positive mind of the Chinese, and no punishment is so much dreaded by the pupils, as exclusion from these classes.¹

The best disposed and most intelligent among the students become priests. The others who wish to stay in the service of the mission are sent to the training school where they are educated to be teachers or catechists.

The eloquence, resourcefulness and wit of these catechists is astonishing. Traveling with the missionaries, they were asked questions at night in the inns, concerning the missions, their scope and the reasons of Christian belief. It was a real delight to us to listen to their explanations, with their peculiar Chinese arguments and comparisons. The foundation of numerous conversions was laid by these familiar conversations which often were protracted late into the night.

Candidates for the priesthood have to spend two years on philosophical and three years on theological studies. Before being ordained, they have to work as catechists for one year under the direction of a missionary.

I remember that one day, when the doctor of the French legation in Peking came to my residence to study the bubonic plague, as he did not speak Chinese he held a long conversation in Latin with one of our Chinese priests. He was surprised at the ease with which the latter used that language.

Formerly no school instruction was provided for Chinese girls, except in some wealthy families who hired private teachers. If I am not mistaken the Catholic missionaries were the first to open schools for them. Although instruction was rather elementary, it enabled them to read in their difficult idiom the prayer book, the catechism of Christian doctrine, the bible history and other religious books.

¹ I find in the *Calendrier annuaire* of the Observatory of Zikawei (Shang Hai) twenty pages devoted to the meteorological observations made by the seminarians of Sung shu tsui, tze, East Mongolia: Wind, temperature, atmospheric pressure, rainfall and some special phenomena as rain and snow by clear weather, yellow wind were observed with great accuracy for three years.

To spread that instruction, the bishops have organized training schools for young women where they are taught something of the Chinese classics, and drilled in the principles of Christianity and the methods of presenting it. A great number of these young students become nuns and devote themselves to the care of the orphans, the teaching in girls schools, and the instruction of the new converts of their own sex.

ORGANIZATION INTO DISTRICTS

Each vicariate is divided into districts, at the head of which is one of the more experienced missionaries. He is a consultor of the bishop and inspector of the different parishes; he makes up the statistics, distributes the money for the different works and takes care of the relations with the Chinese authorities. Very often he has to interfere in law suits. By the treaties, the Christians are free from local taxes imposed for purposes of the pagan religion such as building and repairing of pagodas, and holding theatrical performances in thanksgiving to the gods. Around old Christian centers, the non-Christians know and respect this exemption, but in the newer missions they often force the converts to pay these assessments. Should the latter refuse they are subjected to a thousand petty persecutions. The missionary tries first to settle the trouble on the spot, but this is often impossible, and then he must appear in court. On account of the many law-suits thus initiated the dean of the district is alone allowed by the bishop to have official relations with the mandarins. He generally knows the Chinese character well, and is not easily deceived by false reports.

PARISHES

Subdivisions of the district are known as parishes. In these are located a residence for one or more missionaries, a church, a school for boys, one for girls and often an orphanage. In Mongolia the parishes covered a large territory. Mine had an extension of 600 square miles: there lived

CONVERSIONS

A pagan comes to visit a Christian friend; the first thing he remarks is the absence of all images of idols. He hears the family sing their night prayers, is impressed and asks questions. His friend explains his belief and perhaps gives him a book to read. As his interest increases, he requests a more thorough knowledge of the strange religion. A catechist is sent to his home. Attracted by curiosity the men of the village flock around and every evening the teacher has a fair audience. The women in turn become interested, and want to learn more about Christianity. Two Chinese nuns (for they go by two's) are sent to instruct them.

Finally some families decide to embrace the new religion. They study the Christian doctrine and every night led by the teachers sing their prayers. When the instruction is well advanced, the missionary comes, completes the work of the catechists, and confers baptism on the catechumens. In many vicariates it is the rule to test these for two years before admitting them to baptism.

Conversions are also often effected through contact with a Christian family moving into a remote village, where the people never heard much about the Christian religion. They are attracted by the example of Christian life. In such way, a movement of conversions is often started in a region where the Christian religion was hitherto unknown, and brings into the church several thousand souls.

ORPHANAGES

The Chinese do not like female children. The baby girl is often deprived of the mother's milk in favor of an older brother. In the mission where I labored, the pagans did not throw the infant girls away, except in famine years, but poor people often sold them. Husbands in great need even sold their wives. The buyer of the baby girl brings her up to be a wife for his son, when he and she would be of age. Those children have a very hard life, being treated harshly and burdened with work above their strength.

Some parents knowing their little ones would be better treated in the orphanage bring them to the priest's residence. Under the care of Chinese nuns those innocent beings are well cared for, receive a good Christian education, learn cooking, sewing, and clothes-making, and in due time marry Christian young men. A great number of blind and cripple children are saved from abandonment through Christian charity. Strange calumnies are circulated about the orphanages, as for instance that the eyes and the heart of the children are pulled out and sent to Europe to make drugs. I know at least of one instance in which on account of that calumny, the parents starved slowly to death their girl of eight years of age, rather than bring her to the orphanage.

During prosperous years, few children are received, but when the harvest fails, they are brought in great numbers. Two years before my arrival, a great famine occurred in northern Mongolia. There had been no harvest for two years; on every road people lay dying of starvation. That year 250 children were received in one orphanage, and saved from starvation. When the missionary told me of the anguish he had passed through, not having the resources to save more people, I did not wonder that his face had become wrinkled and his hair white.²

QUALITY OF THE CONVERSIONS

The converts retain after their conversion some of their racial defects, but they acquire a greater sense of freedom, they favor western civilization, they understand the deficiency of their own culture; they have a strong faith, a great love of their religion, and are loyally attached to the missionaries.

During the Boxer uprising, in my parish, forty-two women and children were burned alive in a chapel, rather than give up their faith.

² A certain superstition prevents the parents from letting the children die in the house. A little before death they take them outside. Neither do they bury the small children. They wrap them in a piece of mat and leave them in a secluded place outside the village. Many times I saw a dog or a pig eating the tiny corpses. It is to be hoped that the new ideas will rapidly change this and other strange customs.

Forty more of my people surrounded by the boxers were asked to deny their faith, and on their refusal, were slaughtered in cool blood.

While we were besieged, during an armistice, the Boxers promised immunity to the Christians, if they would only deliver to them the two European priests. I told my men that if they thought it would do them any good, we were ready to die. They answered: Father, we promised to stay with you for life or death, we will stand by what we said and the battle went on.

A review of the Catholic missions would not be complete without statistics:

The latest I could find about the Catholic schools, was Krose's *Katolischen Missionen statistik* which gives in 1907 4857 schools with 118,013 pupils male and female.

In 1909 there were in China, 1,210,054 Catholics, 45 bishops, 1424 European and 631 native priests, 1215 seminarians, 229 European and 130 native lay brothers, 558 European sisters and several thousand Chinese nuns, 13,000 mission places, 8500 churches, chapels and oratories, 400 orphanages with about 24,000 pupils, and 600 dispensaries, hospitals and homes for old people (Cf. *Herder's Konversation lexikon: Supplement 1911.*) The *Calendrier annuaire* of the Observatory of Zi-ka-wei (Shanghai), 1912, gives for 1910-11: Number of bishops, 49; European priests, 1426; native priests, 627; number of Catholics, 1,363,697. That publication is very reliable.

RESOURCES

Considering the small resources of the Catholic missions this seems a satisfactory result. In east Mongolia in 1906 we received from the Society of the Propagation of the Faith about 14,000 francs not quite \$3000. If we assume that the missionaries receive \$3000 more through their friends and relatives, that would make \$6000 to provide for 48 priests, 3 boarding schools, 15 residences, 66 schools, and a number of catechists. The Christians being generally poor, contribute very little. The possibility of keeping up these various works, can only be explained by the fact

that the cost of living is very low and that the missionaries not only receive no salary, but contribute to the work all the gifts made to them personally.

The great need of the day in China are higher educational institutions. The lack of resources alone prevents their foundation in every vicariate. Catholic high schools or colleges are established in Zi-Ka-wei; Shang-hai, Canton, Hong-kong, Tien-tsin, Pekin, Nan-kin, and even in Mongolia, for Christians and non-Christians, but they are too few. The Protestant missions are far ahead in that line of equipment. They have five modern educational institutions to every Catholic one. These schools are the best means of injecting some Christian spirit into the reform movement that pervades China.

The need of that spirit is apparent to all students of Chinese history. That great nation whose people are sturdy, intelligent, laborious, sober and patient and have so many great qualities, was ever held together by fear and torture. It passed through more bloody revolutions than any other country, and a spirit of anarchy is latent among the people, ready to explode any time. Indeed during the nineteenth century, I count thirteen uprisings and rebellions in comparison with which the revolutions of Christian nations look like child's play, in which more lives were lost than was the entire population of Europe in 1870. During the Taiping rebellion 20,000,000 people perished in the one province of Kiang-su. During the Tch'ang-mao-tze rebellion, Marshall Seng after crushing the rebels on the battlefield, pacified the south of the province of Cheh-lih by beheading 100,000 men. Piracy and robbery are always practiced on a great scale, and the idea the people have of their morality is rather strange.

To put it in Chinese terms: Robbery, etc. Robbery for them is a very good business giving easy and big interest, but done with a big principal! One's head is the principal. In 1901 in a small town of Mongolia 280 robbers lost that principal in one row, after first seeing their chief ironed to death with red-hot flat irons.

Those facts should give some matter for reflection to those who exalt the Chinese civilization, without seeing its shortcomings, and deny the need of missionary work among them.

Viewing that work merely from the political and utilitarian standpoint, may we not reasonably conjecture that if ever, as seems quite possible, the yellow race should put his myriads against the armies of the white man, the Christian spirit infused even in the non-Christians by the work of the missionaries will serve to allay inter-racial bitterness, and the Chinese Christians will easily induce their fellow countrymen to trust the Christian nations, and enter into friendly relations with them. Is it not quite possible that the work of the missionaries may some day preserve from torture and slaughter the grandchildren of their critics?

