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THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
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STRATEGIC STUDY

SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. ARMY SECURITY
ASSISTANCE TO CHINA

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IN

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STRATEGIC STUDIES REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: Some Implications for U.S. Army Security Assistance to China

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In a world where Armageddon is conceivable, the sustenance of a U.S. Army security program to the most populace country on the globe, China, cannot be treated too seriously, analyzed too completely, or handled with too much sensitivity. Without a comprehensive assessment of all the relevant variables, the program will suffer from suboptimized or counter productive solutions.

Congruent U.S. and Chinese interests intertwined with China's capability and willingness evoke some principles and guidelines for Army assistance. Concomitantly, the pace and focus of this assistance varies porportionately with its efficacy as perceived independently by each country. China as well as the U.S. reserve the right to place designs on its context as well as its content.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Donald W. Derrah (M.B.A., University of Maine) has been intrigued by Chinese military affairs since he was stationed in Vietnam, the first of two tours in 1967. As Troop Commander for L Troop, 3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry, he was awarded two silver and bronze stars, one Army Commendation Medal for Valor and a Purple Heart. He is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College and the Defense System Management College. Colonel Derrah is a graduate of The National War College Class of 1985.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This article explores two questions pertinent to U.S. Policy on Security Assistance to the People's Republic of China (PRC). The scope of this paper is limited to Army support, but many of the findings are applicable to military assistance in general. The first question addressed is how should Army security assistance be formulated. The answer is based on the premise that policy determination requires an examination and synthesis of its rationale or purpose, the context from three perspectives, and the actual requirement or need for assistance. A chapter is devoted to each one of these three subjects followed by a conclusion where the major findings converge.

In this specific case, the rationale or purpose is more political than military. Although the security of China or the deterrence of Soviet expansionism is one objective, the political value of U.S. assistance in regards to this purpose may be more instrumental than the actual military prowess achieved. Likewise, the second objective, the stabilization of China economically and politically gains more psychologically from U.S. assistance than from the actual means provided. Based upon the theory that support of these two objectives is the primary purpose of U.S. Army Assistance, rationale exists to develop a policy authorizing strategic defensive weapons including Army tactical offensive weapons provided certain precautionary measures are observed primarily to protect regional interests and friends. On the other hand, equally obvious is the exclusion of strategic offensive weapons based upon the potential risk of future adverse use by the PRC counter to U.S. interests.

In regards to the context, three perspectives are analyzed: the global one, where the proliferation of security assistance as a highly competitive political tool among nations, warrants more controls while at the same time makes certain restrictions unrealistic due to the rapidly expanding sources; the U.S. one, where the reality of the global situation encourages a liberal policy within the constraints demanded by U.S. security concerns. And finally, the Chinese one, where the desire for self reliance and economic restraints forces compromises in the content of the assistance as well as the nature of its implementation. Rather than an immediate influx of foreign weapons, the PRC seeks long term solutions such as the transfer of production wherewithal for coproduction, the development of uniquely designed systems compatible with the missions, or assistance in basic technology and infrastructure improvements so they can find their own solutions. Second hand equipment will not suffice; the PRC will patiently pursue modern capability to develop and sustain their own military hardware.

The requirement itself -- that is what the PRC needs militarily to accomplish the intended purpose described above -- conjures up some instructive points. The PRC needs help in methods as well as means particularly in functional areas of professionalism, training, and logistics where they are already undergoing reform. Method and technique assistance is equally important as actual equipment upgrade. However, certain equipment functional areas are also discerned as contributing significantly to the PRC needs.

In synthesizing these findings, the conclusion proffers some overall suggestions making the program attractive as well as productive.

The second question wrestles with the actual content of U.S. assistance. Although many content restrictions and suggestions have arisen in developing the answer to the first question, the quantessential message is that without PRC participation in the development of the assistance program, the actual content cannot be prescribed. The U.S. must build a framework limiting the content commensurate with the risks. And, of course, without U.S. inculcation, the PRC can't identify available and suitable alternatives. But equally as significant to program success is for the U.S. to realize the PRC will not be manipulated, intimidated, or cajoled into Western military techniques and solutions. The program content must originate from joint U.S.-PRC functional analysis and mission assessments to be acceptable and productive.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

U.S. Army Security Assistance (USASA) often invokes the perception of a massive infusion of military materiel for the recipient. This is misleading particularly in the case of the People's Republic of China (PRC). USASA can be much more encompassing than materiel in scope yet much more refined in technology transfer than massive infusion of end items. Indeed then, what should this program for the PRC consist of? And how should this assist be determined? The answer to these questions is precisely the intent of this document.

I would argue that any formulation of USASA would be suboptimized unless the confluence of three major areas is developed. From the first area, rationale, one must ascertain the purpose of the support. Congruent interests must be served. Conversely, the level of support should be limited by the risks of any potential adverse use perceived or certain measures evoked to reduce the risk.

After circumscribing USASA based upon its rationale, we can further amplify its content by considering the context, the second area influencing USASA. The idiosyncracies and intent of each country superimpose some peculiarities on the nature of USASA. In this area we will see not only constraints on the scope and character, but some qualifiers on how it will proceed. Considered third and perhaps the most relevant to identifying specific assistance, the PRC requirement based upon the military situation examines the military environment, the doctrine, and the Army's posture. Appropriately addressing this area -- what is really needed -- consummates USASA formulation. Some recommendations concerning USASA surface in all three of these areas.

CHAPTER II

RATIONALE

(The Purpose of U.S. Assistance)

The rationale for providing security assistance to the PRC is not obvious and the paradox of provisioning the PRC with instruments of war raises many eyebrows among uninformed Americans. Adversary perceptions have been fostered by legacies of distrust stemming from past hostilities (Vietnam and Korean War); ambivalence has arisen over international disputes on Taiwan, Korea, ASEAN and third world countries; and ideological differences have continued during the past 35 years in which communism engulfed China, or was it the other way around? The withdrawal of the U.S. from Vietnam in the early seventies lessening the perceived U.S. threat, the emergence of the USSR threat and the dire need to fix the political instability and mend the depressed economy existing internally prompted the PRC to seek reduction of tensions with the U.S. For more than 12 years, relations have steadily progressed, and the two countries remain cautious friends.

Obviously, some compelling advantages must accrue from congruent interests, particularly security, to justify military assistance in light of the risks involved in the numerous divergent views and potential future conflicts.

This section will be a review of those parallel issues and associated benefits vis-a-vis those divergent issues and associated risks. Obviously, the correlation of assistance to a benefit -- risk assessment is paramount. A. Doak Barnett aptly describes the efficacy of this approach:

But the character of the present military-security relationship is difficult to define, and determining future U.S. policy requires analysis of some extremely delicate and sensitive issues.¹

The Soviet Threat

The most pressing security interests shared by both countries were expressed in a joint communique in 1972. Promotion of peaceful coexistence, reduction of international conflict, and prevention of hegemony in the Southeast and Pacific region is the crux of this agreement.² The Soviet Union continues to build up its forces and expand its influences in the Asian region threatening those shared security interests. The following in the words of Mr. Barnett expresses the feelings of both countries in regard to this threat:

Both Washington and Peking oppose increases in the Soviet military presence and power position in East Asia, as well as in South Asia or other adjacent regions such as the Middle East. China's fear of Russia's actions, especially in East Asia, may be more acute than that of the United States, but the two have common interests in regard to the problem.³

The number of Soviet medium-range nuclear missiles, SS-20, targeted on Asian nations totals 144. At least nine Soviet TU-16 "Badger" medium-range bombers were placed at the extensively fortified Soviet air and naval bases at Cam Ranh, Vietnam, supplementing the Soviet TU-95 Bears, submarines, and the surface fleet stationed there. A near tripling of troops stationed along the Soviet-Chinese border, to 500,000, transpired since the sixties.⁴ The magnitude of the threat is mind boggling as the following facts in the words of Henry B. Gass substantiate:

The Soviet forces are vastly superior to the Chinese in technology, firepower, and mobility. The major population areas of China are within striking range of the ICBM and MRBM Strategic Rocket Forces and the Soviet naval cruise missiles. There is no question of Soviet capability to inflict devastating damage if they make the decision to do so.⁵

Spring 1984 reports in China Daily, A Peking newspaper, highlighted Vietnam's aggression: "Vietnamese troops made more than 30 raids against Chinese border areas, more than 3,000 bullets and shells were fired on 60 occasions into Yunan, killing and wounding many inhabitants, and armed Vietnamese seized at sea 14 Chinese fishermen."⁶ China is threatened by gradual encirclement, most notably, from the formidable Soviet ally to the South as depicted by LTC Gass:

The other major threat facing the PRC is also Soviet, but in the form of Vietnamese surrogates. The Vietnamese possess an offensive capability substantial enough to occupy significant Chinese manpower and assets. Vietnam has 50 infantry divisions, one armored division, and three marine divisions. With 485 combat aircraft and an excellent air defense capability, Vietnam is a formidable military force, as the Chinese learned in February 1979. The Soviets can thus threaten China with a "two-front" war.⁷

Additionally, the Soviets occupy outer Mongolia, supply arms to India, and conduct sustained incursions into Afghanistan as best expressed below by Mr. Chi Su:

The Soviet Union's ring of encirclement consists of heavy military pressure on China's northern border; the potential threat posed by the Soviet Pacific fleet off China's coastline; the probable subversion of restless Xinjiang minorities; the low-key but persistent pursuit of an "Asian collective security system"; and Moscow's special influence in Vietnam, India, Mongolia and Afghanistan.⁸

The motive of self preservation by the Chinese is obvious from this discussion. Hence, they have willingly participated in an international anti-Soviet united front and a new strategic U.S. relation to constrain Soviet behavior. The Chinese desire much-needed information on advanced weapons technology, or prototypes, or limited supplies of certain equipment to close the gaps in military capabilities between the PRC and the Soviets.⁹ The Soviet forces tied down by the PRC in the Far East provide a defacto strategic dimension to the U.S. relationship.¹⁰

A broader assessment of this strategic perspective adds insight to the U.S. motives and expectations. Approximately fifty Soviet divisions, 25 per cent of Soviet air, and 10,000 tanks along the Sino-Soviet border deter further Soviet expansion and aggression elsewhere. Not only is the U.S. concerned about the Pacific region but also Western Europe, the Persian Gulf, and third world countries in general, most notably, Afghanistan. When he was Secretary of State, Alexander Haig described close relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China as a "fundamental strategic reality and strategic imperative."¹¹

China now favors U.S. military presence in East Asia to avoid a military vacuum into which the Soviets might move. This is particularly pertinent to Japan, defended by a U.S. strategic and nuclear umbrella; South Korea, augmented by U.S. forces; the Philippines, insured by the presence of U.S. bases; and other ASEAN nations and Pakistan, assisted by U.S. military aid.

As Assistant Secretary of State John Holdridge stated before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in July 1981:

Our security and that of Japan, South Korea, and our ASEAN friends have been demonstrably enhanced by the growth of close U.S.-China ties. We gain very positive benefits both in Asia and in the global balance of forces.

Mr. Holdridge reiterated the Reagan administration policy that the relationship with China is global and strategic.¹²

More needs to be said about the U.S./PRC strategic relationship before leaving the first and key parallel issue -- the Soviet threat. Originally, China's self imposed isolation from both the Soviets and the west left no strength to negotiate with or fight the Soviets. Thus the PRC was drawn toward U.S. rapprochement. But this didn't totally allay the ideological and other international differences -- such as Taiwan nor did it do anything but aggravate the domestic PRC political polarization on international alignment. A. Doak Barnett, authority on China Affairs in a May 7, 1984 issue of U.S. News and World Report states the following about polarization in the PRC:

But there've been a number of people in the leadership who felt that, while the Soviet Union was China's main problem, China ought to deal with it in a less confrontational way.

