


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 \* POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF \*  
 \* THE FAR EASTERN SITUATION. \*  
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 \* Illustrated Lecture, to be given \*  
 \* at the Army Industrial College, \*  
 \* Washington, D.C. on 16, May, 1938 \*  
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 \* by \*  
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 \* Colonel Cary I. Crockett, Infantry. \*  
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POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF THE FAR EASTERN SITUATION

The information and conclusions which I present are based on research and observation abroad, extending over a period of many years. The conclusions are merely my own. They are in no sense official.

In establishing a background for the present situation, I shall begin at the time --more than a hundred thousand years ago-- when man changed from a sub-human to a human animal.

The increase in population from that time to the year 1800, when the total population of the world reached an estimated figure of five hundred millions, was so slow that if it were plotted graphically, to scale, the curve would appear practically as a long, horizontal line. During the hundred years following, however, the world population almost quadrupled, the estimated total for 1900 being nearly two billion. The curve of increase for that one century would appear therefore as a short, almost vertical line.

Biologically, the human race has infinite possibilities of multiplication; unfortunately, we are living in a finite world.

Within the last two hundred years some of the great western nations, our own included, through expansion --either natural or resulting from imperialistic aims-- have preempted a major portion of the most desirable land areas of the earth. As a result, perhaps, of the higher standards of living thus made possible, their population totals tend towards stabilization and in some cases have even begun to decline.

On the other hand, there are three great nations, already heavily overpopulated, yet with a rapidly increasing excess of births over deaths, each seeking --demanding-- room to expand. Common to all three are a populace

physically strong, morally aggressive, armed and organized for war under militant leaders who propose to grasp what they think is essential --if necessary by force of arms. Allied to resist Communism, these states aim for new empires; a German Empire in Central and Eastern Europe; a Roman Empire along the Mediterranean and in Africa, and a Japanese Empire in Eastern Asia and the Pacific.

Add to these disturbing factors another; the situation in Russia; where one hundred and seventy million people, occupying nearly one-sixth of the land surface of the globe, have undergone, through revolution, the most comprehensive change in government and human relationships the world has ever known and who are now dominated by a political organization which has for one of its expressed objectives the destruction of Christian civilization as we know it.

Lastly, there has been a general spread of socialist and communist ideology which has stimulated the masses all over the world and excited an urge for material betterment.

These are some of the causes of the deeply seated fear and unrest which prevail everywhere. Throughout the civilized world there seems to have been a reversion almost to medievalism. International relationships and diplomacy have changed. For instance, even Japan and China legally are at peace.

The situation in Europe has been such, therefore, that neither the League of Nations nor any European state, or combination of states, except Russia, has been in a position to divert military force to the Asiatic theater --and force is the only thing that counts out there.

Japan, the leading power in Asia, has realized this and acted accordingly.

The great nations with home borders that fringe the North Pacific are the United States, Russia, China, and Japan.

I shall touch briefly upon the policies and actions of these states which relate to my subject.

The United States is an Asiatic Power. We became one upon the acquisition of the Philippine Islands in 1898.

(Show Slide No. 4399, Map of Pacific Area)

Under our economic system of free competition, we must preserve and develop foreign trade or, rather, an international exchange of products. There has been some loose thinking on this subject, judging by adverse remarks made sometimes about Americans who are carrying on commercial activities abroad. Such men are directly promoting the international trade essential to our present system. The day has passed when an European or American business representative could stay at home or even sit in his counting room, say in Shanghai, and wait for trade. He has to go out and get the business, and this the Americans have done. At the beginning of last year, the American civilian residents in Shanghai, alone, with their families, totalled some four thousand.

Our greatest exchange of products in the Far East is with Japan. Most of this trade is complementary. Competition has already started, however, and is rapidly growing.

The salient point about American trade in the Far East is that while the data upon the Philippine Islands and China show a visible balance in their favor, the data relative to Japan demonstrate that our sales to Japan are greatly in excess of our purchases from that country.

(Show Slide No. 4495, Trade Data, China, P.I., and Japan, 1936).

The principal American pronouncements establishing our diplomatic policy in the Far East are to be found in the notes of Secretary John Hay, 1900, regarding the open door; provisions of the Nine Power Treaty of 1922 and Pact of Paris (Kellogg), 1928; Secretary Stimson's Note, 1932; and the State Department's Note of October 7th, 1937, concerning Japanese military operations in China.

(Show slides:

No. 4486, Secretary Hay's Note, 1900.

No. 4488, Pact of Paris, Kellogg, 1928.

No. 4487, Secretary Stimson's Note, 1932.

No. 4493, U.S. State Dept., Note of 7th Oct. 1937,

re Japanese Military Operations in China.)

Our Far Eastern policies can be epitomized in a few words; peace in the Pacific, preservation of the territorial and administrative integrity of China; parity with other nations in trading rights and privileges.

In 1934, Congress passed an act providing for the independence of the Philippine Islands. Regard for the truth compels the statement that this was done more for material reasons than to keep a promise.

(Show Slide No. 4491, P.I. Independence)

Soon afterwards (November 14, 1935), the President proclaimed the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth, complete independence to be granted at the expiration of a ten-year period (July 4th, 1946).

It appears, therefore, that unless the present policy is changed, the United States is to recede from the geographical position in Asia --the sooner the better, perhaps. Since the Washington Conference of 1921-1922 when the American Government agreed not to strengthen the possessions in the Western Pacific, our position in the Philippine Islands, in the military sense, has been untenable.

Whether or not we have acted wisely in relinquishing power out there to the brilliant Filipino leader, Mr. Quezon, while we retain responsibility for what may happen, is not for me to say.

The Japanese have large holdings in the Philippine Islands. They are rapidly increasing their trade and also are getting ownership of the retail business formerly monopolized by Chinese. Davao, one of the richest provinces, with an excellent port, is settled and practically controlled by some 15,000 Japanese colonists, who have made of it a little Japan.

~~Under a strained situation --and the situation now is strained-- calmness~~  
in dealing with Japanese Nationals is essential. I hope that the President  
of the Philippine Commonwealth does not fail to remember this when he is  
handling the incidents in which Japanese are concerned that each year becomes  
more frequent. In the Far East we are weak. It was Milton, I believe, who  
said in "Paradise Lost", "To be weak is miserable."