This view partly answers the question sometimes asked: Is the vast expenditure of money and energy for the conversion of the Chinese really worth the while?

Looking at it from a religious standpoint, the Catholic believes that the saving of one soul would more than compensate for the entire outlay by Catholics and Protestants alike.

Progress in the work has been slow, first on account of the natural apathy of the Chinese people towards religious questions; Secondly on account of the frequent persecutions against the Christians, and the destruction of their lives and property in political disturbances and rebellions; thirdly on account of the prejudices aroused against the Christian religion by the greed of the western nations for Chinese territory and resources, the missionaries being much against their will implicated by some of the powers, and so being regarded as agents of the foreign aggressors; fourthly on account of the divisions of christendom, which the Chinese are not slow to note.

Notwithstanding all these obstacles, the outlook is fairly bright. Since the Boxer uprising, the conversions have enormously increased, and now that the educated among the Chinese are all eager for western methods and western culture, now that the spirit of civil and religious free

has conquered China, the missionaries will try to reap a big harvest of souls, and to instill into the nation at least a leaven of Catholicism. It is true, as long as the Catholics in China depend on foreign countries for their priests and resources, Catholicism cannot expect to take hold of any large part of the Chinese people, but it is the earnest desire of all concerned to see as soon as possible the Catholic Church in China presided over by native bishops ministered to by native priests and sustained by her own resources.

NOTES FROM THE PHILIPPINES

By James A. Robertson, L.H.D., Librarian of the Philippine Library, Manila, P. I.

Considered with relation to race development, the Philippine Islands offer at the present time one of the most interesting and valuable fields of study in the world. For here, within the last dozen years, have been set in motion new forces, or new directions given to old forces, the outcome of which is still problematical, and of the efficacy of which there is still honest doubt in many quarters. There is a seething of the pot of humanity here such as was never before known in this archipelago, and indeed in not many places in the orient. The ferment of a powerful leaven has begun its work, and these islands are passing through a period to them never before equalled in intensity.

The importance, direction, and effects of the struggle it were easy enough to exaggerate and overrate, or even to mistake. We Americans are rather prone to look upon our work and pronounce it good, and to regard our own customs and institutions as the best in the world, being in this respect not unlike the Chinese. This characteristic has arisen in great part from optimism bred up under peculiar pioneer conditions. To those who criticise the course of the United States in the Islands (leaving aside the question of right of occupancy about which many good men cannot agree), and find fault because the colonizing policy of no other nation (especially that of Great Britain) has been followed in its entirety, it is sufficient to point to this pioneer record. Viewed in that light, the course followed here could not have been different.

It must be recognized that in part the changed conditions here are the logical result of forces first set in motion noticeably near the opening of the nineteenth century with the

coming to the Philippines of Spaniards of advanced ideas, plus various other factors of that century, such as better methods of communication, the travel and study of Filipino youth in Europe, and better opportunities for education here. It must also be recognized that some institutions in the Philippines regarded by many as quite new had their parallel in very early Spanish days. The efficacy and formative value of such factors at the present time lies not in their newness, but in their direction and dynamic force.

Considered with respect to the Filipino, the efforts being expended here are of value only to the degree that they tend toward his material, mental, and spiritual welfare and advancement. If they make him more efficient in his three-fold development; if through them he becomes more fit to compete with other peoples: the equation is plus. If, on the contrary, nothing of a positive value is added to him, then the American experiment must be called a failure, or it must be said that the Filipino is incapable of advance. Failure is not yet announced, and most certainly the Filipino, as history distinctly shows, is not irresponsive to opportunity. It is, in a sense, somewhat arrogant to speak of one people as uplifting another. There has been much useless and insipid vamping about "the white man's burden," as if the white man had a monopoly on everything that is good and desirable. Paternalism in government is still perhaps too plainly apparent. The progress of any people, to be real and lasting, must be the seizing of opportunity, and the assimilation of the good that is offered by that opportunity. To the degree that opportunity arises from the people themselves, so much the more rapid and solid must be the ultimate advance. The placing of opportunity by one people before another, where it has not risen from the people themselves, constitutes the only "burden" or mission of one people to another, and who shall say that in the placing of it a corresponding opportunity is not grasped, or a distinct character-growth made?

Touching the Philippines various questions naturally arise. How far are the American ideals applicable to, or desirable for, the Filipino? Is the result to be merely a

veneer, or will something really substantial be added to the Filipino nature and character? Can three centuries of Spanish possession, during which Spanish ideals were inculcated to a certain extent, be overcome; and if so, is it desirable? Is the American talk of progress only egotistical bombast? Must there not be a mutual benefit to character in the communication between peoples? How far should assimilation or contact go? What is the effect of racial feeling or racial difference?

No attempt will be made to answer these questions directly or many others that present themselves. It is possible that an answer to some of them may be suggested in the following pages. We are not especially concerned with those abstract questions that have puzzled many honest men. We are confronted with the single fact of American occupancy of the Philippines, and American efforts here; and this paper concerns itself with the bare recital of some of the things that are being attempted and done which have within themselves the possibilities of racial improvement.

I shall restrict myself quite narrowly to the Filipinos proper, and shall not touch at all upon the Negritos, wild Malayan tribes, or Moros. By the term "Filipinos" is to be understood the descendants of the eight divisions or peoples who were Christianized (at least nominally) by the Spaniards. A Malayan people, they resemble, more or less closely, in character and language, the peoples of the Malay Peninsula, Java, Sumatra, and other islands. The Filipinos, however, of all oriental tropical peoples, stand in a class by themselves, for they are the only large body of tropical people who have been Christianized in modern times, and who have very largely (although somewhat imperfectly) adopted Christian standards and ideals. For over three centuries they have had contact with an occidental nation (although it is true that the Spaniards are themselves tinged with orientalism), and the effect of that contact distinguishes them very largely from all other races of the orient; for this contact, especially as regards religion, was so intimate that it reached into nearly every act of their daily life; while Spanish blood is diffused to a very large

extent throughout the archipelago. Yet one must not make the mistake of supposing that racial characteristics have been lost and that the Filipino is a Spaniard in all but birth. His characteristics are as pronounced today as when the Spaniards first arrived; and this forms one of the chief hopes for the greater future of the race. It has been remarked by a competent observer, the late James A. LeRoy, that the Filipino is virgin material ready to be worked upon, so little real impress did the Spanish contact make. This refers more especially to the *tao* or peasant class, and to the people of the remoter districts. Many Filipinos and others have had much to say about the so-called Filipino soul, by which is to be understood those qualities that are peculiarly Filipino. The best production has come from the eminent Spanish-Filipino scholar, Dr. Pardo de Tavera, who disclaims any especial monopoly of soul life for the Filipinos, beyond that which will allow them to take and assimilate the best wherever and however they might acquire it; and that those who fear lest the Filipino lose any of his characteristics that make for good and permanence may rest easy.

In the matters to be mentioned below in which the elements of race development may be seen, one very striking fact is discernible, namely, that in no case has the seed sown been due to native initiative. In each the force has been supplied by the governing or other outside people. Advance made before the American occupation was due in general to the Chinese or Spaniards. That of today is largely due to the American. Rizal, the greatest man produced by the Malay race, was over one-half Chinese. His education was largely European or western, and the ideals that he sought to implant or encourage were for the most part European or western. The very field of education, in which the Filipino shows his keenest interest, perhaps, is a striking proof of this. Whether in time a distinct initiative force can be supplied by the people themselves, and one that will be sufficient unto itself in moments of crisis and uncertainty, cannot yet be asserted. This lack of initiative is not necessarily a Filipino trait. It is well known that

the Spanish government, neither on its temporal nor its spiritual side, consciously encouraged the exercise of initiative, and that innovation in any form was frowned upon. Consequently, there is something in the argument which claims that the Filipino has hidden his true character and covered his real life with a true oriental impassiveness. To endow this people with the power of effective initiative for growth and progress—that is the self-imposed task of Americans here in the Philippines, and the latter nation would be untrue to itself if it hesitated or turned its back upon the work before it in these islands which came under its care by the most fortuitous of accidents. When the day comes on which it can be said that the task has been completed, then can the Filipinos, if they care for it, achieve their political independence and take their place among the nations of the world. And for this end the Filipinos must work even harder and more willingly than the Americans.¹

In the following notes, some of the influences that are being thrown about the new Filipinos, and which contain possibilities for racial improvement will be discussed. Accordingly, it will be necessary to mention the educational, public-improvement, and health factors, although all three have been already treated in this JOURNAL.

EDUCATION

Public schools

Spain established public schools in the Philippines in the nineteenth century, but outside of Manila, they could scarcely be said to exist, and were, moreover, almost completely dominated by the ecclesiastical influence. Still Spain did honestly try to give to these Islands some real education, although the conditions of society both in the Peninsula and in the Philippines prevented the efforts from having the result that was to be desired.

Almost coeval with American occupancy, public schools modeled on the American system were established. Quite

¹ This was written before the Jones' bill was introduced into Congress.

naturally there have been mistakes, but progress is spelt by those very mistakes; and there will be other mistakes, for which God be thanked, if they teach the lesson to be learned from them. But there has been continuous progress from the beginning, and that is a good augury for the future. The first generation of Filipino youth trained by the American system and by American teachers is almost ready to step into the ranks and to take its proper place in the evolution of Filipino society. The importance of this must not be overlooked. It means that American ideals are permeating the rank and file of Filipino life, and are having a part in the shaping of future generations, although one must recognize that it is easy to be deceived as to the extent of their influence. There is an increase in many qualities that Americans consider desirable—straightforwardness, frankness, and self-control. No attempt is being made to refashion the Filipinos into Americans, but the government is endeavoring to make good Filipinos by giving them the dynamic force that comes from the best American ideals, while still preserving to them their best Filipino ideals.