He goes on to express what China has learned from its past:

The lesson, as they see it, is that when you start lining up too closely with one of these stronger powers, they start treating you as sort of a junior partner. And China doesn't want to be a junior partner.¹³

China recognized that by total emersion in the anti-Soviet sentiment, it may have exhausted U.S. concessions, needed to adjust alignment for domestic political compromise, sensed a decrease in the Soviet threat,

and thus turned at least politically back toward the Soviets, not necessarily equidistant. Doak Barnett is further quoted:

They are not equidistant between us and the Soviet Union. They are still closer to the U.S., even though Peking is not lining up with us against Moscow.¹⁴

Economics would be emphasized; strategic cooperation would diminish in PRC-western relations. Likewise, detente with the Soviets without any degradation in western leverage enhanced the PRC's international economic and political bargaining position while reducing the PRC's internal political strife. Subsequently, the core ingredient of U.S./PRC strategic relations was economics.

What are the prospects for Sino-Soviet detente and what is the likelihood of total rapproachment? The PRC proclaims three conditions for improved relations with the Soviets: withdrawal from Afghanistan, Vietnam, and outer Mongolia. Little likelihood of Soviet compliance to these conditions is foreseen. The PRC is still motivated to pursue western economic leverage and more or less committed to anti Soviet hegemony as discussed earlier. Both incentives take precedence over any real desire for Soviet entente. Mr. Chi Su Professor of Diplomacy in Taipei stated,

China's continuing search for security ties with the West and the deep Soviet concern about such ties underline one of the major causes for the current failure of the Sino-Soviet detente process. For the Chinese, 'Soviet hegemonism,' incarnated in the Soviet military buildup and the ring of Soviet-supported hostile states, remains a grim reality after two decades of tension.¹⁵

Even further PRC withdrawal from its western security alignment is not apt to resolve the deep seeded difference. Moscow's belief in itself as the third Rome for communism versus China's nationalistic quest for independence in addition to the mutually perceived security threat of one another cement the cleavage. Professor Chi Su elaborates,

Sino-Soviet rapprochement will come about only if the Soviet Union shows greater willingness to accept 'national communism' and if China feels more secure.¹⁶

From the U.S. perspective, the most advantage envisioned from a PRC/U.S. strategic anti-Soviet military front rest in the magnitude of Soviet forces committed to the PRC border. The U.S. motive is best portrayed by the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff:

The United States cannot afford to build sufficient military force to meet all its security commitments alone. As General David Jones stated, 'The United States must continue to pursue a strategy that draws upon the combined resources of allied and friendly nations to the full and mutual advantage.' Security assistance is and will probably continue to be the most efficient way to spend defense dollars.¹⁷

However, limited faith in the PRC's strategic role has given rise to the regional emphasis the U.S. places on China, as expressed below by Mr. Robert Manning in an article on the subject in Foreign Policy:

Increasingly, the United States places China in the framework of an overarching Pacific basin policy centered on Japan, a view that reflects the Reagan administration's special emphasis on Asia as a region and an accompanying perception of China as but one, albeit very important, factor in a critical regional equation.¹⁸

Other U.S. strategic options against the Soviets are limited by its over commitments. Moreover, the U.S. hopes to avoid more than a limited Sino Soviet rapprochement, to continue to tie down 25 per cent of total Soviet ground forces on the Sino Soviet border, and to lock the PRC into its opening to the West. Military assistance contributes to all three of these goals. Therefore, in the U.S. view, the U.S./PRC bilateral relations still contain an inherently strategic component.¹⁹

From the PRC perspective, the strategic dimension in U.S. relations diminished to some extent as Soviet rapprochement, East European ties, and third world courtships developed. Nevertheless, the strategic element of this relation was relevant to the second major parallel issue about to be addressed. That issue, the creation of a stable China, invokes an efficacious strategic U.S. dimension abetting China's security. How close a relation is a matter of some conjecture as the following statement by Mr. Barnett alludes to:

I think we still have common strategic interests, and therefore we have a strategic relationship. But neither country is pushing for a very close strategic partnership.²⁰

Before we turn to this second parallel issue justifying security assistance, let's discuss the implications of U.S./PRC defacto strategic relations against the Soviets. Of utmost concern, are Soviet reactions to U.S.-PRC amalgams. Certainly, nuclear or offensive weapons not to

mention alliances debilitates the Soviets status quo provoking pernicious Soviet responses.

Furthermore, China's security is not a military force equal to the Soviet's or capable of regional dominance is the central congruent U.S.-PRC interest. Consequently, the objective of the assistance is to establish a credible defense sufficient to deter Soviet intimidation and aggression without escalating Soviet tensions. Hence a policy of strategic defensive weapons caveated by some precautionary tasks lessening the risk of China ever incongruently using its power on a regional basis.

The implied precautionary tasks for the U.S. to pursue in concert with a sound PRC security assistance policy follow: consultations with friendly countries, particularly allies and regional ones, should be expanded; controls must be mutual; our friends must be granted similar defense capability; sales must be contingent on assurances that resales to third world countries are prohibited. To be more precise, the Atlantic Council in its 1983 policy papers states,

The United States, more than it has the recent past, should consult with and take into account the views of its Asian friends and allies in dealing with the PRC and encourage reciprocal consultations. Specifically, the security and economic concerns of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the nations of ASEAN and ANZUS, and the population of Taiwan should be taken into account.

Our Atlantic friends and allies should also be consulted with respect to our China policies and encouraged to consult with the U.S. with respect to their policies. It is important that our respective policies be compatible particularly in the areas of technology transfer and international trade.²¹

Additionally, we must not become too dependent upon the relation nor in any way weaken our regional resolve or military strength as the following prescription by the Atlantic Council denotes:

Relations with the PRC and other countries in the region require that the U.S. maintain a strong military presence in East Asia and the Pacific and make clear we are committed to a forward military defense of our interests in the region.²²

I will return to a more detailed examination of how to best achieve this PRC deterrence later on. For military assistance to China.

The Stabilization of China

Although the issue of the Soviet threat was key to bringing the PRC/U.S. together, of equal significance to both countries' security interests is the stabilization and modernization of China. The Atlantic Council of the United States writing on "China Policy for the Next Decade" writes,

The basis of our relations with China should not rest exclusively on our common opposition to the Soviet Union. We should seek to expand the basis of the relationship to rest on economic, scientific, and cultural ties, on shared efforts to maintain stability in Asia.²³

The China threat played a dominating role in U.S. Pacific Strategic thought for years. On the other hand, a China devoting its energy and resources to internal development and international peaceful diplomacy as evidenced in the last decade offers an opportunity to turn U.S. concerns to other exigencies. Based upon the heirarchy of needs--survival ranks first, I would posit that the propensity to act violently is inversely proportional to the degree of economic growth and political stability. Unless a reasonable level of growth and stability exists in a country

with nuclear capability such as China, the situation is inevitably acute. A strong modern China with more at stake ponders the detrimental consequences brought upon itself or the possibility of its own demise before resorting to aggressive acts. Likewise, a weak China is susceptible to the whims and threats of an external aggressor. Put more precisely in this regard is the following on stabilization from the Atlantic Council:

An economically growing, secure, and modernizing China can be an important trading partner, a stable counterweight to the Soviet Union, and a valuable contributor to peace and stability in Asia and the world. A weak, vulnerable, unstable China, on the other hand, could offer a tempting target that would invite aggression.²⁴

From a long range perspective, U.S. strategic interests in China's stability means potentially more than the strategic interests in cooperation against the Soviets. The detention of Soviet forces on the Chinese border doesn't solve any problems; on the other hand, a stable China is more apt to be a positive world force less threatening as well as less threatened. As the following words from Mr. Barnett imply, the U.S. will not be able to manipulate the Chinese against the Soviets or in any other area:

I think the better policy for us--and one that will be viable insofar as the Chinese are concerned--is to have cooperation but on a low-key basis. It's a great mistake for our military and political people to give the impression that our interest in the Chinese is solely because they provide a buffer--a card against the Soviet Union.²⁵

As previously alluded to, the PRC's security is perhaps the key U.S./PRC congruent interest. For it precipitates deterrence and augments stabilization, the two major issues. Thus defense oriented support

alleviates security concerns and permits concentration on growth and stability. Assistance must be self perpetuating in nature. That is to say, military aid in the form of U.S. manufactured end items increasing China's dependence treats the symptom and is anathema to China's quest for autonomy.

What is really appropriate is curing the disease or helping China help herself in security needs while China's major emphasis goes toward economic modernization, the underpinning of stability. From this, the entire world can conceivably benefit. Doak Barnett aptly states,

A weak China, economically and militarily, invites aggression--Soviet or any other kind. China needs, above all else, to have economic progress so that it can develop the military capability to defend itself.²⁶

China's potential for a constructive role in the world relies predominately on simultaneous successful growth, stability, and security. The Atlantic Council appraises,

An economically healthy, stable, and secure China, which contributes to the peace and stability of the region, is in the national interest of the United States, and is an interest shared by our Asian and European friends and allies.²⁷

The relationships jelled during this revolutionary economic growth program of modernization will be enduring if trust and confidence congeal. U.S. assistance in the name of altruistic diplomacy can encourage communication and peaceful resolution on many international problems. The Atlantic Council further espouses,

China is a very large and very distinct political and cultural entity capable of an increasingly influential role in world affairs, particularly as a stabilizing element in both the regional and global correlation of forces--not as a client of the United States or of the Soviet Union, but as a secure and independent power in its own right.²⁸

An interesting perspective on PRC intentions and motives relative to U.S. security assistance is contained in the following quote from Deng's opponents in the Moscow New Times.

....the arguments offered by Mr. Deng's adherents for strategically accepting...long-term compromise as consonant with China's military weakness and its need to defend against Soviet expansionism are mocked as a 'pretext of the scum of the nation.'

The article continues:

In order to counter the well-founded accusation of betrayal of national interests, Deng and his crowd are badly in need of U.S. support not only in regard to the Taiwan question, but also on the issues of economic stabilization and rearmament of the army.²⁹

The appeasement of political and military opponents to Deng's revolutionary economic reforms plays a major role in forcing compromises and concessions anethama to nationalistic long range intentions and goals. The following are examples: Concessions with the U.S. on the Taiwan problem were made and compromises on long range independent self determination goals were tolerated for the sake of accommodating the U.S. so that expedient and simultaneous modernization in defense as well as economics could transpire. The opponents, particularly the Army, would have been more antagonistic to the modernization priority shifts away from the military had the PRC not condescended to some U.S. demands in exchange for military and technology assistance.

The U.S., for reasons already given, enthusiastically accommodated the PRC. President Reagan, initially ambivalent, certainly had to be convinced that the benefits outweigh the risks as Mr. Barnett suggests:

Whatever the risks, Reagan, once an archfoe of Communist China, has gone far in a commitment to underpin the country's present reformist regime.³⁰

What are those risks? And what are their prospects? The most significant one is expressed below by the Atlantic Council:

However, it recognizes this course involves a degree of risk since a strong Chinese industrial base could be used in the future for military purposes....³¹

It would be naive not to recognize the potential threat posed by this most populist country of one billion armed with U.S. weapons.

Obviously there is little danger of an attack against the U.S. save for a suicidal nuclear strike. The Soviet Union, likewise, is not threatened by any rational military act provided the offensive, nuclear, or strategic weapons necessary to make China a viable threat are not acquired. However, even within a defensive weapon restriction, several risks are evident. Provoking the Soviets unpredictable behavior, destabilizing the Korean peninsula, threatening Japan and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, influencing third world revolutions, enveloping Taiwan, or punishing Vietnam are the salient cases in point. The likelihood of these occurring vary with some conditions over which we have control and others over which we have influence such as these listed below:

Controlled Conditions

1. Retention of strong U.S. defense force and alliance system in the Pacific not only to thwart Soviet adventurism but to check China's intimidations.
2. Strengthening existing U.S. defense ties with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and ASEAN countries.

3. Prohibit third country sales of PRC provisioned technology and weapons.
4. Consistent and liberal economic, political, and technological U.S. support.

Influenced Conditions

1. PRC economic, political, and security ties in Southeast Asia.
2. Longevity and success of PRC modernization.
3. Education and training to develop technical and administrative talent and expertise.
4. Reduced tensions and enhanced cooperation over Taiwan.
5. Exploitation of Resources particularly offshore oil.
6. Expand PRC international participation such as integration into arms control talks and trade treaties.

