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1964-1968
Volume XXX
China**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, DC



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, DC

Questions Pertaining to Tibet

337. Memorandum for the Special Group/1/

Washington, January 9, 1964.

/1/Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Special Group Files, S.G. 112, February 20, 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. The source text bears no drafting information. Memoranda for the record by Peter Jessup of February 14 and 24 state that the paper was considered at a Special Group meeting on February 13 and approved by the Special Group on February 20. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80-B01285A, Box 1, 303 Committee Meetings (1964))

SUBJECT

Review of Tibetan Operations

1. Summary--The CIA Tibetan Activity consists of political action, propaganda, and paramilitary activity. The purpose of the program at this stage is to keep the political concept of an autonomous Tibet alive within Tibet and among foreign nations, principally India, and to build a capability for resistance against possible political developments inside Communist China.
2. Problem--To explain Agency expenditures in support of the Tibetan program.
3. Background and Objectives--At a 13 December 1963 meeting "The Special Group approved the continuation of CIA controlled Tibetan Operations [*1 line of source text not declassified*]." Previous operations had gone to support isolated Tibetan resistance groups within Tibet and to the creation of a paramilitary force on the Nepal/Tibet border of approximately 2,000 men, 800 of whom were armed by [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] airdrop in January 1961. In 1963, as a result of the [*2 lines of source text not declassified*] and as a result of the

cited Special Group meeting, the Agency began a more broadly based political program with the exiled Tibetans. This included bringing 133 Tibetans to the United States for training in political, propaganda and paramilitary techniques; continuing the support subsidy to the Dalai Lama's entourage at Dharmasala, India; continuing support to the Nepal based Tibetan guerrillas; the reassignment of a part of the unarmed guerrillas to India for further training; and the [6 lines of source text not declassified]. Operational plans call for the establishment of approximately 20 singleton resident agents in Tibet [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] two road watch teams in Tibet to report possible Chinese Communist build-ups, and six border watch communications teams [1 line of source text not declassified]. The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] will stay in direct touch with Dharmasala and will conduct political correspondence with Tibetan refugee groups [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to create an increased Tibetan national political consciousness among these refugees. The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] was established in October 1963, and the communications center serving it, [1 line of source text not declassified] is presently being built with a completion date scheduled in February 1964.

One of the most serious problems facing the Tibetans is a lack of trained officials equipped with linguistic and administrative abilities. The Agency is undertaking the education of some 20 selected Tibetan junior officers to meet this need. A United States advisory committee composed of prominent United States citizens has been established to sponsor the education of these Tibetans. Cornell University has tentatively agreed to provide facilities for their education.

The Agency is supporting the establishment of Tibet Houses in [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Geneva, and New York City. The Tibet Houses are intended to serve as unofficial representation for the Dalai Lama to maintain the concept of a separate Tibetan political identity. The Tibet House in New York City will work closely with Tibetan supporters in the United Nations, particularly the Malayan, Irish, and Thai delegations.

The cost of the Tibetan Program for FY 1964 can be summarized in approximate figures as follows:

- a. Support of 2100 Tibetan guerrillas based in Nepal--\$ 500,000
- b. Subsidy to the Dalai Lama--\$ 180,000
- c. [1 line of source text not declassified] (equipment, transportation, installation, and operator training costs)--\$ 225,000
- d. Expenses of covert training site in Colorado--\$ 400,000
- e. Tibet Houses in New York, Geneva, and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] (1/2 year)--\$ 75,000
- f. Black air transportation of Tibetan trainees from Colorado to India--\$ 185,000
- g. Miscellaneous (operating expenses of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified])

equipment and supplies to reconnaissance teams, caching program, air resupply--not overflights, preparation stages for agent network in Tibet, agent salaries, etc.)--\$ 125,000

h. Educational program for 20 selected junior Tibetan officers-- \$ 45,000

Total--\$ 1,735,000

4. Coordination--This Tibetan operational program has been coordinated with the Department of State for a number of years. Specific operational activity has been coordinated with the Department of Defense and the [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] as necessary.

