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**POLITICAL STRATEGY
PRIOR TO OUTBREAK OF WAR**

PART II

**PREPARED BY
MILITARY HISTORY SECTION
HEADQUARTERS, ARMY FORCES FAR EAST**

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FOREWORD

This monograph is the second of a series of five monographs dealing with Japan's political and military strategy from the time of the Manchurian Incident to the outbreak of the Pacific War.

The information contained herein was compiled by Rear Admiral Sadatoshi Tomioka, former Chief of Operational Section, Imperial General Headquarters, from official documents as well as from private records.

A statement by Captain Toshikazu Ohmae, then a member of the Naval Affairs Bureau and responsible for the defense of Navy installations throughout the Japanese Empire, has been added to emphasize the fact that it was definitely under duress that the Navy agreed to the signing of the Tripartite Pact.

Additional monographs covering Japanese political and military strategy during this period are:

Political Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of War, Part I Political Strategy Prior to the Outbre

PREFACE

Through Instructions No. 126 to the Japanese Government, 12 October 1945, subject: Institution for War Records Investigation, steps were initiated to exploit military historical records and official reports of the Japanese War Ministry and Japanese General Staff. Upon dissolution of the War Ministry and the Japanese General Staff, and the transfer of their former functions to the Demobilization Bureau, research and compilation continued and developed into a series of historical monographs.

The paucity of original orders, plans and unit journals, which are normally essential in the preparation of this type of record, most of which were lost or destroyed during field operations or bombing raids rendered the task of compilation most difficult; particularly distressing has been the complete lack of official strength reports, normal in AG or G3 records. However, while many of the important orders, plans and estimates have been reconstructed from memory and therefore are not textually identical with the originals, they are believed to be generally accurate and reliable.

Under the supervision of the Demobilization Bureau, the basic material contained in this monograph was compiled and written in Japanese by former officers, on duty in command and staff units within major units during the period of operations. Translation was effected through the facilities of Military Intelligence Service Group, G2, Headquarters, Far East Command.

This Japanese Operational Monograph was rewritten in English by the Japanese Research Division, Military History Section, Headquarters, Army Forces Far East and is based on the translation of the Japanese original. Editorial corrections were limited to those necessary for coherence and accuracy.

Fourth Year of the China Incident (1940)

Summary of Important Events during 1940

- 10 January: Aerial bombardment of Kweilin.
- 14 January: General resignation of Abe Cabinet.
- 16 January: Yonai Cabinet formed.
- 21 January: Asama Maru inspected off Tokyo Bay and German passengers transferred to B
- 28 January: Nanning Operations started (Resumption of mopping up operations: January
- 12 March: Wang Ching-wei announced establishment of a new Chinese Central Governm
- 17 March: Soviet-Finnish Peace Treaty signed.
- 30 March: New Chinese National Government formally established in Nanking.
- 9 April: German forces invaded Denmark and Norway.
- 1 May: Ichang Operations started (May - June).
- 10 May: German forces entered Holland and Belgium.
- 14 May: Dutch forces surrendered.
- 17 May: German forces penetrated the Maginot Line.
- 28 May: Belgium surrendered.
- 4 June: America placed an embargo on export of machine tools to Japan.
- 10 June: Italy entered the war to aid Germany.
- 13 June: A new treaty between Japan and Thailand concluded.
- 14 June: German forces entered Paris.
- 17 June: France surrendered to Germany.
- 20 June: French Indo-China accepted Japan's request to ban the shipment of supplies to Cl
- 27 June: Japanese forces occupied Ningming for observation of French Indo-China.
- 28 June: Soviet troops invaded Rumania.
- 1 July: Japanese forces occupied Lungchow for observation of French Indo-China.
- 16 July: General resignation of Yonai Cabinet.
- 17 July: Great Britain decided to close the Burma Road.
- 22 July: The Second Konoye Cabinet formed.
- 27 July: The Japanese Government formulated its national policy "Principles to Cope with
- 10 August: Blockaded zone of Central and South China sea coast expanded.
- 13 September: Aerial bombardment of Chungking.
- 23 September: Japanese forces crossed border into northern French Indo-China.
- 27 September: United States placed an embargo on export of scrap iron to Japan.
- 27 September: Japan-Germany-Italy Tripartite Alliance Pact signed.
- 5 October: German forces invaded Rumania.

11 October: Italy entered war against Greece.

18 October: Japanese naval planes started bombing the Burma Road. Great Britain reopened

28 October: Japanese force evacuated Nanning.

13 November: Council convened to discuss the China Incident in the presence of the Emperor

30 November: The Japan-China Basic Treaty concluded. Japan-Manchuria-China Joint Declaration

8 December: Hostilities started between Thailand and French Indo-China forces.

12 December: Germany and Soviet Russia agreed to the partition of Poland. Japanese Air Force

Summary of Operations in China from 1937 - 1940

In 1937, the first year of the China Incident, the Japanese forces controlled North China, reduced Shanghai and occupied Nanking, the capital of China; in 1938, the second year, they reduced Hsuechow (in Central China), captured the three Wuhan cities and Canton; in 1939, the third year of the Incident, the Japanese forces attempted to restore peace by mopping-up the enemy in the areas surrounding key points that were occupied, while taking strategic points, such as Nanchang and Nanning on land, as well as capturing Hainan Island, Haichow, Swatow and Pakhoi, important points along the coast, and tightening the sea blockade in an attempt to bring about the downfall of the Chiang regime.

However, Chiang Kai-shek removed the government to Chungking and persistently continued his war against Japan. In a radio broadcast he stated, "The campaign up to the abandonment of the Wuhan cities closes the first phase of the war against Japan and the subsequent year or year and a half may be termed the second phase of resistance during which preparations for counteroffensives will be made. In the following years, namely, the third period of resistance, the offensive will be taken." Chiang started to rebuild his army, and, about October 1939, he boasted he had 250 divisions of about 2,000,000 men. In early December of that year he launched concerted attacks in many places south of the Yangtze River.

Chiang Kai-shek took the offensive since he estimated that the invasion power of the Japanese forces had been dissipated while his preparations for counteroffensives had made considerable progress. He was also apprehensive that the movement for the establishment of the Wang regime would pick up momentum as time passed while the attitude of the powers to aid his regime would cool off due to the European war.

In 1940, the Japanese Army concentrated its main effort on smash Chiang Kai-shek's

counteroffensive and mopping-up operations which extended to Nanning, Ichang and other areas south of the Yangtze River. These operations were highly successful. The policy of the Japanese Armed Forces during this year gradually shifted from operations to political strategy. The main points were as follows:

1. Non-expansion of operations area.
2. Promotion of pacification and peace preservation activities in occupied areas.
3. Cooperation in the growth of a new central government.
4. Undermine the fighting strength of Chiang Kai-shek's army through a tight sea blockade and effective interception of Chiang-aid routes from Burma, northern French Indo-China, Hongkong and Kwangchowan.

The Asama Maru Incident

Leaving San Francisco on 6 January 1940 for Yokohama via Honolulu, the NYK liner Asama Maru was stopped by a British cruiser at about 1250 hours on the 21st at a point 35 miles off, Nojima Zaki, Chiba Prefecture. In the face of the captain's protestations, an inspection party carried off 21 German passengers on the pretext of exercising Great Britain rights under international law, without giving any reason or even the name of the cruiser.

In connection with this incident Japan protested on the basis of Article 47, London Declaration, dated 1909, that only persons actually enlisted in the armed services of belligerent nations could be removed from the ships of neutral countries while Great Britain adhered to the broad interpretation that any male personnel 18 to 50 years of age and physically fit for military service could be taken as prisoners of war whether they were passengers or crew members.

This forceful action occurring off the coast of Japan made a deep impression on the government and people of Japan and further added to anti-British sentiment. Moreover, the unsatisfactory results of the negotiations with and protest against Great Britain caused the public to accuse the newly-organized Yonai Cabinet of vacillation and incompetency and resulted in a more vigorous execution of political maneuvers by those dissatisfied with the policy of the Yonai Cabinet. However, in order to avoid involvement in a political plot the Japanese Navy did not take any concrete counter-measures during this incident but left diplomatic negotiations to the Foreign Ministry.