(Show Slide No. 4474; conflicting issues between U.S. and Japan)  
The situation of Japan athwart the direct route from our west coast  
to Asia is shown on this slide.

(Show Slide No. 4338; Great circle chart of North Pacific)

(Lights on)

### Russia

The Soviet Union is a federation of eleven Soviet, socialist, republics  
with the capital at Moscow. Territorially it has been characterized by  
Trotsky as "a monolithic mass sprawled over the top of the world from the  
Baltic to the Behring Sea".

The Russian people are ruled by the Communist Party, which is controlled  
by the Politburo, an inner council of ten men. The Politburo is dominated by  
Stalin. The government, which is in effect the Communist Party, is supported  
in power by the Red Army. The strength of the army is given as 1,400,000 men  
with the colors. This figure does not include an independent interior defense  
force composed of about 250,000 frontier guards and so-called political troops.

If it were possible to develop the Russian army in full strength against  
a single objective, it would constitute the most powerful military force in  
existence. However, with the threat of hostilities ever present, on both  
the Asiatic and European fronts, almost five thousand miles apart, there can be  
no hope of concentrating the army as a whole for mass action on any one front.  
The conclusions follow, therefore, that until there is a change in the world  
situation, which cannot yet be envisaged, two groups of field armies --each  
completely autonomous-- must be maintained strategically available, one for  
the European and the other for the far eastern frontier.

The Soviet leaders have done exactly this, and as an added common-sense measure are improving the means for east and west transportation. They expect war and are preparing to meet it on both fronts.

Of the Army's loyalty and will to fight there was little doubt before the execution last year of various officers of high reputation as Bolshevik leaders. What happened to them was the result probably of their partial deviation from the strict party line with respect to the attitude towards Germany and also opposition to the installation by Stalin in each military unit of a political commissar with authority to pass upon all actions and orders of the commander. The political administration in the Army is directly subordinate to the Central Committee of the Communist Party. This action on the part of the Dictator has had a serious effect upon morale and loyalty in the Army. The Japanese are aware of the opposition to Stalin and may have been influenced by it in timing the present military operations against China.

(Show Slide No. 4385; The Far East).

As a rule the Russians whom I met when I crossed Russia in 1936 were averse to talking freely to a foreigner. I did meet two or three, however, who were either high enough in the Party not to be afraid, or perhaps had been detailed to check up on me. They professed fear of an attack by Germany, either through the Baltic countries with the left flank resting on the sea and supported by the German navy, or with a straight drive through Czecho Slovakia against Kiev, with the grain fields of the Ukraine and the oil regions of the Black Sea area as part of the fruits of victory. At the same time the Japanese, bound by secret military agreement with the Germans, are to advance towards the Lake Baikal bottleneck in an attempt to lop off maritime Siberia, a region greater than Canada. Alliance with France was sought by Russia as a counterpoise against Germany but military assistance from France is dependent on action of the League, hence prompt support cannot be counted upon.

(Show Slide No. 4513; Sketch Map of U.S.S.R.)

In the Far East, especial measures have been taken to overcome the weakness of the Soviet railway system. Moreover, the group of armies out there, fully equipped with tanks, heavy guns and airplanes, has been made self-sufficient not merely with respect to food supply but also as to replenishment in munitions. A recent German estimate gives the Trans-Baikal forces 15 to 18 divisions, 3 cavalry divisions, 800 tanks, 600 armored cars, and 900 airplanes.

Soviet defense plans have provided for the establishment of the principal munition factories far in the interior in the remote Baikal-Ural regions. The advantage of this is that the factories are beyond the present-day radius of hostile bombing planes while, on the other hand, the principal cities of the prospective enemy states are within effective range of Red air fleets, operating from advanced bases.

At the same time, the frontiers have been strengthened by fortifications, and the Siberian railway line, double-tracked throughout its length, except at some of the large bridges.

In addition, the new Baikal-Amur railway, which branches from the Trans-Siberian west of Lake Baikal at Taishet, has been under rapid construction with forced labor. Political prisoners estimated to number more than 100,000, have been used to rush the work. Completion of this railway was recently (February 28) announced, but the truth of this statement is open to doubt. The line passes north of Lake Baikal and extends roughly parallel to the Trans-Siberian to Komsomolsk on the Amur, thence north to Nicolaevsk on the sea of Okhotsk and south to Khabarovsk and Vladivostock.

Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang have come under Russian influence and are being developed as buffer states. Russian railways are being rapidly extended towards these areas. Motor highways are also under construction. Local industries are being developed through Russian loans and other measures are being taken to attract commerce to the northward.

After the Japanese took Manchuria Russia found it expedient to release the Chinese Eastern Railway to Japan for much less than what it was worth. The advantage to Japan of this strategic line is apparent.



Russia has accomplished remarkable developments in the Arctic regions. Russian ships have succeeded in getting through the northeast passage to Behring Sea. As you know, Russian aviators were the pioneers in a non-stop flight to the United States over the North Pole.

In the Pacific, Russia is reported to have some 50 submarines and 30 destroyers. A glance at the map suffices to show the menace thus set up to Japanese control of the sea of Japan which is essential to Japanese conquest on the mainland.

No wonder the Japanese are uneasy at the proximity of Russia; and no wonder that the renewal by the United States of diplomatic relations with Russia increased the uneasiness and thus added to the resentment kept alive by long series of acts on our part that the Japanese regard as directly hostile to them.

(Lights on)

### China

And now we come to China. I have been there many times. I first went out there forty-two years ago. At that time China included Thibet, Outer and Inner Mongolia, and Manchuria, and Japan was merely a small island nation. These slides afford an interesting comparison.

(Show Slide No. 4383; China and Japan in 1895)

(Show Slide No. 4383 a; China and Japan in 1938)

In 1912, China was changed by revolution from a monarchy to a republic. Before then the country had been held together loosely by the administrative framework, but after the revolution various provinces set up semi-independent governments and there has been almost constant internecine strife. Imagine what conditions would be like in the United States if the boundaries of the country controlled by the Federal Government had changed during a 25 year period as those in China changed between 1914 and 1938. These slides are taken from a League of Nations report;

No. 6 government of Yuan Shi-Kai; 1912-1916 Peking.