The majority of the Filipinos have entered heartily into the educational plan. Indeed the desire for education is one of the most noticeable of their characteristics; and in general all Filipino legislators stand committed to the educational ideal. Regularity of attendance in the schools is constantly being pushed and is becoming an important factor, and this means an increase in efficiency to both pupil and teacher. New schools are being opened as rapidly as possible, but the greater stress is being laid on thoroughness and permanence in those schools now open. It is to be regretted that some schools have been closed recently because of lack of funds.

The actual work of teaching is entrusted to a corps of over 8000 Filipino and of almost 700 American teachers, and all teaching, incredible as it may seem, is in English. In itself, this fact is of great importance, for the Philippines with their many dialects have never had a common medium of communication. The Spanish language never penetrated the masses in the more than three centuries of Spanish domina-

tion as much as has the English in less than a decade and a half. In each village the children greet the American in his own language, and many of the older generation are anxious to show that they know some English, although it must be admitted that the brand is often very poor.

Special stress is being laid on industrial training, for it has been seen that pure classical training is out of place here in the majority of the schools. The Filipino has long been famous for his manual dexterity, and with proper training this can be turned to rich account. One is continually surprised as he examines the industrial and manual training exhibits of the schools at the annual Manila carnival. One commercial school has been established with good results. The high and normal schools and the university enable those attending them to reach the higher education. The dominant idea throughout is to prepare the Filipino youth for the life which he must fill, but not to close the door to something higher if he has the stamina and courage to reach out and grasp any opportunity that may be offered him.

The total result is a distinct and lasting element for racial improvement. The change has been so great that it has led foreigners who have lived in the islands for many years, during both the Spanish and American régimes, to note it and commend it and this is of greater value than if the praise came from Americans. The American teacher in the Philippines has by his unselfish labors and by his generally very moral conduct, gained the confidence of the Filipino to an amazing degree. From one end of the islands to the other the American teacher is welcome and is trusted. It is true that many parents still prefer to send their children to private and religious schools, especially the *ilustrado* or upper class. Yet the spirit of the public schools is making its entrance even into such institutions and their usefulness is expanding daily.

The public schools are exerting considerable force toward the growth of democracy here, the formation of a true middle class, and a realization of the dignity of labor. The permanent school buildings that have been constructed are serving as models for better and more permanent dwelling

houses. The small garden plots cultivated by the pupils as a part of their work are likewise serving as models for cultivation by the adults at their homes. Influences are exerted in continually new and unexpected directions, and it can be confidently asserted, with no fear of contradiction, that if (notwithstanding what often seems slow progress) American occupancy were to end tomorrow, the impulse given by the American teachers of the public schools would persist.

The University of the Philippines

As its name indicates the University of the Philippines is a government institution. It was created by the legislative act of June 18, 1908, with the avowed purpose of giving higher instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences and arts, and technical and professional education. An important provision is that no one may be barred from entrance because of age, sex, nationality, religious belief, or political affiliation. The university comprises the colleges of liberal arts, law, medicine and surgery, veterinary medicine, agriculture, and fine arts. The faculties are composed of both Americans and Filipinos, with the exception of the last which consists of Filipinos and Spaniards. This is the first year in which it can be said that the university has fulfilled its function on a real university basis, notwithstanding that the first university commencement was held in March 1911.

The first president of the university was formally inducted into office on December 20, 1911, with appropriate and dignified services. In his address the president emphasized the three necessary elements that must be united in each member of a university faculty: teaching, original investigation, and living. Efficiency in both faculty and students is the primary end sought in a university, and this the president declared to be the end that would be sought in the University of the Philippines. The work of the university will bear fruit in the men and women trained therein and they will serve their country in many ways in its upward march toward the larger and freer life—in politics, in teaching, in the professions, and in other spheres.

Manila has long had a university, that of the Dominican Order, Santo Tomás, which last year celebrated its tercentenary. An attempt was made by the Spanish government to found a secular university here in the eighteenth century, but failure resulted. The University of the Philippines is, in a sense, its successor. There is room here for both universities in Manila, and both cannot fail to have a great future if they give the broad training that is necessary to fit the Filipinos for a life of service and usefulness. The University of Santo Tomás has been one of the elements in the civilizing of the Filipino, and it is still a great factor in the educational life here. The government has wisely adopted a standard to which all educational institutions must conform in order to receive recognition by the University of the Philippines, and this is productive of much good. A healthy competition between the two universities will redound to the benefit of the Filipinos and their country. The new university has as wonderful a life to live and as great service to perform as any of the state universities of the United States which are having so large a share in the raising of the level of the average.

The Philippine Library

The third great factor in education, strictly considered as such, may be said to be the public library. The Philippine Library, although yet in its infancy, is to the Philippine Islands what the Library of Congress is to the United States. This library was created by the Philippine legislature by virtue of act no. 1935 enacted May 20, 1909. By that act, all existing collections of books wherever located, that belong to the insular government were consolidated into one library. The institution is thus unique as to organization. The nucleus of the consolidation was the former American Circulating Library of Manila, which was founded privately in 1900 as a memorial to those American soldiers and sailors who lost their lives in the Philippines. Both the work and expense proved too heavy, however, for the Association, and the following year it was transferred first

to the military and later to the civil government, with the proviso that the name was not to be changed and that the work among the soldiers and sailors was to be continued. Considerable aid was sent to the library by interested friends and societies in the United States. In 1905 it became a division of the bureau of education and was so maintained until the adoption of the act above mentioned, which was given full force on July 1, 1910. It is known now as the circulating division (American Circulating Library), of the Philippine Library, thus preserving its name, while its distinctive service to soldiers and sailors is still maintained and is even performed with greater facilities. The general collection of books of this division is rapidly growing and now numbers over 25,000 volumes in active use. Its books cover a wide range of interests, chief among which, in addition to the necessary fiction, are the so-called social sciences.

The Filipiniana division is one of the most interesting collections to be found anywhere. It owes its inception very largely to Dr. David P. Barrows, formerly director of the bureau of education here, who set aside some books of Spanish government collections and some especially purchased as a section of the American Circulating Library. Its greatest growth has come since the consolidation and its creation as a distinct division. It now possesses much of the rarest and most valuable of Filipiniana, while not a few of its pieces are, so far as known, unique. By the recent purchase of the private collection of Dr. José Rizal, and the Filipiniana collections of Mr. James A. LeRoy, Prof. Clemente J. Zulueta, and Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera, and the transfer of books from the executive bureau, this division can boast the largest collection of printed Filipiniana in existence.

The two divisions above mentioned are housed together: the former has both American and Filipino attendants, while the latter has only Filipinos. They have but recently occupied the new quarters assigned to the library in a government building, and with more space at their disposal, have entered upon a new and larger life. In this building two

more divisions are being developed, namely, the public documents and the periodical divisions.

The science division of the library is located in the Bureau of Science Building. This division has risen from various small collections of books that began to be formed almost as soon as the bureau of government laboratories (the former name of the bureau of science) was created. These small collections were gradually consolidated into one and special rooms were devoted to their housing. The collection has expanded until now it contains more than forty thousand volumes, (most of which are in active use), and is in many respects the best scientific collection in the orient.

The law division of the library is divided into two sections, that of the supreme court and that of the attorney-general. These will naturally be consolidated into one collection whenever a special building is constructed for the courts. The books consist of reports, digests, treatises, and textbooks.

The small collection of the Philippine assembly is devoted in great part to books on legislation and parliamentary matters. Conspicuous on its shelves is the collection of Felipe G. Calderon, one of Manila's brightest young native lawyers who was stricken by death at the time of his greatest usefulness.

Lastly, each bureau possesses a collection of such books as are necessary for its work. The most noteworthy of such collections are those of the bureaus of agriculture, education, public works, and customs. In the various divisions and minor collections the Philippine Library contains considerably more than 100,000 volumes. As rapidly as possible the titles of all these works are being gathered into a central catalogue for the convenience of readers and investigators. This catalogue will eventually contain, not only the titles of all government-owned books but as well those of semi-public and private collections, in order that one may tell at a glance exactly what can be secured in Manila in any line of research. Thus there is an opportunity to make of the Philippine Library an institution second to none in the orient in point of usefulness. A room has been set aside in

the new quarters exclusively for the use of investigators, in which they may have books reserved for their special studies.

As an educative factor among the people, the influence of the library cannot be overestimated. This is true to a much greater extent than in the United States. It is an inspiring sight to see the numbers of young men and women who resort thither daily for purposes of reading and study. These are mainly the younger generation among the Filipinos whom the library is reaching, those in the public schools and in the university: it must be admitted that the pupils of private schools do not yet appreciate the value of the library so fully as the former. The teachers of the public schools throughout the archipelago are allowed free cards to the circulating division (for various reasons a small fee of five pesos annually is charged), and books of all sorts are constantly being sent to both American and Filipino teachers, with the far-reaching benefits that can be readily understood. The library acts, therefore, as a powerful aid in the spread of the English language throughout the islands and in this regard is a worthy competitor of the public schools. It reaches many people not in the schools, and is slowly but surely doing its part in the education of the masses, and consequently is not a small factor in the racial improvement of the Filipino.

PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS

After the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, certain public improvements were carried on by the central government, but without any continuous and well established system. The first public improvements were somewhat of a negative character, being for the most part fortifications and other military works, and shipbuilding, and generally for these the labor employed was forced. Under the direct supervision of the central government in the nineteenth century some remarkably good roads were constructed and various other public works were carried on. But the little that was done, while exceedingly useful and practical, was a mere beginning and served as an object lesson of the great need for systematic efforts. The friars and the Jesuits

also made many improvements on their estates and in the villages and districts administered by them, although there was the same lack of system, and generally of practical and technical knowledge. Their work, however, served and still serves useful purposes. They were carried on for the most part under the same labor conditions as the government work. The "Economic Society of Friends of the Country," during its two periods of existence in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, encouraged and advocated public improvements with some little success, although its resources were never sufficient to accomplish much. All the improvements effected through these various agencies, although imperfect and slight, yet tended to develop the country by rendering communication easier, by providing better facilities for transportation, and by a general economic advance.