The Policy on China

Details of the establishment of the Wang Ching-wei regime and the negotiations therewith were given in Monograph No. 144. The new policy for adjusting diplomatic relations between Japan and China, decided by the Cabinet meeting on 8 January 1940, is cited in Appendix No. 1. No changes were made in fundamental policies emphasizing good neighbor relations, Joint anti-Comintern defense, economic cooperation and recognition of special collaboration areas.

On 30 March 1940 a new National Government under the Wang Ching-wei regime was established with the removal of the capital to Nanking. The Government proved weak in power and imperfect in its administrative structure. In mid-June of the same year the Japanese Government issued instructions to Abe, Minister Plenipotentiary, regarding the conclusion of a treaty covering the following points:

1. The Japan-Manchukuo-China Joint Declaration. 2. Treaty determining the relations bet

At that time, the new National Government, lacking in both military and financial strength as well as in administrative ability, particularly in military authority which constituted the basic strength of political administration, was ill-prepared to fulfill treaties as the Central Government. However, with a view toward contributing to the speedy over-all settlement of the China Incident in anticipation of the Chungking regime relaxing its resistance in view of the developments of the European war, Japan accelerated the restoration of normal diplomatic relations with the now regime and finally completed the negotiations on 31 August.

Then, after a partial revision of the draft, with Manchukuo participating in subsequent negotiations, the treaty was signed on 30 November and the joint declaration was issued.

Occupation of Northern French Indo-China

In the summer of 1938, the flow of Chiang-aid supplies through French Indo-China was taken up for discussion, but Japan's repeated requests to French Indo-China to stop these supplies were refused each time by the French Government. This greatly increased the tension between Japan and French Indo-China. On 17 June 1940, France surrendered to Germany and on 20 June the French Indo-China authorities submitted to Japan's demands to ban the transit of Chiang-aid supplies and approved the dispatch of Japanese inspectors. Thereupon, Japan dispatched a Chiang-aid supplies inspection group, under the leadership of Major General Issaku Nishihara, to French Indo-China. They immediately began an investigation of the actual transport conditions, stationing inspectors at such key points as Langson, Haiphong, Laokay and Moncay.

Japan further desired to intercept effectively the traffic of Chiang-aid supplies by stationing troops in northern French Indo-China, also to secure bases there to facilitate bombing of the Burma Road and Chungking, and, if necessary, make preparations to carry forward land operations from northern French Indo-China to Kunming, in an attempt to bring the Chiang regime to its knees. General Nishihara carried on negotiations with Governor General Catroux, and later his successor Decoux, with regard to the entry of Japanese troops into French Indo-China, but the negotiations did not progress smoothly. Therefore, Foreign Minister Matsuoka conferred with Henri, French Ambassador to Japan, and after much difficulty, succeeded obtaining the consent of France to grant military facilities to Japan in French Indo-China. On 30 August, the basic Japan-French Indo-Chinese Agreement was finally concluded in Tokyo. This agreement was to become effective after details of the entry of Japanese forces into French Indo-China had been worked out by the local authorities. The basic agreement incorporated the following:

1. French Indo-China agreed to cooperate in Japan's economic and political aims in Asia.

2. French Indo-China agreed to the basing of Japanese troops in French Indo-China for the purpose of prosecuting their operations against Chiang Kai-shek. These bases were to be limited to the area bordering French Indo-China and China.

3. Japan would respect the sovereign rights of France and the territorial integrity of French Indo-China.

4. Details of the agreement insofar as entry of Japanese troops into French Indo-China was concerned, would be worked out by the local authorities.

The Emperor, who was especially concerned over the Japanese entry into northern French Indo-China, did not approve this agreement until he obtained assurance from the Army that, under no circumstances, would it resort to force in making an entry. However, through local misunderstandings, the group commanded by Lt. General Akito Nakamura in Kwangsi Province clashed with the French forces when they crossed the border on 23 September and the French were compelled to surrender after the Japanese forces attacked Langson. The Japanese troops were then able to proceed with their "friendly entry." Other Japanese army units began to land at Haiphong on 26 September. (Monograph No. 25 presents additional information on the entry of Japanese troops into French Indo-China.)

On 27 September, the Japanese and French Indo-Chinese Government issued the following joint statement:

With a view to contributing to the establishment of a new order in East Asia and the settlement of the China Incident, a meeting on problems of fundamental concern to French Indo-China was held in Tokyo during August, under amicable conditions, between Foreign Minister Matsuoka and Henri, French Ambassador to Japan. The Japanese Government has given the French Government assurance that it will respect the rights and interests of France in East Asia, especially the territorial integrity of French Indo-China and French sovereign rights in French Indo-China.

The French Government has consented to grant the Japanese Government special facilities for the Imperial Army and Navy in French Indo-China for the prosecution of operations. Moreover, negotiations to settle details concerning the provision of military facilities were held in Hanoi between the French and Japanese military authorities and a satisfactory agreement was reached on 22 September.

In accordance with the agreement, Japanese forces proceeded to Hanoi on 5 October and powerful units advanced to Bachinh, east of Hanoi on the 10th. This advance was actually the first step toward the southward advance by the Japanese forces which set the stage for the Japanese entry into southern French Indo-China, America's all-out economic blockade against Japan and the outbreak of the Pacific War the following year. This should be regarded as a manifestation of the Japanese national policy decided on 27 July, namely, "The Principles to Cope with the Changing World Situation." France was unable to defend French Indo-China and was compelled to yield to Japan's demands.

Under the circumstances the attitude of the French authorities in southern French Indo-China was always antagonistic.

The occupation of French Indo-China gave the impression to the Allied world that the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere advocated by Japan was designed not only to build up a new order in East Asia based on the cooperation of Japan, Manchukuo and China, but also to establish a far greater coprosperity zone of East Asia, including French Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies. This constituted one of the principal causes of the Pacific War.

The occupation of French Indo-China cut off the flow of the greater part of Chiang-aid supplies, and bombings of the Burma Road tightened the blockade. At the same time, air attacks on Kunming and Chungking were carried out more readily, but all this did not prove sufficiently effective to bring about the downfall of the Chiang regime. The land operation from northern French Indo-China to the Kunming area was not carried out as the Japanese Army was understrength and the operation was difficult, but from the viewpoint of political strategy, the character of French Indo-China changed completely when placed under a cooperative relationship with Japan. This placed Japan in a far more advantageous position, both economically and politically, to pursue her southward expansion policy. On the other hand, as it posed a serious threat to Singapore, the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies, Great Britain and America viewed the situation with serious concern. The United States finally took steps to extend a

\$25,000,000 credit to the Chiang regime and placed an embargo on the exportation of scrap iron and steel to Japan. This brought the Pacific War another step closer.

Important National Policies

Decision on a General National Policy (27 July 1940)

With the establishment of the new Nanking Government in late March, the China Incident entered a stage where it was necessary to make new decisions on policy. On the European front, the German forces breaking a long silence, suddenly started an invasion of Holland and Belgium in early May. Their sweeping drive destroyed British and French forces at Dunkirk and caused France to surrender unconditionally on 17 June.

Germany's decisive victory made a deep impression on the Japanese who had entertained friendly feelings toward Germany since the signing of the Japanese-German-Italian Anti-Comintern Pact. Moreover, Germany gradually succeeded in her fifth-column actions within the Japanese Army by taking advantage of a favorable war situation in Europe and converting the Japanese Army into a motive power to hasten a tripartite alliance and establish a positive national policy. The Yonai Cabinet, adhering strictly to the policy of opposing the Tripartite Alliance and maintaining a prudent attitude toward Great Britain and the United States, was forced to resign on 16 July by a political plot of the Army wherein it refused to recommend a successor to War Minister Hata.