Two of these influenced conditions are worthy of a few more words of diagnoses in relation to security assistance risks. First, Taiwan is overstressed. The U.S. in exchange for PRC promises of peaceful resolution on the reunification problem committed itself to a Taiwan arms reduction program, but never has relinquished its allegiance to Taiwan security. The issue is not destined for resolution any time soon and by consensus must be resolved by the Chinese.

Taiwan is a "floating variable" in the U.S./PRC relations designed primarily to float as political bargaining dictates. The Atlantic Council shares a similar view as stated below:

Taiwan, Hong Kong, and other possible irridentist claims are specific objectives whose value as instruments of foreign policy may exceed their intrinsic importance.³²

The second U.S. influenced condition relevant to the risks in military assistance to the PRC and in my estimation the key one around which all other issues revolve is the success and longevity of the modernization program. A reform program, approximating capitalism economically, by many, has been doomed to failure as the following by Mr. McLaughlin connotes:

Now the PRC has opened up marginally, and people are going in. And they are also coming out, and with them some grim accounts of Communism's grisly public policies.³³

I would argue contrarily for the following reasons: Deng's emphasis on crucial education and training, (influenced by U.S. support), forced retirements, infusion of controls down to the grass roots, depoliticizing the military, separation of government management and policy, and the astounding record of success to date in both internal growth and external diplomacy. Doak Barnett states,

There is a fairly broad consensus that China is moving in a desirable direction--away from ideological dogmatism toward pragmatism, emphasizing the need for economic development and growth and de-emphasizing the priority Mao gave to permanent social revolution. While some Chinese will keep on sniping at this trend, it will continue.³⁴

A November 1984 editorial in The Washington Post expresses another positive view on China's reform:

Still, if you had to bet on a socialist country that could make a go of a modified capitalism, China would be the one. Hong Kong and Taiwan do appear to demonstrate the compatibility of Chinese culture and free enterprise. A China with a system that had liberated the full energies and talents of its people, at least in the economic sphere, would be a formidable power on the world scene. The reform could yet become one of the major events of the end of the 20th century.³⁵

China's success is in the interest of the U.S. for a weak economic and political situation is threatening as Roger Sullivan in his article on "The Value of the Chinese Connection" wrote:

Rather, a China which found itself rejected by the outside world, unable to get the technology and capital it needed, failing in its effort of modernization, embittered and impoverished, and forced to come to terms, perhaps, with its hostile neighbors, would be a threat to all of us.³⁶

Hence, China's reform program has a good probability of success and is in the interest of the U.S. to support. In this regard, U.S. military assistance has a positive political, economic, and military impact on the program. Nevertheless, although a more stable China is less threatening, no one can deny the opportunity still exists for China to use the improved military power adversely.

However, past precedence argues otherwise. China using military power adversely can be gained by examining past precedence. China's characteristically non-aggressive nature is substantiated by its record. Even military actions in Vietnam and Korea over the past two decades occurred only after aggressive encroachments threatened China's borders. PRC withdrawal in both incidents proceeded immediately upon termination of action. Despite hostilities and tensions with Taiwan for 35 years, China hasn't overthrown or attacked this Island. Other optimistic projections are expressed below by the Atlantic Council:

Where it might have exacerbated tensions on the Korean peninsula, it has acted as a stabilizing force. Where it might have strained Japanese-U.S. relations, it has in fact helped to improve them. Where it might have caused further strife in Southeast Asia, its endorsement of ASEAN has served to raise stability and confidence in that increasingly important region of the Pacific. Where it might have

been a disruptive influence in the United Nations, it has acted independently, but responsibly. Where it might have chosen to trade outside Western economic institutions, it is steadily expanding its involvement in the economic infrastructure of the industrialized nations. Where it might have overextended its credit on overambitious modernization plans, it has scaled back its aspirations to coincide with its modest economic means. Where it might have turned to more extreme measures to undermine Taiwan's economy and physical security, it has not done so.³⁷

Although all this argues for a liberal policy, it does not preclude adherence to precautionary measures listed above under controlled conditions and advocated by the Atlantic Council.³⁸

The U.S. gives China the benefit of many doubts because it does not threaten it as Russia does--it has virtually no severe conflict of interest with the U.S. (maybe Taiwan)--and because a stable, strong China is more in America's interest than a crumbling failed China. For some time to come, we may have to accept that China is fairly stable and repressive, useful to the U.S. and an arena of human frustration. Another bout of extreme hostility and pessimism about China would serve us ill.³⁹

A publication on Asian and African Third World Armies by Peter Rosen purports three prescriptions relevant to China: First, Armies reflect their societies suggesting disintegrating societies produce disunited military structures, secondly, isolation of the Armed Forces from political conflict produce cohesive and effective units, thirdly, the best way to improve their military effectiveness is to give them adequate amounts of equipment and training.⁴⁰ China's military reform program with the adjunct of U.S. military assistance sufficiently addresses all three of these ingredients.

In summarizing the rationale for assistance, our purpose is primarily couched in terms of two issues, both considered threats, one global and the other regional. Soviet expansionism threatens the peaceful coexistence of all countries, while an unstabilized, isolated China promulgates tensions in the East Asian region. Equally as instructive is what our purpose isn't. Security assistance is not intended nor should it be to transform the PRC into a global power, or for that matter even to threaten the Soviets. In fact, in this century it conceivably can't; however, a more secure China less threatened by the Soviets or less unequal to them in military power is justifiable.

Furthermore, it would be ludicrous not to recognize the adversary potential between the U.S. and the PRC if suppression of divergent views on many international issues become unglued. Consequently, sensitive technologies and strategic offensive weaponry which we might regret as opposing us some day should be precluded from the assistance. But a liberal U.S. policy to augment the PRC rudimentary defense envelope is justifiable. In fact the primary motive is more political than military. The political and economic support for the current regime and its stabilization program is obvious. As trust and confidence builds from this assistance, beneficial communication and cooperation over politically stalemated problems such as Korea and Taiwan are envisaged. U.S. Security assistance supplementing PRC security offers a dynamic opportunity enhancing world security and stability provided certain restrictions and precautions are observed. As compared to Russia, China doesn't occupy any foreign lands, hasn't attacked any nation save for

border threatening situations, and isn't as domestically repressive as it pursues economic modernization and political stabilization. This is not the first time a paradoxical relation of military assistance existed without disastrous results -- for example, U.S. aid to Yugoslavia against the Soviets in 1948; Soviet aid to Cuba despite U.S. disapproval; U.S. Arms sales in various Arab countries despite the threat to Israel.⁴¹

CHAPTER III

CONTEXT

(Three Perspectives on Security Assistance)

Army security assistance decisions fall within some barriers erected by the U.S. and some boundaries established by the PRC. Both countries circumscribe the nature and character of potential exchanges only by comprehending these buyer and seller conditions can we develop suitable and acceptable options. The means may not necessarily determine the ends, but they certainly influence it. This section proceeds from arms sales in general where the world context will help put sales to China in the proper perspective. Next, we will turn to the specifics of the U.S. context where controls limit sales to the PRC. Finally, the context envisioned by the PRC where idiosyncrasies will influence the scope of sales.

Arms Sales in General

Arms sales are far more than an economic occurrence, a military relationship, or an arms control challenge -- arms sales are foreign policy writ large.¹

This description by Mr. Andrew Pierre best characterizes arms sales in general around the world. These sales have more than doubled over the last decade reaching a total for the current year of \$20 billion. Provisioning arms as an alternative to nuclear confrontation has become the norm in safeguarding international interests. Weapon transfer decisions made individually country by country involve complex judgments, controls, and trade offs. Arms sales, an instrument of diplomacy, as well as security are reality and here to stay whether we like it or not.²

Both the U.S. and the Soviets grant more military assistance than economic aid. Despite the complications and risks, arms sales properly managed are preferred over the simpler strategies of war. This apparent contradiction makes more sense when viewed in the world context where the U.S. share of sales decreases while the Soviet and West European portions grow. Insipid Soviet supply of cheap and abundant arms with associated advisors, permeate the unstabilized third world. For the sake of power balances, the U.S. is forced to retaliate. France where arms are built for export, Israel, Arab countries, Brazil and Argentina are becoming major contributors to international arsenals.

The current competitive and uncoordinated sales bring truth to the statement: "If we don't sell, someone else will." World regulatory procedures are badly needed. Certainly controls implemented in COCOM, (U.S., NATO, and Japan) are a step in the right direction, but meek in light of the magnitude of the problem. Standardization of weapons, market sharing, specialization in production, collaboration in sales and expansion of consultations starting in the western alliances are means to minimize the hazards and inefficiencies of weapon sales. Conceivably, even Moscow motivated by their inability to compete with the greater western industrial capacity could be persuaded to some "rules of the game" that introduce restraint particularly in offensive and strategic weapons.

The use of arms as a political instrument is strewn with examples of prominent failures. Some of the most striking include Moscow's support of Egypt, Indonesia, and Peru and the U.S. support in Ethiopia, Iran, and

Vietnam. In determining country to country weapon sales, certainly, we must be circumspect of content and constraints.

Recently, arms transfers consist of the most sophisticated weapons in the supply states inventory. Challenges in logistics and training are associated with the transfer of front line equipment. Another trend is coproduction acquisitions. These enable countries seeking self sufficiency to obtain manufacturing and assembly know how on advanced weapons.³ Another means of acquiring military assistance is through the purchase of dual-use technologies. Countries must be sensitive to the security implications of making civilian technology sales with future military application potential. Secretary of Defense Weinberger expressed his concern that sufficient and consistent control on dual-use technology required sound and effective coordination of government and industry. The goal is to stop undesirable transfers.⁴

U.S. Context

Arms sales now have a central role in American diplomacy and are an important dimension of peacemaking and stabilization. An article on the subject by Harry Shaw in Foreign Policy emphasis this point:

No major program -- domestic, foreign, or even defense -- has been more favored in Reagan administration budgets than security assistance. The administration's proposed \$9.2 billion 1984 program of foreign military sales (FMS) credits, military aid as grants, and security-related economic support exceeds the fiscal 1981 program by 70 per cent.⁵

As a vital instrument short of direct deployment of U.S. forces, arms sales are a major component of America's competition with the Soviets. "Dealing with the world the way it is and not the way we want it," was President Reagan's way of expressing our arms sale policy.⁶

In a 1981 Presidential directive China's economic trade support was first formalized. The intent was to integrate China into the world economy and assist its stable development. Further liberalization came in May 1983 when China moved into the same export Category V enjoyed by NATO, Japan, India, and Yugoslavia. For the first time, provisos for arms sales and dual-use technology exports provided Beijing with the opportunity to acquire high technology and arms of a defensive nature. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) is the only type of U.S. security assistance authorized the PRC. None of the grant aid categories, education and training assistance, or export credits and loans apply. Three U.S. control zones applicable to the PRC were devised for FMS: commerce approved items not requiring interagency review is called zone green; case by case approved items, generally approved but requiring interagency review is called zone intermediate; and zone Red included items prohibited. The items listed in each category are unique to China requiring substantial review and update. This screening gave the PRC case more procedural controls then heretofore known. Moreover, approval from COCOM allies on China exports was superimposed on U.S. authorizations. A promise prohibiting third country sales from China accompanied the liberalization.⁷

Other controls within the U.S. system help to allay the fears and apprehensions about adequate constraints on technologies and weapons authorized for the PRC. Congress' legislative controls, most notably, the Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act applies. Congress has shown an intense interest in PRC security assistance primarily

watchful of Taiwan's security and other threats imposed from the sales. A senior Interagency Control Group formulated in the National Security Council with responsibility for maintaining consistency in arms exports and national security consists of State, Defense, Commerce and Treasury.

Major strategies and implementation decisions on assistance are in the purview of this group. In spite of the stringent controls within the U.S. system, the arms sales to the PRC are quite liberal within the defense weapons only restriction. Computers, helicopters, ground defense weapons, ammunition and the like are permitted. Many are concerned about private industry's ability to obtain licenses from commerce and sell directly to the PRC. However, military and dual-use technology are still under the interagency, congress, NSC, and COCOM controls. Furthermore, industry driven by the profit motive aggressively promotes sales, but their desire to protect proprietary components counters this tendency. Industry is anxious to make sales but does not want to release well guarded product secrets; consequently, a measure of self control by industry adds to the security of our precious technology.