No. 7 government of Tuan Chi-Jui; 1916-1920 Peking.

No. 8 government of Chihli; 1920-1924.

No. 9 regency under Tuan Chi-Jui; interregnum period.

1925-1927, Mukden.

No. 10 Nationalist government of Canton, later Nanking,

1927.

No. 11 Nationalist government of Nanking territory actualled  
by Chiang Kai-Shek, 1929.

No. 12 Nationalist government of Nanking normally controlling  
entire China, 1930.

No. 13 Nationalist government of Nanking territory actually  
controlled in 1931.

No. 5359 Chiang Kai-Shek.

The Nanking Government, theoretically controlled by the Kuomintang,  
or People's Party, has been held together by a military force of over 250,000  
men under Marshal and Dictator Chiang Kai-Shek. His organizations are fairly  
well trained and equipped. When I was at Nanking in 1933, I saw the military  
schools there where some 2,000 cadets and 1,500 company officers were being  
instructed under direction of 20 or more German officers headed by General  
von Seeckt. Frankly, the spectacle of Asiatics being taught by Europeans  
how to use artillery, airplanes, tanks and machine guns impressed me  
unpleasantly.

In addition to the marshal's modernized army, and the Communist forces,  
there are, or were, hundreds of thousands of poorly trained and equipped  
soldiers which form part of the various provincial armies, or are controlled  
by local War Lords. In a recent press dispatch sent from Hankow by John  
Gunther, he states that more than thirty new divisions have been formed  
from these troops under supervision of German military officers. As basic  
military material the Chinese soldier is good. The great weakness, aside

from the question of munitions, lies in the absence of an organized and trained staff and the lack of good regimental officers. 1136

For years the Nanking Government has struggled along under almost incredible difficulties. It has not only had to undergo continuous foreign pressure and various military revolutions, but in addition there has been a Communist or an agrarian revolt and revolution in various other forms such as political, economic, sociologic, and even literary.

Pressure from the exterior really has had a unifying effect. Radio helped greatly in the unification. For the first time China has been able to circulate news quickly throughout the country. The great majority of the people are unable to read but they can hear.

In view of the previous lack of a widely disseminated feeling among the people of loyalty to the central government; the capture of large areas by Communist forces; local jealousies due to sectionalism; famine; civil wars; the great flood of 1931; the difficulties of enforcing the authority of the central government in distant provinces, and above all the obstacles placed by Japan, the advance towards unification seems surprising.

Chiang Kai-Shek, following his sequestration by the young Marshal Chang Hsueh Ling in 1936 and subsequent release, was no longer able to hold off active resistance against Japan, hence he became reconciled with the Communists and all are now united in opposition to the common enemy. The basis of the Marshal's agreement with the Communists is: government control of the Chinese Red army; dissolution of district soviets and suspension of class war. The Communists are willing because they realize that imperialist Japan must first be blocked before they can have any hope of making further headway in promulgating Communist doctrines in China.

Japan has opposed everything which would help the Nanking Government. She has prevented foreign loans for promotion of railways, highways, and air transport systems, and she has deliberately tried to wreck the customs service which formed the principal source of revenue and the basis for guaranteeing loans. I got information at first hand on this subject from Mr. T. V. Soong,

the de facto president, which was confirmed by the best independent sources; such as the American Minister, and various consular officials, both American and British.

1137

(Show Slide No. 4391; The three great trade routes).

For hundreds of years the commerce of China has been carried mainly along three great trade routes, each with its terminal city on the coast and a river, caravan trail, or more recently a railway line of communications extending far into the interior.

These routes are:

1st. The route Tientsin--Peking, prolonged by railway to Kalgan and beyond. The "Great North Road" branches from Kalgan for Urga, capital of Outer Mongolia. Kalgan means gateway, and it is the main gateway to Mongolia.

2d. The route Shanghai-Yangtze River to Hankow, and Chungking in Szechwan, the great western Hinterland. This is the arterial commercial channel for nearly 200,000,000 people.

3d. The route Hong Kong-Canton, prolonged by railway and water routes to the interior.

Exclusive of Manchuria, captured by the Japanese in 1931; for purposes of foreign trade, China may therefore be divided into three great regions: North China, Central China, and South China. Tientsin, seized by the Japanese in July, 1937, is the port of collection and distribution for northern China; Shanghai, recently captured, is the port for Central China; and Canton, now blockaded against Chinese vessels, is the port for South China.

The Lunghai Railway line extending east and west between Sian in Shensi Province and Haichow, on the Yellow Sea, constitutes a fourth route now the objective of Japanese armies advancing against it from both north and south. The area held by the Chinese forces along this line has been referred to frequently in press reports as the Lunghai corridor.

The railway line extending north and south between Peking and Canton through the heart of China is now continuous except at Hankow where the

Yangtze is crossed by ferry. Strategically it is of the greatest importance as you see from the slide. 1140

China has tremendous potential military capabilities. Provision of munitions and the loan to China of a few thousand American officers to train and lead the Chinese troops would be decisive factors in a war with Japan.

These slides may give an idea of what the Chinese soldier looks like in the field.

Show slides:

No. 26 - Chinese troops, 19th route Army Kiangwan, 1932.

No. 2 -- C.I.C. in Chinese trenches at Kiangwan, 1932.

(Lights on)

### Japan

To review Japanese history in detail since the overthrow of the Shogunate in 1868 would be tedious and unnecessary. The turning point with which we are concerned occurred shortly before the close of the last century. You will recall that in 1894 Japan, still young and untried as a modern state, went to war with China to prevent Chinese occupation of Korea.

As the spoils of her more or less unexpected victory, Japan compelled China to cede the Port Arthur peninsula, but Russia, Germany and France intervened and made Japan relinquish it. Then Russia took over this peninsula by lease. Here was the turning point. By direction of the Emperor the elder statesman made an estimate of the situation. The conclusion reached then was that in the family of nations "might is right". Whether this conclusion still holds true, I leave you to judge.