5. Recommendations--Barring sudden developments inside Communist China and Tibet, expenses for this long-range, politically-oriented Tibet program are not expected to exceed this amount in the foreseeable future. In fact, there are a number of probable economics, [*1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] for example. Nonetheless, this program will continue to require fairly large expenditures over a long period of time to keep the possibility of a non-Communist government alive to the Tibetan people. We recommend continuance of this program.

338. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/

Washington, December 29, 1964, 1 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 TIBET/US. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by John W. Kimball of IO/UNP; cleared by Sisco, Officer in Charge of Indian Affairs David T. Schneider, Louise McNutt of FE/RA, Henry W. Allen of SCA/ORM, Bundy, Komer, and the President; and approved by Marshall Green. Repeated to USUN.

1292. Please convey following message from President Johnson to Dalai Lama in reply to Dalai Lama's letter of November 18./2/

/2/Not printed. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Tibet--Dalai Lama)

Begin text

Your Holiness:

I thank you for your gracious letter of November 18, 1964.

As you point out, the United States Government is deeply concerned with the abrogation of the basic human rights of the Tibetan people and the progressive elimination of their distinctive cultural and religious heritage by the Communist Chinese.

The United States welcomed the opportunities in previous years to assist in bringing the plight of the Tibetan people to the attention of world opinion through the United Nations. As Your

Holiness is aware, the United States has also assisted directly in programs to alleviate the material hardships of the Tibetans who have been forced to leave their homeland.

Your Holiness may be assured that the deep and abiding interest of the United States in the welfare of the Tibetan people will continue. My Government welcomes the initiative of the Governments of El Salvador, Nicaragua, and the Philippines to place the Tibetan question on the agenda of the Nineteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly. We wish, of course, to see the Tibetan item succeed in the United Nations, and we will do everything appropriate to support it.

With assurances of my highest esteem.

Sincerely yours,
Lyndon B. Johnson. *End text.*

Embassy should indicate to Tibetans that Dept expects no publicity on exchange of correspondence. Embassy may at its discretion inform appropriate GOI officials of substance President's letter.

Rusk

339. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State/1/

New York, November 30, 1965, 0229Z.

[/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 TIBET/UN. Confidential. Repeated to New Delhi, Manila, Managua, and San Salvador.](#)

2354. Tibet. Gyalo Thondup called on Goldberg and Congressman O'Hara Nov. 29. Thondup said Dalai Lama is anxious keep Tibetan issue alive and to forefront of world opinion; sees no better way accomplish this than through GA debate, though he recognizes GA debates and reses unlikely produce concrete results. Thondup said Tibetans are, however, in somewhat of quandary as to how they best proceed this year. On one hand, Tibetans own convictions re status of Tibet, plus desire give hope and encouragement to people within Tibet, lead them to prefer GA debate which would end with res recognizing political aspects of Tibetan problem through references to self-determination and independence.

On other hand, Tibetans well aware of attitude of GOI which, for two years, has assured Tibetans it willing give full and active support to res emphasizing human rights aspects of Tibetan problem. However, GOI has been very hesitant, and is more so than ever at present moment, to support res touching on political side of Tibetan problem. Would, therefore, appreciate US advice.

Goldberg assured Thondup (and asked that this be conveyed to Dalai Lama) that US Govt and

people deeply concerned re plight of Tibetan people, recognize Tibetan problem has both human rights and political aspects, and prepared support appropriate res touching on both. Nevertheless, must recognize that Afro-Asian attitude has been disappointing this year in many respects (e.g. ChiRep vote and inscription of Tibetan item); Africans are unusually preoccupied with problems of own continent; and many AAs seem anxious avoid taking stand on issues which entail degree of confrontation with Communist China.