Recognizing that a too liberal release policy impacts negatively on our security, excess restrictions, on the other hand, can be fruitless. The PRC have other means to obtain some of the desired military technology. Even the Soviets sell the PRC helicopters; the British are negotiating for aircraft engines, and the West Germans and Japanese are offering helicopters and seaplanes respectively. If the Chinese can obtain technologies elsewhere, it makes little sense to prohibit U.S. exports and incur economic hardships for U.S. business.⁸

Espionage and transfers illegally obtained provide another source for the PRC. Over 2,000 Chinese students in the U.S. provide other collection means at places such as the University of Minnesota where the President refused to deny the students access to sensitive computer equipment not authorized for release to the PRC.⁹

Secondary U.S. motives for PRC sales include quid pro quo for military bases, ports, and overflight rights. Although we previously expressed doubt that the current PRC strategic relation was strong enough to expect these rights, future opportunities should not be overlooked. Other U.S. expectations include quid pro quo for alternate sources of energies particularly oil and other rare minerals found in China. Exploitation of these resources could loosen the stranglehold the Middle East and Africa enjoy to some extent. Likewise, secondary economic benefits (economy of scale, R&D recoupment, jobs, and sustainment of industrial base), not the euphoria initially contemplated, provide some incentives especially in production of proprietary items and machine tooling manufacture still prerequisite purchases from the U.S. even if the agreement calls for coproduction in China.

Although the opportunities provided by U.S. policy have been sufficiently liberal enough to offer a formidable improvement in China's defense needs, this has not been the case to date. From the U.S. government perspective, more and more stress needs to be placed on direct U.S. industrial enterprise and PRC business contracts and interactions as opposed to (FMS) through the U.S. government. This is at logger head with the PRC's desire to acquire U.S. government assurances and

guarantees. The Chinese, recognizing their needs extend beyond simple end item procurement, still have difficulty comprehending the different implications of the two optional methods of procurement. They can't understand why the government doesn't back private contracts. The avoidance of bureaucratic delays, development of specific packages suitable for unique PRC needs, and enhancement in technological absorption available only from industry almost demands PRC direct involvement with producers. The PRC must understand U.S. promises by private firms aren't the same as U.S. government approval. An article on Security Assistance by Andrew Semmel describes the U.S. government's position:

The real conundrum here is that generally we do not want to get directly involved in the marketing of United States defense articles and services and are content to leave that task to private industry. At the same time, the Defense Security Assistance Agency doesn't want to be an obstacle to that process.¹⁰

From the U.S. perspective significant political-military benefits described in the first section of this paper derive from security assistance to the PRC provided the contextual nature of the aid develops within the following ramifications: U.S. lead in critical military technology is not threatened; U.S. business interests are protected in an appropriate legal framework; a PRC foundation in business practices is inculcated in such areas as quality control, accounting, planning and feasibility studies; a suitable base is established in engineering, design, and research techniques enhancing the absorptive capacity of the PRC; restrictions are observed in onward transfers to third parties; and eventual PRC integration into the existing international framework for trade and technology transfer transpires.¹¹ An examination about to be

undertaken of the PRC's contextual framework for the procurement of foreign weapons adds insight to these prescriptions.

PRC Context

Accordingly, I will turn to the other side of the coin and look at the FMS contextual framework based upon the PRC's desires and qualifications. Two significant traits mark the nature of PRC's arms' dealings. They want to remain self sufficient free of dependence on foreigners while at the same time, they want the latest technologies and a modern military capability. Mr. Marks aptly points out this dilemma:

Only slowly did Peking come to the realization that it was being left behind--that the technological development of weapons had begun to accelerate at such a rate that a continued insistence on self-sufficiency would have doomed the nation to a permanent military inferiority vis-a-vis not only the superpower, but also its potential regional rivals.¹²

In order to cope with this ambiguity, the PRC inherently patient and pragmatic were willing to accept temporarily a compromising position in military modernization. Mr. Marks elaborates,

...the new receptiveness to the importation of foreign technology were both the spurs to, and the consequence of, the rise of a new group of pragmatic leaders in Peking.¹³

Knowing full well their long term aims had only been delayed not subjugated, this approach permitted near term practical accommodations for critical military needs.

This PRC contradictory predicament -- want the best but not dependence -- could seemingly be resolved by sticking with internal technological advancements, but obvious shortfalls exist precluding this option. Myths about the PRC technological capacity have furthered the

confusion over the PRC's self reliance. Several examples of technological genius such as their nuclear achievements, the reverse-engineering copy of a 707 airliner, and some relatively impressive submarine technology are cases in point.. However, the true nature of their tech-base capability and capacity is narrow and shallow.

Only through intense concentration in a narrow dimension are significant PRC feats accomplished. They lack the broad scientific and engineering talent of an industrial society; they are deprived of the facilities and wherewithal of a strong technological base and the capacity available is shared with the modernization priority of light industry manufacturing for consumption and welfare; they are deficient in managerial experience, institutional structures, systems, and processes; they are devoid legal, financial, accounting, and organizational frameworks although great strides have been undertaken. This is not to denigrate the tremendous progress achieved and inherent skills possessed by the PRC which can provided adequate assistance is obtained, eventually overcome these shortfalls.

Another problem area is affordability. Although ample financial assets and credit are available based on a foreign reserve approaching \$15 billion, a very low debt level of \$6 billion, a remarkable repayment record, and a society with a propensity to save, affordability decisions must be weighed against the countries modernization priorities (defense is last), the countries unwillingness to leverage very much debt, particularly for military expenses, and the countries persistence in

desiring self-sufficiency. In other words they have the assets but don't necessarily want to spend very much of it on military purchases.

Based on all these considerations the PRC attempted to remain self-sufficient, but fell further behind. Some obvious setbacks are observed in the following examples. The reverse-engineered 707 airplane accomplished in less than ten years is facetiously named the 708 and labeled primitive by prime U.S. aircraft manufacturer's representatives observing the plane first hand. Captured U.S. weapons from Vietnam such as the TOW antitank weapon confounded attempts at replicating the system. The guidance system and the texture and quality of the wire perplexed reverse-engineering trials.¹⁴ The nuclear force, inferior to both the Soviet's and the U.S.'s in sophistication, substantially defies any near term attainment of parity.¹⁵ Finally, the event that triggered the PRC to turn outward was when the attempt to design and produce the F-9 aircraft failed. Keeping all these motives and lack of abilities just discussed in mind will help you understand the reasoning behind the following PRC stance as expressed by Jan Prybyla in an article on "Science and Technology" in Current History, September 1984:

Increasingly, the Chinese have turned to the second way of acquiring scientific knowledge and technological know-how, the way of show-and-tell. While this involves some transfer of physical assets, its essence is the direct communication of ideas from people to people. In other words, show-and-tell is the acquisition of scientific knowledge and technical processes by means of patents, coproduction agreements, production under license, joint ventures....¹⁶

This "show and tell" technique is most suitable in keeping with their desires to minimize dependence, their needs to build a military technological foundation, and their priorities to obtain modern

technology in the most cost-effective manner without slighting their economic modernization or over extending their debt burdens or dependency. Another efficient approach within these constraints most suitable to the PRC needs is best described below as one PLA officer explained:

China must develop its own research, development, and production capability and supplement it with joint production arrangements and occasional foreign purchases as necessary. Thus, for us, the Israeli 'junkyard army' solution of incrementally upgrading the equipment in the inventory will be our approach. Ultimately the PRC will develop its own capability to the point of self-reliance.¹⁷

In response to an offer by Secretary Weinburger for assistance in the form of arms, the following comments expressed in an article, "China" in Global Political Assessments, April/October 1983, amplify the PRC political motivations:

But the Chinese responded coolly. Premier Zhao noted that China "might buy" some weapons if the U.S. offered to sell and if the price were right, but the purchases would be very selective and designed not to compromise Chinese independence. He and other leaders reiterated their adherence to an independent foreign policy without attachment to any superpower. Reluctance to enter into a closer military relationship with the U.S. stems not only from fears of compromising Chinese independence but also from fears that in such a relationship China would become hostage to the changing fortunes of U.S.-Soviet relations. Given the movement in Sino-Soviet relations, China is now in a position to bargain with both superpowers.¹⁸

Nationalism is a potent force influencing immensely the PRC actions as LTC Gass states,

PRC interests will always come first. Woe to that Chinese official whose government feels he was manipulated by the United States. Even so powerful a figure as Deng Xiaoping has felt the effect.¹⁹

Much more rhetoric than actual military development has been the rule. Very little evidence of actual military, especially Army agreements, have transpired. Much window shopping, some serious negotiating and planning, but after 18 months very few actual contracts have been consummated as elaborated on below by Mr. Robert A. Manning:

....some working-level military exchanges and discussions concerning a shopping list that includes antitank, antiaircraft, and radar equipment. But since the Chinese want to coproduce military hardware rather than simply import significant quantities, negotiations between American firms and China are likely to be long and tedious and cannot be expected to expand substantially U.S./PRC military ties.²⁰

Military exchanges in training and logistics are currently underway. A U.S. Army training team visited the PRC in the fall of 1984. The PRC has rebuffed large scale arms purchases and although progress is gradual some specific examples of arm sale interests are indicative of some positive future potential. In a June 1984 meeting between Secretary Weinberger and Aiping, China's Defense minister, interest was expressed in acquiring upgraded artillery munitions as well as the procurement of coproduction capability for air defense weapons and the Improved TOW, antitank weapon.²¹

In an interview with Emerson Electric the producer of the TOW some interesting aspects were learned about future PRC dealings. China wants to build export capability economically sound for China but militarily dangerous from the U.S. perspective. China now exports tanks and APCs to such countries as Iraq. Unconfirmed Jack Anderson reports claim that China intends eventually to sell U.S. weapons not yet procured to Iran although the same report accuses Israel and South Korea of similar dealings. Whether its true or not, the problem cannot be ignored.

Stipulations on resales need to be carefully addressed. China's civilian economic development trends are relevant to the future of Chinese thought on military development. Three trends are relevant: First, China increasingly has turned to international and private banks to meet its borrowing needs. The world bank recently announced a loan to the PRC of \$1 billion in 1984. China has encouraged joint ventures by expanding economic incentives to potential investors. Secondly, technology transfer primarily in energy and power-generating equipment, electrical machinery and precision instruments have amounted to over 130 contracts from the west in the last ten years.²² Thirdly, coproduction of dual-use technology such as commercial airliners has been noted in China's economic reform. From the above trends China's ability to accept interdependence with the west has been demonstrated.

Whether or not they will be similarly motivated in the military arena is another question. Even if these trends are acceptable, affordability considerations may be along the critical path. The magnitude of the combined economic and military program costs may preclude the desired military transfers for the sake of progress in the economic realm. Affordability not only addresses the availability of resources to make acquisitions, but also examines the buyers inclination to make purchases and his priorities of what purchases to make. Hence the following affordability assessment consummated from all three of these criteria:

China is not now economically capable of large-scale military modernization, and is unlikely to achieve such a capability in this century. The current PRC defense budget is only \$11 billion, and has been cut twice in the past two years.²³

How much will it take to provide China an adequate defense is difficult to quantify. Perceptions about deterrence and the Army's intangible qualities make any quantitative analysis suspect. Having said all that, some reference point to hang our hat is desirable regardless of its shortcomings. The Defense Department was quoted in this regard by Mr. Kau in his article on "Military Ties with Communist China" in Asian Affairs:

All this would cost between \$31 and \$63 billion, and would give the People's Liberation Army only a "confidence capability" to defend itself against a conventional Soviet attack.²⁴

The bottom line of all this discussion is that what's expressed as needed by the PRC is perhaps on the high side and what the PRC can afford if they so desire is perhaps on the low side. It is my contention that an adequate defense or security for the PRC is within their purview and purse strings. More importantly, the PRC is in the driver's seat when it comes to determining their security needs and military assistance. No other lesson is more important for U.S. planners to comprehend in dealing with the Chinese.