The program of public improvements for the Islands has grown steadily since American occupation; and is one that is proving, and will prove, far-reaching in its results. The government is fully alive to the importance of the development of the country through public improvement; and what is of far more consequence the people as a whole are coming to understand more clearly the efficacy of good roads, of navigable rivers, of good harbors, of irrigation, of parks and public playgrounds, and of abundance of pure drinking water. For the first time in the history of the islands systematic efforts have been inaugurated, and have been productive of good results.

In the brief period of American occupation, much has been done, but that is no reason for special self congratulation. Much more remains to be done. Only by means of good roads in all parts, by good canals and other water ways, by an efficient method of irrigation, and by other public improvements that will open up the country so that the wonderful productive climate and soil of these islands may be used to advantage, will the Philippines be able to assume their proper place and, like Java, become a garden of the orient. But all improvements must be undertaken with due regard to the revenues of the islands, or the extent to which bonds

may be safely issued. The Philippines, while potentially an extremely rich country, have not yet advanced to that economic affluence that renders possible the fullest public improvements. Each public improvement, however, brings nearer the time when this can be done.

The effect of public improvements on race development is obvious. By means of the material something is achieved in the realm of the mental and moral that creates a higher standard and ideal. This is what is happening here. It is no tale of sordid commercialism. The Filipino is raising his standard daily and the public improvements now being carried on form one of the factors. He may or may not be as happy as under the old régime. Indeed he is being touched with a very healthful discontent that is leading him to grasp at opportunity and to assume a greater direct responsibility.

HEALTH AND SANITATION

The orient offers a large and interesting field for the health movement, and of the orient, no section is more interesting or more important than the Philippines. The problems to be met here and the tasks to be accomplished are in general those of other tropical countries of the Far East, with this difference, that the comparatively limited extent (notwithstanding the number of islands) and population of the Philippines lend a greater element of hopefulness toward the solution and the fulfilment of them.

During the Spanish régime considerable attention was directed to the cure and prevention of epidemic disease—more especially by vaccination against smallpox which had long been endemic here, and which was always a serious menace. The municipal board of health in Manila accomplished some work worthy of mention, although the board met continual discouragement from lack of funds and of interest. Health efforts were mainly restricted to Manila and to several other centers, while the provinces at large suffered a great neglect. Reputable physicians were few and but seldom found in the provinces. Quacks, inade-

quately trained physicians (so-called, and often men who had obtained some little smattering of medicine in Manila, and some of whom were unable to pass their medical examinations) and apprentices with some superior intelligence and rudimentary training were commonly found in the provinces. In the provinces also the local priests (usually friars) often rendered what assistance lay in their power (and this was sometimes considerable), although the majority of them were wont to rely on the miraculous cures effected by the use of holy water. The quacks and apprentices have had much to answer for here in the matter of questionable and even criminal practices; but in most districts they were the only recourse outside of the self-administered home remedies of the people. Those remedies, too often indeed, consisted of a superstitious belief in the efficacy of certain observances and so-called cures, which are comparable, though much more common, to some superstitions still found among ignorant and credulous people in some parts of the United States. Much credit is due the hospitals for the work carried on by them. They were located, for the most part, in the large centers, the most important ones, being, of course, in Manila, and were usually in charge of religious persons. The Hospital Order of St. John of God labored with rare fidelity, and together with the secular Brotherhood of Mercy, was able to alleviate much suffering. The Economic Society of Friends of the Country also extended its many-sided labors for the betterment of medical practice during its short life. But one and all of these agencies were lacking in systematic effort. The principles of sanitation especially appear not to have been understood or to have been disregarded, and no effort of any moment was exerted toward the dissemination of hygienic and sanitary knowledge among the people.

Given such antecedent conditions the need for health measures and for systematic effort were naturally apparent at the very beginning of American occupation. The military and later the civil authorities were not slow in bending their best energies to the formidable task. The work of the board of health and of its successor, the bureau, cannot be given here in anything like the detail it merits, for the activi-

ties of the health movement have continually broadened and extended along many different lines, the ramifications of which reach to many of the acts of every-day life.³ A peculiar disadvantage has been experienced because the people, as might well be imagined, have not understood the reasons for the existence of the health department and the necessity for its action. Its measures have often appeared drastic and an invasion of the private sanctity of the home, and on this account, as well as because of the ignorance of the common people progress has been hampered. Little by little, however, active hostility has lessened, and the people are daily coming to appreciate health and sanitation measures more nearly at their real value. Information has been disseminated by means of various publications, such as bulletins, circulars, and careful instructions and rules, and by means of health talks. These have been published and given in English, Spanish, and various of the native languages in order that they might reach as many of the people as possible. Personal contact and example are elements of strength in the health propaganda, and more has often been and is being accomplished by subtle suggestion than would be possible by direct force. The Roman Catholic Church and the bureau of education are aiding very materially by their hearty coöperation in the health movement. Such a simple thing as the introduction of the use of knife, fork and spoon bring large results.

One of the most important movements that has grown out of the efforts of the health authorities is the active anti-tuberculosis crusade now being waged. Tuberculosis is rampant throughout the lowlands of the Philippines where the moist climate is fit breeding place for this disease; but far more disastrous than the climate is the ignorance of the vast majority of Filipinos in the simplest matters of every-day living. The Filipino house or hut is really of sanitary construction. It is rendered a deathtrap by the careful exclusion of all night air during sleeping hours, as well as by overcrowding. It is by no means uncommon to see a

³ See Dr. Heiser's article "Sanitation in the Philippines," in the October number of this JOURNAL.

whole family sleeping in a single room. Squalor and filth are the normal condition about many of the houses of the *tao* or peasant class. The custom of building clusters of huts indiscriminately together within one enclosure with inadequate entrance into the grounds from the exterior makes the accumulation of filth the more offensive and festering, and the overcrowding the more deadly. This neglect by the Filipino of conditions outside his house is an anachronism of his character, for he is generally scrupulously neat and cleanly about his person and clothing. American methods of living and the teaching of the public schools are having their effect on the sleeping customs and surroundings of the people, and in many places a decided improvement is to be noted, some villages presenting a pleasing contrast to others in this regard.

The struggle against this disease is being carried on chiefly by the Philippine Islands Anti-tuberculosis Society. This Society was established largely through the efforts of several Americans and Filipinos, and enjoys the hearty support and coöperation of the government, and in fact is so closely identified with the government that it is almost a government institution, at least in its management. It was incorporated July 10, 1910, and has acquired a very respectable membership, both among Americans and Filipinos, the nominal annual membership fee of two pesos not being prohibitive to anyone who is sincerely interested in the work. The government has loaned to the Society the grounds about the old water reservoir at San Juan del Monte just on the outskirts of Manila, for use as a sanitarium, while the legislature at its last session allotted the sum of 50,000 pesos to aid in the crusade. A Filipino physician is in charge of the sanitarium, and treatment is largely by the open-air method. About two score open-air cottages have been constructed by the Society, the government, and by interested business firms and private individuals. Free dispensaries and clinics have been established in various congested districts of Manila, each of which is in charge of a competent physician. Branch societies have been established in Iloilo, Cebu, Zamboanga, and Dumaguete.

All this is making an impress in the right direction. It cannot be said that tuberculosis has been lessened as yet, but some cases have been arrested. There is an earnestness back of the work that carries weight, and the ideas that the society is trying to propagate are daily gaining ground. The fact that the best people among the Filipinos are interested in the movement gives hope of speedier positive results. The natives of their own accord are having recourse to the sanitarium, dispensaries, and clinics for treatment and medicines, and are losing their deep-seated dread of such institutions. This in turn is lessening the oriental passiveness and fatalism that afflicts to a certain degree the Filipinos in common with all other peoples of the east.

The Philippine Medical School, now a part of the University and known as the College of Medicine and Surgery is a remarkably well equipped institution and is giving an up-to-date medical training to many young men and some young women. The far-reaching effects that the college must exert are apparent. The health of the Philippines and the freeing of the people from ignorance and superstition in regard to their bodies must in great part fall on the young men and women trained by it. It is they who must take up the vast work that is awaiting in the provinces. From the enthusiastic testimony of their instructors, the students are justifying their training and compare well with those of other countries. The real test of their capacity will come when they are thrown upon their own resources in places remote from all other help where quick and sane decision is a matter of life and death; and in the spirit of helpfulness and sympathy with which they go about their life-saving work.

Clinics are provided for the students of the college at the Philippine General Hospital, a government institution, as well as at the University and St. Paul's Hospitals, the first an Episcopal and the second a Roman Catholic institution. The first-named ranks among the hospitals of the world in its equipment and free clinic. The great majority of patients who seek admission to the hospital and the free clinic are Filipinos, and inquiries and requests are con-

stantly being received by mail, all of which is eloquent testimony of the confidence which is placed in it. The other two hospitals, although less well equipped, do not lag behind in the earnestness and thoroughness of their work.

Hand in hand with the making of physicians and surgeons goes the training of nurses, and this training is being given in each of the hospitals. Several classes have already graduated from each institution and have gone out into active service. The nurses have demonstrated their usefulness. The young Filipina women especially make excellent nurses, and will in due time share with Filipino physicians the health education of the provinces. One who has never been in the islands can scarcely appreciate what it means for a young Filipina woman to dedicate herself to the profession of nursing. The old Spanish education for women was along quite other lines. It required considerable courage for the pioneers to enter the nursing courses. They have shown fitness, gentleness, and enthusiasm for their tasks, and have met the conditions imposed with the highest of resolution. It is charged by some that both the Filipino physicians and surgeons have a tendency to lose their heads in moments of crisis when they must show their resourcefulness and depend entirely on themselves. I cannot attest the truth or falsity of this charge, but it would prove no wonder were there some element of truth in it. The Spanish training here, unfortunately, did not make for self-reliance, initiative, and resourcefulness.