In planning strategy, therefore, Goldberg said care must be exercised not to seek res which would fail to carry or carry with only weak vote. Attitude of Asian states with sizeable Buddhist populations of central importance. This particularly true of India, partly because of its positions in AA world, partly because it is closest to and has most intimate knowledge of Tibetan problem. It is unlikely that at present time many AAs willing go much further on Tibetan res than Indians prepared to lead.

Thondup said US support and help with other delegations will be essential for any res. Goldberg said US, of course, would render appropriate help but reiterated view that essential thing for Tibetans is to get active support of Indians and other Asians. MisOff added that US help, if too obvious, would tend damage rather than improve prospects for good vote because it would lend credence to those who contend Tibetan item is essentially US-inspired "cold-war" item./2/

/2/Telegram 1412 to USUN, December 6, stated that while the Department had been concerned that "too active" lobbying on the Tibet item might be disadvantageous, additional effort might be desirable to overcome "apparent apathy enveloping item in GA." It instructed USUN to broaden its approaches to Western European and African delegations and to include such delegations as Jordan and Iran. (Ibid.)

Thondup then presented us with text of draft res which, he said, was drafted by Tibetans in New Delhi and approved by GOI (text which Thondup has not yet discussed with Phils and other co-sponsors, sent septel). Thondup expressed concern that res might be interpreted as retreat from 1961 res. Goldberg said it did not appear to be retreat since it reaffirmed both previous reses in preamble, and spoke of "denial of the fundamental freedom" which Tibetans have always enjoyed in operative section.

After leaving Goldberg, Thondup told MisOff he was assured in New Delhi that GOI would instruct its UN del to give "full and active support" to this res, including speech in debate and promoting support among other dels. Thondup said Indian Mission confirmed receipt of such instructions earlier in day.

Goldberg

340. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, December 17, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 TIBET. Confidential. Drafted by Koren.

SUBJECT

Tibet

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Gyalo Thondup

Dep. Under Secretary U Alexis Johnson

Amb. H. L. T. Koren, INR

Mr. Thondup said that the Indian attitude regarding the Tibetan question had changed, and, largely because of India's new situation vis-a-vis Communist China, India was now being more forthcoming and helpful. However, the difficulty was that India was weak militarily and hard-pressed, and therefore, reluctant to be truly forthcoming. They were supporting, although not sponsoring, the human rights resolution on Tibet now before the General Assembly. What the Tibetans wanted was support in a political sense and to have a case made for their political freedom. For instance, when approached for support, the Afro-Asians asked what the Tibetans really gained from a resolution on human rights. The Afro-Asians felt that a political resolution looking to independence was what was needed, a resolution dealing with fundamental freedom for Tibet. However, the Indians were unwilling to take this step and the current resolution, which was first aimed at fundamental freedom, was watered down at their insistence to fundamental freedoms. Prime Minister Shastri and the majority of his ministers as well as the Indian people were for the Tibetan cause. But in their present situation, they were not ready to take a position of leadership. They needed to be urged by the U.S.

Therefore, Mr. Thondup wished to pass on to Mr. Johnson the Dalai Lama's request that the U.S. re-examine its position and encourage India to take a political, rather than a purely humanitarian position regarding Tibet. Mr. Thondup went on to say that for Communist China Tibet was a weak spot militarily, spiritually, and morally. He felt that the U.S. had a right to ask for a stronger Indian position and hoped that Ambassador Bowles might take this up with Prime Minister Shastri. The near-term objective was to establish a government-in-exile under the Dalai Lama in India.

Mr. Johnson said that Taiwan posed something of a problem for us. It was not a question that Taiwan's influence with us was strong, but it was a factor that we must consider. Mr. Thondup felt that the Nationalist Chinese should take a more progressive attitude, but in talking to them he found them difficult and hampered by a hundred years of tradition and the present dominance of the conservative group. The younger officials were not so hidebound, but the present Chi-Nat stance was that once they were back on the Mainland, they would support self-determination for Tibet. There followed a brief discussion of the status of Tibet in recent history, whether it had been, in fact really independent.