Two (U.S./PRC) Transfer Examples

Two diverse technology transfer cases help to illustrate my points and allude to some future implications for military assistance.

McDonnell Douglas (MD) contracted with China for coproduction of mainline commercial aircraft (MD 82). Not only is assembly completed in China, but after some U.S. training for the Chinese technicians, production of many of the component parts and much of the tooling to manufacture those parts will be accomplished in Shanghai. Profits for MD are offset by approximately 30%. MD is obligated to accept landing gear

doors for all of its U.S. manufactured planes (quality of those shipped to date is excellent). Furthermore, MD agreed to obtain other contractors willing to coproduce in China and encourage tourism as part of the offset. The Chinese demanded and obtained Federal Aviation Agency certification of all aircraft produced in China an example of their desire for U.S. government assurances on U.S. products.

The Chinese prefer quality as opposed to quantity when it comes to technology. Also, labor intensive products are suitable because the labor costs in China are 25% cheaper. Despite U.S. restrictions on third country sales, China wants technology suitable for export. Additionally, nuances in cultural transitions require patience to resolve. For example, twenty tons of engineering drawings had to be translated into Chinese. Another case in point, in China, the pilot does not command the plan. Operating differences such as this impact on both training and design.

Overall MD assessment of the Chinese market was that: Initial profits are marginal at best, offsets and red tape are substantial, the legal framework is incomplete, and long range potential payoffs require patience. Self-reliance is the Chinese's eventual goal, but the PRC lacks a good master plan on how to get there. Current technology in avionics is considered primitive vis a vis U.S. standards. A joint planning study encompassing the entire program was the first MD effort. Emphasis is on buying the latest technology and kit procurement in modular design to enhance component interchange and future improvements.

U.S. master tooling will be used to manufacture the tooling eventually used in China for fabricating and production. Both business and engineering training of 147 Chinese is conducted in the U.S. MD's program manager expressed satisfaction with the quality of the trainees: "Their questions showed a broad base of knowledge and competence." "The quality of components sent to the U.S. from China are of excellent quality," stated the manager. By 1989 the Shanghai production facility will turn out eight aircraft per year.

Other possible MD transfers with military application include the C-17 transport capable of hauling tanks, the F-8 fighter aircraft, and an Advance Feeder Aircraft to be used by the Chinese to integrate upgraded avionics as they become releasable from the West. Aircraft simulators for pilots and mechanics are a cost-effective approach with implications relevant to future Army sales. MD is conscientious about security and painstakingly prevents either leaks or release of critical design or "How to" technology prohibitive by the U.S. government or protected by MD proprietary rights.²⁵

Resource allocation even within the defense ministry is extremely competitive. Each Service's requirements are considered and compete for the military's scarce resources. This was also evident in the second case, Emerson Electric who is negotiating with the Chinese on three separate military components: the TOW antitank missile system, the APC 69(v) Airborne Fire Control Radar, and the TAT 251 anti-armor and suppressive weapon cupola. The PRC ministry of aviation (CATIC) would procure the APC 69(v) while the ministry of ordnance (NORINCO) procured

the TOW and the TAT 251. These are two of fourteen ministries competing for the scarce defense resources. An additional nine logistic suppliers compete in the General Logistics Department of the People's Liberation Army.

Emerson Electric found the PRC to be knowledgeable of the TOW evidence that one was confiscated from Vietnam. Since the PRC is now attempting to buy the TOW, apparently reproduction by reverse engineering was not possible. Particularly confounding to the PRC was the sophisticated technology in the guidance system and the quality of the thin wire used to direct the TOW. Therefore, the PRC opt for the next best solution, a coproduction of the TOW in CHINA. Progress to date is encouraging; production site selection is underway. Prior to agreement on TOW coproduction, China shopped around. The HOT, a French antitank missile, was considered until the TOW was found more cost-effective. Once selecting the TOW, the Chinese then attempted to procure only the tech data package (TDP) until Emerson convinced them more knowledge was necessary. Emerson explained: "the TDP alone will not give you the "How to" processes of production and generally is sketchy on the techniques of component integration. Subsequently, the PRC agreed to coproduction. As at MD, the PRC preferred the latest technology. Emerson's marketing representative explained, "the PRC asked for some theoretical weapons not yet prototyped for development. They not only want the latest available technology, but will request any new system discovered as conceivable." The PRC wants the TOW II, an advance model, not yet considered for U.S. release since TOW II is an upgraded TOW I,

the initial coproduction could eventually be upgraded to at least a TOW 1 1/2 having some suitable improvements for the PRC without jeopardizing U.S. technology leads. It will take compromises such as this to make the PRC and the U.S. bedfellows. Similar offsets to those in MD contracts were part of Emerson-PRC negotiations.

Emerson like MD found the technology primitive in the PRC except for some intensive efforts conducted in a limited dimension. Labor specialization considered staggering by Emerson, results from the size of the labor force. Emerson is equally constrained from releasing trade secrets even from products approved for export to the PRC.²⁶

In both of these cases, the U.S. contractors stressed the differences in PRC requirements vis a vis U.S. systems. The implication here is that PRC systems should be specifically designed for the PRC not necessarily equivalent to U.S. weapons.

In conclusion, on the contextual nature of security assistance, Michael Pillsbury's guidelines of 1977 remain valid.²⁷

1. U.S.-China mutual defense policy is not feasible.
2. China will seek to avoid the appearance of political or military weakness in any specific deal.
3. China will diversify its arms purchases among several countries.
4. China will prefer top of the line equipment.
5. China may want to train its technicians overseas.
6. Chinese negotiating practices avoid direct responses and may produce conflicting signals which require considerable patience.

In conclusion on the context of security assistance, arms sales in general are pervasive as a political instrument around the world. There is conclusive evidence of substantial arms accessibility throughout the globe making certain U.S. restrictions counter-productive to PRC policy. The U.S. system is inundated with bureaucratic control mechanisms generally protective of our technologies although sometimes at odds with one another. International controls are meager at best and should be expanded to include even the Soviets as a means to lessen the proliferation in arms sales competition.

For Policy Formulation, the U.S. must consult allies at least within the framework of COCOM (NATO and Japan), but equally as prudent would be consultation with those allies and friends in the proximity of China. Another sensible policy for those concerned friends is to grant accessibility to comparable military capabilities or protection within the U.S. security umbrella as the situation dictates. Sensitive military technology can be compromised by the U.S. private sector over-zealously seeking profits or by PRC students and trainees gaining accessibility while in the U.S. However, the magnitude of this problem is offset somewhat by industries' sensitivity to proprietary rights.

Final decisions on military sales and transfer is a two way street. Both countries must educate themselves about the others point of view. The process is slow and gradual. Little evidence of any substantial military sales exists after nearly two years of liberal authority. Patience and pragmatic compromise will be the golden rules for both countries if any significant implementation is to occur. An accommodating U.S. offer such as credit sales for weapons suggested as

early as 1981 by other writers would be productive. Moreover, credit sale grants to China could conceivably forge good perceptions about U.S. intentions, entice the reluctant Chinese to "buy America," and count on the excellent credit record and financial standing of China.

Regardless of U.S. policy, the PRC will be driven by its own persuasions. That is the synergism of political, military, economic, and cultural considerations. The most predominate ones being a xenophobic quest for independence, a proclivity to avoid substantial debt, a tendency toward long range permanent solutions as opposed to quick fixes, and a preference for economic improvements prior to military ones. In fact, the synthesis of all these traits underlies the pre-eminence given to production base and infrastructure reforms relevant to building a strong defense in the name of self reliance. Chinese characteristic is technical proficiency albeit narrow in scope. The potential for absorbtion and growth are excellent, but desparately needed is outside inculcation in techniques and procedures.

Acceptance of other than the latest technology is anathema to Chinese intentions. Workable solutions satisfactory to all are joint ventures and coproduction agreements direct from U.S. industry with reasonable U.S. government controls and assurances. However, since these solutions give China our production and design know-how, some more compromises in regard to the scope of assistance are required. Unless the U.S. policy is liberal enough to include sophisticated weaponry, China's interest will wane. On the other hand, unless China condescends to essential U.S. restrictions designed to protect our most sensitive technologies, there will be few systems acceptable to them.

CHAPTER IV

REQUIREMENT

(The PRC Military Situation)

If there was one salient point of Chapter III, the contextual framework, it was the PRC's intent on self reliance. Chapter II, the rationale, emphasized that military assistance provided more political and diplomatic values for both countries than actual military enhancement. These two themes taken together allude to the fact that the magnitude of U.S. assistance will be more token than substantive in nature. Therefore, there would be very little value in trying to perfect it by analyzing the military. In fact, one could posit: The U.S. need only to seek assurance that PRC requests fall within the proposed U.S. limits of allowable military assistance.

However, this is not the case. Despite the predominance of the diplomatic value, given that the relaxation of tension perceived from U.S.-PRC military cooperation is something for the Soviets to contemplate while at the same time is an opportunity for the friendly countries in the region, the actual security of the PRC can be enhanced by U.S. assistance in a mutually beneficial way.

Moreover, even though the PRC is predisposed to self-determination, some U.S.-PRC preliminary planning is essential to correlate the U.S. means with the desired PRC ends if the assistance is to be effective. The U.S. will have to interpret how available U.S. capabilities can fulfill PRC needs. In many cases, the U.S. systems or processes may not fit the requirements. When this occurs, unique designs from U.S.

concepts should be tailored to specific PRC weaknesses. This is not to imply that the U.S. will tell the PRC what to buy, but without U.S. help, the lack of Chinese familiarity with U.S. products and procedures will tend to produce less than optimal solutions.

Therefore, an appreciation of the PRC military situation by the U.S. is prerequisite to effective planning for military assistance. This Chapter presents three major aspects of the PRC military situation and offers some suggestions for USASA related to each area. Presented first is an orientation on the environment emphasizing the peculiarities of the threat, infrastructure, geography, population, and climate. Next, the discussion turns to PRC doctrine, primarily consisting of strategy and tactics. Finally, this Chapter concludes with an appraisal of the military posture nearly synonymous with the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Conditions and trends relevant to USASA are explored in the functional areas of organization, training, logistics, and equipment.

The Environment: The Threat

As established in Section II, the U.S., on balance, gains from the Sino-Soviet dispute, one rationale for bolstering China's military capability to resist Soviet intimidation. This predominant threat to the PRC, the Soviets, is far superior to the PRC; therefore, China's security can be improved substantially without posing a major threat to the Soviets in this century. Just how do the Soviets threaten China and what is the most threatening course of action among the propable scenarios available to the Soviets? Many Soviet options threaten China,

from simple air and ground raids to a major conventional envelopment extending to the Yellow River. The PRC needs to be able to deal with the most threatening scenario, along with the most likely one, to prepare an adequate deterrent. Since a drive beyond the Yellow River would be considered too costly to the Soviets, a conventional armor thrust into Manchuria and North China and perhaps an envelopment through Xinjiang eastward toward Beijing constitutes the most threatening rational option.¹ Therefore, the PRC must cope with armor warfare in the northern plains. The PRC-Soviet equation favors the Soviets, particularly in mechanized units and aircraft. A PRC forward defense would be unreasonable in light of these ratios. Hence the PRC depends upon an active defense strategy relying heavily on countermeasures other than counterforce. This is a two or more phase operation as explained by Harlan Jencks:

Evidently, it involves local forces units and rural militia guerrillas attacking enemy lines of communications and support formations, while main forces units conduct combined arms defensive operations roughly similar to the "active defense" tactics of the U.S. Army.²

Relatively inexpensive antiarmor missiles and air defense weapons suitable to the PLA's massive manpower become strikingly appropriate to the PRC's needs. These and other deficiencies as expressed below have been repeatedly pointed out:

Even the best main forces units, however lack the air defense, modern tanks, C³I, and long-range, precision-guided antitank weapons required for an American-style "active defense."³

Among the other salient deficiencies, Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence Systems (C³I), can, with U.S. help, provide the PRC with synergistic advances in capability. Because the PRC relies on an enormous militia besides the massive strength of the PLA, the latest technology providing adequate unit to unit information and coordination is essential. Weak command and control identified in the Vietnam experience can be given a tremendous boost with the dynamics provided from U.S. advances in C³I. Additionally, this technology may be the most cost effective equipment improvement in the PRC's near term modernization program and is certainly the most compatible means relevant to supporting combined arms tactics of "People's War under Modern Conditions" explained later. Moreover, joint service operations, particularly close air support, suffered immensely from communication deficiencies in the Vietnam experience; indeed U.S. technology can solve this deficiency. In addition to providing the PRC innovative Intelligence equipment, a mutual beneficial exchange of certain intelligence between the two countries is also warranted.