On 22 July, the second Konoye Cabinet was formed. Japan advanced toward a tripartite alliance and steered a course toward southward expansion, together with a resolute policy against America and Great Britain.

The national policy at that time was governed by "The Basic National Policy" decided by the Cabinet meeting on 26 July 1940 and "The Principles to Cope with the Changing World Situation" formulated by the Liaison Conference between Imperial General Headquarters and the Government on 27 July, the latter being of particular importance since it followed the proposals of Imperial General Headquarters. Circumstances leading

up to the decision to accept "The Principles to Cope with the Changing World Situation" were as follows:

On 4 July 1940, chiefs of the 2d and 8th Sections of the Army General Staff accompanied by section members and Military Affairs Section members of the War Ministry, called on the Naval General Staff to submit a draft of "The Principles to Cope with the Changing World Situation" as an opinion agreed upon by both the Army General Staff and the War Ministry. This had already been submitted to the War Minister and the Assistant Chief of Army General Staff with the explanation:

The Army's estimate of the situation:

1. The establishment of a European-African bloc by Germany and Italy was inevitable. 2. C
- Japan must form an economically self-sufficient zone, including the Southern Area, establish a powerful political structure and institute a planned economy.

The Navy agreed with the Army's policy of strengthening the northern defense and advancing southward but disagreed with the policy of resorting to armed force. The Navy interpreted the Army's intentions as follows:

1. The Army intended to settle the China Incident by making huge concessions to China, a

"The Principles to Cope with Changing World Situation" was in substance as follows:

Policy:

Japan will endeavor to cope with changes in the international situation and settle the China Incident as early as possible. At the same time, Japan will undertake to solve the problems of the Southern Area by continually availing herself of every opportunity to effect improvement in internal and international conditions. Pending settlement of the China Incident, the measures for the Southern Area will be decided after considering the world situation.

War preparations will be accelerated so as to be completed by the end of August.

Summary of Main Points:

1. Destruction of Chiang-aid activities by third powers. 2. Political collaboration with Gerr
cussions and negotiations with the Army along these lines. Meanwhile, the Yonai Cabinet was overthrown by the political stratagem of the Army and the Second Konoye Cabinet was formed on 22 July. Immediately after its formation it held the First Liaison Conference between Imperial General Headquarters and the Government on 27 July and decided on "The Principles to Cope with the Changing World Situation," in the form that had been initiated by Imperial General Headquarters. (See Appendix 2.) Imperial General Headquarters' detailed comments on this policy are given in Appendix 3.

Perceiving that the war situation in Europe was definitely developing in favor of Germany and Italy and believing that the capitulation of Great Britain and the restoration of peace in Europe were imminent, the Japanese Army forcibly induced the Navy and the Government to put into writing the "Principles to Cope with the Changing World Situation" as a national policy, although there were many complications to overcome. The policy was so inconsistent that, in conversations between War and the Navy Ministers, they found themselves utterly in conflict with each other in their opinions. However, the Army, with its political influence, determined the actual policy of Japan, which was successively translated into such significant measures as the entry of Japanese troops into northern French Indo-China on 23 September and the conclusion of the Japan-Germany-Italy Tripartite Alliance on 27 September. These proved to be the turning points in the outbreak the Pacific War.

The Navy's Views on the "Principles to Cope with the Changing World Situation"

The "Principles to Cope with the Changing World Situation" mentioned in the previous section was a national policy of great significance in regard to the beginning of the Pacific War, but between the Army, the Navy and the Government there was a great divergence of opinion in regard to this policy. The interpretation agreed upon and views of the Navy Central Authorities (the Navy Section of Imperial General Headquarters and Navy Ministry) as regards the policy were as follows:

The southward expansion policy was originally advocated by the Navy but it emphasized that the goal must be achieved by peaceful means, if at all possible, and the use of military force must be determined with great prudence.

Instances wherein Japan would resort to arms for her very existence were:

1. In case America imposed an all-out embargo upon exports to Japan and other third powers followed suit, thus rendering it impossible for Japan to acquire essential materials.
2. In case Great Britain and the United States cooperated to exert pressure upon Japan, and America began to use strategic points in British territories in the Pacific areas.
3. In case Great Britain or the United States independently took such measures which would constitute a direct threat to the existence of Japan, such as a large reinforcement of United States military strength in the Philippine area, or a large reinforcement of Great Britain's military strength in East Asia.
4. In case it could be estimated that Great Britain could be defeated, that America would not open hostilities against Japan and that Great Britain and America were completely separated.

The Navy claimed it could not resort to force due to lack of war preparations. It stated that the use of force in the southern area would possibly develop into a large-scale war that would determine the fate of Japan. The Navy required far greater quantities of materials and labor than the Army to complete its war preparations, but the Army received far greater allocations of materials due to the China Incident. Under the circumstances, it was impossible to predict the time of completion of Navy preparations. The Navy was of the opinion that once war was declared against Great Britain, Japan would have to be prepared militaristically and psychologically to fight also the United States.

The Navy was certain of victory if the United States attempted an early decisive sea battle and a quick termination of war, but it had little confidence in Japan's staying power if the United States waged a protracted war.

If Japan waited for the inevitable expansion of the United States' war preparations, she would be overwhelmed. It would be better to start war before the United States was fully prepared.

At the same time, the Navy felt that this problem should be a great deal more thought before arriving at a final decision as to whether or not to go to war with the United States on the basis of her war preparations.

From an operational point of view it was considered unwise to provoke Great Britain and the United States at that time, as it would only spur them on to step up their war preparations and crystallize their determination to fight.

The Navy's estimate of the situation stood in striking contrast to that of the Army. However, although the Government vigorously initiated domestic measures, it was completely dominated by the Army in executing its foreign policy.

Tripartite Alliance Pact

The First Phase

After the conclusion of the anti-Comintern Pact by Japan, Germany and Italy in November 1937, the policy of strengthening the Axis ties sounded the keynote to the Japanese diplomatic policy. Moreover, this policy was always enforced by the Japanese Army. What the real intention of the Army was and how it changed is not clear, but the Navy generally estimated it as follows: At first, the Army aimed at containing the Soviet Union, with the aid of Germany, by enforcing the Japanese policy toward Manchuria and

China. However, with the protraction of the China Incident, Japan gradually became isolated internationally. Furthermore, it became obvious that the Incident could not be settled merely by containing the Soviet Union. The Army seemed to believe that the strengthening of the Axis ties would prevent Japan from becoming isolated and would strengthen her determination to resist Great Britain and America and that this would ultimately contribute to the settlement of the Incident. Thus, the Japanese Army, fortified by enormous political powers, took every possible step to make the government and the people thoroughly recognize the necessity for strengthening the Axis ties.

The Japanese Navy for the most part had no objection to the strengthening of anti-Comintern ties, but warned that such a course might bring about conflict with Great Britain and America. From the standpoint of reinforcing its war preparations, however, the Navy welcomed the fact that the Army was gradually placing importance on the attitude of Great Britain and the United States, as well as on that of the Soviet Union. This was the situation at the time General Itagaki, War Minister in the first Konoye Cabinet, proposed the ratification of the Tripartite Pact. The Navy strongly objected to this pact on the grounds that it would antagonize the United States.

At the time of the Hiranuma Cabinet, the Tripartite Alliance was discussed at the Five Ministers' Conference. Again, the Navy strongly objected to it stating that Japan's automatic participation in the war in the event of an attack or, any one of the signatories by other countries would be contrary to the principles of the Imperial Armed Forces. Perceiving the particularly serious effect the Tripartite Alliance would have upon the United States, Admiral Yonai, Navy Minister, insisted on the issuance of a government statement to the effect that the Tripartite Alliance did not in any way represent a threat to the United States. To this the Japanese Army, as well as Germany, strongly objected. The ostensible reason for the downfall of the Hiranuma Cabinet was that the Cabinet was unable to cope with the complicated international situation following the conclusion of the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact, but it is an undeniable fact that the basic reason was the disagreement among the Cabinet members concerning the Tripartite Pact. Thus, the draft of the Tripartite Alliance Pact which was drawn up as a measure against the Soviet Union lost its significance and failed to materialize as such. However, the basic policy of strengthening the Axis ties in the following Abe and Yonai Cabinets continued still quite strongly. The Army, which had encountered much difficulty in its efforts to settle the China Incident, keenly felt the necessity to change the situation by adopting new measures and gradually succeeded in guiding public opinion toward a speedy conclusion of the Pact by mobilizing officials in the foreign and home ministries, who shared the same view. With the political situation became increasingly unstable from day to day, and neither the Abe Cabinet nor the Yonai Cabinet were able to carry out their strong domestic and foreign policies. Incompatible with the situation, these cabinets

were inevitably short lived. Especially it was obvious that the resignation of the Yonai Cabinet was due to the opposition the Army created by maneuvers of the elements demanding an immediate conclusion of the Pact.