Mr. Thondup said, in summary, that in future efforts it was best to avoid the question of past independence and to rally support for the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan people in their independence struggle. He made a strong plea for U.S. help as well as advice on how to pursue their goals. Mr. Johnson noted that the question of government-in-exile was somewhat difficult for us at the present time, because we had resisted all pressure for a Cuban Government-in-exile in this country. He promised to discuss Mr. Thondup's plea with his colleagues who had been

following Tibetan matters much more closely recently than he and we would pass our considered view to him, most likely through Ambassador Bowles.

341. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/

Washington, March 22, 1966, 1:53 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30-2 TIBET. Confidential. Drafted by Arthur Dornheim of FE/ACA and Herbert G. Hagerty of NEA/SOA; cleared by NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary William J. Handley, Richard K. Stuart of INR/DDC, and in draft by Officer in Charge of Republic of China Affairs Norman W. Getsinger, Kimball of IO/UNP, and NEA/SOA Deputy Director David T. Schneider; cleared by U. Alexis Johnson. Repeated to USUN, Taipei, Hong Kong, and Kathmandu.

1766. For Ambassador.

1. In conversation with Deputy Under Secretary Johnson December 17, Gyalo Thondup conveyed Dalai Lama's request that USG re-examine its position and encourage India to take a political rather than a humanitarian position regarding Tibet. In this connection, Thondup said Dalai Lama's near-term aim is to establish government-in-exile in India. Mr. Johnson commented that Dept would pass USG views to Thondup most likely through you.
2. We have re-examined our position and have concluded that from our point of view, there would be little to be gained from such a change in status of the Dalai Lama, that in fact there might be some losses in supporting any change his status, that in terms our current bilateral relations with India we are unenthusiastic about adding this sensitive item to agenda of things we are pressing GOI on, and that in any event, we do not wish to become involved in the Dalai Lama's government-in-exile moves.
3. At your convenience, you are requested to call in Thondup and say you have been instructed to reply to his remarks to Deputy Under Secretary Johnson on December 17 last.
4. Your comments should be in following vein:
 - A. USG has given careful consideration to Dalai Lama's views. We are particularly mindful of special attention which GOI has already devoted to problems of Tibetan refugees, when the needs of its own people are so very pressing. In these circumstances USG would be most reluctant to be the first to approach GOI, the host government, to ask it to adopt a new attitude toward Dalai Lama.
 - B. Beyond this, as a practical matter, we feel that Dalai Lama should weigh all aspects of question before making any move this direction. Trying to look at it not only from our own angle but also from that of Indians and of Tibetans themselves, we see very little if any practical advantage deriving to anyone from such a change in status of Dalai Lama. either in terms of his

dealings with UN, with his friends, with GRC, or in terms Chicoms. If anything, we see some distinct disadvantage in terms of possible jeopardy such status would place existence of present Offices of Tibet in other countries which now formally recognize Communist China, e.g. UK, Switzerland, and possible establishment of future such offices.

5. In general you should assure Thondup that USG is determined to persevere in its efforts achieve a just and peaceful solution of Tibetan problem./2/

/2/Telegram 2614 from New Delhi, March 29, reported that on March 28 the Chargé had orally conveyed the Department's response to Gyalo Thondup. (Ibid.)

Rusk

342. Memorandum for the 303 Committee/1/

Washington, January 26, 1968.