The PRC needs in regard to tanks also recommended in the preceding quote is a conundrum. First, it is difficult to make an assessment of how the PRC tanks compare to the Soviets. Neither quantity nor quality alone, or for that matter tanks alone, portray an accurate picture of how they will fair in battle. Force structures available for each side in a sino-Soviet conflict contain an equivalent number of tanks, approximately 10,000, and overall along the entire border, Chinese

forces outnumber Soviet forces about two to one. Nevertheless, these figures are deceptive and don't account for the inferiority in Chinese tank armor protection and accuracy, the protection and mobility offered the Soviet forces vis-a-vis a total armored mechanized ratio of 20:1 compared to a 241:1 ratio for Chinese forces, and organizational, logistical, and training deficiencies which will be detailed in part three of this section on the PLA posture (Army).⁴ Although the PRC needs to do something about these deficiencies making them overall inferior to the Soviets, keep in mind the PRC needs to find relatively inexpensive means and at the same time desires to retain its self sufficiency. Some specific solutions will be suggested in the next section. For now it suffices to recognize improvements in the fighting capability of the PRC armor forces are relevant to deterring the Soviet threat.

Despite all these PRC shortcomings, they can achieve their primary goal of becoming a convincing deterrent to a Soviet conventional attack especially in Northeast China by making the Soviets believe the cost is prohibitive. Hence, the debate over the PRC's vulnerability in terms of the economic disaster should the Soviets occupy this northern industrial strategic cornerstone becomes irrelevant. Another Soviet threat is the proclivity to use nuclear and chemical weapons. Although some deterrence exists, the PRC lacks defensive measures against both forms of warfare. The PRC has a nuclear force, but as Henry B. Gass points out, it is not very potent:

The PRC does not have a defense against a nuclear attack, but their small strategic nuclear force is sufficiently protected from a complete counter-force strike to retain a reasonable strategic nuclear deterrence.⁵

Indeed, the U.S. is not inclined to provide nuclear weapons as we established in Section II. However, some U.S. assistance in Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) defense equipment and tactics are worthy considerations. Certainly, medical training and equipment could pay dividends, particularly in nuclear and chemical treatments.

Soviet weaknesses offer the PRC several feasible exploitations. Limited Soviet transport capacity makes stockpiling war materials essential for the Soviets. Intelligence gathering capability to identify these stockpiles would aid the PRC in acquiring lucrative targets and provide them early warnings of Soviet attack preparations. Moreover, the vulnerability of the trans-Siberian railway and the only two adequate ports capable of resupply in the Far East make excellent targets for PRC interdiction.⁶ Tactics and equipment in support of these opportunities could come from the U.S.

So far, this discussion on the threat focused to the North. Soviet surrogates, particularly North Vietnam, would be expected to provide supporting attacks at least of a harassing nature in the South. Soviet air bases and seaports, likewise those in North Vietnam, provide targets of opportunity to PRC forces. PRC needs in this regard include rapid mobility and adequate transport to react with sufficient forces as the situation dictates. Helicopters and light cargo planes such as the C-17 and later versions would permit rapid tactical adjustments.

Another suggestion suitable for USAMA is mine warfare. In particular, antitank mine technology and mine sowing techniques, both land and air, could enhance the PRC's defenses. Finally, although many writers have precluded any U.S. involvement or direct assistance should a PRC-Soviet conflict transpire, I for one, find it conceivable. USAMA by itself can create the perception of future U.S. involvement to the Soviets thus serving as a creditable deterrent. In fact, a poll on U.S. public opinion showed support of the PRC in the event of a Soviet attack more popular than support to Taiwan should the PRC attack.⁷

The following words from Henry Gass best summarize the Sino-Soviet equation and place the U.S. contribution into perspective:

What do they need? In terms of achieving an offensive capability against the Soviet Union, the Chinese need everything but people. In terms of deterring a Soviet invasion intended to seize and occupy large portion of Chinese territory, the Chinese "People's War" capability probably will continue to serve as a deterrent for the immediate future. However, as Soviet forces enhance their battlefield mobility and logistical support capabilities, the Soviet lines of communication and supply will become easier to maintain, making the guerrilla tactics of a "People's War" less effective. The PRC needs to start this long process of modernization now, or its "people's war" deterrence may soon diminish. Nevertheless, U.S. sales must move with deliberation so as not to upset the stability which now exists.⁸

The Environment: Infrastructure, Geography, Population, and Climate

Other environmental factors contributing to an appreciation of the military situation in the security of China are infrastructure, geography, population, and climate.

The infrastructural support systems in almost every respect are insufficient to sustain modern warfare. I've discussed the lack of

research and development skills. Likewise the thin transport and communications infrastructure could not support a modern conflict as evidenced in the brief excursion into Vietnam in 1979. The transport structure was overloaded in southern China by the demands of the three-week conflict in Southeast Asia.⁹ Energy shortcomings in capacity are evident; however, the U.S. recently permitted nuclear power firms to sell to China. The PRC also recognizes this problem, and Defense Minister Aiping in a May 1983 address pointed out their corrective actions.

The state has decided to use most of its financial and material resources in economic construction, giving priority to the basic facilities of energy and communications and in developing science and education.¹⁰

Turning to geography, the vast majority of terrain is rugged, ideally suited for infantry which in fact constitutes over 90% of the PLA ground forces. This is particularly true of China's borders to the south and west, which are protected by thick vegetation and mountainous rough terrain. To the north along the 4,700 mile sino-Soviet border, the open spaces and the thin population of the west and center of Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia respectively offer optimum terrain for mobile assaults. A single rail connection traverses the Gansu corridor, and desert terrain ringed by mountains mark Xinjiang. The Gobi Desert separates inner and outer Mongolia. The Northerly, Manchuria consists of a flat central plain surrounded by mountains to the north and west. Seventy percent of China's industrial capacity, rich agricultural land, many natural resources, and a large population

make this area a lucrative Soviet objective. Generally along the northern border temperatures drop to minus 20 degrees in the winter with snow hindering movement in the mountain passes; while in the summer flooding may hinder movement in eastern Manchuria. Winter and spring winds from the northwest favor Soviet use of chemicals.¹¹ Despite the one billion plus population, space to maneuver is a strategic asset in China, the world's third largest country. Because of this space, refugee problems in China such as those hampering operations in Europe would be minimal. On the other hand, because of the abundant population, the magnitude of China's mobilization program is impressive. The implications of these environmental factors in terms of China's security needs are obvious. The battlefield will vary widely in terrain and weather, while the combat missions and tasks will be diverse. Therefore, there will be variations in force structures and training scenarios. For example, infantry deployed against the North Vietnamese in the South; anti armor and heavy mobile forces deployed against the Soviets in the North. Likewise, training diversification for the jungles, mountains and plains is essential. Zhang Aiping, the Chinese Defense Minister writing on defense modernization points out:

Since our country has a vast territory, a long border and complicated geographic and weather conditions, only by developing -- through self-reliance and in a realistic light -- sophisticated military equipment that can be adapted to various conditions can we satisfy our Army's needs in its wars against aggression.¹²

Many assessments of the PRC environment have concluded with expressions of pessimistic views about the PLA's chances against a Soviet

attack, even with U.S. assistance. These views usually exclude the acumen of the PRC to extract a high cost from an aggressor and merely express a force-on-force analytical comparison. However, conflicts in Vietnam and Afghanistan are two examples where sophisticated equipment and quantifiable comparisons did not portend the ability of a strong willed diminutive force utilizing other elements of war to prolong the conflict. I will turn to some of these other elements of war, namely, the PRC intentions and posture, relevant to the PRC's security. But it is posited herewith--the PRC doesn't need to achieve parity in force-on-force ratios to become a viable deterrent to the Soviets. General MacArthur once testified, "Anyone who advocated such a thing as getting involved in a war on the China mainland in conventional terms should have his head examined."¹³

The PRC Doctrine: Strategy and Tactics

Chinese military intentions (strategies and tactics) and subsequent equipment requirements are shaped by many factors. First, the magnitude of China's inability to project an effective deterrent vis-a-vis the Soviets other than its own "indigestibility" combined with China's incapacity to rapidly absorb western military fixes limits the PRC focus to other than conventional counterforce doctrine. Furthermore, economic and resource shortcomings, the primacy of the economy over the military, and military reform debates influence the focus and necessitate compromises in doctrine.

Accordingly, the PRC focuses predominantly on conflict avoidance and subsequently on the most effective deterrent relevant to the threat.

Therefore, as Harlan W. Jencks says in the following pronouncement, China relies first on a grand strategy designed to diplomatically avoid war. Second it depends on the deterrence of its nuclear forces, and only last without any sense of urgency does it count on the conventional deterrent.

. . .the primary Chinese aim is to deter Soviet attack, and the primary means of deterrence are diplomatic, political, economic and ideological. Backing them up is the primary military deterrent provided by China's small but improving strategic nuclear forces. Secondly, Chinese leaders do not regard war with the Soviet Union as imminent, nor do they feel particularly threatened strategically. The Soviet threat is seen as a chronic long-term problem.¹⁴

In the eyes of the PRC the Soviet threat is a long-range menace and as such long-range solutions should be patiently pursued. The most pragmatic long range solution in the PRC's perception is the construction of a solid scientific and technological base in their economy, permitting eventual defense modernization without jeopardizing their independence. Consequently, strategy and tactics must be suited to their available weapons yet flexible enough to evolve as new technologies are introduced.

In this context, the current PRC administration has concluded that the strategic defense of people's war remains the best way to secure China's national security interests.¹⁵ There is little evidence for the moment that Peking aspires to much more than being a regional military power and protecting its sovereignty against threats, predominately the Soviets. However, it has become apparent to the PRC that they can no longer or don't want to rely on "luring the enemy deep," the essence of people's war doctrine because of the cost to their developed regions. Therefore, in evolutionary transition, as

professionalism increased and equipment and resources improved, pragmatic and ad hoc adjustments were made to the flexible framework of people's war. Hence the term: "People's war under modern conditions."¹⁶ This elastic modification to doctrine is analogous to the infusion of capitalistic inclinations into the socialistic PRC economy. I earlier alluded to the active defense strategy generally accepted by the PRC as the most practical means to confront a large conventional threat such as the Soviets. This strategy minimizes the cost of an expensive equipment fix and maximizes the Chinese strengths of time, space, and population.