The Second Phase

As mentioned earlier, as soon as the Second Konoye Cabinet was formed on 22 July 1940, "The Principles to Cope with the Changing World Situation" was speedily decided on at the Liaison Conference between the Imperial General Headquarters and the Government. The Axis ties between Japan, Germany and Italy were strengthened in accordance with the basic national policy decided on 27 July. However, the Navy strongly opposed the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance Pact fearing its effect on Japanese-American relations. With Germany's failure in her first large-scale air attack against Great Britain, the Army too began to show less desire to conclude the pact. On the other hand, the Japanese Government and people advocated the of the Axis ties and, on 1 August, Foreign Minister Matsuoka invited Otto, German Ambassador to Japan, to secretly sound out the intentions of Germany. However, no progress was made relative to this suggestion until the arrival in Japan of Stahmer, Special and Confidential Adviser to Ribbentrop, German Foreign Minister, sent by Ribbentrop on 23 August.

As soon as Minister Stahmer arrived in Japan on 7 September he entered into direct negotiations with Foreign Minister Matsuoka and the problem of strengthening the Axis ties made rapid progress. As a result of these talks, held on three occasions between Matsuoka and Stahmer, the treaty draft was outlined. After exchange of opinions between Japanese and German officials the draft was completed and a final decision was reached at a Liaison Conference, which was held in the presence of the Emperor on 19 September. It was marked by swift action with Foreign Minister Matsuoka playing a leading role.

As for the Navy, on 5 September, Admiral Koshiro Oikawa was appointed Navy Minister to replace ex-Minister Yoshida who had suffered a severe nervous breakdown caused by the tension and conflict created by the political situation. In the Naval High Command, Vice Adm. Nobutake Kondo as Vice Chief of the Naval General Staff was assistant to HIH Prince Fushimi, Chief of the Naval General Staff. At that time the problem of the Tripartite Alliance was being discussed in secrecy by top-level officials of the Foreign, Army and Navy Ministries. The reason, therefore, the Navy changed its stand and concurred in the opinion of Foreign Minister Matsuoka cannot be defined, due to the lack

of official documents.

However, the Navy at all times would seriously consider the recommendations of a responsible diplomatic specialist. It is interesting to note that when the question of the alliance first arose in 1939, Mr. Arita, the then Foreign Minister, opposed the alliance. As this is considered to be a most important and delicate point in the history of the Japanese Navy, statements and discussions of the responsible persons at that time are given below. The details of the Tripartite Alliance Pact which was concluded on 27 September are given in Appendix 4.

Estimates by the Japanese Government

As Prime Minister Konoye, Foreign Minister Matsuoka and War Minister Tojo, who played the most important roles at that time, have all passed away, it is necessary to depend upon the proceedings of the Investigation Committee meeting of the Privy Council which was

held on 26 September to probe this matter. The outline of the proceedings was as follows:

a. Gist of an address by Prime Minister Konoye:

At this time, with the China Incident not yet settled, the United States of America has recently taken a firm attitude toward Japan. The attitudes of the Chungking Government and governments of other nations hostile to Japan are influenced thereby. As a result, the international position of Japan has become increasingly difficult. To tide over this difficulty, it is necessary for Japan to strengthen her international situation by promoting cooperation between the nations sharing a common interest under existing conditions. Not only Germany and Italy but also Japan hopes to avoid conflict with the United States of America. Sharing this common interest, the Japanese Government, after a thorough study, has drawn up the treaty draft for strengthening the ties with Germany and Italy.

The original aim of this treaty is the maintaining of peace, but we must be prepared for any eventualities. Moreover, as this is an unprecedented matter of grave importance on which the destiny of our nation hinges, it is my sincere hope that a decision will be made after careful consideration.

b. Summary of the explanation by Foreign Minister Matsuoka:

This treaty springs from the aim of the German officials to avoid intervention by America in the war in Europe as reflected in their statement that participation by Japan in the European war is not essential, and also that Japan should avoid conflict with America. The Japanese policy of nonintervention in the European war may be affected by the treaty in the future, but it can be maintained for the present. The United States, immediately after establishing joint defense with Canada, has intervened in even trivial matters in the American-Japanese relationship in an almost unbearable manner.

The United States of America is preparing positions for the envelopment of Japan by actively and rapidly building strong military bases in Australia, New Zealand, India, Burma and at the key points of British possessions in the southern area, besides the military installations already established or being in the Pacific Ocean and the Southern areas. It has been feared that the United States, perceiving the depletion of the national strength of Japan caused by the war of attrition in China, might resort to threats. Thus there is apprehension that the improvement of diplomatic relations between the United

States of America and Japan in a courteous or friendly manner is entirely out of the question and that relations will become increasingly aggravated.

In this instant it is my belief that there is no alternative but to take a resolute attitude. If this be the case, the close cooperation with as many countries as possible to solidify our resolute attitude and the declaration and notification thereof within the country and abroad as soon as possible to effect resistance against America, will be an urgent diplomatic question. However, this Ministry, while keeping a watchful eye on the reaction to and effects of such measures, is determined to seize any opportunity that may contribute to the improvement of diplomatic relations with

America. With an extremely firm determination, however, our resolute attitude of resistance must be clearly demonstrated to the whole world.

Outline of debate:

The privy councilors asked searching and profound questions. Questioned in particular about the chances of operational success and prospects for procurement of materials, particularly gasoline and steel, if the worst came to the worst and Japan and America went to war, Tojo, Minister of War, Oikawa, Minister of the Navy and Hoshino, Chairman of the Planning Board, in turn answered as follows:

Tojo, Minister of War:

I will answer chiefly from the Army's standpoint. In the event of the worst situation, as only a portion of the Army's strength will be committed to the operations against the United States, there is no need for concern in regard to equipping this force. However, the operation against the United States cannot be planned without considering eventual warfare with Soviet Russia. Accordingly the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and Soviet Russia is a very important problem. If the adjustment is carried out successfully, the burden of military preparations may be considered to be lightened considerably. Nevertheless, Japan's Army preparations must not be neglected in view of Soviet Russia's character. It is hoped that the China Incident can be settled before this situation develops, by utilizing this treaty effectively.

Oikawa, Minister of Navy:

Since war preparations of our existing fleets have now been completed, America can never defeat us in an early decisive battle. In the event of a prolonged war, however, we must make full preparations to cope with the American Navy expansion plan. The Navy is now working on an airtight policy.