The decision was that Japan should continue efforts to build up a large army and navy with modern organization and equipment; the navy organized and trained on British and the army on German lines. This was done. Furthermore, observers in large numbers were sent to America and Europe. They brought back what were thought to be the most suitable features of western civilization

and these after adaptation to Japanese institutions and sociology were put in effect. The results attained were illustrated by the brilliant successes of <sup>1141</sup> the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905. The Japanese were victorious in every encounter on land and sea.

In a few decades Japan was thus transformed from a feudal to a modern state. But the inherent traits and mentality of the people were not changed. We have, therefore, the presence among the family of nations of a people fully equipped with modern appliances for making war and skilled in their use, but with a medieval mind. And these people believe that all their greatness has come from war.

Japan has openly proclaimed an intention to dominate the Asian-Pacific portion of the globe. Now she is advancing again. Until the present war, Japan has had her own way with China. With respect to China, perhaps she should heed the warning in King Henry VIII, "Heat not a furnace for your foe so hot that it do singe yourself".

(Show slides No. 4377 - Japan in 1894)

No. 4378 " " 1910

No. 4375 " " 1919

No. 4376 " " 1931

No. 4379 " " 1933

No. 4374 " " 1937

No. 4374 a " " 1938

During the years of my travel and residence in the Far East I have had an opportunity personally to observe the step by step advance of Japan. Formosa and the Pescaderes were taken from China after the War of 1894-95. Korea and the Port Arthur Peninsula were occupied and the southern half of Sakhalin was added by cession from Russia in 1905. Korea was annexed in 1910. The mandated groups of islands were taken over in 1919. Manchuria was overrun and a new empire set up in 1931-1932. Jehol was conquered in 1933. As for today, you have but to look at the current press headlines.

(Show Slide No. 21, Japanese Expansion Southward)

To all intents the mandated islands (Marianas, Carolina, Pelew, and Marshall) are now practically a part of the Japanese Empire. The position of these islands extends Japan's barrier to the equator, thus enabling her to dominate the sea routes to the Asiatic mainland.

(Show slide No. 22; Japan in relation to Australia)

Japan and Australia are as close as the two halves of an apple. They meet at the Equator. Along that line the Japanese Mandate joins the Australian Mandate.

The Army envisages lateral expansion almost without limit and the Navy similarly seeks expansion southward through the East Indies and Oceanica towards Australia. To this advance, however, Russia, in the maritime provinces and Britain at Singapore afford a counterpoise. I do not refer to the United States in the Philippines or the Dutch in the East Indies because neither has offensive power in that theatre. The French, however, are said to be building a new naval base in Indo China.

The heads of the Japanese Army and Navy have direct access to the Emperor, who is all powerful. In Russia, politicians run the Army; in Japan, the Army runs the politicians.

There is the final objective of Japan occupying a resplendent place in the sun; the leader in all Asia with full political and economic control, and head of the movement for consolidation against the western nations. The resignation four years ago of General Araki, Minister of War, to enable him to take charge of the quasi-official Black Dragon propaganda organization marked the end of a phase. General Araki was the "strong man" of Japan when I was there in 1932. He was largely responsible for the seizure of Manchuria, for which Japan was found guilty by the League of Nations Commission, headed by Lord Lytton. I had my picture taken in a group with General Araki, and a few minutes later our Military Attaché whispered to me, "You have just been photographed sitting beside the most dangerous man in Asia." He made me think of Chengiz Khan.

Show Slides;

1142

No. 5361; Findings of League of Nations Commission.

No. 1; Picture of General Araki, T.R. and C.I.C.

No. 0; General Araki in "Kwodo", "Japan's way".

No. 4389; Extract from Harbin Shumbun.

No. 4492; Japan's Military policy.

General Araki in 1932 made a statement to the effect that the Japanese Navy is supreme from Suez to Honolulu. The statement is still true and will remain so until Great Britain sends a fleet to the new naval base at Singapore. Japan has refused recently to disclose her naval program.

(Show Slide No. 5548; Japan's sources of basic raw material).

Japan lacks various strategic raw materials among which are cotton, wool, iron, oil and rubber. She exchanges silk for American cotton. Her wool comes from Australia. Now it is planned to produce cotton in North China and wool on the Manchurian plains. Iron likewise is to be obtained on the mainland. Oil comes largely from the United States but also from the Dutch East Indies. While I was in Java in 1933 the Dutch had a scare --almost a panic. They called out their reserves and mobilized a reinforced brigade at Balikpapan in Borneo where the greatest oil bunkering establishments in the Far East are located. The Dutch were then also greatly excited over the reported sale to Japan of the Portuguese half of the Island of Timor, only 700 miles north of Australia. The sale was not made; the British intervened. Nevertheless The South Seas Development Company of Japan has leased large areas in Dutch New Guinea for raising cotton. Japan will never rest content until she is independent of potential enemies with respect to basic raw materials for war.

(Lights on)

To return to the Black Dragon Society, that is an organization having for its mission dissemination of ideas epitomized in the Slogan, "Asia for the Asiatics", with Japan, of course, exercising hegemony. Had I the time and the ability, I could write an interesting book about what I learned as I



followed the ramifications of this society through various countries in Asia.

One point in the Japanese thesis is that the people of Asia can no longer<sup>1144</sup> be compelled to buy manufactured products from white nations when Japan can provide them at much cheaper prices.

Let me give you a typical example of what this society turns out. I extracted this from an article in the vernacular press in Manila in 1933.

"The Americans have been promising the Filipinos independence for over thirty years. Now they wish to give it to them, not to keep their high sounding promise, but for the sordid reasons of self-interest, because of the economic depression and the fact that they do not wish the people or products of the Philippines to enter the United States.

"America is merely an incident in Asia and before long will disappear from the scene. The Filipinos should turn to us because we are close by and will always be here.

"We, the people of Asia, must show the rest of the world that we do not need their help and will not submit to their control."