/1/Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Tibet, 1967-1968. Secret; Eyes Only. The source text bears no drafting information. A March 4 memorandum from Battle to Bohlen describes it as a CIA memorandum. (Ibid.) It was discussed at a March 19 meeting of the 303 Committee. According to Peter Jessup's memorandum for the record of the meeting, CIA representative James Critchfield stated that "achievements inside Tibet were minimal--outside more substantial." He observed that "the Tibetans by nature did not appear to be congenitally inclined toward conspiratorial proficiency." Jessup records no action by the 303 Committee at the meeting. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, 303 Committee)

SUBJECT

Status Report on Tibetan Operations

1. Summary--The CIA Tibetan program, parts of which were initiated in 1956 with the cognizance of the Committee, is based on U.S. Government commitments made to the Dalai Lama in 1951 and 1956. The program consists of political action, propaganda, paramilitary and intelligence operations, appropriately coordinated with and supported by [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. This program was last reviewed and endorsed by the Committee on 20 February 1964. Current activities have been coordinated with and have the approval of [*1 line of source text not declassified*], Mr. William Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Mr. Lucius Battle, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs.

2. Program Objectives--In the political action and propaganda field, Tibetan program objectives are aimed toward lessening the influence and capabilities of the Chinese regime through support, among Tibetans and among foreign nations, of the concept of an autonomous Tibet under the leadership of the Dalai Lama; toward the creation of a capability for resistance against possible political developments inside Tibet; and the containment of Chinese Communist expansion--in

pursuance of U.S. policy objectives stated initially in NSC 5913/1./2/ [6 lines of source text not declassified]

/2/The text of NSC 5913/1, approved September 25, 1959, is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1958-1960, vol. XVI, pp. 133-144. Also see the record of the NSC discussion of NSC 5913 on September 17, 1959, *ibid.*, pp. 116-127.

3. Appraisal of Current Programs--The cultural revolution in China expanded into Tibet bringing with it tremendous disturbances including the disruption of internal transportation, communication, travel and, to a significant extent, peace and order. Unfortunately there are no apparent signs that the Tibetan people are capitalizing upon this internal chaos to seek further autonomy. Chinese security has shown no signs of deterioration and their control over Tibet, both political and military, remains as pervasive as ever. Tibetan leadership has been purged, leaving the Chinese in direct control of the local administration, and a large number of underground assets have been uncovered and neutralized.

The Tibetan program has a potential for operational success based on a reservoir of trained agent material, the location in a safe-haven of the Dalai Lama together with the nucleus of new young leaders, widespread sympathy for the Tibetan cause, indications of a more positive Indian attitude toward the political aspirations of the Tibetan government, and evidence of considerable disarray among the Chinese stationed in Tibet.

a. At present there are no radio teams remaining inside Tibet. Radio teams continue to function [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] although much of their information comes from the debriefing of traders and refugees. Singleton resident agent operations in Tibet, regarded as being the long-range replacement of the black radio teams, have not progressed as planned due to continued tightening of Chinese security in the border areas. Intelligence reporting from all sources deals primarily with military, political and construction activities along the Tibetan border.

b. The Tibetan paramilitary unit, a remnant of the 1959 resistance force, is dispersed in 15 camps [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. The Tibetan leadership views the force as the paramilitary arm of its "government-in-exile" [2 lines of source text not declassified]. Because of the diplomatic sensitivity occasioned by the presence of the Tibetan force [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] it has been enjoined from offensive action which might invite Chinese [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] retaliation. Joint efforts to disperse the force to other uninhabited areas [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] have not been successful because of Chinese [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reaction or of difficulties in resupply.

c. [1 line of source text not declassified] responsible for radio contact with and operational direction of the radio teams, the paramilitary resistance force, and the support mechanism [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] continue to serve their intended purpose with a minimum of problems.

d. Bi-lateral CIA-Tibetan intelligence collection operations into Tibet, [less than 1 line of

source text not declassified] have increased significantly, both in number and in value during the past few years.

e. Activities designed to develop a dynamic political program [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] to weld the refugee communities into a cohesive whole under the leadership of the Dalai Lama and his brother, Gyalo Thondup, continue. These include:

(1) The Geneva, New York and [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] "Tibet houses" continue in operation. The Geneva office serves as the coordinating point for the resettlement of some 500 Tibetan refugees in Switzerland and other European countries and maintains contact with the international agencies concerned with Tibetan relief. Although time has dimmed some of the effectiveness of its pleas, the New York office continues to lobby among the U.N. delegations for legal and moral support for the Tibetan cause, guided in their efforts by a sitting former U.S. delegate to the U.N. who is also a well-known international lawyer. [*2 lines of source text not declassified*]

(2) The covert training program conducted in the U.S. under which some 250 Tibetans were trained, ended in November 1964.