Along with this strategic adjustment to defense, considerable diplomatic energy is exerted in support of defense, ranging from cooperation with the U.S. in response to the Soviet threat to opening negotiations with the Soviets in reducing the threat. Colonel Alfred Wilhelm's words help to explain the underlying motives of China's international dealings: "Going to the negotiation table is a tactic, not a strategy. It is but one phase of a dynamic process continually at work."¹⁷ and "there are no permanent friends or enemies only permanent interests."¹⁸ Certainly, national policymakers have not forgotten the words of Sun Tzu: "To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill." In this regard the U.S. plays a strategic role with respect to countering the Soviet threat and a political role with respect to appeasing those--generally the PIA--advocating large scale, rapid defense modernization.¹⁹

"People's war under modern conditions" acknowledges materiel weaknesses, but again from its Sun Tzu origin: as water adheres to the

path of least resistance, it reacts flexibly by seeking out and taking advantage of enemy weaknesses.²⁰ Recognizing a forward defense for the PLA is not feasible because of the superiority of the Soviet forces, the PRC relies on force multipliers rather than seeking parity in force structures. Surprise, deception, counterattacks, mobilization, guerrilla warfare, decentralization, "luring deep," mobile warfare, and active defense are all techniques designed to first bog down and attrite the enemy and then gain the momentum from positions of strength. Obviously, this doctrine, a strategy of total war, requires a lot of space to implement and is defensive in nature. Therefore, it does not apply to the limited PRC experiences in Korea, India, and Vietnam where China fought from its tactical doctrine, a subset of this strategy. China was constrained by the lack of terrain and indigenous assets during these conflicts precluding the opportunities to fully implement the precepts of people's war strategy. Likewise, a Soviet limited incursion into China would not be an occasion for people's war strategy. These limited actions restrict PLA flexibility and invoke the need for a modicum of sophisticated forces to cope with them as a corollary to their strategic doctrine. As Major Thomas Waller states, the Chinese readily adapt doctrine without compromising its basic principles:

Thus, even China's building of a rapid deployment force or several fully modernized divisions would not indicate the abandonment of people's war as her central concept of national defense.²¹

People's war is malleable and dynamic. It's malleable within the rigid precepts of doctrine. Although the doctrine espouses the primacy of man, defense, and deception, the response is adapted to the actual situation, always trying to pit strength against weakness. The response can be direct as well as indirect, offense as well as defense, and massive as well as illusive. It's also dynamic relative to the means available. Strategy and tactics are adjusted as maneuver space, enemy destructive potential, and indigenous weapon capability dictate. In addition to supplemental doctrine to cope with special situations as previously discussed, evolutionary adjustments occur to provide a more pragmatic response. For example, nothing in their doctrine precludes the use of the most modern weapons, nor does anything preclude a more direct response to a Soviet threat. As a matter of fact, in response to a Soviet attack to the lucrative northeast industrial area, the PRC is known to be preparing positional defenses approximately 300 km from the borders supported by extensive antitank ditches. Likewise, key cities are being fortified in "Stalingrad" fashion. The introduction of combined arms tactics and joint service strategies are representative of the pliancy in doctrine.²² In response to the more challenging doctrine, the PLA is stressing training and demanding professionalism. As will be made apparent in the next topic on the army posture, organizational modernization is occurring symmetrically with the modification of doctrine. Although the PLA forces may not be too impressive vis-a-vis the Soviet forces, PLA doctrine will make them a

little less unequal and will unequivocally up the ante on an invasion of the "Motherland."

In regard to the art of deception, "Jimou," the Chinese term for it, exists in statescraft as well as military doctrine. The Chinese legitimize the employment of this deceitful technique within the canons of their moral code. I suspect that "Jimou" contributed to the intractability on the Taiwan issue and the irresponsibility on the U.S. grain deal where they reneged on contractual purchases.

All this has USASA implications. Obviously new equipment means more sophisticated training and logistics. Another instructive point is that the PRC will not be satisfied with "hand me down" equipment or merely quantitative infusions lacking in quality. To meet the vastly superior and rapidly advancing destructive capacity of the Soviets in particular, and to avoid devastation to their homeland, the PRC want nothing but the latest, cost-effective fighting capacity. Certainly, the U.S. must be cautious in negotiations and agreements with the PRC, recognizing what they say and what they do can be intentionally conflicting.

PLA Posture (Army):

The three services are known collectively as the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the world's largest armed forces. Of the 4.5 million persons in the PLA, 3.6 million are enlisted in the Army. An armed militia estimated at 12 million strong backs up the PLA. Weapons are mainly copies of much older Soviet models. A dearth of sophisticated weapons and equipment, inadequate logistical support and

expertise, and insufficient training and professionalism have all prompted reforms in the name of national security. There is no question that they could use some help, and as I have already established, U.S. assistance is justifiable within the limits of PRC national security. Defense against a Soviet invasion is the best the PRC can achieve for some time to come as David E. McGiffert explains:

. . .it is the U.S. interest to encourage gradual improvement in China's military posture, particularly in its ground and air forces, even if it is unlikely that this will create a credible threat to the Soviet Union of an early second front.²³

Defense ranks high as a national objective despite being last among the four modernizations. Therefore, as expressed by Colonel Alfred Wilhelm the PLA and the infrastructure have received national attention:

Consequently the PLA's modernization requirements have received considerable attention from the central leadership, in addition to that given to development of the transportation and communications infrastructure. Hard political decisions have been made concerning manpower issues such as competency based promotions, leadership and training, force reductions and reorganizations, research and development (R&D) and procurement of equipment, and strategy and tactics.²⁴

Deng appears to be shaping the PLA into a less politicized, more professional military force. Not only is military provincial and regional leadership not automatically selected to political positions such as the central committee of the communist party, but those in high ranking positions are more apt to have scientific and technical backgrounds or professional military command experience as compared to the political backgrounds preeminent among the older leadership.²⁵ The Army has been placed more firmly under civilian control. Deng retired aged commanders and replaced them with younger, better educated,

more professional officers. Morale and discipline have been emphasized; military parades, snappier uniforms, a new discipline code, and rank reinstatement exemplify this trend. Stress has been placed on getting more value out of existing equipment by improving training and maintenance methods.

Obstacles, not insurmountable but impacting on the progress of the reforms, include conflicts between the military and civilian leaders, conflicts between the military and the civilian populace, and conflicts within the military; economic priorities and constraints; and the army's role in the civilian economy. The essence of the conflicts and their implications are outlined by June Dreyer below:

There is general agreement in China on the need for military modernization, but less accord on pace, direction, and funding. In recent years, the Chinese elite has argued over questions of strategic doctrine, procurement, organizational structure, size, training methods, recruitment practices, and the relationship of the military to the Communist Party and the civilian population. How these debates are resolved will have a profound effect on the character of the armed forces, their capabilities against various adversaries, and therefore, on the potential effectiveness of military cooperation with the United States.²⁶

Politics plays an important role in shaping of national security policy. Interactions of government bureaucracies, communist party leadership, and the PLA are complex and difficult for the U.S. observer to comprehend. The politics within the Defense Ministry itself involves much internecine bickering over priorities and policies. The Navy is purportedly receiving the lion's share of modernization funds, most likely to advance the nuclear submarine fleet and counter the increase in the Soviet Navy in the Pacific area.²⁷

Not only within the Army but nationally as well, there are conservatives calling for retention of Mao Doctrine and opposed to reduction in PLA manpower for the sake of arms and technology. This has exacerbated the problems and forced compromises and concessions slowing the pace of the reforms.²⁸ The remainder of this overview on the Army will be devoted to specific Army functions suitable for modernization, symmetrical to doctrine, in response to the threat, and appropriate for U.S. assistance. These are categorized most conveniently into professionalism, training, logistics, and equipment.

Professionalism describes functions in organization, education, command and control, morale and discipline. This area, in my opinion, has the most profound long-range impact, for it is precisely the means by which the Army's image, prestige, and role can be enhanced. In light of the obstacles to modernization previously pointed out and the intense competition for scarce resources, professionalism creates a palpable image, exonerates the Army's good name, and influences decisions on expenditures.

Deng announced plans to increase soldier literacy and technical skills which would be tied to future advancements. He required military academies for all officers to attend where they will learn modern warfare and science. Likewise, the Chinese leaders recognized the need for a non-commissioned officer corps, especially after the Vietnamese incursion. Moreover, the PLA was replaced by the People's Armed Police founded to take over menial security tasks including border guards and government facilities protectors. At the same time,

administration of the nation's railways was placed under the control of the Ministry of Railways. These two moves sanctioned the streamlining of forces and military tasks both of which accommodate the emphasis on professional subjects such as combat readiness. Deng and another high ranking official in the military have published some works similar to Mao's compendium emphasizing the need for discipline and mastery of skills. Generally, the intent is to revise Mao's thoughts relative to modern conditions of military thinking making the Army more professional. Deng said, "Apply Chairman Mao's works in a flexible way, emancipate our thinking, dare to break away from old conventions."²⁹ Stress has been placed on turning every soldier into a model citizen, as can be seen in the following mandate distributed to the military grass roots.

They have been told to carry out the "four have's" (ideals, morality, knowledge and physical strength), and "three stresses" (appearance, courtesy and discipline), and the "two fear-not's" (difficulties and hardship, and bloodshed and sacrifice). In addition, the CPC has reinstated (partially to placate the more Maoist-inclined PLA cadres) the "Learn from Lei Feng" movement, which sought to instill into the fighters the revolutionary notions for "serving the people" through self-sacrifice. Yang Dezhi has proclaimed that it is necessary to place special emphasis on organization and discipline in the armed forces because they are indispensable to a modern, regular military.³⁰

Professionalism is the most difficult area to give specific suggestions for U.S. assistance. However, two procedural techniques come to mind: First, the U.S. contingent involved in USAMA must become intimately familiar with PRC peculiarities and intentions so that Chinese, not American, solutions are suggested. Otherwise they probably

won't work and certainly won't be accepted. Secondly, reciprocal military visits already underway should further understanding of one another. The prestige invoked in these associations can impact on PRC military professionalism. Specific educational techniques, processes, and systems could be effectively adapted to PRC needs. Technical learning equipment such as videos, computers, and other audio-visual aids are suggested. Law and order, personnel management, organizational concepts, and civil-military relations are all topics for mutual introspection between the U.S. and China. Moreover, command and control techniques related to organizational and managerial improvements should be useful. Of course, some training and equipment improvements soon to be discussed are also relevant to the modernization of command and control.

The emphasis in training, the second applicable function, has changed. Training from anti-infantry to anti-tank warfare, from single-function to combined exercises, and from single-service to joint coordinated actions were observed in massive war games outside Beijing in late 1981.³¹ Training challenges stem from those military doctrine and professional adjustments in PRC thinking. This twofold underpinning to training is threat oriented on the Soviet conventional attack to the PRC's northeast. Doctrinal innovations in the name of "People's war under modern conditions" is traditional enough to be useful with available capability yet malleable enough to be compatible with equipment modernization. And PLA professionalism is designed to enhance the psychological commitment and subjective initiatives of the leaders

and soldiers in accord with the dangerous nature of their missions.

Based on doctrine and certainly demanding professionalism, training in combat operations, more than ever before, requires coordination between the positional units, the mobile (combined arms) units, and those guerrilla units in accordance to the situation. Each task force is tailored to its specific mission; to the enemy, weather and terrain it faces; and to the time and troops available.³²

Moreover, lessons from Vietnam point up other training challenges. Too much political indoctrination, 40 percent of their time, was devoted to this training; and the command structure was unable to provide adequate leadership.³³ The U.S. has already commenced reciprocal visits. An 11-member training delegation headed by a U.S. major general was dispatched to China in November 1984. U.S.-PRC joint operations are too bold a move in today's political environment but not inconceivable for eventual implementation. Of course, consultations on the scope and purpose of these exercises with our friends and allies are needed.

U.S. military assistance in the form of Initial Military Education and Training (IMET) has not received very much attention. Any magnitude of U.S. technological infusion and any degree of significant cooperation in training would appear to mandate IMET if for no other reason than to educate the PRC Army in the processes and methodologies of U.S. military assistance, not to mention the measure of trust and confidence conceivable from such a move by the U.S.

U.S. simulators and training devices are plentiful and appropriate to PRC training needs. Despite the voluminous literature, multiple

interviews, and solid inculcation on Chinese military modernization that I've been subjected to, nobody has proposed training simulators as an adjunct to PRC training reforms. Not only do training devices avoid costs but they also are an example where preliminary U.S. indoctrination is appropriate for the Chinese Army who may not be familiar with the value of training devices. The U.S. needs to educate them on what devices are available and how much money simulators can save. The next step is to conduct a joint U.S.-PRC analysis to match devices available to PRC needs. For example, the TOW antitank system about to be co-produced in China has an effective simulator to inexpensively train gunners. Other tank, artillery and infantry training devices are readily adaptable to PRC weapons.