The psychology of the Japanese has undergone a great change in my time. I landed at Kobe in 1899 in charge of a cargo of 500 mules. All my men got drunk, hence all the mules got loose. They tore like a living avalanche through the narrow streets, leaving destruction in their wake. The people were afraid of them and of us. In order to catch the mules, I planned to put a bell on a gray horse and go after them. We had no bell and as no one spoke the language, we went from shop to shop making sounds like a bell and soon had a crowd of about 1000 following us. Whenever we turned to look at the people they ran away. The point about this story is that they do not run from the foreigner now; they crowd him into the gutter.

There has been a change in our attitude too. Americans have experienced successively towards Japan curiosity, admiration, apprehension, suspicion, reprobation and alarm.

Japan has announced that she will be the guardian of the Pacific. This "hands off" policy she calls her Monroe Doctrine. But there is a difference

between it and ours. Our Monroe Doctrine was for the protection of Latin America, not to help us conquer it. Japan's Monroe Doctrine is equivalent to notice that she intends to dominate China and will not permit interference.

I think I am able to appreciate the point of view of the ruling elements in Japan. From their viewpoint there are many things to be said in favor of what they are doing. Under the belief that "might makes right" they put no faith in treaties. They know that diplomacy has had to recognize the well-known rule of Rebus Sic Stantibus, which in substance means that treaty provisions hold good only until circumstances change --and circumstances always do change. The Japanese express the rule this way: "The sanctity of any treaty depends on its utility and mutual benefit."

Japan is over-populated and does require more room. She has to industrialize, and this implies free sources of raw materials and foreign markets. If Japan should allow China to develop into a modern industrial state, not only would she lose her principal market but she would find a superior competitor in the world markets. Japan is afraid of Communism. According to the Japanese viewpoint, had not Japan taken over Manchuria and made further advances on the mainland, Soviet Russia, already progressing through Outer Mongolia, would have seized Manchuria. The Japanese also claim that if they listened to America and Britain they would soon sink to the status of a third-rate power. The Japanese people, speaking again from their viewpoint are amazed at the failure of America to understand their problems and they attribute this failure and the long series of affronts to which they have been subjected by America, to a deeply seated enmity on our part that eventually will lead to war.

#### The War in China

The Japanese may have been glad to have Chiang-Kai-Shek combat the Communists. Nevertheless by so doing he was enabled to forestall Japanese intervention under the excuse of saving China from Communism. After his agreement with the Communists to combine against further Japanese aggression, the army elements controlling Japan began to lay the train of powder for

the explosion that took place near Peking at the Marco Polo bridge last July.

Chinese resistance to Japanese invasion resulted in the war, undeclared,<sup>1/2</sup> which began then and has continued to the present day.

On September 5th Japan's foreign minister announced that his country's object was to break Chinese resistance once and for all. Japanese spokesmen explained that this meant replacing the existing government with one more friendly to Japan. What it actually meant apparently was that Japan intended to make of China a protectorate of her own.

Later in September China appealed to the League of Nations.

America was asked by the League to participate in judging the merits of the Chinese-Japanese fight.

One answer was our President's speech in Chicago on October 11th in which he denounced the epidemic of world lawlessness and treaty breaking and spoke of quarantining the violators.

The League's Far East committee suggested in its report on October 5th that the signatories of the Nine-Power Pact and other nations with special interests in the Far East (Russia) should meet to consider the situation.

The League accepted this report. About the same time our State Department issued a statement in effect accusing Japan of violating the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact. Shortly afterwards the State Department accepted the invitation to the Nine-Power conference scheduled to meet at Brussels.

The conference met; urged Japan to attend and upon being refused, addressed a report upholding the principles of the Nine-Power Treaty and then adjourned.

This conference is characterized by many as having been a "flop".

(Show Slide No. 5568, Situation in June, 1937).

With respect to Japanese strategy, their main effort during 1937 was in the north. The immediate objectives in North China were:

- (1) A western advance to isolate China from Outer Mongolia and Russia.
- (2) Capture of all territory north of the Yellow River.

(3) Establishment of a North China buffer state to include the five northern provinces of Hopei, Shantung, Shansi, Suiyuan, and Chahar. 1187

I repeat that what they wish to do ultimately is to cut off maritime Siberia (Soviet Primorskaya), thus making the sea of Japan a Japanese lake and freeing the Japanese from fear of attack by Russian air and submarine forces operating from bases on the Pacific. So long as Russia represents Communism, and possesses the port of Vladivostock, within bombing range of every important city of Japan, the Japanese can never feel secure.

(Show Slides No. 4373; Effective Bombing Range from Vladivostock.

No. 15, Camel Caravan at Great Wall.

No. 14, View showing Topography along Great Wall.

No. 4296, Situation Early September, 1937.)

The advance to the west in North China entailed flanking protection against a Chinese attack coming up from the south via the Hankow-Pieping and the Fukow-Tientsin Railways. To guard against such a threat, the Japanese sent columns southward along the railways towards the line of the Yellow River.

The Shanghai-Nanking drive was probably started as a secondary movement to assist the northern advance by attracting Chiang-Kai-Shek's modern troops eastward. Shanghai fell, after a prolonged battle. Nanking, the Chinese capital, was then captured. Japan thus gained control of the great Yangtze River trade route. Victory at Shanghai was also desired to remove the stigma which attaches from what was practically a Japanese defeat at that place by the Chinese 19th route army in 1932. This defeat meant serious loss of face for Japan.

Without doubt the Japanese high command thought that the setting up of another puppet state in the north with the consequent closing of the principal land communications with Russia; the capture of Shanghai and Nanking, and the isolation of China from the sea brought about by blockading all ports, would give them such a strangle hold on the political and economic life of

the country that the war would end at once. In brief, they thought they were going to have a cheap war. 1142

But such was not the case. Despite immense losses in battle the Chinese carried on. The capital was moved to Hankow, five hundred miles up the Yangtze. The people became unified in opposition to the invaders and the cohesion and tenacity in battle of the Chinese fighting forces surprised the entire world. The Japanese found that they had a bear by the tail and couldn't let go. They were committed to war and couldn't stop short of victory and capture of the new capital.

(Show Slide No. 374, Military Situation as of Dec. 31, 1937).

The farther the Japanese have advanced into the interior the more vulnerable their long lines of communication have become to attack by Chinese irregulars, such as the re-equipped Communist forces on their flank in the west. As yet, one major obstacle is athwart the path to the Japanese objectives, and that is the Nanking government's main army, with its generalissimo, Chiang-Kai-Shek.