(3) Twenty selected Tibetan junior officers studied at Cornell University, over a three year period. Due to the Katzenbach strictures, this program was concluded in July 1967; CIA is considering a continuation of the program, on a limited scale, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].

(4) The Tibetan organizational party, the Cho Kha Sum, (i.e. the Defense of Religion by the Three Regions: Kham, Amdo and U-Tsang), which was established in India in April 1964 by Gyalo Thondup, now has an active press and publications arm. While the future potential of the party is still in question, the Tibetans are making an effort to mold it into an effective organization, aimed at halting a drift towards disunity among the refugees, developing a political consciousness and a political program with which to challenge the Communist efforts inside Tibet.

4. Significant Previous 303 Committee Approvals--

a. September 1958--initial endorsement of CIA covert support to Tibetan resistance;

b. 20 May 1959--initial approval of covert support to the Dalai Lama;

c. 14 February 1961--endorsed continuation of the covert program;

d. 13 December 1962--approved training of Tibetan guerrilla force;

e. 20 February 1964--reviewed and endorsed continuation of covert program;

f. 9 April 1965--approved relocation of Tibetan paramilitary force;

g. 8 July and 25 November 1966--endorsed the covert paramilitary program [*1 line of source*

text not declassified].

These landmark reviews were interspersed with status reports and briefings of the Committee, in one period at monthly intervals. The basic decisions listed above in several instances were reviewed with Higher Authority.

5. Coordination--

a. Department of State--Since the project's inception, appropriate officials of the Department have approved various elements of the program. Department officers who have been briefed on aspects of this project include Elmer Falk and Clement J. Sobotka, Director and Deputy Director, respectively, of the Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs; Harald Jacobson, Director, Office of Asian Communist Affairs; William Gleysteen, Deputy Director, Office of U.N. Political Affairs; William Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; and Lucius Battle, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs.

b. Ambassadors--The past and present Ambassadors to Nepal and India have approved the Tibetan program, [*1 line of source text not declassified*].

c. [*2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*]

6. Projected and Planned Programs--

a. On the political front during 1967, the Dalai Lama began what is hoped will be a long-range program of projecting himself and Tibetan affairs on an international basis. He is contemplating visits to Ceylon, Burma and Cambodia, having visited Japan and Thailand in late 1967. Invitations have also been extended from several European countries having active Tibetan refugee programs or interests.

b. Gyalo Thondup, acting for the Tibetan partnership in our liaison with the Indians, has proposed the establishment of a Tibetan Operations Center to represent Tibetan interests [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. This Tibetan center would conceivably provide greater efficiency in the Tibetan handling of existing operations and in the relegation of operational tasks to Tibetan assets. [*1 line of source text not declassified*]

c. Some elements of the basic covert program remain to be implemented. They include: the deployment of landline wiretap teams to selected priority targets within Tibet; the activation of special refugee debriefing teams; a census of some 70,000 Tibetan refugees spread throughout India and its neighboring countries which may locate additional operational assets; and the resupply of arms and ammunition to the Mustang force.

7. Costs--At the time of the February 1964 review by the Committee, the projected annual cost for all Tibetan operations was \$1,735,000. With the discontinuation of the training programs in the U.S., [*1 line of source text not declassified*] a reduction of \$570,000 in this estimate for FY68 has been achieved. The remainder of \$1,165,000 has been programmed in the CIA budget for FY68 for the activities described in this paper. Of this amount \$650,000 was approved by

the 303 Committee on 25 November 1966 in its review of the [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].

343. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, December 6, 1968.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 TIBET. Confidential. Drafted by Dougall.