Hoshino, Chairman of the Planning Board:

As I explained yesterday (Hoshino had given a detailed explanation of the Materials Mobilization Plan at the Privy Council's regular meeting the day before) our country, determined to achieve self-sufficiency in various materials, has been making preparations for several years. As we now depend upon Great Britain and America for 1.9 billion yen out of a total of 2.1 billion yen for annual imports, an airtight policy must be formulated in consideration of the event wherein Article 3 of the treaty will be enforced to counteract the mounting economic pressure upon us. As regards iron, this year's production is estimated at 5,200,000 tons or at the worst, 4,000,000 tons. The quantity of iron presently used for armament, as well as for munitions, is 1,500,000 tons. Iron other than for the above, is being used to increase production as well as to meet private and government requirements. If civil and government requirements for iron are restricted in the event the import of scrap iron and iron material stops, there will be no difficulty in supplying the requirements for war preparations. As regards nonferrous metals, procurement will not be so simple as in the case of iron, but there is no need for concern, since every effort is being made to gather these metals from all parts of the world. The most important item is gasoline. At present we are depending upon America for a great quantity of gasoline, and aviation gasoline, in particular, is nearly all imported from there. Accordingly, efforts must be exerted to increase domestic production of gasoline and, at the same time, measures must be taken to obtain it from countries other than America. Recently a considerable quantity of aviation oil has been stocked. Nevertheless, in the event of a prolonged war with the United States, unlike the case of iron and other metals, the achievement of self-sufficiency in gasoline with the three countries of Japan, Manchuria and China is impossible. Therefore, it is necessary to secure as soon as possible gasoline rights from the Netherland East Indies, North Sakhalin and elsewhere. This point came into question also at the recent conference with German authorities. For your information, at present, peaceful negotiations on the acquisition of gasoline are under way in the Netherland East Indies.

Oikawa, Minister of Navy:

The Navy has been storing large quantities of gasoline in preparation for such a contingency.

Tojo Minister of War:

In regard to materials for the Army, preparations have been made to hold out for a long time. In the event of a prolonged war, oil for aircraft and mechanized forces must be taken into consideration.

Oikawa, Minister of Navy:

Since the manufacture of synthetic gasoline has just been initiated, emergency use thereof is not considered possible. Accordingly, there is no alternative but to obtain gasoline from the Netherlands East Indies or North Sakhalin by peaceful means.

If this proves successful procurement of sufficient gasoline is very hopeful. Consequently, the adjustment of diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia is considered important even when viewed from this angle. On the other hand, the Navy must consider the conservation of oil in anticipation of a prolonged war. In recent years, the Navy also has established a special high octane gasoline research department and has been undertaking the manufacture of this gasoline by the Navy's own process.

Other important questions and answers were:

Question by Privy Councilor: "We have our misgivings about the gasoline problem. As we still have doubts in our minds, we request your clarification to set us at ease."

To which the following answer was given repeatedly:

"Both the Army and Navy have a fairly large stock of gasoline and prospects for acquisition from abroad are hopeful."

Question: "In the event the conditions described in Article 3 of the treaty, namely in the event of commencement of hostilities between Japan and America, what military aid is Germany capable of rendering to Japan?"

Foreign Minister Matsuoka answered that this question was discussed in negotiations with the German authorities. German, had stated they would supply Japan with new weapons before the conditions prescribed in Article 3 of the treaty came into being. Moreover, in the event of the outbreak of war between Japan and America, German, would divert America's attention to the European theater.

Minister of War Tojo stated that supplies of excellent military equipment were being obtained from Germany by way of Siberia with the consent of Soviet Russia.

Minister of the Navy Oikawa then stated that his views were generally in accord with the Army in regard to assistance that could be expected from Germany.

Question: "If war between Japan and the United States is inevitable, diplomatic emphasis must be placed upon either Germany or the Anglo-American alliance. Nevertheless, it is realized that the conclusion of this treaty may hasten hostilities between Japan and the United States. We wish to know whether the Prime Minister is confident of being able to tide over the worst situation wherein shortages in military supplies and materials in general may arise."

Prime Minister Konoye answered: "The basic concept of this treaty has always been the avoidance of conflict between Japan and the United States. However, a humble attitude will only prompt the United States to become domineering, therefore, a demonstration of strength is necessary. If the worst comes to the worst, the Government, with unwavering determination, must take proper measures through diplomatic negotiations and domestic administration."

Question: "At this time when Japan still has not solved the China Incident, the

assumption of obligations to support Germany and Italy in the event of America's entry into the European war is indeed a heavy burden upon us. On the other hand, there is little possibility that hostilities will break out between Japan and the United States. Therefore, we wish to know if this treaty has become extremely unilateral."

Foreign Minister Matsuoka replied: "You may safely consider that there is a 50-50 chance that the United States will enter the war and that Japan and the United States will go to war. Therefore, I do not consider the treaty to be unilateral."

Question: "If the situation takes a turn for the worse as a result of the conclusion of this treaty, what aid is Germany capable rendering to Japan? Moreover, when the Japanese Navy renders aid to Germany and Italy, what aid is to be offered?"

Foreign Minister Matsuoka answered: "The question of what aid can be rendered must be studied thoroughly at the meeting of the joint military committee."

Question: "War between Japan and the United States is considered inevitable, whether or not this treaty is concluded. Therefore, must we not watch closely the expansion of the United States Navy and make our preparations accordingly?"

Minister of Navy Oikawa replied: "There is a good chance of victory if speedy decisive action is taken against the United States at this time. At present, various armament plans for the future are being formulated."

Most of the answers were noncommittal and no exhaustive discussions were held. At midnight on 26 September, the treaty was unanimously approved at the Privy Council meeting in the presence of the Emperor and on the 27th it was signed in Berlin.

Briefly, the situation was that no real scientific research or systematic preparations were undertaken to wage war against the United States; only a wishful estimate was made - an estimate that called for prevention of war with the United States by demonstrating a resolute attitude. In other words, our diplomacy was a complete bluff.

Views of the Japanese Navy

In answer to the Emperor, when the Navy consented under duress to the Tripartite Alliance, Admiral Prince Fushimi, then chief of the Navy General Staff stated, "War with the United States must be avoided. The chances of victory cannot be estimated." Kondo, Vice Chief of the Naval General Staff then stated, "A victory such as we achieved in the Russo-Japanese War would be difficult and, even if the war is won, we are certain to sustain heavy losses." The Japanese Navy was then without a operations plan against America, Great Britain, the Netherlands East Indies or China nor was it making any study of such a large-scale operation. It was evident, therefore, that the Japanese Navy was neither prepared for nor desirous of engaging in war with Great Britain and America.

The Japanese Navy, while desiring to strengthen the Axis relations and pursue peaceful southward expansion was, until the Yonai Cabinet collapsed, still strongly opposed to concluding the Tripartite Alliance against Great Britain and America. As there were no available records to show clearly why the Japanese Navy finally consented to the conclusion of the Pact, after having so strongly opposed it, in an endeavor to obtain more detailed information, the 2d Demobilization Bureau, in January 1946, requested former Minister of the Navy Oikawa and Admirals Yoshida, Toyoda, Kondo, Sawamoto and Inoue, as well as about 20 others concerned with the Navy Ministry and Naval General Staff, to assemble for discussions and conduct a series of round-table conferences at which opinions were exchanged freely. The data obtained as a result was generally as follows:

1. It was evident that the Army and Navy placed widely different interpretations on the "Principles to Cope with the Changing World Situation" from which the Tripartite Alliance originated. While the Army interpreted "strengthening the Political Unity between Japan, Germany and Italy" as a step toward a military alliance which had been advocated by the Army, the Navy's attitude was that it was to "strengthen the political unity short of an alliance." Furthermore, the Army desired to make the southward advance by force, even to the extent of waging war against Great Britain and the United, while the Navy desired to advance peacefully toward the southern area. Because of the Army's dominance of the Government, the national policy was developed with almost complete disregard for the Navy's attitude.

2. Hitherto, the Navy's opposition to the Tripartite Alliance lay primarily in the obligation to automatically enter into war. Without the condition of "automatic entry into the war," the Navy could find no reason for opposing the conclusion of the Alliance. According to the text of the Alliance, the signatories pledged "every political, economic and military assistance to each other," but since the phrase "entry into the war" did not appear in the text, it was interpreted to mean that there was no obligation to enter into war. Furthermore, Foreign Minister Matsuoka explained in this regard that the choice between peace and war was a prerogative of the Emperor and the matter would be decided independently by each nation and that complete understanding on this point had been reached with the German Special Envoy Stahmer. As a result, the Navy's opposition weakened and the matter was pushed through. Japan's principle aims at that time were to settle the China Incident, prevent isolation and to prevent the United States from entering the war while Japan pushed forward her policy of expansion in the southern area. At the same time, Germany was to carry out the war against England and France and to prevent the United States from entering the war.