The great infant mortality of the Philippines is most serious and is due in large measure to insufficient care and nourishment. The Filipino is fond of his children, and Filipino families live a happy united life, and as a rule get far more enjoyment than do Americans, but the greatest of ignorance prevails in regard to the proper care of infants. The Filipina mother, often for want of proper nourishment herself, is unable to suckle her child, and it is no uncommon sight to see a child of a few days fed on rice or bananas. The lack of proper diet is but one of the directions taken by the general ignorance of the Filipinos in the rearing of their offspring. The result is a fearful infant mortality. Over

one-half the deaths are of children less than one year old. The bureau of health early turned its attention to this matter, but it is one of the most difficult things in the islands to handle. After all these years the best that can be said is that signs of advance are just dimly to be discerned. Care of the mother during pregnancy, and of mother and child at birth is being urged. The ignorance and malpractice of so-called midwives have caused much suffering and calamity, and has led to the establishment of courses for the training of midwives. The infant mortality and ignorance in child rearing among the poorer classes in the large cities in the United States offer no true parallel to conditions here, where both are extreme. Advance in this most vital of tasks will be painfully slow and uncertain. As in many other directions the brunt of the efforts expended must fall upon the Filipino physicians and nurses.

Much aid in this work is being given by the society known as the *Gota de Leche* (Drop of Milk). This Society was founded in December 1906, by Americans and Filipinos, Dr. David J. Doherty, of Chicago, being its most prominent founder, and is now managed almost wholly, if not wholly, by Filipina women. The Society provides clean, pure milk for the feeding of infants, and in addition, instructs Filipina mothers in the diet and care of their infants, and the necessity for the greatest of cleanliness in all that pertains to home life. But after all this Society, it must be confessed, does not reach a very large per cent of the people for whom it is intended.

Yet one other element remains to be mentioned here—that of exercise and sport—which is making rapidly for race improvement. In all parts of the archipelago, the Filipino boy (and in the schools, the Filipina girl) is taking, as if by magic, to the idea of outdoor sport. Baseball, basketball, volleyball, tennis, and all the field sports to be witnessed at home in any of the college meets, are now a fully recognized part of child and adolescent life among Filipinos. The Filipino of the future will bring to his work more stamina, and a better physical machine on account of the enthusiasm with which he is taking to sport. Fairness, give and take,

readiness, are all being developed by this. The child life and adolescent period of the Filipinos are being enriched beyond all conception by their capacity for adopting these outdoor sports. This is really one of the most striking things to be seen in the Philippines today, and its effect will be proportionate to its healthy development.

AGRICULTURE

The wealth of these islands is chiefly agricultural. Here lies the only source of supply for the world's abacá, commonly called "Manila hemp." The fiber wealth, apart from abacá, is considerable, rattans, various grasses, and other fibers abounding in great variety. Incredible as it may seem, over one thousand varieties of rice are grown here, and about thirty species of banana. Tobacco, sugar, cocoanuts, and hosts of fine fruits and vegetables thrive here. In short, the values of the land products of the Philippines, expressed in dollars and cents, fills up the greater part of the ledger of trade and operations.

Yet notwithstanding this, there is vast room for improvement. These islands can be made in cultivable area as productive as the great garden of Java. The immediate branch of the government concerned most intimately with the development of these agricultural interests is the Bureau of Agriculture, which is placed rightly (until perhaps a new department of government be formed) under the department of public instruction. However, closely connected with this development is the work of the bureau of public works in irrigation, and better methods of communication and transportation.

The work of the bureau of agriculture is two-fold—first, experimental, and second, purely instructive. By means of the first it is raising the value of the soil products through practical investigation carried on at its experimental stations and farms. By means of the second it is reaching the people directly and showing the farmers how to raise more and better crops by better, cheaper, and more careful methods of cultivation. The operations of the bureau

cover an extremely difficult field. It is no child's play to attempt to introduce new methods and carefulness where old methods and neglect have been ruling for centuries. Conservatism is too deeply rooted in all men to be broken through in a few brief years, especially in a land where everything until the present has been against the new method, and where, moreover, superstition has played no small part even in the working of the soil.

It is not my intention to review even cursorily the operations of the bureau of agriculture. A large volume could scarce do it justice. I wish simply to point out its importance in regard to the matter of race development. The direction of that improvement is obvious. Better method alone bespeaks a better intelligence or a development of the intellect. Better and more abundant food gives a better physique and makes for the sane mind. A balance on the credit side is an evidence of wealth. New and improved products show an advancing country. In short, the inherent benefits for which the bureau of agriculture stands in the Philippines are as far reaching as any other agency at work here.

Yet one other factor should be mentioned here because of its direct bearing on agriculture, namely, the veterinary work. This forms a very important part of the work of the bureau of agriculture. The official at the head of this division is also dean of the College of Veterinary Science of the University of the Philippines. The connection in efficiency is obvious. The two great problems before the veterinary division are the eradication of the rinderpest disease in cattle and the surra in horses, the first named being the more pressing. The rinderpest epizootic has deprived the farmers of many localities of the most valuable aid in their farming. The ungainly but useful carabao had become almost extinct in some districts. This was a most serious matter and the bureau very early turned its attention to the cause of this awful mortality. The course followed in other countries has been carefully studied in the hope of profiting by their experience. During the last two years, especially, the work has been constant and hopeful. The hostility

of the people has everywhere been encountered, for the element of segregation of sick animals has not been understood, and quite naturally the farmer who found himself temporarily unable to market his produce because he was not permitted to use his carabaos, could not entertain (in his ignorance of the reason) very friendly regard for the veterinary officials. However, the work has gone on steadily and has made substantial progress.

The College of Agriculture, which is a part of the University of the Philippines, is training scientifically young men for the practical work. These young men become so many nuclei of progress. They are learning the dignity of labor and the sanctity of the soil. They will help to stem the stampede, so natural in the Philippines, because of the old training, towards clerkships in government offices and, for many, nonentity, inefficiency, and disappointment.

CONCLUSION

The term "education" after all covers everything that looks toward race development here, if one accept the broader idea conveyed by the word rather than that of mere book learning. Schools and colleges and libraries are but a part of it all. The forces set in motion through them together with those set in motion through the several government and other agencies are bringing about a larger racial life for the Filipino. The country is now manifestly in the early stages of an evolution toward something better than it has yet experienced, but an evolution, it must not be forgotten partly made possible by the more than three centuries of Spanish domination. Of the threefold human development, the spiritual, as elsewhere, needs special care and emphasis that it may not suffer through an improper balance and the evolution thereby lose in force or be delayed.

As nowhere else in the world, perhaps, one can perceive results here, or, at least, tendencies. Efforts in all directions give indications that augur well—a fact that speaks volumes for the adaptability of the Filipino. The general resultant predicted by the indications is a race which can compete with other races because it is has learned self control. The

schools, the workshop, the farm, the playground, are all aiding in this. The Filipinos are learning how to utilize their economic resources, as well as to estimate correctly the value of health and obedience to sanitary principles. Good health is having a tendency, as elsewhere, to lessen crime. Good health means also a doubling of economic efficiency. Immunity to disease and its consequent weakness is producing a man better fitted to compete with his fellow man. Even the great prison, Bilibid, the largest in the world, and yet, perhaps, the easiest managed, is aiding considerably in the evolution by the training of each prisoner in a trade, and in the giving of a rudimentary instruction, as well as by daily health exercise.

As a whole the people are gaining a new level, where insight is keener, necessities more numerous, and luxuries more desirable. Above I have indicated some of the factors that are bringing this about. Each factor is related to and inextricably bound up with the others. There is no such thing as isolation in factors. Halting and slow or even hopeless though the work and achievements may seem at times, there is steady progress. The result is a real evolution which with the lapse of time will gain the respect it merits.

THE MUTATION THEORY AND THE BLOND RACE

By Thorstein Veblen, University of Missouri

The theories of racial development by mutation, associated with the name of Mendel, when they come to be freely applied to man, must greatly change the complexion of many currently debated questions of race—as to origins, migrations, dispersion, chronology, cultural derivation and sequence. In some respects the new theories should simplify current problems of ethnology, and they may even dispense with many analyses and speculations that have seemed of great moment in the past.

The main postulate of the Mendelian theories—the stability of type—has already done much service in anthropological science, being commonly assumed as a matter of course in arguments dealing with the derivation and dispersion of races and peoples. It is only by force of this assumption that ethnologists are able to identify any given racial stock over intervals of space or time, and so to trace the racial affinities of any given people. Question has been entertained from time to time as to the racial fixity of given physical traits—as, *e.g.*, stature, the cephalic indices, or hair and eye color—but on the whole these and other standard marks of race are still accepted as secure grounds of identification.¹ Indeed, without some such assumption any ethnological inquiry must degenerate into mere wool-gathering.

But along with this, essentially Mendelian, postulate of the stability of types, ethnologists have at the same time habitually accepted the incompatible Darwinian doctrine that racial types vary incontinently after a progressive fashion, arising through insensible cumulative variations and passing into new specific forms by the same method,

¹ Cf., however, W. Ridgeway, "The Application of Zoölogical Laws to Man," *Report, British Association for Advancement of Science* (Dublin), 1908.

under the Darwinian rule of the selective survival of slight and unstable (non-typical) variations. The effect of these two incongruous premises has been to leave discussions of race derivation somewhat at loose ends wherever the two postulates cross one another.

If it be assumed, or granted, that racial types are stable it follows as a matter of course that these types or races have not arisen by the cumulative acquirement of unstable non-specific traits, but must have originated by mutation or by some analogous method, and this view must then find its way into anthropology as into the other biological sciences. When such a step is taken an extensive revision of questions of race will be unavoidable, and an appreciable divergence may then be looked for among speculations on the mutational affinities of the several races and cultures.