Logistical reforms, the third function discussed, becomes more complex as modern equipment is introduced. Even now, without any new systems, the lack of wartime support from PLA transport, maintenance, and supply units is a major detriment to the sustainment of combat forces, as evidenced in the 1979 Vietnamese conflict. In modern warfare on China's vast terrain, the proliferation in mechanization, mobility, and movement will compound the inadequacies of the logistic system. The magnitude of the problem is expressed by A. James Gregor below:

Transport and communications remain major weaknesses of the PLA. With about one million trucks in service on about 900,000 kilometers of roads, and with the extant rail services on 50,000 kilometers of track, it is doubtful that the General Rear Services Department, responsible for the logistics of the PLA armed forces, could sustain the large-scale mechanized infantry, tank, and artillery formations required to engage an enemy in modern warfare, or provide transport and supplies for the care of casualties and the replenishment of front-line elements.³⁴

Of course, the nature of the infrastructure (roads, railways, communication, and energy) where China has already initiated improvements and ferreted U.S. help, facilitates logistical support.

The dearth of trucks and the antiquated condition of those available trucks have been identified as one of the primary deficiencies in logistical support. Agreement was recently concluded on an AMC Jeep production of 10,000 trucks for the PRC through a joint venture agreement with an Austrian subsidiary of AMC Jeep, Steyr-Daimler-Puch. Follow-on production is likely.³⁵

To arrive at the specifics of logistical reforms (processes and equipment), again a detailed U.S.-PRC reciprocal investigation matching up what's available to what's needed by some sort of functional analysis is a prerequisite. Adequate logistical support must be integral with PRC equipment purchases. The PRC fell into the Soviet trap where equipment was provided without appropriate maintenance and component derivatives now finding themselves with a great deal of unoperable equipment.³⁶

Turning to equipment, the last functional category of PRC reforms, it's the least urgently pursued function but perhaps the most critical. For reasons already elaborated upon, the PRC patiently await long-range improvements from internal sources while minimum direct purchases are made to fill essential gaps. The first challenge is like walking a tightrope. That is -- keeping the weapons nonprovocative to regional neighbors while at the same time providing the offensive punch essential for an active defense, the mobility to counter multiple threats, and the

lethality to be a viable deterrent. Another challenge facing U.S. decisionmakers is not closing the door to technologies obtainable from other sources. And in this same regard the following quote from A. Doak Barnett is offered:

And the United States should follow a policy that minimizes security restrictions on technology and equipment that are on the borderline between civilian and military use and that would therefore permit the sale of certain types of computers, transport jets, helicopters, and the like. (Even the Soviet Union has continued to sell transport jets and helicopters to China, despite the intensity of the Sino-Soviet dispute.)³⁷

During the May 1984 military parade in Peking an Israeli 105mm gun was observed. Also seen were self-propelled howitzers of approximately 122 and 152 caliber mounted on armored carriers, the source of which is unknown, but these howitzers are certainly representative of pretty good capacity in manufacturing.³⁸

As previously alluded to, tanks may be the least understood component of the Chinese forces. Writers have consistently voiced antiquated opinions about the status of PRC armor. The tank currently produced in the PRC is the T-69 version updated from the Soviet T-54. This tank has been upgunned to a 105mm smooth bore tube making it compatible with western ammunition. Gun stabilization, passive night sights, laser range finders, infra-red searchlights, and armored side skirts have been applied to this tank; all of these components were not integrated by the U.S. until 1978 when the M60A3 tank was introduced. Although stabilization and laser technology do not equate to U.S. sophistication, this is a viable tank suitable for product improvements

particularly in armor applique kits available in the west and in line with cost-effective methodologies desired by the PRC as discussed in Chapter III.

Tanks are produced in sufficient quantity so that China can export them. Kampuchea, North Korea, Pakistan, Sudan, Tanzania and Vietnam have Type 59 Chinese main battle tanks, but these are not of the latest configuration.³⁹ More importantly, the PRC tanks are still inferior to the Soviets'. Given the continued Soviet tank improvements, even with the PRC advances in tank technology, they will only marginally improve vis-a-vis the Soviets. Furthermore, exposed to Soviet air and antiarmor, the PLA tanks would suffer grievous attrition rates.⁴⁰

Battlefield mobility over extended distances is another deficiency in PRC operational capability. The Chinese lack adequate transport aircraft either fixed or rotary wing. Helicopters would provide combat support and combat service support to the PRC. The only significant U.S. purchase by the PRC was 24 Sikorsky Blackhawk helicopters made last year.⁴¹ This heavy transport model is the latest version fielded by the U.S. Army.

Air defense shortcomings include relatively ineffective radar and ground control intercept systems, outdated ground to air fixed sites, and the lack of portable ground to air weapons for the troops. U.S. Hawk and Redeye ground to air systems are suitable for PRC consideration and ones in which they have expressed interest. Over 90% of the PLA ground forces are ideally suited for infantry operations in rugged terrain. However, they lack long-range antitank weapons, air defense,

command and control, and battle field mobility.⁴² In addition to the critical equipment already listed, China recognizes the importance of data processing and long-range surveillance/target acquisition/night observations (STANO). In both of these areas there is room for some U.S. assistance without jeopardizing our unreleasable technology.

China's quest for autonomy eclipses the likelihood of all but very limited outright purchases of equipment. However, there are excellent markets for production base support equipment and innovative defense technologies which would still be necessary to purchase from the U.S. even when co-production is used. Of course, prerequisite to any reforms in military production is general modernization of China's science, technology, and industry which is now a major national priority. Consequently, most of the weapons and military equipment upgrade will be gradual. In fact, equipment improvements in general are lowest priority of all military functional areas with the exception of those critical ones to fill major gaps in their defense capability. At the same time, the Army is becoming smaller, decentralized to the 11 regions and 26 provinces, less political and more professional. Thus better skills and training may transform the Army into a more viable fighting force despite equipment discrepancies. As Harlan Jencks has written, the enormous material, financial, and human costs of modern war, and the dependency of a modern army upon a modern industrial economy and national mobilization system has influenced their course of actions and priorities.⁴³

In conclusion, the extension of military reforms to the Army is crucial to China's modernization. They need it to secure their country and obtain political support for the reforms. The reform program correctly recognizes more military proficiency, and improved infrastructure and a broader science and technological base offer long-range opportunities for security and stabilization both in the interests of the U.S. This approach is consistent with curing the military's maladies as opposed to quick equipment fixes merely treating the military's symptoms. On the other hand, they recognize isolationism is counter to attainment of these goals. Reluctantly, compromises and in some cases meeting the U.S. on its terms will be essential to obtain the desired wherewithal.

The usefulness of the U.S. will depend upon U.S. participants' (government and industry) ability to extrapolate western style means into solutions satisfactory to Chinese type ends. The U.S. initial role is that of a consultant. As a prelude to this role, an appreciation of PRC attitudes and objectives by the U.S. is paramount. Once the U.S. contingent comprehends the context and content of the desired ends consultations on the means will require two way communications. From the PRC planners come expressed requirements in the form of missions or tasks. From the U.S. consultants come an array of available means or design creations from releasable U.S. data and technologies suitable to accomplish the job. This give-and-take approach is similar to U.S. military functional area assessments conducted in the U.S. Army today.

In May of 1984, Dr. James Wade Assistant U.S. Secretary of Defense for Development and Support made the following profound remarks to U.S. industry relevant to just how we should approach U.S. military assistance to China:

I broached to the PRC the CONCEPT of cooperation in military mission areas as the most effective way to bring about meaningful cooperation in military technology. Joint participation by the U.S. and the PRC in modernization programs involving U.S. technologies is to our mutual benefit. This participation helps us to understand the PRC's needs and to provide hardware or technologies appropriate to those needs, and it also helps the PRC to develop and implement priority programs much faster and more efficiently than they could do alone.⁴⁴

Some have proposed Chinese equipment requirements lie at the opposite end of the quantity and quality spectrum from the U.S. Others have suggested a euphoria of sales in U.S. equipment replication for China. Neither of these propositions approximates the Chinese opinion. In fact, solutions can become part of the problem which these suggestions, void of Chinese opinion, represent. Only by joint participation, as described, do mutually satisfactory solutions evolve.

Additionally, emphasis on non-equipment ideas in professionalism, training, and logistics can be mutually beneficial and a conduit to better trust and confidence. Not much has been written on U.S. lessons and gains from PRC exchanges, but undoubtedly many exist. The Corps of Engineers show interest in PRC seismic devices and cold weather testing.⁴⁵ The U.S. intrigue in acupuncture demonstrates that some of

the austere Chinese medical practices particularly in combat medicine might be appropriate to U.S. application. The durability and reliability of Chinese equipment most notably the small arms produced is an area the U.S. has emphasized of late. The prestige of U.S. assistance enhances the regimes political existence perhaps more significant toward eventual PRC stabilization than the actual military influence on security.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

In response to the question posed at the beginning of this essay: What should U.S. Security Assistance consist of? There can be no U.S. generated solutions to PRC problems; the Chinese will decide from within a framework established by the U.S. In formulation of U.S. assistance, the other question posed, the U.S., after methodically assessing those parameters presented herewith, i.e., the purpose and the context establish a framework limiting availability as enunciated heretofore. Subsequently the U.S. proceeds with an open minded, readily accommodating, and responsive attitude toward assisting the PRC in finding their own solutions. You can't mirror image China. However, after a comprehensive review of the materiel presented here the U.S. participates in generating solutions by stimulating Chinese origination. Of course, this is done without jeopardizing U.S. security superiority. If U.S. policy formulation is couched in these terms, efficacy in U.S. assistance toward the achievements recognized as mutually beneficial is possible. Otherwise, resentment and antagonism eclipse those cooperative attitudes necessary to promote good will and generate constructive pursuits between the U.S. and the PRC.

This approach is the quantessential message for security assistance. The positive atmosphere, the trust and confidence, the political opportunities garnered from constructive assistance will bring about an amicable China conducive to world peace. By influencing China with our support, the long term vision, although China resists, can't

help but include some dependencies. Dependency moderates adversarial relations while at the same time fosters cooperation. The prospects, in this regard, can be the promulgation of a less repressive China content within her borders; an independent state not intimidated, but influential in protecting friendly regional neighbors; a China not isolated from the world, but a major player participating in it.

In another twenty or thirty years China will be a world power with or without the U.S. in the estimation of Mr. John Garver. He goes on to express the significant force Chinese nationalism represents and cautions against any but the most essential opposition.¹ In the same vein, even a modicum of goodwill stemming from security assistance to the PRC can have far reaching apposite consequences for the entire world.

To reiterate the salient points concluded relative to security assistance, the following guidelines are listed:

1. Strategic offensive and nuclear assistance is not justified nor within an acceptable risk for U.S. policy.
2. Strategic defensive assistance including tactical Army offensive weapons should be authorized provided risk avoidance measures are taken.
3. Mandatory risk avoidance measures include:
 - a. Strong U.S. military presence maintained in the Pacific - East-Asia region.
 - b. Consultations with Allies and friends.
 - c. Accessibility of equivalent assistance to regional friends and Allies.

- d. Restraint on China from selling to third countries.
 - e. Sensitive technologies and techniques precluded from production rights in China.
4. The proliferation of security assistance as a political instrument around the world is a reality forcing U.S. liberalization of policy but demands more emphasis on obtaining international controls.
 5. Credit sales and training and educational grants should be incorporated into the security assistance program.
 6. Communication of ideas in professionalism, training, and logistics can be reciprocal and more compatible with Chinese intentions than insistence on massive U.S. equipment infusion.
 7. Tactical offensive weapons of the latest technology is consistent with the PRC intentions and the U.S. purpose.
 8. In regards to hardware, the U.S. should make some specific suggestions from within allowable technologies, but joint PRC-US feasibility studies are essential for final determination of transfers.
 9. Suggestions must consider methodology as well as cost conjuring up the following equipment recommendations.
 - a. Concentrate on long range solutions consistent with PRC self reliance and affordability.
 - b. Production base and infrastructure assistance is tantamount.

c. Specific weapons and systems should be coproducable and inexpensive.

d. Product Improvements to existing PRC equipment or baseline purchases is desirable.

e. Training devices and simulators are attractive and consistent with intentions and prerequisites.

f. Command and control, logistics, and operations both joint and combined are functions under reform and in dire need of equipment augmentation.

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