The fact seemed to be overlooked that if Japan took an aggressive attitude toward the United States, the United States would be compelled to resort to equally aggressive measures, thus aggravating the relations between the two countries to a degree where compromise would be impossible.

Feeling between the Army and Navy at that time was particularly strong and the Army desired the Navy to state clearly if it believed that it could not wage a successful war against Great Britain and the United States. The Navy, however, felt there was a distinct difference between the statement that "we cannot wage war successfully" and their contention that it was "inadvisable to wage war."

From the beginning of the China Incident it had been the policy to give priority to the Army in regard to budget appropriations and allocation of materials. Personnel were also affected by this priority system. This affected the Navy's thinking, as it was felt that should the Navy's policy of expansion south be accepted, they would again be given top priority. At the same time, the Army contended that if the Navy opposed war with Great Britain and the United States, then they had no need for budget appropriations or materials.

Foreign Minister Matsuoka and Minister of War Tojo were both firm supporters of the Alliance, although there were indications that Prime Minister Konoye adopted a passive

attitude. In contrast to the prolonged war in China (settlement of which the people were led to believe was being obstructed by Great Britain and the United States) the victories of Germany and Italy in Europe naturally swayed the attitude of the Japanese people, who advocated a strong and firm attitude toward the United States. Feeling ran so high that the Navy found it impossible to withstand pressure to ratify the pact.

With the report of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact on 27 September, President Roosevelt held a Cabinet meeting to discuss the pact. Secretary of State Cordell Hull issued a statement declaring that the new treaty was merely the confirmation of a fait accompli and that the necessary measures had already been integrated into United States policy to cope with the situation. American newspapers reported that the treaty was a sign indicating that the German war against Great Britain was not progressing according to plan and was aimed to raise the morale of the German people. The papers further reported that the treaty aimed at preventing the United States from the European war by dividing its attention between the Atlantic and the Pacific. They stated it was also an attempt to curtail United States' aid to England and to repress United States' resistance to Japanese moves to control East Asia.

Immediately upon Japanese occupation of the northern part of French Indo-China, the United States State Department condemned the move as an aggressive and unlawful action supported by the Alliance, and, at the end of September, prohibited the export of scrap iron to Japan. Moreover, in early October, American residents in China were advised to evacuate.

The finding of these conferences was that the provoking of the large-scale war feared by the Navy could be traced to the signing of the Tripartite Alliance.

In February 1953, in an endeavor to clarify the Japanese Navy's position in regard to the Tripartite Pact and to show the tremendous pressure brought to bear by the Army which finally compelled the Navy to reluctantly agree to the Pact, Captain Toshikazu Ohmae tendered the following statement:

In early May 1939, the Japanese Army began to insist upon the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. General Itagaki, Army Minister, strongly supported by the Army-dominated Premier Hiranuma, emphasized the Army's attitude at a Cabinet meeting

on 9 May. As Admiral Yonai, Navy Minister, was equally emphatic in his opposition to the Pact, no decision could be reached at the meeting.

Some Army circles regarded the Navy as Public Enemy No 1 and rumors were spread that an Army unit would attempt to occupy the Navy Department in an endeavor to bring about an early Cabinet decision to ratify the Pact. After 9 May, Army gendarmes were ordered to watch Admiral Yonai and Vice Admiral Yamamoto (Vice Minister for the Navy and the strongest opposer of the Pact) under the guise of acting as an escort.

The Navy promptly established a plan to defend the Navy Department. One battalion of the Naval Land Combat Force was alerted at Yokosuka to be ready for immediate action and machine guns were installed in the Navy Department building. Guards stationed in the Department were armed with pistols and swords. These conditions prevailed until the latter part of August 1939, when Admirals Yonai and Yamamoto were forced to resign.

At this time I was a member of the Naval Affairs Bureau and was responsible for the defense of Navy installations through-out the Japanese Empire.

To further emphasize the circumstances which led the Japanese Navy to agree to the Pact, Captain Ohmae prepared a statement giving the main points of conferences, he held with Admiral Kondo, then Vice Chief of the Naval Staff and Admiral T. Takata, Chief of 1st Section of the Navy Affairs Bureau on 17 February 1953 (Appendix 5). A written statement to show the pressure brought to bear on the Navy at that time was promised by Admiral Kondo, but he passed away suddenly 20 February 1953.

Appendix No 1

Outline of the Readjustment of Relations between Japan and China

(Decided by a Cabinet meeting on 8 January 1940)

1. The governments of Japan and China will readjust diplomatic relations in conformity with "The Fundamental Principles for the Readjustment of Relations between Japan and China" explained in a separate paragraph.
2. Matters decided on by the existing local governments before the resumption of new diplomatic relations will be accepted as they are for the time being and will be adjusted in conformity with the principles of Clause 1 as the situation permits.
3. During the course of the Incident, special conditions will exist. These conditions will be adjusted in conformity with the principles of Clause 1 as the situation changes or the Incident is settled.

The Fundamental Principles for the Readjustment of Relations Between Japan and China

Japan, Manchukuo and China will unite as good neighbors in mutual support of each other with the ultimate goal of establishing a new order in East Asia and will seek, as their common objective, the creation of an axis for peace in the Orient. The fundamental principles to be realized are:

1. Principles for cooperation between Japan, Manchukuo and China based on reciprocity, a good neighbor policy, and joint anti-Comintern and economic coalition principles, will be established.
2. Zones in which close cooperation between Japan and China for national defense and economic reasons will be practiced, will be established in North China and Mongolia. In addition, in Mongolia special military and administrative positions for anti-Comintern defense will be established.
3. In the area along the lower reaches of the Yangtze River, close economic cooperation will be effected between Japan and China.
4. Close military cooperation in the specially designated islands off the coast of South China (Hainan Island and Quemoy Island off Amoy) will be effected.
5. In order to achieve this an agreement will be concluded in with "The Specific Principles for the Readjustment of Relations between Japan and China."

The Specific Principles for the Readjustment of Relations between Japan and China

I. Good Neighbor Policy

Japan, Manchukuo and China will respect each other's inherent characteristics, cooperate closely to secure peace in the Orient, conceive measures for mutual aid and amity in various field in order to fulfill a good neighbor policy.

a. China will recognize Manchukuo. Japan will respect the integrity of the territories and the administration and sovereignty of China. Japan, Manchukuo and China will resume

new friendly relations.

b. Japan, Manchukuo, and China will remove any measures or cause which might destroy friendship in the various fields of politics, diplomacy, education, propaganda and trade, and will prohibit their introduction in the future.

c. Japan, Manchukuo and China will conduct diplomatic relations based on mutual cooperation.

d. Japan, Manchukuo and China will cooperate in the creation, blending and development of culture.

e. As friendly relations between Japan, Manchukuo and China are restored, Japan will gradually consider the return of concessions and extraterritorial rights.

II. Joint Anti-Comintern Defense Manchukuo and China will enter into a joint anti-Comintern defense pact.

a. Japan, Manchukuo and China will eradicate communistic elements and organizations in their territories, and will cooperate with each other relative to information and propaganda concerning anti-Comintern defense.

b. Japan and China will jointly carry out anti-Comintern defense. To this end, Japan will station troops in areas deemed necessary.

c. Japan and China will cooperate with each other in the preservation of public order.

d. China will, under separate agreement, comply with the requests of Japan, made out of

military necessity, on those matters pertinent to garrison areas and on railways, aviation, communications, principal ports and waterways connected therewith. In peacetime, however, Japan will respect the administrative authority and control of China.

(Note: Regarding b, c and d, special precaution in handling these matters is necessary since they are military top secret matters and have a bearing upon China's internal maneuverings.)