The question arises: What is the Japanese strategic concept with respect to the operations in Central China?

The Japanese military system has been predominantly Germanic. In view of that fact it therefore appears not improbable that von Schlieffen and his teachings are the inspiration of Japanese strategy.

Strategically, a decisive victory after the Schlieffen order can only be achieved by an encirclement and the annihilation of the hostile main army. Evidently, driving Chiang-Kai-Shek's main army into the mountains and plains of Western China, where he could carry on endless guerilla warfare with Russian help, would not fit into such a picture. More probable was the plan of cutting off Chiang-Kai-Shek from his capital and base, driving him eastward towards the sea; separating him from the Communists; and also closing the principal overland route to Russia. This could be accomplished by having the western Japanese column, the one advancing south along the Peiping-Hankow Railway, cross the Yellow River, cut the Lanchow railway at Chongchow or Kaifeng, and

then join hands with the column advancing north up the Pukow-Tientsin Railway from the direction of Nanking. But the western effort seems to have failed. There were too many guerilla forces in behind the main columns which had to be mopped up and besides the Chinese held the line of the Yellow River in strength. The Japanese front was over 400 miles in width from east to west. Evidently their strategy was too grandiose for quick success.

(Show Slide No. 5369, The Japanese Plan;

Slide No. 5387, Situation, March 1, 1938.)

Hence the prolonged battle in April for the Lunghai Railway junction at Soochow was a natural result.

(Show Slide No. 5391, Situation during first part

of May, 1938.)

What the Japanese really wish, I think, is an opportunity to make peace. One press writer says: Japan has already passed up her best chance to "win the war"; that is, emerge from it with war reserves intact, her immediate strategic necessities realized and her position as strongest power in the Western Pacific unquestioned.

(Show Slide No. 5442, Routes for Supply of Munitions).

Since Japan has control of the sea and all Chinese ports are blockaded, supply of munitions for China from the exterior is difficult. According to recent reports, however, arms, equipment and munitions are being brought in through French Indo China and even through Burma; heavy shipments have been received through Hongkong and likewise from Russia via the 2,000 mile caravan route from the Turk-Sib Railway near the northwestern frontier of Sinkiang to Sian, on the Lunghai railroad. Many Russian planes have been flown to China by Russian pilots.

Railways and roads, in being and under construction, now radiate from Hankow in all directions. Half a million Chinese are reported to be at work on new railway lines and highways connecting Hankow with the Russian railroad through Turkestan; the British system in Burma and the French railway line extending from Hanoi in French Indo-China to Yunnanfu. All these are backdoor

land routes now being used for getting in munitions.

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The Japanese leaders may have overreached themselves in failing to take due account of their nation's economic limitations.

Japan's policies at home have come under severe criticism.

The National Industrial Mobilization Law also has caused much dissension.

Japan's adverse trade balance is serious. The excess of imports over exports for the first six months of 1937 came to 618,000,000 yen. Already Japan is being hard hit by the rise in prices of raw materials. Japan's industrial strength is in the light industries. She cannot even supply herself with automobiles. By last year the national debt was already about eleven billion yen. The total national income is placed at only thirteen billion yen. There is growing industrial unrest and class feeling. Japan may yet be beaten on her home front if the war drags on and this probably is China's hope.

What does the poet say?

"The strongest castle, tower or town; the golden bullet beats it down."

Possibly action by Russia may put an end to Japan's dream of domination over Asia, after continued drain on Japanese resources renders critical her economic and financial weakness. There are some who even contend that the rise of Japan reached its highest point in 1937 and that her decline as a great power has set in.

(Lights on)

### CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions which follow are merely my own, presented for what they may be worth.

#### China

China, unassisted by any other power except Russia in secret, will have to submit to further loss of territory. It does not appear probable that China, even if victorious, will be able to dislodge the Japanese from

Shanghai, the Shantung peninsula, or all of the recently conquered regions north of the Yellow River. 1151

Japan's weakness is economic and financial. China's strategy should be based, therefore, on prolongation of the war, with or without such aid as Russia may give.

Time is working for China. With an immense superiority in manpower and a vast hinterland to fall back upon, China should hold out indefinitely. Everything depends on the spirit of the people and munitions.

Taking a long view of the situation this war may make possible final liberation of China from all foreign domination. The Japanese may be helping the very revolution they profess to fear in that they are wiping out the interests of the world powers in China, destroying the Chinese bourgeoisie, unifying the masses and presenting China with one oppressor instead of many.

#### Japan

Japan, capitalizing on European unsettlement, will continue the policy of Asiatic domination by economic penetration and political expansion on the mainland and through the South Sea Islands.

She will not invade Siberia in the near future unless Russia becomes embroiled in Europe, or attempts to occupy Manchukuo or inner Mongolia.

Japan has lost her best chance to end the war.

The Japanese elements in control have accomplished successfully three achievements in as many wrong directions.

1. In China: Japan's natural and best market, the Japanese not only have made the people hate them but they have inspired the Chinese to unite in defense of their homes against them.

2. In the outside world: The Japanese have filled various nations with distrust which has resulted in an increase in armaments, a decrease in trade and a hostile spirit against Japan.

3. In Japan itself: They have created highly dangerous political and economic conditions which may end in catastrophe.



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Russia

Russia, because of unsatisfactory internal conditions, does not wish war now.

Russia will continue to strengthen her defense and economic control in Siberia, Outer Mongolia, and Sinkiang. She will defend her possessions and interests but will not invade Manchukuo unless internal conditions improve greatly and Japan becomes seriously weakened by the military effort in China.

Great Britain

Great Britain, until the situation clears in Europe, and she reestablishes her military and naval forces on a stronger basis, will continue the present plan of watchful waiting so long as Japan confines her aggression to China. Great Britain will resist, by force if necessary, any Japanese invasion of the East Indies. She will continue to maintain naval superiority, even going so far as to prepare for naval preponderance as far east as Singapore.

The United States

The United States will continue diplomatic pressure to maintain the open door and the integrity of China, but she will not fight for these policies.