SUBJECT

Call on Mr. Rostow by Mr. Gyalo Thondup, Brother of His Holiness the Dalai Lama

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Eugene V. Rostow, Under Secretary for Political Affairs

Mr. Gyalo Thondup

Mr. Reynold A. Riemer÷M

Mrs. Kathleen C. Dougall, EA/ACA

1. Mr. Thondup stated that he had been instructed by His Holiness the Dalai Lama to express His Holiness' gratitude to the United States Government for its assistance to Tibetan refugees-- specifically the surplus food and the monetary assistance. Mr. Rostow replied that we appreciate this message deeply, and that Mr. Thondup can assure His Holiness that we will not forget the plight of the Tibetans.

2. Mr. Thondup said he had another matter to take up. He said it would be very essential and useful if India would take the initiative in the United Nations on a resolution concerning Tibet. He said he has been trying to convince India that it is in its own interest, as well as in the interest of the people of Tibet, to do this. The Indians, he said, are afraid of the Chinese Communists. His Holiness, he said, feels that US indirect encouragement to India to take the initiative on a resolution would be helpful and His Holiness asks the advice and help of the United States on this subject. Mr. Thondup said that the Tibetan people still want to fight the Chinese Communists and that Tibet, "a small nation," is very dependent on large nations to keep the issue alive. Whatever the United States can do would help a small people's struggle for independence.

3. Mr. Rostow said that he had talked about Tibetan matters with a high ranking member of the Indian Foreign Office in New Delhi earlier this year. He said that he will ask the views of the Indian Ambassador here in regard to a UN resolution but that India has its own policy and may not respond to suggestions.

4. Mr. Thondup said that he is afraid of the Soviet Union's position on a UN resolution, also. In 1959 the Soviet Union was bitterly opposed to the resolution and has voted against such resolutions all along, but since last year he thinks the Soviet Union has shown a slight change. He has had private meetings with Soviet officials and was told that "Tibet and Sinkiang are not the interest of India but of the Soviet Union."

5. In response to the fear expressed by Mr. Thondup as to the effect on Tibet of an accommodation the United States might make with the Chinese Communists, Mr. Rostow stated that we seek to bring the Chinese Communists into the family of nations but that we would not make any accommodation with the Chinese Communists at the expense of Tibet.

6. Mr. Thondup stated that there are nearly 900 Tibetan students in Europe and that a visit of His Holiness to Europe is being planned. American friends, he said, always ask why he does not come to the United States. Mr. Thondup said he did not know the reaction of the United States to a private visit of His Holiness to this country. Mr. Rostow said he would have to inquire and added that this would be a matter for the new Administration. Mr. Thondup commented that His Holiness is not an ordinary visitor and would have to make a courtesy call on the President. He expressed his gratitude to Mr. Rostow for inquiring on this subject.

7. Mr. Thondup commented at some length on events in Tibet. He said the situation now is "quite quiet" since the establishment of the Revolutionary Committee for Tibet in September. Two rival organizations are fighting each other and pressing Tibetans to join. The Tibetans, however, are taking a neutral position. There are many killings of Chinese by other Chinese. The Cultural Revolution has affected many military leaders in Tibet. Many have been dismissed; many are new. There is new leadership among the military and in the Party. The Chinese have purged all Tibetan collaborators. Some were killed, some were imprisoned, and some were tortured and released. The elderly people hate the Chinese, and the younger people are now bitter because all important posts are occupied by Chinese, not Tibetans. The Tibetans want to fight, but this is a very wrong position. Events of 1959 are an example. It is only suicide to fight the Chinese.

8. Mr. Thondup said the Chinese system in Tibet is a complete failure. The six million (sic) people in Tibet are not convinced the Chinese are doing anything for them. It is very hard for the Chinese to get used to the altitude and the type of food available in Tibet. There are food shortages because of the difficulty of bringing food long distances to Tibet. The Chinese bring in military and other supplies instead. The Chinese troops do not want to stay in Tibet.

END