III. Economic cooperation

To realize the benefits of mutual aid and anti-Comintern defense, Japan, Manchukuo and China will in essence be equal and reciprocal with a view to offset merits and demerits and minister to each other's wants with respect to industry and economy.

a. In regard to specific resources in North China and Mongolia, especially ore deposits necessary to national defense, Japan and China will cooperate in their exploitation to effect joint anti-Comintern defense and economic cooperation, and in regard to their utilization, special concessions will be granted to Japan upon due consideration of the requests of China.

In other areas, also, necessary concessions will be granted to Japan with respect to exploitation and utilization of specific resources necessary to national defense. In utilizing the resources, the requests of China will be given due consideration.

b. As for industries in general, Japan will render necessary aid to China in accordance with the agreement concluded with the latter.

c. In regard to finance, banking (particularly the establishment of the new Central Bank and circulation of new currency) and the establishment of the economic policy of China, Japan will render the necessary aid to China in accordance with the agreement concluded with the latter.

d. Promotion of commerce and trade between Japan, Manchukuo and China will be developed by respecting tariff autonomy and mutual interest and by the adoption of sound tariff and customs procedures. At the same time, the supply and demand of materials between Japan, Manchukuo and China, especially between North China and Central China, will be facilitated and rationalized insofar as the self-sustenance of each country is maintained.

e. For the development of transportation, communications, meteorology and survey in China, Japan will render the necessary aid to and cooperate with China in accordance with the agreement concluded with the latter.

f. For the construction of a new Shanghai, Municipality Japan will render the necessary aid and cooperation based on the agreement with China.

IV. Others

a. China will, under separate agreement, employ Japanese advisers and staff in charge of matters relative to cooperation between Japan and China.

b. Japan will cooperate in the relief of Chinese destitutes arising out of the Incident.

c. China will indemnify the loss of rights and interests sustained by the Japanese people in China since the outbreak of the Incident.

Appendix No 2

General Principles to Cope with the Changing World Situation

(Decided at the Liaison Conference between Imperial General Headquarters and the Government on 27 July 1940)

Policy

The Japanese Empire will strive for the immediate settlement of the China Incident by improving internal and external conditions in keeping with changes in the world situation and, at the same time, will solve the southern area problem by taking advantage of opportunities.

Changes in policies, with emphasis placed on measures for the southern area, will be decided in consideration of various conditions, internal and external.

Various preparations for the matters described in the above items will be undertaken as soon as possible.

Procedure

Article 1.

In regard to the settlement of the China Incident, the combined strength of political and operational strategies will be concentrated thereon and immediate subjugation of the Chungking Regime by every possible means, to include the prevention of third power aid to Chiang Kai-shek, will be carried out. Efforts will be made to accelerate plans for the southern advance by utilizing the changes in the situation advantageously.

Article 2.

In regard to external measures to hasten the settlement of the China Incident and, at the same time, solve the problem of the southern advance, the following steps will be taken:

1. Emphasis will be placed on measures dealing with relations to Germany, Italy, and Soviet Russia. In particular, political unity with Germany and Italy will be strengthened immediately in an attempt to effect readjustment of diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia.
2. A firm attitude toward the United States will be maintained and the inevitable and natural deterioration of relations with the United States, following the execution of the measures mentioned in paragraph 1, will be accepted. However, the reactions of the United States will be kept under strict surveillance and wherever possible, measures will be taken to avoid increased friction arising from Japanese actions.
3. The following steps will be taken toward French Indo-China and Hongkong:
 - a. Request will be made to French Indo-China (including Kwangchow) for complete discontinuation of aid to Chiang Kai-shek. At the same time, French Indo-China will be requested to furnish supplies to our army, to permit the use of airfields and to allow passage of Japanese troops through the country. Moreover, efforts will be exerted to obtain the resources necessary for the Japanese Empire. Armed strength will be employed, if necessary, depending upon the situation.
 - b. Various maneuverings will be carried out so as to eliminate immediately the antagonistic attitude of Hongkong. Burma will be completely blockaded to prevent aid reaching Chiang Kai-shek.

c. Efforts will be made to eliminate the hostile attitude of settlements and concessions and to evacuate troops of belligerent countries from these areas. At the same time, China will be assisted in obtaining the gradual return of settlements and concessions.

d. In carrying out the measures described in the preceding two paragraphs, armed strength will be employed, where necessary, in accordance with Article 3.

4. Efforts will be made to obtain important resources from the Netherlands East Indies for the present by diplomatic measures.

5. In view of the importance to our national defense of French and former German islands in the South Pacific, steps will be taken so that possession thereof can be achieved, if possible, by diplomatic measures.

6. Measures will be taken so as to gain, by amicable means, the cooperation of other countries in the southern area.

Article 3.

Armed strength will be employed against the southern area in accordance with the following:

1. As the settlement of the China Incident is generally completed, armed strength will be used where necessary, insofar as various internal and external conditions permit, to solve the problem of the southward advance.

2. In the event the China Incident remains unsolved, necessary measures, short of starting hostilities against a third power, will be taken. In this case armed strength may be employed to assist in the advance southward provided that various internal and external conditions improve.

3. The time, extent and method of utilizing the armed strength described in the preceding two paragraphs will be decided, depending upon the situation.

4. In employing armed strength, efforts will be made to limit the war adversary to Great Britain insofar as possible. However, thorough preparations for the commencement of hostilities against the United States will be made as it may prove impossible to avoid war with that country.

Article 4

In regard to the internal control of the nation, while creating and arranging various conditions necessary to carry out the aforementioned measures, work on the defense of Japan, based on the new world situation will be accelerated. For this purpose, efforts will be made to realize especially the following:

- a. Execution of a powerful administration.
 - b. Comprehensive enforcement of the National General Mobilization Law.
 - c. Establishment of a wartime economic structure.
 - d. Stockpiling of war material and increasing of shipping capacity.
5. Adjustment of production increase and armament expansion.
6. Encouragement of the national spirit and unification of public opinion at home.
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Appendix No 3

Imperial General Headquarters Comments on "The Principles to Cope with the Changing World Situation"

Para. 1 of the Policy

This item described the relationship between the settlement of the China Incident in keeping with changes in the world situation and the advance to the south. Measures to realize the southern advance included diplomatic negotiations as well as employment of armed strength. External and internal conditions will be improved by strengthening political unity, mainly with Germany and Italy, as well as adjusting diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia and strengthening the domestic situation.

Para. 2 of the Policy

This should be included in paragraph 1 as it refers to matters concerning measures to be taken for the southern advance before the settlement of the China Incident.

Moreover, the "changes in the policy with emphasis placed on measures for the southern areas" means changing the policy to one stressing measures for the southern advance from the present policy placing emphasis on the China incident.

Para. 3 of the Policy

Details of the various preparations mentioned in this paragraph refer mainly to arranging and accelerating war preparations and strengthening the ties with foreign countries,

particularly with Germany, Italy and Soviet Russia. The maximum acceleration of these preparations is hoped for. Moreover, when the future course of the European War is estimated, the necessity to set the target date for completion of these major preparations by the end of August is keenly felt. However, the reason that the time for completion of the preparations is not clearly indicated is that the time varies according to the nature of the preparations.

Article 1 of the Procedure

This article describes the general principles for the settlement of the China Incident and measures for the southern advance in line with the policy.

Article 2 of the Procedure

Item 1

Details concerning the strengthening of political unity with Germany and Italy will be shown in the measures now under separate study. The opinion as regards adjustment of diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia is that the previous concept of negotiations with that country must be completely abandoned and that bold measures to stabilize the northern area by a nonaggression pact are necessary.

Item 3-a

Indo-China's acquiescence to supply our armed forces, to allow passage of our troops and to offer airfields for our use will be sought by diplomatic measures but, in case of refusal, armed strength will be employed to carry out operations against China. Moreover, in the event of persistent continuation of aid to Chiang Kai-shek by French Indo-China in violation of her pledge or other treacherous acts, armed strength will be employed. However, it goes without saying that the employment of armed strength will be in accordance with Imperial Order.

Furthermore, the employment of armed strength against Hongkong would be based upon a decision to wage war against Great Britain. Consequently, the employment of armed strength against Hongkong must be in accordance with the "Employment of Armed Strength" as described in Article 3.