If the United States withdraws from the Philippines, she will try to insure their independence by treaties. The United States will continue to exclude Asiatics and will maintain sufficient military strength to be superior in the Eastern Pacific.

\* \* \* \* \*

I have tried to present the picture as it appears to me. But if I were to stop here the picture would be incomplete. One vital thing remains to be portrayed. It relates to our national security.

A large proportion of the American people think that we should recede from Asia. They believe that the problem of how to avoid war with Japan could be solved at once and for good by abandoning everything west of the

Hawaiian Islands; and holding defensively on the line: Alaska--Hawaii--  
Panama. 113

Let us examine this proposal. To do so intelligently we must have a different map from the mercator projection chart commonly used on which the true strategic situation is seriously misrepresented.

(Show Slide No. 5443, North Pacific Ocean)

This slide is taken from the U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey Sheet No. 5080, 1921, constructed on the transverse polyconic projection which gives as accurate a representation of the area as is possible on a flat surface.

Instead of facing each other, Japan and the west coast of the United States lie very nearly end to end along the air-line route, or "great circle", between Yokohama and San Francisco. Panama is nearly on the same line, some 3,000 miles behind San Francisco. The British naval base at Singapore is about the same distance behind Yokohama.

On the other hand, Dutch Harbor, in the Aleutians, is about halfway between San Francisco and Yokohama on the straight route; and Pearl Harbor, our heavily fortified base in Hawaii, is some sixteen hundred miles south of this route. The "defensive line" Dutch Harbor to Pearl Harbor to Panama thus makes a rather flat triangle more or less end on to Japan. The Pearl Harbor-Panama leg presents not its front but its rear to Japan.

Japan's own defensive line, however, running from Yokohama through the Bonin Islands to the Ladrones and the Carolines, is seen to have great strength, especially if equipped to base aircraft and Japan's ocean-going submarines. It lies like a curtain right across American routes to Manila, China and Singapore. The American air route to the Orient (as now flown by Pan-American Airways) has to pass through this curtain at Guam.

A glance at this slide shows the importance of Hawaii as a key point on the main defensive line. The point I have been working up to is this: Suppose we accept the thesis of the Pacifists: give up everything in Asia; abandon the outpost in the Philippine Islands and withdraw to the Alaska--Hawaii defensive line. Shall we, by doing this, avoid the risk of conflict by

getting out of contact with the Japanese? The answer is "No".

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Without touching upon the friction on the flanks of the line caused by Japanese fishing in Alaskan waters and also in waters adjacent to Panama, we are already in close contact with the Japanese in Hawaii.

According to 1937-1938 data, the Hawaiian Islands have a total population of 354,473. Japanese residents number 148,866, of whom some 77,000 are American born. Is the philosophy of these Japanese American? It is not. Boy children are sent to Japan to be educated. With few exceptions when they return they are Japanese in spirit and thought. But they have the full legal and political rights of American citizens. The Japanese political bloc in Hawaii is already influential locally. And Hawaii is the key point to the entire Pacific defense system. As long as it is held, America is safe from invasion by Asiatics. But Japan has never acceded in spirit to the acquisition of Hawaii by the United States.

Nevertheless at the present time the issue of statehood for Hawaii is raised; raised, I am told, at the instance of the Japanese political bloc. A large party of Congressmen but recently returned from an investigation on the ground of the question of giving statehood to Hawaii.

I wonder if the time will ever come when a full blooded Japanese as Senator from Hawaii will cast the deciding vote on some issue of national importance to America.

In Japan the population is increasing at the rate of over a million per year. The surplus population has to go somewhere. Like Italy, they must expand or explode. There are blocks of Japanese spread about the Pacific areas, and South America. We are already in contact with them on our defensive line. With the passage of time the problem of our relations with Japan will become more pressing. Anyone who has seen with his own eyes how this nation has expanded in only 40 years is bound to think seriously of the future, especially if he has children.

We are living in a finite world.

(Show Slide No. 5555 - Defensive Line: Alaska--Hawaii--Samoa--)

Looking only as far into the future as I have observed in the past, it is clear that if Japan is going to keep on spreading out at the rate she has during my experience in the Far East the solution of the problem does not lie in refusing the defensive line to the eastward at Hawaii. Conservative as I am, I cannot get away from the conclusion that, taking a long view, it would be best to extend the line southward, to include Samoa; thence westward north of the Australian mandates, and the Dutch East Indies, all the way to Singapore. You can see what this would mean with respect to international naval cooperation.

A blockade of Japan along this line by combined fleets of the United States and Great Britain, perhaps with some help from France and Holland, would cut off from Japan nearly 80 per cent of her normal trade. But that would mean war, which of course, everyone wishes to avoid. Moreover, we have a deeply rooted objection to entangling foreign alliances.

(Lights on)

Perhaps I am thinking fifty years ahead of my time when I bring up the question of who is ultimately to dominate on this little globe, the western nations or the Asiatics. My conclusion is that, in any case, we should heed the lesson that Great Britain has already learned, play safe, and in the interest of peace build up our fighting strength, because, "To be weak is miserable".

End

A LIST OF SLIDES ACCOMPANYING LECTURE; "POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF THE FAR EASTERN SITUATION".

- 1 Slide No. 4399, Map of Pacific Area.
- 2 Slide No. 4483, Trade Data, China, P.I., and Japan 1936.
- 3 Slide No. 4486, Secretary Hay's Note, 1900.
- 4 Slide No. 4488, Pact of Paris, Kellogg, 1928.
- 5 Slide No. 4487, Secretary Stimson's Note, 1932.
- 6 Slide No. 4493, U.S.State Dept., Note of 7th Oct. 1937, re Japanese Military Operations in China.
- 7 Slide No. 4491, P. I. Independence.
- 8 Slide No. 4474, conflicting issues between U.S. and Japan.
- 9 Slide No. 4388, Great circle chart of North Pacific.

Lights On.

- 10 Slide No. 4385, The Far East.
- 11 Slide No. 4513, Sketch Map of U.S.S.R.
- 12 Slide No. 23, Chinese Eastern Railway.

Lights On.