Among matters so awaiting revision are certain broad questions of derivation and ethnography touching the blond race or races of Europe. Much attention, and indeed much sentiment, has been spent on this general topic. The questions involved are many and diverse, and many of them have been subject of animated controversy without definitive conclusions.

The mutation theories, of course, have immediately to do with the facts of biological derivation alone, but when the facts are reviewed in the light of these theories it will be found that questions of cultural origins and relationship are necessarily drawn into the inquiry. In particular, an inquiry into the derivation and distribution of the blond stock will so intimately involve questions of the Aryan speech and institutions as to be left incomplete without a somewhat detailed attention to this latter range of questions. So much so that an inquiry into the advent and early fortunes of the blond stock in Europe will fall, by convenience, under two distinct but closely related captions: The Origin of the Blond Type, and The Derivation of the Aryan Culture.

(a) It is held, on the one hand, that there is but a single blond race, type or stock (Keane, Lapouge, Sergi), and on the other hand that there are several such races or types, more or less distinct but presumably related (Deniker,

Beddoe, and other, especially British, ethnologists). (b) There is no good body of evidence going to establish a great antiquity for the blond stock, and there are indications, though perhaps inconclusive, that the blond strain, including all the blond types, is of relatively late date—unless a Berber (Kabyle) blond race is to be accepted in a more unequivocal manner than hitherto. (c) Neither is there anything like convincing evidence that this blond strain has come from outside of Europe—except, again, for the equivocal Kabyle—or that any blond race has ever been widely or permanently distributed outside of its present European habitat. (d) The blond race is not found unmixed. In point of pedigree all individuals showing the blond traits are hybrids, and the greater number of them show their mixed blood in their physical traits. (e) There is no community, large or small, made up exclusively of blonds, or nearly so, and there is no good evidence available that such an all-blond or virtually all-blond community ever has existed, either in historic or prehistoric times. The race appears never to have lived in isolation. (f) It occurs in several (perhaps hybrid) variants—unless these variants are to be taken (with Deniker) as several distinct races. (g) Counting the dolicho-blond as the original type of the race, its nearest apparent relative among the races of mankind is the Mediterranean (of Sergi), at least in point of physical traits. At the same time the blond race, or at least the dolicho-blond type, has never since neolithic times, so far as known, extensively and permanently lived in contact with the Mediterranean. (h) The various (national) ramifications of the blond stock—or rather the various racial mixtures into which an appreciable blond element enters—are all, and to all appearance have always been, of Aryan (“Indo-European,” “Indo-Germanic”) speech—with the equivocal exception of the Kabyle. (i) Yet far the greater number and variety (national and linguistic) of men who use the Aryan speech are not prevailingly blond, or even appreciably mixed with blond. (j) The blond race, or the peoples with an appreciable blond admixture, and particularly the communities

in which the dolicho-blond element prevails, show little or none of the peculiarly Aryan institutions—understanding by that phrase not the known institutions of the ancient Germanic peoples, but that range of institutions said by competent philologists to be reflected in the primitive Aryan speech. (k) These considerations raise the presumption that the blond race was not originally of Aryan speech or of Aryan culture, and they also suggest (l) that the Mediterranean, the nearest apparent relative of the dolicho-blond, was likewise not originally Aryan.

Accepting the mutation theory, then, for the purpose in hand, and leaving any questions of Aryanism on one side for the present, a canvass of the situation so outlined may be offered in such bold, crude and summary terms as should be admissible in an analysis which aims to be tentative and provisional only. It may be conceived that the dolichocephalic blond originated as a mutant of the Mediterranean type (which it greatly resembles in its scheme of biometric measurements²) probably some time after that race had effected a permanent lodgment on the continent of Europe. The Mediterranean stock may be held (Sergi and Keane) to have come into Europe from Africa,³ whatever its remoter derivation may have been. It is, of course, not impossible that the mutation which gave rise to the dolicho-blond may have occurred before the parent stock left Africa, or rather before it was shut out of Africa by the submergence of the land connection across Sicily, but the probabilities seem to be against such a view. The conditions would appear to have been less favorable to a mutation of this kind in the African habitat of the parent stock than in Europe, and less favorable in Europe during earlier quaternary time than toward the close of the glacial period.

The causes which give rise to a variation of type have always been sufficiently obscure, whether the origin of species be conceived after the Darwinian or the Mendelian fashion, and the mutation theories have hitherto afforded

² Cf. Sergi, *The Mediterranean Race*, ch. xi, xiii.

³ Sergi, *Arii e Italici*; Keane, *Man Past and Present*, ch. xii.

little light on that question. Yet the Mendelian postulate that the type is stable except for such a mutation as shall establish a new type raises at least the presumption that such a mutation will take place only under exceptional circumstances, that is to say, under circumstances so substantially different from what the type is best adapted to as to subject it to some degree of physiological strain. It is to be presumed that no mutation will supervene so long as the conditions of life do not vary materially from what they have been during the previous uneventful life-history of the type. Such is the presumption apparently involved in the theory and such is also the suggestion afforded by the few experimental cases of observed mutation, as, *e.g.*, those studied by De Vries.

A considerable climatic change, such as would seriously alter the conditions of life either directly or through its effect on the food supply, might be conceived to bring on a mutating state in the race; or the like effect might be induced by a profound cultural change, particularly any such change in the industrial arts as would radically affect the material conditions of life. These considerations, mainly speculative it is true, suggest that the dolicho-blond mutant could presumably have emerged only at a time when the parent stock was exposed to notably novel conditions of life, such as would be presumed (with De Vries) to tend to throw the stock into a specifically unstable (mutating) state; at the same time these novel conditions of life must also have been specifically of such a nature as to favor the survival and multiplication of this particular human type. The climatic tolerance of the dolicho-blond, *e.g.*, is known to be exceptionally narrow. Now, it is not known, indeed there is no reason to presume, that the Mediterranean race was exposed to such variations of climate or of culture before it entered Europe as might be expected to induce a mutating state in the stock, and at the same time a mutant gifted with the peculiar climatic intolerance of the dolicho-blond would scarcely have survived under the conditions offered by northern Africa in late quaternary time. But the required conditions are had later on in Europe, after the Mediterranean was securely at home in that continent.

The whole episode may be conceived to have run off somewhat in the following manner. The Mediterranean race is held to have entered Europe in force during quaternary time, presumably after the quaternary period was well advanced, most likely during the last genial, interglacial period. This race then brought the neolithic culture, but without the domestic animals (or plants?) that are a characteristic feature of the later neolithic age, and it encountered at least the remnants of an older, palaeolithic population. This older European population was made up of several racial stocks, some of which still persist as obscure and minor elements in the later peoples of Europe. The (geologic).date to be assigned this intrusion of the Mediterranean race into Europe is of course not, and can perhaps never be, determined with any degree of nicety or confidence. But there is a probability that it coincides with the recession of the ice-sheet, following one or another of the severer periods of glaciations, that occurred before the submergence of the land connection between Europe and Africa, over Gibraltar, Sicily and perhaps Crete. How late in quaternary time the final submergence of the Mediterranean basin occurred is still a matter of surmise; the intrusion of the Mediterranean race into Europe appears, on archaeological evidence, to have occurred in late quaternary time, and in the end this archaeological evidence may help to decide the geologic date of the severance of Europe from Africa.

The Mediterranean race seems to have spread easily over the habitable surface of Europe and shortly to have grown numerous and taken rank as the chief racial element in the neolithic population; which argues that no very considerable older population occupied the European continent at the time of the Mediterranean invasion; which in turn implies that the fairly large (Magdalenian) population of the close of the palaeolithic age was in great part destroyed or expelled by the climatic changes that coincided with or immediately preceded the advent of the Mediterranean race. The known characteristics of the Magdalenian culture indicate a technology, a situation and perhaps a race somewhat closely

paralleled by the Eskimo;⁴ which argues that the climatic situation before which this Magdalenian race and culture gave way would have been that of a genial interglacial period rather than a period of glaciation.

During this genial (perhaps sub-tropical) inter-glacial period immediately preceding the last great glaciation the Magdalenian stock would presumably find Europe climatically untenable, judging by analogy with the Eskimo; whereas the Mediterranean stock should have found it an eminently favorable habitat, for this race has always succeeded best in a warm-temperate climate. Both the extensive northward range of the early neolithic (Mediterranean) settlements and the total disappearance of the Magdalenian culture from the European continent point to a climatic situation in Europe more favorable to the former race and more unwholesome for the latter than the conditions known to have prevailed at any time since the last interglacial period, especially in the higher latitudes. The indications would seem to be that the whole of Europe, even the Baltic and Arctic seaboard, became climatically so fully impossible for the Magdalenian race during this interglacial period as to result in its extinction or definitive expulsion; for when, in recent times, climatically suitable conditions return, on the Arctic seaboard, the culture which takes the place that should have been occupied by the Magdalenian is the Finnic (Lapp)—a culture unrelated to the Magdalenian either in race or technology, although of much the same cultural level and dealing with a material environment of much the same character. And this genial interval that was fatal to the Magdalenian was, by just so much, favorable to the Mediterranean race.

But glacial conditions presently returned, though with less severity than the next preceding glacial period; and roughly coincident with the close of the genial interval in Europe the land connection with Africa was cut off by submergence, shutting off retreat to the South. How far communication with Asia may have been interrupted during

⁴ Cf. W. J. Sollas, "Palaeolithic Races and their Modern Representatives," *Science Progress*, vol. iv, 1909-1910.

the subsequent cold period, by the local glaciation of the Caucasus, Elburz and Armenian highlands, is for the present apparently not to be determined, although it is to be presumed that the outlet to the east would at least be seriously obstructed during the glaciation. There would then be left available for occupation, mainly by the Mediterranean race, central and southern Europe together with the islands, notably Sicily and Crete, left over as remnants of the earlier continuous land between Europe and Africa. The southern extensions of the mainland, and more particularly the islands, would still afford a favorable place for the Mediterranean race and its cultural growth. So that the early phases of the great Cretan (Aegean) civilization are presumably to be assigned to this period that is covered by the last advance of the ice in northern Europe. But the greater portion of the land area so left accessible to the Mediterranean race, in central or even in southern Europe, would have been under glacial or subglacial climatic conditions. For this race, essentially native to a warm climate, this situation on the European mainland would be sufficiently novel and trying, particularly throughout that ice-fringed range of country where they would be exposed to such cold and damp as this race has never easily tolerated.