Item 5

The "former German islands in the Pacific Ocean" denote generally the Inner South Seas islands now under a mandate to the Japanese Empire and Northeast New Guinea, as well as the Bismarck Archipelago, the "French islands" mean New Caledonia and Tahiti. The strategic value in our national defense of these islands, particularly the former German islands, is well recognized. Diplomatic measures refer mainly to political agreements between Japan and Germany.

Item 6

The "other countries in the southern area" denote Thailand and the Portuguese territories. The necessity to accelerate maneuverings so as to obtain immediately, by political measures, especially Thailand's collaboration with our policy for the southern advance, is recognized.

Article 3 of the Procedure

An immediate realization of the southern advance is hoped for, but the relationship between the employment of armed strength therefore and the settlement of the China Incident is of particular importance and a separate solution of the two is impossible under prevailing conditions. Consequently, this article especially clarifies that relationship. Moreover, in employing armed strength, it is necessary to consider various matters such as internal and external conditions, especially the progress of settlement of the China Incident; the European situation, particularly the coalition with Germany, Italy and Soviet Russia; the United States attitude towards Japan and our war preparations.

Since the employment of armed strength against Great Britain may lead to the opening of hostilities against the United States, it is necessary to complete preparations for war the United States as described herein.

Article 4 of the Procedure

This article describes the primary requisites for carrying out the measures mentioned in each preceding article. The extremely urgent necessity to accelerate the execution thereof is keenly felt. Moreover, detailed concrete measures concerning each important item of this article will be studied later.

Appendix No 4

Tripartite Alliance Pact

After consultation with the Privy Councilors We hereby sanction the Tripartite Alliance Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy signed by the Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary with the representatives of the countries concerned in Berlin on 27 September 1940 and thereby order the promulgation of the same.

(The Imperial signature and seal) 19 October 1940 Countersigned by: Konoye Ayamaro (P)
Treaty No 9

Tripartite Alliance Pact

In view of the fact that the essence of eternal peace is to enable all the nations of the world to live in contentment and peace and that it is a fundamental principle to establish and maintain the order necessary for the realization of coexistence and mutual prosperity of the peoples of Greater East Asia and Europe, the Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy have resolved to cooperate with each other in efforts founded upon this principle, Moreover, the governments of these countries are prepared to render full cooperation, exerting their efforts for the same cause throughout the world, and desire to realize the ultimate objective of establishing world peace. The Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy, therefore, have agreed as follows:

Article 1.

Japan shall acknowledge and respect the leadership of Germany and Italy in establishing the new order in Europe.

Article 2.

Germany and Italy shall acknowledge and respect the leadership of Japan in establishing the new order in Greater East Asia.

Article 3.

Japan, Germany and Italy shall pledge themselves to mutual cooperation in all efforts founded upon the above principles. Moreover, these countries shall pledge themselves to take very political, economic and military measure to assist each other when any one of the signatories is attacked by a country not participating in the European War or in the China Incident.

Article 4.

A joint special committee composed of members to be appointed by the Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy shall convene without delay for the enforcement of this Treaty.

Article 5.

Japan, Germany and Italy shall confirm the fact that the above articles will not in any way affect the political relationship between the three signatories and the Soviet Union.

Article 6.

This Treaty shall come into force immediately upon signing and shall cease to have effect ten years from the day of its enforcement. The signatories shall discuss the renewal of the Treaty upon a request submitted by any one of the signatories at an appropriate time

before the expiration of the Treaty.

In attestation to the above, the following persons, having been duly entrusted by their respective governments, signed and sealed this Treaty. Three copies of this agreement were prepared in Berlin on 27 September 1940 - 27 September of the 18th year of the Fascist Calendar, and 27 September the 15th year of Showa.

Kurusu Saburo Joachim Von Ribbentrop Ciano

Appendix No 5

Circumstances which led the Japanese Navy to agree to the Tripartite Pact

Notes on Conference with Admiral T. Takata, former Chief of 1st Section. Navy Affairs Bureau, 17 February 1953

On 16 July 1940 the Yonai Cabinet collapsed, due to plotting by the Army, and the Second Konoye Cabinet was formed. This Cabinet adopted "The Principles to Cope with the Changing World Situation" drawn up by Imperial General Headquarters (Army Section), as the basis for its national policy and began to strengthen the Axis ties between Japan, Germany and Italy in accordance with this policy. Although Admiral Zengo Yoshida, Minister of the Navy at that time, agreed to the policy, he had no idea that it would eventually lead to an alliance with Germany and Italy.

A conference was held between Foreign Minister Matsuoka and German Ambassador to Japan Ott, which showed a definite movement toward the formation of an alliance. It was not until the arrival in Japan of Special Envoy Stahmer, however, that any real progress was made in this direction. Anxiety and tension caused by the political situation finally drove Minister of the Navy Yoshida to a severe nervous breakdown and he had to be hospitalized. In consequence, Admiral Oikawa was appointed Minister of the Navy on 5 September.

The brilliant German victories on the European battlefields swayed public opinion within Japan and gave further support to the formation of an alliance. Even within the Navy office itself there were people who supported this view. They believed that the Navy should not oppose the Tripartite Alliance, provided Japan was not obliged to automatically enter war on the side of Germany, even should the United States intervene in the European war.

The leading men in the Ministry of Navy and the Naval General Staff at that time were: Minister of Navy Oikawa, Vice Minister Teijiro Toyoda, Chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs Abe, Chief of the Naval General Staff Prince Fushimi, Deputy Chief of the Naval General Staff Kondo, and Chief of the Operational Bureau of the Naval Staff Ugaki. Because of their desire to maintain good relations with the United States, knowing that the Navy was not fully prepared for war, these men were not supporters of the Alliance. Ugaki and Abe, in particular, strongly opposed the alliance, Ugaki being most vigorous in his opposition. However, after several meetings for joint study of the pact held by the leaders of the Ministry of the Navy and the Naval General Staff during mid-September, Minister of the Navy Oikawa expressed the opinion that recognition of the alliance was inevitable and even Ugaki was finally compelled to agree.

Notes on Conference with Admiral Kondo, former Deputy
Chief of the Naval Staff 17 February 1953

The following were the reasons given for the Navy finally agreeing to the alliance:

1. Foreign Minister Matsuoka at the time strongly contended that the strengthening of the ties between Japan; Germany and Italy through the conclusion of a tripartite alliance would force the United States to act more prudently in carrying out her plans against Japan, and, in the long run, was the best method to prevent war with the United States. the Navy did not necessarily agree with this contention in every respect, but the Navy was in a position where she had to respect the opinion of a responsible diplomatic specialist. (Mr. Arita, who was Foreign Minister in 1939 when the question of the alliance first arose, had strongly opposed it.)
2. At the time, because of the German Army's successes in Europe, popular opinion desired the alliance, and there was a general tendency to disregard the Navy's desire to retain good relations with the United States and avoid war. It was felt that if the Navy adhered to its policy of opposition to the Alliance, that not only would it prove detrimental to the preparations for war in time of a national emergency but might, in an extreme case, even result in serious conflict between the Army and the Navy. The Navy felt that the preparations for the defense of Japan might be seriously threatened if she maintained her attitude of opposition.

3. Had the Navy continued to block the alliance, it may have helped maintain friendly relations with the United States, but this was doubtful. Therefore, as it was unwise to continue to rely on materials from the United States alone for the completion of the defense, in order to maintain and increase the national strength, it was absolutely necessary to obtain resources from the Southern areas through as friendly means as possible. Under the circumstances, it was felt that the completion of the alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy would greatly strengthen Japan's bargaining potential with the Southern area.

Apart from the above reasons, it is a fact that the Navy leaders of the time lacked the courage to maintain firmly their opposition to the alliance. This is borne out by the fact that the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet Yamamoto upon hearing of the approval of the alliance by the leaders of the Naval General Staff and the Ministry of Navy, said: "their line of thinking is far too political."