- 13 Slide No. 4383, China and Japan in 1895.
- 14 Slide No. 4383 a, China and Japan 1938.
- 15 Slide No. 6, government of Yuan Shi-Kai; 1912-1916 Peking.
- 16 Slide No. 7 government of Tuan Chi-Jui; 1916-1920 Peking.
- 17 Slide No. 8, government of Chihli; 1920-1924.
- 18 Slide No. 9, regency under Tuan Chi-Jui; interregnum period, 1925-1927, Mukden.
- 19 Slide No. 10, Nationalist government of Canton, later Nanking 1927.
- 20 Slide No. 11, Nationalist government of Nanking territory actualled by Chiang Kai-Shek, 1929.
- 21 Slide No. 12, Nationalist government of Nanking normally controlling entire China, 1930.
- 22 Slide No. 13, Nationalist government of Nanking territory actually controlled in 1931.

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- 23 Slide No. 5359, Chiang Kai-Shek.
  - 24 Slide No. 4391, The three great trade routes.
  - 25 Slide No. 26, Chinese troops, 19th route Army Kiangwan, 1932.
  - 26 Slide No. 2, C.I.C. in Chinese trenches at Kiangwan, 1932.

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- 27 Slide No. 4377 \* Japan in 1894.
- 28 Slide No. 4378 " in 1910.
- 29 Slide No. 4375 " in 1919.
- 30 Slide No. 4376 " in 1931.
- 31 Slide No. 4379 " in 1933.
- 32 Slide No. 4374 " in 1937.
- 33 Slide No. 4374 a " in 1938.
- 34 Slide No. 21, Japanese Expansion Southward.
- 35 Slide No. 22, Japan in relation to Australia.
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- 37 Slide No. 1, Picture of General Araki, T.R. and C.I.C.
- 38 Slide No. 0, General Araki in "Kwodo", "Japan's way".
- 39 Slide No. 4389, Extract from Harbin Shumbum.
- 40 Slide No. 4492, Japan's Military policy.
- 41 Slide No. 5548, Japan's sources of basic raw material.

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- 42 Slide No. 5368, Situation in June, 1937.
- 43 Slide No. 4373, Effective Bombing Range from Vladivostock.
- 44 Slide No. 15, Camel Caravan at Great Wall.
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- 46 Slide No. 4296, Situation Early September, 1937.
- 47 Slide No. 374, Military Situation as of Dec. 31, 1937.
- 48 Slide No. 5369, The Japanese Plan.
- 49 Slide No. 5387, Situation, March 1, 1938.
- 50 Slide No. 5381, Situation during first part of May, 1938.
- 51 Slide No. 5442, Routes for Supply of Munitions.

Lights On.

52 Slide No. 5445, North Pacific Ocean.

53 Slide No. 5555, Defensive Line: Alaska--Hawaii--Samoa--  
Singapore.

Lights On.

END.

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Discussion Following Lecture  
"The Political and Strategic Situation in the Far East"  
by  
Colonel Cary I. Crockett, Inf.

May 16, 1953

Q. What success are we having in developing the Philippine army?

A. I have not been over there since 1933 but I think they are developing it quite successfully under Eisenhower. I am not familiar with the latest information about that.

Q. I have two questions: First, what assistance is Russia giving China and what does she expect to get out of it?

A. Three hundred planes (somebody told me). I do not know - undoubtedly they are giving some assistance. What she expects to get out of it is, I suppose, affiliation and perhaps trading facilities. One by-product of the situation has been the opening up of back-door communication to a remarkable extent back of Asia toward Russia.

Q. In the event of a Japanese war with the United States, how effective would an economic blockade be? That is, a blockade joined in by the United States, Great Britain, and Russia? What military action would be necessary over and above such an economic blockade?

A. We have had people say that to fight Japan we would have to spend fifty billion dollars; that it would be a major emergency -



all of which in my opinion is sheer <sup>e</sup> nonsense. The weak point of Japan is economical and financial. What is the strong feature of China? Manpower. An economic blockade along that route, as I told you, is estimated to cut off eighty per cent of Japanese foreign trade, and I think the loan of officers who can handle native troops would be the decisive factor. I would not send an American soldier across the Pacific. That, I think, is common sense.

Q. Suppose we used American officers - what effect would the difference between American and various Chinese lingo have in handling this army?

A. Well, that to a certain extent is difficult, but many people are interpreters. When I first went with native troops I did not speak the language but finally I became their interpreter. I was six years in command of the Filipinos. You very quickly acquire a language, enough to command them, through the use of the interpreters. However, of course, that would be an obstacle. It is best to speak the language, but one soon gets a working knowledge of any language - learn to swear. I learned to swear in Russian. I learned to say "Devil fly away with you" - a few swear words always help.

Captain Allen: I would like to ask, Colonel Crockett, what stopped the Japs from going into the maritime province in 1933? I went to the Philippines in 1933 and there was a pretty well grounded feeling then that as soon as the land dried out in the spring the Japs were going to tackle the maritime province. I spent two years there, and it seems to me they lost a great opportunity.

A. I asked Walter Duranty that question. He had been out there. He said they were too far away from the base - fifteen hundred miles. That perhaps is true. They were unready to take on Russia then. Russia in 1933 was probably better off than she is now. It is a big problem.

Q. I believe the speaker wanted me to bring out another point, which has to do with the Americanized Japanese in Hawaii. I might say in that connection that I recently returned from Hawaii, and we have today in our large depots, our Air Corps depots, (the one I know most about) many Japanese of American citizenship and we also have alien Japanese employed in our military establishments. I thought you might want to elaborate on that.

A. I notice that they have not amalgamated in the melting pot of the Pacific, which indicates to me they do have some Japanese aspects - personally I think they are Japanese to the marrow of the bone, as a rule.

Q. Has the effect of withdrawing all the American troops from <sup>V</sup>~~T~~sin and that area had any effect as far as losing faith for the Americans over there? Is it going to be of any real value?

A. I think we have lost faith. The destruction of the Panny was for the purpose of causing us to lose faith; any recession before the Japanese causes us to lose faith. I think if China is victorious she will not be especially grateful to us. China thinks the world let her down, just as Haile Selassie does.