The situation so outlined would afford such a condition of physiological strain as might be conceived to throw the stock into a specifically unstable state and so bring on a phase of mutation. At the same time this situation, climatic and technological, would be notably favorable to the survival and propagation of a type gifted with all the peculiar capacities and limitations of the dolicho-blond; so that any mutant showing the traits characteristic of that type would then have had an eminently favorable chance of survival. Indeed, it is doubtful, in the present state of the available evidence, whether such a type of man could have survived in Europe from or over any period of quaternary time prior to the last period of glaciation. The last preceding interglacial period appears to have been of a sufficiently genial (perhaps sub-tropical) character throughout Europe to have definitively eliminated the Magdalenian race

and culture, and a variation of climate in the genial sense sufficiently pronounced to make Europe absolutely untenable for the Magdalenian—presumed to be something of a counterpart to the Eskimo both in race and culture—should probably have reached the limit of tolerance for the dolicho-blond as well. The latter is doubtless not as intolerant of a genial—warm-temperate—climate as the former, but the dolicho-blond after all stands much nearer to the Eskimo in this matter of climatic tolerance than to either of the two chief European stocks with which it is associated. Apparently no racial stock with a climatic tolerance approximately like that of the Eskimo, the Magdalenian, or the current races of the Arctic seaboard, survived over the last inter-glacial period; and if the dolicho-blond is conceived to have lived through that period it would appear to have been by a precariously narrow margin. So that, on one ground and another, the mutation out of which the dolicho-blond has arisen is presumably to be assigned to the latest period of glaciation in Europe, and with some probability to the time when the latest glaciation was at its maximum, and to the region where glacial and seaboard influences combined to give that racial type a differential advantage over all others.

This dolicho-blond mutation may, of course, have occurred only once, in a single individual, but it should seem more probable, in the light of De Vries' experiments, that the mutation will have been repeated in the same specific form in several individuals in the same general locality and in the same general period of time. Indeed, it would seem highly probable that several typically distinct mutations will have occurred, repeatedly, at roughly the same period and in the same region, giving rise to several new types, some of which, including the dolicho-blond, will have survived. Many, presumably the greater number, of these mutant types will have disappeared, selectively, being unfit to survive under those sub-glacial seaboard conditions that were eminently favorable to the dolicho-blond; while other mutants arising out of the same mutating period and adapted

to climatic conditions of a more continental character, suitable to more of a continental habitat, less humid, at a higher altitude and with a wider seasonal variation of temperature, may have survived in the regions farther inland, particularly eastward of the selectively defined habitat of the dolicho-blond. These latter may have given rise to several blond races, such as are spoken for by Deniker⁵ and certain British ethnologists.

The same period of mutation may well have given rise also to one or more brunet types, some of which may have survived. But if any new brunet type has come up within a period so recent as this implies, the fact has not been noted or surmised hitherto—unless the brunet races spoken for by Deniker are to be accepted as typically distinct and referred to such an origin. The evidence for the brunet stocks has not been canvassed with a question of this kind in view. These stocks have not been subject of such eager controversy as the dolicho-blond, and the attention given them has been correspondingly less. The case of the blond is unique in respect of the attention spent on questions of its derivation and prehistory, and it is also singular in respect of the facility with which it can be isolated for the purposes of such an inquiry. This large and persistent attention, from all sorts of ethnologists, has brought the evidence bearing on the dolicho-blond into such shape as to permit more confident generalizations regarding that race than any other.

In any case the number of mutant individuals, whether of one or of several specific types, will have been very few as compared with the numbers of the parent stock from which they diverged, even if they may have been somewhat numerous as counted absolutely, and the survivors whose offspring produced a permanent effect on the European peoples will have been fewer still. It results that these surviving mutants will not have been isolated from the parent stock, and so could not breed in isolation, but must forthwith be crossed on the parent stock and could therefore

⁵ *The Races of Mankind*; and "Les six races composant la population de l'Europe," *Journal Anth. Inst.*, 1906.

yield none but hybrid offspring. From the outset, therefore, the community or communities in which the blond mutants were propagated would be made up of a mixture of blond and brunet, with the brunet greatly preponderating. It may be added that in all probability there were also present in this community from the start one or more minor brunet elements besides the predominant Mediterranean, and that at least shortly after the close of the glacial period the new brachycephalic brunet (Alpine) race comes into the case; so that the chances favor an early and persistent crossing of the dolicho-blond with more than one brunet type, and hence they favor complications and confusion of types from the start. It follows that, in point of pedigree, according to this view there neither is nor ever has been a pure-bred dolicho-blond individual since the putative original mutant with which the type came in. But under the Mendelian rule of hybrids it is none the less to be expected that, in the course of time and of climatically selective breeding, individuals (perhaps in appreciable numbers) will have come up from time to time showing the type characters unmixed and unweakened, and effectively pure-bred in point of heredity. Indeed, such individuals, effectively pure-bred or tending to the establishment of a pure line, will probably have emerged somewhat frequently under conditions favorable to the pure type. The selective action of the conditions of life in the habitat most favorable to the propagation of the dolicho-blond has worked in a rough and uncertain way toward the establishment, in parts of the Baltic and North Sea region, of communities made up pre-vaillingly of blonds. Yet none of these communities most favorably placed for a selective breeding in the direction of a pure dolicho-blond population have gone far enough in that direction to allow it safely to be said that the composite population of any such given locality is more than half blond.

Placed as it is in a community of nations made up of a hybrid mixture of several racial stocks there is probably no way at present of reaching a convincing demonstration of the typical originality of this dolicho-blond mutant, as contrasted with the other blond types with which it is associ-

ated in the European population; but certain general considerations go decidedly, perhaps decisively, to enforce such a view: (a) This type shows such a pervasive resemblance to a single one of the known older and more widely distributed types of man (the Mediterranean) as to suggest descent by mutation from this one rather than derivation by crossing of any two or more known types. The like can not be said of the other blond types, all and several of which may plausibly be explained as hybrids of known types. They have the appearance of blends, or rather of biometrical compromises, between two or more existing varieties of man. Whereas it does not seem feasible to explain the dolicho-blond as such a blend or compromise between any known racial types. (b) The dolicho-blond occurs, in a way, centrally to the other blond types, giving them a suggestive look of being ramifications of the blond stock, by hybridization, into regions not wholly suited to the typical blond. The like can scarcely be said for any of the other European types or races. The most plausible exception would be Deniker's East-European or Oriental race, Beddoe's Saxon, which stands in a somewhat analogous spacial relation to the other blond types. But this brachycephalic blond is not subject to the same sharp climatic limitations that hedge about the dolicho-blond; it occurs apparently with equally secure viability within the littoral home area of the dolicho-blond and in continental situations where conditions of altitude and genial climate would bar the latter from permanent settlement. The ancient and conventionally accepted center of diffusion of blondness in Europe lies within the seaboard region bordering on the south Baltic, the North Sea and the narrow waters of the Scandinavian peninsulas. Probably, if this broad central area of diffusion were to be narrowed down to a particular spot, the concensus of opinion as to where the narrower area of characteristic blondness is to be looked for, would converge on the lands immediately about the narrow Scandinavian waters. This would seem to hold true for historic and for prehistoric times alike. This region is at the same time, by common consent, the peculiar home of the dolicho-

blond, rather than of any other blond type. (c) The well known but little discussed climatic limitation of the blond race applies particularly to the dolicho-blond, and only in a pronouncedly slighter degree to the other blond types. The dolicho-blond is subject to a strict regional limitation, the other blond types to a much less definite and wider limitation of the same kind. Hence these others are distributed somewhat widely, over regions often remote and climatically different from the home area of the dolicho-blond, giving them the appearance of being dispersed outward from this home area as hybrid extensions of the central and typical blond stock. A further and equally characteristic feature of this selective localization of the dolicho-blond race is the fact that while this race does not succeed permanently outside the seaboard region of the south Baltic and North Sea, there is no similar selective bar against other races intruding into this region. Although the dolicho-blond perhaps succeeds better within its home area than any other competing stock or type, yet several other types of man succeed so well within the same region as to hold it, and apparently always to have held it, in joint tenancy with the dolicho-blond.

A close relationship, amounting to varietal identity, of the Kabyle with the dolicho-blond has been spoken for by Keane and by other ethnologists. But the very different climatic tolerance of the two races should put such an identity out of the question. The Kabyle lives and thrives best, where his permanent home area has always been, in a high and dry country, sufficiently remote from the sea to make it a continental rather than a littoral habitat. The dolicho-blond, according to all available evidence, can live in the long run only in a seaboard habitat, damp and cool, at a high latitude and low altitude. There is no known instance of this race having gone out from its home area on the northern seaboard into such a region as that inhabited by the Kabyle and having survived for an appreciable number of generations. That this type of man should have come from Mauritania, where it could apparently not live under the conditions known to have prevailed there in the

recent or the remoter past, would seem to be a biologic impossibility. Hitherto, when the dolicho-blond has migrated into such or a similar habitat it has not adapted itself to the new climatic requirements but has presently disappeared off the face of the land. Indeed, the experiment has been tried in Mauritanian territory. If the Kabyle blond is to be correlated with those of Europe, it will in all probability have to be assigned an independent origin, to be derived from an earlier mutation of the same Mediterranean stock to which the dolicho-blond is to be traced.

Questions of race in Europe are greatly obscured by the prevalence of hybrid types having more or less fixity and being more or less distinctly localized. The existing European peoples are hybrid mixtures of two or more racial stocks. The further fact is sufficiently obvious, though it has received less critical attention than might be, that these several hybrid populations have in the course of time given rise to a number of distinct national and local types, differing characteristically from one another and having acquired a degree of permanence, such as to simulate racial characters and show well marked national and local traits in point of physiognomy and temperament. Presumably, these national and local types of physique and temperament are hybrid types that have been selectively bred into these characteristic forms in adaptation to the peculiar circumstances of environment and culture under which each particular local population is required to live, and that have been so fixed (provisionally) by selective breeding of the hybrid material subject to such locally uniform conditions—except so far as the local characters in question are of the nature of habits and are themselves therefore to be classed as an institutional element rather than as characteristics of race.

It is evident that under the Mendelian law of hybridization the range of favorable, or viable, variations in any hybrid population must be very large—much larger than the range of fluctuating (non-typical) variations obtainable under any circumstances in a pure-bred race. It also follows from these same laws of hybridization that by virtue of the

mutual exclusiveness of allelomorphic characters or groups of characters it is possible selectively to obtain an effectually "pure line" of hybrids combining characters drawn from each of the two or more parent stocks engaged, and that such a composite pure line may selectively be brought to a provisional fixity⁶ in any such hybrid population. And under conditions favorable to a type endowed with any given hybrid combination of characters so worked out the given hybrid type (composite pure line) may function in the racial mixture in which it is so placed very much as an actual racial type would behave under analogous circumstances; so that, *e.g.*, under continued intercrossing such a hybrid population would tend cumulatively to breed true to this provisionally stable hybrid type, rather than to the actual racial type represented by any one of the parent stocks of which the hybrid population is ultimately made up, unless the local conditions should selectively favor one or another of these ultimate racial types. Evidently, too, the number of such provisionally stable composite pure lines that may be drawn from any hybrid mixture of two or more parent stocks must be very considerable—indeed virtually unlimited; so that on this ground there should be room for any conceivable number of provisionally stable national or local types of physique and temperament, limited only by the number of characteristically distinguishable local environments or situations that might each selectively act to characterize and establish a locally characteristic composite pure line; each answering to the selective exigencies of the habitat and cultural environment in which it is placed, and each responding to these exigencies in much the same fashion as would an actual racial type—provided only that this provisionally stable composite pure line is not crossed on pure-bred individuals of either of the parent stocks from which it is drawn, pure-bred in respect of the allelomorphic characters which give the hybrid type its typical traits.

When the hybrid type is so crossed back on one or other of its parent stocks it should be expected to break down;

⁶ Illustrated by the various pure breeds or "races" of domestic animals.

but in so slow-breeding a species as man, with so large a complement of unit characters (some 4000 it has been estimated), it will be difficult to decide empirically which of the two lines—the hybrid or the parent stock—proves itself in the offspring effectively to be a racial type; that is to say, which of the two (or more) proves to be an ultimately stable type arisen by a Mendelian mutation, and which is a provisionally stable composite pure line selectively derived from a cross. The inquiry at this point, therefore, will apparently have to content itself with arguments of probability drawn from the varying behavior of the existing hybrid types under diverse conditions of life.

Such general consideration of the behavior of the blond types of Europe, other than the dolicho-blond, and more particularly consideration of their viability under divergent climatic conditions, should apparently incline to the view that they are hybrid types, of the nature of provisionally stable composite pure lines.

So far, therefore, as the evidence has yet been canvassed, it seems probable on the whole that the dolicho-blond is the only survivor from among the several mutants that may have arisen out of this presumed mutating period; that the other existing blond types, as well as certain brunets, are derivatives of the hybrid offspring of the dolicho-blond crossed on the parent Mediterranean stock or on other brunet stocks with which the race has been in contact early or late; and that several of these hybrid lines have in the course of time selectively been established as provisionally stable types (composite pure lines), breakable only by a fresh cross with one or other of the parent types from which the hybrid line sprang, according to the Mendelian rule.⁷

All these considerations may not be convincing, but they are at least suggestive to the effect that if originality is to

⁷ Mr. R. B. Bean's discussion of Deniker's "Six Races," *e.g.*, goes far to show that such is probably the standing of the blond types, other than the dolicho-blond, among these six races of Europe; although such is not the conclusion to which Mr. Bean comes. *Philippine Journal of Science*, September, 1909.

be claimed for any one of the blond types or stocks it can best be claimed for the dolicho-blond, while the other blond types may better be accounted for as the outcome of the crossing of this stock on one or another of the brunet stocks of Europe.

NOTES AND REVIEWS

The Passing of the Manchus. By PERCY HORACE KENT, M.A. (Oxon), Legal Adviser to the Taotai of Industries in the Province of Chihli, China. New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1912.

By this volume Mr. Kent has increased the public's indebtedness to him for a sensible clear and sympathetic narrative of the great events enacting in new China. His earlier work, *Railway Enterprise in China*, warranted us in looking for a second well-wrought task, and these expectations have been fulfilled. Both these books are invaluable to all such readers as wish to follow intelligently the absorbing modern drama of China in development.

The *Railway Enterprise* traces the history of China's dealings with foreign financiers seeking railway and kindred concessions, cajoling, bargaining and intriguing,—often with the dollar diplomacy of their honorable governments applying “pressure” to support them. The story as Mr. Kent tells it extenuates nothing, while free from animus or partiality. The documents and agreements are set before us, so that we may form our own judgment of China's impotence or worse, and of the moral standards of “business” in Christendom! Alas, even for our own country we have to blush with shame and indignation. But the author is ever the dispassionate narrator—no more. His book, while not lacking a lawyer's analysis, is pervaded withal by a style so good that even the ordinary reader, and not alone the railway expert, is carried along as in the current of an interesting tale. And when he lays down the book at last, the reader has become most curious to know the sequel of the complications in which harassed China had become entangled. This he will find in *The Passing of the Manchus*. In the earlier chapters of this book, he will find a close connection with Mr. Kent's former work; and he will learn the *dénouement* of the railway story in the popular agitations of Hunan, the unanimous revolt of Sz Chuan, and the dramatic downfall of the Minister, Sheng Kung-pao. But after all, momentous as were these events, they are only a single feature in the history of the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty. We have given to them this

prominence because they constitute so natural and interesting a sequel to Mr. Kent's *Railway Enterprise*.

We turn now without further delay to the other and wider value of the book which forms the subject of the present notice. Here is a narrative of the causes and events which led to the uprising of October, 1911, at Wuchang, of the unavailing efforts of the Peking government to suppress it, of the growth of the rebellion within a few weeks into a revolution which set up its own capital, its own president, its own congress, and speedily effected the abdication of the Manchu regent, Prince Chun. Meanwhile, we witness the dramatic re-entry of Yuan Shih-kai upon the national stage; then come the pregnant negotiations at Shanghai between Yuan's envoys on behalf of the Manchu monarchy and the revolution's representatives,—the latter demanding nothing less than the abdication of the emperor, the resignation of the imperial house forever, and the establishment of a republic. The steps by which Yuan—convinced at length that the monarchy cannot be saved—brings about Manchu renunciation of the throne, acquiescence in the republic, and the transference of governmental authority in strictly legal form, are vividly related. Next follows the election of Yuan as provisional president, the disinterested and patriotic self-effacement of Sun Yat Sen, and the establishment of the new government at Peking—after much discussion of the claim that the capital ought to be Nanking, as it had been in the first portion of the Ming era. The last part of the book is largely (and necessarily) devoted to the efforts of the new regime to reach an agreement with the International syndicate and obtain a foreign loan. The narrative is brought down to the end of August, 1912, at which time the loan negotiations were still uncompleted.

Throughout his task the author has enjoyed a marvellous field for the description of dramatic incidents in rapid and surprising succession, and for frequent discussions and conclusions of a judicial kind. The events of the *coup d'etat* of 1898 claim his consideration, and the still vexed question of Yuan's loyalty at that crisis—so tremendous an issue for him. The writer seems to think, as we do, that had the Empress Dowager lived, the monarchy would not have fallen, and China would not be a doubtful republic today. He reveals to us the revolutionaries at work behind the scenes for years before the rebellion actually broke out. We are given glimpses of Sun Yat Sen's activity in inciting the Chinese students and others, in Japan and other foreign countries, against the Manchus; we see Liang Chi-chao and Sun Chiao-jen stirring

their fellow countrymen to political thought by means of the new and free press. We believe that no reader, whether of the class already familiar with China, or of those who have hitherto cared little for far-eastern affairs, can drop this book till he has read it through; the situations are too startling, the actors too various and too human, the plot too momentous not to absorb our undivided interest. And when the drama closes, we are challenged by the greatest of all present world questions: Will the new government maintain itself, and secure the prolonged confidence and support of the Chinese nation? If not so, then what is to be the outcome? To these questions Mr. Kent addresses himself in his concluding chapter, "Quo Vadis." Here the various chances of the near future are marshalled one by one and examined. The diverse conditions and influences now prevalent in China are set forth and weighed. There is anxiety but not cynicism, hopefulness but no gushing optimism. The present reviewer refrains from marring this fair comprehensive and lucid analysis by an attempt to condense it.

In closing a far from optimistic forecast our author writes: "The belief is entertained, however, that the inherent soundness of the race, which has weathered so many storms, may be relied upon ultimately to realise and follow the wiser way. In the meantime the West may well extend to China a patient and well-informed sympathy, remembering that if, like Pandora, the revolutionaries have liberated a cloud of troubles, there also fluttered forth from the fateful box the radiant vision of Hope."

Why, then, has America for the past twelvemonth violated her former traditions and turned the cold shoulder on the new China's plea for mere recognition? It were a small boon, and we might have helped so her much! Have we ceased to act for ourselves, and are we permitting Europe and Japan to think and to decide for us?

E. B. DREW.

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
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